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SC relaxes rules on psychological incapacity as ground to annul marriages, says the news title in a
popular newspaper. While the news article does not mention the title of the case, its clearly abundant
that it refers to the 2015 case of Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez (G.R. No. 166357, 14
January 2015). Did the Supreme Court, in the case of Kalaw, relax the rules on petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity? Lets discuss this question and,
at the same time, highlight ten matters that may be of interest to those seeking answers.
In Kalaw, the Supreme Court reiterated its categorical statement, made in a 2009 case, that we are
not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. The set of guidelines in Molina, therefore,
stays.
The pronouncement in Kalaw that is closest to relaxation of the guidelines is its reiteration that
the foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. There is
no doubt that the Molina Doctrine is strict, but there is also no doubt that countless petitions have been
granted pursuant to its guidelines.
The Court did not relax the rules when it reconsidered the Kalaw ruling. On the contrary, the ruling
falls under the ambit of the Molina guidelines. The first time the Supreme Court decided Kalaw in 2011,
with Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo as the ponente, the Court dismissed the petition for insufficiency of
evidence. There was no sufficient evidence to prove the alleged acts of the respondent wife
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect
of their children. While it was shown that the respondent-wife played mahjong (bringing the kids with
her), the petitioner-husband failed to show the FREQUENCY of the mahjong sessions. There is no
proof that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. In other
words, the allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his
experts, were not actually proven.
In 2015, with Justice Lucas Bersamin as ponente, the Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier decision.
The Supreme Court, lest it be misunderstood, explicitly stated that its not abandoning Molina. The
Court, bound by the same set of proven facts, clarified that the failure to show the frequency of
mahjong sessions does not preclude a finding of psychological incapacity. Its not the FREQUENCY
of the mahjong sessions; its the fact that the respondent-wife should have known that bringing her
children along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. This, based on the totality of
facts in the case, supports the finding of psychological incapacity. This ruling is very much consistent
with the Molina Doctrine. There is no relaxation of the rules in this respect.
The label that the Court relaxed the rules is most likely derived from the Courts statement that the
rules set forth in Molina are rigid. This is bolstered by the apparent expression of regret, also reiterated
in Kalaw, that in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules,
as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. In my opinion, and as
discussed below, the term rigid should not be understood along the lines of relaxed as an antonym.
Going back to the value of expert testimonies, the Supreme Court in Kalaw restated the rule that in
the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage,
the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of
necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable
themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. There is no relaxation of the rules in
this respect.
Incidentally, in one of our cases, the judge noted that it is for the court not the psychologist to
conclude that one or both parties is/are psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the existence of
psychological incapacity is a legal conclusion, which is within the exclusive province of the court, but
this does not preclude the expert witness from expressing a similar opinion, pointing to the exact
condition or personality disorder of the spouse/s.
Article 36 is patterned after Church rules. As noted in Molina: Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This Constitutional protection of marriage, however, does not apply to void marriages. As reiterated
by the Supreme Court in Kalaw, Article 36 protects the institution of marriage the fulfillment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates
to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because
such a marriage has no legal existence.
In my opinion, there is no inconsistency, and there is no relaxation of the rules. A presumption can
always be overturned by contrary evidence. Once contrary evidence is admitted and the marriage is
declared void, then the presumption loses any value and the marriage cease to be constitutionally
protected. Under this scenario, it does not help to be saddled with presumptions (or assumptions,
predilections or generalizations) at the start of the petition. The task is to examine the evidence and
look at the totality of the case. In the words of the Supreme Court, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. There should be no rigid application of Molina and
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of less specificity obviously to enable some
resiliency in its application.
However, the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity. The committee that
drafted the Family Code decided to adopt a provision with less specificity than expected in order to
have the law allow some resiliency in its application. The intent of the commitee is to give courts
sufficient leeway to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had
persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.
The intended resiliency of Article 36 had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a
set of strict standards in Molina, yet the Supreme Court still maintains that it is not abandoning Molina.
In the original Kalaw case, the Court focused solely on the psychological incapacity of the wife,
concluding that there was insufficient evidence; the Court did not discuss the incapacity of the
husband. This appears to be consistent with the first guideline in Molina the burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
In the reconsidered Kalaw case, the Court declared BOTH spouses as psychologically incapacitated.
While it can be argued that this is a deviation, or relaxation, of the rule that was followed in the
original Kalaw case, there is no basis for such argument.
As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of psychological incapacity is with the petitioner. This is
based on the basic rule that he who alleges must prove the allegation. This basic rule, stated in another
manner, simply means that the person who alleges psychological incapacity must prove such
psychological incapacity.
Under the circumstances, the court has three options: (a) declare the WIFE as psychologically
incapacitated; (b) declare the HUSBAND as psychologically incapacitated; or (c) declare BOTH
spouses as psychologically incapacitated. It doesnt matter who raised the allegation of psychological
incapacity. In the words of the Supreme Court in the reconsidered decision: The courts are justified
in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is
the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party
alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage
has to be deemed null and void.
As far as remarriage is concerned, it doesnt really matter who between the spouses is psychologically
incapacitated there is absolutely no prohibition for the psychologically incapacitated spouse to
marry again.
Lets consider a number of scenarios. What if, in another case, the husband alleges that the wife is
psychologically incapacitated and the wife simply denies such allegation, without replying that the
husband is the one psychologically incapacitated? What if the husband alleges that wife is
psychologically incapacitated and the wife fails to answer? If, for one reason or another, evidence
shows that there is no basis for finding that the wife is psychologically incapacitated, but sufficient
evidence exists to support a finding of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband, can the
court still declare the existence of the psychological incapacity, albeit on the part of the husband?
In reconsidering its earlier decision in Kalaw, the Supreme Court cited the general rule that findings
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a partys psychological
incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies
of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every
situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence
presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.
In EACH and EVERY petition for annulment or declaration of nullity, the State (through the OSG and
the public prosecutors) is mandated by law to participate and ensure that the institution of marriage is
amply protected. According to the Supreme Court, it need not worry about the possible abuse of the
remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which
is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of
cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
What the Supreme Court again pointed out in Kalaw is the need to emphasize other perspectives
that should guide courts in dealing with petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
What are the other perspectives? The Supreme Court noted that Article 36 cases should not be
decided based on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations and emphasized that courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
This, in my opinion, means that other perspectives can run parallel to the Molina guidelines. In other
words, the Molina Doctrine is not the be-all and end-all of Article 36 interpretation. The intention not to
define Article 36 simply means that the provision should not be static; it is intended to be a living
provision, with courts guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Cases that dont fall squarely under the Molina guidelines should not be dismissed outright. A rigid
interpretation of Molina means that petitions must be strictly construed in favor of the validity of
marriage and any deviation from the guidelines, no matter how reasonable, must lead to the dismissal
of the petition. But it should be remembered that a void marriage enjoys no protection and not entitled
to any presumption of regularity, which means that even if a particular case does not fall squarely
under the Molina principles, the court must still examine the totality of evidence and must apply other
perspectives. This way, diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the
like will not be allowed to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.