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November 23, 2011 Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a

VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. defense. Article 12 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the legal provision pertinent to accident,
Bersamin, J. contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal,
exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari, Virgilio Talampas y Matic (Talampas) seeks the review of the someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor an accidental result
affirmance of his conviction for homicide (for the killing of the late Ernesto Matic y Masinloc) by the Court flowing out of a legal act. Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the sway of our
of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated on August 16, 2007. will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of
humanly foreseeable consequences. In short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to
FACTS: commit the wrong done.
An information was filed on November 17, 1995, to which Talampas pleaded not guilty. The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and poked his
Jose Sevillo (Jose) who allegedly witnessed the incident in question, testified that on July 5, revolver at Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind
1995 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he together with Eduardo Matic and Ernesto Matic Ernesto. At that point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the right
were in front of his house, along the road in Bian, Laguna, repairing his tricycle when he portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall face down to the ground. Another shot hit
noticed the appellant who was riding on a bicycle passed by and stopped. Eduardo on the nape, causing Eduardo to fall on his back. Certainly, Talampas' acts were by
Brought out a short gun, a revolver, and poked the same to Eduardo and fired it hitting no means lawful, being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto. The appellant again fired his gun three (3) times, And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas' assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not
one shot hitting Ernesto at the right portion of his back causing him to fall on the ground with excuse his hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct
his face down. consequence of Talampas' felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas' poor aim
Thereafter, the appellant ran away, while he (Jose) and his neighbors brought the victims to amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted
the hospital. On June 6, 1995, Jose executed a Sworn Statement at the Bian Police Station. him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la
On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that his enemy had causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
been Eduardo, not victim Ernesto; that Eduardo, who was then with Ernesto at the time of the caused). Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
incident, had had hit him with a monkey wrench, but he had parried the blow; that he and committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Eduardo had then grappled for the monkey wrench; that while they had grappled, he had
notice that Eduardo had held a revolver; that he had thus struggled with Eduardo for control DISPOSITIVE: The Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2007 finding VIRGILIO
of the revolver, which had accidentally red and hit Ernesto during their struggling with each TALAMPAS y MATIC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and IMPOSES the
other; that the revolver had again fired, hitting Eduardo in the thigh; that he had then seized indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months, and one
the revolver and shot Eduardo in the head; and that he had then fired the scene when people day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
had started swarming around. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT:


The RTC, giving credence to the testimony of eyewitness Jose Sevilla, found Talampas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide with one mitigating circumstance of murder.

COURT OF APPEALS:
The CA affirmed the conviction based on the RTC's factual and legal conclusions, and ruled
that Talampas, having invoked self-defense, had in effect admitted killing Ernesto and had
thereby assumed the burden of proving the elements of self-defense by credible, clear and
convincing evidence, but had miserably failed to discharge his burden. The CA deleted the
award of temperate damages in view of the awarding of actual damages, pointing out that the
two kinds of damages were mutually exclusive.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts both erred in rejecting appellants self-defense and accidental
death

HELD: NO

RATIO:
Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in defending
himself.
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. The
established circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was Talampas who
had initiated the attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a
target of Talampas' attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene of the attack.
In reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression against
Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the victim
(Ernesto), thereby rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.
October 4, 2000 4. Whether or not erred in imposing the dealth penalty of Gemoya : YES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO GEMOYA, and RONILO TIONKO,
accused-appellants. RATIO:
Melo, J. SELF-DEFENSE
It must be borne in mind that accused-appellant Gemoya has not denied having executed the
NATURE: Before us on automatic review is a joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of the Eleventh fatal act, which caused the death of Alferez. He admittedly discharged the weapon which hit
Judicial Region stationed in Davao City (Branch 15), finding accused-appellants guilty of frustrated a vital organ of the victim, causing his instantaneous death. His only lame excuse is that, to
homicide. defend himself, he used the indian pana, which he grabbed from "somebody," against the
victim in the course of a tumultuous affray allegedly instigated by the victim himself.
FACTS: When an accused admits having killed the victim, the burden of proving his innocence is
At about 9:00 in the evening of January 27, 1996, the neighborhood of Barrio Malagamot, shifted to him. We ruled in People vs. Manlulu that "by invoking self-defense, the accused
Panacan, Davao City was awakened by a commotion. admit killing Alfaro. The burden of proof is thus shifted to them. Their duty now is to establish
Irene Lantapon was among those who went out to check what was happening. She saw by clear and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the killing." Accused-appellant
accused Armando Gemoya and Candelario Aliazar running towards their house. Gemoya can no longer invoke the constitutional right of being presumed innocent of the crime
After about half an hour, Gemoya and Aliazar came back with Ronilo and Rolly Tionko, the charged. As far as he is concerned, the crime of murder in the case at bar is established once
former's uncles and the latter's in-laws. They were armed with pipe, wood and an improvised the prosecution, establishes any of the qualifying circumstances with proof beyond
bow and arrow locally called "indian pana." It was like a sling shot with an arrow made of nail reasonable doubt. This is because the fact of death and the cause thereof are already
with feathers in the end. Addressing a group of people who were huddled together, Ronilo established by the admission. The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death.
Tionko stopped and demanded an explanation for what happened to his brother-in-law. They The court finds no cogent reason to disregard the trial court's factual findings on this score.
replied that nothing happened to him and advised them to go home. The theory of self-defense has not been duly established.
Accused ignored them and proceeded to the house of the Alferezes, which was along the The fact that accused-appellant shot the victims with an "indian pana" cannot be negated by
road in front of the school, when they saw Wilfredo Alferez standing by the road waiting for a supposed inconsistencies between the testimony of the eyewitnesses and the findings of the
taxi. medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy examination. It matters not if Wilfredo
The quartet rushed to him. Ronilo Tionko beat him with a cylindrical wood, Rolly Tionko with suffered no injury other than the fatal puncture wound. His death was caused by that puncture
a pipe of the same size while Aliazar held his arms behind him. Once Gemoya had aimed his wound, and the fact that there were four assailants who ganged upon the said victim is
"indian pana," they stepped aside to ensure that they would not be hit. Wilfredo Alferez was incontestable. These established realities make accused-appellants criminally liable for
hit directly on his left chest. Slumped to the ground, Edgardo Jimenez rushed to his aid. His murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength.
daughter Rosalie, who had just come from school, tried to pull him away. Irene Lantapon
yelled at her to run as Gemoya was about to shoot his "indian pana" again. Before she could ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
do so, she was hit in her left ear. Then the four scampered away. Rosalie Jimenez and Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
Wilfredo Alferez were rushed to the hospital. After minor treatment, she was declared out of between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously
danger. Wilfredo Alferez was not as lucky. He was pronounced dead on arrival. advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of in the commission
Accused-appellant Gemoya claims that the uniform narration of facts by prosecution of the crime.
witnesses is not supported by the documentary and the expert's testimony of the NBI Medico When four armed assailants, two of whom are accused-appellants in this case, gang up on
Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy examination on the victim Wilfredo Alferez. Dr. one unarmed victim, it can only be said that excessive force was purposely sought and
Ricardo M. Rodaje affirmed that he found no other injury on Wilfredo aside from the puncture employed. Although only accused-appellant Gemoya may have inflicted the fatal wound upon
wound on his chest which was the sole cause of death. the victim in this case, accused-appellant Tionko is also liable for the crime of murder since
evidently, the concerted acts of the two accused appellants, and their two other companions,
Two separate Informations were filed against four suspects; to obtain a common criminal objective signify conspiracy among them. Ronilo Tionko beat
Criminal Case No. 36,459-96 Wilfredo with a cylindrical wooden cane or "batuta," and Rolly Tionko with a pipe, while
xxx with intent to kill, hit with the use of an "Indian Pana," one Rosalie Jimenez. The Gemoya, after his companions had step aside to give him a clear shot, released his dart-
accused performed all the acts of execution which could produce the crime of Homicide, missile at Wilfredo.
as a consequence but which did not produce it by reason of a timely medical
intervention, a cause which is independent of the will of the perpetrators. CONSPIRACY
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
Criminal Case No. 36,460-96 commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
xxx with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior strength, wilfully, unlawfully and Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime.
feloniously attacked, assaulted and hit with an "Indian Pana" one Wilfredo Alferez which It may be deduced either from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed or
caused his subsequent death. from the accused themselves pointing to a community of interest or concerted action.
Herein accused-appellants and their companions ganging up upon a single common victim
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT: until one of them is able to inflict the fatal wound is clearly indicative of a common design to
Criminal Case No. 36,459-96 the penalty of two years, four months, twenty-one days to assail and disable their victim. Conspiracy can be inferred and proved by the totality of the
eight years and one day is imposed on accused Armando Gemoya and Ronilo Tionko for acts of the accused when said acts point to a joint purpose and design.
frustrated homicide with respect to victim Rosalie Jimenez. With or without himself inflicting injuries upon victim Wilfredo, accused appellant Ronilo
Criminal Case No. 36,460-96 the death penalty is imposed on accused Armando Gemoya Tionko is equally liable for the crime of murder in the case at bar as accused appellant
and Ronilo Tionko for the murder of Wilfredo Alferez. Gemoya. He cannot escape criminal liability under the circumstances even though the
autopsy report indicated no other injuries except the punctured wound on the victim's chest.
ISSUES & HOLDING: A conspirator, no matter how minimal his participation in the crime, is as guilty as the principal
1. Whether or not Gemoya acted on self-defense : NO perpetrator of the crime.
2. Whether or not the court erred in failing to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in favor of Gemoya : YES
3. Whether or not the court erred in convicting Gemoya of the crime of frustrated homicide : NO
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE March 15, 1930
As regards their second victim, Rosalie Jimenez, however, the court agrees with accused- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GONA (Mansaca), defendant-
appellants that the trial court erred in convicting them of frustrated homicide. appellant.
As correctly pointed out in the People's brief, the testimony of Jerry Lantapon and Irene Ostrand, J.
Lantapon concurred to the effect that the hitting of Rosalie was accidental as the second
"indian pana" was intended for Wilfredo. The intent to kill Rosalie which is essential if accused NATURE: Appeal from the trial courts decision
appellants were to be held liable for frustrated homicide is therefore, absent.
The two accused-appellants herein are liable for the crime resulting from Gemoya's act of FACTS:
releasing the second "indian pana," which accidentally hit Rosalie. Although Rosalie may not On the evening of October 26, 1928, a number of Mansacas celebrated a reunion in the house
have been their intended victim, accused-appellants, acting in conspiracy with one another of the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems to have been a liberal supply of alcoholic drinks and
as we have earlier discussed, are liable for the consequences of their felonious act. some of the men present became intoxicated, with the result that a quarrel took place between
Mistake in the identity of the victim, which may either be the Mansaca Dunca and the defendant.
(a) "error in personae" (mistake of the person), or Dunca and his son Aguipo eventually left the house and were followed by Mapudul and one
(b) "aberratio ictus" (mistake in the blow), is neither exempting nor mitigating. Awad. The defendant left the house about the same time with intention of assaulting Dunca,
Accordingly, accused-appellants may only be held liable for the crime of slight physical injury but in the darkness of the evening and in the intoxicated condition of the defendant, he
under Paragraph 2 of Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. mistook Mapudul for Dunca and in icted on him a mortal wound with a bolo.
There can be no doubt that the defendant killed Mapudul and that he is guilty of the crime
PENALTY charged, but his attorney argues that in view of the fact that said defendant had no intention
Both accused-appellants in this case are sentenced to the penalty of arresto menor or a fine to kill the deceased and committed the crime by mistake, he should have been found guilty
of P200.00 and censure for the crime of slight physical injury. of homicide through negligence.
As to the imposition of the death penalty upon both accused-appellants in this case, the court The defendant was charged before the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao with
agrees with the Solicitor General and accused-appellant Gemoya that the trial court seriously the crime of homicide.
erred in not considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of The Information reads: "That on or about October 26, 1928, in the municipal district of
accused-appellant Gemoya. The trial court likewise erred in imposing the maximum in the Pantukan, Province of Davao, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, the
range of penalty for murder. said accused voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with a bolo which he then carried,
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punished by reclusion assaulted the Mansaca Mapudul, causing him a mortal wound on the left side of the neck and
perpetua to death. Where there are no aggravating and no mitigating circumstances attendant that, as a consequence of said wound, the said Mapudul died."
in the commission of the crime the medium penalty shall be imposed. For the crime of murder,
the medium as well as the minimum penalty are the same because the lower range penalty, TRIAL COURT:
reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty. The court below found the defendant guilty as charged in the information and taking into
The minimum penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed. consideration the extenuating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication, sentenced him to
Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of Wilfredo Alferez will have to be suffer twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal with the accessory penalties prescribed
awarded in favor of his heirs. Accused-appellants being convicted as co-principals for the by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
crime of murder, the two shall be held solidarily liable for the civil indemnity. From this sentence the defendant appealed.

DISPOSITIVE: Accused-appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of: (a) slight physical injury ISSUE:
in Criminal Case No. 35,459-96 and each sentenced to a determinate prison term of thirty (30) days of Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the defendant guilty of intentional homicide
arresto menor; and (b) murder in Criminal Case No. 36,460-96 and accordingly each sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. HELD: NO.

RATIO:
The defendants contention is contrary to earlier decisions of this court. In the case of United
States vs. Mendieta, the court said:

"Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario Lauigan instead of
Pedro Acierto, even that, in view of the mortal wound which he inflicted upon the
latter, in no way could be considered as a relief from his criminal act. That he made
a mistake in killing one man instead of another, when it is proved that he acted
maliciously and willfully, cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility. Neither do
we believe that the fact that he made a mistake in killing the wrong man should be
considered as a mitigating circumstance."

DISPOSITIVE: The appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the defendant.
June 11, 1981 "pandesal" to slide into the neckline were, however, attributable to what appellant and his co-
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIEGO OPERO Y COSIPAG, et al., accused did to the victim, for if they did not hogtie her, she could have easily removed the
accused, DIEGO OPERO Y COSIPAG, defendant-appellant. "pandesal" from her mouth and avoided death by asphyxiation.
It may not avail appellant to contend that the death was by mere accident for even if it were
NATURE: Automatic review of the death sentence imposed on Diego Opero for robbery with homicide so, which is not even beyond doubt for the sliding of the pandesal into the neckline to produce
with which he was charged in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, asphyxiation could reasonably have been anticipated, it is a settled doctrine that when death
supervenes by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, it is immaterial that the
FACTS: occurrence of death was by mere accident. What is important and decisive is that death
At about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of April 27, 1978, Salvador Oliver, a GSIS security guard results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.
was informed by Demetrio Barcing, another security Guard, that the latter picked up a little In the instant case, the intended victim, not any other person, was the one killed, as a result
girl about three years old loitering at the second floor of the building. Rafael Ordoa, a janitor of an intention to rob, as in fact appellant and his co-accused, did rob the deceased. As stated
of the House International Hotel, told Oliver that the little girl is residing at Room 314 of the earlier, what may be appreciated in appellant's favor is only the mitigating circumstance
hotel. Oliver called up Room 314 by telephone and when nobody answered, he and Barcing of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, under paragraph
brought the little girl to said room. 3 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, an entirely different situation from that
Upon reaching Room 314, Oliver knocked at the door, and when nobody answered, he contemplated under paragraph 1, Article 49 of the same Code. Article 49, paragraph 1 of the
pushed the door open but he smelled foul odor emanating from the room. Oliver covered his Revised Penal Code has been applied only to cases when the crime committed befalls a
nose with a handkerchief and together with Barcing and the little girl, they entered the room different person from the one intended to be the victim, not when the intended victim, not any
where they saw prostrate on a bed a dead person with the face down and both feet tied. Oliver other person, was the one killed, as a result of an intention to rob, as in fact appellant and his
called up the homicide division of the Manila Police. Patrolman Fajardo who was assigned to co- accused, did rob the deceased.
investigate the report of Oliver, together with some funeral parlor men arrived at the scene, Notwithstanding the presence of the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit
and they saw a small baby crying and trying to get out of a crib near the bed of the dead so grave a wrong as that committed, there still remains one aggravating circumstance to
person. consider, after either one of the two aggravating circumstances present, that of superior
The dead body at Room 314 of the House International Hotel was that of Liew Soon Ping. strength and dwelling, is offset by the mitigating circumstance aforesaid.
Room 314 had been ransacked and personal belongings thrown all around. The hands and The higher of the imposable penalty for the crime committed, which is reclusion perpetua to
feet of the dead person were tied the body was bloated. A towel was tied around the mouth death, should therefore be the proper penalty to be imposed on appellant. This is the penalty
of the victim with a pandesal stuffed in her mouth causing death by asphyxiation. of death as imposed by the lower court.
The occupants of Room 314 were Dr. Hong, his wife Liew Soon Ping who is the victim in this
case, their three children and two maids, namely, Mila and Ester. After conducting a DISPOSITIVE: The judgment appealed from being in accordance with law and the evidence, except as
preliminary inquiry around the vicinity of the incident, Patrolman Fajardo made an advance to the non-appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong
report naming therein three suspects, namely, Diego Opero, Milagros Villegas, Asteria Avila as that committed, which nevertheless does not call for the modification of the penalty of death as
and a fourth unidentified suspect. The names of these suspects were furnished by neighbors imposed by the lower court, is hereby affirmed.
of the victim.
In his said statement to the police, Lacsinto admitted his participation and narrated in detail
the commission of the robbery in Room 314 of the House International Hotel.
Opero admitted that he had robbed the victim and identified some of the missing articles
recovered from his possession. He described in detail how he planned the robbery and named
the rest of his co-accused as willing participants. He also narrated in his said supplemental
statement that he and his co-accused Lacsinto subdued the victim by assaulting her, tying up
her hands and feet stabbing her and stuffing her mouth with a piece of pandesal.
The third suspect, Asteria Avila told the Manila Police that she was not a party to the crime
and upon advice of her lawyer she did not give any further statement.
Appellant advances the theory that he never intended to kill the deceased, his intention being
merely to rob her, for if indeed he had the intention to kill her, he could have easily done so
with the knife, and therefore, his liability should be only for robbery.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be liable only for robbery

HELD: NO.

RATIO:
It has been repeatedly held that when direct and intimate connection exists between the
robbery and the killing, regardless of which of the two precedes the other, or whether they are
committed at the same time, the crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide.
If the circumstances would indicate no intention to kill, as in the instant case where evidently,
the intention is to prevent the deceased from making an outcry, and so a "pandesal" was
stuffed into her mouth, the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so
grave a wrong may be appreciated. The stuffing of the "pandesal" in the mouth would not
have produced asphyxiation had it not slid into the neckline, "caused by the victim's own
movements," according to Dr. Singian. The movements of the victim that caused the
April 30, 1985 intended shall be imposed in its maximum period, the prescribed penalty is
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME TOMOTORGO y ALARCON, therefore reclusion temporal maximum. This is a divisible penalty.
defendant-appellant.
Alampay, J. "Under Article 64, sub-par. 5, of the Penal Code,
"When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
NATURE: The accused-appellant in this case, appeals from the decision rendered by the Court of First circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch IV, finding him guilty of the crime of parricide for having killed his prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the
wife Magdalena de los Santos. number and nature of such circumstances."

FACTS: ISSUES:
Several months prior to the occurrence of the fatal incident on June 23, 1977, Magdalena de 1. Whether or not the accused-appellant should be punished only for the offense he intended to
los Santos had been persistently asking her husband to sell the conjugal home which was commit which avers to be serious physical injuries, qualified by the fact that the offended party
then located in the Municipality of Siruma, Camarines Sur. She wanted their family to transfer is his spouse : NO
to the house of her husband's in-laws which is in the town of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. 2. Whether or not the penalty prescribed by law for his offense is divisible and he should thus
Accused Tomotorgo would not accede to his wife's request. He did not like to abandon the be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law : NO
house wherein he and his wife were then living. Furthermore, he had no inclination to leave
because he has many plants and improvements on the land which he was then farming in RATIO:
said municipality of Siruma, Camarines Sur, a town very far from the place of his in-laws The contentions of the accused are manifestly untenable and incorrect.
where his wife desired their family to transfer to. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that criminal liability shall be
On June 23, 1977, at about 7:00 in the morning, the accused left his home to work on his incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be
farm. Upon his return at about 9:00 that same morning, he found his wife and his three-month different from that which he intended and that the accused is liable for all the
old baby already gone. He proceeded to look for both of them and sometime later on, on a consequences of his felonious acts.
trail about two hundred (200) meters from their home, he finally saw his wife carrying his infant The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code which
son and bringing a bundle of clothes. He asked and pleaded with his wife that she should prescribes graduated penalties for the corresponding physical injuries committed is entirely
return home with their child but she adamantly refused to do so. When appellant sought to misplaced and irrelevant considering that in this case the victim died very soon after she was
take the child from his wife, the latter threw the baby on the grassy portion of the trail hereby assaulted. It will be, therefore, illogical to consider appellant's acts as falling within the scope
causing the latter to cry. of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime committed is parricide no less.
This conduct of his wife aroused the fire of the herein accused. Incensed with wrath and his The court is in complete accord with and sustains the ruling made by the courts below that
anger beyond control, appellant picked up a piece of wood nearby and started hitting his wife the accused is not entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
with it until she fell to the ground complaining of severe pains on her chest. Realizing what he The court holds that the fact that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict
had done, the accused picked his wife in his arms and brought her to their home. He then physical injuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting and more serious crime
returned to the place where the child was thrown and he likewise took this infant home. Soon committed.
thereafter, Magdalena de los Santos died despite the efforts of her husband to alleviate her The appellant is only entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit
pains. so grave a wrong. The penalty imposed on the herein accused is therefore correct in the
After the accused changed the dress of his wife, he reported the tragic incident to the light of the relevant provisions of law and jurisprudence.
Barangay Captain of their place who brought him to Policeman Arellosa to whom the accused The trial court in its consideration of this case had added a recommendation that "executive
surrendered. He also brought with him the piece of wood he used in beating his wife. clemency be extended to the accused-appellant after his service of the minimum of the
Charged with the crime of parricide, the accused pleaded not guilty to the said offense. medium penalty of prision mayor. " This Court is constrained to take note that the accused-
However, his counsel manifested to the court that after his conference with the accused, the appellant is said to have been in detention since June 23, 1977 or for more than seven years
latter expressed a desire to change his previous plea of not guilty to that of guilty. already. This Court can do no less than express its hope that the accused-appellant can be
Accordingly, and upon motion by the counsel of the accused and without objection on the part now extended an absolute or conditional pardon by the President of the Republic of the
of the prosecution, the trial court allowed the accused to withdraw his original plea. Upon Philippines or that there be a commutation of his sentence so that he may qualify and be
being re-arraigned, the accused entered a plea of guilty. eligible for parole.

TRIAL COURT DISPOSITIVE: The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed without any pronouncement as to costs.
After the accused had testified and upon his plea given in open court, the court below found
him guilty of the crime of parricide, but with three mitigating circumstances in his favor,
namely: voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and that he acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation.
With the imposition by the court below of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the herein
accused and the subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration of the judgment rendered
against him, the accused through his counsel filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
Appellant submits that the penalty for the felony committed by him which is parricide being
higher than that for the offense which he intended to commit, and which he avers to be that
of physical injuries only, the provisions of Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code which relate
to the application of penalties should have been observed and followed by the trial court.
Appellant argues in his appeal brief submitted to this Court, that:
xxx xxx xxx
"The felony actually committed, parricide, has a higher penalty (reclusion perpetua
to death) than the felony intended, qualified physical injuries (reclusion temporal
medium and maximum). Hence, since the penalty corresponding to the felony
December 19, 1933 RATIO:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y The court cannot entertain the appellant's contention that he acted in legitimate self-defense
SANCHEZ, defendant-appellant. inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the aggression by whipping out and brandishing
Avancea, C.J. his penknife.
Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code is a reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and has
NATURE: The judgment appealed from finds the appellant Gines Alburquerque guilty of the crime of been interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime committed befalls a different
homicide committed on the person of Manuel Osma person which is not the case herein.
The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in article
FACTS: 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal.
One of the appellants daughters named Pilar became acquainted and had intimate relations In view of the concurrence therein of three mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
later with the deceased Manuel Osma. circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree, that is prision mayor, should be imposed.
The relations between Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a child. The
appellant did not know that his daughter's relations with the deceased had gone to such DISPOSITIVE: Pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer
extremes, that he had to be deceived with the information that she had gone to her godfather's the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year of prision correccional to eight (8) years and one (1) day
house in Singalong, when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital for delivery. of prision mayor, af rming the judgment appealed from in all other respects, with the costs.
The appellant learned the truth only when Pilar returned home with her child.
Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he had appeared
sad and worried not only because of the dishonor it brought upon his family but also because
the child meant an added burden to Maria upon whom they all depended for support.
For some time, the appellant wrote letters, that at times were hostile and threatening and at
other times entreating the deceased to legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying her, or at
least, to support her and his child. Although the deceased agreed to give the child a monthly
allowance by way of support, he never complied with his promise.
The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office where the
deceased worked and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both went
downstairs. What happened later, nobody witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that
occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the deceased, causing his
death.
The court infers from the testimony of the appellant that he proposed to said deceased to
marry his daughter and that, upon hearing that the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his
penknife. Upon seeing the appellant's attitude, the deceased tried to seize him by the neck
whereupon the said appellant stabbed him on the face with the said penknife. Due to his lack
of control of the movement of his arm, the weapon landed on the base of the neck of the
deceased.

TRIAL COURT:
The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death
of the deceased. The court finds that this conclusion is supported b y the evidence.
In his testimony the appellant emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound that
would leave a permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that would compel him to
remain in the hospital for a week or two but never intended to kill him, because then it would
frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or, at least, support his daughter.
The appellant had stated this intention in some of his letters to the deceased by way of a
threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the bene t of his daughter.
That the act of the appellant is stabbing the deceased resulted in the fatal wound at the base
of his neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore mentioned that appellant did not have
control of his right arm on account of paralysis and the blow, although intended for the face,
landed at the base of the neck.
Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the
death of the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be taken into
consideration in favor of the appellant.

ISSUES & HOLDING:


1. Whether or not the defendant-appellant acted in self-defense : NO
2. Whether or not Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which refers to cases where the crime
committed is different from that intended by the accused, should be applied herein : NO
May 31, 1960 RATIO:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLIMACO DEMIAR, defendant-appellant. Appellant's behavior, is evidently incompatible with his protestations of innocence.
Barrera, J. As correctly observed by the trial court:
"If it is true that the accused did not choke his mother, there was certainly no
NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu convicting appellant Climaco necessity for him to induce hi sister Santas Demiar to just declare that their mother
Demiar of the crime of parricide. died of illness. This letter, in effect, bolsters the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution that the accused, in truth and in fact, choked his mother on the
FACTS: afternoon in question."
Appellant who was a gambler, accompanied by her wife, went to the market place in barrio Appellant's claim that the charge against him is false, malicious, and concocted by his sister
Tambongon, Cebu. returned shortly before sunset and, finding that his mother, Pilar Edao, Santas and her husband Lope Mayol, who allegedly bore a grudge against him, because of
had not prepared any food, reprimanded her. The latter explained that she was not able to his opposition to his proposal to mortgage the land of their mother, does not deserve any
cook their food, because she had been very busy grinding corn. serious consideration.
Appellant thereupon became angry and began to choke his mother, making her and her It is also contended for appellant that the trial court erred in admitting appellant's letter to his
daughter scream. The screams and shouts attracted the attention of Trifona Demiar who was brother-in-law Lope and that there is nothing in the letter which would show that appellant
living in a house nearby, about 30 yards away. Trifona immediately went to the house of her admitted his guilt. But if appellant therein asked forgiveness from his sisters and begged them
mother, whereupon she saw her brother, appellant herein, choking their mother Pilar Edao, to discontinue the case against him, and tried to induce them to testify that their mother died
near the stove in the kitchen. She then and there told appellant to release their mother. of natural illness and not of strangulation, we fail to see why said statements could not be
Appellant did as he was told and went upstairs. taken as an admission of appellant's guilt.
Meliton Magdadaro, barrio lieutenant of Tambongon, whose house was only about 15 yards As to the argument that said letter should have been considered in appellant's favor, it may
from that of Pilar Edao, was also attracted by the shouts for help and the commotion in the be stated that self-serving statements made extra-judicially cannot be admitted as
house of the latter. He immediately went to said house, and inquired what the commotion was evidence in favor of the person making them, although the incriminating statement is
all about. evidence against him.
After the choking by appellant, Pilar Edao could no longer swallow any food, nor drink water, It is argued that the trial court should have given credence to the defense version that the
due to her swollen neck. Her physical condition deteriorated, until she died 3 days after the deceased was a sick woman, suffering from high blood pressure, which may have caused
incident. Trifona Demiar tried to call a doctor, but appellant prevented her from doing so, her death. But, as already stated, there is direct and positive, fully-corroborated
threatening her with death, if she ever called a doctor. testimony, that before the choking incident, the deceased Pilar Edao was enjoying
During the investigation, appellant denied having choked his. He claimed that he only held normal health. That after appellant choked her, she became seriously ill; that from the time
her shoulder, and she fell to the floor; that on that occasion, he tried to tell his mother to keep she was strangled, she could not swallow food or drink water; and that she died 3 days later,
quiet, as he was then quarreling with his wife. Appellant's wife, however, when questioned by without recovering from the effects of the strangulation.
the chief of police in the presence of appellant, admitted that her husband (appellant) choked From these facts, it is safe to conclude, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the
his mother. deceased's death was the direct and natural consequence of the injuries infliicted on
Likewise, during the investigation, appellant cried and asked for forgiveness from his sisters her by appellant.
and begged them to discontinue the case against him. He sent a letter to his brother-in-law, Considering that appellant had choked the deceased, thereby inflicting injuries upon her, he
Lope Mayol, husband of Santas Demiar, asking him, among other things, for forgiveness and is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal act, the death of said deceased, which
pity, and requesting his sisters to withdraw the complaint against him. resulted as a consequence of such injuries. Well-settled is the rule that a person is
On the witness stand, appellant denied that he choked his mother, Pilar Edao, the deceased, responsible for the direct, natural, and logical consequences of his criminal or unlawful
and stated that she died of ill-health and high-blood pressure. His version, corroborated by acts.
his brother and two sisters. The crime committed by appellant is parricide (Art. 246, Revised Penal Code), the deceased
victim of his criminal act being his legitimate mother, which crime is punishable with reclusin
TRIAL COURT: perpetua to death. As correctly held by the trial court, appellant is entitled to the mitigating
Appellant's claim that his mother's death was due to natural sickness and that she died of circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. We do not agree, however,
high blood pressure, cannot be sustained in the face of the direct and positive testimonies of that the mitigating circumstance of obfuscation, or a circumstance of analogous nature should
Pacita Catanda, the 12-year old grandchild of the deceased, who actually saw the choking of be considered in his favor. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the failure of appellant's
her grandmother. But apart from Pacita Catanda's testimony, there is the testimony of Trifona deceased mother to prepare food for him while he was away gambling, leaving her at
Demiar, appellant's sister, who also saw appellant choke their mother. home to do the household chores for him, gave him no justification to lose his temper
The defense, however, contends that the trial court erred in relying upon the allegedly and strangle her to death.
unreliable testimonies of Catanda and Demiar. Appellant points to an apparent contradiction The penalty imposed by the trial court is, therefore, modified to that of reclusin perpetua,
of Catanda's testimony, who, on cross-examination, stated that she did not see appellant in which we hereby impose on appellant.
her grandmother's house, while on direct examination she said that she saw appellant choke
her grandmother in the latter's house. Suffice it to say, that the trial court, which observed DISPOSITIVE: Modified as above indicated, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed, in all
and sized up said witness, gave credence to her testimony, not only because it is respects, with costs against the defendant appellant Climaco Demiar.
rational, but also because it is intelligible as well.

ISSUES & HOLDING:


1. Whether or not the trial court should have considered appellants letter to his brother-in-law
in his favor, because he disclaimed therein his guilt : NO
2. Whether or not trial court erred in convicting appellant of the crime of parricide in the absence
of evidence that the cause of the deceased's death was the result of strangulation; that no
expert witness was presented to testify on the cause of her death; and that possibly the
deceased had died of another cause and not due to the act of appellant. : NO
July 24, 1997 Ortega, Jr. likewise corroborated the testimony of Appellant Garcia. According to him, He
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE, MANUEL went behind the house where he saw the victim peeping through the room of his sister Raquel.
GARCIA y RIVERA and JOHN DOE, accused, BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE and MANUEL He ignored the victim and continued urinating. After he was through, the victim approached
GARCIA y RIVERA, accused-appellants. him and asked where his sister was. He answered that he did not know.
Panganiban, J. Without warning, the victim allegedly boxed him in the mouth, an attack that induced bleeding
and caused him to fall on his back. When he was about to stand up, the victim drew a knife
NATURE: Joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia from the and stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm, thereby immobilizing him.
Decision, written by Judge Osorio, finding them guilty of murder. Unable to move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came and, to avoid being stabbed,
grabbed the victims right hand which was holding the knife. Quitlong was able to wrest the
FACTS: knife from the victim and, with it, he stabbed the victim ten (10) times successively. When the
Appellants were charged by State Prosecutor Bernardo S. Razon in an Information, which stabbing started, Ortega moved to the left side of the victim to avoid being hit. Quitlong chased
reads: the victim who ran towards the direction of the well. Thereafter, Ortega went home and treated
"That on or about October 17, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the his injured left armpit and lips. Then, he slept.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, without any justi able cause, with treachery and evident TRIAL COURT:
premeditation and with abuse of superior strenght (sic) and with deliberate intent to kill, did The Court is convinced that the concerted acts of accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a Garcia, Jr. and one Romeo Ortega in lifting, carrying and dumping the victim Andre Mar
pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y Masangkay who was still alive and breathing inside the deep well filled with water, head first
ABLOLA, thereby in infliicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which directly caused and threw big stones/rocks inside the well to cover the victim is a clear indication of the
his death." community of design to finish/kill victim Andre Mar Masangkay. Wounded and unarmed
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, pleaded not guilty to the charge. victim Andre Mar Masangkay was in no position to flee and/or defend himself against the
three malefactors. Conspiracy and the taking advantage of superior strength were in
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION: attendance. The crime committed by the accused is Murder. Concert of action at the moment
Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel of consummating the crime and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered to the
Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a drinking spree in the compound person inflicting the fatal wound may determine complicity where it would not otherwise be
near the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal, Dalandanan, Valenzuela. evidence.
That while they were drinking, accused Ortega, Jr. and Garcia who were [already] drunk
arrived and joined them. Victim answered the call of nature and went to the back portion of ISSUES & HOLDING:
the house. Accused Ortega, Jr. followed him and later they heard the victim Andre Mar 1. Whether or not the Benjamin Ortega Jr. is guilty only of homicide alone. : YES
shouted, 'Don't, help me!' (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) 2. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Manuel Garcia and in not acquitting the latter
Quitlong and Caranto ran towards the back portion of the house and [they] saw accused of the crime charged : YES
Ortega, on top of the victim who was lying down in a canal with his face up and stabbing the
latter with a long bladed weapon. What are the criminal liabilities, if any, of Appellants Ortega and Garcia?
Romeo Ortega went to the place of the stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia lifted the victim from the canal and brought Andre Mar to the well and dropped RATIO:
the latter inside the well. They then dropped stones measuring 11 to 12 inches high, 2 feet in The court finds the appeal partly meritorious.
length and 11 to 12 inches in weight to the body of the victim inside the well.
Upon reaching home, his conscience bothered him and he told his mother what he witnessed. LIABILITY OF APPELANT ORTEGA:
That he went to the residence of Col. Leonardo Orig and reported the matter. That Col. Orig The court has meticulously scoured the records and found no reason to reverse the trial
accompanied him to the Valenzuela Police Station and some police officers went with them court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies insofar as
to the crime scene. That accused, Ortega and Garcia were apprehended and were brought Appellant Ortega is concerned. The narration of Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to
to the police station. be spontaneous and consistent. It is straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus it clearly
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat substantially testified that he conducted [an] deserves full credence.
autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. There were 13 stab wounds. That the contused abrasion On the other hand, in asserting alibi and denial, the defense bordered the unbelievable.
could be produced by cord or wire or rope. That the large airway is filled with muddy particles Appellant Ortega claimed that after he was able to free himself from 'Masangkay's grip, he
indicating that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles. The heart is went home, treated his injuries and slept. This is not the ordinary reaction of a person
filled with multiple hemorrhage, loss of blood or decreased of blood. The lungs are filled with assaulted. Likewise, it is difficult to believe that a man would just sleep after someone was
water or muddy particles. The brain is pale due to loss of blood. The stomach is one half filled stabbed in his own backyard. Further, we deem it incredible that Diosdado Quitlong would
with muddy particles which could [have been] taken in when submerged in water. stab Masangkay ten (10) times successively, completely ignoring Benjamin Ortega Jr. who
was grappling with Masangkay. Also inconsistent with human experience is his narration that
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE: Masangkay persisted in choking him instead of defending himself from the alleged successive
Appellant Garcia testifyed that in the early morning of October 15, 1992, he and his wife, stabbing of Quitlong. The natural tendency of a person under attack is to defend himself and
Maritess Garcia, brought their feverish daughter, Marjorie, to the Polo Emergency Hospital. not to persist in choking a defenseless third person.
That after drinking beer, He and Ortega left at eight o' clock in the evening and headed home.
En route, they chanced on Quitlong the victim, who invited them to join their own drinking MURDER OR HOMICIDE?
spree. Although treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were alleged in the
To alleviate his daughter's illness, he fetched his mother-in-law who performed a ritual called information, the trial court found the presence only of abuse of superior strength. The court
"tawas." After the ritual, he remained at home and attended to his sick daughter. He then fell disagrees with the trial court's finding. Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate
asleep but was awakened by police of cers at six o'clock in the morning of the following day. intent on the part of the accused to take advantage of such superiority. It must be
Maritess Garcia substantially corroborated the testimony of her husband. shown that the accused purposely used excessive force that was manifestly out of
proportion to the means available to the victim's defense. In this light, it is necessary to
evaluate not only the physical condition and weapon of the protagonists but also the various September 27, 2006
incidents of the event. ARTEMIO YADAO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-footer, whereas Appellant Ortega, Jr. was CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
only five feet and five inches tall. There was no testimony as to how the attack was initiated.
The accused and the victim were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the NATURE: Petitioner Artemio Yadao (Yadao) prays for the reversal of the decision finding him "guilty
foregoing testimony and circumstances can be interpreted as abuse of superior beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide for the death of Deogracias Gundran (Gundran),
strength. Hence, Ortega is liable only for homicide, not murder.
FACTS:
LIABILITY OF MANUEL GARCIA On 21 April 1989, petitioner Yadao was charged with the crime of homicide for allegedly
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Quitlong stated, "Nilubayan lang nang saksak nang mapatay mauling one Deogracias Gundran.
na si Andrew ni Benjamin Ortega, Jr." Thus, the prosecution evidence shows Masangkay was It was petitioner Yadao's birthday and he had a few guests over at his house to help him
already "dead" when he was lifted and dumped into the well. Hence, Garcia could be held celebrate it. Petitioner Yadao noticed the victim, Gundran, albeit not invited, to be milling
liable only as an accessory. around with the guests and was already drinking gin. While petitioner Yadao was sitting on
The court does not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal one end of a bench, the victim, who happened to be lying down on the other end of the same
Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by "any person committing a felony (delito) bench, suddenly stood up. Because no one else was sitting on the middle, said bench tilted
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." due to the weight of petitioner Yadao, thus, causing him to fall to the ground.
The essential requisites for the application of this provision are: Upon seeing him fall to the ground, the victim went over to petitioner Yadao and began boxing
(1) The intended act is felonious; him on the stomach. Petitioner Yadao's wife tried to pacify her nephew but this merely
(2) The resulting act is likewise a felony; and enraged the latter who then got a can opener and tried to stab petitioner Yadao with it.
(3) The unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor's The latter deflected said attempt and delivered a slap on the face of the victim in order to
wrongful acts. "knock some sense" into him. But because he was already intoxicated, as he had been
In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to the well, Appellant Garcia drinking since early that morning, the victim lost his balance, hit his head on the edge of a
was committing a felony. The offense was that of concealing the body of the crime to prevent table and fell to the ground landing on his behind. The other guest helped the victim to stand
its discovery, i.e., that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide. Although Appellant up and proceeded to show him to the door.
Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was still alive when he assisted Ortega in The victim, Gundran, left the house of petitioner Yadao, and proceeded to the house of
throwing the body into the well, he is still liable for the direct and natural consequence of his Carmelita Limon. Upon seeing him, Limon noticed a one-inch in diameter lump on the victim's
felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse than that intended. forehead. The victim told her that he came from the birthday party of petitioner Yadao and
The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that Appellant that the latter "mauled" him. While she treated the "wound" with "kutsay," an herb, the victim
Garcia had intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter intentionem covered by Article 4, par. complained of pain on his breast/stomach area, the area where he claimed to have been hit
1, of the Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a person may be convicted of by petitioner Yadao.
homicide although he had no original intent to kill. Two days later, Teofilo Gundran, the father of the victim was informed by his granddaughter
In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held liable as principal in the that his son, the victim, was having difficulty breathing. Teofilo Gundran then proceeded to
crime of homicide, there are, however, two legal obstacles barring his conviction, even as an where the victim was. When he got to the house, Teofilo Gundran saw the victim sitting on an
accessory as prayed for by appellants' counsel himself. "arinola" gasping for breath. He then held the victim's two hands until the latter expired.
(1) Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an
information that charges murder by means of stabbing. His responsibility AUTOPSY REPORT OF DR. ALAMBRA
relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting That fibrocaseous meant that half of the victim's lungs, the right one in particular, was already
drowning of the victim. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an gone; that she was only told that the victim had been mauled and that the latter became weak
accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged thereafter; that although a hematoma was present on the victim's forehead, she did not
in the complaint or information. consider it as the cause of death as hematoma alone will not cause the death of a person
(2) Garcia can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact de ned under especially seven to eight days later; and, that when she opened the skull of the victim to study
Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that the latter's brain, she did not see anything unusual.
Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega, the latter's sister, Dr. Alambra then confirmed that the cause of death of the victim was cardio-respiratory arrest
Maritess, being his wife. Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from due to pulmonary tuberculosis that was already so far advanced with massive pleural
criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code. adhesions. On cross, however, she stated that a person with only one lung left, with proper
Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of the principal accused, medication, would still be able to live normally.
Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally entitled to the aforequoted exempting
provision of the Revised Penal Code. This Court is thus mandated by law to AUTOPSY REPORT OF DR. LLAVORE
acquit him. Dr. Llavore testified that the cause of death of the victim was the collective effect of all the
injuries sustained by the latter on the head. He explained that the forces that could have
PENALTY: caused the injuries to the victim's head were also the same forces that could have caused the
edema or swelling of the victim's brain. He illustrated further that a human fist applied with
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
"sufficient" force on the fronto-temporo- parietal region of the head could cause an injury the
which is imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, same as that sustained by the victim on his forehead.
as in the case of Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Similarly, the injury found at the back of the head of the victim could have been caused by an
Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be one degree lower, that is, prision mayor. edge of a palm applied with sufficient force or it could have been caused by hitting his head
on the edge of a table as the shape of said injury is somewhat elongated.
DISPOSITIVE: The joint appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant Benjamin Ortega, Jr. is found GUILTY On cross examination, Dr. Llavore admitted that he did the re-autopsy seven (7) days after
of homicide and sentenced to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) the victim died but that his Autopsy Report failed to indicate that the cadaver had previously
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. Appellant Ortega, been autopsied by another physician; that the blow inflicted on the head of the victim was
Jr. is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity and P31,790.00 as actual strong enough to have injured the "moorings" of the brain causing the destruction of the brain
damages. Appellant Manuel Garcia is ACQUITTED.
cells and the shifting of the fluid in the skull to one side; that the most serious wound between accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted. The overriding
the two injuries sustained by the victim on the head is the one found on his right forehead; consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it
and that the process of swelling became irreversible when the compression of the brain had entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 48 If there exist even one iota of doubt, this
caused its center to become "imbalanced," so that the victim's brain ceased to function. Court is "under a long standing legal injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-
petitioner."
TRIAL COURT: From the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that the guilt of petitioner Yadao has not been
The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner Yadao guilty of the crime of homicide proved beyond reasonable doubt. The facts of the case, the autopsy reports, as well as the
The court is inclined to give more weight on the testimony of Dr. Llavore testimony of Dr. Llavore do not definitely establish that the assault was the proximate cause
of the death of the victim.
APPELLATE COURT: Even assuming for the sake of argument that the blow inflicted on the head of the victim
Appealed the trial courts decision resulted in an edematous condition of the brain, petitioner Yadao would still not be held liable
for the death as the prosecution failed to present proof that said act was the efficient and
ISSUE: proximate cause of the victim's demise. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner Yadao beyond even though the accused's innocence may be doubted. It is better to free a guilty man than
reasonable doubt on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, especially Dr. to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of
Llavore's, and documentary evidence presented, i.e., the Dr. Llavore's Autopsy Report evidence. For only when there is proof beyond any shadow of doubt that those responsible
should be made answerable.
HELD: NO Though petitioner Yadao is acquitted, nonetheless, his liability for damages is not considered
extinguished since the judgment of acquittal is not based on a pronouncement that the facts
RATIO: from which civil claims might arise did not exist. Accordingly, this Court awards P50,000.00
The elements of homicide are as follows: as civil damages to the heirs of the victim.
(1) A person was killed;
(2) The accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; DISPOSITIVE: Decision of the RTC and the resolution of the Court of Appelas are hereby
(3) The accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Artemio Yadao is ACQUITTED of the charge of homicide
(4) The killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that on the ground of reasonable doubt.
of parricide or infanticide.
The Constitution demands that every accused be presumed innocent until the charge is
proved. Before an accused can be convicted of any criminal act, his guilt must first be proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
Basic is the principle in criminal law that the evidence presented must be sufficient to prove
the corpus delicti the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to
the fact that a crime has been actually committed. The corpus delicti is a compound fact
composed of two things:
(1) the existence of a certain act or a result forming the basis of the criminal charge;
(2) The existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result.
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the body or substance
of the crime. In the case at bar, was the prosecution able to prove the two components of the
corpus delicti? No.
The prosecution nonetheless failed to show the nexus between the injury sustained by the
victim and his death. It failed to discharge the burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the death of the victim resulted from the use of violent and criminal means by petitioner Yadao.
The fact that the victim herein was wounded is not conclusive that death resulted therefrom.
To make an offender liable for the death of the victim, it must be proven that the death is the
natural consequence of the physical injuries inflicted. If the physical injury is not the proximate
cause of death of the victim, then the offender cannot be held liable for such death.
Dr.Llavores testimony, as well as the Autopsy Report containing his findings, vis--vis the
first autopsy conducted by Dr. Alambra and the factual circumstances surrounding the
conduct of two autopsies done on said cadaver, do not engender a moral certainty, much less
a belief, that the injury sustained was the cause of his death.
The embalming may alter the gross appearance of the tissues or may result to a wide variety
of artifacts that tend to destroy or obscure evidence.

Conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not merely on
conjectures or suppositions, and certainly not on the weakness of the accused's defense;
otherwise, the phrase "constitutional presumption of innocence" will be reduced to nothing
but an innocuous grouping of words; worse, to a conspicuous exercise in futility.
The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction,
accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The proof against him must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. If the
evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the
October 21, 1992 The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
PHILIPPINES, respondents. petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
Campos, Jr., J. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the
NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder. makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
FACTS: The factual situation in the case at bar presents physical impossibility which rendered the
Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Palangpangan's house. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act
the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case, all circumstances which prevented the
that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will
especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for
an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner contends that, DISPOSITIVE: The petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. WE hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an
bullets made the crime inherently impossible. impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory
attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a
cause or accident other than petitioner's and his co-accused's own spontaneous
desistance. Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been
for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible.

TRIAL COURT:
The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder.

APPELATE COURT:
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's decision. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of attempted murder

HELD: NO

RATIO:
The RPC, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, and
now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out
with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against
property. The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies.
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
persons or property because:
(1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or
(2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment.
There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example
is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.
July 13, 2009 RATIO:
GEMMA T. JACINTO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements
Peralta, J. of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the
Revised Penal Code:
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari led by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the (1) the taking of personal property
Decisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, (2) said property belonged to another
and its Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. (3) the taking was done with intent to gain
(4) it was done without the owner's consent
FACTS: (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and nor of force upon things
Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence
Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the RPC, the personal
Isabelita Aquino Milabo handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is
P10,000.00. The check was payment for Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides
petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the
sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam. same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the
Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from one of question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced. The Court must
their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. Said customer had apparently been instructed by resolve the issue in the negative.
Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Ricablanca Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored. ineffectual.
Valencia instructed Ricablanca to ask Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which
told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of
Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advice of Mega unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
Foams accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco. enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face
Thereafter, Dyhengco talked to Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
Aquino further testified that, petitioner also called her on tine phone to tell her that the BDO prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out
check bounced. Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam
subject check to Mega Foam. However, Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the dishonored check. The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment.
in his bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
unknown woman arrived at his house to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
in exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.
her address. When he was informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for
disregarded it as he didn't know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check. the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified
Dyhengco led a Complaint, with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was
an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of
were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement
to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan. should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen
fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that proof of her intent to gain. Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the
petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI led a criminal case for qualified dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent
theft. scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by the
allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused;
TRIAL COURT: otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent
The RTC finds the accused Jacinto, Valencia, and Capitle guilty beyond reasonable doubt of scheme could have been another possible source of criminal liability.
the crime of qualified theft
DISPOSITIVE: The petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an
APPELLATE COURT: IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal
CA modified the RTCs decision, in that: (1) The sentence against accused Jacinto stands; Code, respectively.
(2) The sentence against accused Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium;
and (3) The accused Capitle is acquitted.

ISSUES & HOLDING:


1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information: NO
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft : NO
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt : NO
October 19, 2011 petitioner did not raise anything substantial to merit the reversal of our finding of guilt. To
ROMARICO J. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. reiterate, the petitioner's conviction was based on his admission that he failed to remit his
Brion, J. employees' contribution to the SSS.

NATURE: Motion for reconsideration filed by Petitioner seeking the reversal of the Supreme Courts THE PETITIONER CANNOT BENE T FROM THE TERMS OF RA NO. 9903, WHICH CONDONE ONLY
decision. The Decision affirmed the petitioner's conviction for his failure to remit the Social Security EMPLOYERS WHO PAY THEIR DELINQUENCIES WITHIN SIX MONTHS FROM THE LAW'S
Service (SSS) contributions of his employees. The petitioner anchors the present motion on his EFFECTIVITY
supposed inclusion within the coverage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9903 or the Social Security The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers with delinquent
Condonation Law of 2009, whose passage the petitioner claims to be a supervening event in his case. contributions or pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies within
He further invokes the equal protection clause in support of his motion. the six (6)- month period set by the law. Mere payment of unpaid contributions does not
suffice; it is payment within, and only within, the six (6)-month availment period that triggers
FACTS: the applicability of RA No. 9903.
The Supreme Court affirmed with modification the degree of conviction issued by both the
trial and appellate courts for the petitioner's violation of Section 22 (a) and (d), in relation to The court cannot grant the petitioner's prayer to impose a fine in lieu of imprisonment; neither
Section 28 of RA No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997. T RA No. 8282 nor RA No. 9903 authorizes the Court to exercise this option.
To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that the petitioner readily admitted during On the matter of equal protection, the court stated in Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, et
trial that he did not remit the SSS premium contributions of his employees at Summa Alta al. that the guarantee simply means "that no person or class of persons shall be denied the
Tierra Industries, Inc. from August 1998 to July 1999, in the amount of P239,756.80; inclusive same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
of penalties, this unremitted amount totaled to P421,151.09. The petitioner's explanation for place and in like circumstances."
his failure to remit, which the trial court disbelieved, was that during this period, Summa Alta
Tierra Industries, Inc. shut down as a result of the general decline in the economy. The THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A WAIVER OF HIS ACCRUED PENALTIES
petitioner pleaded good faith and lack of criminal intent as his defenses. The one bene t the petitioner can obtain from RA No. 9903 is the waiver of his accrued
The court ruled that the decree of conviction was founded on proof beyond reasonable doubt, penalties, which remain unpaid in the amount of P181,394.29. This waiver is derived from the
based on the following considerations: first, the remittance of employee contributions to the last proviso of Section 4 of RA No. 9903. This proviso is applicable to the petitioner who
SSS is mandatory under RA No. 8282; and second, the failure to comply with a special law settled his contributions long before the passage of the law. Applied to the petitioner,
being malum prohibitum, the defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent are immaterial. therefore, RA No. 9903 only works to allow a waiver of his accrued penalties, but not the
The petitioner further argued that since he was designated in the Information as a "proprietor," reversal of his conviction.
he was without criminal liability since "proprietors" are not among the corporate officers
specifically enumerated in Section 28 (f) of RA No. 8282 to be criminally liable for the violation REFERRAL TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE FOR POSSIBLE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
of its provisions. The court rejected this argument based on our ruling in Garcia v. Social Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, 12 the courts are bound to apply the law as it is
Security Commission Legal and Collection. The court ruled that to sustain the petitioner's and impose the proper penalty, no matter how harsh it might be. The same provision,
argument would be to allow the unscrupulous to conveniently escape liability merely through however, gives the Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems
the creative use of managerial titles. appropriate but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive.
In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioner points out that pending his appeal
with the Court of Appeals (CA), he voluntarily paid the SSS the amount of P239,756.80 to DISPOSITIVE: Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, the courts are bound to apply the law as it is
settle his delinquency. Note that the petitioner also gave notice of this payment to the CA via and impose the proper penalty, no matter how harsh it might be. The same provision, however, gives
a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for New Trial. Although the People did not contest the Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its
the fact of voluntary payment, the CA nevertheless denied the said motions. power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. In light of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
9903, the petitioner's liability for accrued penalties is considered WAIVED. Considering the
THE PRESENT MR RESTS ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS: circumstances of the case, the Court transmits the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department
First. On January 7, 2010, during the pendency of the petitioner's case before the Court, then of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed RA No. 9903 into law. RA No. 9903 mandates the
effective withdrawal of all pending cases against employers who would remit their delinquent
contributions to the SSS within a specified period, viz., within six months after the law's
effectivity. The petitioner claims that in view of RA No. 9903 and its implementing rules, the
settlement of his delinquent contributions in 2007 entitles him to an acquittal. He invokes the
equal protection clause in support of his plea.
Second. The petitioner alternatively prays that should the Court find his above argument
wanting, he should still be acquitted since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of
the crime charged.
Third. The petitioner prays that a fine be imposed, not imprisonment, should he be found
guilty.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition should be acquitted

HELD: NO.

RATIO:
THE PETITIONER'S LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME IS A SETTLED MATTER
The court rejects the petitioner's claim that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of
the crime charged. This is a matter that has been resolved in the courts Decision, and the