G.R. No. 176858 | Heirs of Padilla v.
Magdua In an Order dated 20 February 2006, the RTC dismissed
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 176858. September 15, 2010.]
HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA, represented by
CLAUDIO PADILLA, petitioners, vs.
DOMINADOR MAGDUA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
assailing th e Orders dated 8 September 2006 and 13
February 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tacloban City, Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 2001-10-
161.
The Facts
Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners,
owned a piece of land located in San Roque, Tanauan,
Leyte. After Juanita's death on 23 March 1989,
petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita, sought to have the
land partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their eldest
brother Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo) regarding their plans
for the partition of the land. In a letter dated 5 June 1998
written by Ricardo addressed to them, petitioners were
surprised to find out that Ricardo had declared the land
for himself, prejudicing their rights as co-heirs. It was
then discovered that Juanita had allegedly executed a
notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property
(Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making
him the sole owner of the land. The records do not show
that the land was registered under the Torrens system.
On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action with the
RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 34, for recovery of
ownership, possession, partition and damages.
Petitioners sought to declare void the sale of the land by
Ricardo's daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia
Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua
(Dominador). The sale was made during the lifetime of
Ricardo.
Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through
misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name
without the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs.
Petitioners also stated that prior to 1966, Ricardo had a
house constructed on the land. However, when Ricardo
and his wife Zosima separated, Ricardo left for
Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased to
third parties. ADCEcI
Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita
in the Affidavit is highly questionable because on 15
May 1978 Juanita executed a written instrument stating
that she would be leaving behind to her children the land
which she had inherited from her parents.
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction since the assessed value of the land
was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
of Tanauan, Leyte.
the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that
the assessed value of the land in the amount of P590.00
was less than the amount cognizable by the RTC to
acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners argued that the action was not merely for
recovery of ownership and possession, partition and
damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since
actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary
estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the
ground of prescription.
In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC
reconsidered its previous stand and took cognizance of
the case. Nonetheless, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration and dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court. The RTC ruled that the case was filed only in
2001 or more than 30 years since the Affidavit was
executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the
right of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet
when one of the co-heirs appropriates the property as his
own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription
can set in. The RTC added that since prescription had
set in to question the transfer of the land under the
Affidavit, it would seem logical that no action could also
be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardo's
daughters in favor of Dominador. The dispositive
portion of the order states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the
Court is reconsidered in so far as the pronouncement of
the Court that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action. The dismissal of the action, however, is
maintained not by reason of lack of jurisdiction but by
reason of prescription.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration
which the RTC denied in an Order dated 13 February
2007 since petitioners raised no new issue.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The main issue is whether the present action is already
barred by prescription.
The Court's Ruling
Petitioners submit that the RTC erred in dismissing the
complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners
insist that the Affidavit executed in 1966 does not
conform with the requirement of sufficient repudiation
of co-ownership by Ricardo against his co-heirs in
accordance with Article 494 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners assert that the Affidavit became part of
public records only because it was kept by the
Provincial Assessor's office for real property tax
declaration purposes. However, such cannot be
contemplated by law as a record or registration affecting
real properties. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit is not
an act of appropriation sufficient to be deemed as
constructive notice to an adverse claim of ownership
absent a clear showing that petitioners, as co-heirs, were
notified or had knowledge of the Affidavit issued by
their mother in Ricardo's favor. ICESTA
Respondent Dominador, on the other hand, maintains
that Juanita, during her lifetime, never renounced her
signature on the Affidavit or interposed objections to
Ricardo's possession of the land, which was open,
absolute and in the concept of an owner. Dominador
contends that the alleged written instrument dated 15
May 1978 executed by Juanita years before she died was
only made known lately and conveys the possibility of
being fabricated. Dominador adds that the alleged
'highly questionable signature' of Juanita on the
Affidavit was only made an issue after 35 years from the
date of the transfer in 1966 until the filing of the case in
2001. As a buyer in good faith, Dominador invokes the
defense of acquisitive prescription against petitioners.
At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The factual findings of the lower courts
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal except under any of the following circumstances:
(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises
or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence
on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding
of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the
Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties.
We find that the conclusion of the RTC in dismissing
the case on the ground of prescription based solely on
the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo,
the alleged seller of the property from whom Dominador
asserts his ownership, is speculative. Thus, a review of
the case is necessary.
Here, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by
Dominador based on Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court which states:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or
that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the case.
(Emphasis supplied)
The RTC explained that prescription had already set in
since the Affidavit was executed on 31 May 1966 and
petitioners filed the present case only on 26 October
2001, a lapse of more than 30 years. No action could be
taken against the deed of sale made in favor of
Dominador without assailing the Affidavit, and the
action to question the Affidavit had already prescribed.
After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC
incorrectly relied on the Affidavit alone in order to
dismiss the case without considering petitioners'
evidence. The facts show that the land was sold to
Dominador by Ricardo's daughters, namely Josephine
Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, during the lifetime of
Ricardo. However, the alleged deed of sale was not
presented as evidence and neither was it shown that
Ricardo's daughters had any authority from Ricardo to
dispose of the land. No cogent evidence was ever
presented that Ricardo gave his consent to, acquiesced
in, or ratified the sale made by his daughters to
Dominador. In its 8 September 2006 Order, the RTC
hastily concluded that Ricardo's daughters had legal
personality to sell the property: ScaEIT
On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that
Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas had no legal
personality or right to [sell] the subject property is of no
moment in this case. It should be Ricardo Bahia who has
a cause of action against [his] daughters and not the
herein plaintiffs. After all, Ricardo Bahia might have
already consented to or ratified the alleged deed of sale.
Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not
present any proof to show that Ricardo's possession of
the land had been open, continuous and exclusive for
more than 30 years in order to establish extraordinary
acquisitive prescription. Dominador merely assumed
that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for 30
years based on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC. The
petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading filed
with the RTC for recovery of ownership, possession,
partition and damages, alleged that Ricardo left the land
after he separated from his wife sometime after 1966
and moved to another place. The records do not
mention, however, whether Ricardo had any intention to
go back to the land or whether Ricardo's family ever
lived there.
Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the
land declared in his name for taxation purposes from
1966 after the Affidavit was executed until 2001 when
the case was filed. Although a tax declaration does not
prove ownership, it is evidence of claim to possession
of the land.
Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-
owners of the land. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot
acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other
co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the
co-ownership, as expressed in Article 494 of the Civil
Code which states:
Art. 494. . . . No prescription shall run in favor of a co-
owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee,
in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the
following requisites must concur: (1) that he has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to
an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2)
that such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing.
In the present case, all three requisites have been met.
After Juanita's death in 1989, petitioners sought for the
partition of their mother's land. The heirs, including
Ricardo, were notified about the plan. Ricardo, through
a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his co-
heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for himself.
Accordingly, Ricardo's interest in the land had now
become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after
repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In
Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that
title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it
must be clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims
of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership, before the
prescriptive period begins to run. AaSTIH
However, in the present case, the prescriptive period
began to run only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners
received notice of Ricardo's repudiation of their claims
to the land. Since petitioners filed an action for recovery
of ownership and possession, partition and damages
with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three
years had lapsed. This three-year period falls short of
the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription period
required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal
ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot
invoke acquisitive prescription.
Further, Dominador's argument that prescription began
to commence in 1966, after the Affidavit was executed,
is erroneous. Dominador merely relied on the Affidavit
submitted to the RTC that Ricardo had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years.
Dominador did not submit any other corroborative
evidence to establish Ricardo's alleged possession since
1966. In Heirs of Maningding v. Court of Appeals, we
held that the evidence relative to the possession, as a
fact, upon which the alleged prescription is based, must
be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish
the prescription. Here, Dominador failed to present any
other competent evidence to prove the alleged
extraordinary acquisitive prescription of Ricardo over
the land. Since the property is an unregistered land,
Dominador bought the land at his own risk, being aware
as buyer that no title had been issued over the land. As
a consequence, Dominador is not afforded protection
unless he can manifestly prove his legal entitlement to
his claim.
With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC,
we hold that the RTC did not err in taking cognizance
of the case.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),
amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; . . . cDEICH
On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over all
civil actions which involve title to or possession of real
property, or any interest, outside Metro Manila where
the assessed value does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). The provision states:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of determine who among the parties are legally entitled to
land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of the land.
such property shall be determined by the assessed value WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We
of the adjacent lots." REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Orders dated 8
In the present case, the records show that the assessed September 2006 and 13 February 2007 of the Regional
value of the land was P590.00 according to the Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 34 in Civil Case
Declaration of Property as of 23 March 2000 filed with No. 2001-10-161.
the RTC. Based on the value alone, being way below SO ORDERED.
P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the case. Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin and Abad, JJ., concur.
However, petitioners argued that the action was not
merely for recovery of ownership and possession,
partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of
sale. Since annulment of contracts are actions incapable
of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction over
the case.
Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,
we held that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation
this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it
is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts). aCTHEA
When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they
sought to recover ownership and possession of the land
by questioning (1) the due execution and authenticity of
the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo
which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of the land
to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal
heirs and entitled to the land, and (2) the validity of the
deed of sale executed between Ricardo's daughters and
Dominador. Since the principal action sought here is
something other than the recovery of a sum of money,
the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus
cognizable by the RTC. Well-entrenched is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred
by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted.
In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal
evidence relied upon by the RTC to dismiss the case on
the ground of prescription, insufficiently established
Dominador's rightful claim of ownership to the land.
Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits to
G.R. No. 171914 | Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 171914. July 23, 2014.]
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF
JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z.
LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,
respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under
the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence,
any settlement of property between the parties of the
first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an
incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable
against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan
Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated
on November 11, 2005, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered
on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 138, in Makati City. The CA thereby denied her
right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in
a condominium unit, and in the law books of the
husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as
follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name
partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna,
Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that
time when he was living with his first wife, herein
intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil
ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of
Paraaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral
in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In
ATTY. LUNA's marriage to EUGENIA, they begot
seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal,
Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana
Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina
Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost
two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and
EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each
other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of
property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT"
dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live
separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of property. CAHaST
On January 12, 1977, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce
decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil
and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription
of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted
another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to
the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife
until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law
firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing
partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY.
LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development
Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma
Condominium Project (condominium unit) at Gamboa
St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for
P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36
months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium
unit was to be used as law office of LUPSICON. After
full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and
CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which
was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna
(46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN,
married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
. . ."
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100
share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the
condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko,
for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February
7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna
(38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married
to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) . . ."
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but
the same was still registered in common under CCT No.
21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY.
LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100
share.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed
another law firm with Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz and
used a portion of the office condominium unit as their
office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY.
JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the
condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over
by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the first
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100
portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father
to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own
law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office
furniture and equipment became the subject of the
complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of
ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject
properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
through their joint efforts that since they had no
children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent
of 3/4 pro-indiviso share consisting of her 1/2 share in
the said properties plus her 1/2 share in the net estate of
ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the
latter's last will and testament; and that the heirs of
ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded
SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The
complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the
owner of the 1/2 portion of the subject properties; that
the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals
on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of
SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed
to preserve and administer the subject properties; and
that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay
attorney's fees and costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.
EIaDHS
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after
trial upon the aforementioned facts, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium
unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting
of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100)
SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired
by Juan Luces Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil
status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books
Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit and defendants are
ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as
appropriate arrangements have been made for transport
and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors
to the RTC namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED
THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN
LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE
MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY
OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE
UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA
AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY
DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE
UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF
THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT
IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT
APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT; cAaDHT
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY
CODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED
BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION
FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO
PAY FILING FEE.
In contrast, the respondents attributed the following
errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE
LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT
WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF'S MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM
OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS
FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA'S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE
RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED
AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed
modified decision, holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of
ATTY. LUNA until the latter's death on July 12, 1997.
The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA
in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior
marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our
jurisdiction. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium
unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting
of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic)
SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-
appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Lung (first marriage), having been acquired
from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces
Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and
valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as
owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds
of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces
Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna"; SHaATC
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna
and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) are hereby
declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On March 13, 2006, the CA denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for
review on certiorari that:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was
unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was
not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
recognizing the Dominican Republic court's approval of
the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner Failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual
contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subject
condominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law books.
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the
contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro
indiviso share in the condominium unit; and to the law
books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the
Court to ascertain the law that should determine, firstly,
whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first
marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage
entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner
entitled the latter to any rights in property.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1.
Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna. and Eugenia,
both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the
solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued
to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although
living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both
Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until
the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their
marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing
abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have been the void and the
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration
of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the
marriage. DHIcET
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first
marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with
the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if
voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997.
This finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution, and regards it as a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the
marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It
affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must
be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or
upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long
as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos
exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2.
The Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation
and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in
connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI
of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable
against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains governed
their property relations. This is because the Spanish
Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their
marriage, did not specify the property regime of the
spouses in the event that they had not entered into any
marriage settlement before or at the time of the
marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so
provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community
of property, or upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a conjugal
partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of
gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from
their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either
spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until
terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code,viz.:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains
terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under
Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia did not per se dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still required
under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as
follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in
the marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
cCaSHA
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the
separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the
spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been
declared absent, or when legal separation has been
granted.
xxx xxx xxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the
creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition
for judicial approval or the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may
appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, the court shall take such measures as may
protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition
stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI
of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient
in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of
gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no
question that the approval took place only as an incident
of the action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their
execution of the Agreement were identical to the
grounds raised in the action for divorce. With the
divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under
Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public
policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement
was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership
of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the
lifetime of their marriage.
3.
Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being
bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second
marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's subsequent
marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for
being bigamous, on the ground that the marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved
by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted
until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the
Civil Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting
a second or subsequent marriage before the first
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A
bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.
cDTCIA
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being
bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership,
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership
carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To
establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative
for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere
allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and
competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her
favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals:
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-
ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to
the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis
because they failed to substantiate their allegation that
they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed
properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that the fact that the controverted property was
titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership
absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition
of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon
the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the party's own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent's
defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present
evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the
defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff
must still prove the allegations in the complaint.
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is
convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant
such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence.
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved
her actual contributions in the purchase of the
condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least
P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of
P159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had
obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino
totaling P146,825.30; and that such aggregate
contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to almost
the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the
unit's purchase price of P1,449,056.00.
The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were
paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which
Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; that
she had the financial capacity to make the contributions
and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the
properties on his own due to the meagerness of the
income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the
co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the
petitioner's assertions on her actual contributions
through the following findings and conclusions,
namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that her own independent funds were used to
buy the law office condominium and the law books
subject matter in contention in this case proof that
was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and
Article 148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases
where properties were acquired by a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife but not married, or
under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under
Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-
ownership would govern. But this was not readily
applicable to many situations and thus it created a void
at first because it applied only if the parties were not in
any way incapacitated or were without impediment to
marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal
partnership or absolute community between the man
and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption
of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the
property acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be
equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of
actual contribution was required. The same rule and
presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and
evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly
married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
accrued to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party
who acted in bad faith was not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The
rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in
bad faith. SDTIHA
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal
partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby
marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce
decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was
held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs.
Escao, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15
SCRA 355, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
As to the 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. LUNA in
the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that
she made an actual contribution to purchase the said
property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks
that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition
of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit.
This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial
court, viz.:
". . . The first check, Exhibit "M" for P55,000.00
payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on
January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months
before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was
signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the
amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to
Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, this was in
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check
which was for P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was
dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of
Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for
P4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the
foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff
to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject
condominium unit. The connection was simply not
established. . . ."
SOLEDAD's claim that she made a cash contribution of
P100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no
basis for SOLEDAD's claim of co-ownership over the
25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial
court correctly found that the same was acquired
through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the
condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna,
together with his partners in the law firm. The name of
the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse
of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the
Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking
Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company
were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff
does not have evidence to show that she paid for them
fully or partially. . . ."
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No.
21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA,
married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that
SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
different acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
The phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So
it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in
the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm.
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to
contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the
law office amortization and for the law books. It is more
logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his
earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for
use of the law firm that he headed. STcEaI
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and
conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not
been shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed,
the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership,
did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere
allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, did
not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence
of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties
out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It
should then be justly concluded that the properties in
litis legally pertained to their conjugal partnership of
gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole
ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty.
Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks
pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty.
Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and
Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 159310 | Borromeo v. Descallar
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159310. February 24, 2009.]
CAMILO F. BORROMEO,
petitioner,vs.ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR,
respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J p:
What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-
interest) who acquired real properties in the country as
against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name
the properties were registered under the Torrens
system? CaAIES
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the
Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his
employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.,an Austrian
company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he
transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of
the National Power Corporation. There, he met
respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated
mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at
St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and
asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of
additional income to support her children, respondent
agreed. The tutorials were held in Antonietta's residence
at a squatters' area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live
together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue
City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots
at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue
City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985
and March 10, 1986 covering the properties, Jambrich
and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed
of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 was likewise
issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the
Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the
ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently,
Jambrich's name was erased from the document. But it
could be noted that his signature remained on the left
hand margin of page 1, beside respondent's signature as
buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is
the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties were issued
in respondent's name alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondent's two sons
in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN, and per Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5,
1988.
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then,
respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich
began to live with another woman in Danao City.
Jambrich supported respondent's sons for only two
months after the break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime
in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate
business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a
hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some
accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he
became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To
pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the
Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as
evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment".
On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the
deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three
lots have been transferred in the name of respondent,
and that the subject property has already been
mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent for recovery of real property before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner
alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18,
1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which
identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do
not reflect the true agreement of the parties since
respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase
price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich
alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive
funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of
the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute
ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich
executed in his favor. IcSEAH
In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she
did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On
the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and
exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and
pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in
question",and that Jambrich, being an alien, was
prohibited to acquire or own real property in the
Philippines.
At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her
alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed property
with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner,
in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and
documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries
which Jambrich received while still employed by the
Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the
purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under
litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and
earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not
only supported by documentary evidence but also by the
admission made by the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla.
So that, Jambrich's financial capacity to acquire and
purchase the properties ...is not disputed.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, evidence ...clearly show that before
defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter part of
1984, she was only working as a waitress at the St.
Moritz Hotel with an income of P1,000.00 a month and
was ...renting and living only in ...[a] room at ...[a]
squatter area at Gorordo Ave.,Cebu City; that Jambrich
took pity of her and the situation of her children that he
offered her a better life which she readily accepted. In
fact, this miserable financial situation of hers and her
two children ...are all stated and reflected in the Child
Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-
1") which facts she supplied to the Social Worker who
prepared the same when she was personally interviewed
by her in connection with the adoption of her two
children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if such facts
were not true because these are now denied by her ...and
if it was also true that during this time she was already
earning as much as P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 as profit per
month from her copra business, it would be highly
unbelievable and impossible for her to be living only in
such a miserable condition since it is the observation of
this Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an
expensive person and not thrifty as she wanted to
impress this Court in order to have a big saving as
clearly shown by her actuation when she was already
cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to
her ...the allowance given ...by him in the amount of
$500.00 a month is not enough to maintain the education
and maintenance of her children. IDAESH
This being the case, it is highly improbable and
impossible that she could acquire the properties
under litigation or could contribute any amount for
their acquisition which according to her is worth more
than P700,000.00 when while she was working as [a]
waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning P1,000.00 a
month as salary and tips of more or less P2,000.00
she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of
her family so much so that it is safe to conclude that
she was really in financial distress when she met and
accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live with
him because that was a big financial opportunity for
her and her children who were already abandoned
by her husband.
xxx xxx xxx
The only probable and possible reason why her name
appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell dated
November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the
deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] as
buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a
scheming and exploitive woman, she has taken
advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time
was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good
attitude shown by her to him since he could still very
well provide for everything she needs, he being earning
(sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by this
Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation
was at the time when their relationship was still going
smoothly and harmoniously. [Emphasis supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, ...Decision is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant Antoniet[t]a
Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the
residential house of strong materials and three parcels of
land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered
by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791
and 24792 issued in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a
Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to
cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in the name
of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new
ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits
"I","K" and "L" as avoided insofar as they appear to
convey rights and interests over the properties in
question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar;
ATSIED
5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney's fees
in the amount of P25,000.00 and litigation expenses in
the amount of P10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated April 10, 2002, the appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the
respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower court's conclusion. The
circumstances involved in the case cited by the lower
court and similar cases decided on by the Supreme
Court which upheld the validity of the title of the
subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at
bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the title to the
subject property has been issued in the name of the alien
transferee (Godinez et al. vs. Fong Pak Luen et al.,120
SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of
Manila,79 Phils. 461; United Church Board for World
Ministries vs. Sebastian,159 SCRA 446, citing the case
of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco,113 SCRA
547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma,138 SCRA 78).In the case at
bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of
Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus,
Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has
no title thereto.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
RESPONDENT'S JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND
OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING JAMBRICH'S PARTICIPATION,
INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY THE
HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES
IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT THEREFORE
TRANSFER AND ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELL-
REASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST
HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE). HTScEI
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial
court, who between respondent and Jambrich possesses
the financial capacity to acquire the properties in
dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties
in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.,an Austrian company. He
was earning an estimated monthly salary of P50,000.00.
Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one
year where his monthly salary was approximately
P90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was employed as a
waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of not
more than P1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of land
were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by her
during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of
income from a copra business were unsubstantiated. The
supposed copra business was actually the business of
her mother and their family, with ten siblings. She has
no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income
tax return. All the motorized bancas of her mother were
lost to fire, and the last one left standing was already
scrap. Further, the Child Study Report submitted by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondent's
two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children
until she was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz
Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no problem with
money because most of the customers of St. Moritz are
(sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the
end of 1984 there were no more foreigners coming
because of the situation in the Philippines at that time.
Her financial problem started then. She was even
renting a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo
Ave.,Cebu City. It was during her time of great financial
distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who later
offered her a decent place for herself and her children.
The DSWD Home Study Report further disclosed that:
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz
when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses
of the said Restaurants. He made friends with the girl
and asked her to tutor him in [the] English language.
Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need
of additional income to support [her] 2 young children
who were abandoned by their father. Their session was
agreed to be scheduled every afternoon at the residence
of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue,
Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of
the family particularly the children who were
malnourished. After a few months sessions, Mr.
Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent
place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good for
the children. Antonietta who was miserable and
financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for
the sake of the children. aSTECA
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence
point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to purchase
the three parcels of land, and to construct the house
thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath,
during her re-direct examination and during the
proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that
Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question,
but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute
Sale because of legal constraints. Nonetheless, his
signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed
as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in
installments was in postdated checks issued by
Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account
with any bank. Receipts of the installment payments
were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with
Jambrich and her two children for ten months, where she
was completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where
he, as owner, bequeathed the subject properties to
respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights,
interests and participation over the subject properties to
petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he
executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of
facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are accorded
great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court,
subject to a number of exceptions. In the instant case,
we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the
trial court. Even the appellate court did not controvert
the factual findings of the trial court. They differed only
in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were
acquired during the couple's cohabitation also does not
help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a
man and a woman living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but
are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not
apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally
married to another when she and Jambrich lived
together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-
ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for
each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be
able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of
co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
DcaCSE
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the
properties in the name of respondent alone. Having
found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots
was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the
effect of registration of the properties in the name of
respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of
its existence with notice to the world at large.
Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner
of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has
the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does
not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that
the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible. However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a
holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject
properties for a valuable consideration. This is the
situation in the instant case. Respondent did not
contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time,
nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were
then fully supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from
acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which is basically
a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution, and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution. The capacity to acquire private land is
dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain." Private land may be transferred only
to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain". Only Filipino citizens or
corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is
owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the
fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only
by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was
made by a former natural-born citizen.
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from
Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich,
who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if
challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to
petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church
Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court
reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases that
if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it
to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for
World Ministries,the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic)
Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation
[were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the
Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner,
yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who
is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is
valid.
The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of
petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in
the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner
in fee simple of the residential house of strong materials
and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and
5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City
to issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial
court likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner
P25,000 as attorney's fees and P10,000 as litigation
expenses, as well as the costs of suit. DScTaC
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The rationale behind the Court's ruling in United
Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in
subsequent cases, is this since the ban on aliens is
intended to preserve the nation's land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making
lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who
became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those
transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the
property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified
person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public
policy to be protected. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No.
42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated
July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City
in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Corona, Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 40064 | Tagarao v. Garcia
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 40064. December 4, 1934.]
RESURRECTION TAGARAO,
BUENAVENTURA TAGARAO and SERAFIN
TAGARAO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARCOS
GARCIA ET AL., defendants. MARGARITA
GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, DOLORES
RUFINO, and ELEUTERIO RUFINO, appellants.
Vicente T. Remitio for appellant E. Rufino.
Rafael P. Guerrero for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION; DISABILITY OF A
COOWNER DOES NOT SAVE ANOTHER
COOWNER WHO IS "SUI JURIS" FROM THE
EFFECTS OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The disability which protects an heir from the effects of
prescription is no protection to co-heirs, or in other
words, using the same language of the author of the
footnotes on the decision rendered in the case of Moore
vs. Armstrong, reported in 36 Am. Dec., 63, 78, wherein
the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio from which
section 42 of Act No. 190 was taken, sustained said
point of view, "where the rights of the parties are not
joint, the cases are uniform, and hold that the disability
of one will prevent the operation of the statute as to him,
but that those who are not under a disability will be
barred."
2. ID.; ID. The Supreme Court of Ohio correctly
stated in a similar case that whatever doubt might once
have been entertained on this subject it was conclusively
settled both in Great Britain and in the United States that
the statute is saved in favor only of the person laboring
under the alleged disability and this is precisely the rule
with respect to coparceners and tenants in common.
3. ID.; ID.; JOINT TENANCY AND TENANCY IN
COMMON. What particularly distinguishes the case
at bar from that of Sturges and Anderson vs. Longworth
and Horne (1 Ohio St., 545) and the other cases wherein
it was established that when the rights are joint the
exception which saves one of the interested parties also
inures to the benefit of the others, is that it was assumed
in the latter cases that the rights and interests involved
therein pertained to joint tenancy, not tenancy in
common, which are two distinct relations, each having
its own juridical meaning. The distinguishing feature
between the one and the other, as stated in the case of
Mette vs. Feltgen (148 Ill., 357, 371), is that the
surviving coowner in joint tenancy is subrogated in the
rights of the deceased coowner immediately upon the
death of the latter, by the mere fact of said death, but this
does not take place in cases of tenancy in common
which corresponds to what is known in our law as
community of property (articles 392 et seq. of the Civil
Code). For this reason, according to American
jurisprudence, a coowner in joint tenancy can not
dispose of his share or interest in the property which is
the subject matter of the joint tenancy, without the
consent of the other coowner because in so doing he
prejudices the other's rights and interests.
4. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS. The purpose of the statute of
limitations is no other than to protect the diligent and
vigilant, not the person who sleeps on his rights,
forgetting them and taking no trouble of exercising them
one way or another to show that he truly has such rights.
5. ID.; ID.; SECTIONS 40, 41 AND 42 OF ACT NO.
190. The law provides that in whatever way the
occupancy by a person claiming to be the owner of a
real property may have commenced, if said occupancy
is under claim of title and is furthermore open,
continuous for ten years and adverse, it constitutes
sufficient title for the occupant thereof (sections 40 and
41 of Act No. 190), and there can be no other exception
to this rule than the disability of persons who are entitled
to said property, by reason of age, some mental defect,
or imprisonment, for whom the same law provides the
exceptions contained in its section 42.
6. ID.; ID.; INDEMNITY. It being clear that R. T.'s
action is barred it should be understood that only the
plaintiffs S. T. and B. T. are entitled to compel the
defendants to pay to them the value of two-thirds of the
1,000 cavans of palay produced in the land in question,
at the rate of P3 a cavan. Occeo & Alba for appellants
M. Garcia, R. Garcia and D. Rufino.
DECISION
DIAZ, J p:
This action was brought by the brothers and sisters
Resurreccion Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, and
Serafin Tagarao, children of the deceased Merced
Garcia, daughter of the deceased Buenaventura Garcia
who was a brother of the defendant Marcos Garcia,
against the latter and the other defendants named Paula
Tabifranca, Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia, Dolores
Rufino and Eleuterio Rufino, praying that judgment be
rendered against the defendants ordering them to deliver
to the plaintiffs, after executing the necessary deeds of
transfer, one-fourth of the land known as lot No. 510 of
cadastral case No. 11 of the municipality of Isabela,
Occidental Negros (G. L. R. O. Cad. Record No. 100),
which was formerly covered, first by original certificate
of title No. 10009 (Exhibit M), later by transfer
certificate of title No. 3001 (Exhibit 3), and at present
by transfer certificate of title No. 8782 (Exhibit 7), all of
the office of the register of deeds of said Province of
Occidental Negros.
In their amended complaint of July 29, 1931, which was
reamended on March 8, 1932, said plaintiffs prayed that
should the defendants fail to deliver to them the required
portion of the land in question, the latter be ordered to
pay them the value thereof based on the assessed value
of the whole property, and that they furthermore be
indemnified for the value of 1,407 cavans of palay at the
rate of P4 a cavan, alleging that said 1,407 cavans
represented their share in the products of said land from
the time the defendants took exclusive possession
thereof.
Before the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on
the date above stated, the defendants Marcos Garcia,
Paula Tabifranca, Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and
Dolores Rufino filed a demurrer to said plaintiffs'
original complaint, alleging that it did not state
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and was
furthermore ambiguous, unintelligible and uncertain.
The lower court sustained said demurrer and ordered the
plaintiffs to amend their complaint within the
reglementary period.
When the plaintiffs amended their complaint in the
sense expressed in their pleading of February 13, 1929,
said five defendants again filed another demurrer
alleging this time that the lower court lack jurisdiction
to try the case by reason of the subject matter involved
and the lower court overruled said demurrer ordering
them to answer within the reglementary period. In
compliance therewith, the defendants on October 28,
1992, filed their answer wherein the first two
defendants, or the spouses Marcos Garcia and Paula
Tabifranca, alleged that although they formerly were the
absolute and exclusive owners of the land in question
they already ceased to be so at that time, having sold the
half belonging to Paula Tabifranca to the defendants
Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino,
and the other half belonging to Marcos Garcia to
Eleuterio Rufino. On June 9, 1931, said two defendants
filed a petition of even date stating that they had no more
interest in the case, having sold their respective
participations to the two Garcias and two Rufinos and
praying in succession that they be absolved from the
complaint.
A few days later, or on July 15, 1931, said two
defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca filed a
motion to include Eleuterio Rufino among the
defendants and on the following day the lower court,
granting the motion, ordered the inclusion of Eleuterio
Rufino in the case as one of the defendants. For this
purpose the plaintiffs filed their said amended complaint
of July 29, 1931, which they reamended with a slight
addition on March 8, 1932.
The defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca did
not answer the plaintiffs' last amended complaint but
Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino
jointly entered a general denial of all the allegations
contained therein, alleging as a special defense (1) that
they are the exclusive owners of one-half of the land in
question; (2) that the plaintiffs have already lost their
right of action because such right, if they ever had any,
has already prescribed; and (3) said plaintiffs cannot
invoke the decision rendered in civil case No. 4091
because with respect to them it does not constitute res
judicata.
The defendant Eleuterio Rufino, answering said
plaintiffs' last amended complaint, stated in his pleading
of November 19, 1931, that he denied each and every
allegation contained therein, alleging as a special
defense that one half of the land in question was sold by
Marcos Garcia and purchased by him in good faith,
paying the corresponding price therefor.
After due trial the lower court rendered judgment
ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs one
fourth of the land in question after executing the
necessary deeds of transfer in favor of said plaintiffs or,
in lieu thereof, to indemnify them in the sum of P3,882
plus the value of 1,000 cavans of palay at P3 a cavan,
with costs. In said judgment said court "declared the
deeds of sale executed by Marcos Garcia in favor of the
defendant Eleuterio Rufino and by Paula Tabifranca in
favor of the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario
Garcia and Dolores Rufino, null and void." The
defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia, Dolores
Rufino and Eleuterio Rufino appealed but Marcos
Garcia and Paula Tabifranca did not.
In support of their appeal, the defendants Margarita
Garcia, Rosario Garcia, and Dolores Rufino contend
that the lower court committed the eight alleged errors
assigned in their brief as follows:
"1. The lower court erred in not sustaining the demurrer
of the defendants-appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario
Garcia and Dolores Rufino to the second amended
complaint of the plaintiffs.
"2. The lower court erred in admitting, under objections
of the defendants-appellants, oral and documentary
evidence tending to attack original certificate of title No.
10009 in the name of the spouses Marcos Garcia and
Paula Tabifranca issued on May 17, 1918.
"3. The lower court erred in holding that the deed of sale
made and executed by Paula Tabifranca with respect to
her undivided one- half (1/2) share of lot No. 510 of the
cadastral survey of Isabela in favor of Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino, was made without
consideration and declaring same null and void being
fictitious.
"4. The lower court erred in holding that the transaction
made by Paula Tabifranca in favor of Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino had no other
purpose than to deprive the plaintiffs of their shares in
lot No. 510, as legitimate heirs of Ventura Garcia and
Merced Garcia.
"5. The lower court erred in condemning the
defendants-appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino, jointly and severally with the other
defendants to return to the plaintiffs one-fourth (1/4) of
lot No. 510 of the cadastral survey of Isabela, or in its
place, to indemnify the plaintiffs the sum of P3,882,
value of said portion.
"6. The lower court erred in condemning the
defendants-appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino, jointly and severally with the other
defendants, to pay the plaintiffs one thousand cavanes
of palay or its value at P3 per cavan.
"7. The lower court erred in holding that the right of the
plaintiffs to present this action to recover a portion of lot
No. 510 of the cadastral survey of Isabela has not
prescribed.
"8. The lower court erred in denying the petition for a
new trial of the defendants-appellants Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino."
The appellant Eleuterio Rufino also contends that said
court in rendering its judgment in question committed
the four alleged errors relied upon in his brief, which
read as follows:
"1. The lower court erred in admitting over the
defendant's objection oral as well as documentary
evidence of the plaintiffs tending to attack the stability
of original certificate of title No. 10009 (Exhibit 5) in
the name of the defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula
Tabifranca, relative to alleged facts that took place prior
to the issuance of said title.
"2. The lower court erred in ordering the defendant
Eleuterio Rufino, jointly with his codefendants, to
deliver to the plaintiffs one-fourth (1/4) of said lot No.
510, or in lieu thereof to indemnify them in the sum of
P3,882 representing the value of said portion.
"3. The lower court erred in holding in its judgment that
the deed (Exhibit 8) is fictitious and fraudulent and
declaring it null and void.
"4. The lower court erred in not absolving the defendant
and appellant Eleuterio Rufino from the complaint and
in denying his motion for a new trial."
Without losing sight of the purpose of the complaint of
the plaintiffs and appellees as expressed in the prayer of
their pleadings or last amended complaints, it is clear
that the first assignment of alleged error attributed to the
lower court by the appellants is unfounded on the
ground that its purpose is not to attack the validity of the
decree by virtue of which original certificate of title No.
10009 was issued in favor of Marcos Garcia and Paula
Tabifranca, or that under which transfer certificates of
title Nos. 3001 and 8782, were issued later, but to
compel the defendants to give them one- fourth of the
land described in said certificates and to pay them the
indemnity referred to therein.
The facts which have been clearly established at the
trial, according to the record and the evidence before us,
may be briefly stated as follows:
The land in question has an area of 31 hectares, 3 ares
and 65 centares. It was originally purchased with pacto
de retro by the defendant Marcos Garcia and his brother
Ventura Garcia from Vidal Saravia on July 20, 1900. As
the latter failed to exercise his right of repurchase the
two brothers became the absolute owners of said land
and it was so held by the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros in case No. 274 which was instituted
by Pedro Saravia, against said two brothers to compel
the latter to resell it to him (Exhibit L). When the two
brothers purchased said land, the defendant Marcos
Garcia was yet single because he had not even been
married to his former wife, as the defendant Paula
Tabifranca is only his wife by a second marriage.
Marcos Garcia had by his first wife three children who
are the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and
the deceased Catalina Garcia, mother of the defendant
Dolores Rufino. Ventura Garcia, now deceased, also
had two children: Merced Garcia who was married to
Rafael Tagarao, and Claro Garcia.
While Merced Garcia was still living, or at least until
June, 1914, the defendant Marcos Garcia had been
delivering to her and her brother Claro Garcia their
share of the products harvested from the land in
question. Merced Garcia who, as stated, died about the
year 1914 and was followed years later by her husband
Rafael Tagarao, had three children, the herein plaintiffs
Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin Tagarao and
Buenaventura Tagarao. When this action was brought
on October 14, 1928, Resurreccion Tagarao was more
than 24 years of age; Serafin was then only 23 years, 1
month and 1 day, and Buenaventura, 18 years, 4 months
and 3 days.
With the plaintiffs' grandfather, Ventura Garcia, and
their mother, Merced Garcia, already dead, the
defendant Marcos Garcia claimed the land in question
in cadastral case No. 11 of the municipality of Isabela
of the Province of Occidental Negros (G. L. R. O.
Cadastral Record No. 100), known in said case as lot
No. 510, alleging in the pleading presented by him to
that effect (Exhibit I) that he had acquired it on July 20,
1904, when he was yet unmarried to his codefendant
Paula Tabifranca. Before the original certificate of title
acknowledging him to be the owner of the land in
question was issued to him, and during the period within
which any person could ask for the revision of the
decree issued to that effect, Marcos Garcia, fearing that
Claro Garcia, brother of the plaintiffs' mother, might
frustrate his designs by asking for said revision,
executed in favor of Claro Garcia a document binding
himself to give to the latter four hectares of said land
upon the issuance to him of the corresponding certificate
of title. In view thereof, Claro did not ask for the
revision of the decree but he later brought an action ase
No. 4091 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros, against Marcos Garcia to recover from him four
hectares of said land, lot No. 510 of the cadastre of
Isabela, basing his claim on the document which Marcos
Garcia executed in his favor in order to promise and
bind himself to give Claro said four hectares, because
after Marcos Garcia had obtained his certificate of title
he refused to comply with his promise; and as a result
said court, on October 10, 1927, rendered judgment
against Marcos Garcia ordering him to segregate four
hectares of said land to be delivered to Claro Garcia and
furthermore to pay to the latter as indemnity 90 cavans
of palay, or the value thereof in the sum of P360.
In the certificate of title which was issued in favor of
Marcos Garcia on May 17, 1918 (original certificate of
title No. 10009), by virtue of his claim presented in said
cadastral case No. 11 of the municipality of Isabela,
Occidental Negros, it was stated, as in the decree
ordering the issuance thereof, that one-half of the land
therein described belonged to him, and that the other
half to his wife by a second marriage, Paula Tabifranca.
A few years after the issuance of said certificate of title,
the defendant Paula Tabifranca, second wife of the
defendant Marcos Garcia, sold her rights to the
defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and
Dolores Rufino, her husband's daughters and
granddaughter, respectively, by his first marriage,
executing the deed Exhibit N dated December 31, 1921,
while the alleged purchaser Dolores Rufino was yet a
minor. This was agreed upon between her and her
husband Marcos Garcia to prevent the land, part of
which belonged to her under said certificate of title,
from ever passing to her son by her first marriage named
Juan Tabigui, as she was already a widow when she
contracted marriage with said Marcos Garcia.
In the meantime the plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao was
informed that her uncle Claro Garcia had succeeded in
obtaining his share of the land in question and, desiring
to protect her rights and those of her brothers and
coplaintiffs, she negotiated with Marcos Garcia so that
he might give them their corresponding share. Marcos
Garcia at first entertained her with promises that he
would see to it that she got what she wanted but later, at
her back, he sold his share of the land to the defendant
Eleuterio Rufino, brother of his son-in-law Lope
Rufino, husband of the defendant Rosario Garcia,
executing in favor of Eleuterio Rufino the deed Exhibit
8 wherein it was made to appear that the price paid to
him for only one-half of the land, lot No. 510, was
P6,567.
Twelve days after Paula Tabifranca had executed said
deed of transfer Exhibit N in favor of her stepdaughters
Margarita Garcia and Rosario Garcia and of her husband
Marcos Garcia's granddaughter named Dolores Rufino,
said three defendants together with Marcos Garcia
obtained transfer certificate of title No. 3001, after the
cancellation of original certificate of title No. 10009,
and two days after Marcos Garcia had executed in favor
of the defendant Eleuterio Rufino the deed of sale
Exhibit 8 whereby he sold to the latter his half of the
land described in the above stated certificate of title No.
10009 (Exhibit M), he and his daughters and
granddaughter jointly with the defendant Eleuterio
Rufino succeeded in having said transfer certificate of
title No. 3001 (Exhibit 3) cancelled to be substituted, as
it was in fact substituted, by transfer certificate of title
No. 8782 (Exhibit 7).
The transfer made by Paula Tabifranca in favor of her
stepdaughters Margarita and Rosario Garcia and her
husband's granddaughter Dolores Rufino, and that made
by Marcos Garcia in favor of Eleuterio Rufino, stated in
said deeds Exhibits N and 8, are fictitious and feigned
in view of the following reasons inferable from the
evidence of record:
Notwithstanding the fact that in the original certificate
of title No. 10009 Paula Tabifranca's right to one half of
the property therein described has been acknowledged,
she was conscious that she was not entitled thereto
because it belonged exclusively to her husband or, at
least, he had acquired it long before he married her. This
explains the ease with which she parted with her alleged
right for a sum disproportionate to the true value of the
land sold by her. The alleged purchasers Margarita
Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino were not in
a financial position to pay her the alleged purchase price
which, according to Exhibit N, amounted to P1,500; and
Dolores Rufino, being then of tender age, could not have
taken part in said contract of sale, notwithstanding that
it was stated in said document that she was represented
by her father Lope Rufino, because it does not appear
that the latter was then the guardian of her property and
it is a fact that minors can not give consent to any
contract.
Neither was Eleuterio Rufino in a financial position to
pay what he allegedly paid to the defendant Marcos
Garcia for the latter's share in the land in question on the
ground that the amount of six thousand five hundred
sixty-seven pesos (P6,567) which is the price allegedly
paid by him to Marcos Garcia is a fortune greater than
the income he could have had for several years, because
his means of livelihood, according to his own testimony,
consisted simply of extracting tuba from about 200
coconut trees leased from different persons and in
retailing fresh fish bought by him for a lump sum in
order to obtain a small profit. He is a brother of the
defendant Rosario Garcia's husband, and
notwithstanding that the deed Exhibit 8 was executed in
his favor, the land continues until now to be registered
for taxation purposes in the name of Marcos Garcia; and
notwithstanding the alleged deed of transfer Exhibit 8
the land in question continues to be under the Isabela
Sugar Company Inc., of Occidental Negros, as property
of Marcos Garcia, although it is divided into three
portions named "THREE SISTERS A," "THREE
SISTERS B," and "HACIENDA GARCIA," the first
portion being under the management of Macario Torilla,
husband of the defendant Margarita Garcia; the second
under the management of Lope Rufino, husband of the
defendant Rosario Garcia; and the third under that of
Claro Garcia, uncle of the plaintiffs (Exhibit D). In
addition to these reasons, it may and should be stated
that Eleuterio Rufino's testimony explaining how the
transaction between him and Marcos Garcia was
effected, does not agree with the text of the deed of
transfer Exhibit 8. It is expressly stated in said document
that the price paid by him for the land in question was
P6,567 and that he also assumed the lien in the form of
a mortgage constituted on said land to secure the
payment to Candido Montilla of a loan in the sum of
P4,675 from which it may be inferred that the total price
paid by him for said land was really P11,242.
Notwithstanding this, he testified that he paid only
P1,892 to the defendant Marcos Garcia. It should be
stated furthermore that on December 1, 1928, or
scarcely two and a half months from the time he bought
said land from Marcos Garcia, Eleuterio Rufino leased
it, according to Exhibit 9, to Marcos Garcia's sons-in-
law and husbands of the defendants Margarita Garcia
and Rosario Garcia, when it is natural that as he was
poor and his business of tapping tuba and reselling
fishes was not lucrative, he should have personally
taken charge of the cultivation and exploitation of the
land bought by him. Furthermore, on January 10, 1930,
long after the alleged transfer of said land, Exhibit 8,
Macario Torilla and Lope Rufino, as Marcos Garcia's
attorneys-in-fact, the latter having executed in their
favor the power of attorney, Exhibit O-1, by virtue of
which they mortgaged the land in question in the name
of their principal to Candido Montilla on July 7, 1928,
Exhibit O, paid to Montilla the sum of P514.25 as
interest on the loan secured by the mortgage above
stated (Exhibit 4). This last fact convinces us more that
said deed of transfer Exhibit 8 is fictitious because if it
were genuine, there being as in fact there is in said
document a stipulation that the purchaser Eleuterio
Rufino assumed all the lien on said property, Eleuterio
Rufino, not Marcos Garcia, personally, nor through his
sons-in-law Macario Torilla and Lope Rufino, should
have paid said interest.
The foregoing proves to our satisfaction that errors 2, 3
and 4 relied upon by the appellants Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino in their brief are
absolutely unfounded, and so is alleged error No. 3
attributed to the lower court by the appellant Eleuterio
Rufino.
It follows from the foregoing conclusions and
considerations that errors 5 and 2 attributed to said court
by the defendants Garcia and Eleuterio Rufino,
respectively, are likewise unfounded. If the transfers
made under the deeds which later made possible the
issuance to the interested parties of certificates of title
Nos. 3001 and 8782 (Exhibits 3 and 7) are fraudulent, it
is but proper, being in accordance with law, that the
defendants execute the deeds of transfer prayed for by
the plaintiffs in their complaint in order to give them
what is theirs; and this is undoubtedly one fourth of the
entire land because if one half belonged to the
defendants' predecessor in interest, the other half
belonged to the plaintiffs' grandfather who, as already
stated, had only two children: Claro Garcia, the
plaintiffs' uncle, and Merced Garcia, their mother.
But the question now arises whether or not the three
plaintiffs are entitled to what they jointly pray for in
their complaint. There is no doubt but that the plaintiffs
Serafin Tagarao and Buenaventura Tagarao are entitled
thereto on the ground that the former was only 23 years,
1 month and 1 day, when this action was brought, and
therefore the three years exception granted by the
provisions of section 42 of Act No. 190 had not yet
elapsed as to him, and because Buenaventura Tagarao,
then being only 18 years, 4 months and 3 days of age,
was yet a minor and the period of prescription as to him
is extended to three years after he has attained majority.
The plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao, notwithstanding
that she was of legal age when this action was brought,
contends that neither has her right to seek the same relief
prayed for by her brothers and coplaintiffs prescribed,
and cites in support of her contention the ruling laid
down in the case of Velasquez vs. Teodoro (46 Phil.,
757). It was truly stated in said case, citing with
approval a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of
the State of Ohio in the case of Sturges and Anderson
vs. Longworth and Horne (1 Ohio St., 545), that:
"Where the interests of two defendants are joint and
inseparable, and the rights of one are saved under the
provision of the statute of limitations, on account of his
disability, such saving inures to the benefit of the other
defendant, although laboring under no disability."
As may be seen, this ruling refers to cases in which the
rights of the defendants are joint and inseparable
because when they are not so, that is, when they are joint
and several at the same time, as is the case of the
plaintiffs whose rights are joint and several, the rule
according to said court, interpreting the section from
which section 42 of Act No. 190 was copied, is
different; and said court stated that in said cases the
disability which protects an heir from the effects of
prescription is no protection to coheirs, or in other
words, using the same language of the author of the
footnotes on the decision rendered in the case of Moore
vs. Armstrong, reported in 36 Am. Dec., 63, 78, wherein
the same Supreme Court of the State of Ohio sustained
the latter point of view, "where the rights of the parties
are not joint, the cases are uniform, and hold that the
disability of one will prevent the operation of the statute
as to him, but that those who are not under a disability
will be barred."
The case of Moore vs. Armstrong, supra, has more
points in common with the case at bar than those of
Sturges and Anderson, vs. Longworth and Horne, and
Wilkins, vs. Philips cited in case of Velazquez vs.
Teodoro, supra. The question for determination in the
former case was whether or not the period of
prescription runs not only against the heir who is
laboring under disability but also against his coheirs
who are sui juris. The plaintiffs, to all appearances, were
the heirs of one Furgus Moore and the heiress who
seemed to be laboring under disability was a married
woman named Mrs. Fleming. The Supreme Court of
Ohio decided the question in the negative with the
remark that whatever doubt might once have been
entertained on this subject, it was conclusively settled
both in Great Britain and in the United States that the
statute is saved in favor only of the person laboring
under the alleged disability, adding in succession that
this is precisely the rule with respect both to coparceners
and tenants in common.
It cannot be argued that the separation of rights among
the plaintiffs was not practicable in the sense that one of
them could not have disposed of or alienate his legal
portion of the thing possessed in common without the
consent of the others, because the law provides
otherwise. It says:
"Every part owner shall have the absolute ownership of
his part, and of the fruits and benefits derived therefrom,
and he may, therefore, sell, assign, or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless
personal rights are involved, but the effect of the sale or
mortgage, with respect to the other participants, shall be
limited to the share which may be allotted him in the
partition upon the dissolution of the community."
Furthermore, whosoever among said plaintiffs should
have desired the partition of the property of which he
was a coowner, could have demanded such partition
inasmuch as the law then allowed and still allows such
act (article 400, Civil Code; and section 181, Act No.
190). What particularly distinguishes the case at bar
from that of Sturges and Anderson vs. Longworth and
Horne, supra and the other cases wherein it was
established that when the rights are joint the exception
which saves one of the interested parties also inures to
the benefit of the others, is that it was assumed in the
latter cases that the rights and interests involved therein
pertained to joint tenancy, not tenancy in common,
which are two distinct relations, each having its own
juridical meaning. The distinguishing feature between
the one and the other, as stated in the case of Mette vs.
Feltgen (148 Ill., 357, 371), is that the surviving
coowner in joint tenancy is subrogated in the rights of
the deceased coowner immediately upon the death of the
latter, by the mere fact of said death, but this does not
take place in cases of tenancy in common which
corresponds to what is known in our law as community
of property (articles 392 et seq. of the Civil Code). For
this reason, according to American jurisprudence, a
coowner in joint tenancy can not dispose of his share or
interest in the property which is the subject matter of the
joint tenancy, without the consent of the other coowner
because in so doing he prejudices the other's rights and
interests.
That the separation of rights and interests among the
plaintiffs was practicable is further evidenced by the fact
that Claro Garcia with whom they were entitled to one-
half of the land in question could recover his legal
portion thereof from Marcos Garcia, although certainly
not in its entirety, having failed to assert his rights. This
being so, and it being known as it is in fact known that
the purpose of the statute of limitations is no other than
to protect the diligent and vigilant, not the person who
sleeps on his rights, forgetting them and taking no
trouble of exercising them one way or another to show
that he truly has such rights, it is logical to conclude that
the right of action of the plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao
is barred, and the fact that that of her brothers and
coplaintiffs Serafin and Buenaventura Tagarao still
subsists does not inure to her benefit.
Although Resurreccion Tagarao could have enforced
the right which she exercised in this case on May 17,
1918, when Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca
obtained original certificate of title No. 10009 (Exhibit
M) or shortly afterwards, or long before, that is, from
the death of her mother Merced Garcia in 1914 or 1915,
she did nothing to protect her rights. On the contrary,
she allowed said spouses to perform acts of ownership
on the land covered by said certificate, publicly,
peacefully, uninterruptedly and adversely to the whole
world including herself, and from that time until the
filing of her first complaint more than ten years had
elapsed. It is for this reason why it cannot be sustained
that the defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula
Tabifranca, after it has been shown that the transfers
made by them are null and void, being fictitious and
false, hold the land in question in trust, because if they
ever held it in said capacity it had been during the
lifetime of the plaintiffs' mother to whom said
defendants used to give part of the fruits thereof. But
after she had died, their possession was under the
circumstances above stated and the law provides that in
whatever way the occupancy by a person claiming to be
the owner of a real property may have commenced, if
said occupancy is under claim of title and is furthermore
open, continuous for ten years and adverse, it constitutes
sufficient title for the occupant thereof (sections 40 and
41 of Act No. 190), and there can be no other exception
to this rule than the disability of persons who are entitled
to said property, by reason of age, some mental defect,
or imprisonment, for whom the same law provides the
exceptions contained in its section 42.
It having been established by the evidence for both the
plaintiffs and the defendants that Candido Montilla
holds a lien on the land in question, which is noted at the
back of transfer certificates of title Nos. 3001 and 8782
(Exhibits 3 and 7) for a loan in the sum of P4,675 which
he granted to Marcos Garcia in the honest belief that the
latter was the true owner of the land described in
certificates of title Nos. 10009 (Exhibit M), 3001
(Exhibit 3), and 8782 (Exhibit 7), it is but just that said
lien be acknowledged by the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao
and Buenaventura Tagarao, with the necessary
reservations in favor of said two plaintiffs.
It should be stated in passing that the land in question,
lot No. 510 of cadastral case No. 11 of Isabela,
Occidental Negros, is assessed at P15,530, and therefore
one-twelfth (1/12) thereof is worth P1,294.17 on that
basis.
As to the indemnity which the plaintiffs claim from the
defendants, the conclusion arrived at by the lower court
in its decision and judgment is supported by the
evidence, that is, the plaintiffs' share of the crops from
1918 to 1929, including that of Resurreccion Tagarao,
should be 1,000 cavans of palay. However, it being clear
that Resurreccion Tagarao's action is barred, it should
be understood that only the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao
and Buenaventura Tagarao are entitled to compel the
defendants to pay to them the value of two-thirds of the
1,000 cavans of palay at the rate of P3 a cavan.
For all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed in so far as it favors the plaintiffs Serafin
Tagarao and Buenaventura Tagarao, and said
defendants are hereby ordered to execute in favor of said
Tagarao brothers the deed or deeds necessary to transfer
to them, by virtue of this judgment, two-twelfths (2/12)
of the entire lot No. 510 of the cadastre of Isabela,
Occidental Negros, including the portion transferred to
Claro Garcia (G. L. R. O. Cad. Record No. 100); to
indemnify each of them in a sum equal to what he may
pay to the mortgage creditor Candido Montilla to free
his said portion from the lien thereon in favor of said
Montilla; or likewise to pay to each of them, upon
failure of the defendants to deliver said portion and
execute the necessary deed of transfer, the sum of
P1,294.17; and furthermore to pay, as indemnity, the
value of two-thirds of 1,000 cavans of palay, at the rate
of P3 a cavan, with costs against the defendants. Said
judgment is reversed as to the plaintiff Resurreccion
Tagarao. So ordered.
Street, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial and Butte,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the opinion of Justice Villa-Real, but in
addition desire to append the following observations:
The case at bar is permeated with fraud. To do justice to
the parties, all three of the plaintiffs should be permitted
to enforce their equitable rights. This can be done if the
rule announced in the case of Velazquez vs. Teodoro
([1923], 46 Phil., 757), be accepted as stating a rule of
property and practice which should be followed. The
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
GODDARD, J., concurring:
I concur with this opinion of Justice Malcolm.
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority opinion in so far as it favors
the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and Buenaventura
Tagarao, but I regret having to dissent therefrom in so
far as it declares that Resurreccion Tagarao's right of
action is barred.
After a lengthy disquisition during which American and
English jurisprudence was examined, the majority lays
down the general rule that in all actions involving
community of property or tenancy in common, the
disability of a cotenant or a coowner to bring an action
does not benefit those who are sui juris.
The rulings in the various supreme courts of the
American Union on this point are stated in 37 Corpus
Juris, page 1031, paragraph 441, as follows:
"Disability of one of several parties. The authorities
are not in harmony upon the question of the effect of the
disability of one or more of several parties when one or
more are sui juris. Thus it has been held that if one
cotenant is a minor the disability will save the interests
of his cotenant from the operation of limitations in
actions for land, and this rule is extended to tenants in
common as well as joint tenants, the latter being a
somewhat anomalous doctrine, although in personal
actions it is held otherwise, and one plaintiff may be
barred while another is saved. On the other hand it is
held that, where the right is joint so that all must sue, all
must have the right to sue when the suit is brought, and
if one is barred at that time all are barred, although some
may have labored under disability. Perhaps the rule
which is best supported by the authorities is that if the
right is joint and several the disability of one will save
him but will not avail another who is not under
disability, and that if the right is joint so that the suit
cannot be brought except by the parties jointly then the
rights of all are saved if any is under disability; and one
of coheirs or tenants in common is saved by his own
disability notwithstanding his cotenant is sui juris and
barred, and the saving as to the former will not save the
latter, upon the principle that each may sue for his own
share severally. This general rule is subject to
qualifications, however, and while it is held that if the
cause accrues to two jointly who are under disability,
the statute will not run until the disability is removed as
to both, the application of the rule is confined to cases
where all the parties are under disability when the cause
accrues and if one is not under disability the statute will
run against all; and this latter branch of the rule is
confined in some cases to actions other than for the
recovery of land in which the rule is applied that as each
may sue for is own share, even though all may join, the
bar as to one will not operate against the other who is
under disability."
It is inferred from the foregoing that one of the best rules
laid down by the authorities on the matter is that if the
right is joint so that the suit cannot be brought except by
the parties jointly, the rights of all are saved if any is
under disability. It will be seen that the rule that when a
cotenant or coowner is sui juris, the fact that his
cotenants or coowners are laboring under disability does
not save him from the prescription of the right of action
if it is not exercised in due time, is not absolute. The rule
is applicable only when a cotenant or coowner may
exercise his right of action independently of his
coowners or cotenants; but not when the action
necessarily has to be brought jointly by all the coowners
or cotenants.
In the case of Palarca vs. Baguisi (38 Phil., 177, 180,
181), this court through Justice Fisher, interpreting
section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stated as
follows:
". . . We hold that a coowner cannot maintain an action
in ejectment without joining all other persons interested.
Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that
every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest, and that any person who has an interest
in this subject matter and who is a necessary party to a
complete determination of the questions involved
should be made a party to the proceeding. The same
article provides, in its last paragraph, that if any person
having an interest in the subject of the action, and in
obtaining the relief demanded, refuses to join as plaintiff
with those having a like interest, he may be made a
defendant, the fact of his interest and refusal to join
being stated in the complaint. Were the courts to permit
an action in ejectment to be maintained by a person
owning merely an undivided interest in any given tract
of land, a judgment in favor of the defendant would not
be conclusive as against the other coowners not parties
to the suit, and thus the defendant in possession of the
property might be harassed by as many succeeding
actions of ejectment, as there might be coowners of the
title asserted against him. The evident purpose of
section 114 is to prevent the multiplicity of suits by
requiring the person asserting a right against the
defendant to include with him, either as coplaintiffs or
as codefendants, all persons standing in the same
position, so that the whole matter in dispute may be
determined once and for all in one litigation."
who should be joined as defendants in an action. I agree
that American jurisprudence should be followed as
persuasive authority in all that which is in accord with
our laws, customs and social condition, particularly if
the legal provision to be interpreted or construed has
been copied from some law of the State the Supreme
Court of which has rendered the decision invoked. But
in the case at bar we have our own law on civil
procedure regulating the form and manner of bringing
actions and the persons who should bring them and
against whom they should be brought. If section 114 of
our Code of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by this court,
does not allow the bringing of an action for the recovery
of a common property, as the one in question, by any
cotenant or coowner without the consent of the others,
and if under the American decision on which the
majority opinion is based "if the right is joint so that the
suit cannot be brought except by the parties jointly then
the rights of all are saved if any is under disability," then
the appealed judgment should be affirmed in all its parts.
For the foregoing considerations, I am of the humble
opinion that inasmuch as Resurreccion Tagarao,
independently of her coowners Buenaventura Tagarao
and Serafin Tagarao, could not bring the present action
for the recovery of their undivided portion of lot No. 510
of cadastral case No. 11 of Isabela, Occidental Negros,
G. L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 100, in question,
which belongs to the plaintiffs and defendants in
common and undivided shares, the disability of her
minor brothers saves her, and her fate follows theirs.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

We have not examined, nor do we need to do so, the

procedural laws of the State of Ohio to the doctrine of
the Supreme Court of which the majority
unconditionally adheres, inasmuch as we have our own
civil procedural law section 114 of which, taken from
the Code of Civil Procedure of California, enumerates
those who should be joined as plaintiffs as well as those
G.R. No. 56550 | Reyes v. Concepcion
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 56550. October 1, 1990.]
MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO
and SOCORRO Z. FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B.
CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, CFI of Cavite,
Tagaytay, Br. IV, SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE
ZABALLERO, EUGENIA Z. LUNA, LEONARDO
M. ZABALLERO, and ELENA FRONDA
ZABALLERO, respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioners.
Leonardo M. Zaballero for private respondents.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
On March 13, 1980, petitioners filed with the CFI a
complaint for injunction and damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. TG-572, seeking to enjoin private respondents
Socorro Marquez Vda. De Zaballero, Eugenia Z. Luna
and Leonardo M. Zaballero from selling to a third party
their pro-indiviso shares as co-owners in eight parcels
of registered land (covered by TCT Nos. A-1316 to A-
1322) located in the province of Cavite, with an
aggregate area of about 96 hectares. Petitioner claimed
that under Article 1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as
co-owners, had a preferential right to purchase these
shares from private respondents for a reasonable price.
cdll
On March 17, 1980, respondent trial judge denied the ex
parte application for a writ of preliminary injunction, on
the ground that petitioners' registered notice of lis
pendens was ample protection of their rights.
On April 24, 1980, private respondents received the
summons and copies of the complaint. Private
respondents then filed their answer with counterclaim,
praying for the partition of the subject properties.
Private respondent Elena Fronda Zaballero filed a
motion for intervention dated April 29, 1980, adopting
therein her co-respondents answer with counterclaim.
At the pre-trial hearing, the parties agreed on the
following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
1.That the plaintiffs, the defendants and the intervenor
are the pro-indiviso co-owners of the properties cited
and described in the complaint;
2.That six and nine tenth (6-9/10) hectares of the land
covered by TCT No. T-1319; approximately twelve (12)
hectares of that covered by TCT No. T-1320; and the
entire parcel of covered by TCT No. T-1321, are subject
of expropriation proceedings instituted by the National
Housing Authority (NHA) now pending before this
Court in Civil Case Nos. TG-392, TG-396 and TG-417;
3.That based on the evidence presented by the herein
parties in the aforecited expropriation cases, the current
valuation of the land and the improvements thereon is at
P95,132.00 per hectare;
4.That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs received a written
notice from the defendants and the intervenor that the
VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION had offered to buy the
latter's share in the properties listed in the complaint
subject to the following terms:
"1.The selling price shall be net at TWELVE & 50/100
(P12.50) PESOS per square meter, or a total price of
NINE MILLION (P9,000,000.00) PESOS for a total
area of SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES ONLY;
"2.A downpayment equivalent to THIRTY (30%)
PERCENT of the selling price, or a minimum
downpayment of TWO MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P2,700,000.00) PESOS;
"3.The balance of the purchase price to be payable
within THREE (3) YEARS from the date of
downpayment in THREE (3) EQUAL ANNUAL
PAYMENTS with interest at the legal rate prevailing at
the time of payment;
"4.The balance shall be covered by a BANK
GUARANTEE of payments and shall not be governed
by Art. 1250 of the Civil Code."
(Cf Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer)
5.That in said letters (Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer), the
plaintiffs were requested:
a)To exercise their pre-emptive right to purchase
defendants' and intervenor's shares under the above-
quoted terms; or
b)To agree to a physical partition of the properties; or
c)To sell their shares, jointly with the defendants and the
intervenor, to the VOLCANO SECURITIES
TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION
at the price and under the terms aforequoted.
6.That the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION is ready, willing
and able to purchase not only the aliquot shares of the
defendants and the intervenor, but also that of the
plaintiffs, in and to all the properties subject of this case,
for and in consideration of the net amount of TWELVE
and 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS per square meter and under
the afore-quoted terms;
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 43-44.]
The parties laid down their respective positions, as
follows:
PLAINTIFFS
1.That the subject properties are incapable of physical
partition;
2.That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly
excessive;
3.That they are willing to exercise their pre-emptive
right for an amount of not more that P95,132.00 per
hectare, which is the fair and reasonable value of said
properties;
4.That the statutory period for exercising their pre-
emptive right was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint;.
DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR
1.That the reasonable price of the subject properties is
P12.50 per square meter;
2.That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed
upon their failure to exercise the same within the period
prescribed in Art. 1623 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;
3.That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that
the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly
excessive, it would be to the best interest of the plaintiffs
to sell their shares to the VOLCANO SECURITIES
TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION,
whose sincerity, capacity and good faith is beyond
question, as the same was admitted by the parties herein;
4.That the subject properties consisting approximately
95 hectares may be physically partitioned without
difficulty in the manner suggested by them to plaintiffs,
and as graphically represented in the subdivision plan,
which will be furnished in due course to plaintiffs'
counsel.
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 44-45.]
Based on the foregoing, respondent trial judge rendered
a pre-trial order dated July 9, 1980 granting petitioners
a period of ten days from receipt of the subdivision plan
to be prepared by a competent geodetic engineer within
which to express their approval or disapproval of the
said plan, or to submit within the same period, if they so
desire, an alternative subdivision plan.
On July 16, 1980, counsel for private respondents sent
to the counsel for petitioners a letter enclosed with a
subdivision plan.
On August 4, 1980, petitioners filed their comment to
the pre-trial order, contending that the question of
reasonable value of the subject properties remains a
contentious issue of fact ascertainable only after a full
trial. Petitioners likewise insisted on their pre-emptive
right to purchase private respondents' shares in the co-
ownership after due determination of the reasonable
price thereof.
Thereafter, counsel for private respondents sent the
counsel for petitioners another subdivision plan
prepared by a geodetic engineer. Still, no definite
communication was sent by petitioners signifying their
approval or disapproval to the subdivision plans.
In order to settle once and for all the controversy
between the parties, private respondents filed a motion
dated December 16, 1980 requesting that petitioners be
required to formally specify which of the two options
under Article 498 of the New Civil Code they wished to
avail of: that petitioners' shares in the subject properties
be sold to private respondents, at the rate of P12.50 per
square meter; or that the subject properties be sold to a
third party, VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
(claimed to have been erroneously referred to in the pre-
trial as VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION) and its proceeds
thereof distributed among the parties.
Finding merit in the private respondents' request, and for
the purpose of determining the applicability of Article
498 of the New Civil Code, respondent trial judge issued
an order dated February 4, 1981 which directed the
parties to signify whether or not they agree to the
scheme of allotting the subject properties to one of the
co-owners, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, or
whether or not they know of a third party who is able
and willing to buy the subject properties at terms and
conditions more favorable than that offered by
VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. The order
contained a series of questions addressed to all the
parties, who were thereupon required to submit their
answers thereto.
Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that
they were willing to allot their shares in the subject
properties to Socorro Marquez Vda. de Zaballero, at the
rate of P12.50 per square meter, and that they did not
know of any other party who was willing and able to
purchase the subject properties under more favorable
conditions than that offered by VOLCANO
LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
However, instead of submitting their answers to the
queries posed by respondent trial judge, petitioners filed
a motion for clarification as to the true identity of the
third party allegedly willing to purchase the subject
properties.
On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge rejected
petitioners' motion on the ground that it was irrelevant.
Thereupon, on February 27, 1981, petitioners filed a
pleading captioned "Compliance and Motion", (1)
reiterating the relevance of ascertaining the true identity
of the third party buyer, VOLCANO SECURITIES
TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION
or VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC., (2)
expressing their view that there is actually no bona fide
and financially able third party willing to purchase the
subject properties at the rate of P12.50 per square meter,
and, (3) once again insisting on their pre-emptive right
to purchase the shares of private respondents in the co-
ownership at a "reasonable price", which is less than that
computed excessively by the latter at the rate of P12.50
per square meter. Petitioners therein prayed that further
proceedings be conducted in order to settle the factual
issue regarding the reasonable value of the subject
properties. cdll
On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an
order denying petitioners' motion. The judge ruled that
petitioners did not possess a pre-emptive right to
purchase private respondents' shares in the co-
ownership. Thus, finding that the subject properties
were essentially indivisible, respondent trial judge
ordered the holding of a public sale of the subject
properties pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil
Code. A notice of sale was issued setting the date of
public bidding for the subject properties on April 13,
1981.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from
the above order. Respondent trial judge reset the hearing
on petitioners' motion for reconsideration to April 6,
1981, and moved the scheduled public sale to April 14,
1981.
Without awaiting resolution of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition for
certiorari, alleging that the respondent trial judge acted
without jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing his order
dated March 16, 1981 which denied petitioners' claim of
a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents'
pro-indiviso shares and which, peremptorily, ordered
the public sale of the subject properties. On April 8,
1981, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the sale of the subject properties at public
auction.
With the comment and reply, the Court considered the
issues joined and the case submitted for decision.
The Court finds no merit in the present petition.
The attack on the validity of respondent trial judge's
order dated March 16, 1981 is ultimately premised on
petitioners' claim that they had a pre-emptive right to
purchase the pro-indiviso shares of their co-owners,
private respondents herein, at a "reasonable price". It is
this same claim which forms the basis of their complaint
for injunction and damages filed against private
respondents in the court a quo.
This claim is patently without basis. In this jurisdiction,
the legal provisions on co-ownership do not grant to any
of the owners of a property held in common a pre-
emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his
co-owners. Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of the
New Civil Code is misplaced. Article 1620 provides:
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of
redemption in case the shares of all the co-owners or of
any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall
pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the
right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion
to the share they may respectively have in the thing
owned in common [Emphasis supplied].
Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-
owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a stranger.
By the very nature of the right of "legal redemption", a
co-owner's right to redeem is invoked only after the
shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or
stranger to the co-ownership [See Estrada v. Reyes, 33
Phil. 31 (1915)]. But in the case at bar, at the time
petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and
damages against private respondents, no sale of the
latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third party had yet been
made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil Code finds
no application to the case at bar.
There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention that
private respondents had acknowledged the pre-emptive
right of petitioners to purchase their shares at a
"reasonable price". Although it appears that private
respondents had agreed to sell their pro-indiviso shares
to petitioners, the offer was made at a fixed rate of
P12.50 per square meter [See Pre-trial Order dated July
9, 1980, Annex "C" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 43-45]. It
cannot be said that private respondents had agreed,
without qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners.
Hence, petitioners cannot insist on a right to purchase
the shares at a price lower than the selling price of
private respondents.
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin
private respondents from alienating theirpro-indiviso
shares to a third party. The rights of a co-owner of a
property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the New
Civil Code, thus:
Article 493.Each co-owner shall have the full ownership
of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling,
alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property
held in common. The law merely provides that the
alienation or mortgage shall be limited only to the
portion of the property which may be allotted to him
upon termination of the co-ownership [See Mercado v.
Liwanag, G.R. No. L-14429, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA
472; PNB v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207; Go Ong v. The
Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75884,
September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 270,] and, as earlier
discussed, that the remaining co-owners have the right
to redeem, within a specified period, the shares which
may have been sold to the third party. [Articles 1620 and
1623 of the New Civil Code.]
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that
respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of
discretion when he denied petitioners' claim of a pre-
emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro-
indiviso shares.
Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting respondent
trial judge's order for the holding of a public sale of the
subject properties pursuant to the provisions of Article
498 of the New Civil Code. After a careful examination
of the proceedings before respondent trial judge, the
Court finds that respondent trial judge's order was
issued in accordance with the laws pertaining to the
legal or juridical dissolution of co-ownerships.
It must be noted that private respondents, in their answer
with counterclaim prayed for, inter alia, the partition of
the subject properties in the event that the petitioners
refused to purchase theirpro-indiviso shares at the rate
of P12.50 per square meter. Unlike petitioners' claim of
a pre-emptive right to purchase the other co-owners'
pro-indiviso shares, private respondents' counterclaim
for the partition of the subject properties is recognized
by law, specifically Article 494 of the New Civil Code
which lays down the general rule that no co-owner is
obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Article 494 reads
as follows:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided
for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years,
shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new
agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period
which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be partition when it is prohibited by
law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies
to the case at bar. Private respondents' counterclaim for
the partition of the subject properties was therefore
entirely proper. However, during the pre-trial
proceedings, petitioners adopted the position that the
subject properties were incapable of physical partition.
Initially, private respondents disputed this position. But
after petitioners inexplicably refused to abide by the pre-
trial order issued by respondent trial judge, and
stubbornly insisted on exercising an alleged pre-emptive
right to purchase private respondents' shares at a
"reasonable price", private respondents relented and
adopted petitioner's position that the partition of the
subject properties was not economically feasible, and,
consequently, invoked the provisions of Article 498 of
the New Civil Code [Private respondents' "Motion To
Allot Properties To Defendants Or To Sell the Same
Pursuant To Article 498 Of The Civil Code", Annex "D"
of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 46-49].
Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the
fact that the subject properties should not be partitioned,
and private respondents continued to manifest their
desire to terminate the co-ownership arrangement
between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial
judge acted within his jurisdiction when he issued his
order dated February 4, 1981 requiring the parties to
answer certain questions for the purpose of determining
whether or not the legal conditions for the applicability
of Article 498 of the New Civil Code were present in the
case.
Article 498 provides that:
Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-
owners cannot agree that it be alloted to one of them
who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
proceeds distributed.
The sale of the property held in common referred to in
the above article is resorted to when (1) the right to
partition the property among the co-owners is invoked
by any of them but because of the nature of the property,
it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [See Article
495 of the New Civil Code] would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners [See Section 5 of Rule 69 of
the Revised Rules of Court] and (2) the co-owners are
not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted
or assigned the entire property upon reimbursement of
the shares of the other co-owners.
Petitioners herein did not have justifiable grounds to
ignore the queries posed by respondent trial judge and
to insist that hearings be conducted in order to ascertain
the reasonable price at which they could purchase
private respondents' pro-indiviso shares [Petitioners'
"Compliance and Motion" dated February 27, 1981,
Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-60].
Since at this point in the case it became reasonably
evident to respondent trial judge that the parties could
not agree on who among them would be allotted the
subject properties, the Court finds that respondent trial
judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the holding of a public sale for the subject
properties (with the opening bid pegged at P12.50 per
square meter), and the distribution of the proceeds
thereof amongst the co-owners, as provided under
Article 498 of the New Civil Code.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, there was no need
for further hearings in the case because it is apparent
from the various allegations and admissions of the
parties made during the pre-trial proceedings, and in
their respective pleadings, that the legal requisites for
the application of Article 498 of the New Civil Code
were present in the case. No factual issues remained to
be litigated upon. LLpr
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The temporary restraining order issued by
the Court is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 179205 | Heirs of Dela Rosa v. Batongbacal
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 179205. July 30, 2014.]
HEIRS OF REYNALDO DELA ROSA, Namely:
TEOFISTA DELA ROSA, JOSEPHINE
SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH DELA ROSA,
petitioners, vs. MARIO A. BATONGBACAL,
IRENEO BATONGBACAL, JOCELYN
BATONGBACAL, NESTOR BATONGBACAL AND
LOURDES BATONGBACAL, respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari pursuant to
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 7
December 2006 Decision and 8 August 2007 Resolution
of the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64172. In its assailed Resolution, the
appellate court modified its earlier ruling and proceeded
to direct petitioners to execute the requisite Deed of Sale
over the subject property.
The Facts
The subject property consists of a 3,750 square meter-
portion of the 15,001 square meters parcel of land
situated in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan denominated
as Lot No. 1, and registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-107449 under the names of
Reynaldo Dela Rosa (Reynaldo), Eduardo Dela Rosa
(Eduardo), Araceli Dela Rosa (Araceli) and Zenaida
Dela Rosa (Zenaida).
Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the subject
property to Guillermo Batongbacal (Guillermo) and
Mario Batongbacal (Mario) for P50.00 per square meter
or for a total of P187,500.00. Pursuant to the agreement,
Reynaldo received an advance payment of P31,500.00
leaving a balance of P156,000.00. As shown in the
document denominated as Resibo and signed by
Reynaldo on 18 February 1987, the parties agreed that
the amount of P20,000.00 as part of the advance
payment shall be paid upon the delivery of the Special
Power-of-Attorney (SPA), which would authorize
Reynaldo to alienate the subject property on behalf of
his co-owners and siblings namely, Eduardo, Araceli
and Zenaida. The balance thereon shall be paid in
P10,000.00 monthly installments until the purchase
price is fully settled, to wit:
RESIBO
Tinaggap ko ngayong araw na ito kay Engr. Guillermo
A. Batongbacal, ng Poblacion II, Marilao, Bulacan, ang
halagang sampung libong piso (P10,000.00) salaping
Pilipino, bilang bahaging bayad sa bahagi ng lupang
may sukat na 3,750 sq.m. na aking kabahagi sa isang
(1) lagay na lupang nasasaog, Marilao, Bulakan,
sinasaklaw ng T.C.T. No. T-107449, ng Bulakan, na
ipinagkasundo kong ipagbili sa naulit na Engr.
Guillermo A. Batongbacal sa halagang Limampung
Piso (P50.00) salaping Pilipino, bawat isang (1)
metrong parisukat. Ang paunang bayad na aking
tinaggap ukol sa lupang nabanggit sa itaas ay
P21,500.00, nuong Abril 14-18, 1984. Ang halagang
dapat pa niyang bayaran sa akin ay P156,000.00, na
ang halagang dalawampung libong piso (P20,000.00)
ay babayaran niya sa akin sa araw na nag power-of-
attorney nina Zenaida dela Rosa, at Enrique Magsaloc
ay aking nabigay sa nasabing Engr. Guillermo A.
Batongbacal; na ang nalalabing bahaging bayad ay
kanyang babayaran sa akin ng Sampung libong piso
(P10,000.00) salaping Pilipino, bawat buwan hanggang
sa matapusan ang pagbabayad ng kabuuang halaga na
Isang Daang at Walumpu't Pitong libo Limang Daang
Piso (P187,500.00). Ang bahaging aking ipinagbibili ay
ang Lote No. 1, may sukat na 3,750 sq.m. na makikita
sa nakalakip na sketch plan na aking ding nilagdaan sa
ikaliliwanag ng kasulutang DIETcH
Subsequent to the execution of the said agreement,
Mario and Guillermo, on their own instance, initiated a
survey to segregate the area of 3,750 square meters from
the whole area covered by TCT No. T-107449,
delineating the boundaries of the subdivided parts. As a
result, they came up with a subdivision plan specifically
designating the subject property signed by a Geodetic
Engineer. Mario and Guillermo thereafter made several
demands from Reynaldo to deliver the SPA as agreed
upon, but such demands all went unheeded.
Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated an action
for Specific Performance or Rescission and Damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, seeking to enforce their Contract to Sell dated
18 February 1987. In their Complaint docketed as Civil
Case No. 215-M-90, Mario and Guillermo asserted that
they have a better right over the subject property and
alleged that the subsequent sale thereof effected by
Reynaldo to third persons is void as it was done in bad
faith. It was prayed in the Complaint that Reynaldo be
directed to deliver the SPA and, in case of its
impossibility, to return the amount of P31,500.00 with
legal interest and with damages in either case.
To protect their rights on the subject property, Mario
and Guillermo, after initiating Civil Case No. 215-M-
90, filed a Notice of Lis Pendens registering their claim
on the certificate of title covering the entire property.
In refuting the allegations of Mario and Guillermo in
their Complaint, Reynaldo in his Answer countered that
the purported Contract to Sell is void, because he never
gave his consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted that he was
made to understand that the contract between him and
the Batongbacals was merely an equitable mortgage
whereby it was agreed that the latter will loan to him the
amount of P31,500.00 payable once he receives his
share in the proceeds of the sale of the land registered
under TCT No. T-107449.
Following the pre-trial conference without the parties
reaching an amicable settlement, trial on the merits
ensued. Both parties proceeded to present, in open court,
documentary and testimonial evidence to substantiate
their claims.
For failure of Mario and Guillermo as plaintiffs therein
to adduce sufficient evidence to support their complaint,
the RTC, in a Decision dated 24 March 1999, dismissed
Civil Case No. 215-M-90 and ordered Reynaldo to
return to the former the sum of P28,000.00 with 12%
annual interest. Reynaldo failed to convince the court a
quo that the contract he entered into with Mario was an
equitable mortgage. It was held by the trial court,
however, that the supposed Contract to Sell
denominated as Resibo is unenforceable under Article
1403 of the New Civil Code because Reynaldo cannot
bind his co-owners into such contract without an SPA
authorizing him to do so. As such, Reynaldo cannot be
compelled to deliver the subject property but he was
nonetheless ordered by the court to return the amount he
received as part of the contract price since no one should
be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another. The RTC disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the instant
complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
However, [Reynaldo is] hereby ordered to return to
[Mario and Guillermo] the sum of P28,000.00 plus 12%
interest per annum from the date of this decision until
fully paid.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 7
December 2006, brushed aside the claim of equitable
mortgage and held that the sale effected by Reynaldo of
his undivided share in the property is valid and
enforceable. According to the appellate court, no SPA is
necessary for Reynaldo's disposition of his undivided
share as it is limited to the portion that may be allotted
to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. The
Batongbacals could have validly demanded from
Reynaldo to deliver the subject property pursuant to the
Contract to Sell but such option is no longer feasible
because the entire property has already been sold to
third persons to whom a new title was issued. The
appellate court thus proceeded to rescind the contract
and ordered Reynaldo to return the amount he received
as consideration thereby restoring the parties to their
situation before entering into the agreement. The
decretal portion of the decision reads: cAHDES
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 24, 1999 is
AFFIRMED with modification that appellee is ordered
to return to appellants the amount of P31,500.00 plus
12% interest per annum from the date of decision of the
trial court until full payment thereof.
In addition, the appellee is ordered:
1. To pay appellants P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. To pay attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
P50,000.00; and
3. Double costs.
In seeking modification of the appellate court's decision,
Mario and Guillermo pointed out that the title of the
subject property has not yet been transferred to third
persons, and thus, Reynaldo can still be compelled to
execute a deed of conveyance over his undivided share
of the entire property.
In a Resolution dated 8 August 2007, the Court of
Appeals granted the Motion for Reconsideration of
Mario and Guillermo and directed Reynaldo to convey
the subject property to them, viz.:
WHEREFORE, [Reynaldo's] Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
Upon the other hand, [Mario and Guillermo] Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
decision dated December 7, 2006 is PARTIALLY
RECONSIDERED ordering defendant-appellee
Reynaldo dela Rosa or his successor-in-interest to
execute the requisite Deed of Sale over his 1/4
undivided share in the subject property covered by TCT
T-107449 and to accept the consideration of
P156,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the finality of
the decision.
In case of failure of [Reynaldo] to execute the deed of
sale, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Br. 16 of
Malolos, Bulacan is directed to execute the same and
receive the P156,000.00 balance on the purchase price
on behalf of Reynaldo dela Rosa.
On 9 September 2007, the appellate court was notified
of the death of Reynaldo, and his heirs sought to be
substituted as party in this case.
Petitioners Heirs of Reynaldo are now before this Court
via this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
praying that the Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution be reversed on the ground that it was
rendered not in accordance with the applicable law and
jurisprudence.
Issues
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A CONTRACT OF
SALE BETWEEN REYNALDO DELA ROSA AND
GUILLERMO BATONGBACAL;
II.
ASSUMING THAT THERE IS A CONTRACT OF
SALE, WHETHER OR NOT GUILLERMO
BATONGBACAL COMPLIED WITH HIS
OBLIGATION [UNDER THE CONTRACT];
III.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY
OF LACHES;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT MARIO BATONGBACAL IS A
PARTY TO THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN
REYNALDO DELA ROSA AND GUILLERMO
BATONGBACAL; SHDAEC
V.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT[S] ARE
ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES;
VI.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENTS
ARE ENTITLED TO AWARD OF DAMAGES,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS'
AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS EXCESSIVE.
The various contentions revolve on the sole issue of
whether the contract entered into by parties was a
Contract to Sell or an equitable mortgage. The Court
will not delve into questions which are factual in nature,
consistent with the rule that this Court is not a trier of
facts.
The Court's Ruling
In assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision and
Resolution, petitioners are unflinching in their stand that
the disputed contract purporting to be an absolute deed
of sale was an equitable mortgage with the subject
property as security for a loan obligation. To prove their
point, petitioners asserted that the consideration in the
amount of P187,500.00 for a property consisting of
15,001 square meters is grossly inadequate because the
land valuation in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan, at the
time the transaction was entered into by the parties in
1984, was already P80.00 to P100.00 per square meter.
The gross inadequacy of the price, the Heirs of
Reynaldo argued, is telling of the intention of the parties
to mortgage and not to sell the property with the end
view of affording the mortgagor an easy opportunity to
redeem the property should his means permit him to do
so.
An equitable mortgage is defined as one although
lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other
requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals
the intention of the parties to charge real property as
security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or
contrary to law. For the presumption of an equitable
mortgage to arise, two requisites must concur: (1) that
the parties entered into a contract denominated as a sale;
and (2) the intention was to secure an existing debt by
way of mortgage. Consequently, the non-payment of the
debt when due gives the mortgagee the right to foreclose
the mortgage, sell the property and apply the proceeds
of the sale for the satisfaction of the loan obligation.
While there is no single test to determine whether the
deed of absolute sale on its face is really a simple loan
accommodation secured by a mortgage, the Civil
Code,however, enumerates several instances when a
contract is presumed to be an equitable mortgage, to wit:
Article 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is
unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or
otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the
purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on
the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that
the real intention of the parties is that the transaction
shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of
any other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other
benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise
shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to
the usury laws.
A perusal of the contract denominated as Resibo reveals
the utter frailty of petitioners' position because nothing
therein suggests, even remotely, that the subject
property was given to secure a monetary obligation. The
terms of the contract set forth in no uncertain terms that
the instrument was executed with the intention of
transferring the ownership of the subject property to the
buyer in exchange for the price. Nowhere in the deed is
it indicated that the transfer was merely intended to
secure a debt obligation. On the contrary, the document
clearly indicates the intent of Reynaldo to sell his share
in the property. The primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract is the intention
of the parties. If the words of a contract appear to
contravene the evident intention of the parties, the latter
shall prevail. Such intention is determined not only from
the express terms of their agreement, but also from the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
That the parties intended some other acts or contracts
apart from the express terms of the agreement, was not
proven by Reynaldo during the trial or by his heirs
herein. Beyond their bare and uncorroborated
asseverations that the contract failed to express the true
intention of the parties, the record is bereft of any
evidence indicative that there was an equitable
mortgage. STHDAc
Neither could the allegation of gross inadequacy of the
price carry the day for the petitioners. It must be
underscored at this point that the subject of the Contract
to Sell was limited only to 1/4 pro-indiviso share of
Reynaldo consisting an area of 3,750 square meter and
not the entire 15,001-square meter parcel of land. As a
co-owner of the subject property, Reynaldo's right to
sell, assign or mortgage his ideal share in the property
held in common is sanctioned by law. The applicable
law is Article 493 of the New Civil Code, which spells
out the rights of co-owners over a co-owned property,
to wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership
of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate
his pro-indiviso share in the co-owned property even
without the consent of his co-owners. This right is
absolute and in accordance with the well-settled
doctrine that a co-owner has a full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and substitute another person for its
enjoyment. In other words, the law does not prohibit a
co-owner from selling, alienating, mortgaging his ideal
share in the property held in common.
In Vaglidad v. Vaglidad, Jr., a case nearly on all fours
to the present petition, the Court upheld the right of the
co-owner to alienate his pro-indiviso share in the co-
owned property as part of his right of dominion. It was
even pointed out that since the previous sale is valid, the
subsequent conveyance effected by the co-owner is null
and void pursuant to the principle that "no one can give
what he does not have", nemo dat quod non habet, thus:
LORETO sold the subject property to GABINO, JR. on
May 12, 1986 as a co-owner. LORETO had a right, even
before the partition of the property on January 19, 1987,
to transfer in whole or in part his undivided interest in
the lot even without the consent of his co-heirs. This
right is absolute in accordance with the well-settled
doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and substitute another person for its
enjoyment. Thus, what GABINO, JR. obtained by virtue
of the sale on May 12, 1986 were the same rights as the
vendor LORETO had as co-owner, in an ideal share
equivalent to the consideration given under their
transaction.
LORETO sold some 1,604 square meters of Lot No.
1253 to GABINO, JR. Consequently, when LORETO
purportedly sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989
the same portion of the lot, he was no longer the owner
of Lot No. 1253-B. Based on the principle that "no one
can give what he does not have", LORETO could not
have validly sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989
what he no longer had. As correctly pointed out by the
appellate court, the sale made by LORETO in favor
of WILFREDO is void as LORETO did not have the
right to transfer the ownership of the subject
property at the time of sale. (Emphasis supplied).
In the same breadth, a co-owner cannot be compelled by
the court to give their consent to the sale of his share in
a co-owned property. In Arambulo v. Nolasco, the Court
intimated:
The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such
by the Court, agree that co-owners such as respondents
have over their part, the right of full and absolute
ownership. Such right is the same as that of individual
owners which is not diminished by the fact that the
entire property is co-owned with others. That part which
ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be
disposed of as they please, independent of the decision
of their co-owners. So we rule in this case. The
respondents cannot be ordered to sell their portion of the
co-owned properties. In the language of Rodriguez v.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, "each party is the sole
judge of what is good for him". (Underscoring ours).
Thus, even if the impression of the Court of Appeals
were true, i.e., that the entire property has been sold to
thirds
Indeed, the intention clearly written, settles the issue
regarding the purchase price. A contract of sale is a
consensual contract, which becomes valid and binding
upon the meeting of minds of the parties on the price
and the object of the sale. The mere inadequacy of the
price does not affect its validity when both parties are in
a position to form an independent judgment concerning
the transaction, unless fraud, mistake or undue influence
indicative of a defect in consent is present. A contract
may consequently be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent and not due to the inadequacy of the price. In
the case at bar, however, no evidence to prove fraud,
mistake or undue influence indicative of vitiated
consent is attendant.
As the parties invoking equitable mortgage, the Heirs of
Reynaldo did not even come close to proving that the
parties intended to charge the property as security for a
debt, leaving us with no other choice but to uphold the
stipulations in the contract. Basic is the rule that if the
terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control, we find that the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for ruling, in modification of
its original judgment, that the sale effected by Reynaldo
of his undivided share in the property is valid and
enforceable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.