Luis Marcos Laurel v Hon. Zeus Abrogar
Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
Posted on June 29, 2013
Luis Marcos Laurel vs Hon. Zeus Abrogar
GR No. 155076
January 13, 2009
FACTS:
Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly
taking, stealing, and using PLDT's international long distance calls by conducting
International Simple Resale (ISR) a method of outing and completing
international long-distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave
frequency which connect directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the
country where the call is destined. PLDT alleged that this service was stolen
from them using their own equipment and caused damage to them amounting to
P20,370,651.92.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of
appropriation and can be objects of theft.
ISSUE:
WON Laurel's act constitutes Theft
HELD:
Art.308, RPC: Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latters consent.
Elements of Theft under Art.308, RPC:
There be taking of Personal Property;
Said Personal Property belongs to another;
Taking be done with Intent to Gain;
Taking be done without the owners consent;
No violence against, or intimidation of, persons or force upon things
Personal Property anything susceptible of appropriation and not
included in Real Property
Thus, the term personal property as used in Art.308, RPC should be
interpreted in the context of the Civil Code's definition of real and personal
property.
incorporeal, capable of appropriation may be the subject of theft (*US v Carlos;
US v Tambunting; US v Genato*), so long as the same is not included in the
enumeration of Real Properties under the Civil Code.
The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft, is that it
be subject to appropriation.
Art. 416 (3) of the Civil Code deems Forces of Nature which are
brought under the control of science, as Personal Property.
The appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by
science can be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or
measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from
such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally
connecting various equipment or apparatus to PLDTs telephone system, through
which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using
PLDTs facilities constitute Subtraction.
Moreover, interest in business should be classified as personal property
since it is capable of appropriation, and not included in the enumeration of real
properties.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or telephone
service are personal property which can be the object of theft under Art. 308 of the
RPC. The act of engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction penalized under the
said article.
While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical energy
and may be considered as personal property, the said long-distance calls do not
belong to PLDT since it could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT
merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its
complex communications infrastructure and facilities.
Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not
validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent.
 What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications facilities
without PLDT's consent. The theft lies in the unlawful taking of the telephone
services & businesses.
The Amended Information should be amended to show that the property
subject of the theft were services and business of the offended party.
Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellate Court
GR L-66575 24May1988 J. Fernan
FACTS:
Petitioners Adriano Maneclang et.al. filed with the CFI a complaint for quieting of
title over a certain fishpond located within the 4 parcels of land belonging to them
situated in Bugallon, Pangasinan. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon a
finding that the body of water traversing their land is a creek constituting a
tributary to Agno River and hence public in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. The Maneclangs appealed the decision to the IAC, but the IAC
affirmed the trial court decision. Hence, this instant petition for review on
certiorari. However, after having been asked by the Court to comment to the case,
Petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part of the awardee in the
public bidding, Maza, they desire to amicably settle the case by submitting a
Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing their
ownership over the land and the body of water found within their titled properties.
Petitioners state that there would be no benefit on their part, but to the advantage
of the municipality instead, since it is clear that after the National Irrigation
Authority built the dike over the land, no water gets in or out of the land.
ISSUE:
Whether the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement adjudicating ownership
over the questioned fishpond in favor of the Maneclangs are valid.
HELD/RATIO:
NO, the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement are null and void and have no
legal effect for being contrary to law and public policy. The stipulations partake of
the nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of the Maneclangs of the
questioned fishpond that was clearly found to be originally a creek forming a
tributary of the Agno River, which belongs to the public domain and is thus not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. A
creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the
ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public
water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any
individual and considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation
dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from
flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter
or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain. The finding
that the subject body of water is a creek belonging to the public domain is a
factual determination binding upon the Supreme Court. The Municipality of
Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted municipal council is clothed with
authority to pass, as it did,the two resolutions dealing with its municipal waters,
and it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process as
mere publication of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a constructive
notice to the whole world.
Depra v Dumlao
G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985
FACTS:
The properties of Francisco Depra and Agustin Dumlao were adjoining each
other. In 1972, Dumlao built his house however, he unwittingly built the kitchen
portion of his house on Depras land. Depra then sued Dumlao for unlawful
detainer. During pre-trial, the parties agreed that Dumlao was a builder in good
faith.
Eventually, the trial court ruled that both parties were in good faith but then a
forced lease was ordered whereby Dumlao retains the kitchen but he shall pay a
rental to Depra at P5.00 per month. But Depra refused to receive the rental
payments from Dumlao, instead, Depra filed an action for quieting of title against
Dumlao. In his defense, Dumlao raised the defense of res judicata considering that
the nature and purpose of the initial unlawful detainer case and that of the
subsequent quieting of title case is ejectment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the order of forced lease decreed in the unlawful detainer case is
valid.
2. Whether or not the subsequent case of res judicata is barred by prescription due
to the prior case of unlawful detainer.
HELD:
1. No. The judgment of forced lease is improper. A forced lease, just like co-
ownership is not favored. It should be considered that the parties themselves
stipulated that Dumlao, the builder, was in good faith and it was later found that
Depra, the owner, was also in good faith. Hence, what applies is the provisions of
Article 448 of the Civil Code, which provides in sum that:
a. Builder in good faith entitled to retain the possession of the land on which he
built in good faith until he is paid the value of the building he built in good faith;
b. Owner in good faith has the option to either (i) pay for the building OR (ii)
sell his land to the builder in good faith but builder cannot be forced to buy said
land if the same is considerably more than the value of the building.
Forced rent only comes in if the owner exercises his right to sell the land but the
builder rejects it by reason of the price thereof being considerably more than the
value of the building in such case, the parties shall agree to the terms of the
lease, if they cant agree then they may bring the issue to court.
2. No. The action for quieting of title is not barred by reason of res judicata. The
cause of action in the unlawful detainer case involves possession while the cause
of action in the quieting of title case involves ownership. Furthermore, the Rules
of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land.
Alviola v. CA
FACTS:
Victoria Tinagan bought two parcels of land in 1950. She and her son Agustin
took possession of the said land thereafter.
Sometime in 1960, petitioners occupied portions of the land whereat they built a
copra dryer and put up a store wherein they engaged in the business of buying and
selling copra.
On 1975, Victoria and Agustin died, the latter survived by his wife and children
who are the private respondents in the instant case.
The private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession against the
petitioners asking the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental that they be
declared the absolute owners of the said parcels of land and that petitioners be
ordered vacate the same, to remove their copra dryer and store, to pay actual
damages (in the form of rentals), moral and punitive damages, litigation expenses
and attorney's fees.
The trial court ruled in favour of the private respondents, hence this petition.
The petitioners put up the defense that the contested parcels of land are public
lands, making them qualify to become beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian
reform program and rightful possessors of the land in virtue of their occupation of
the same for 20 years.
The petitioners also contend that the copra dryer and the store are permanent
structures as they are made of hollow blocks and cement.
Private respondents on the other hand offer overwhelming evidence of their
ownership and possession of the land and contended that they merely tolerated the
petitioners occupation of the disputed property.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners have ownership over the portions of land where the copra
dryer and store are located.
HELD:
No.
The petitioners defense that the said parcels of land are public lands is rebutted
by the Private respondents' tax declarations and receipts of payment of real estate
taxes, as well as other related documents which prove their ownership of the
disputed properties. The record further discloses that Victoria S. Tinagan and her
son, Agustin Tinagan, took possession of the said properties in 1950, introduced
improvements thereon, and for more than 40 years, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious occupation thereof in the concept of owners.
The Court brushed as an afterthought the petitioners later defense that the
portions where the copra dryer and store are located were ceded to them by
Victoria in exchange for a prior debt since it was not supported by any document
pointing to Victoria transferring the ownership of the said portion and the lack of
declaration on the part of the petitioners. The Court also ruled that though the
petitioners were in occupation of the portions of land in question for 20 years,
they were able to do so out of the tolerance of the private respondents and thus,
their posture that they have acquired the property by "occupation" for 20 years
does not have any factual or legal foundation.
As correctly ruled by the respondent court, there was bad faith on the part of the
petitioners when they constructed the copra dryer and store on the disputed
portions since they were fully aware that the parcels of land belonged to Victoria
Tinagan.
But there was likewise bad faith on the part of the private respondents, having
knowledge of the arrangement between petitioners and Victoria Tinagan relative
to the construction of the copra dryer and store. Thus, for purposes of indemnity,
Article 448 of the New Civil Code should be applied. 32 However, the copra dryer
and the store, as determined by the trial court and respondent court, are
transferable in nature. Thus, it would not fall within the coverage of Article 448.
As the noted civil law authority, Senator Arturo Tolentino, aptly explains: "To fall
within the provision of this Article, the construction must be of permanent
character, attached to the soil with an idea of perpetuity; but if it is of a transitory
character or is transferable, there is no accession, and the builder must remove the
construction. The proper remedy of the landowner is an action to eject the builder
from the land." 33 The private respondents' action for recovery of possession was
the suitable solution to eject petitioners from the premises.
Petition dismissed.
Mores vs. Yu-Go
G.R. NO. 172292
July 23, 2010
Principle:
Indeed, full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises
until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one
who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply
where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it
would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his
property.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from an injunction suit filed by plaintiff-appellants Yu-go
et.al, alleging that, sometime in March 1983, appellees Mores, pleaded to
appellants that they be allowed to stay in the subject property in the meantime that
they did not own a house yet. Said property was co-owned by plaintiff-appellants.
They readily agreed without asking for any rental but subject only to the condition
that the said stay would last until anyone of appellants would need the subject
property. Forthwith, appellees and their children occupied the same as agreed
upon.
In November 1997, appellants made known to appellees that they were already in
need of the subject property. However, appellees begged that they be given more
time. Extensions of time were repeatedly given to appellee but, instead of heeding
such demand, appellees hired some laborers and started demolishing the
improvements on the subject property on January 20, 1999.
Consequently, appellants instituted the said action for injunction where they also
prayed for the reimbursement of the value of the residential building illegally
demolished. Appellees filed their Answer where they denied the material
averments of the complaint. They claimed that appellees were the ones who
caused its renovation consisting of a 3-bedroom annex, a covered veranda and a
concrete hollow block fence, at their own expense, and with appellants consent,
which renovation was made without altering the form and substance of the subject
property. Also, appellees argued that what they removed was merely the
improvements made on the subject property, which removal had not caused any
substantial damage thereto as, in fact, it remained intact. By way of counterclaims,
they demanded payment of actual damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
The trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the spouses Mores ruling that
Defendants, who are possessors in good faith, were able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that they removed only the improvements they
introduced without destroying the principal building, after the plaintiffs refused to
pay them the reasonable value of the improvements. x x x
However, the appellate court disagreed that spouses Mores were in good faith,
believing that the relationship between the Yu siblings and the spouses Mores is
one between a lessor and a lessee, making Article 1678 of the Civil Code
applicable to the present case. The options given by Article 1678, the right of
appropriating the useful improvements after reimbursing 50% of its value or the
right of removal of the useful improvements, are given by law to the lessor - the
Yu siblings. Hence the appellate court ordered the spouses Mores to pay the Yu
siblings moral damages worthP100,000 and denied Mores Motion for
Reconsideration for want of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court awarding the Yu siblings moral damages in the
amount of P100,000 is rendered with grave abuse of discretion and is not in
accord with the decisions of this Court.
RULING:
The petition has merit.
The good faith referred to by Alida Mores was about the building of the
improvements on the leased subject property. However, tenants like the spouses
Mores cannot be said to be builders in good faith as they have no pretension to be
owners of the property. Indeed, full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor
in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a
rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to
"improve" his landlord out of his property.
The appellate court is correct in ruling that Article 1678 of the Civil Code should
apply in the present case. Article 1678 reads:
If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the
use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the
property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee
one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to
reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the
principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to the ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any
reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is
caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by
paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
There is thus no reason for the appellate courts award of moral damages to the
Yu siblings. We agree with the trial courts finding that the spouses Mores
"removed only the improvements they introduced without destroying the principal
building, after the [Yu siblings] refused to pay them the reasonable value of the
improvements." When the spouses Mores demanded reimbursement, the Yu
siblings should have offered to pay the spouses Mores one-half of the value of the
improvements. Since the Yu siblings failed to make such offer, the spouses Mores
had the right to remove the improvements.
Petition is Granted with Modification as to damages awarded to the Yu siblings.
Robles vs. CA
Posted on August 13, 2013
328 SCRA 97
GR no. 123509
March 14, 2000
Topic: Property; Quieting of title
FACTS:
Leon Robles primitively owned a land in Morong Rizal. When Leon died, his son
Silvino Robles inherited the land. Both of them declared the property under their
name for taxation purposes. Upon the death of Silvino, his widow Maria dela Cruz
and his children inherited the property. They took adverse possession of it and
paid the taxes thereon. The task of cultivating the land was assigned to one of
Silvinos son, Lucio Roles while the payment of the taxes was entrusted to their
half brother, Hilario Robles.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the name
of Silvino Robles was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father of
Andrea Robles who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel
Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank, using the tax declaration as
security. Somehow, the tax declaration was transferred to the name of Antipolo
Rural Bank and later on, was transferred to the name of defendant Hilario Robles
and his wife. In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cadona Rural Bank,
Inc., using the tax declaration as security. For failure to pay the mortgage debt,
foreclosure proceedings were had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as the
highest bidder during the auction sale in October 1968.
The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax
declaration was transferred in the name of defendant Rural Bank. On September
25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and
Ruth Santos who took possession of the property and was able to secure Free
Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their names.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have the appropriate title that is essential for them
to avail themselves of the remedy of quieting of title.
HELD:
Yes. The land had previously been occupied by Leon and later by Silvino Robles,
petitioners predecessor-in-interest, as evidenced by the different tax declarations
issued in their names. Also, the petitioners continued occupying and possessing
the land from the death of Silvino in 1942 until they were allegedly ousted
therefrom in 1988.
The title of the petitioners over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the
registered owner which is a total nullity. The long and continued possession of
petitioners under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a
registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning since Hilario
mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a
mere co-owner thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of title to
the property at the time of the institution of the Complaint for quieting of title.
Maestrado v CA
G.R. No. 133345.
March 9, 2000
FACTS:
These consolidated cases involve Lot No. 5872 and the rights of the contending
parties thereto. The lot has an area of 57.601 sq.m. and is registered in the name of
the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses died intestate in
1943 and 1944, respectively. They were survived by six heirs. To settle the estate
of said spouse, Angel Chaves, one of the heirs, initiated intestate proceedings and
was appointed administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of the
estates was made and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a project partition. The court
approved the partition but a copy of said decision was missing. Nonetheless, the
estate was divided among the heirs. Subsequently, in 1956, the partition case
effected and the respective shares of the heirs were delivered to them.
Significantly, Lot No.5872 was not included in a number of documents. Parties
offered different explanations as to the omission of said lot in the documents.
Petitioners maintain the existence of an oral partition agreement entered into by all
heirs after the death of their parents. To set things right, petitioners then prepared
a quitclaim to confirm the alleged oral agreement. Respondents dispute
voluntariness of their consent to the quitclaims. Six years after the execution of
the quitclaims, respondents discovered that indeed subject lot was still a common
property in the name of the deceased spouses. Eventually, an action for Quieting
of Title was filed by petitioners on December 22, 1983. The trial court considered
Lot No. 5872 as still a common property and therefore must be divided into six
parts, there being six heirs. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which
sustained the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for quieting of title had already prescribed.
RULING:
Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the deceased spouses
Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners ownership over said lot was acquired by
reason of the oral partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses heirs sometime
before 1956. That oral agreement was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims
executed by the said heirs on August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977. There was
indeed an oral agreement of partition entered into by the heirs/parties. A possessor
of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant
establishes a better right. In the instant case it is the petitioners, being the
possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established a superior right thereto by
virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed by the notarized quitclaims
of the heirs. Partition is the separation,division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong. It may be effected extra- judicially
by the heirs themselves through a public instrument filed before the register of
deeds.
However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an
inherent element of a contract of partition. Since registration serves as
constructive notice to third persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no
creditors are affected. Moreover, even the requirement of a written memorandum
under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where
no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of
property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and
segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.
Spouses Yu vs. Pacleb
G.R. No. 172172
Feb. 24, 2009
FACTS:
Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife Angelita Chan are registered owners of an
18,000-square meter parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmarias, Cavite,
covered by TCT No. T-118375 (Langcaan Property). On Feb. 27, 1992, Spouses
Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan sold the property to Rebecca del Rosario.On
May 7, 1992, the lot was thereafter sold to Ruperto Javier. On Nov. 10, 1992, a
Contract to Sell was entered into between Javier and Spouses Yu wherein
petitioner spouses agreed to pay JavierP200,000 as partial payment and P400,000
to be paid upon execution of the contract, and Javier undertook to deliver
possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign a deed of absolute sale within 30
days from execution of contract. All the aforementioned sales were not registered.
In 1993, spouses Yu filed a complaint with the RTC for specific performance and
damages against Javier, contending that Javier represented to them that the
Langcaan Property was not tenanted, but after they already paid P200,000 as
initial payment and entered into the agreement of sale on Sept. 11, 1992, they
discovered that it was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, son of Baltazar Pacleb.
Subsequently, spouses Yu demanded for the cancellation of the agreement and for
the return of their initial payment. On March 10, 1995, spouses Yu, Ramon, and
the latters wife executed a Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at
Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan, where spouses Yu paid Ramon
P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the subject
property. But on Oct. 12, 1995, Baltazar Pacleb filed a complaint for annulment of
the deed of sale to Javier, alleging that the deed of sale executed between him and
his late first wife Angelita was spurious as their signatures were forgeries.
Meanwhile, on Nov. 23, 1995, spouses Yu filed an action for forcible entry
against respondent with the MTC alleging that they had prior physical possession
of the Langcaan Property through their trustee Ramon until the latter was ousted
by respondent in Sept. 1995. MTC ruled in favor of spouses Yu, affirmed by the
RTC, but set aside by CA. His first action for annulment of deed of sale having
been dismissed, respondent filed action for removal of cloud from title on May 29,
1996, contending that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife and
Rebecca del Rosario could not have been executed on Feb. 27, 1992, because on
said date, he was residing in the U.S. and his late first wife died 20 years ago.
During pendency of the case, respondent died, succeeded by his surviving spouse
and representatives of children with his first wife. RTC held that spouses Yu are
purchasers in good faith, but on appeal, CA reversed and set aside lower courts
decision and ordered for the cancellation of the annotation in favor of spouses Yu
on the TCT of Langcaan Property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in good
faith.
HELD:
Petitioner spouses are not innocent purchasers for value, and they are not in good
faith. Several facts should have put petitioner spouses on inquiry as to the alleged
rights of their vendor, Javier, over the Langcaan property. First, the property
remains to be registered in the name of respondent despite the 2 Deeds of
Absolute Sale from respondent to Del Rosario then from the latter to Javier, and
both deeds were not even annotated in the title of the subject property.
Second, the 2 deeds of absolute sale were executed only 2 months apart containing
identical provisions. Third, the fact that the Langcaan Property is in the possession
of Ramon, son of the registered owners, this should have made petitioner spouses
suspicious as to the veracity of the alleged title of their vendor, Javier. Petitioner
spouses could have easily verified the true status of the subject property from
Ramons wife, since the latter is their relative. The law protects to a greater degree
a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a
higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the
registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered. While
one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the
certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is
expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances
necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor,
or in his capacity to transfer the land. Therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be
considered as innocent purchasers in good faith, and respondent has a better right
over the Langcaan Property as the true owner thereof.
__________________________________________________________________
____________
G.R. No. 77976 November 24, 1988
MAXIMO GABRITO, ROGER LIBUT, CARMELITA UY, LIZA DE
VERA, thru her Attorney-in-Fact, JESUS DE LOS SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NINTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. NICIAS
O. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo
City, ET AL., respondents.
Cornelio C. Cardenas and Valeriano S. Peralta for petitioners.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary injunction and
restraining order of the decision of the Court of Appeals * dated March 4, 1987 in
CA-G.R. No. SP No. 08710, "Maximo Gabrito et al. vs. Hon. Nicias O. Mendoza
and Roberto Tan et al.," affirming the April 2, 1986 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City ** which also affirmed the decision of MTCC, Branch V,
Olongapo City, and the Resolution of respondent court dated March 30, 1987
denying herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The appeal originated as an unlawful detainer complaint filed by herein private
respondents with the Municipal Trial Court, Branch V, Olongapo City.
The antecedent facts as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The spouses Roberto Tan and Benita Ching-Tan filed a complaint in the
Municipal Trial Court against defendants Maximo Gabrito, et al., alleging that
they are the possessors and legal owners of the property situated at No. 107
Gordon Ave., New Kalalake, Olongapo City as evidenced by Tax Declaration No.
4-2046. The defendants are leasing portions of this parcel of land, each paying the
corresponding monthly rentals due thereon.
On the leased portion, the defendants constructed buildings and have allowed
other persons to sublease the same for commercial purposes.
As the spouses Tan have no other property where they could construct their
residential house, the spouses Tan notified the defendants (in January 1984) that
they intend to personally use the land to build their house thereon and gave
defendants three (3) months to vacate the premises and remove the structures and
improvements which defendants had constructed thereon.
In April 1984, defendants requested for an extension of time within which to
vacate, which was granted by the spouses Tan. However, from that time on,
defendants also stopped paying monthly rentals due on the land they leased.
In view of this, in July 1984, defendants were told to leave the premises and to
pay rentals in arrears. As defendants refused to comply with both demands, the
matter was brought to the Barangay Council for settlement. As no agreement was
reached, a certification to file action was issued to the spouses Tan. Hence, the
Tans filed an action for unlawful detainer with damages against Gabrito, et al.
In answer to the complaint, defendants Gabrito, et al. denied the material
allegations of the complaint and alleged that: they are builders in good faith over
the land as provided in Article 448 of the Civil Code; the land where the houses of
defendants were built is a public land, not yet awarded nor titled to anybody;
plaintiffs's alleged predecessor-in-interest not being the owner thereof could not
have passed nor transferred ownership thereof to them (plaintiffs) considering that
Gloria Carillo's Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (X-4-4320) has not yet been
acted upon by the Bureau of Lands; plaintiffs and their predessors-in-interest are
absentee applicants over the land, hence, are disqualified to own the same;
plaintiffs have never been in possession of the land while the defendants are in
actual physical possession thereof; the sale of plaintiffs' alleged predecessor-in-
interest in favor of plaintiffs is null and void for being in violation of P.D. No.
1517 as defendants being lessees of the land have the right of first refusal thereof.
Defendants brought a counterclaim for damages against the plaintiffs. (Rollo,
Annex "C", pp. 39-40).
Respondent Municipal Trial Judge applied the rule on summary procedure in this
case, rendered its decision dated November 22, 1985, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for all the defendants to vacate the
parcel of land described in par. 3 of the complaint, removing therefrom the
buildings and any other improvements respectively owned by them; and to pay
plaintiffs the following as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises:
Maximo Gabritoat
P250.00 per month from April 1984 until he vacates the premises;
Roger Libutat
P150.00 per month from May 1984 until he vacates the premises;
Liza de Veraat:
P150.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises; Carmelita
Uyat
Pl 70.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises.
for all defendants to pay, in equal shares, damages by way of attorney's fees in the
amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS ( P1,000.00 ) as well as costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35).
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No. 450-08-5), the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court was affirmed in its decision dated April 2, 1986, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premised on all the foregoing consideration and finding no
prejudicial and reversible error was ever committed by the lower Court, the Court
affirms in toto the decision being appealed, with costs against the defendants-
appellants.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex 'B' p. 38).
On review, herein respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision rendered by
the Regional Trial Court Branch LXXIV, and ruled;
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review herein is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
(Rollo, Annex "C", p. 44).
On March 16, 1987, the petitioner filed their "Motion for Reconsideration and
Opposition to the Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Further Proceedings"
which was denied by the Ninth Division of respondent Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated March 30, 1987 and granted the Motion for Immediate Issuance
of a Writ of Execution filed by private respondents (Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 57-58).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed on April 13, 1987.
On April 21, 1987, Acting Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, authorized the grant of
Temporary Restraining Order in this case which was confirmed by the Second
Division of this Court in its Resolution dated April 27, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 86, 87,
88).
In a Resolution dated June 8, 1987, petitioners were required to comment on the
motion dated April 26, 1987 (Rollo, p. 94) of counsel for respondents, praying to
set aside the temporary restraining order issued on April 21, 1987 and to issue a
writ of execution pending appeal or to allow the Court of Appeals to proceed with
the execution of the decision pending appeal (Rollo, p. 115), which was complied
with by petitioners on July 22, 1987 (Rollo, p. 143).
In the resolution of October 5, 1987 (Rollo, p. 187) the petition was given due
course and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda within
twenty (20) days from notice. Petitioners' memorandum was submitted on
December 3, 1987 (Rollo, p. 196). Respondents submitted their memorandum on
April 12, 1988 (Rollo, p. 235). Petitioners raised the following issues:
1. That a Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
case for Unlawful Detainer under Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, where
the plaintiffs are merely the legal possessors and recent transferees of a public
land, and the defendants are the absolute owners of the building existing on the
same land, for a number of years already.
2. That the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXIV, Olongapo
City, ought to have dismissed the action for Unlawful Detainer and as the same
was also heard on appeal by the said Court on this jurisdictional challenge.
3. The market value of the residential houses or buildings of the defendants
on the said land is approximately P170,000.00, and it was with plaintiffs'
predecessor-in-interest, one Gloria Carillo-Potente that defendants caused said
structures to be erected on said land plaintiffs having only acquired from said
predecessor, by means of a Deed of Sale of such rights sometime on January 5,
1984.
4. Upon this frame of facts which are admitted in the Decision of both
Courts, only a Court of General Jurisdiction, a Regional Trial Court, can have the
competence to try and decide the same: the Court of Special Limited Jurisdiction,
cannot take cognizance of such facts as an action for Unlawful Detainer.
5. Arguendo, that the Court of Origin has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the cause of action for Unlawful Detainer, it should have not heard the case in
accordance with the Rules of Summary Proceedings, and based its Decision on an
Affidavit hearing, as the question of ownership was being contested between
plaintiffs and defendants, with respect to whom was the preferred grantee to the
same land, and which falls under the complete administration and control of the
Bureau of Lands.
6. In fact, the Court of Origin, Branch V, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Olongapo, should have suspended the proceedings, as there was an Administrative
Protest being heard by the District Land Office of Olongapo City.
7. On the question of suspension of proceedings denied by the Court of
Origin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch V, Olongapo City, an action for
certiorari was filed before Branch LXXIII of Regional Trial Court, Olongapo
City, Civil Case No. 399-0-85, and although a Restraining Order against
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch V, City of Olongapo, was issued, the
same was already academic as by that time said Municipal Trial Court, Branch V,
Olongapo City, has already rendered its Decision in favor of private respondent
hereat, plaintiff therein.
8. Branch LXXIV, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo, in its Decision
rendered on appeal, did not pass upon such matters, specified supra, so as to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Origin: the subject Decisions, have not
considered the due process rights of petitioners toward their residences and
structures, the same are facing the risk of condemnation and destruction without
fair hearing, and such improvements have an aggregate value of Pl70,000.00,
more or less.
9. Respondent Honorable Judge Mendoza of Branch LXXIV, Regional
Trial Court, Olongapo, may have been misled by the citation of authority, case of
Vda. de Bocaling vs. Laguna, et al., 54 SCRA, 243, relied upon by appellees, said
case being totally inapplicable to the facts of this case.
10. Respondent Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Lumanlan, without regard to the
fif'teen (15) days period finality of the Order and/or Writ of Demolition, harrassed
herein petitioners, notwithstanding the pendency of matters involved to their
extreme discomfort and anxiety.
11. The Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Annex "C", sustained
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court and ignored the vital issues posed for
resolution: A Motion For Reconsideration, copy is hereto attached as Annex "D",
was presented, precisely to stress the same but, a pointed or precise ruling upon
such issues was avoided in the Resolution dated 30th of March, 1987, true copy
attached herein as Annex "E".
12. On the other (sic) upon Motion of private respondents, the Tans, despite
Opposition thereto, Writ of Execution pending appeal was issued and respondent
Deputy Sheriff Lumanlan enforced the same, copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "F": true copy of Notice to Vacate served by said respondent Deputy
Sheriff to petitioners is attached as Annex "G" herein.
13. Per Annex "D" Motion For Reconsideration a constitutional point, was
reared forth, on first impression, per proviso of Sec. 10, Art. XIII-new, 1986
Constitution, relevant to demolition and resettlement, and, Resolution, dated 30th
March, 1987, Annex "E", of the Honorable Appellate Authority, avoided said
constitutional question, without passing upon the same.
14. Of Jurisdictional matters: Decision dated March 4, 1987, of the
Honorable Court of Appeals was, received on March 6, 1987, Motion For
Reconsideration was filed on March 16, 1987, and Resolution dated 30th of
March, 1987, denying Motion for Reconsideration was received on April 1, 1987:
thus, this Petition is filed within the 15 day period. (Rollo, pp. 4-8).
All of which boil down to the main issue of whether or not an action for unlawful
detainer is the proper action to oust petitioners from their occupation of the land in
dispute.
There is no question as to the ownership of the land in litigation as both
petitioners and private respondents admit that the same is a public land and owned
by the government. The bone of contention is, who has a better right to possess
the land which definitely falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
and the rule of summary procedure may properly be applied.
In a preliminary conference held pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, defendants admitted that they entered the premises as lessees and had
been paying rentals for the use of the land to Gloria Carillo, private respondents'
predecessor-in-interest (Order dated May 15, 1985 in Civil Case No. 2511, MTC,
Olongapo City, Branch V; Rollo, pp. 72-73).<re||an1w> When requested to In a later development, petitioners filed a supplemental memorandum submitting
vacate the premises, petitioners asked for an extension of time which request was
granted. However, petitioners failed to vacate the premises and also stopped
paying rentals. In view of said admissions, petitioners had unquestionably
recognized private respondents' prior right of possession over the questioned
property.
Petitioners' allegation in their answer that they are builders in good faith over the
land as provided for in Article 448 of the Civil Code is untenable. As ruled by this
Court, Article 448 of the Civil Code, applies only where one builds on land in the
belief that he is the owner of the land, but does not apply where one's interest in
the land is that of a lessee under a rental contract (Balucanag v. Francisco, 122
SCRA 498 [1983]). More than that, it has been settled that the mere fact that, in
his answer, defendant claims to be the exclusive owner of the property from which
plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient to divest the Municipal Trial Court of
jurisdiction (Vivar v. Vivar, 8 SCRA 847, 849 [1963]; De Santa vs. Court of
Appeals, 140 SCRA 52 [1985]).
In addition, this Court held in Bocaling v. Laguna, et al (54 SCRA 243, 250
[1973]) that:
The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good
faith because he knew that their occupancy of the premises continues only during
the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their
improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are
reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which
allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their improvements
if the lessor so elects.
Petitioners contend that the above cited case is "completely inapplicable to the
case at bar, because the genesis case of Ejectment therein was subjected to a
compromise Agreement" (Rollo, p. 18). Such contention is, however, untenable.
One of the issues raised in the above-cited case was whether or not lessees are
builders and/or possessors in good faith entitled to reimbursement for the value of
their improvements. The Court categorically resolved the issue in the negative
without qualification nor even a reference to the compromise agreement alluded to
by the petitioner.
the decision of the Bureau of Lands dated June 7, 1987, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Miscellaneous Sales Application No.
4320 of Benita Ching Tan should be, as hereby as it is rejected forfeiting to the
government whatever amount had been paid on account thereof. The
miscellaneous sales application of Maximo Gabrito, Carmelita Uy, Roger Libut
and Liza de Vera shall continue to be given due course after a subdivision survey
of the portion occupied by them shall have been made at their pro-rata expense.
SO ORDERED.
In view thereof, petitioners maintain that they are the lawful owners of the
buildings and the legal possessors of subject land and that the records of the court
proceedings show the pendency of the administrative protest before the Bureau of
Lands between the same litigating parties (Rollo, pp. 166-167).
Respondents countered that the decision of the Bureau of Lands granting
preferential right to the petitioners to apply for the subject parcel of land is still on
appeal before the Department of Natural Resources.1 Hence, said decision which
is not yet final, cannot affect the outcome of this case because the authority given
to the land department over the disposition of public land does not exclude the
courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the character of the land
notwithstanding (Rollo, pp. 246-247).
The contention of private respondents is well taken.
This issue has long been laid to rest by this Court. As early as the case of Pitarque
v. Sorilla (92 Phil. 55 [1952]), this Court ruled that:
The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose of, and
alienate public lands must not be understood as depriving the other branches of
the Government of the exercise of their respective functions of powers thereon,
such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of peace by the police
and the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory
actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and
disposition.
Said ruling was reiterated in Bahayang v. Maceren, 96 Phil 390 (1955); in Molina
v. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 56 (1967) and in Rallon v. Ruiz, Jr., 28 SCRA 331 (1969).
In the latter case, the Court specifically ruled on the jurisdictional question, as
follows:
Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public lands to
determine the issue of physical possession (in forcible entry cases before the
inferior court) on the better right of possession (in accion publiciana cases before
court of first instance). And this is because the issue of physical possession raised
before the courts is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of
public lands which should be threshed out in the Bureau of Lands.
The above ruling was further reiterated in Francisco v. Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources (121 SCRA 380 [1983]) and in a recent case of National
Development Co., et al. v. Hervilla, G.R. No. 65718, June 30, 1987 (151 SCRA
520), where it was held that:
It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are
committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants
of public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public
lands. The jurisdiction of courts is limited to the determination of who has the
actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry
cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana, in cases before the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court).
And even more recently in the case of Guerrero v. Amores, et al., G.R. No.
L-34492 promulgated on March 28, 1988, the Court clearly stated that "pending
final adjudication of ownership by the Bureau of Lands, the Court has jurisdiction
to determine in the meantime the right of possession over the land." Corollary
thereto, the power to order the sheriff to remove improvements and turn over the
possession of the land to the party adjudged entitled thereto, belongs only to the
courts of justice and not to the Bureau of Lands.
In the same case, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies with reference to public lands, was further clarified by this Court as
follows:
On the other hand, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as a condition precedent to the filing of a juridical action is confined to
controversies arising out of the disposition of public lands (Geukoko vs. Araneta,
102 Phil. 706 (1957); Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil. 128 (1957), alienation of
public lands (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra) or to the determination of the respective
rights of rival claimants to public lands (Pitarque vs. Sorilla, supra) and not to
possessory actions involving public lands which are limited to the determination
of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question
(Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra
In fact, the Bureau of Lands in its decision of June 7, 1987, admitted the
jurisdiction of the courts to decide the case on the question of physical possession,
although not on the question of ownership (Rollo, p. 179).
Under the circumstances, a careful study of the records failed to show any cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities and of the
Regional Trial Court, both of Olongapo City, and finally of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and
the temporary restraining order is lifted. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 148830. April 13, 2005
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
versus
COURT OF APPEALS, BULACAN GARDEN CORPORATION and
MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Pres. Marcos issued Proc. No. 481 (1968) setting aside a 120-hectare
portion of land in Quezon City owned by the NHA as reserved property for the
site of National Government Center (NGC). Subsequently, he issued Proc. No.
1670 (1977), which removed a 7-hectare portion from the 120-hectare land, giving
the usufructuary rights to the xxx Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc., for use
in its operation and projects, subject to private rights if any there be, and to future
survey, under the administration of the Foundation. This parcel of land, which
shall embrace 7 hectares, shall be determined by the future survey based on the
technical descriptions found in Proclamation No. 481, and most particularly on the
original survey of the area, dated July 1910 to June 1911, and on the subdivision
survey dated April 19-25, 1968. Over the years, MSBF occupied the area but it
exceeded the 7-hectare subject of the usufruct and occupied 16 hectares instead.
By then the land occupied by MSBF was bounded by Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) to the west, Agham Road to the east, Quezon Avenue to the
south and a creek to the north. On 1987, MSBF leased a portion of its area to BGC
and other stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing EDSA, which occupies
4,590 square meters of the 16-hectare area. On November 1987, Pres. Corazon
Aquino issued MO 127 which revoked the reserved status of the 50 hectares, more
or less, remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of
the NGC. It also authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and to sell it to
the public. On August 1988, acting pursuant to MO 127, the NHA gave BGC 10
days to vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind after the expiration of
the 10-day period will be demolished by NHA. BGC then filed a complaint for
injunction on 21 April 1988 before the trial court. On 26 May 1988, BGC
amended its complaint to include MSBF as its co-plaintiff. Both the NHA and
MSBF conducted survey on the subject parcel of land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MSBF has the right to determine the subject 7-hectare
portion of land
HELD:
Yes. Art. 565 states that, the rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be
those provided in the title constituting the usufruct; in default of such title, or in
case it is deficient, the provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be
observed. In the present case, Proc. No. 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct.
It categorically states that the 7-hectare area shall be determined by future survey
under the administration of the Foundation subject to private rights if there be any.
It authorized MSBF to determine the location of the 7-hectare area. This authority,
coupled with the fact that Proc. No. 1670 did not state the location of the 7-hectare
area, leaves no room for doubt that Proc. No. 1670 left it to MSBF to choose the
location of the seven-hectare area under its usufruct. However, the Court cannot
countenance MSBFs act of exceeding the 7-hectare portion granted to it by the
proclamation. A usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary
has the duty to protect the owners interests. Article 601 of the Civil Code states:
the usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third person,
of which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of
ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so, for damages, as if they had
been caused through his own fault. The controversy would not have arisen had
MSBF respected the limit of the beneficial use given to it. Hence, there is a need
for a new survey, conducted jointly by the NHA and MSBF, consider existing
structures of MSBF and as much as possible include all of the facilities of MSBF
within the 7-hectare portion without sacrificing contiguity.
Another point in the case: Article 605 of the Civil Code states: Usufruct cannot be
constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or association for more than fifty
years. If it has been constituted, and before the expiration of such period the town
is abandoned, or the corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be
extinguished by reason thereof.Proc. No. 1670 was issued in 1977, or 28 years
ago. Hence, under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22 years
left.MO 127 released approximately 50 hectares of the NHA property as reserved
site for the NGC. However, it does not affect MSBFs 7-hectare area since under
Proc. No. 1670, MSBFs 7-hectare area was already excluded from the operation
of Proc. No. 481, which established the NGC Site.
[ G.R. No. 152809, August 03, 2006 ]
MERCEDES MORALIDAD, petitioner, VS. SPS. DIOSDADO PERNES
AND ARLENE PERNES, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Davao City which is the
subject of the controversy. The petitioner had worked in U.S.A. for years until
retirement. Being single, she would usually stay in the house of her niece,
respondent Arlene Pernes, at Mandug, Davao City during her vacation and that in
1986, when she received news from Arlene that Mandug was infested by NPA
rebels and many women and children were victims of crossfire between
government troops and the insurgents, she immediately sent money to buy a lot in
Davao City proper where Arlene and her family could transfer and settle down.
Petitioner wanted the property to be also available to any of her kins
wishing to live and settle in Davao City and made known this intention in a
document she executed on July 21, 1986. which reads: I, MERCEDES VIA
MORALIDAD, of legal age, single, hereby declare:
1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build
their house therein and stay as long as they like;
2. That anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned
real property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in
harmony and must avoid bickering with one another;
3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and
may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not
inimical to the purpose thereof;
4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the
undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own;
5. That any proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned
properties shall be allotted to my nearest kins who have less in life in
greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of in
standing.
In her retirement, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with the
respondents on the house they build on the subject property. In the course of
time, their relations turned sour which resulted in violent confrontations and the
filing of suits at the barangay lupon and to the Ombudsman for conduct
unbecoming of public servants and at the MTCC, an ejectment suit for unlawful
detainer.
The MTCC rendered judgment for the petitioner directing the defendants
to vacate the premises and to yield peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff.
Respondent spouses appealed to the RTC where the decision of the MTCC was
reversed, holding that respondents possession of the property in question was not
by mere tolerance of the petitioner but rather by her express consent.
It further ruled that Article 1678 of the Civil Code on reimbursement of
improvements introduced is inapplicable since said provision contemplates of a
lessor-lessee arrangement, which was not the factual milieu obtaining in the case.
Instead, the RTC ruled that what governed the parties relationship are Articles
448 and 546 of the Civil Code. Petitioner went to the CA wherein her petition was
denied on the ground that it is still premature to apply Articles 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code considering that the issue of whether respondents right to possess a
portion of petitioners land had already expired or was already terminated was not
yet resolved. The CA further ruled that what governs the rights of the parties is the
law on usufruct but petitioner failed to establish that respondents right to possess
had already ceased.
ISSUES:
What provisions of the Civil Code should govern the rights of the parties. Whether
or not the respondents right to possess the land had been terminated.
HELD:
Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following wise:
ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the
obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or
the law otherwise provides.
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy
anothers property . It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another
temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, with the owner
retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same. It is undisputed that
petitioner, in a document, made known her intention to give respondents and her
other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of her property and the
respondents were being given the right to build their own house on the property
and to stay thereat as long as they like. Paragraph #5 of the same document
earmarks proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties for
the petitioners nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser
percentage to those who are better of in standing. The established facts
undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the property but also
granted them, among the petitioners other kins, the right to enjoy the fruits
thereof. There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be
considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the Civil Code enumerates such
other modes of extinguishment:
ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly
appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the
fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the
usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription.
The document executed by the petitioner constitutes the title creating,
and sets forth the conditions of the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states That
anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use
thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof.
What may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be
gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear
that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned property
should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid
bickering with one another. That the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious
relations between and among kin constitutes an indispensable condition for the
continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding Paragraph #4
where petitioner stated That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the
wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own.
In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere
of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship
between/among kins constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish of
the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct. Thus, the Court rules that the continuing
animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and
humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition,
are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been terminated. The
relationship between the petitioner and respondents respecting the property in
question is one of owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents claim for
reimbursement of the improvements they introduced on the property during the
effectivity of the usufruct should be governed by applicable statutory provisions
and principles on usufruct. In this regard, we cite with approval what Justice
Edgardo Paras wrote on the matter: If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will
be governed by Arts. 579 and 580. By express provision of law, respondents, as
usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they
may have introduced on the property. We quote Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct
such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper,
provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be
indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be
possible to do so without damage to the property Art. 580. The usufructuary may
set off the improvements he may have made on the property against any damage
to the same.
La Vista Association v. CA, Solid Homes, Inc., Ateneo de Manila University
et al.
Facts:
Mangyan Road is the boundary between the La Vista Subdivision on one side and
Ateneo and Maryknoll (Miriam) on the other. The road extends to the entrance
gate of Loyola Grand Villas. The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was
originally part of a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons. The Tuasons sold to
Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings. The Philippine
Building Corporation transferred, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject
parcel of land to Ateneo. The Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the
portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into La Vista Subdivision.
La Vista seeks the issuance of a writ of injunction to finally enjoin private
respondents Solid Homes, Inc., developers of Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision,
the latters predecessor-in-interest, Ateneo, and the residents of the said
subdivision from enjoying an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road.
La Vista contends that mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to
serve as its (the easement of right-of-way) basis. To justify the imposition of this
servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it
Issue:
Whether or not La Vista may withhold from the private respondents the use of the
Mangyan Road.
Ruling:
The rule cited by La Vista, enunciated in Ramos, Sr., v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,
concerns a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way. A legal or compulsory
easement is that which is constituted by law for public use or for private interest.
A voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement
of the parties.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and
their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-
of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and
servient estates. This is quite evident when:
(a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation stipulated in
par. 3 of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the "boundary line
between the property herein sold and the adjoining property of the
VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of
which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the VENDEE
and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the
vendors;"
(b) the Tuasons expressly agreed and consented to the assignment of the
land to, and the assumption of all the rights and obligations by
Ateneo, including the obligation to contribute seven and one-half
meters of the property sold to form part of the 15-meter wide
roadway;
(c) the Tuasons filed a complaint against Maryknoll and Ateneo for
breach of contract and the enforcement of the reciprocal easement on
Mangyan Road, and demanded that Maryknoll set back its wall to
restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters, after
Maryknoll constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide
roadway;
(d) La Vista President Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified, in a
letter to Ateneo President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road
is a road fifteen meters wide, one-half of which is taken from your
property and the other half from the La Vista Subdivision. So that
the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created
in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was created
on our 7 1/2 m. portion of the road in your favor;"
(e) La Vista, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the Ateneo
property, acknowledged the existence of the contractual right-of-way
as it manifested that the mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de
Manila University and La Vista Homeowners' Association would be
extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO property and would
thus become the owner of both the dominant and servient estates;
and,
(f) La Vista President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the
Chief Justice, acknowledged that "one-half of the whole length of
(Mangyan Road) belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is
owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo in equal portions;"
These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had
indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and,
like any other contract, the same could be extinguished only by mutual agreement
or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
The argument of petitioner that there are other routes to Loyola Grand Villas from
Mangyan Road is meritless. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can
extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements. That
there is no contract between La Vista and Solid Homes, Inc., and thus the court
could not have declared the existence of an easement created by the manifest will
of the parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-in-interest of both La Vista and
Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation,
respectively, clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road.
[G.R. No. 130845. November 27, 2000.]
BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D.C.
VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and
SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Villanueva is the registered owner of a parcel of land previously owned
by spouses Gabriel. When Villanueva bought the land, there was a small house on
the southeastern portion, occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement of
right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest
of private respondent. Unknown to Villanueva, even before he bought the land,
there was already a final and executory decision enforcing the right
to easement where the small house encroaching the same was ordered demolished
by Judge Velasco.
The easement in the case at bar is both voluntary and legal easement. The settled
rule is that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement.
Hence, petitioner ought to demolish the small house on the easement obstructing
the entry of private respondents' cement mixer and motor vehicle. And even if
the easement was not annotated in the title of the land and the notice of lis
pendens was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, in legal easement, the
servient estate is bound to provide the dominant estate ingress from and egress to
the public highway. Further, the decision enforcing the right of easement against
the previous owner is conclusive and binding upon the successor-in-interest.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; EASEMENTS; KINDS; LEGAL EASEMENT;
ELUCIDATED. [A] legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for
public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a
compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as
provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for
an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity.
has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. DAESTI
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE NEEDS OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE DETERMINE
THE WIDTH OF THE EASEMENT. [T]he small house occupying one meter
of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents' cement
mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private
respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the
width of the easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever
edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents' estate.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL EASEMENT BINDING EVEN IF NOT ANNOTATED
IN THE TITLE AND NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS OF CASE ENFORCING THE
SAME NOT RECORDED. Petitioner's second proposition, that he is not
bound by the contract of easement because the same was not annotated in the title
and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not
recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious . . . it is in the
nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to
provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and
egress to the public highway.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS;
DECISION IN A CASE BINDING TO THE PARTIES AND SUCCESSOR-IN-
INTEREST AFTER CASE COMMENCED. Petitioner's last argument that he
was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 and that he had not been given his
day: in court, is also without merit [in view of] Rule 39, Sec. 47, of the Revised
Rules of Court. . . . [A] decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the
parties to said case and those who are their successor in interest by title after said
case has been commenced or filed in court. In this case, private respondents. . .
initiated; Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8,1991, against the original owners. .
. . Title in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on March
24, 1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from
the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner.
For, although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action in court.
Facts:
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land.
- He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said
property.
- The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel
at a public auction on March 19, 1983.
When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its
southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of
right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest
of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way.
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had
constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter
easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian
and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, for
easement, damages and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order against the spouses Gabriel. 4 As successors-in-interest,
Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement.
On May 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On August
1991, it issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to
provide the right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on
the easement. On August 1991, the Gabriels filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied. Thus, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals.
On March 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and upheld the RTC's
issuances. The decision became final and executory on July 1992. 5
On January 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon City issued
an Alias Writ of Demolition. On June 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the small
house pursuant to the writ. Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to
Quash Alias Writ of Demolition.
- He maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his property
since he was not a party to the civil case.
- His Third Party Claim with prayer to quash the writ of demolition was
denied for lack of merit
- The motion for reconsideration as well as the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration were denied
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
docketed asserting that the existence of the easement of right of way was not
annotated in his title and that he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703,
hence the contract of easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Espinolas
could not be enforced against him.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and denied
the reconsideration
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the easement on the property binds petitioner.
HELD:
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition
is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by
necessity or a legal easement.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the existence of
said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is
conclusive on this Court.
 - The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter
wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents' cement mixer
and motor vehicle.
- One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents.
- It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the
width of the easement.
- Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice
obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents' estate.
Petitioner's second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract
of easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis
pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with the
Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious.
- As already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that the
servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant
estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to the
public highway.
In this case, private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated
Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991, against the original owners, the
spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner was entered
in the Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the
bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case
No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For, although not a party to the suit, he is a
successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action in
court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs Guzman
G.R. No. 132964
February 18, 2000
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses
Simeon Guzman (naturalized American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American
citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate
consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan.
In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and registered
it to the RD a year after.
In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and
conveying her share of the properties to David. But since it was not registered,
she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first.
In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished it with documents
showing that Davids ownership of of the estate was defective. He argued that
Art. XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire private lands in the
country. The only instances when a foreigner may acquire private property are by
hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born citizen who lost his
Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed
by Helen were really donations inter vivos.
Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that of Davids interest
be forfeited in its favor. RTC dismissed. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos
HELD:
NO. Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties
by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1) reduction of her patrimony as
donor and the (2) consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee.
However, Helens (3) intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David
was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to
convey to her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver
and renunciation of her rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen merely
contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands in favor of David,
not a donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible.
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration
to make the donation valid is lacking. The SPA executed by David in favor of
Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but an acknowledgment that David owns the
property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his
name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accepted the
donation.
However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of Helen in
favor David valid. There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had
already accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and
adjudicating between them all the properties. By virtue of that settlement, the
properties were registered in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the land
in the concept of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and effect.
Helen still owns of the property.
DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD, PROSPERO
ALUAD, and CONNIE ALUAD, Petitioners,
versus
ZENAIDA ALUAD, Respondent.
G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were
raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad
(Crispin).Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676,
677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife
Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled Deed of
Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos (Deed of Donation) in favor of
petitioners mother Maria covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from
her husband Crispin.
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674
and 676 were issued in Matildes name. On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot
No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.
Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and
testament,devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her remaining
properties including Lot No. 674 to respondent. Matilde died on January 25,
1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.
On August 21, 1995, Marias heirs-herein petitioners filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, for declaration and
recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages
against respondent.
The trial court, by Decision of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde
could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she
having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
By Decision of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
courts decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation
mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the
formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by
only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with
Article 805 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is a donation mortis causa and have
complied with the formalities of a will.
RULING:
The Deed of Donation which is one of mortis causa. The donation being
then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observedbut they
were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following
Article 805 of the Civil Code.Further, the witnesses did not even sign the
attestation clausethe execution of which clause is a requirement separate from the
subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of
the pages of the will.
Danguilan vs IAC
Facts:
Apolonia Melad filed a complaint against Felix Daguilan with CFI Cagayan for
recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed she had purchased
from Domingo Melad in 1943 and were now being unlawfully withheld by the
Danguilan. She claimed to be the illegitimate daughter of Domingo and presented
a deed of sale purportedly signed by the latter. She only moved out in 1946
because Danguilan approached her and asked permission to cultivate the land and
to stay therein. She had agreed on condition that he would deliver part of the
harvest from the farm to her, which he did from that year to 1958. Deliveries later
stopped thus the complaint.
Danguilan, on the other hand, is the husband of Isidra Melad, Domingo's niece.
He presented a private instrument which Domingo Melad also purportedly signed,
giving to him the farm in 1943 another private instrument in which Domigo also
gave him the residential lot, on the understanding that the Danguilan would take
care of the grantor and would bury him upon his death.
Lower court ruled in favor of Danguilan. Upon appeal, the IAC modified the
deicision and ruled that the conveyance of the real properties in question were null
and void, as they were donations of real property and as such should have been
effected through a public instrument.
Apolonia Melad alleges that the deed of sale was allegedly executed when the
respondent was only three years old and the consideration was supposedly paid by
her mother, Maria Yedan from her earnings as a wage worker in a factory.
Danguilan, on the other hand, avers that this contract was simulated and prepared
after Domingo's death.
Issue:
WON Apolonia Melad can be considered as the owner of the disputed properties
Held:
Decision of trial court reinstated. Danguilan wins.
Based on the evidence adduced, it is clear that Domingo did intend to donate the
properties to Danguilan. The fact that the donation was executed in a private
document is not material because the donation was onerous- the properties were
given to the Danguilan in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for
the rest of his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it could not come under the
operation of Article 749 requiring donations of real properties to be effected
through a public instrument.
As to the deed of sale executed between Domingo and Apolonia, the record shows
that the Apolonia Melad did not take possession of the disputed properties and
indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery of the lands from the
Danguilan. If she did have possession, she transferred the same to the petitioner in
1946, by her own sworn admission, and moved out to another lot belonging to her
step-brother. She thus failed to show that she consummated the contract of sale by
actual delivery of the properties to her and her actual possession thereof in
concept of purchaser-owner.
As consistently held by jurisprudence, ownership does not pass by mere
stipulation but only by delivery. That symbolic delivery was effected through the
deed of sale, which was a public instrument, Addison vs Felix controls:
"in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is
necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at
the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not
enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession.
The thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no impediment
whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the
sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public
instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument,
the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and
make use of it himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will, then fiction yields to
realitythe delivery has not been effected."
(eventually, the Court said that both claims were weak, but the presumption is in
favor of Danguilan who is in possession)