SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, assails the October 18, 2013 Decision1 and the January 8, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. S.P. No. 03768-MIN, which affirmed the October 8, 2009 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon (RTC), in SP Proc. Case No. 3316-09, granting the petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva (Edna) and declaring her
husband, Romeo L. Villanueva (Romeo), as presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.4chanrobleslaw

The Antecedents

Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City.

In 1992, Edna worked as domestic helper in Singapore while her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia City, Bukidnon. In 1993,
Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo had left their conjugal home without reason or information as to his whereabouts.

Thereafter, Edna took a leave from work and returned to the country to look for Romeo. She inquired from her parents-in-law and
common friends in Iligan City. Still, she found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence. She also went to his birthplace in Escalante,
Negros Oriental, and inquired from his relatives.

On August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition5 to declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.

During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness. In its October 8, 2009 Order,6 the RTC granted the petition on the basis of
her well-founded belief of Romeo's death. Hence:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Romeo L. Villanueva to be presumptively dead for all legal
intents and purposes in accordance with Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to his reappearance.

SO ORDERED.7
On August 13, 2010, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in finding that Edna had a well-founded belief that Romeo, her absent spouse, was dead. It argued
that the conclusions reached by the RTC were in direct opposition to established jurisprudence, as ruled by the Court in Republic v.
Nolasco8 (Nolasco) and U.S. v. Biasbas9 On October 18, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition, holding that the RTC acted within its
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed decision having been expressly clothed with the power to determine the case. 10 It also cited Article
247 of the Family Code11 which provided for the final and immediate executory character of the decision of the RTC, acting as a family
court, thus, rendering the issue of whether or not Edna had sufficiently established a well-founded belief to warrant the decree of
presumptive death of her absent spouse, as moot and academic.

On November 20, 2013, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it on January 8, 2014.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CONCLUSION
REACHED BY THE RTC IS CONTRARY TO PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE GROUNDS RAISED BY THE PETITIONER TO ASSAIL THE RTC
DECISION ARE MERE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT.12
The OSG argues that the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when the latter affirmed the
existence of Edna's well-founded belief as to the death of her absent spouse. It claims that the evidence presented by Edna, which
merely consisted of bare and uncorroborated assertions, never amounted to a diligent and serious search required under prevailing
jurisprudence.

Respondent Edna, through her counsel, invokes the finality, inalterability and immutability of the RTC decision, which was affirmed by
the CA.13chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the Court

The Court grants the petition.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive death may be granted, the present spouse must
prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.14 In this case, Edna failed. The RTC and the CA overlooked
Edna's patent non-compliance with the said requirement. The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse
to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts
and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort
(not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee
spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. 15 The
premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of
well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
not only the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead.16chanrobleslaw

This strict standard approach ensures that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not
used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws in light of the State's policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.
Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts but instead should see to it that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is
met.17chanrobleslaw

Accordingly, in a string of cases, this Court has denied petitions for the declaration of presumptive death on the said basis.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court ruled that the present spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded
belief that his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of
the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) He went to his in-laws' house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captain's aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends' houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among her friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
Despite these claimed "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court explained that he failed to present
the persons from whom he made inquiries and only reported his wife's absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in
the RTC.

Similarly in Republic v. Granada,19 the Court ruled that the present spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. She simply did not exert diligent efforts to locate her husband either in the
country or in Taiwan, where he was known to have worked. Moreover, she did not explain her omissions. In said case, the Court
wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present
acted on a well-founded belief of the death of the absent spouse depends upon inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of an absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present
spouse.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who had been missing for more than
four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless.
The Court held that the present spouse's methods of investigation were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead. It
stated that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not
that she was dead.

Recently, in Republic v. Cantor20 (Cantor), the Court considered the present spouse's efforts to have fallen short of the "stringent
standard" and lacked the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence as she did not actively look for her missing husband; that she
did not report his absence to the police or seek the aid of the authorities to look for him; that she did not present as witnesses her
missing husband's relatives or their neighbors and friends, who could corroborate her efforts to locate him; that these persons, from
whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named; and that there was no other corroborative evidence to support her claim
that she conducted a diligent search. In the Court's view, the wife merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on
uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She, thus, failed to conduct a diligent search. Her claimed efforts
were insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead.

In this case, Edna claimed to have done the following to determine the whereabouts and the status of her
husband:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. She took a vacation/leave of absence from her work and returned to the Philippines to look for her husband.
2. She inquired from her parents-in-law in Iligan City and from their common friends in the same city and in Valencia
City.
3. She went as far as the birthplace of her husband in Escalante, Negros Oriental, so she could inquire from her
husband's relatives.
Despite her efforts, she averred that she received negative responses from them because none of them had knowledge of the
existence of her husband who had been missing for 15 years.

Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases, particularly Cantor, Edna's efforts failed to satisfy the
required well-founded belief of her absent husband's death.

Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare assertions without any
corroborative evidence on record. She also failed to present any person from whom she inquired about the whereabouts of her
husband. She did not even present her children from whom she learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she was the lone
witness. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof, 21 the Court cannot give credence
to her claims that she indeed exerted diligent efforts to locate her husband.

Moreover, no document was submitted to corroborate the allegation that her husband had been missing for at least fifteen (15) years
already. As the OSG observed, there was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her husband disappeared.
In Cantor, the present spouse claimed to have sought the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, reported his absence to the
police.22 Yet, the Court denied her pleas.

Verily, it makes sense to conclude that her efforts were not diligent and serious enough to give meaning to her well-founded belief that
Romeo was already dead. Suffice it to state that her petition should have been denied at the first instance. The RTC, however, granted
it, reasoning
xxx that it was in 1993 when the petitioner while abroad heard the news from her children that her husband left their conjugal home
xxx without informing the children nor communicating with the herein petitioner as to the reasons why he left their family abode nor
giving them any information as to his whereabouts; that herein petitioner took vacation/leave of absence from her work and return to
the Philippines, in order to look for her husband and made some inquiries with her parents-in-law in Iligan City, from their common
friends in Iligan City and in Valencia City, and even went as far as the birthplace of her husband, particularly at Escalante, Negros
Oriental, inquiring from her husband's relatives, but she only got negative response from them since none of them have any knowledge
as to the present existence of her husband that since the year 1993 up to the present, a period of about fifteen [15] years have
elapsed, the person and the body of petitioner's husband could not be found, located nor traced as there is no any information as to
his existence or whereabouts.23
Worse, the CA affirmed the RTC decision when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the OSG. The CA should have realized the
glaring and patent disregard by the RTC of the rulings in similar situations where petitions for declaration of presumptive death have
been denied by this Court. By declaring Romeo presumptively dead, the CA clearly ignored this Court's categorical pronouncements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the October 18, 2013 Decision and the January 8, 2014 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband
declared presumptively dead is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

THIRD DIVISION

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. No. 165545

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, Chairperson,*
-versus- CARPIO, Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.

TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON,

Respondent. Promulgated:
 March 24, 2006
x----------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated June 23, 2004[2] and Resolution dated September 28, 2004[3] reversing the Resolution
dated April 2, 2003[4] and Order dated June 4, 2003[5] of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are
challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari.

On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.[6]

More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a
petition[7] to declare Alice presumptively dead.

By Order of December 10, 1970,[8] the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of the
Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby declared to [ sic] all legal
intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.

SO ORDERED.[9] (Underscoring supplied)

Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with
Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.[10]

On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner
thereof effective July 1994, died.[11]

Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,000[12] by the SSS.

Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits[13] which was also granted by the SSS on April 6,
1998.[14]

Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the
release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first
with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings,
paid for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are
spurious.

In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February 13,
1999[15] averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they
were reserving their right to file the necessary court action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally
know that Alice is still very much alive.[16]

In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of Aliz P. Diaz, filed
before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailons death, [17] he further attesting in a sworn statement [18] that it was
Norma who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses.

Elisa and seven of her children[19] subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailons beneficiaries before the SSS. [20]

Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the cancellation of payment of
death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May
1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support
during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailons beneficiaries according to the order
of preference provided under the law, after the amount erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of
the Memorandum read:

1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation in declaring the
first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.

xxxx

x x x the Order of the court in the Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead, did not become
final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx

3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [ sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the
deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.

xxxx

In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of reappearance
to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a
voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.[21](Underscoring supplied)
 In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000,[22] advised respondent that as Cecilia and Norma
were the ones who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses, she should return the P12,000 paid to her.

In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,[23] the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her monthly pension for
death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted
while the latters marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did
not become final, her presence being contrary proof against the validity of the order. It thus requested respondent to return the
amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.

Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS dated October 12,
1999.[24] In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 1999[25] to the SSC, she reiterated her request for the release of her monthly
pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it
remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.

The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,[26] maintained the denial of her claim for and the
discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she was not deprived of her right to file a petition with
the SSC.

Respondent thus filed a petition[27] against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly
pension.

In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000 representing the
funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any amount
during Bailons wake.[28]

After the SSS filed its Answer [29] to respondents petition, and the parties filed their respective Position Papers, one Alicia P.
Diaz filed an Affidavit[30] dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only
recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon
could have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was
having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.

By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she was just
a common-law-wife. Accordingly it disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the
legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.

Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00 representing
the death benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as well as P12,000.00
representing the funeral benefit.

The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from
the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS
Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of its compliance herewith.

SO ORDERED.[31] (Underscoring supplied)

In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.

After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion
that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.

xxxx

There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of
Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member represented in bad
faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its Memorandum dated August 9,
1999,[32] revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente
Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and by
exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the deceased member the
right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the first marriage
on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled, invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of
the parties thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the
abandoning spouse, not Alice Diaz Bailon.

xxxx

It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law wife of the
deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, to the latters death
benefit. x x x

xxxx

It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary
beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she received from the
SSS for the period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti x x x
 Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of
Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her by the SSS as funeral
benefit.[33] (Underscoring supplied)

Respondents Motion for Reconsideration[34] having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for
review[35]before the Court of Appeals (CA).

By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the SSC
and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her. Held the CA:

x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the then
CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more importantly, whether or not
the respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the
latters decision to be bereft of any basis.On similar import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the
first marriage subsisting and the second marriage null and void?

xxxx

x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as the
finding that the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum, the second marriage
contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent court that can
nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing
spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that
respondent SSS may validly declare the second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and
declare that the decision of the RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.

Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular
courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members. Notwithstanding its
opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision of the RTC
absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x

x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the decision of
the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of fair play and thus its findings
are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample opportunity to present evidence for
and her behalf.

xxxx

Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is
no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore as the marital bond
between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the latters death. Neither is there a second
marriage to terminate because the second marriage was likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.

However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with
the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the respondent SSS has now the
authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare the second marriage null and
void.[36] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration[37] which were both denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the SSS present petition for review on certiorari[38] anchored on the following grounds:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION.[39]

The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the prior and subsisting
marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the
death benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 5[40] of the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give
respondent due process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.

The SSS submits that the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no moment to the present
controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the SSCs finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting
marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has a better right to the death benefits. [41]

The petition fails.

That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no
doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the
case at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the
same, making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alices marriage on the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon
and respondents marriage on the other.

In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does not give the
SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[42]

Article 83 of the Civil Code[43] provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is
illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional
circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid until declared null and void by
a competent court. It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage.[44]

In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years [45] when Bailon sought the
declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage. [46]

Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:

Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the
second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first
marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not
ended when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from
crime or wrong and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life
of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.[47] (Underscoring supplied)

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,[48] it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case
instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides:

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice
to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not
preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or
termination of the subsequent marriage.[49]

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such
marriage.[50] Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally
an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.[51]

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but
by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:

x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised, because,
as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct action for
annulment.[52] (Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio[53] instructs:

 In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an
absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment
became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2,
of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of
the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from
such voidable marriage must be carried out in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, as
expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding. [54] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. [55] Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is
made good ab initio.[56]

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and respondents marriage prior to
the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.

In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An
affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated November 28,
2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her
presumptively dead.

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her
husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose
of remarriage on June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.2chanrobleslaw

In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere
in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were
engaged in the buy and sell business.4chanrobleslaw

Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in
Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to work abroad. 7 She allegedly applied in an
employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from
again.8chanrobleslaw

Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too,
did not know their daughter's whereabouts.10 He also inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any
information.11chanrobleslaw

Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she
had passed away.12chanrobleslaw

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.13chanrobleslaw

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true
residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in
Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until
Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the
petition declaring her presumptively dead.18chanrobleslaw

Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad.20 Neither did she go to
an employment agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was
aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with
another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false
allegations in his petition.24chanrobleslaw
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a
newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of
Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw

The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for
being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil
registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.28chanrobleslaw

Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated November 28, 2008. 29 The Court of Appeals denied
the motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5, 2009.30chanrobleslaw

Hence, this petition was filed.

The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a
wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.

Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is
actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's
death.31 She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place. 32 She
insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained
fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw

Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a sufficient remedy
because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive death. 34chanrobleslaw

In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it cannot be availed
when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the subsequent marriage.
Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is the appropriate
remedy.

The petition is meritorious.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the
"remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner."36chanrobleslaw

The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos
v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain
to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or
collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of
his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations in the
court with respect to her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of
the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she was
deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively dead. 42chanrobleslaw

Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death were false. 43 Celerina further
claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were
not given copies of Ricardo's petition.44chanrobleslaw

These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient
ground/s for annulment of judgment.

Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from the July 27, 2007
decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was,
therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is
the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw

There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.

The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions.

The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by
the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence
of another marriage.47chanrobleslaw

The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he
or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties
to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and
without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)

In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by
mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse
was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.

Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to
several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in
the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance
must either be undisputed or judicially determined.

The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only
when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.

Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first
marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in
the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.

When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse
is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations
with the first spouse.48 The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid.49 The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.50chanrobleslaw

This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security
System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties
to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an]
affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]"53 "Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the
former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must
still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law. "54chanrobleslaw

The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of
the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.

A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the
following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.55

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the
requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as. validly terminated.
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. 57 Only a
subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.

Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his subsequent
marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies.58chanrobleslaw

If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted
the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is
because the circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the
exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply.59chanrobleslaw

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude
the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that
a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage."60chanrobleslaw

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent
marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
"children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same
as in valid marriages."61 If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution
for bigamy.63chanrobleslaw

It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent
marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.

However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." 64 This means
that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second
marriage,65 this remedy is not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file
an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for
nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSE B. SAREOGON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge a trial court''s declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of The Family Code of the Philippines1(Family Code).2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assails the October 24, 2011 Decision4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MIN
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic).

Factual Antecedents

On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition 5 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz6 City-
Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S.7Sareogon (Netchie).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the Petition for initial hearing on April 16, 2009. It likewise directed the
publication of said Order in a newspaper of general circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of
Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition.9 Trial then followed.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991,11 They later became sweethearts and on August 10,1996,
they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall.12 However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he
left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. 13 For three months, he did not receive any
communication from Netchie.14 He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts.15 While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie''s
parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental.16 He returned home after his contract expired.17 He then
inquired from Netchie''s relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was. 18 Because of these,
he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead.19 He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage
pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jose''s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareogon, and by Netchie''s aunt, Consuelo Sande. 21 These two witnesses
testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate
destinations abroad.22 These two added that they had no information regarding Netchie''s location.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision24 dated January 31,2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-08, the RTC held that Jose had established by preponderance of
evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under Article 41 of the Family Code.25 The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared
for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.26 The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondent presumptively dead for purposes of
remarriage of petitioner.

SO ORDERED.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On April 19,2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari28, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In its Decision29 of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA perceived no error at all in the RTC''s judgment granting Jose''s
Petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his wife, Netchie. The CA thus held in effect that the Republic''s appeal sought
to correct or review the RTC''s alleged misappreciation of evidence which could not translate into excess or lack of jurisdiction
amounting to grave abuse of discretion.30 The CA noted that the RTC properly caused the publication of the Order setting the case for
initial hearing.31 The CA essentially ruled that, "[a] writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower court''s evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an
appeal,"32 The CAthendisposed of the case in this wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Issues

The Republic filed the instant Petition34 raising the following issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION
BECAUSE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC''S PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE RTC
DECISION, BECAUSE IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE
EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED
BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT''S ABSENT WIFE X X X IS PROBABLY DEAD.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner''s Arguments

The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge an
RTC''s immediately final and executory Decision on a presumptive death.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose''s alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not engender or generate a well-
founded belief that the latter is probably dead.37 It maintains that even as Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts to locate
Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the assistance of the relevant government agencies like the Philippine National Police, the
National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration.38 It likewise points out that Jose did not present any disinterested
person to corroborate his allegations that the latter was indeed missing and could not be found.39 It also contends that Jose did not
advert to circumstances, events, occasions, or situations that would prove that he did in fact make a comprehensive search for
Netchie.40 The Republic makes the plea that courts should ever be vigilant and wary about the propensity of some erring spouses in
resorting to Article 41 of the Family Code for the purpose of terminating their marriage.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to have Netchie declared presumptively dead
because he intends to get married again, an essential premise of Article 41 of the Family Code. 42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent''s Arguments

Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic''s Petition because the latter''s petition is erected upon the ground that the
CA did not correctly weigh or calibrate the evidence on record, or assigned to the evidence its due worth, import or significance; and
that such a ground does not avail in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.43 Jose also contends that the
Republic should have instead filed a motion for reconsideration44 of the RTC''s Decision of January 31, 2011, reasoning out that a
motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law. Jose furthermore submits that the RTC did not act arbitrarily
or capriciously in granting his petition because it even dutifully complied with the publication requirement. 45 He moreover argues that
to sustain the present petition would allow the executive branch to unduly make inroads into judicial territory. 46 Finally, he insists that
the trial court''s factual findings are entitled to great weight and respect as these were arrived after due
deliberation.47chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Court''s Ruling

This Court finds the Republic''s petition meritorious.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to question the RTC''s Decision in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death

In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,48 we held that the RTC''s Decision on a Petition for declaration of presumptive death
pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of
appeal pertaining to such judgment.49 Concurring in the result, Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban further therein pointed
out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC Decision was to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and not a petition for
review under Rule 45.50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v. Tango:51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family
Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon,

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that
govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69,
73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter
of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court''s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the
Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court''s original jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, x x x52 (Citation omitted; Underscoring supplied)
"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may
file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the C A, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court."53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,54 we held that the OSG availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a notice of appeal under Rule 42 with
the CA to question the RTCs Decision declaring the presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Above all, this Court''s ruling in Republic v. Cantor56 made it crystal clear that the OSG properly availed of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 to challenge the RTCs Order therein declaring Jerry Cantor as presumptively dead.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly availed of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in
assailing before the CA the aforesaid RTCs Decision.
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only upon a showing that
sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead

We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted Jose''s Petition. Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41
of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.58 (Underscoring
supplied)
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case invites extended discussion), the holding is that the
-
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice.
This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the
additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse''s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent
spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead.

xxxx

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort (not a mere passive one).59 (Emphasis omitted; underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose 1ms "well-founded belief that Netchie was already dead upon the following grounds:

(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie''s parents while he was still out of the country, but did not reach them as they had allegedly
left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;

(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned home, he was not able to obtain any information
that Netchie was still alive from Netchie''s relatives and friends;

(3) Jose''s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be presumed dead, was corroborated by Jose''s older
brother, and by Netchie''s aunt, both of whom testified that he (Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one
month and that after this, there had been no information as to Netchie''s whereabouts.

In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,60 this Court held that the present spouse (Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor) merely conducted a
"passive search" because she simply made unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and friends. For that reason, this
Court stressed that the degree of diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met (1) when there is failure to present the
persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouse''s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2)
when there is failure to report the missing spouse''s purported disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when the
present spouse''s evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the
latter was indeed dead.61 The rationale for this palpably stringent or rigorous requirement has been marked out
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx [T]he Court fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the "strict
standard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not
used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter
standard required by the Family Code is met. xxx

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State''s policy to protect and strengthen the
institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the family''s foundation and since it is the state''s policy to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic social institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. xxx

xxx [I]t has not escaped this Court''s attention that the strict standard required in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has
not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on
the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this
situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family
Code." (Citations omitted)62chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Given the Court''s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC''s finding that Jose''s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of
the Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief standard. If anything, Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing
Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that
he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie''s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific
individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did
he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media, Nor did he show mat he undertook
a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming the
particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he
interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, The Decision dated October 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MN
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent''s Petition in said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is accordingly DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.