PEOPLE VS PASTOR

TOPIC: PLEA GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE

FACTS:
Pastor was charged with raping of his own
daughter. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
During the hearing, his counsel manifested that
Pastor decided to change his plea of not guilty to
guilty.

Upon re-arraignment, he entered a plea of guilty.

After, the trial court propounded clarificatory
questions to Pastor to ascertain whether he
understood the consequences of his plea.

Pastor then testified on the mitigating circumstances

of plea of guilty, voluntary surrender and
drunkenness which is not habitual.

The trial court convicted the accused. In its

decision, it said that: The Court herein was saved
of its precious time in conducting full-dress trial
because the accused pleaded guilty. The
prosecution even conformed to accused' claim of
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and spontaneous plea of guilt.

Accused contended that the trial court failed to

conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of the
Pastor's plea because the questions propounded to
the Pastor were limited to his family background
and personal circumstances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion
when the judge did not properly do a searching
inquiry
RULING:
YES.

First, all the questions propounded by the court

were couched in English but there is nothing in the
records to show that Pastor had a good
comprehension, or at least, a nodding acquaintance
with the English language. The records also do not
show whether the judge translated and explained
his questions to Pastor in a language or dialect
known and understood by the latter. Pastor is a
simple fisherman and his educational background is
unknown.

The trial court failed to explain to Pastor the

elements of the crime of rape. In addition, Pastor
was not categorically advised that his plea of guilt
would not under any circumstance affect or reduce
his sentence.

When Pastor attempted to prove the mitigating

circumstances of plea of guilty, voluntary surrender
and drunkenness, he was under the mistaken
assumption that his liability would be reduced. He
was not warned that the penalty of death is
indivisible and is not affected by either aggravating
or mitigating circumstances.

A conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on

a plea of guilt. The prosecution evidence must be
sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
independently of the plea of guilty.

The judge failed to state the factual and legal

reasons on which he based accused-appellant's
conviction. Also, there is no evaluation of the
evidence and no reason given why the court found
that the testimony of the complainant is credible.
 PEOPLE VS BAHARAN
TOPIC: PLEA GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE
FACTS:
Valentines Day bombing incident.
charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat
were arrested, while the other accused remain at-
large.

On the arraignment, all except Rohmat plead

guilty to multiple murder. Only Asali plead guilty to
multiple frustrated murder.

The trial court asked whether accused Baharan and

Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not
guilty" pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an
apparent inconsistency in their pleas.

Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan

a n d Tr i n i d a d a n d e x p l a i n e d t o t h e m t h e
consequences of the pleas. The two accused
acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested
their readiness for re-arraignment. After the
Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad
pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder.
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue
that the trial court did not conduct a searching
inquiry after they had changed their plea from "not
guilty" to "guilty."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in
accepting accused-appellants' plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the said plea.

RULING:
No.

The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty

of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to
satisfy themselves that the accused had not been
under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or
a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement
is stringent and mandatory.

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry

should not be deemed
satisfied in cases in which it was the defense
counsel who explained the consequences of a
"guilty" plea to the accused, as it appears in this
case.

However, in the case at bar, the Court observes that

accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty
to another charge multiple murder based on
the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated
murder charge.

The Court further notes that prior to the change of

plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad
made two other confessions of guilt one through
an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television
interviews, as stipulated by both accused during
pretrial), and the other via judicial admission
(pretrial stipulation).
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Court
deems it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of
the "searching inquiry" in this instance.

PEOPLE VS. GAMBAO

TOPIC: PLEA GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE
FACTS:
The accused were charged with kidnapping. All 7
accused manifested their desire to change his
earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty."

The presiding judge then explained the

consequences of a change of plea stating that they
will be sentenced to the penalty provided by law
after the prosecution shall have finished the
presentation of its evidence.

Their counsel had earlier conferred with them and

explained to each of them the consequences of a
change of plea, their desire to change the pleas
they entered. The trial court separately asked each
of the accused if they understood the consequence
of changing their pleas. All of them answered in the
affirmative.

Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-

arraignment. After they pleaded guilty, the trial court
directed the prosecution to present evidence, which
it did.

They were convicted by the RTC and the decision

was affirmed by the CA on appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court did a searching inquiry
RULING:
No. The pleas were improvidently made.

The questions propounded by the trial court judge

failed to ensure
that accused-appellants fully understood the
consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily
apparent from the records that Karim had the
mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would
mitigate the imposable penalty and that both the
judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that
such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty.

As a general rule, convictions based on an

improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases
are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is
the sole basis of judgement.

If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and

credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in
this case, the conviction must be
sustained, because then it is predicated not merely
on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the
commission of the offense charged.

PEOPLE VS GUMIMBA
TOPIC: PLEA GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE
FACTS:
The accused were charged for a crime of rape with
homicide. They both pleaded not guilty on
arraignment.

Later, accused wanted to change of plea to guilty.

The RTC ordered appellant's re-arraignment and
the latter accordingly entered a plea of guilty. The
court conducted an inquiry to ascertain the
voluntariness of appellant's plea and his full
comprehension of the consequences thereof.
Prosecution was likewise charged to establish the
guilt and degree of culpability of appellant.

Ababo was acquitted (co-accused ni).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court did a searching inquiry

RULING:
No.

When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered,

there are 3 conditions that the trial court must
observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilty by
the accused:
(1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension by the
accused of the consequences of his plea;
(2) it must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability; and
(3) it must ask the accused whether he
desires to present evidence on his behalf, and
allow him to do so if he so desires.

In the instant case, when the accused entered a

plea of guilty at his re-arraignment, it is evident that
the RTC did not strictly observe the requirements
under Section 3, Rule 116 above. A mere warning
that the accused faces the supreme penalty of
death is insufficient.

Q When you were arraigned, you pleaded guilty, do

you understand
the consequence of your pleading guilty?
A I do not know Your Honor [,] the consequence.
Q You pleaded guilty to the offense of rape with
homicide, did you
understand?
A Yes, Your Honor, I understand.
Q That by your pleading guilty to the offense you
will be sentenced
to die?
A Yes, I am aware.

BANDOY VS JUDGE JACINTO

TOPIC: ARRAIGNMENT; HOW MADE
FACTS:
Bandoy was charged with Serious Illegal Detention.
The provincial prosecutor recommended "no bail"
leaving them incarcerated for more than two years.

Ang case daw gi-file ni De Jesus, Jr. kay galagot ni

siya sa case pud nga gi-file against niya for Ballot
Switching. Kani si Judge Jacinto wa ray paki bisan
walay tunga2x si De Jesus, sige lang ug postpone
(4years).

Another example of Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s supposed

unreasonable bias towards Bandoy was his lack of
interest to dispose of the case of serious illegal
detention despite De Jesus, Jr.'s obvious dilatory
tactics and unjustified absences when his
appearance was necessary.
They filed a petition for review in DOJ. DOJ
instructed the prosecutor to withdraw information.
Judge denied the motion. Meanwhile, the case of
ballot switching against De Jesus, Jr. was
dismissed, while their bail for the serious illegal
detention case was cancelled.
Gi-arraign diay si De Jesus sa chambers ra ni
Judge.

ISSUE:
Whether there is gross ignorance of the law

RULING:
YES.
Section 1. Rule 116. Arraignment and plea, how
made. (a) The accused must be arraigned before
the court where the complaint or information was
filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be
made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint
or information, reading the same in the language or
dialect known to him, and asking him whether he
pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call
at the trial witnesses other than those named in the
complaint or information.

DAAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

TOPIC: PLEA BARGAINING; NOT A MATTER OF
RIGHT
FACTS:
Daan was accused for three counts of malversation
and falsification of public document.

@falsification case: Proposal

1. Substitute not guilty with guilty provided,
the mitigating circumstances of confession or
plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. OR
2. Substitute not guilty to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public
officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but
to the lesser crime of falsification of a public
document by a private individual. (kani ang
gipili sa prosecution)
@malversation case: Proposal
Substitute "not guilty" with "guilty", but to the
lesser crime of failure of an accountable
officer to render accounts. (ok pudd aw, ingon
si prosecutor)
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to
Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by
the prosecution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to plea bargain should be
granted

RULING:
YES.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that
for the graver charge.

SEC. 2. Rule 116. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.

At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said
lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary.

Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-

trial stage of the proceedings. But it may also be
made during the trial proper and even after the
prosecution has finished presenting its evidence
and rested its case.

Requisites upon which plea bargaining may be

made:
1. it should be with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor, and
2. the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense
charged.

The rules however use word may in the second

sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of
discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow
the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are
exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a
lighter offense than that actually charged is not
supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.

LUMANLAW VS. JUDGE PERALTA

TOPIC: ARRAIGNMENT; WHEN MADE
FACTS:
Lumanlaw was charged with illegal possession of a
dangerous drug. The initial date for the arraignment
was Jan8,2003. It was deferred to Feb21,2003
because of a motion for preliminary investigation.

It was then moved to Mar26,2003 (ordered by the

new Judge; ni-retire ang old). Then it was reset to
June 25, 2003, due to the public prosecutor's
absence.

On June 25, 2003, petitioner's counsel received the

lower court's Order granting Petition to Reduce Bail
and denying his Motion for Preliminary
Investigation. In the same Order, the trial court set
petitioner's arraignment on August 6, 2003.

The arraignment was postponed again, this time

due to the absence of petitioner's counsel.
According to him, he requested the court to proceed
with the arraignment, with the public defender
assisting the accused, but that respondent judge
denied the request on the ground that petitioner was
already represented by a counsel de parte. The trial
court then re-scheduled the arraignment on Sept24,
2003.

It was again postponed in view of the scheduled

meeting of presiding judges with accredited
newspaper publishers and was thus reset to
Oct1,2003. On the said date, judge issued an order
resetting the arraignment on Dec10,2003.
Again, the arraignment did not occur on December
10, 2003, because petitioner had not been brought
to the court by the wardens of the Manila City Jail.
According to the trial court's Order, there was no
proof of service on the Manila City Jail. The
arraignment was thus reset to March 1, 2004.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on account of the

violation of right to a speedy trial.denied! The
arraignment was reset yet again to March 17, 2004.
Reset to Apr6,2004 (wa daw giproduce sa warden)
Now frustrated with the repeated postponements,
petitioner filed a Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss.

It was again moved to May26,2004 and then to

June16,2004, then July21,2004. (TOTAL OF 14
POSTPONEMENTS)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of Judge Peralta to
conduct the arraignment despite the delay of 1yr,
9mos and 4days constitute undue and unjustifiable
delay in violation of the constitutional right to speedy
trial.

RULING:
YES.

As provided by the Rules, arraignment shall be held

within 30days from the date the court acquired
jurisdiction over the accused.

It was held in that case that the period was not

absolute. Certain delays were allowed by law and
excluded from the computation of the time within
which trial must commence.

In the case at bar, it should be stressed that

petitioner asserted his right to speedy trial twice, but
was denied by respondent in both instances.

The only justifiable reasons for the delay are: Judge

retirement, filing of motion for P.I.

(10mins raman unta daw nang arraignment oy!)

TAGLAY VS JUDGE DARAY

TOPIC: ARRAIGNMENT; WHOSE JURISDICTION
FACTS:
Taglay was charged with Qualified Trespass to
D w e l l i n g i n M C T C D a v a o d e l S u r. U p o n
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Because
the offended party was a minor at the time of the
incident, it was then transferred to the RTC.
Petitioner insists that she should have been
arraigned anew before the RTC and that her
arraignment before the MCTC does not count
because the proceedings conducted therein were
void.

Petitioner contends that the RTC did not acquire

jurisdiction over the case because Circular No.
11-99, which authorizes the transfer of Family
Courts cases filed with first-level courts to the
RTCs, is applicable only to cases which were filed
prior to the effectivity of the said Circular on March
1, 1999.

Petitioner argues that all Family Courts cases filed

with first-level courts after the effectivity of the said
Circular can no longer be transferred to the RTC;
instead they should be dismissed. Considering that
the Information in the instant case was filed with the
MCTC on November 19, 2001, petitioner avers that
the MCTC should have dismissed the case instead
of ordering its transfer to the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arraignment in MCTC is void

RULING:
Yes.

Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all

the proceedings conducted therein, including
petitioner's arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the
need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a
valid Information filed with the RTC.

PEOPLE VS. VILLARAMA

TOPIC: PLEA OF GUILTY TO A LESSER
OFFENSE
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused)
moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the
prosecution had already rested its case. In such
situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court
and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick
within which their discretion may be properly
exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355,
May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the
rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution
does not have sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of the crime charged. People vs. Villarama, Jr.,
210 SCRA 246, G.R. No. 99287 June 23, 1992