Wills Cases (Atty Castillo) Set 1

WILLS AND SUCCESSION (ATTY.
CASTILLO-TALEON) SET 1
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES,
ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner.
Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth Civil Cases
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus
Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents the
sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of
Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00,
P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the
resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were originally
known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square
meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858
(8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio
and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not
clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not
attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record
does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that
Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II.
According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in
question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he
was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694
(29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a
portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the name of
Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said transfer certificate of title
also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum
of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in
Fuentebella's name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de
Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. 7 By virtue of a court order granting said
1
WILLS AND SUCCESSION (ATTY. CASTILLO-TALEON) SET 1
motion, 8 on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo
Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were
respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato
Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return"
of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the
land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said
accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered
to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and
another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to
Siason, 13 who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes. 14
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and
assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs
"renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case." 15
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case
No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to
the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said
defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 16
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the aforesaid
decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of service dated
October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and
773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773
could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution." 17
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private respondents (the
Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of
a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo
Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773
and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and
823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against
said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he was not
a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only
because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final and executory. 20 Finding
said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its
previous order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title mentioned therein. 21
2
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No.
5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting
that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment
therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with damages. 24 Named
defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register
of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued
to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in
accordance with the sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot
773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be
made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed
that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the filing of the
complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been
passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were
estopped from questioning said order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause
of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in
question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a
valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis
pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property in
question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale
thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 28 The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in the
following manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds are ( sic) hereby
dismmissed,
B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the legitimate
children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of
Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the
plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00 representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's
fees, all with legal rate of interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment.
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants, Laura,
Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay the
costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 29
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of August 31,
1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and
773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of
3
P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively." 31 The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered defendants-
appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00
representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia,
Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and
P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and properly
invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if ever there are
any, as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial
court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or
prescription of action and estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra and father
of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil
Case No. 8474, supra where the private respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived,
renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated
November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or
indirectly denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally
passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and
due process . 33
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme Court, to review
the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private
respondents. Said decision had long become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason,
who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties
thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the decision against them. 34
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an end. Access to the
court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final
judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try. The
prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed,
unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice. 36
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally adjudicated in
Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have
been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now
4
under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed
to private respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners'
father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles.
Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on
November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in
Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the
actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and
one devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his
nefarious decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an
undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against." 40
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in
favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the defenses of
prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed
in the former case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be
heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has longing become
final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo
Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his
death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. 41
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the
provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from
his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that
whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the
heirs would have been entitled to receive.
5
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties
that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From the
Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation
from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring
those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their
father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the
property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved
into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in
their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.
With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased
which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990

BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all surnamed,
GEVERO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Carlito B. Somido for petitioners.
Benjamin N. Tabios for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988 decision 1 of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-GR CV No. 69264, entitled Del Monte Development Corporation vs.
Enrique Ababa, et al., etc. affirming the decision 2 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Misamis Oriental declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot 476
of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an
area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Eight (7,878) square meters more or less.
As found by the Appellate Court, the facts are as follows:
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing
an area of 20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was
acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per Deed of Absolute
6
Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320
was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel
from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which
was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610
covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha 1/2
share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed
surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters.
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children
aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-
Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots,
among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by
the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D,
among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-
judicial settlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with
the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the
heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion
of lot 2476.
Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica
Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476.
Plaintiff proved that before purchasing Lot 2476-A it first investigated and checked the title of
Luis Lancero and found the same to be intact in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan
de Oro City. The same with the subdivision plan (Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical
description (Exh. "P") and the Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero all of which were
found to be unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff claims to have bought the land in
good faith and for value, occupying the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero's
possession until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly entered the property. (Rollo, p.
23)
After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiff
corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot No. 2476 of the Cagayan
Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an
area of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT (7,878) square meters,
more or less. The other portions of Lot No. 2476 are hereby adjudicated as follows:
Lot No. 2476 B to the heirs of Elena Gevero;
Lot No. 2476 C to the heirs of Restituto Gevero;
Lot No. 2476 E to the defendant spouses Enrique C. Torres and Francisca Aquino;
Lot No. 2476 F to the defendant spouses Eduard Rumohr and Emilia Merida Rumohf ;
Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 G to defendant spouses Enrique Abada and Lilia
Alvarez Abada.
No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A considering that the said lot is the
subject of a civil case between the Heirs of Maria Gevero on one hand and the spouses Daniel
Borkingkito and Ursula Gevero on the other hand, which case is now pending appeal before the
Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to costs,
7
SO ORDERED. (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22)

From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of
Appeals) which subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision appealed from.
Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 28) but was denied on April 21,
1986.
Hence, the present petition.
This petition is devoid of merit.
Basically, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: 1) whether or not the deed of sale executed by
Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is valid; 2) in the affirmative, whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of
Teodorica Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No. 7610 is included in the deed
of sale; and 3) whether or not the private respondents' action is barred by laches.
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that: 1) the
signature of Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero had recognized the fatal defect
of the 1952 deed of sale when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation"; 3)
Ricardo's children remained in the property notwithstanding the sale to Lancero; 4) the designated Lot No. is
2470 instead of the correct number being Lot No. 2476; 5) the deed of sale included the share of Eustaquio
Gevero without his authority; 6) T.C.T. No. 1183 of Lancero segregated the area of 20,119 square meters from
the bigger area (OCT No. 7616) without the consent of the other co-owners; 7) Lancero caused the 1952
Subdivision survey without the consent of the Geveros' to bring about the segregation of the 20,119 square
meters lot from the mother lot 2476 which brought about the issuance of his title T-1183 and to DELCOR's title
T4320, both of which were illegally issued; and 8) the area sold as per document is 20,649 square meters
whereas the segregated area covered by TCT No. T-1183 of Lancero turned out to be 20,119 square meters
(Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 62-78).
As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale in favor of Lancero was forged
without Ricardo's knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p. 71) it will be observed that the deed of sale in question was
executed with all the legal formalities of a public document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both
parties before the notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal presumption of the regularity of
the notarized document (Dy v. Sacay, 165 SCRA 473 [1988]); Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No. 77423, March 13,
1989). In fact it has long been settled that a public document executed and attested through the intervention of
the notary public is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has the presumption
of regularity and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant
(Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 520-521 [1987]). Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be proven (Siasat v. IAC,
No. 67889, October 10, 1985). Likewise, petitioners allegation of absence of consideration of the deed was not
substantiated. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the
document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation" (Rollo, p. 71), it is a basic rule of evidence that the
right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of
Court). This particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under
Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former." It is
however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a property must have been made while he was the
owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v. del
Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465 [1910]). Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of
executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed to
DELCOR in 1964.
8
Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property, notwithstanding the alleged sale by Ricardo to Lancero
(Rollo, p. 71) involves a question of fact already raised and passed upon by both the trial and appellate courts.
Said the Court of Appeals:
Contrary to the allegations of the appellants, the trial court found that Luis Lancero had taken
possession of the land upon proper investigation by plaintiff the latter learned that it was indeed
Luis Lancero who was the owner and possessor of Lot 2476 D. . . . (Decision, C.A., p. 6).
As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De Gola-Sison v. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595 [1963]; Gaduco vs.
C.A., 14 SCRA 282 [1965]; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 19 SCRA 289 [1967]; Tan v. C.A., 20 SCRA 54 [1967];
Ramirez Tel. Co. v. Bank of America, 33 SCRA 737 [1970]; Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 [1968]; Guerrero v.
C.A., 142 SCRA 130 [1986]).
Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners which allegedly invalidated the 1952 deed of sale
have not been raised before the trial court nor before the appellate court. It is settled jurisprudence that an issue
which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Matienzo v.
Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140 SCRA 44 [1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434
[1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and Development Corporation v. C.A., 157
SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282, July 5, 1989).
Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610
was not included in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to Ricardos' proportionate share out of the
undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title and that the Deed did not
include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite that she was
deceased at the time it was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).
The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja
v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted from the
moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition,
when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold
his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded
in the deed of sale.
Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from Teodorica was excluded in the sale considering that a paragraph of
the aforementioned deed refers merely to the shares of Ricardo and Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-68).
It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to the different
provisions thereof (Reparations Commission v. Northern Lines, Inc., 34 SCRA 203 [1970]), to ascertain the
meaning of the provisions of a contract, its entirety must be taken into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff of Manila, 34
SCRA 83 [1970]). The interpretation insisted upon by the petitioners, by citing only one paragraph of the deed of
sale, would not only create contradictions but also, render meaningless and set at naught the entire provisions
thereof.
Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches considering that the petitioners have remained in the
actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof until at present (Rollo, p. 17).
An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is a public instrument (Eacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil.
742). The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing (Art. 1498, 1st Par., Civil
9
Code) and is deemed legal delivery. Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient delivery of the property
(Buencamino v. Viceo, 13 Phil. 97; [1906]; Puato v. Mendoza, 64 Phil. 457 [1937]; Vda. de Sarmiento v. Lesaca,
108 Phil. 900 [1960]; Phil. Suburban Development Corp. v. Auditor Gen., 63 SCRA 397 (1975]).
Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers the ownership of the land
sold. (GSIS v. C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January 20, 1989). If the property is a registered land, the purchaser in
good, faith has a right to rely on the certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws
(Mallorca v. De Ocampo, No. L-26852, March 25, 1970; Unchuan v. C.A., 161 SCRA 710 [1988]; Nuguid v.
CA-G.R. No. 77427, March 13, 1989).
Under the established principles of land registration law, the person dealing with registered land may generally
rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate
to determine the condition of the property (Tiongco v. de la Merced, L-2446, July 25, 1974; Lopez vs. CA., G.R.
No. 49739, January 20, 1989; Davao Grains Inc. vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 612 [1989]). This notwithstanding,
DELCOR did more than that. It did not only rely on the certificate of title. The Court of Appeals found that it
had first investigated and checked the title (T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired
into the Subdivision Plan, the corresponding technical description and the deed of sale executed by Ricardo
Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found everything in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis
Lancero to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any other person. DELCOR had therefore acted in
good faith in purchasing the land in question.
Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by laches.
The main issues having been disposed of, discussion of the other issues appear unnecessary.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L.
CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES
JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and
HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.
Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.
Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 affirming with modification the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose
Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages is sought. in
these proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however reinstated upon a
second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents were required to comment
thereon. The petition was thereafter given due course and the parties were directed to submit their
10
memorandums. These, together with the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the
case.
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He
owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death,
his estate was divided among his three (3) children as follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena
Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose,
Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and
the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into
his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties
which she had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other
properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, 1 which however was not blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System. Those that Mariano
inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano
Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir
of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after
both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would
go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her
"Jaucian relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was
probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. As
directed in his will, Doa Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding
was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate court for
approval, 6Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the
deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34
to 42 are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the
last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him
custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her
lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more
often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria
Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his
death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years,
Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties
to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had
received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:
11
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES

23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481
favor of Mariano Locsin
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000
Jose R. Locsin
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian
6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto -
favor of Aurea B. Locsin
7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto -
favor of Aurea B. Locsin
15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto -
Aurea Locsin
16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado
17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto -
favor of Mariano Locsin
1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio
Locsin
12
2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
from bigger portion of
Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio
Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and nieces and others:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000
Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
(6,825 sqm. when
resurveyed)
24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000
in favor of Francisco M.
Maquiniana
26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300
favor of Francisco
Maquiniana
27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000
favor of Ireneo Mamia
28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750
favor of Zenaida Buiza
29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor of Felisa Morjella
30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000
favor of Inocentes Motocinos
31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor of Casimiro Mondevil
32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200
favor of Juan Saballa
25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500
of Rogelio Marticio
Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers she
had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all
the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to
them under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except some
legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already
received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi
13
City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during
her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to
circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin
defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo Jaucian, who
withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian
Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregorio,
both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and all other instruments
conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those
in the inventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all certificates of title
and other transfers of the real properties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and
derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and possession of all
such properties to the plaintiffs, together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and
delivered, and all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina,
with legal interest from the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be
effected for reasons that might have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for
the value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest from
the filing, of this case
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and
(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in the
amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
Costs against the defendants. 9
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now appealed
judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa
Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10)
years before her death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina had
transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her
death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at
the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as
donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a
decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or
forced) heirs. 12
14
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in transferring the properties she
had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the
private respondents' rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not
pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any
transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise
restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil
Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof,
provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law
entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on
petition of any person affected. (634a)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old when she died on July 6,
1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced
and morally pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties
which she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa Catalina had already begun transferring
to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot
on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she
passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or on
March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian
and Agapito Lorete. 17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is estopped from
assailing the genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and
Agapito Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.
Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property which she made in
favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made
those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she was
transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor
of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-half
(or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same
lot to Julian Locsin. 19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other persons, namely:
Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro
Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the private
respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea
Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to make that conveyance to
Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other pieces of property to
Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a "consciousness
of its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife had
15
inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doa Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that
"items 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the
time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the
marriage." She would have known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal
property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath, and
was approved by the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was
prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have
prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to
inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano died, he and his
wife (Doa Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective properties should eventually revert to their
respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doa Catalina,
he would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doa Catalina's nephews and nieces, those
closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c)
her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco
and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she made in
favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively
demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the
petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to Doa Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the
petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate her
properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with
her in her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties. The
sales and donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and
nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November 19,
1974 23 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975 24 in favor of Matilde
Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed
by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doa Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is
married to another niece, Maria Olbes. 26The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15,
1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions
could not have been anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this
action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions
had been consummated, and six (6) years after Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the
subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property, 28 whether considered an action based on fraud,
or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said
transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole
world. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint for annulment of
contracts and reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of
Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 125835. July 30, 1998]
16
NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC and
MIGUEL OLIVAN, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.
Is a contract to sell a real property involved in testate proceedings valid and binding without the approval of
the probate court?
Statement of the Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review before us, assailing the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals[2] in CA-GR CV No. 41994 promulgated on February 6, 1996 and its Resolution[3] dated July 19,
1996. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint is SET ASIDE and
judgment is hereby rendered declaring the CONTRACT TO SELL executed by appellee in favor of appellants as
valid and binding, subject to the result of the administration proceedings of the testate Estate of Demetrio
Carpena.
SO ORDERED. [4]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the challenged Resolution.[5]
The Facts
The antecedent facts, as succinctly narrated by Respondent Court of Appeals are:

In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo [herein private respondents] Aladin Simundac
and Miguel Oliven alleged that [herein petitioner] Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a
CONTRACT TO SELL Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of 23,766 square meters located in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant,
despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract. [Private respondents] therefore prayed
that [petitioner] be ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay damages, attorneys fee and
litigation expenses.
In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt
of P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property
subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioners father), in respect of which a
petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna; that at the time the
contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell
17
was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to return
the downpayment received from [private respondents], but the latter refused to accept it; that [private
respondents] further failed to provide funds for the tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy
rights on the land; that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract.
At the pre-trial conference the parties stipulated on [sic] the following facts:
1. That on February 3, 1989, [private respondents] and [petitioner] entered into a contract to sell involving a
parcel of land situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, otherwise known as Lot No. 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate.
2. That the price or consideration of the said sell [sic] is P150.00 per square meters;
3. That the amount of P300,000.00 had already been received by [petitioner];
4. That the parties have knowledge that the property subject of the contract to sell is subject of the probate
proceedings;
5. That [as] of this time, the probate Court has not yet issued an order either approving or denying the said
sale. (p. 3, appealed Order of September 15, 1992, pp. 109-112, record).
[Private respondents] submitted their evidence in support of the material allegations of the complaint. In addition
to testimonies of witnesses, [private respondents] presented the following documentary evidences: (1) Contract
to Sell (Exh A); (2) machine copy of the last will and testament of Demetrio Carpena (defendants father) to show
that the property sold by defendant was one of those devised to her in said will (Exh B); (3) receipts signed by
defendant for the downpayment in the total amount of P300,000.00 (Exhs C, D & E); and (4) demand letters sent
to defendant (Exhs F & G).
It appears that [petitioner], instead of submitting her evidence, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. In essence,
defendant maintained that the contract to sell was null and void for want of approval by the probate court. She
further argued that the contract was subject to a suspensive condition, which was the probate of the will of
defendants father Demetrio Carpena. An Opposition was filed by [private respondents]. It appears further that in
an Order dated December 15, 1992 the court a quo granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the
complaint. It justified its action in dismissing the complaint in the following manner:
It is noteworthy that when the contract to sell was consummated, no petition was filed in the Court with notice to
the heirs of the time and place of hearing, to show that the sale is necessary and beneficial. A sale of properties
of an estate as beneficial to the interested parties must comply with the requisites provided by law, (Sec. 7, Rule
89, Rules of Court) which are mandatory, and without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and the order
approving it, would be null and void ab initio. (Arcilla vs. David, 77 Phil. 718, Gabriel, et al., vs. Encarnacion, et
al., L-6736, May 4, 1954; Bonaga vs. Soler, 2 Phil. 755) Besides, it is axiomatic that where the estate of a
deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any
transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate Court. (Estate of Obave, vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA
767).
As held by the Supreme Court, a decedents representative (administrator) is not estopped from questioning the
validity of his own void deed purporting to convey land. (Bona vs. Soler, 2 Phil, 755). In the case at bar, the
[petitioner,] realizing the illegality of the transaction[,] has interposed the nullity of the contract as her defense,
there being no approval from the probate Court, and, in good faith offers to return the money she received from
the [private respondents]. Certainly, the administratrix is not estop[ped] from doing so and the action to declare
the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe. This is what precipitated the filing of [petitioners] demurrer to
evidence.[6]
The trial courts order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents who alleged:
18
1. The lower court erred in concluding that the contract to sell is null and void, there being no approval of the
probate court.
2. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] in good faith offers to return the money to [private
respondents].
3. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] is not under estoppel to question the validity of the
contract to sell.
4. The lower court erred in not ruling on the consideration of the contract to sell which is tantamount to plain
unjust enrichment of [petitioner] at the expense of [private respondents].[7]
Public Respondents Ruling
Declaring the Contract to Sell valid, subject to the outcome of the testate proceedings on Demetrio
Carpenas estate, the appellate court set aside the trial courts dismissal of the complaint and correctly ruled as
follows:
It is apparent from the appealed order that the lower court treated the contract to sell executed by appellee as one
made by the administratrix of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena for the benefit of the estate. Hence, its main reason
for voiding the contract in question was the absence of the probate courts approval. Presumably, what the lower
court had in mind was the sale of the estate or part thereof made by the administrator for the benefit of the estate,
as authorized under Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires the approval of the probate court
upon application therefor with notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees.
However, as adverted to by appellants in their brief, the contract to sell in question is not covered by Rule 89 of
the Revised Rules of Court since it was made by appellee in her capacity as an heir, of a property that was
devised to her under the will sought to be probated. Thus, while the document inadvertently stated that appellee
executed the contract in her capacity as executrix and administratrix of the estate, a cursory reading of the entire
text of the contract would unerringly show that what she undertook to sell to appellants was one of the other
properties given to her by her late father, and more importantly, it was not made for the benefit of the estate but
for her own needs. To illustrate this point, it is apropos to refer to the preambular or preliminary portion of the
document, which reads:
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the lawful owner of a certain parcel of land, which is more particularly described as
follows:
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
WHEREAS, the SELLER suffers difficulties in her living and has forced to offer the sale of the above-described
property, which property was only one among the other properties given to her by her late father, to anyone who
can wait for complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father.
WHEREAS, the SELLER in order to meet her need of cash, has offered for sale the said property at ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (150.00) Philippine Currency, per square meter unto the BUYERS, and with this
offer, the latter has accepted to buy and/or purchase the same, less the area for the road and other easements
indicated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2125 duly confirmed after the survey to be conducted by
the BUYERs Licensed Geodetic Engineer, and whatever area [is] left. (Emphasis added).
19
To emphasize, it is evident from the foregoing clauses of the contract that appellee sold Lot 2125 not in her
capacity as executrix of the will or administratrix of the estate of her father, but as an heir and more importantly
as owner of said lot which, along with other properties, was devised to her under the will sought to be
probated. That being so, the requisites stipulated in Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court which refer to a sale
made by the administrator for the benefit of the estate do not apply.
xxxxxxxxx
It is noteworthy that in a Manifestation filed with this court by appellants, which is not controverted by appellee,
it is mentioned that the last will and testament of Demetrio Carpena was approved in a final judgment rendered
in Special Proceeding No. B-979 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24 Binan, Laguna. But of course such
approval does not terminate the proceeding[s] since the settlement of the estate will ensue. Such proceedings will
consist, among others, in the issuance by the court of a notice to creditors (Rule 86), hearing of money claims
and payment of taxes and estate debts (Rule 88) and distribution of the residue to the heirs or persons entitled
thereto (Rule 90). In effect, the final execution of the deed of sale itself upon appellants payment of the balance
of the purchase price will have to wait for the settlement or termination of the administration proceedings of the
Estate of Demetrio Carpena. Under the foregoing premises, what the trial court should have done with the
complaint was not to dismiss it but to simply put on hold further proceedings until such time that the estate or its
residue will be distributed in accordance with the approved will.
The rule is that when a demurrer to the evidence is granted by the trial court but reversed on appeal, defendant
loses the right to adduce his evidence. In such a case, the appellate court will decide the controversy on the basis
of plaintiffs evidence. In the case at bench, while we find the contract to sell valid and binding between the
parties, we cannot as yet order appellee to perform her obligations under the contract because the result of the
administration proceedings of the testate Estate of Demetrio Carpena has to be awaited. Hence, we shall confine
our adjudication to merely declaring the validity of the questioned Contract to Sell.
Hence, this appeal.[8]
The Issue
Petitioner raises only one issue:

Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989 executed by the [p]etitioner and [p]rivate
[r]espondent[s] without the requisite probate court approval is valid.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Contract to Sell Valid
20
In a nutshell, petitioner contends that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a
testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior
approval of the Probate Court.[9] She maintains that the Contract to Sell is void because it was not approved by
the probate court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. The court having
jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or
otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears necessary or beneficial,
under the following regulations:
xxx
Insisting that the above rule should apply to this case, petitioner argues that the stipulations in the Contract
to Sell require her to act in her capacity as an executrix or administratrix. She avers that her obligation to eject
tenants pertains to the administratrix or executrix, the estate being the landlord of the said tenants.[10] Likewise
demonstrating that she entered into the contract in her capacity as executor is the stipulation that she must effect
the conversion of subject land from irrigated rice land to residential land and secure the necessary clearances
from government offices.Petitioner alleges that these obligations can be undertaken only by an executor or
administrator of an estate, and not by an heir.[11]
The Court is not persuaded. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as
an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the lawful owner and seller
of the subject parcel of land.[12] She also explained the reason for the sale to be difficulties in her living
conditions and consequent need of cash.[13] These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on
behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence
cited by petitioner has no application to the instant case.
We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedents death.
[14] Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of
judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell
the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.[15] Thus, in Jakosalem vs. Rafols,[16]the Court
resolved an identical issue under the old Civil Code and held:
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to
the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be
accepted. And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the
undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a
community of ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided. xxx
And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common
property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him
in the partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence
of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice
Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be
allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.
Administration of the Estate Not Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell
21
Petitioner further contends that [t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a partial distribution of
the decedents estate pending the final termination of the testate proceedings.[17] This becomes all the more
significant in the light of the trial courts finding, as stated in its Order dated August 20, 1997, that the legitime of
one of the heirs has been impaired.[18]
Petitioners contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioners offer to sell
is contingent on the complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father.[19] Consequently,
although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency
of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to
the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of
the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners apprehension that the Contract to Sell may
result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that the sale
made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way
of such administration.[20]
Estoppel
Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to Sell with
private respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as initial payment of the purchase
price. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents
who have relied on them.[21] Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party
from an unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of its consequences.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126334 November 23, 2001

EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO, SHERWIN TABANAO, VICENTE
WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAO DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA,
ROSELA TABANAO and VINCENT TABANAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known
as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and
executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them, consequent to
Jacinto Divinagracia's withdrawal from the partnership.1 Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing
boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Nio and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash
deposits in the local branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank.
22
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao's untimely demise in 1994,
petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to
render an accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to
Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or
the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment thereof.2
Consequently, Tabanao' s heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of
shares, division of assets and damages.3 In their complaint, respondents prayed as follows:
1. Defendant be ordered to render the proper accounting of all the assets and liabilities of the partnership
at bar; and
2. After due notice and hearing defendant be ordered to pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs
the following:
A. No less than One Third (1/3) of the assets, properties, dividends, cash, land(s), fishing
vessels, trucks, motor vehicles, and other forms and substance of treasures which belong and/or
should belong, had accrued and/or must accrue to the partnership;
B. No less than Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages;
C. Attorney's fees equivalent to Thirty Percent (30%) of the entire share/amount/award which the
Honorable Court may resolve the plaintiffs as entitled to plus P1,000.00 for every appearance in
court.4
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the estate of Tabanao to sue.5 On August 30, 1994, the trial
court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that venue was properly laid because, while realties were involved,
the action was directed against a particular person on the basis of his personal liability; hence, the action is not
only a personal action but also an action in personam. As regards petitioner's argument of lack of jurisdiction
over the action because the prescribed docket fee was not paid considering the huge amount involved in the
claim, the trial court noted that a request for accounting was made in order that the exact value of the partnership
may be ascertained and, thus, the correct docket fee may be paid. Finally, the trial court held that the heirs of
Tabanao had aright to sue in their own names, in view of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which
states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.6
The following day, respondents filed an amended complaint,7 incorporating the additional prayer that petitioner
be ordered to "sell all (the partnership's) assets and thereafter pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs"
their corresponding share in the proceeds thereof. In due time, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to
dismiss,8arguing that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case due to the plaintiffs' failure to pay
the proper docket fees. Further, in a supplement to his motion to dismiss,9 petitioner also raised prescription as
an additional ground warranting the outright dismissal of the complaint.
On June 15, 1995, the trial court issued an Order,10 denying the motion to dismiss inasmuch as the grounds
raised therein were basically the same as the earlier motion to dismiss which has been denied. Anent the issue of
prescription, the trial court ruled that prescription begins to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership
when the final accounting is done. Hence, prescription has not set in the absence of a final accounting.
Moreover, an action based on a written contract prescribes in ten years from the time the right of action accrues.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,11 raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance of a case despite the failure to pay the required docket fee;
23
II. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
insisting to try the case which involve (sic) a parcel of land situated outside of its territorial jurisdiction;
III. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the estate of the deceased to appear as party plaintiff, when there is no intestate case and filed
by one who was never appointed by the court as administratrix of the estates; and
IV. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.
On August 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision,12 dismissing the petition for certiorari,
upon a finding that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by
the trial court in issuing the questioned orders denying petitioner's motions to dismiss.
Not satisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, raising the same issues resolved by the Court of
Appeals, namely:
I. Failure to pay the proper docket fee;
II. Parcel of land subject of the case pending before the trial court is outside the said court's territorial
jurisdiction;
III. Lack of capacity to sue on the part of plaintiff heirs of Vicente Tabanao; and
IV. Prescription of the plaintiff heirs' cause of action.
It can be readily seen that respondents' primary and ultimate objective in instituting the action below was to
recover the decedent's 1/3 share in the partnership' s assets. While they ask for an accounting of the partnership' s
assets and finances, what they are actually asking is for the trial court to compel petitioner to pay and turn over
their share, or the equivalent value thereof, from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership assets. They also
assert that until and unless a proper accounting is done, the exact value of the partnership' s assets, as well as
their corresponding share therein, cannot be ascertained. Consequently, they feel justified in not having paid the
commensurate docket fee as required by the Rules of Court.1wphi1.nt
We do not agree. The trial court does not have to employ guesswork in ascertaining the estimated value of the
partnership's assets, for respondents themselves voluntarily pegged the worth thereof at Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00). Hence, this case is one which is really not beyond pecuniary estimation, but rather partakes of
the nature of a simple collection case where the value of the subject assets or amount demanded is pecuniarily
determinable.13 While it is true that the exact value of the partnership's total assets cannot be shown with
certainty at the time of filing, respondents can and must ascertain, through informed and practical estimation, the
amount they expect to collect from the partnership, particularly from petitioner, in order to determine the proper
amount of docket and other fees.14 It is thus imperative for respondents to pay the corresponding docket fees in
order that the trial court may acquire jurisdiction over the action.15
Nevertheless, unlike in the case of Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,16 where there was
clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, we see no attempt to cheat
the courts on the part of respondents. In fact, the lower courts have noted their expressed desire to remit to the
court "any payable balance or lien on whatever award which the Honorable Court may grant them in this case
should there be any deficiency in the payment of the docket fees to be computed by the Clerk of Court."17 There
is evident willingness to pay, and the fact that the docket fee paid so far is inadequate is not an indication that
they are trying to avoid paying the required amount, but may simply be due to an inability to pay at the time of
filing. This consideration may have moved the trial court and the Court of Appeals to declare that the unpaid
docket fees shall be considered a lien on the judgment award.
24
Petitioner, however, argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in condoning the non-payment of
the proper legal fees and in allowing the same to become a lien on the monetary or property judgment that may
be rendered in favor of respondents. There is merit in petitioner's assertion. The third paragraph of Section 16,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court states that:
The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment in favor of the pauper-litigant.
Respondents cannot invoke the above provision in their favor because it specifically applies to pauper-litigants.
Nowhere in the records does it appear that respondents are litigating as paupers, and as such are exempted from
the payment of court fees.18
The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 5(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which defines the two
kinds of claims as: (1) those which are immediately ascertainable; and (2) those which cannot be immediately
ascertained as to the exact amount. This second class of claims, where the exact amount still has to be finally
determined by the courts based on evidence presented, falls squarely under the third paragraph of said Section
5(a), which provides:
In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with the
appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be. (Underscoring
ours)
In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Court of Appeals,19 this Court pronounced that the above-quoted
provision "clearly contemplates an Initial payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of
the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may be proved."20 Moreover, we reiterated therein the principle
that the payment of filing fees cannot be made contingent or dependent on the result of the case. Thus, an initial
payment of the docket fees based on an estimated amount must be paid simultaneous with the filing of the
complaint. Otherwise, the court would stand to lose the filing fees should the judgment later turn out to be
adverse to any claim of the respondent heirs.
The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary to defray court expenses
in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and to the
government as well, the payment of docket fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the case, except
when the claimant is a pauper-litigant.
Applied to the instant case, respondents have a specific claim - 1/3 of the value of all the partnership assets - but
they did not allege a specific amount. They did, however, estimate the partnership's total assets to be worth
Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00), in a letter21 addressed to petitioner. Respondents cannot now say that
they are unable to make an estimate, for the said letter and the admissions therein form part of the records of this
case. They cannot avoid paying the initial docket fees by conveniently omitting the said amount in their amended
complaint. This estimate can be made the basis for the initial docket fees that respondents should pay. Even if it
were later established that the amount proved was less or more than the amount alleged or estimated, Rule 141,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the court may refund the 'excess or exact additional
fees should the initial payment be insufficient. It is clear that it is only the difference between the amount finally
awarded and the fees paid upon filing of this complaint that is subject to adjustment and which may be subjected
to alien.
In the oft-quoted case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion,22 this Court held that when
the specific claim "has been left for the determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment and it shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee." Clearly, the rules and jurisprudence
contemplate the initial payment of filing and docket fees based on the estimated claims of the plaintiff, and it is
only when there is a deficiency that a lien may be constituted on the judgment award until such additional fee is
collected.
25
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint outright despite their failure to pay
the proper docket fees. Nevertheless, as in other procedural rules, it may be liberally construed in certain cases if
only to secure a just and speedy disposition of an action. While the rule is that the payment of the docket fee in
the proper amount should be adhered to, there are certain exceptions which must be strictly construed.23
In recent rulings, this Court has relaxed the strict adherence to the Manchester doctrine, allowing the plaintiff to
pay the proper docket fees within a reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.24
In the recent case of National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court held that:
The court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by
the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of
the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime.
It does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint for failure of private
respondent to pay the correct amount of docket fees. Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a
jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a
reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If the
plaintiff fails to comply within this requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of
jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the balance between the
appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be considered a lien or any
award he may obtain in his favor. (Underscoring ours)
Accordingly, the trial court in the case at bar should determine the proper docket fee based on the estimated
amount that respondents seek to collect from petitioner, and direct them to pay the same within a reasonable
time, provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired, Failure to comply
therewith, and upon motion by petitioner, the immediate dismissal of the complaint shall issue on jurisdictional
grounds.
On the matter of improper venue, we find no error on the part of the trial court and the Court of Appeals in
holding that the case below is a personal action which, under the Rules, may be commenced and tried where the
defendant resides or may be found, or where the plaintiffs reside, at the election of the latter.26
Petitioner, however, insists that venue was improperly laid since the action is a real action involving a parcel of
land that is located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court a quo. This contention is not well-taken. The
records indubitably show that respondents are asking that the assets of the partnership be accounted for, sold and
distributed according to the agreement of the partners. The fact that two of the assets of the partnership are
parcels of land does not materially change the nature of the action. It is an action in personam because it is an
action against a person, namely, petitioner, on the basis of his personal liability. It is not an action in rem where
the action is against the thing itself instead of against the person.27 Furthermore, there is no showing that the
parcels of land involved in this case are being disputed. In fact, it is only incidental that part of the assets of the
partnership under liquidation happen to be parcels of land.
The time-tested case of Claridades v. Mercader, et al.,28 settled this issue thus:
The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets of the partnership, including the fishpond in
question, did not change the nature or character of the action, such sale being merely a necessary
incident of the liquidation of the partnership, which should precede and/or is part of its process of
dissolution.
The action filed by respondents not only seeks redress against petitioner. It also seeks the enforcement of, and
petitioner's compliance with, the contract that the partners executed to formalize the partnership's dissolution, as
26
well as to implement the liquidation and partition of the partnership's assets. Clearly, it is a personal action that,
in effect, claims a debt from petitioner and seeks the performance of a personal duty on his part.29 In fine,
respondents' complaint seeking the liquidation and partition of the assets of the partnership with damages is a
personal action which may be filed in the proper court where any of the parties reside.30 Besides, venue has
nothing to do with jurisdiction for venue touches more upon the substance or merits of the case.31 As it is, venue
in this case was properly laid and the trial court correctly ruled so.
On the third issue, petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue
since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate. Petitioner's objection in this regard is
misplaced. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before
she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente
Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned
were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent.32
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to
respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of
which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted.33 Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment
Vicente Tabanao died.34
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is
not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of
their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent.35 From the
moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as outlined in
their dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the
court's intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
Finally, petitioner contends that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, arguing that respondents' action prescribed four (4) years after it accrued in 1986. The trial court
and the Court of Appeals gave scant consideration to petitioner's hollow arguments, and rightly so.
The three (3) final stages of a partnership are: (1) dissolution; (2) winding-up; and (3) termination.36 The
partnership, although dissolved, continues to exist and its legal personality is retained, at which time it completes
the winding up of its affairs, including the partitioning and distribution of the net partnership assets to the
partners.37 For as long as the partnership exists, any of the partners may demand an accounting of the
partnership's business. Prescription of the said right starts to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership
when the final accounting is done.38
Contrary to petitioner's protestations that respondents' right to inquire into the business affairs of the partnership
accrued in 1986, prescribing four (4) years thereafter, prescription had not even begun to run in the absence of a
final accounting. Article 1842 of the Civil Code provides:
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, or his legal representative as against
the winding up partners or the surviving partners or the person or partnership continuing the business, at
the date of dissolution, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
Applied in relation to Articles 1807 and 1809, which also deal with the duty to account, the above-cited
provision states that the right to demand an accounting accrues at the date of dissolution in the absence of any
agreement to the contrary. When a final accounting is made, it is only then that prescription begins to run. In the
case at bar, no final accounting has been made, and that is precisely what respondents are seeking in their action
before the trial court, since petitioner has failed or refused to render an accounting of the partnership's business
and assets. Hence, the said action is not barred by prescription.
27
In fine, the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's motions to dismiss.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in upholding the trial court's orders. Precious
time has been lost just to settle this preliminary issue, with petitioner resurrecting the very same arguments from
the trial court all the way up to the Supreme Court. The litigation of the merits and substantial issues of this
controversy is now long overdue and must proceed without further delay.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, which is ORDERED to determine the
proper docket fee based on the estimated amount that plaintiffs therein seek to collect, and direct said plaintiffs
to pay the same within a reasonable time, provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet
expired. Thereafter, the trial court is ORDERED to conduct the appropriate proceedings in Civil Case No. 416-
C.
Costs against petitioner.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,3 dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No.
CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered
the defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot
No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-
in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of
that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated
and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of
141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights
which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and
spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
28
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla
shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of
Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he
dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export
sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to
still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I
have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer,
lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED
(100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December,
SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria
Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my
command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately
seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near
desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100)
piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that
my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to
sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my sister."4
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora,
Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-
heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and
sister of the testatrix.
29
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75
piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from
sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated
demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in case of the
sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation
to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to
the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default
was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein
petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable
settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of
sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not
later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y
Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is
considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in
the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent
of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the
composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment, payable on or before
the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before
December of crop year 1988-89;
December of crop year 1989-90;
December of crop year 1990-91; and
December of crop year 1991-92."5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery
of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as
follows:
30
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed as no
cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-
performance of the command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge
Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The
remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff
may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full
meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court;
ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar
annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as
heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-
appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by
both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in
case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392
from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute
separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute
Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive
her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees,
as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate
of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."7
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this Court via the
present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of
the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with Article 882 of the
New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or
prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no
modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to
herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can
be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs are
not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or
reference as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843 8 and 8459 of the New Civil
Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from
the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity
31
of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a
cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the
private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which
issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death
of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the
latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to
them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject
Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by
death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition
that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also
assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such
obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the
fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at
bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable because
what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near
descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private
respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first
instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to
whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express
charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. 13 The
Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity,
predecease or renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide
that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not
fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary
substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the
second heir.15 In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate
the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very
important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first
32
heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve
clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."16 Also, the near
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second
heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first
heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first
degree to the second heir.17 In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the
nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point.
Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by the testator, or the
charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give
security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive,
together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect
in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in
conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as
an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the
institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the
testator upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the
efficacy of his rights to the succession.19 On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the
condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition
suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.20 To some extent, it is similar to a
resolutory condition.21
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that
subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an
obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the
herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix
did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the
performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the
property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir
should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of
the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.22
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has only a right of
usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was
expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
33
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of its
provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made.23 Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts
must be adopted.24
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar
yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected,
Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-
performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the
testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the
instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-
fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said obligation
imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the
obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his
obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having
consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the
obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his
property, to take effect after his death.25 Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his
properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the
subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December
23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104482 January 22, 1996

BELINDA TAEDO, for herself and in representation of her brothers and sisters, and TEOFILA
CORPUZ TAEDO, representing her minor daughter VERNA TAEDO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RICARDO M. TAEDO AND TERESITA BARERA
TAEDO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; SALE; MAY NOT BE ENTERED INTO UPON FUTURE
INHERITANCE; EXCEPT IN CASES EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY LAW. -- Pursuant to Article
1347 of the Civil Code, (n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law. Consequently, said contract made in 1962 conveying one hectare of his future
inheritance is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the
parties. Hence, the affidavit of conformity dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or
ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, suffers from the same
infirmity. Even private respondents in their memorandum concede this.
34
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OF VENDEES IN CASE OF DOUBLE SALE. --
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private respondents never took
possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a preferred
right over the other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the
immovable property.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACT OF EXISTENCE OF GOOD

FAITH, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL. -- There are indeed many conflicting documents and
testimonies as well as arguments over their probative value and significance. Suffice it to say, however,
that all the above contentions involve questions of fact, appreciation of evidence and credibility of
witnesses, which are not proper in this review, It is well-settled that the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised and passed upon. Absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless the lack of
any basis for the conclusions made by the lower courts be amply demonstrated, the Supreme Court will
not disturb their findings. At most, it appears that petitioners have shown that their evidence was not
believed by both the trial and the appellate courts, and that the said courts tended to give more credence to
the evidence presented by the private respondents. But this in itself is not a reason for setting aside such
findings. We are far from convinced that both courts gravely abused their respective authorities and
judicial prerogatives.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a sale of future inheritance valid? In multiple sales of the same real property, who has preference in
ownership? What is the probative value of the lower court's finding of good faith in registration of such sales in
the registry of property? These are the main questions raised in this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court to set aside and reverse the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV NO.
24987 promulgated on September 26, 1991 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Third
Judicial Region, Tarlac, Tarlac in Civil Case No. 6328, and its Resolution denying reconsideration thereof,
promulgated on May 27, 1992.
By the Court's Resolution on October 25, 1995, this case (along with several others) was transferred from the
First to the Third Division and after due deliberation, the Court assigned it to the undersigned ponente for the
writing of this Decision.
The Facts
On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest brother,
Ricardo Taedo, and the latter's wife, Teresita Barera, private respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the
latter in consideration of P1,500.00, "one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the cadastral
survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac", the said
property being his "future inheritance" from his parents (Exh. 1). Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro
executed an "Affidavit of Conformity" dated February 28, 1980 (Exh. 3) to "re-affirm, respect, acknowledge and
validate the sale I made in 1962." On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor
of private respondents covering his "undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191 . . . "
(Exh. 4). He acknowledged therein his receipt of P10,000.00 as consideration therefor. In February 1981,
Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale
35
dated December 29, 1980 (Exh. E). On June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in
their favor in the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
166451 (Exh. 5).
Petitioners on July 16, 1982 filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale executed by
Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from his father.
Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated December 29, 1980
(Exit. E). Conveying to his ten children his allotted portion tinder the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs
of Matias, which deed included the land in litigation (Lot 191).
Petitioners also presented in evidence: (1) a private writing purportedly prepared and signed by Matias dated
December 28, 1978, stating that it was his desire that whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from him
should be given to his (Lazaro's) children (Exh. A); (2) a typewritten document dated March 10, 1979 signed by
Lazaro in the presence of two witnesses, wherein he confirmed that he would voluntarily abide by the wishes of
his father, Matias, to give to his (Lazaro's) children all the property he would inherit from the latter (Exh. B); and
(3) a letter dated January 1, 1980 of Lazaro to his daughter, Carmela, stating that his share in the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of his father was intended for his children, petitioners herein (Exh. C).
Private respondents, however presented in evidence a "Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale" dated March 12,
1981 (Exh. 6), wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of petitioners for the reason that it was "simulated or
fictitious without any consideration whatsoever".
Shortly after the case a quo was filed, Lazaro executed a sworn statement (Exh. G) which virtually repudiated
the contents of the Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale (Exh. 6) and the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in favor of
private respondents. However, Lazaro testified that he sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who
induced him to execute a deed of sale in favor of his children after giving him five pesos (P5.00) to buy a "drink"
(TSN September 18, 1985, pp. 204-205).
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed "to adduce a proponderance
of evidence to support (their) claim." On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court,
ruling that the Deed of Sale dated January 13, 1981 (Exh. 9) was valid and that its registration in good faith
vested title in said respondents.
The Issues
Petitioners raised the following "errors" in the respondent Court, which they also now allege in the instant
Petition:
I. The trial court erred in concluding that the Contract of Sale of October 20, 1962 (Exhibit 7, Answer) is
merely voidable or annulable and not void ab initio pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the New
Civil Code involving as it does a "future inheritance".
II. The trial court erred in holding that defendants-appellees acted in good faith in registering the deed of
sale of January 13, 1981 (Exhibit 9) with the Register of Deeds of Tarlac and therefore ownership of the
land in question passed on to defendants-appellees.
III. The trial court erred in ignoring and failing to consider the testimonial and documentary evidence of
plaintiffs-appellants which clearly established by preponderance of evidence that they are indeed the
legitimate and lawful owners of the property in question.
IV. The decision is contrary to law and the facts of the case and the conclusions drawn from the
established facts are illogical and off-tangent.
From the foregoing, the issues may be restated as follows:
36
1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?

2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 (and registration with the Registry of Property) of
a deed of sale covering the same property to the same buyers valid?
3. May this Court review the findings of the respondent Court (a) holding that the buyers acted in good
faith in registering the said subsequent deed of sale and (b) in "failing to consider petitioners' evidence"?
Are the conclusions of the respondent Court "illogical and off-tangent"?
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, let it be clear that the "errors" which are reviewable by this Court in this petition for review
on certiorari are only those allegedly committed by the respondent Court of Appeals and not directly those of
the trial court, which is not a party here. The "assignment of errors" in the petition quoted above are therefore
totally misplaced, and for that reason, the petition should be dismissed. But in order to give the parties
substantial justice we have decided to delve into the issues as above re-stated. The errors attributed by petitioners
to the latter (trial) court will be discussed only insofar as they are relevant to the appellate court's assailed
Decision and Resolution.
The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In context, the assailed Decision
conceded "it may be legally correct that a contract of sale of anticipated future inheritance is null and void."3
But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "(n)o
contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law."
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation between the parties.
Hence, the "affidavit of conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962
sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, "suffers from the same infirmity." Even private
respondents in their memorandum4 concede this.
However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are: (a) the deed of sale of January 13,
1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided inheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot
No. 191, which was subsequently registered on June 7, 1982; and (b) the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980
in favor of petitioners covering the same property. These two documents were executed after the death of Matias
(and his spouse) and after a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his (Matias') estate was executed, thus vesting in
Lazaro actual title over said property. In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer
infected with the infirmities of the 1962 sale.
Petitioners contend that what was sold on January 13, 1981 was only one-half hectare out of Lot No. 191, citing
as authority the trial court's decision. As earlier pointed out, what is on review in these proceedings by this Court
is the Court of Appeals' decision which correctly identified the subject matter of the January 13, 1981 sale to
be the entire undivided 1/12 share of Lazaro in Lot No. 191 and which is the same property disposed of on
December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners.
Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given effect is the registration of the sale in favor of
private respondents with the register of deeds on June 7, 1982.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales, as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
37
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership shall belong to
the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of
private respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of
the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private respondents never took
possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right
over the other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable
property.5
As to third issue, while petitioners conceded the fact of registration, they nevertheless contended that it was done
in bad faith. On this issue, the respondent Court ruled;
Under the second assignment of error, plaintiffs-appellants contend that defendants-appellees acted in
bad faith when they registered the Deed of Sale in their favor as appellee Ricardo already knew of the
execution of the deed of sale in favor of the plaintiffs; appellants cite the testimony of plaintiff Belinda
Taedo to the effect that defendant Ricardo Taedo called her up on January 4 or 5, 1981 to tell her that
he was already the owner of the land in question "but the contract of sale between our father and us were
(sic) already consumated" (pp. 9-10, tsn, January 6, 1984). This testimony is obviously self-serving, and
because it was a telephone conversation, the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 was not shown;
Belinda merely told her uncle that there was already a document showing that plaintiffs are the owners
(p. 80). Ricardo Taedo controverted this and testified that he learned for the first time of the deed of
sale executed by Lazaro in favor of his children "about a month or sometime in February 1981" (p. 111,
tsn, Nov. 28, 1984). . . .6
The respondent Court, reviewing the trial court's findings, refused to overturn the latter's assessment of the
testimonial evidence, as follows;
We are not prepared to set aside the finding of the lower court upholding Ricardo Taedo's testimony, as
it involves a matter of credibility of witnesses which the trial judge, who presided at the hearing, was in
a better position to resolve. (Court of Appeals' Decision, p. 6.)
In this connection, we note the tenacious allegations made by petitioners, both in their basic petition and in their
memorandum, as follows:
1. The respondent Court allegedly ignored the claimed fact that respondent Ricardo "by fraud and deceit
and with foreknowledge" that the property in question had already been sold to petitioners, made Lazaro
execute the deed of January 13, 1981;
2. There is allegedly adequate evidence to show that only 1/2 of the purchase price of P10,000.00 was
paid at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, contrary to the written acknowledgment, thus
showing bad faith;
3. There is allegedly sufficient evidence showing that the deed of revocation of the sale in favor of
petitioners "was tainted with fraud or deceit."
4. There is allegedly enough evidence to show that private respondents "took undue advantage over the
weakness and unschooled and pitiful situation of Lazaro Taedo . . ." and that respondent Ricardo
38
Taedo "exercised moral ascendancy over his younger brother he being the eldest brother and who
reached fourth year college of law and at one time a former Vice-Governor of Tarlac, while his younger
brother only attained first year high school . . . ;
5. The respondent Court erred in not giving credence to petitioners' evidence, especially Lazaro
Taedo's Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 27, 1982 stating that Ricardo Taedo deceived the former in
executing the deed of sale in favor of private respondents.
To be sure, there are indeed many conflicting documents and testimonies as well as arguments over their
probative value and significance. Suffice it to say, however, that all the above contentions involve questions of
fact, appreciation of evidence and credibility of witnesses, which are not proper in this review. It is well-settled
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be raised and passed upon. Absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of
judgment, and unless the lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the lower courts be amply demonstrated,
the Supreme Court will not disturb their findings. At most, it appears that petitioners have shown that their
evidence was not believed by both the trial and the appellate courts, and that the said courts tended to give more
credence to the evidence presented by private respondents. But this in itself is not a reason for setting aside such
findings. We are far from convinced that both courts gravely abused their respective authorities and judicial
prerogatives.
As held in the recent case of Chua Tiong Tay vs. Court of Appeals and Goldrock Construction and Development
Corp.7
The Court has consistently held that the factual findings of the trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals, are
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Among the exceptional circumstances where a
reassessment of facts found by the lower courts is allowed are when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or
impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the judgment is premised
on a misapprehension of facts; when the findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee. After a careful study of the case at bench, we find none of the
above grounds present to justify the re-evaluation of the findings of fact made by the courts below.
In the same vein, the ruling in the recent case of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Court
of Appeals, et al.8 is equally applicable to the present case:
We see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions of the appellate court. . . . (I)t is not the
function of this Court to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary,
adduced by the parties, particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court on the matter coincide. (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No
Costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169129 March 28, 2007

SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, &
LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO, Respondents.
DECISION
39
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60450 entitled, Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza
Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos, dated 8 June
2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, which granted the appeal filed by herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao
and Proserfina Lumbao (Spouses Lumbao) and ordered herein petitioners Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and
Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos to
reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter attorneys fees and litigation
expenses, thus, reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, dated 17 June 1998
which dismissed the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao for lack
of merit.
Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving
heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985. The other petitioners Esperanza Lati
and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-law of Rita.
Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of the 107-square
meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime.
The facts of the present case are as follows:
On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property
which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on 19
September 1978. On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mothers estate
through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979.4 Respondents Spouses Lumbao
claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by
their signatures affixed therein. On the second occasion, an additional seven square meters was added to the land
as evidenced by a document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 9 January 1981.5
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected
thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners
of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her
lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the
issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she
could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs
from Maria had not yet been partitioned.
On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one
another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement,6 adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the
other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao and now covered by TCT No. 817297 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.
On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal demand letter8 to petitioners but
despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the
respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with
Damages9before the RTC of Pasig City.
Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the subject property had been sold to the respondents
Spouses Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed
because the same was duly published as required by law. On the contrary, they prayed for the dismissal of the
40
Complaint for lack of cause of action because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, which repealed Presidential Decree No. 150810 requiring first resort to barangay conciliation.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended their Complaint because they discovered that on 16
February 1990, without their knowledge, petitioners executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta
S. Esplana for the sum of P30,000.00. The said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT
No. PT-81729 on 26 April 1991. Also, in answer to the allegation of the petitioners that they failed to comply
with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, respondents Spouses Lumbao said that the
Complaint was filed directly in court in order that prescription or the Statute of Limitations may not set in.
During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented Proserfina Lumbao and Carolina Morales as their
witnesses, while the petitioners presented only the testimony of petitioner Virgilio.
The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Considering that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to protect their interest, [respondents spouses
Lumbao] are hereby directed to pay [petitioners], to wit: 1) the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses, and 2) costs of the suit.11
Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 8 June 2005, the appellate court
rendered a Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated
June 17, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 62175 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered ordering [petitioners] to reconvey 107 square
meters of the subject [property] covered by TCT No. PT-81729 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Metro
Manila, and to pay to [respondents spouses Lumbao] the sum of P30,000.00 for attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
No pronouncement as to costs.12
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but it was denied in the
Resolution of the appellate court dated 29 July 2005 for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT, THEREBY CREATING A VARIANCE ON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TWO
COURTS.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE

PETITIONERS TO RECONVEY THE SUBJECT [PROPERTY] TO THE RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE GUILTY OF LACHES,
HENCE THEY CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT ALLEGEDLY SOLD TO THEM.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO BE IN GOOD FAITH IN EXECUTING THE "DEED OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT" DATED [2 MAY 1986].
41
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPPOSED
BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981] THAT WERE
SUPPOSEDLY EXECUTED BY THE LATE RITA CATOC.
V. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT

RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAOS] ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE WITH
DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN UNENFORCEABLE DOCUMENTS, SUCH
AS THE BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981].
VI. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAOS] COMPLAINT FOR RECONVEYANCE IS
DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF THE MANDATE OF [P.D. NO.] 1508, AS
AMENDED BY Republic Act No. 7160.
VII. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR
PETITIONERS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[]S FEES.
Petitioners ask this Court to scrutinize the evidence presented in this case, because they claim that the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting. They allege that the findings of fact by the trial
court revealed that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo did not witness the execution of the documents known as
"Bilihan ng Lupa"; hence, this finding runs counter to the conclusion made by the appellate court. And even
assuming that they were witnesses to the aforesaid documents, still, respondents Spouses Lumbao were not
entitled to the reconveyance of the subject property because they were guilty of laches for their failure to assert
their rights for an unreasonable length of time. Since respondents Spouses Lumbao had slept on their rights for a
period of more than 12 years reckoned from the date of execution of the second "Bilihan ng Lupa," it would be
unjust and unfair to the petitioners if the respondents will be allowed to recover the subject property.
Petitioners allege they are in good faith in executing the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement because even
respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness, Carolina Morales, testified that neither petitioner Virgilio nor petitioner
Tadeo was present during the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981.
Petitioners affirm that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was published in a newspaper of general circulation
to give notice to all creditors of the estate subject of partition to contest the same within the period prescribed by
law. Since no claimant appeared to interpose a claim within the period allowed by law, a title to the subject
property was then issued in favor of the petitioners; hence, they are considered as holders in good faith and
therefore cannot be barred from entering into any subsequent transactions involving the subject property.
Petitioners also contend that they are not bound by the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa" because the
same were null and void for the following reasons: 1) for being falsified documents because one of those
documents made it appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were witnesses to its execution and that they
appeared personally before the notary public, when in truth and in fact they did not; 2) the identities of the
properties in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property
in litigation were not established by the evidence presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao; 3) the right of
the respondents Spouses Lumbao to lay their claim over the subject property had already been barred through
estoppel by laches; and 4) the respondents Spouses Lumbaos claim over the subject property had already
prescribed.
42
Finally, petitioners claim that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses
Lumbao was dismissible because they failed to comply with the mandate of Presidential Decree No. 1508, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7160, particularly Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160.
Given the foregoing, the issues presented by the petitioners may be restated as follows:
I. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao
is dismissible for their failure to comply with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law under R.A. No. 7160.
II. Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and enforceable, thus, they can
be the bases of the respondents spouses Lumbaos action for reconveyance with damages.
III. Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the "Bilihan ng Lupa" dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981 and consequently, reconvey the subject property to herein respondents
spouses Lumbao.
It is well-settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case considering that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Court.13 But, the rule is not without exceptions. There are several recognized exceptions14 in which factual
issues may be resolved by this Court. One of these exceptions is when the findings of the appellate court are
contrary to those of the trial court. This exception is present in the case at bar.
Going to the first issue presented in this case, it is the argument of the petitioners that the Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for failure to comply
with the barangay conciliation proceedings as mandated by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under
Republic Act No. 7160. This argument cannot be sustained.
Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular No. 14-9315 provide that all disputes between
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are subject to barangay conciliation. A prior recourse
thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices. Non-compliance with the
said condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a
court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the
defendants failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction.16
While it is true that the present case should first be referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation because the
parties involved herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig City) and the dispute between them involves a real
property, hence, the said dispute should have been brought in the city in which the real property, subject matter
of the controversy, is located, which happens to be the same city where the contending parties reside. In the
event that respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the said condition precedent, their Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages can be dismissed. In this case, however, respondents Spouses Lumbaos non-
compliance with the aforesaid condition precedent cannot be considered fatal. Although petitioners alleged in
their answer that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao should
be dismissed for their failure to comply with the condition precedent, which in effect, made the complaint
prematurely instituted and the trial court acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case, yet, they did not file a Motion
to Dismiss the said complaint.
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of doing so, they invoked the
very same jurisdiction by filing an answer seeking an affirmative relief from it. Worse, petitioners actively
participated in the trial of the case by presenting their own witness and by cross-examining the witnesses
43
presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case
pending against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of that courts jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the courts jurisdiction. 17 It
is also well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not
jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to
dismiss.18 Hence, herein petitioners can no longer raise the defense of non-compliance with the barangay
conciliation proceedings to seek the dismissal of the complaint filed by the respondents Spouses Lumbao,
because they already waived the said defense when they failed to file a Motion to Dismiss.
As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981 are null and void for being falsified documents as it is made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and
Tadeo were present in the execution of the said documents and that the identities of the properties in those
documents in relation to the subject property has not been established by the evidence of the respondents
Spouses Lumbao. Petitioners also claim that the enforceability of those documents is barred by prescription of
action and laches.
It is the petitioners incessant barking that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981 were falsified because it was made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the
executions thereof, and their allegation that even respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness Carolina Morales
proved that said petitioners were not present during the execution of the aforementioned documents. This is
specious.
Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August
1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. Moreover, in petitioners Answer and
Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made
an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August
1979.19However, in order to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his
cross-examination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not remember the
same as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had passed. Noticeably,
petitioner Virgilio did not categorically deny having signed the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and in
support thereof, his testimony in the cross-examination propounded by the counsel of the respondents Spouses
Lumbao is quoted hereunder:
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Now, you said, Mr. WitnessVirgilio Santos, that you dont know about this document which was marked as
Exhibit "A" for the [respondents spouses Lumbao]?
ATTY. BUGARING:
The question is misleading, your Honor. Counsel premised the question that he does not have any knowledge but
not that he does not know.
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Being you are one of the witnesses of this document? [I]s it not?
WITNESS:
A. No, sir.
Q. I am showing to you this document, there is a signature at the left hand margin of this document Virgilio
Santos, will you please go over the same and tell the court whose signature is this?
A. I dont remember, sir, because of the length of time that had passed.
44
Q. But that is your signature?

A. I dont have eyeglasses My signature is different.
Q. You never appeared before this notary public Apolinario Mangahas?
A. I dont remember.20
As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon
him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it
expects to prove, but it is not evidence.21 And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a partys
pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented.22 However, in the case at bar,
as the Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision, "[herein petitioners] had not adduced any other evidence to
override the admission made in their [A]nswer that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] actually signed the [Bilihan
ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the purpose of the document, x x
x."23 Virgilios answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a party
in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case.
On the testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness Carolina Morales, this Court adopts the findings
made by the appellate court. Thus -
[T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question during cross-examination if the [petitioners
Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with her and the vendor [Rita] during the transaction. It must be pointed out that
earlier in the direct examination of said witness, she confirmed that [respondents spouses Lumbao] actually
bought the lot from [Rita] ("nagkabilihan"). Said witness positively identified and confirmed the two (2)
documents evidencing the sale in favor of [respondents spouse Lumbao]. Thus, her subsequent statement that the
[petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with them during the transaction does not automatically imply that
[petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] did not at any time sign as witnesses as to the deed of sale attesting to their
mothers voluntary act of selling a portion of her share in her deceased mothers property. The rule is that
testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or
isolated passages therein.24
Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were duly notarized
before a notary public. It is well-settled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public
document25 that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution.26 To overcome this presumption, there
must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be
upheld.27 In addition, one who denies the due execution of a deed where ones signature appears has the burden
of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged
the deed to be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners denials without clear and convincing
evidence to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned
presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng
Lupa" are upheld.
The defense of petitioners that the identities of the properties described in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property were not established by respondents Spouses
Lumbaos evidence is likewise not acceptable.
It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire
property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her co-heirs and so the
description of the entire estate is the only description that can be placed in the "Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981" because the exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that time. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of
45
sale between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and jurisprudence have
categorically held that even while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their
respective aliquots or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. 28 The co-owner,
however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because
such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical division. In any case,
the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void. The sale is
valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the
results of the partition upon the termination of the co-ownership.29
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the petitioners to respondents Spouses
Lumbao should be deducted from the total lot, inherited by them in representation of their deceased mother,
which in this case measures 467 square meters. The 107-square meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as
it was already sold during the lifetime of their mother.
Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents was described as "a
portion of a parcel of land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-018-01674," while the subject matter of the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement was the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3216 of the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal in the name of Maria is of no moment because in the "Bilihan ng
Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, it is clear that there was only one estate left by Maria upon her
death. And this fact was not refuted by the petitioners. Besides, the property described in Tax Declaration No. A-
018-01674 and the property mentioned in TCT No. 3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of
Pasig, Province of Rizal, and almost have the same boundaries. It is, thus, safe to state that the property
mentioned in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and in TCT No. 3216 are one and the same.
The defense of prescription of action and laches is likewise unjustifiable. In an action for reconveyance, the
decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its
title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name to its rightful or legal owner,
or to the one with a better right. It is, indeed, true that the right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not
absolute because it is subject to extinctive prescription. However, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land
to be reconveyed, prescription cannot set in. Such an exception is based on the theory that registration
proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.30
In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to seek reconveyance does not prescribe because
the latter have been and are still in actual possession and occupation as owners of the property sought to be
reconveyed, which fact has not been refuted nor denied by the petitioners. Furthermore, respondents Spouses
Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches because from the very start that they bought the 107-square meter lot
from the mother of the petitioners, they have constantly asked for the transfer of the certificate of title into their
names but Rita, during her lifetime, and the petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to do so on the flimsy
excuse that the lot had not been partitioned yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the entire estate of Maria,
petitioners still included the 107-square meter lot in their inheritance which they divided among themselves
despite their knowledge of the contracts of sale between their mother and the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
Under the above premises, this Court holds that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981 are valid and enforceable and can be made the basis of the respondents Spouses Lumbaos action
for reconveyance. The failure of respondents Spouses Lumbao to have the said documents registered does not
affect its validity and enforceability. It must be remembered that registration is not a requirement for validity of
the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The
principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction
involving the property had been entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is
46
unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has
the effect of registration as to him.31 Hence, the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981, being valid and enforceable, herein petitioners are bound to comply with their provisions. In short,
such documents are absolutely valid between and among the parties thereto.
Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in
the present case. Article 131132 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that
whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of
succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of
the inheritance of the heirs.33 Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into
by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their
common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only
succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as
against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right
and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the
subject matter of the contract.34
In the end, despite the death of the petitioners mother, they are still bound to comply with the provisions of the
"Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently, they must reconvey to herein
respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners mother. And as
correctly ruled by the appellate court, petitioners must pay respondents Spouses Lumbao attorneys fees and
litigation expenses for having been compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest.35 On this
matter, we do not find reasons to reverse the said findings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Herein petitioners
are ordered to reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter attorneys fees
and litigation expenses. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR.
31, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the National Housing Authority (NHA) against
the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 31, and private respondent Segunda
Almeida.
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land
which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No.
3787.1 By virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757. 2 NHA
as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in this case.
47
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private
respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.3
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of
Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the
deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed
by Margarita Herrera. The pertinent portions of which are as follows:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;
Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo, kasalukuyang naninirahan at
tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, sa ilalim ng panunumpa ay malaya at
kusang loob kong isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan (SOLAR), tumatayo sa Nayon ng San
Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, mayroong PITONG DAAN AT PITUMPU'T ISANG (771) METRONG
PARISUKAT ang laki, humigit kumulang, at makikilala sa tawag na Lote 17, Bloke 55, at pag-aari ng
Land Tenure Administration;
2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng paghuhulog sa Land Tenure
Administration, at noong ika 30 ng Julio, 1959, ang Kasunduang sa Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO SELL
No. 3787) ay ginawa at pinagtibay sa Lungsod ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario Publico na si G. Jose C.
Tolosa, at lumalabas sa kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento No. 13, Pagina No. 4; Libro No. IV,
Serie ng 1959;
3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang hanap buhay, ako ay nakatira at pinagsisilbihan
nang aking anak na si Francisca Herrera, at ang tinitirikan o solar na nasasabi sa unahan ay binabayaran
ng kaniyang sariling cuarta sa Land Tenure Administration;
4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay, ang
lupang nasasabi sa unahan ay aking ipinagkakaloob sa nasabi kong anak na FRANCISCA HERRERA,
Filipina, nasa katamtamang gulang, kasal kay Macario Berroya, kasalukuyang naninirahan at
tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayong ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, o sa kaniyang mga tagapagmana at;
5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga ay bawian na ng Dios ng aking
buhay ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman sa pangalan ng aking anak na si
Francisca Herrera ang loteng nasasabi sa unahan.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan kong kamay sa ibaba nito at sa
kaliwang gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng Octubre, 1960.4
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses signed at the left-hand side of both
pages of the document with the said document having 2 pages in total. Margarita Herrera placed her
thumbmark5 above her name in the second page and at the left-hand margin of the first page of the document.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication
before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan, Laguna (now, Regional Trial Court Branch
25). The case for annulment was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263.6
On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) was
rendered and the deed was declared null and void.7
48
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an
application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the
application.
In a Resolution8 dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera, holding
that:
From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we gathered the following facts:
the lots in question are portions of the lot awarded and sold to the late Margarita Herrera on July 28,
1959 by the defunct Land Tenure Administration; protestant is the daughter of the late Beatriz Herrera
Mercado who was the sister of the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of the late Margarita
Herrera; Beatriz was the transferee from Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of
the lots transferred to Beatriz, e.g. Lot 47, with an area of 148 square meters is in the name of the
protestant; protestant occupied the lots in question with the permission of the protestee; protestee is a
resident of the Tunasan Homesite since birth; protestee was born on the lots in question; protestee left
the place only after marriage but resided in a lot situated in the same Tunasan Homesite; her (protestee)
son Roberto Herrera has been occupying the lots in question; he has been there even before the death of
the late Margarita Herrera; on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" whereby she waived or transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in question in
favor of the protestee; and protestee had paid the lots in question in full on March 8, 1966 with the
defunct Land Tenure Administration.
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in question.9
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President.10 The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the
Office of the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987.11
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which
they submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the NHA.12 The NHA executed several
deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor.13 Thereafter, the
heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private
respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of
Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with
the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed properties, and
re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because
the other heirs were disregarded. The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred
by laches and that the decision of the Office of the President was already final and executory. 14 They also
contended that the transfer of purchase of the subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a
consideration and that Francisca Herrera paid for the property with the use of her own money.15 Further, they
argued that plaintiff's occupation of the property was by mere tolerance and that they had been paying taxes
thereon.16
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. 17 The
Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving "title and possession to real property within its
jurisdiction."18The case was then remanded for further proceedings on the merits.
A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.
49
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the
decision of the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the
deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void. The Register of Deeds of Laguna,
Calamba Branch was ordered to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title issued. Attorney's fees were also awarded
to private respondent.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition
of property which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to
probate before it can transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were
both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of Appeals. The brief for the
heirs of Francisca Herrera was denied admission by the appellate court in a Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for
being a "carbon copy" of the brief submitted by the NHA and for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, viz:
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was awarded to Margarita Herrera in
1959. There is also no dispute that Margarita executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960.
Defendant NHA claims that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a waiver or transfer of rights and
interest over the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed to believe otherwise.
After a perusal of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Margarita Herrera, it can be ascertained from its
wordings taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense that the document is a simple disposition of her
estate to take effect after her death. Clearly the Court finds that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of
Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the intention of Margarita Herrera was to merely assign her right over
the lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera, she should have given her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the
defendant NHA or to Francisca Herrera for submission to the defendant NHA after the full payment of
the purchase price of the lots or even prior thereto but she did not. Hence it is apparent that she intended
the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and not an assignment of rights as what the NHA in its
resolution would want to make it appear. The intention of Margarita Herrera was shared no less by
Francisca Herrera who after the former's demise executed on August 22, 1974 a Deed of Self-
Adjudication claiming that she is her sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed was questioned in
court by the surviving heirs of Margarita Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that Francisca
Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots and presented the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
stating that it is a deed of assignment of rights.19
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera.
It upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but one that
involved disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must
first be determined by probate.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED FINALITY, AND IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE
PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA BARS THE COURT FROM FURTHER
DETERMINING WHO BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS FOR AWARD
OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE AWARD ON THE
SUBJECT LOTS; AND
50
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE NHA IS ARBITRARY.
We rule for the respondents.
Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts.
But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "the rule which forbids the
reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of
persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme
Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata."20 To be sure,
early jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to
decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope
thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon
whom judicial powers have been conferred.
In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals,21 the Court held that the rule prescribing that
"administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an express statutory provision for that
purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies.
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial powerthat
which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication of an administrative
agency for the "formulation of a final order."22 This function applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of
public administrative officers or bodies who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature.23 However, administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine
of separation of powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branchesthe legislative, the executive,
and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the
executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary.
Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."24 Courts have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the
resolution of societal conflicts under the grave abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to check
whether the other branches of government committed an act that falls under the category of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.25
Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 198026 where it is therein
provided that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts and
Quasi-Judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution"27 and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled that the issue
of the trial court's authority to hear and decide the instant case has already been settled in the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of
judgment dated October 10, 1989).28 We find no reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an
end to controversies. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a
final and executory judgment.29 The appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which must be
adhered to by the parties by reason of policy.30
51
Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on meritorious grounds when it considered the
application for the purchase of lots. Petitioner argues that it was the daughter Francisca Herrera who filed her
application on the subject lot; that it considered the respective application and inquired whether she had all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a possible awardee. It is the position of the petitioner that
private respondent possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for lot award and hence the
award was not done arbitrarily.
The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a will, it could not bind the
NHA.31 That, "insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is an evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred
by Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then applying to purchase the same before
it."32
We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the
effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words
"sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay" Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person
should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue
of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.33
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already passed
away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.34 The NHA issued its resolution35 on February 5,
1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the
initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever
interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner
had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that
interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirsin
accordance with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an
existing Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was
neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both partiesMargarita Herrera and
NHA. Obligations are transmissible.37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of
her death either by will or by operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent should
transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA
cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such
would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations.38
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next
"person"39likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other
heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots.
Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which
rendered the deed therein null and void40 should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests
and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded.
The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine. We affirm the
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element of testamentary disposition
52
where (1) it devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the
instrument maker.41
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84450 February 4, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y AMADO, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for defendants-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 85-473 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Gloria Umali and Suzeth
Umali were charged for violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 under an
information which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1985, at Recto Street, Poblacion, Municipality of Tiaong,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give marijuana or Indian Hemp, a prohibited drug
to one Francisco Manalo y Arellano, without authority of law.
Contrary to law. (Rollo, pp. 7-8)
Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not, guilty" as accused Suzeth Umali remained at large. After
trial, the lower court rendered a decision on September 9, 1987, the dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Gloria Umali guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. 1 (sic) of RA 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused being a
detention prisoner is entitled to enjoy the privileges of her preventive imprisonment. The case against
Suzeth Umali, her co-accused in this case is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be revived until the arrest of
said accused is effected. The warrant of arrest issued against her is hereby ordered reiterated.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Hence, this appeal from the lower court's decision with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE BIASED
TESTIMONY OF FRANCISCO MANALO
II
53
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE

WHICH WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED NEVER DISPUTED
THE CLAIM THAT SHE WAS THE SOURCE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES FOUND IN THE
POSSESSION OF FRANCISCO MANALO ON APRIL 5, 1985 AND THAT WHICH WAS USED BY
PIERRE PANGAN RESULTING TO THE LATTER'S DRUG DEPENDENCY
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GLORIA 1, GUILTY OF
VIOLATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972 ON THE BASIS OF MERE CONJECTURES
AND NOT ON FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES PROVEN
V
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
DID NOT PASS THE TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY. (Rollo, p. 49)
The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the trial court are as follows:
On April 27, 1985 Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino Noguerra for drug dependency and for
an alleged crime of robbery. In the course of the investigation, the policemen discovered that Pierre Pangan was
capable of committing crime against property, only if under the influence of drug (sic). As Pierre Pangan is a
minor, the police investigators sought the presence of his parents. Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor was
invited to the police headquarters and was informed about the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked the police
investigators if something could be done to determine the source of the marijuana which has not only socially
affected his son, but other minors in the community. Previous to the case of Pierre Pangan was the case of
Francisco Manalo, who was likewise investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and
for which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him, covered by Criminal Case No.
85-516 before Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Aside from said case, accused Francisco
Manalo was likewise facing other charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes against
property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong Municipal Jail, and sought the help of Francisco Manalo and
told him the social and pernicious effect of prohibited drugs like marijuana being peddled to minors of Tiaong,
Quezon. Manalo although a detention prisoner was touched by the appeal made to him by the policeman and
agreed to help in the identification of the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the policeman to help him
in some cases pending against him. He did not negotiate his case for violating the dangerous drug act, as he has
entered a plea of guilty to the charged (sic) before the sala of Judge Eriberto Rosario.
With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation Division gave him four (4)
marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to him. The serial numbers of the money was entered
in the police blotter. The instruction was (sic) for Manalo to bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him to
the police headquarters. Few minutes there after (sic), Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana
which lie allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators
to give a statement on the manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two (2) marijuana foils
from accused Gloria Umali. With the affidavit of Francisco Manalo, supported by the two (2) foils of marijuana.
the Chief of the Investigation Division petitioned the Court for the issuance of a search warrant as a justification
for them to search the house of Gloria Umali located at Rector (sic) Street. Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon. After
securing the same, the police operatives, went to the house of Gloria Umali and served the search warrant on her.
Confiscated from the person of Gloria Umali were the four P5.00 bills with serial numbers BA26943,
54
DT388005, CC582000 and EW69873, respectively as reflected in the police blotter. Likewise, present in the four
(4) P5.00 bills were the letters T which were placed by the police investigators to further identify the marked
four (4) P5.00 bills. The searched (sic) in the house was made in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan. The
search resulted in the confiscation of a can of milo, containing sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana leaves which
were placed in a tupperware and kept in the kitchen where rice was being stored. The return of the search
warrant reads as follows:
DATE: 22 April 1985
WHAT: "RAID"
WHERE: Residence of Dr. Emiliano Umali
Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon
WHO: MBRS. OF TIAONG INP
TIME STARTED/ARRIVED AT SAID PLACE:
221410H Apr '85
SERVED TO: MRS. GLORIA UMALI
MR. EMILIANO UMALI
PERSON APPREHENDED/PROPERTY SEIZED/RECOVERED
Mrs. Gloria Umali 16 Aluminum Foils of
Mr. Emiliano Umali Suspected Marijuana leaves
TIME/DATE LEFT SAID PLACE: 221450H Apr '85
WITNESSES (sic) BY:
1. (Sgd) Reynaldo S. Pasumbal
2. (Sgd) Luisabel P. Punzalan
3. (Sgd) Arnulfo C. Veneracion
4. (Sgd) Isidro C. Capino
Samples of the marijuana leaves confiscated were submitted to the PC Came Laboratory for
examination. Capt. Rosalinda Royales of the PC crime Laboratory took the witness stand, testified and
identified the marijuana submitted to her and in a written report which was marked as Exhibit "G" she
gave the following findings:
Qualitative examination conducted on the specimen mentioned above gave POSITIVE result to
the tests fur marijuana.
In Criminal Case No. 85-516, Francisco Manalo was charged of having in his possession Indian Hemp
on April 5, 1985, in violation of Section 8, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425 as amended, otherwise as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The Court in rendering against him disposed the case as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal possession of "Indian Hemp" penalized under Sec. 8 of Article 6425 (sic); as
amended otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and the Court hereby sentences
him to suffer an imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional to six
(6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor and to pay a fine of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00).
Let the period of detention of the accused be credited to his sentence.
55
Accused never disputed the claim of Francisco Manalo that the marijuana found in his possession on
April 5, 1985 in the municipality of Tiaong, Quezon was sold to him by the accused Gloria Umali. The
defense also did not dispute the claim of the prosecution that in the investigation of Pierre Pangan, the
police investigator came to know that Gloria Umali was the source of the marijuana leaves which he
used and smoked resulting in his present drug dependency. (Rollo, pp. 22-27)
The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court and insisted that said court committed
reversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said witness
has several charges in court and because of his desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell
falsehood.
However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said that even if Francisco Manalo was then facing
several criminal charges when he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify him as a witness. "His
testimony is not only reasonable and probable but more so, it was also corroborated in its material respect by the
other prosecution witnesses, especially the police officers." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)
The appellant also claimed that the marked money as well as the marijuana were confiscated for no other
purpose than using them as evidence against the accused in the proceeding for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act
and therefore the search warrant issued is illegal from the very beginning. She stressed that there can be no other
plausible explanation other than that she was a victim of a frame-up.
In relation to this contention, the Solicitor General noted that it is not true that the evidences submitted by the
prosecution were obtained in violation of her constitutional right against illegal search and seizure.
Furthermore, the appellant contended that the essential elements of the crime of which she was charged were
never established by clear and convincing evidence to warrant the findings of the court a quo. She also stressed
that the court's verdict of conviction is merely based on surmises and conjectures.
However, the Solicitor General noted that the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
who had personal knowledge of the happening together with the physical evidence submitted clearly prove the
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused-appellant for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from casually modifying or rejecting the trial court's
factual findings. Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the testimony
of the witnesses are accorded with great respect on appeal for the trial judge enjoys the advantage of directly and
at first hand observing and examining the testimonial and other proofs as they are presented at the trial and is
therefore better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof (See People v. Bravo,
G.R. No. 68422, 29 December, 1989,180 SCRA 694,699). The findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight, and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts
of weight and importance, it being acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses
during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies (People v. Alverez y Soriano, G.R. No. 70831,
29 July 1988, 163 SCRA 745, 249; People v. Dorado, G.R. No. L-23464, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53; People
v. Espejo, G.R. No. L-27708, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400). Hence, in the absence of any showing that the
trial court had overlooked certain substantial facts, said factual findings are entitled to great weight, and indeed
are binding even on this Court.
Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving can
make known their perception to others may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
56
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article 821 of the Civil
Code which states that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony" are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will." (Paras, RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44)
Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a
witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said witness is facing
several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.
The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he was actuated
by improper motive (People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 718). Hence, in the absence
of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be
accorded full credence.
Appellant's contention that she was a victim of a "frame-up" is devoid of merit.1wphi1 "Courts must be
vigilant. A handy defense in such cases is that it is a frame-up and that the police attempted to extort from the
accused. Extreme caution must be exercised in appreciating such defense. It is just as easy to concoct as a frame-
up. At all times the police, the prosecution and the Courts must be always on guard against these hazards in the
administration of criminal justice." (People v. Rojo, G.R. No. 82737, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA 119)
The appellant's allegation that the search warrant is illegal cannot also be given any merit. "Where marked peso
bills were seized by the police as a result of the search made on the appellant, the admissibility of these marked
peso bills hinges on the legality of the arrest and search on the person of the appellant" (People v. Paco, G.R. No.
76893, 27 February 1989, 170 SCRA 681). Since the search is predicated on a valid search warrant, absent any
showing that such was procured maliciously the things seized are admissible in evidence.
Appellant argues that the lower court's verdict is based on surmises and conjectures, hence the essential elements
of the crime were never established by clear and convincing evidence.
Conviction cannot be predicated on a presumption or speculation. A conviction for a criminal offense must be
based on clear and positive evidence and not on mere presumptions (Gaerlan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
57876, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 20). The prosecution's evidence consisted of the testimony of witness
Manalo and the law enforcers as well as the physical evidence consisting of the seized marked peso bills, the two
(2) foils of marijuana purchased and the can containing sixteen (16) aluminum foils of dried marijuana.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen.
Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary
(People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, 21 February 1989, 170 SCRA 497). Hence, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, full credence should be accorded to the prosecution's evidence. The evidence on record sufficiently
established that Umali gave two (2) foils of marijuana to witness Manalo for which she was given and received
four (4) marked five peso (P5.00) bills, and fully supports conviction for drug pushing in violation of Section 4
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Thus, the Court has no option but to declare that the trial court did not err in finding, on the basis of the evidence
on record, that the accused-appellant Gloria Umali violated Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Pursuant to recent jurisprudence and law, the case is covered by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1675, effective February 17, 1980, which raised the penalty for selling prohibited
drugs from life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos (People v.
Adriano, G.R. No. 65349, October 31, 1984, 133 SCRA 132) Thus, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty
of life imprisonment but failed to impose a fine.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that a fine of twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) be imposed, as it is hereby imposed, on the accused-appellant.
57
SO ORDERED.
58

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WILLS AND SUCCESSION (ATTY.

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,

G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990

SO ORDERED. (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22)

G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES

[G.R. No. 125835. July 30, 1998]

Statement of the Case

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the challenged Resolution.[5]

The antecedent facts, as succinctly narrated by Respondent Court of Appeals are:

Public Respondents Ruling

Hence, this appeal.[8]

Petitioner raises only one issue:

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Contract to Sell Valid

Administration of the Estate Not Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell

G.R. No. 126334 November 23, 2001

G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

G.R. No. 104482 January 22, 1996

3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACT OF EXISTENCE OF GOOD

1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?

G.R. No. 169129 March 28, 2007

II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE

III. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

IV. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

V. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT

VI. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

VII. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

Q. But that is your signature?

G.R. No. 84450 February 4, 1991

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE

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