People V.

Narvaez
GR. Nos. L-33466-67
Makasiar, J.

Facts:

There was a feud between Fleischer and Co. which Fleisher and Rubia worked on,
and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was Narvaez. The formal award to the
land in dispute was given to Fleischer and Co., causing the ejectment of Narvaez.
Narvaez voluntarily dismantled his house and transferred to the other house near the
highway. On November 14, 1966, the settlers filed an injunction or annulment of order of
award with pater for preliminary injunction. During the pendency of the case, Narvaez
entered into a contract of lease with Feilscher and Co., wherein he will pay monthly rent,
just to avoid trouble until the question of ownership be decided. Naravaez never paid
the rental claiming that the milling job he did for Rubia was considered as payment.
Fleischer told that he will be giving Narvaez until December 31, 1968 to remove his house,
ricemill, bodega and water pitcher pumps.

On August 22, 1968, Juan, Verano, Ibanez, and the two deceased, Fleischer and
Rubia were fencing the land of George Fleischer. Narvaez woke up to the sound of his
walls being chiseled, and saw the fencing going on. One of the laborers of Fleischer was
chisellingthe wall of his house with crowbar, while Rubia was nailing the barbed wire. If
the fencing were to proceed, Narvaez would be prevented from getting into his house
and the bodega of his ricemill. Narvaez talked to the group properly asking them to talk
it over, but Fleishcer answered, No, gademit, proceed, go ahead. This made Narvaez
lose his equilibrium as ge got his gun and shoot Fleischer. Rubia was about to run for the
jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, Narvaez also shoot Rubia. After shooting,
Narvaez surrender to the police thereafter, bring with him the shotgun, and claiming that
he shot two persons.

Issue:

WON Narvaez should be exempted from criminal liability because he acted in

defense of his person and of his rights.

RULING:

No, Narvaez should not be exempted from criminal liability, but he is entitled to
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense and of two generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and passion and obfuscation.

Defense of ones persons or rights is treated as justifying circumstance under Article

11, paragraph 1 of RPC. Its requisites are unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending it.

Unlawful aggression There was unlawful aggression on the part of the

victim when Fleischer angrily ordered for the continuance of the fencing.
This was aggression on Narvaez property right and not on his person.

Fleischer told Narvaez he would be giving him until December 31,

1968 to remove his properties. Hence Fleisher should have allowed Narvaez
peaceful enjoyment of the said property. Also, the pendency of the case if
still in progress, and his execution of lease is just to avoid trouble.

Reasonable necessity for the means employed The firing of his shotgun
from his window, thus killing the victims were disproportionate to the attack.

Lack of provocation on the part of Narvaez There was no provocation on

the part of Narvaez.

Narvaez killing was not justifiable because not all the elements for justification are
present. He should be responsible for the death of the victim, but he could be credited
with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense.

The Court also gave credit to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, when he appeared before the authorities after the shooting.

The Court also gave credit to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation, because not only was his house being unlawfully violated, but
his business was also in danger of closing down for lack of access to the highway. He
must have been so aggravated that he lost all reason causing him to shoot the victims.

Dissenting opinions:

Abad Santos The self-defense of RPC refers to unlawful aggression on persons, and not
to property.

Gutierrez, Jr. An attack on the persons defending his property is indispensable element
where an accuse pleads self-defense, but what is being defended is only property.
Defense on property is not so much of importance as the right to life, and the defense of
property can only be invoked when it is occupied with any form of attack on the person
of one entrusted with said property.

The mere utterance of No, gademit, proceed, go ahead is not an unlawful

aggression which entitles Narvaez to the plea of self-defense.