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Randall B.
Aiman-Smith #124599
2 Reed W.L. Marcy #191531 ELECTRON ICALLY
3 Hallie Von Rock #233152 FILED
Carey A. Jamcs #269270 Superior Court of California,
4 Brent A. Robinson #289373 County of San Francisco
7677 Oakport St. Suite 1150 08/24/2017

5 Clerk of the Court
Oakland, CA 94621 BY:JUDITH NUNEZ
T 510.817.2711 Deputy Clerk
6
F 510.562.6830
7
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Attorneysfor Angelica Cosio
11 *Additional Counsel Listed on Next Page
12 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
13 FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

14
ANGELICA COSIO, an individual, on her) Case No. CGC-16-551337
15 own behalf and on behalf of all others )
similarly situated, )
16 ) PLAINTIFF ANGELICA COSIO'S
Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
17 ) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
v. ) EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY
18 ) RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO
INTERNATIONAL PERFORMING ARTS) SHOW CAUSE WHY A PRELIMINARY
19 ACADEMY, LLC, a California limited ) INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE
liability company, BARBIZON SCHOOL )
20 OF SAN FRANCISCO, INC., a California ) The Honorable Curtis E.A. Karnow
corporation, LION MANAGEMENT ) Department 304
21 GROUP INC., a California corporation, ) Civic Center Courthouse
ANTHONY LOUIS LIONETTI, LARRY ) 400 McAllister Street
22 D. LIONETTI, LENA QUESADA ) San Francisco California 94102
LIONETTI, LENA M. LIONETTI, and )
23 DOES 1-100, inclusive, ) Date: Friday, Aug. 25, 2017
) Time: 9:00 a.m.
24 Defendants. )
) Complaint Filed: April 6, 2016
25 )
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Cosio, et al. v. International Performing Arts Academy, LLC, et al. Case No. CGC-16-551337
Ethan Preston (263295)
PRESTON LAW OFFICES
4054 McKinney A venue, Suite 310
2
Dallas, Texas 75204
3 (972) 564-8340 (telephone)
(866) 509-1197 (facsimile)
4
5 Zack Broslavsky (241736)

Jonathan A. Weinman (256553)
6 BROSLAVSKY & WEINMAN, LLP
1500 Rosecrans Ave., Suite 500
7 Los Angeles, CA 90266
(310) 575-2550 (telephone)
8 (31 464-3550 (facsimile)
9
10
David C. Parisi (162248)
II Suzanne Havens Beckman (188814)
PARISI & HA YENS LLP
12 212 Marine Street, Suite 100
Santa Monica, California 90405
13 (818) 990-1299 (telephone)
(818) 501-7852 (facsimile)
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15
16 Attorneys for PlaintiffAngelica Cosio, on

her own behalf, and behalf of all others
17 similarly situated
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... - 1 -
3
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE .......................................................................................... - 1
4
III. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ..................................................................... - 2
5
6 A. THE PUTTERMAN DECLARATION CONTAINS STATEMENTS MRS. HEU DID NOT MAKE,
7 AND WAS NOT ASKED ABOUT ............................................................................................. - 4-

8 B. THE PUTTERMAN DECLARATION CONTAINS STATEMENTS THAT DIRECTLY CONTRADICT
9 WHAT MRS. HEU SAID .......................................................................................................... 5-

10 C. THE PUTTERMAN DECLARATION CONTAINS STATEMENTS THAT ARE GROSSLY
II MISLEADING ......................................................................................................................... - 5-
12
IV. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... - 6 -
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A. DEFENDANTS' ONGOING EFFORTS TO OBTAIN FALSE AND MISLEADING DECLARATION
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TESTIMONY FROM CLASS MEMBERS UNDER FALSE PRETENSE WILL CAUSE PLAINTIFF, THE
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CLASS, AND THE COURT IRREPARABLE HARM UNLESS ENJOINED ...................................... -7-
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i. Irreparable Harm to Plaint~D: ..................................................... .............................. - 8 -
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ii. Irreparable Harm to the Absent Class Members . ..................................................... - 8 -
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iii. Irreparable Harm to the Judiciary ............................................................................ - 9 -
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B. THE COURT MAY ENJOIN ALL COMMUNICATIONS WITH ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS
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PENDING ACTUAL CURATIVE NOTICE .................................................................................. - 9-
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C. THE COURT SHOULD REQUIRE DEFENDANTS TO IMMEDIATELY TURN OVER ALL
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CONTACT INFORMATION FOR THE PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS So THAT PLAINTIFF'S
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COUNSEL CAN PROVIDE CURATIVE NOTICE TO THE CLASS MEMBERS ............................. - 11 -
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D. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DEFENDANTS TO SHOW CAUSE WITHIN A REASONABLE
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TIME WHY THE TRO SHOULD NOT BECOME A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO REMAIN IN
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EFFECT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE LITIGATION ........................................................ - 13 -
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E. THE TRO AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HAVE No POTENTIAL TO DAMAGE
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DEFENDANTS AND, ACCORDINGLY, No BOND SHOULD BE REQUIRED ............................. - l3 -
2 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. - 14
3
4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
5
Statutes
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Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code 6068 ......................................................................................................... - 11 -
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Cal. Civ. Code 526 ................................................................................................................. - 6 -, - lO-
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Cal. Lab. Code 1704.2 ...................................................................................................................... - 1 -
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Cal. Pen. Code 137 .......................................................................................................................... - 11 -
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Cal. Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq.) .................................................... - 1 -
II
12 Treatises
13 Manual For Complex Litigation (4th Ed. 2013) .............................................................. - 9 -, - 10 -, - 12-
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California Supreme Court Decisions
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Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System (1999) 21 CaL4th 121 ................................................................ - 10 -
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California Courts of Appeal Decisions
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Hernandez v. Vitamin Shoppe Indus., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.AppAth 1441 ......................................... - 12 -
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Howard Gunty Profit Sharing v. Sup. Ct. (2001) 88 Cal.AppAth 572 .............................................. - 10 -
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Parris v. Sup. Ct. (2003) 109 CaLAppAth 285 .................................................................................. - 10-
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San Francisco Unified Schoof Dist. ex ref. Contreras v. First Student, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.AppAth
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1212 .................................................................................................................................................. -6-
22
Sheller v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.AppAth 1697 ..................................................................... - 9 -
23
United States Supreme Court Decisions
24
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard (1981) 452 U.S. 89 ............................................................................. - 9 -, - 10-
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26 United States Circuit Court of Appeals Decisions
27 E.E. 0. C v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. ofAm .. Inc. (7th Cir. 1996) 102 F.3d 869 ................................... - 9 -
28

Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank ofAtlanta (11th Cir. 1985) 751 F.2d 1193 ..................................... - 9 -, - 10-
2 United States District Court Decisions

3
Bullockv. Auto. Club ofS. Cal~l (C.D.Cal. Jan. 28, 2002, No. SA CV 01-731) 2002 U.S.Dist.LEXIS
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7692 ..................................................................................................................................... - 11 -, - 12 -
5
In Re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Securities Litigation (N.D. Cal. 2000) 126 F. Supp.2d 1239 .............. - 10-
6 Mevorah v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. (N.D.Cal. Nov. 17,2005, No. 05-1175) 2005 U.S. Dist.
7
LEXIS 28615 ................................................................................................................................. - 13 -
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I. INTRODUCTION
2 This is a consumer class action which has not yet been certified. Plaintiff's counsel have
3 learned that Defendants International Performing Arts Academy, LLC, Barbizon School Of
4 San Francisco, Inc., Lion Management Group Inc., Larry D. Lionetti, and Lena Quesada
5 Lionetti ("Defendants") have communicated with members of the putative class, and
6 potentially minor children of members of the putative class, under false pretenses and in an
7 apparent attempt to procure declarations containing false and misleading statements of material
8 fact for submission as evidence before this Court.
9 Plaintiff asks that the Court grant Plaintiff's ex parte application; issue a Temporary
10 Restraining Order ("TRO") enjoining Defendants from further contact with any member of the
II putative class absent express confinnation of receipt of corrective notice by each class
12 member; order Defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue
13 carrying forward the TRO's provisions through to the entry of judgment in this action; order
14 Defendants to immediately provide contact information for the putative class to enable
15 providing corrective notice; and order distribution of a curative notice to all class members by
16 Plaintiff's counsel at Defendants' expense in a form subject to either Court approval or
17 stipulation by the parties.
18 II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
19 Plaintiff's class action complaint generally alleges that Defendants operate and advertis
20 their Showcases as an Advance-Fee Talent Representation Service in direct violation of
21 California Labor Code section 1702. The complaint alleges Defendants took hefty fees from
22 each putative class member in exchange for attendance at a Showcase, in which Defendants
23 offered to procure (or to attempt to procure) auditions, talent agents, and/or talent managers.
24 The operative complaint states a cause of action under Labor Code section 1704.2, and for
25 violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq.).
26 Plaintiff filed her operative complaint (the Fifth Amended Complaint ("5AC")) on
27 March 1,2017. Defendants answered the 5AC on June 5, 2017. Under the Court's order
28 staggering class certification briefing, Plaintiff filed her motion for class certification on July

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12,2017, and Defendants' opposition to class certification is due October 27,2017.
2 III. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
3 On August 8, 2017, counsel for Plaintiff were contacted by Tia Heu, a class member
4 who identified herself as the mother of a child who attended a Showcase event in 2015.
5 (Declaration of Brent A. Robinson ("Robinson Decl."), filed herewith, at ~ 3.) Mrs. Heu avers
6 that someone with Barbizon interviewed her under the pretense of conducting a consumer
7 satisfaction survey, only to subsequently send her an unsigned declaration for signature that
8 contained false statements, which directly contradicted what Mrs. Heu told the interviewer. (Jd.
9 at ~~3-4.)
10 At the end of July, Mrs. Heu had received a call from a woman who only in a
II subsequent letter identified herself as Bojana Rnjak, an attomey with Putterman Landry + Yu
12 LLP (Defendants' counsel; "Putterman"). (Declaration ofTia Heu ("Heu Declaration"), filed
13 herewith, at ~~ 5-6 & Ex. A.) During that call with Mrs. Heu, Ms. Rnjak did not identify
14 herself as an attomey or otherwise indicate she worked for a law firm, did not state that she
15 was calling regarding a pending lawsuit, did not identify class counsel, and did not suggest in
16 any way that she was gathering evidence for Defendants to use in court. (ld. at ~ 9.) Instead,
17 Ms Rnjak told Mrs. Heu that she worked for Barbizon, and that she was calling to conduct a
18 consumer satisfaction survey on behalf of Barbizon's owners. (ld. at ~~ 7,9.)
19 That Mrs. Rnjak posed as someone conducting a consumer satisfaction survey was
20 critical in obtaining Mrs. Heu's assent to being interviewed; because of Mrs. Heu's bad
21 experiences with Barbizon, she was otherwise reluctant to speak with anyone from Barbizon,
22 and only agreed because she believed her input would be used to improve their program. (Heu
23 DecL at ~ 12.)
24 After Mrs. Heu rebuffed her attempt to interrogate Mrs. Heu's 10-year-old daughter, Ms
25 Rnjak proceeded to ask Mrs. Heu a series of questions regarding facts material to class
26 certification and liability in this matter. (Heu Dec!. at ~~ 8, 11.) During their conversation, Ms
27 Rnjak stated that "most people" responded to her survey questions with simple "yes" or "no"
28 answers. (Id. at ~ 13.) At the conclusion of their call, Ms Rnjak told Mrs. Heu she needed to

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send her the responses in writing and have her sign them so Ms Rnjak could submit them to the
2 owners. (Id. at,-r 14.) Mrs. Heu asked to have her draft responses emailed to her, and did not
3 provide Ms. Rnjak with her mailing address. (Ibid.)
4 A few days later, Mrs. Heu was surprised to instead receive at home a FedEx package
5 containing a cover letter from Ms Rnjak's law firm, Putterman Landry Yu LLP
6 ("Putterman") addressed to "Tia Hell", and a declaration ready for signature. (Heu Decl. at
7 ,-r15 and Ex. A.) Mrs. Heu was further alarmed to see that the declaration was inconsistent both
8 with what Mrs. Heu told Ms Rnjak, and with Mrs. Heu's actual experiences. (ld. at,-r,-r 15-16.)
9 To Mrs. Heu, it seemed that "some of my statements were falsified to support Barbizon". (ld.
10 at,-r 17. )
II Ms Rnjak's cover letter to Mrs. Heu solely asked Mrs. Heu to "sign the statement and
12 mail it back .... " (Heu Decl. at Ex. 1, p. 1.) It did not invite Mrs. Heu to make changes or
13 otherwise confirm the attached declaration's accuracy. (Ibid.)
14 Mrs. Heu's experiences with Barbizon and Showcase directly contradict the false
15 statements made in the Putterman declaration. While Mrs. Heu's family shopped at a Walmart
16 in 2014, her daughter was approached directly by a Barbizon scout. (Heu Decl. at,-r 22.) The
17 scout handed Mrs. Heu a card listing the date, time, and location for an 'audition' to get into a
18 Barbizon school, and told Mrs. Heu that going to that audition was the "way to get Jane into
19 the business." (ld. at,-r,-r 22-23.) 1 Mrs. Heu's family then attended the Barbizon 'audition',
20 where the children did a catwalk and delivered some scripted lines, they all watched a video,
21 and the scout told Mrs. Heu that Barbizon could introduce them to agents who have worked
22 with the likes of Leonardo DiCaprio. (ld. at,-r 24-25.) Mrs. Heu enrolled her daughter in
23 Barbizon classes in Stockton. (ld. at,-r,-r 4.)
24 During one of the last of the Barbizon classes Mrs. Heu and her daughter attended, a
25 woman from Barbizon gave a presentation about Showcase, which she described as the "next
26
27 I Mrs. Heu's daughter's name is redacted in her declaration for privacy and replaced with the name
"Jane."
28

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step" in getting their children into the entertainment industry, and invited the families to come
2 to a separate Showcase audition. (Heu Decl. at ~ 29.) Mrs. Heu's family proceeded to attend
3 the Showcase 'audition', where the woman from Barbizon told Mrs. Heu that she was "99%
4 certain" that her daughter would get signed by an agent at Showcase, and that "most kids get
5 signed by agents at showcase." (Jd. at ~ 30 (language quoted directly by Mrs. Heu).) The
6 woman from Barbizon also suggested to Mrs. Heu that agents, managers, and casting directors
7 would be "so thick on the ground [at Showcase] that we might even run into them in the
8 hallways while walking to our room." (Jd. at ~ 33.) Mrs. Heu's family then paid for their
9 daughter to attend and audition at the January 2015 Showcase event in Los Angeles. (Heu
10 Decl. at ~4.) However, Mrs. Heu's daughter failed to sign any contracts or obtain any work as
II an artist through the Showcase. (Id. at ~35-38.)
12 The actual experience of Mrs. Heu is included herein for the Court to have an
13 understanding of how the Putterman declaration is misleading and to underscore that Mrs.
14 Heu's willingness to talk to Ms Rnjak was based upon the misrepresentation that her answers
15 were only intended as survey feedback. If Defendants had informed Mrs. Heu that the
16 "survey" was meant to solicit evidence for Defendants to defend litigation, she would have
17 never agreed to speak to Ms Rnjak in the first place. (Jd. at ~l 0.)
18 A. The Putterman Declaration Contains Statements Mrs. Heu Did Not Make, And
19 Was Not Asked About.
20 The Putterman declaration includes statements Mrs. Heu did not make to Ms Rnjak, and
21 on subjects as to which Ms Rnjak did not inquire. For example, the Putterman declaration
22 states that Mrs. Heu heard statements by Showcase instructors, yet she did not hear any such
23 statements, and she did not report having heard them to Ms Rnjak. (Heu Decl. at ~ 31.)
24 Similarly, the Putterman declaration describes Mrs. Heu having heard amorphous "talk" of an
25 unstated origin about agents and managers attending Showcase, and that Mrs. Heu knew not to
26 expect one-on-one conversations with agents at Showcase. (Id. at ~ 33.) Mrs. Heu declares that
27 she did not make these statements to Ms Rnjak, and that Ms Rnjak did not ask any questions
28 along these lines. (Ibid.) IfMs Rnjak had asked, she would have learned that Mrs. Heu was

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told by the woman conducting the Showcase audition that she should expect to network with
2 agents, that running into agents in the halls was very likely, and that she should prepare for that
3 probability by paying extra to get copies of her daughter's headshots to hand out during those
4 interactions. (Ibid.)
5 B. The Putterman Declaration Contains Statements that Directly Contradict Wha
6 Mrs. Heu Said.
7 The Putterman Declaration also includes statements that directly contradict what Mrs.
8 Heu told Ms Rnjak. For example, it states that Mrs. Heu did not visit the Barbizon website at
9 the time of the Barbizon audition, yet Mrs. Heu specifically told Ms Rnjak that she visited the
10 Barbizon website that evening when she returned home from the audition. (Id. at ~ 26.)
II The Putterman declaration also states that Mrs. Heu's family was not interested injob
12 opporhmities, yet Mrs. Heu was very clear to Ms Rnjak that her daughter's interest, and by
13 extension their family's interest, was for her to get work in the entertainment industry. (Id. at
14 ~~ 27,34.)
15 Finally, the Putterman declaration states that Mrs. Heu's understanding was "always"
16 that it was not possible to sign a contract with an agent at the Showcase, yet Mrs. Heu was
17 clear with Ms Rnjak that-while she understands that today, she did not understand that at the
18 time she attended Showcase. (Id. at ~ 35.) If anything, she believed at the time she attended
19 Showcase that it was possible to get signed on the spot, and that belief was induced by
20 representations made by individuals she believed to be Barbizon agents. (Ibid.)
21 C. The Putterman Declaration Contains Statements that are Grossly Misleading.
22 The Putterman declaration also contains statements that are grossly misleading both in
23 light of what Mrs. Heu actually told Ms Rnjak, and what she would have told Ms Rnjak had
24 she inquired adequately. For example:
25 The Putterman declaration states that no one at Barbizon made offers to sign a contract
26 with an agent, yet Mrs. Heu specifically told Ms Rnjak otherwise. (Id. at ~29-30.) She
27 informed Ms Rnjak that the Barbizon woman who ran the Showcase 'audition'
28 presented Showcase as a way to audition in front of "directors, agents, and managers" in

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order to obtain jobs and contracts. (Id. at,-r 29.) That woman also told Mrs. Heu that she
2 was "99% certain" that Mrs. Heu's daughter would get signed by an agent at Showcase,
3 that she was "pretty sure" her daughter would start working right after Showcase, and
4 that "most kids get signed by agents at showcase." (ld. at,-r 30.)
5 The Putterman declaration states that the initial Barbizon audition Mrs. Heu attended
6 "was mostly informational," yet Mrs. Heu specifically told Ms Rnjak that the video
7 shown at the audition was "very glitzy", and communicated the message that "the
8 easiest and quickest and perhaps the only way to get your child into the television,
9 movie, and modelling industry is through Barbizon." (ld. at,-r 24.)
10 The Puttennan declaration states Mrs. Heu credits "Showcase" for her daughter's
II interest in acting, and for Mrs. Heu's subsequent efforts to learn the right way to get int
12 the entertainment industry. (ld. at,-r 37.) However, Mrs. Heu denies saying that, and
13 notes that her family learned from Showcase "what not to do to get our child into the
14 entertainment industry." (Ibid. (emphasis original).) Mrs. Heu also notes that so far as
15 she knows, Barbizon and Showcase are parts of the same entity.
16 Having examined Defendants' interactions with Mrs. Heu, Plaintiff's counsel has
17 detennined that the Defendants' course of conduct with respect to these "customer surveys" is
18 substantially misleading and constitutes a wholly improper attempt to secure under false
19 pretenses declarations containing false and misleading statements of material fact from
20 uninformed, unrepresented putative class members.
21 IV. ARGUMENT
22 This Court has both statutory and inherent authority to enjoin the conduct at issue here.
23 (See, San Francisco Unified School Dist. ex rei. Contreras v. First Student, Inc. (2013) 213
24 Cal.AppAth 1212, 1226-1227 (analyzing order restraining communications with class
25 members as an exercise ofthe court's "inherent power to control the proceedings before it",
26 rather than as an injunction to preserve the status quo); See also, Cal. Civ. Code 526, subd.
27 (a)(2) (injunction authorized where affidavits show some act that "would produce waste, or
28 great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action".)

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As is explained below, the Court's exercise of its authority is necessary because
2 Defendants' continuing efforts to obtain false and misleading declaration testimony from class
3 members under false pretenses will cause Plaintiff, the class, and the judiciary irreparable harm
4 unless enjoined. Based on such a showing of irreparable harm, established precedent authorizes
5 enjoining Defendants' communications with class members pending curative notice. Under the
6 circumstances, curative notice should issue from Plaintiff, and accordingly, Plaintiff seeks an
7 order requiring Defendant to immediately tum over contact information for the class members.
8 Because Plaintiff has fully briefed this matter already, Plaintiff also asks the Court to issue an
9 Order to Show Cause for a preliminary injunction which extends the TRO during the pendency
10 of the case. Finally, Plaintiff notes that the injunction requested threatens no financial harm to
II Defendants if it is subsequently found to be improvidently granted, such that either a nominal
12 bond or no bond at all should be required for an injunction to issue.
13 A. Defendants' Ongoing Efforts to Obtain False and Misleading Declaration
14 Testimony from Class Members Under False Pretense Will Cause Plaintiff, the
15 Class, and the Court Irreparable Harm Unless Enjoined.
16 The evidence before the Court establishes that Defendants obtained information and
17 cooperation from an absent class member, Mrs. Heu, under false pretenses. Mrs. Heu expressly
18 relied upon those representations in choosing to cooperate with Defendants. Defendants then
19 presented Mrs. Heu with a declaration that contained statements that Defendants knew or
20 should have known were false or misleading. From Defendants' inclusion of this matter's court
21 case number on the footer of the Putterman declaration, the Court may infer that Defendants'
22 purpose was to obtain from Mrs. Heu a signed declaration for submission in these proceedings.
23 The Court may also infer that Defendants' conduct towards Mrs. Heu is part of an ongoing
24 campaign targeted at all absent class members. (See, Heu Decl. at ~ 13 (Ms. Rnjak
25 characterized questioning of other absent class members).) From these facts and inferences, the
26 Court may conclude that unless enjoined, Defendants will continue to gather evidence under
27 false pretenses and eventually submit a quantity of similar declarations containing false and
28 misleading statements of material fact in opposition to class certification.

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Unless restrained, Defendants' conduct will cause irreparable hann to Plaintiff, to the
2 absent class members, and to the Court and the integrity of this proceeding. (See, generally,
3 Heu Decl.)
4 i. Irreparable Harm to Plaintiff.
5 Plaintiff will be hanned primarily through expenditure of finite resources in correcting
6 such false declarations through the discovery process. Plaintiff will be forced to depose each
7 absent class member who signed such a declaration to correct the record. The investment of
8 time and expense required in doing so is an irreparable hann because it will necessarily be
9 incurred within the time provided for supporting Plaintiff s motion for class certification, and
10 will divert finite resources away from the task of meeting whatever other evidence and
II argument Defendants muster in opposition. No remedy at law can compensate for the
12 opportunity costs associated with the timing of a diversion of resources at such a crucial time
13 in the litigation.
14 Plaintiff will also suffer irreparable harnl through the mistrust and antagonism that
15 necessarily will be engendered in absent class members in the process of correcting the record.
16 Plaintiff must obtain the cooperation, or compel the deposition, of individuals who will have
17 learned for the first time that they participated not in a consumer satisfaction survey, but in a
18 law finn's dissimulating investigation for a lawsuit. The absent class members will
19 understandably be upset by this, and whatever reluctance they previously felt about involving
20 themselves with lawsuits or lawyers will only increase. Worse, where that reluctance solidifies
21 into an obstinate refusal, Plaintiff will be forced to compel testimony from parties she seeks to
22 represent in order to correct the record, which puts Plaintiff in an untenable position with
23 regard to those absent class members who sign declarations prior to Defendants' being
24 enjoined.
25 ii. Irreparable Harm to the Absent Class Members.
26 As for members of the absent class who sign declarations prior to Defendants' being
27 enjoined, they face irreparable hann in the fonn of potential prejudice to their claims flowing
28 from their having signed a declaration under penalty of perjury that contains false statements 0

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material fact that undermine their claims against Defendants. In addition, should those class
2 members subsequently choose to opt-out of any class that the Court may certify, and pursue
3 their claims separately, they may encounter difficulty in securing counsel where they have
4 already signed a declaration containing multiple statements against interest.
5 iii. Irreparable Harm to the Judiciary.
6 Finally, if Defendants' conduct is not enjoined, it will cause irreparable harm to the
7 judiciary. First, Defendants' conduct undermines the integrity of the judiciary by employing
8 members of the bar of this Court in conduct aimed at members of the public that is grossly
9 misleading and potentially unlawful. Second, each new false declaration Defendant obtains
10 will waste finite judicial resources on needlessly parsing manufactured false statements in
II declarations against subsequent deposition testimony, and in resolving challenges to those
12 declarations at class certification and trial.
13 B. The Court May Enjoin All Communications with Absent Class Members
14 Pending Actual Curative Notice.
15 In general, defendants are permitted precertification communications with class
16 members, with one vital limitation: those communications must be honest and truthful and
17 cannot be false or misleading. (See, e.g., Manual For Complex Litigation (4th Ed. 2013)
18 21.12 ("If class members have received inaccurate precertification communications, the judge
19 can take action to cure the miscommunication and to prevent similar problems in the future.")
20 (citing, E.E.o.C. v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. ofAm., Inc. (7th Cir. 1996) 102 F.3d 869,870-71).)
21 The Court is empowered, and required, to prevent and correct false, misleading, abusive or
22 intimidating communications by defendant to class members. (Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard (1981)
23 452 U.S. 89, 101-102; Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank ofAtlanta (l1th Cir. 1985) 751 F.2d 1193,
24 1203; Sheller v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Ca1.App.4th 1697,1704-1706.)
25 California courts employ two slightly different standards limiting pre-certification
26 contact with putative class members. The first standard applies where there is "a clear record
27 and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential
28 interference with the rights of the parties," and requires the trial court to "identify the potential

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abuses and weigh them against the rights ofthe parties in the circumstances." (Howard Gunty
2 Profit Sharing v. Sup. Ct. (2001) 88 Cal.AppAth 572, 581 (quoting Gu?lOil Co. v. Bernard,
3 supra, 452 U.S. at p. 101.) The other standard applies in the absence of any evidence of abuse,
4 and analyzes contact with the putative class members as a free speech right, which can only be
5 limited upon the showing necessary for a TRO, that is "direct, immediate, and irreparable
6 harm." (Parris v. Sup. Ct. (2003) 109 Cal.AppAth 285,296,299-300 (no evidence of abuse,
7 "motion for leave to engage in [precertification] communications [with class members] was
8 unnecessary").) Defendants' declarations clearly violate the more stringent Parris standard, so
9 it does not matter which standard the Court uses.
10 Defendants' continuing conduct aims to obtain, and doubtlessly has succeeded in
II obtaining declarations from absent class members under false pretenses, which are procured in
12 such a way that the declarations are likely to contain false and misleading statements of
13 material fact, with the purpose of submitting such declarations as evidence before this Court.
14 This is conduct that the Court can, and must, enjoin. (See, CaL Civ. Code 526, subd. (a)(2)
15 (injunction authorized where affidavits show some act that "would produce waste, or great or
16 irreparable injury, to a party to the action"); Id. at subd. (a)(3) (injunction authorized for "some
17 act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action,
18 and tending to render the judgment ineffectual"); see, e.g. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System
19 (1999) 21 CaL4th 121, 141 at fn. 8 (noting that "in a variety of contexts, courts have upheld
20 injunctions prohibiting the continuation of a course of expressive conduct that violates a
21 specific statutory prohibition").)
22 Accordingly, this Court has the power and obligation to redress Defendants' misleading
23 communications and inappropriate conduct. If class members have received inaccurate or
24 misleading precertification communications, the court can make appropriate orders to prevent
25 such conduct from occurring in the future as well as requiring curative notice to cure the
26 misinformation. (See, Manual for Complex Litigation (4th Ed. 2013) 21.12; Kleiner, supra,
27 751 F.2d at p. 1203; In Re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Securities Litigation (N.D. Cal. 2000) 126 F.
28 Supp.2d 1239, 1246 (court ordered curative notice where misleading solicitations were sent to
Page 10-
class members).)
2 Here, Defendants obtained and continue to obtain cooperation from absent class
3 members and their minor children under false pretenses. Defendants' attorney did not identify
4 herself as an attorney. She did not state that her investigation was in connection with pending
5 litigation. She did not identify this Court, or counsel for the putative class. Defendants
6 submitted, and presumably continue to submit to class members for signature, declarations that
7 Defendants knew or should have known contain false and misleading statements of material
8 fact to absent class members to sign. The only reasonable inference from the record is that
9 Defendants intend to submit such false declarations as evidence before this Court. Such
10 communications with absent class members are inaccurate and misleading, and potentially
II violate Penal Code section 137, subdivision (c), as well as Business and Professions Code
12 section 6068, subdivision (d). 2
13 Accordingly, this Court should enjoin Defendants from all communications with
14 putative class members absent confirmation of actual receipt of curative notice. (See, Proposed
15 Order, filed herewith.)
16 C. The Court Should Require Defendants to Immediately Turn Over All Contact
17 Information for the Putative Class Members So That Plaintiff's Counsel Can
18 Provide Curative Notice to the Class Members.
19 Courts have repeatedly ordered curative notice to counteract false and misleading
20 communications to the putative class. For example, in Bullock v. Auto. Club ofS. Calif.
21 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 28,2002, No. SA CV 01-731) 2002 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 7692, *14, the court
22 ordered curative notice in a wage and hour class action where the defendant employer
23 circulated a memo to employees designed to discourage them from participation in the class
24 2 Defendants' conduct, to the extent that is knowing or willful, potentially violates Penal Code section
137, subdivision (c), which states that "Every person who knowingly induces another person to give
25
false testimony or withhold true testimony not privileged by law ... is guilty of a misdemeanor."
26 Defendants' conduct, to the extent that it was deliberately aimed at generating false declarations for
submission to the Court, potentially violates Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision
27 (d), which imposes on attomeys a duty not to seek to mislead "the judge or any judicial officer by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law."
28

Page 11-
action. The court cited the Manual for Complex Litigation and noted that the extension of
2 deadlines and curative notice issued at the expense of the party at-fault may be appropriate
3 where the party at-fault provided class members with inappropriate communications. (Ibid.)
4 Further, the court ordered curative notice as to all class members, not only to those who had
5 actually received the misleading communication. (Ibid.)
6 Because it is unclear how many absent class members have been subjected to
7 Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has served Defendants with written discovery narrowly focused
8 on uncovering the extent of the harm caused by Defendant's conduct. (See, Robinson Decl. at
9 Exhibit C.) Because Defendants' communications may have been circulated among class
10 members, curative notice should be provided to all members of the putative class, not just
II those whom Defendants actually contacted. Where a defendant sends misleading or false
12 communications to some but not all putative class members, courts require curative notice be
13 sent to the entire putative class, not just to those persons directly or actually contacted by
14 defendant. The rationale for curative notice to the entire putative class is that the misleading
15 communication will probably have been transmitted between class members by word of mouth
16 in addition to direct contact from the defendant. (See, e.g., Bullock, supra, 2002
17 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 7692, at * 14.)
18 Defendants are responsible for an extraordinary situation which requires immediate
19 Court action to counteract already irreparable harm caused by Defendants' false and
20 misleading communications with absent class members. Under the circumstances, any curative
21 notice should be sent by Plaintiff. (el Hernandez v. Vitamin Shoppe Indus., Inc. (2009) 174
22 Cal.AppAth 1441, 1456 ("biased, inflammatory, and misleading content of Spencer's letters
23 made plain the possibility that he would engage in future abuses ifhe were permitted to
24 continue to unilaterally communicate with class members").) Plaintiffs counsel have the
25 greatest incentive to preserve the rights of the class members and to cure the harm caused by
26 Defendants' misrepresentations. Further, Plaintiffs counsel will submit Plaintiffs curative
27 notice to the Court for approval if a stipulated form cannot be reached. (See also, Mevorah v.
28 Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. (N.D.Cai. Nov. 17,2005, No. 05-1175) 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

Page 12-
28615, *5-6 (requiring defendants to identify class members to plaintiff, and to bear the cost of
2 corrective notice for misleading communications with class members).)
3 Accordingly, Defendants should be ordered to provide Plaintiff s counsel immediately
4 with the contact information of all members of the putative class including name, address,
5 email, and telephone number, so that Plaintiff s counsel can provide those class members with
6 appropriate curative notice. Telephone numbers should also be provided so that Plaintiffs
7 counsel can have telephone contact to advise anyone who signed a Putterman declaration how
8 to cure any false statements it contained. The expense and delay inherent in using a third-party
9 service to provide this information and notice would render that procedure impracticable and
10 unwieldy.
II D. The Court Should Order Defendants to Show Cause Within a Reasonable Time
12 Why the TRO Should Not Become a Preliminary Injunction to Remain in
13 Effect During the Pendency of the Litigation.
14 A court can structure a TRO to dissolve as of a particular date unless the moving party
15 moves again for preliminary injunction or, alternatively, can order the affected party to show
16 cause why the TRO should not continue during the litigation as a preliminary injunction. Here,
17 the latter course is preferable. Plaintiff has fully briefed this issue and does not need to file
18 another set of opening papers. Further, if the TRO is granted, the only remaining issue will be
19 the scope of Defendants' future contacts with putative class members over the course of the
20 litigation; if Defendants feel the need to increase that scope, they may so move the Court.
21 E. The TRO and Preliminary Injunction Have No Potential to Damage Defendant
22 and, Accordingly, No Bond Should Be Required.
23 Because the TRO and Preliminary Injunction sought by plaintiff affects only
24 communications with class members, and do not in any way affect Defendants' normal course
25 of business, a minimal bond or no bond at all should be required. The purpose of a bond is to
26 create a fund for payment of damages that the affected party might incur if the injunction
27 ultimately turns out to have been improperly granted. For example, where the preliminary
28 injunction restrains development of a parcel of land, even though the developer may eventually

Page 13-
win the case and proceed with development, the developer might incur substantial delay
2 damages during the pendency of the case. Here, however, there is no such potential for
3 economic injury to Defendants from the requested TRO and preliminary injunction.
4 Accordingly, Plaintiff urges the Court to require no bond, or minimal bond in this case.
5 v. CONCLUSION
6 F or the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant Plaintiff s
7 ex parte application, grant Plaintiffs request for a TRO enjoining Defendants from further
8 contact with any member of the putative class; order Defendants to show cause why a
9 preliminary injunction should not issue continuing the TRO's provisions through to the entry
10 of judgment in this action; order Defendants to immediately provide contact information for
II the putative class to enable providing curative notice; and order distribution of a curative notic
12 to all class members by Plaintiffs counsel at Defendants' expense in a fonn subject to either
13 Court approval or stipulation by the parties.
14 Dated: August 24, 2017
15 /s/ Brent A. Robinson

16 Randall B. Aiman-Smith (124599)
Reed W.L. Marcy (191531)
17 Hallie Von Rock (233152)
Carey A. James (269270)
18 Brent A. Robinson (289373)
AlMAN-SMITH & MARCY, P.C.
19 7677 Oakport Street, Suite 1150
Oakland, California 94621
20 817-2711 (tel,epl1one
562-6830 llac:slmllle)
21
22
23
24 Ethan Preston (263295)
PRESTON LAW OFFICES
25 4054 McKinney Avenue, Suite 310
Dallas, Texas 75204
26 564-8340 (telephone)
509-1197 (facsimile)
27
28 Zack Broslavsky (241736)
Cosio. et al. v. International Performing Arts Academy, LLC, et al. Case No. CGC-16-551337
Page 14-
Jonathan A. Weinman (256553)
BROSLAVSKY & WEINMAN, LLP
1500 Rosecrans Ave., Suite 500
2 Los Angeles, CA 90266
575-2550
3 464-3550 (tacslmlJe
4
5 David C. Parisi (162248)

Suzanne Havens Beckman (188814)
6 PARISI & HAVENS LLP
212 Marine Street, Suite 100
7 Santa Monica, California 90405
1 990-1299
8 1 501-7852 (tacsimlle
9
10 Attorneysfor Plaintiff Angelica Cosio, on

her own beha?f, and behalf of all others
II similarly situated
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

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Randall B.

7677 Oakport St. Suite 1150 08/24/2017

13 FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

5 Zack Broslavsky (241736)

16 Attorneys for PlaintiffAngelica Cosio, on

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

7 AND WAS NOT ASKED ABOUT ............................................................................................. - 4-

9 WHAT MRS. HEU SAID .......................................................................................................... 5-

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

13 Manual For Complex Litigation (4th Ed. 2013) .............................................................. - 9 -, - 10 -, - 12-

26 United States Circuit Court of Appeals Decisions

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

2 United States District Court Decisions

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

3 provide Ms. Rnjak with her mailing address. (Ibid.)

13 otherwise confirm the attached declaration's accuracy. (Ibid.)

23 Barbizon classes in Stockton. (ld. at,-r,-r 4.)

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

15 /s/ Brent A. Robinson

5 David C. Parisi (162248)

10 Attorneysfor Plaintiff Angelica Cosio, on

Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Ex-Parte Application

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