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Annu.Rev.Sociol. 1997.23:263-87
? 1997 byAnnualReviewsInc. All rightsreserved
Copyright
ABSTRACT
Recentworkin cognitive psychology andsocialcognitionbearsheavilyon con-
cernsofsociologistsofculture.Cognitive researchconfirmsviewsofcultureas
fragmented; therolesofinstitutions
clarifies andagency;andilluminates supra-
individualaspectsof culture.Individualsexperiencecultureas disparatebitsof
information thatorganizethatinformation.
and as schematicstructures Culture
carriedby institutions,
networks,and social movements diffuses,activates,and
selectsamongavailableschemata. Implicationsforthestudyofidentity,collective
memory, andlogicsofactionaredeveloped.
socialclassification,
INTRODUCTION
The studyof culturein everyday liferemainsa virtuosoaffair.Interpretive
studiesoffergreatinsightbutfailto buildon one another.Culturaltheory has
becomehighlysophisticated butnotfullyoperational. Theserichesreadythe
fieldfortakeoff, in Sorokin'sday (1957
likethestudyof social stratification
[1927]). Butbeforethestudyoflivedculturecan becomea cumulative enter-
prise,scholarsmustclarifythecognitive presuppositions behind their theories
ofwhatculturedoes andwhatpeopledo withit,andthefundamental concepts
andunitsofanalysis(Jepperson & Swidler1994,Wuthnow 1987).
Recentworkincognitive psychology andsocialcognition provides resources
forbothtasks. Afterdescribing recent convergence between cultural sociol-
ogyandpsychology, considers
thischapter lessons ofrecent work on cognition
forpresuppositionsaboutthenatureofculture;developsimplications ofthese
lessonsforsociological work on identity,collectivememory, social classifi-
cation,logicsof action,andframing; points keyproblems remain
and to that
unsolved.
263
0360-0572/97/0815-0263$08.00
264 DiMAGGIO
Sociology:MoreComplexViewsofCulture
In recentyears,however, commongroundbetweensociologyof cultureand
psychologyhas grown. The majordevelopment withinsociologyhas been
a shiftto a morecomplexunderstanding of culture.Thirtyyearsago, most
sociologistsviewedcultureas a "seamlessweb" (Swidler1997),unitary and
internallycoherent acrossgroupsand situations.In effect, culturewas por-
trayedas a latentvariableinfluencingincommonsuchmanifestations as media
images,responses to attitude and
questionnaires, the values embodied in ev-
eryday practices.Individuals to
werepresumed acquire cultureinthe course of
socializationand,inthepopularoversocialized view (Wrong1961), to enact it
unproblematically. It followed fromthis
perspectivethatthere was littlereason
to worryaboutconstructs usedtostudyculture,foranykindof"cultural stuff"
couldserveas an indicator latentvariable.
oftheunderlying
By contrast, recentworkdepictscultureas fragmented acrossgroupsand
inconsistent acrossitsmanifestations (Martin1992). The viewof cultureas
CULTURE AND COGNITION 265
Psychology:MoreComplexViewsofCognition
Suchquestionsmakeitsensibleforsociologists ofculturetoturntopsychology
forinsightintothemechanisms through whichsharedcultureentersintocog-
nition.Yetnothing guarantees whohavetheirownresearch
thatpsychologists,
agendas,can helpus. Thirty yearsago, behaviorism madepsychology essen-
tiallyirrelevant
tothestudyofculture.Twenty yearsago,psychologists casting
offtheyokeofbehaviorism focusedprimarilyon theacquisitionofskillsand
to mostsociologistsofculture.Even a dozenyears
capacitiesoflittleinterest
ago, theimplications forculturalsociologyofmanyoftheideas andresearch
traditionsthataremostusefultodaywerestillunclear.
Whathas happenedto makepsychology usefulto sociologistsof culture?
First,psychologistshaverejectedbehaviorism, acceptedanddemonstrated the
existenceofmentalstructures usedtoperceive, process,andretrieveinforma-
tion,and foundwaysto makeinferences aboutsuchstructures. Second,just
as sociologicalresearchhasdemonstrated andfragmenta-
culture'scomplexity
tion,psychological researchhas demonstratedthecomplexity ofmemory and
providedglimpsesof thepartitioning ofmentalstructures bydomain.Third,
recentfoci of psychologicalresearch(schemata,categories, mentalmodels,
andso on) aremuchricherincultural thantheformaloperations
content orin-
tellectualcapacitiesthatoncepreoccupied and developmentalists
cognitivists
266 DiMAGGIO
COGNITIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS
OF CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
Sociologistswho writeaboutthewaysthatcultureentersintoeverydaylife
necessarilymakeassumptions aboutcognitive processes.If we assumethata
sharedsymbolevokesa senseofcommonidentity (Warner1959),thata certain
frameprovokespeopleto thinkabouta social issue in a new way (Gamson
1992),thatlessonsaboutthestructure ofspace andtimelearnedin schoolare
generalizedto theworkplace(Willis1977),orthatsurveyscan measureclass
consciousness(see Fantasia'scritique1995),we arethenmakingpowerful cog-
nitiveassumptions.Such assumptions, whilemetatheoreticalto sociologists,
are keenlyempiricalfromthestandpoint of cognitivepsychology.It is cru-
cial,then,toevaluateourassumptions (or adjudicatedifferences
amongthem)
by microtranslatingpresuppositions(Collins1981) to thecognitiveleveland
assessingtheirconsistencywithresultsofempirical researchon cognition.
CULTURE AND COGNITION 267
CoherencevsFragmentation
Manysociologistshave come to rejectthelatent-variable viewof cultureas
coherent, integrated, andambiguousin favorofrepresentations ofcultureas a
"toolkit"(Swidler1986) or"repertoire" (Tilly1992): a collectionofstuff that
is heterogeneous in content andfunction. Yetmuchempirical workon culture
stillpresumesthatcultureis organizedaroundnationalsocietiesor cohesive
subnational groupings, is highlythematized, andis manifested insimilarways
acrossmanydomains(Hofstede1980,Bourdieu1984).
Is culturea latentvariable-a tightnetwork ofa fewabstract centralthemes
and theirmoreconcreteentailments, all instantiated to variousdegreesin a
rangeof symbols,rituals,andpractices?If so, thenwe wouldexpectto find
thatgroupmemberssharea limitednumberof consistent elements-beliefs,
attitudes, typifications,strategies-andthattheinclusionofanyoneelementin
thecollectivecultureimpliestheexclusionofinconsistent elements.
Or is culturea grab-bagof odds and ends: a pasticheof mediatedrepre-
sentations, a repertoire of techniques, or a toolkitof strategies?If so, then
we mightexpectless clustering ofcultural elementswithinsocialgroups,less
stronglinkagesamongtheelements, andweakerpressures fortheexclusionof
inconsistent elements.
Researchincognitive psychology strongly supports thetoolkit overthelatent-
variableviewandsuggeststhatthetypicaltoolkitis verylargeindeed.Partic-
ularlyrelevant hereis research(summarized by Gilbert1991) on howpeople
attribute accuracyorplausibility to statements offactandopinion.Consistent
withSwidler's(1986) contention that"all peopleknowmoreculturethanthey
use,"Gilbertreports that"The acceptanceofan idea is a partoftheautomatic
comprehension ofthatidea,andtherejectionoftheidea occurssubsequent to
andmoreeffortfully thanitsacceptance."In otherwords,ourheadsarefullof
images,opinions,andinformation, untagged as totruth value,towhichwe are
inclinedto attribute accuracyandplausibility.
Researchonmemory tellsa similarstory, revealing thatinformation (includ-
ingfalseinformation) passesintomemory without being"tagged"as tosource
orcredibility, andthatactiveinference is requiredto identify thesourceofthe
information whenit is recalled. Such inferences maybe incorrect, yielding
misattributions ofsourceandcredibility (Johnson et al 1991).
This workhas severalimportant implications forstudents ofculture.First,
itrefutes thenotionthatpeopleacquirea culturebyimbibing it(andno other)
through socialization.Instead,itdirectsthesearchforsourcesofstability and
consistency in ourbeliefsandrepresentations, first,to schematic organization,
whichmakessomeideas or imagesmoreaccessiblethanothers;and,second,
to cues embeddedinthephysicalandsocialenvironment.
268 DiMAGGIO
andAgency
Institution
Cognitiveresearchcan also enhanceourappreciation oftheviewthatculture
both constrainsand enables (Sewell 1992). Although positionhas become
this
catechismic
virtually amongsociologistsof culture, we knowlittleaboutthe
conditionsunderwhichoneortheotheris thecase. Manysociologists believe,
followingGramsci (1990), thatculture,embedded in language and everyday
practices,constrains people's capacityto imaginealternatives to existingar-
rangements. Atthesametime,we knowthatpeopleactas iftheyuse cultural
elementsstrategically to pursuevaluedends(Bourdieu1990). Cognitivere-
searchcannotanswertheessentially sociologicalquestionofwhenculture does
each,butitcan providedirection tothesearch.
Thefinding thatcultureis storedinmemory as anindiscriminatelyassembled
andrelatively unorganized collectionof oddsandendsimposesa farstronger
organizing burdenon actorsthandidtheearlieroversocialized view.Theques-
tion,then,is howtheactororganizestheinformation thatshe orhe possesses.
Psychological researchpointsto twoquitedifferent mechanisms or modesof
cognition.
CULTURE AND COGNITION 269
withresultsinhistorical studies:forexample,thegrad-
sociologyandcultural
ual and of
acceptance information
halting about NewWorldbyearlymodern
the
mapmakers (Zerubavel1992);thewaysinwhicharchaicphysicalmodelscon-
strainedmedicalscientists' ofnewevidenceaboutsyphilis
interpretation (Fleck
1979); and thepenchantof malebiologistsforseeingdominancehierarchies
whentheywatchapes andelephantseals (Haraway1991).
Cultureas Supra-Individual
Itis nonewstosociologists
thatculture atthecollectivelevel.
exists,suigeneris,
(The positiontakenhere-thatcultureis also manifestin people'sheads-is
probably morecontroversial.)
Nonetheless,psychologicalresearchcanhelpus
character
appreciateseveralaspectsofculture'ssupra-individual thatsociolo-
gistsofculturesometimes neglect.
fromtheformerwithsignificant consequencesandthatthisprocess
behavioral
autonomy
a basisfortherelative
represents ofsocialnorms(Miller& Prentice
1996,Noelle-Neumann 1993).
APPLICATIONS
This sectionreviewsworkon cognitiveaspectsof thesociologyof culture
in lightof theperspectivedevelopedhere. The topicsare identity,
collective
memory, logicsofaction,andframing.
socialclassification,
Identity
has becomeone ofthemostactiveresearchfieldsin thesociologyof
Identity
kindsofcollective
betweentwoquitedifferent
culture.Itis usefultodistinguish
identity:theidentities ontheonehand,andcollectiveaspectsof
ofcollectives,
theidentities ofindividualson theother.
IDENTITIES OF COLLECTIVES At the supra-individual level,collectiveiden-
Researchat thislevelportrays
of a collectivity.
tityis a sharedrepresentation
as highlyconstructed
collectiveidentities (Anderson1983), through explicit
CULTUREANDCOGNITION 275
CollectiveMemory
Collectivememoryis the outcomeof processesaffecting, respectively,the
information to whichindividuals haveaccess,theschemataby whichpeople
understand thepast,and theexternalsymbolsor messagesthatprimethese
schemata.Like collectiveidentities, researchon collectivememory portrays
thephenomenon in bothsupra-individualandindividualterms.
processesthatmaintain
Severalscholarshavestudiedinstitutional orsuppress
information as partofpublicculture,suchas factors
determining thereputation
andpopularity ofparticular personsor artworks(Fine 1996,Griswold1986,
Lang& Lang 1988). Muchresearch, however, focusesupontheschematic level,
studying struggles to definethewaysin whichmembers ofa societyinterpret
widelysharedinformation abouttheirpast,eithertrackingchangein theways
in whicha personor publicfigureis understood overtime(Schudson1992,
Schwartz1991) or analyzingconflict overalternativevisionsof a collective
past(Maier1988,Zerubavel1994).
Littleresearchhas focusedon theinteraction betweenindividualand col-
lectivememories.An exceptionis theworkofSchuman& Scott(1989), who
use surveymethodsto explorethepossibility thatthehistoricaleventsthat
276 DiMAGGIO
generations
menandwomenofdifferent remember their
mostvividlystructure
socialissues.
ofcontemporary
understanding
Social Classification
The studyofsocialclassification-the socialconstruction anduse ofcategory
schemes-hasburgeoned inthelastdecade.Someworkhasanalyzedprocesses
inhistorical
ofclassification time,describing theemergence ofa strongly clas-
highculture(DiMaggio 1982),ortheuse ofsocialcategorization
sifiedartistic
intheformation andimplementation ofsocialpolicies(Starr1992). Ofparticu-
is Mohr's(1994) analysisof"discourseroles,"whichusesstructural
larinterest
equivalenceanalysisto identify theimplicitclassification of social problems
andclientgroupsembeddedin self-descriptions ofsocial-service andpoverty-
relieforganizationsin earlytwentieth-century New YorkCity.
Otherresearch has focuseduponsocialdifferentiation inshorter timespans.
Zelizer(1989) describestheprocessbywhichwomenfindwaysto differenti-
ate evenmoney,theuniversalmediumof exchange,in orderto imbueit with
social meaning.Lamont(1992) analyzesthebasesuponwhichmenofdiffer-
entregionaland nationaloriginsmakesocial distinctions thatreinforce their
senseofsocialhonor.Gieryn(1997) describesboundary workwithinscientific
communities, examining howscientists respondwhenthestrong classification
science/nonscience is threatened.
Zerubavel,one of fewsociologiststo studyclassification froma cognitive
perspective,pointsoutthatthedriveto partition a continuous worldappears
to be a humanuniversal, thoughthenatureofthecategoriesconstructed may
varysignificantlyamonggroups(Zerubavel1991,1997,Douglas1966). Rosch
(1978), whoseworkhas dominated psychological thinking on thetopic,pro-
poses (withmuchexperimental support)thatcognition is mostefficient when
we chunkmanyseparatefeatures(bitsof information) together by thinking
witha prototype (completementalimage)ofan object.Prototypical constructs
emergeatthemostefficient levelofabstraction:i.e. whereanincreaseinspeci-
ficityprovidesthegreatestmarginalincreasein information. Thus we have
prototypes for"chair"butnot"furniture" or "divan,"and for"bird"butnot
for"animal"or"sparrow." Although thelevelatwhichobjectprototypes form
appearsto be relativelyuniversal,thespecificcontent ofa prototype reflectsa
mixoftypicality andavailabilityin a givenlocation(D'Andrade1995).
Roschappliedhermodelofprototypes to relativelysimpleconcepts.Self-
categorizationtheory drawson theprototype model(Hogg& McGarty1990),
butitremainsto be seen ifcomplexsocial constructs arerepresented in such
unambiguous terms.If so, application to roleanalysismaybe useful,in light
parallelbetweenRosch'scharacterization
of an intriguing of a prototype as a
CULTURE AND COGNITION 277
ofsocialroleas
andNadel's (1957) classicdefinition
coreofessentialfeatures
anda penumbra
ofa coreofentailments
consisting ofoptionalfeatures.
LogicsofAction
Manyauthorshaveusedtheexpression "logicsofaction"to referto an inter-
dependent setofrepresentations orconstraints thatinfluence actionin a given
domain.Sometimes, ofcourse,thetermis usedas a synonym for"idealtype"
(Orru1991) or,in rational-actor approaches, toreferto situational constraints
thatinduceparallelbehaviorsamongplayerswithsimilarresourcesgivenpar-
ticularrulesofthegame(Block 1990,Offe1985).
morecultural,
A richer, senseoflogicshasemerged inrecentworkinpolitical
economy, a viewthatembedsthemintheinteraction betweenmentalstructures
instantiatedin practicalreason(Bourdieu1990),on theone hand,andinstitu-
tionalrequirements on theother.Friedland& Alford(1991:248-49) provide
themostthorough expositionand definition, describing "institutionallogics"
as sets "of materialpracticesand symbolicconstructions" thatconstitute an
order's"organizing
institutional principles"andare"availabletoorganizations
and individuals to elaborate."Accordingto Friedland& Alford,theselogics
are"symbolically grounded, organizationallystructured, defined
politically and
technicallyandmaterially constrained."
Similarimageryis apparentin Boltanski& Thevenot'snotionof modes
of justification(1991), institutionallylinkeddiscoursesembodyingspecific
orientationstowardactionand evaluation.Empiricaldevelopment of similar
ideas can be foundin Fligstein's(1990) workon "conceptions of control"in
corporate governance, andin Stark's(1990) analysisofshopfloorpoliticsin a
Hungarian socialistfactory.
Such workrequiresa taxonomy each ofwhichentailsa dis-
ofinstitutions,
tinctivelogic. (For Friedland& Alford,theinstitutions are capitalism,the
state,democracy, family, religion,andscience,each ofwhichhas itsownax-
ial principleand linkedroutinesand rituals.)Conflicteruptsfromtheclash
of institutionallogics,as whena wifeviewsherhouseholdlaborthrough a
marketplace logicofexplicitexchange, whereasherhusbandimposesa family
logicofselflessserviceuponthesituation.
The notionoflogicsis immensely appealing.First,itproposesthatexternal
ritualsand stimuliinteract withinternal mentalstructures to generateroutine
behavior. Second,it is consistent withtheview thatcultureis fragmented
amongpotentially inconsistentelements,withoutsurrendering thenotionof
limitedcoherence,whichthematization of clustersof ritualsand schemata
aroundinstitutions provides. Third,it providesa vocabularyfordiscussing
culturalconflictas confrontation betweeninconsistent logicsofaction.
278 DiMAGGIO
ATOMISTICDECOUPLING isthateveryday
Thenullhypothesis ispop-
thought
ulatedbyrandomly invoked, looselycoupledschematawithlittleornohigher-
is simplyimposedposthoc bycultural
If so, thematization
levelarchitecture.
specialistsorembeddedintheenvironment andineverydayroutines.
Although
thisviewis inconsistentwithmostworkinthesociologyofculture, andwould
seemill-equippedtoexplaineitherexperimental onschemata
research ormacro-
culturalchange,itcannotnowbe disconfirmed absolutely.
IDENTITYCENTRALITY Someevidencesuggests
thataffectively
hotschemata
aremoresalientandhavemoreextensive entailments
thando emotionally
neu-
tralstructures.
Workon identity(Wiley& Alexander1987,Hogg & McGarty
1990) suggeststhepossibility
that"theself"maybe an emotionally
supersat-
uratedclusterofschematatending towardconsistency
andstability
overtime.
Schematathatareembeddedintheself-schemata, then,aremorecloselyartic-
ulatedwithotherschematathanthosethatarenotincorporatedintotheself.
CulturalChange
A secondpriority forsociologistsof cultureis to createtheoriesof cultural
changethatintegrate
ideasfromresearch onculture andcognitionwithmacroso-
At leastfourdifferent
ciologicalperspectives. changeprocessesarecrucialto
understand.
theyshareparticular
features
in common,butoftheextentto whichrelations
amongfeaturesarestructurally
similar(Gentner1983).
EMOTIONAL RESONANCE Someresearch suggeststhataffectively
hotschemata
aremorelikelytobe generalizedacrossdomainsthanaffectively neutral
sche-
mata. For example,analogiesare likelyto be drawnbetweensituations that
elicitstrong
emotionalreactionsofa similarkind(Abelson1981:725).
POLYSEMY AND SEMANTIC CONTAGION A finalpossibility is thatpolysemous
expressions-those withdistinctmeaningsthatresonate withmultiple schemata
or domains-facilitate analogicaltransfer.
Bakhtin'swork(1986) on textual
is suggestive
multivocality inthisregard,as is White's(1992) workon stories
and rhetorics.Ross (1992) portraysmeaningas emerging fromtherelations
of wordsto one anotherin speechand to activitiesin real time. Because
theseconstantlychange,meaningsarerarelyfixed,butinsteadadapt,diverge,
and spreadacrossdomainsthrough semanticcontagion.This perspective is
attractive
particularly becauseitacknowledges endemicchangeinlanguageand
othersymbolsystems andbecauseitembedsgeneralization insocialinteraction.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
VisittheAnnualReviewshomepage at
http://www.annurev.org.
Literature
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