commentary
The Left and the Third Front
Pritam Singh
Even though the third front
has had a fluctuating history,
the common opposition to the
centralising idea of nationalism
espoused by both the Congress
and the Bharatiya Janata Party
provides the ground for the
coming together of left, regional
and lower caste political forces.
For this to happen, all three will
have to imaginatively rework
their programmatic positions to
accommodate the aspirations of
the others. While there are many
hurdles to this, such a front is
essential if the stranglehold of the
parties representing Indian big
capital has to be broken and space
created for long-term success of
progressive politics.
This is a substantially revised and updated
version of an article “The Political Economy of
the Third Front in India” that was published in
Contemporary South Asia (December 2008).
Pritam Singh (psingh@brookes.ac.uk) is at
Oxford Brookes University Business School,
United Kingdom, and is currently a visiting
fellow at Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi.
8 march 21, 2009  vol xliv no 12  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
I
n the last decade and a half, the pro-
posal for a “third front” politics in India
has gone through cycles ranging from
mere theoretical speculation to concrete
possibility. After the 22 July 2008 no-
confidence vote victory in the Lok Sabha
by the Congress-led United Progressive
Alliance (UPA), political discussions about
the composition and feasibility of a possi-
ble third front returned to the top of the
political landscape in India. The coming
15th general election has added further
ur­gency to the exploration of a possible
alter­native to both the UPA and the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Nati­
onal Democratic Alliance (NDA). The left
parties have played a key role in not
only triggering the July no-confidence
vote by withdrawing support to the UPA
on the controversial Indo-US nuclear
deal but also in forging the new third
front alliance.
This alliance of left parties, some re-
gional parties and the Bahujan Samaj
Party (BSP) has managed to evoke an im-
aginative new national possibility that
combines the class egalitarianism of the
left, the devolutionary perspective of the
regional parties and the caste egalitarian-
ism of BSP politics. The previous third
front attempts, with or without the left,
were generally combinations of regional
parties representing either regional na-
tionalisms or middle castes. With Uttar
Pradesh’s (UP) main middle caste party
(Samajwadi Party) ditching the previously
formed third front and opting to support
the UPA government during the no-
confidence vote, the new third front, with
prominence given to the BSP (which of
course has not formally joined the front
but has expressed its interest in working
together with the alliance), appears to be
more egalitarian and compatible with the
left’s vision. The Samajwadi Party’s short-
term, and certainly opportunistic, alli-
ance with the Congress during the July
2008 no-confidence vote has now almost
collap­sed on the question of seat sharing
for the coming Lok Sabha elections in UP.
Class, Caste and Nation
The central question facing any third front
alternative is the need to define its identity,
distinctly different from the long-term
v­isions of both the Congress and the BJP.
How can we theorise the long-term visions
of Congress and BJP politics? There are
three key aspects that are central to under­
standing the political visions of these two
main political parties in India: (a) the con-
ception of India as a nation, (b) the place of
class and caste in the political perspectives
of these parties, and (c) the class/caste com­
position of their leadership and social base.
Their conception of India as a nation
has implications for their political ap-
proaches to the regional parties, especial-
ly those that are articulators of regional
nationalism. Their perspective on class
has implications for their relationship with
the left parties, and their caste perspec-
tives and the caste composition of their
leadership and social base have implica-
tions for relationships with the parties
representing middle and lower castes.
Regarding the conception of India as a
nation, both the Congress and the BJP vi-
sions represent two versions of the same
perspective on Indian nationalism. Both
stand for one unified Indian nationalism
in opposition to the vision of multiple na-
tionalisms that is articulated by some of
the region-specific parties. Both stand for
strengthening the centre and the forces of
centralisation against the regions and
against the forces of decentralisation. One
(the Congress) represents the secular/
semi-secular, and the other (the BJP) rep-
resents the Hindu version of the perspec-
tive of one unified Indian nationalism
built through a strong centre.1
In terms of class perspectives, both the
Congress and the BJP support the vision of
Indian big capital whose class interests de-
mand a unified Indian market without the
various administrative, legal and financial
hurdles created by provincial boundaries.
There is a small-trader/petty bourgeois
segment that has some pressure group
power in the BJP and, therefore, a more vis-
ible presence in the political calculations of

the BJP at a local level than in the Congress.
However, this segment has a marginalised
role in shaping and influencing the overall
class orientation of the BJP, which is over-
whelmingly in favour of big capital.
In the Congress Party, historically there
has been a segment of political activists
and leaders who articulated the reformist
aspirations of industrial labour. That seg-
ment has become increasingly marginal-
ised and is now totally ineffective in shap-
ing the politico-economic vision of the
Congress Party. The party has now be-
come an unambiguous champion of the
interests of big Indian capital. There is
certainly the influence of international
capital on the economic agenda that is
articulated by Congress, but that influence
is largely compatible with the global aspi-
rations of big Indian capital. The overall
class perspective of the Congress and the
BJP in favour of big Indian capital puts
them in direct opposition to the egalitari-
an perspective of the left parties, and their
support for an integrated Indian capitalist
market also creates tensions with the re-
gion and state-based parties.2
In terms of their political perspectives
on caste, and the caste composition of
their leadership and mass base, both the
Congress and the BJP are predominantly
upper caste parties. Historically, the Con-
gress had a substantial base amongst the
lower castes, which had ensured the emer-
gence of lower caste leaders in the organi-
sational set-up of the party. That base has
been significantly eroded in the past few
decades by the emergence of parties rep-
resenting the middle castes and the lower
castes. The erosion of that caste base has
resulted in the further marginalisation of
party leaders representing the lower
castes and even middle castes. The BJP
has been a much more upper caste-
oriented party than the Congress. This
has been mainly due to the brahminical
influence of Hindutva ideology and organ-
isations (such as the Rashtriya Swayamse-
vak Sangh). In the past couple of decades,
some sections in the BJP leadership have
tried to build a social base amongst the
middle castes (for example in UP), and
even amongst the lower castes and tribals
(for example in Gujarat). However, the
upper caste-oriented Hindutva ideology
of the BJP creates a structural barrier in
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   march 21, 2009  vol xliv no 12
expanding its social base beyond the
upper castes.
Although there are interstate differenc-
es in the caste social base of both the Con-
gress and the BJP, both these parties re-
main primarily upper caste parties in
terms of the composition of their leader-
ship. This upper caste dominance in both
the Congress and the BJP pits them in op-
position to the parties representing the
lower castes and even middle castes. UP
and Bihar are the two states in India where
caste-based regional parties have success-
fully challenged the earlier dominance of
both the Congress and the BJP. Electorally,
the Congress has been the main sufferer
from the rise of these caste-based parties
because the middle caste and lower caste
support base which the Congress Party
previously had, has shifted substantially
to these caste-based regional parties. The
Congress has lost substantial base even
amongst the upper caste social groups
(e  g, brahmins and Rajputs) who have
largely shifted their allegiance to the BJP.
Components of the Third Front
The three components of the possible
third front – the left, the regional nation-
alist parties and the BSP – have one com-
mon and several different reasons in oppo­
sing the Congress and the BJP. The left is
primarily opposed to the class politics of
both these parties. In addition to that, the
left is opposed to the Hindu-nationalist
ideological vision of the BJP. Although the
left’s vacillating positions towards the
inte­grationist and centralising political
perspective of the Congress Party’s Indian
nationalist vision is an obstacle in its
arti­culation of a clear oppositionist stance
towards the Congress, the fact that the
Congress is its main electoral opponent
in the three states of West Bengal, Kerala
and Tripura, where the left has its main
base, does force it to sharpen its anti-
Congress politics.
The regional parties are opposed to the
BJP and the Congress primarily because
both are ideologically supportive of a
strong centre. Some of these regional par-
ties (e g, the Akali Dal in Punjab and, at an
earlier stage, the Telugu Desam in Andhra
Pradesh) have allied themselves with the
BJP not because of the proximity of their
politics to those of the BJP, but because the
commentary
Congress is their main electoral opponent.3
If there is a viable non-BJP and non-
Congress third front, almost all regional al-
lies of the BJP (except perhaps the Shiv
Sena in Maharashtra) will walk out of their
alliance with the BJP.4 The recent decision
of the Oriya nationalist party, the Biju Ja-
nata Dal, to break its ties with the BJP is a
pointer in this direction.5 All regional na-
tionalist parties see the Congress and BJP’s
centralising agendas as a threat to their re-
gion-based identity and strength. They are,
therefore, natural components of a possi-
ble third alternative that advocates decen-
tralisation, diversity and recognition of
multiple regional nationalisms in India.
However, for these regional parties and the
left to become programmatic allies of each
other, both the left and these regional na-
tionalist parties have to reconfigure some
aspects of their respective programmes.
A Devolutionary Perspective
The left will have to articulate very clearly
a devolutionary perspective that recognises
the multiple regional nationalisms in India.
If the left remains integrationist in its per-
spective (as, for example, the Communist
Party of India (CPI) has been more inclined
towards), it will not be able to forge a sus-
tainable alliance with the regional nation-
alist parties. The Maoist strand in the Indi-
an left has always been critical of one inte-
grated Indian nationalism and has been
supportive of the nationality struggles in
India. The overemphasis by the Maoists on
armed struggle has tended to overshadow
the Maoists’ more advanced views on the
nationality question in India. If the parlia-
mentary left can show imagination and in-
tellectual courage in articulating a vision
of multiple nationalisms and federal devo-
lution, it will not only be very conducive to
building a broader left unity and sound
alliance with the regional nationalist par-
ties, it will also expand the political influ-
ence of the third front.6 The regional
national parties, for their part, will have to
embrace some of the egalitarian aspects of
the left’s vision. Any such attempt by the
regional nationalist parties to radicalise
their political programme towards social
justice might lead to internal divisions in
these regional parties. Such divisions, if
they do take place, will have to be accepted
as a part of the necessity of reconfiguring
9
commentary
the politics of regional nationalism for
forging a sustainable third front.
The lower caste parties (BSP being the
most prominent of them) will also need to
reorient their existing politics in two do-
mains – egalitarianism and devolution of
power – if these parties are to build solid
foundations for forging a third front with
the left and regional nationalist parties.
Although the social groups in India that
suffer discrimination on caste grounds
also suffer economic discrimination be-
cause the lowest caste groups are also the
poorest, it is important that the analytical
difference between these two forms of
discrimination is recognised not only for
theoretical clarity but also for an effective
social policy and political strategy. A
wider egalitarian perspective than the
one merely focused on caste would facili-
tate a clearer and consistent basis for alli-
ance between the lower caste parties and
the left. This would also demand that the
Indian left re-evaluates its old politics,
which have not given enough space for
the accommodation of the aspirations of
oppressed castes for liberation from
specifically caste oppression.
The lower caste parties have been am-
bivalent on the question of centralisation
and decentralisation. This is partly a con-
tinuation of Ambedkar’s own ambivalence
on this question. On the one hand, he
thought and advocated that centralised
policy instruments would be more effective
for reducing caste discrimination but, on
the other, he visualised dangers to demo­
cracy from the concentration of economic
and political power that results inevitably
from centralisation. The lower caste parties’
ambivalence on devolution is partly also
due to their political base being located
mainly in the Hindi region, and this region
has historically been suppor­tive of increas-
ing centralisation. The ambivalence of the
lower caste parties on devolution mani-
fests itself in not proactively advocating
increased centra­lisation but simultane-
ously also not supporting decentralisation.
For building a robust alliance with the re-
gional nationalist parties, the lower caste
parties need to end this ambivalence and
argue clearly for devolution of powers to
the states. The regional nationalist parties,
in turn, need to develop a radical vision
on ending caste discrimination if their
10
alliance with the lower caste parties is to and decentralisation can decisively change
be built on secure grounds. the terms of political discourse and mobi-
Although there is a positive potential lisation away from this possible drift
for building a viable third front in India, towards Hindutva-oriented politics.
there are also great hurdles in calibrating To acquire credibility and sustainability,
the politics of the three currents of this po- a third front has to be sufficiently broad
tential third front – the left, the regional based in its appeal, and should include
nationalist parties and the lower caste environmental activists, peace campaigners
parties. If a progressive third front does opposed to the nuclear nationalism of the
not emerge in India, and the BJP and the BJP and the Congress, human rights groups,
Congress remain the only two alternative non-governmental organisations working
poles of politics, the centre of gravity of for egalitarian development projects and
Indian politics will move towards more progressive currents of the Indian diaspora.
Hindutva-oriented politics than it is today. A third front in Indian politics is a his-
The task of opposing the BJP and winning toric necessity and has a reasonable chance
over some sections of the BJP support base of success in the present context of India.
will force the Congress to adopt some ele- Although the coming general elections are
ments of Hindutva politics. From the op- important for all parliamentary parties and
posite side, the BJP – in order to expand its the prospects of a successful performance
electoral appeal – might moderate its Hin- in these elections could be an important glue
dutva agenda. As a result of this two-party for welding a third front, the potentialities
competitive political scenario, each party of a third alternative for shaping a pro-
will influence the other’s politics. How­ gressive politico-economic agenda for
ever, since the BJP is ideologically more I­ndia is of a long-term significance.
committed to a long-term vision of build-
ing a Hindu India than the Congress is Notes
committed to a long-term vision of secular 1 For a further elaboration of the link between the
political economy of centralisation in India and
India, the net result of the Congress-BJP the two versions (secular and Hindu) of Indian
competition will be a shift towards some nationalism, see Pritam Singh (2008): Federalism,
Nationalism and Development: India and the Pun-
version of Hindutva politics in India. A jab Economy (London: Routledge); and Pritam
third front can subvert this scenario of Singh (2005), “Hindu Bias in India’s ‘Secular’
Constitution: Probing Flaws in the Instruments of
Hindu-oriented political culture. A third Governance”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 26, No 6,
front based on an agenda of egalitarianism pp 909-26.
Government of India
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation
Central Statistical Organisation
Invitation for Research Proposals on Official Statistics
The Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) provides financial assistance for
undertaking research studies/projects which aim at strengthening and developing
official statistics, particularly in the field of Social Sector. Detailed information
regarding survey/study subjects, eligibility for availing of financial assistance,
quantum of financial assistance, procedure for making application etc is available
in the Ministry’s web site www.mospi.gov.in → Central Statistical Organisation
→ Social Statistics Division → Guidelines for Research Projects.
Proposals can be submitted at any time during the year to Additional Director
General, Social Statistics Division, Central Statistical Organisation, Ministry of
Statistics and Programme Implementation, West Block-8, Wing No. 6,
R.K. Puram, New Delhi.
Director General
Central Statistical Organisation
march 21, 2009  vol xliv no 12  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly

2 For a politico-economic focus on the third front
politics, see Pritam Singh (2008): “Political Eco­
nomy of the ‘Third Front’ in India”, Contemporary
South Asia, Volume 16, Issue 4, December.
3 The unresolved tension in the Akali-BJP relations
in Punjab is a relatively less explored phenome-
non. There is a constant pressure on the top Akali
leaders from its lower and middle ranging leader-
ship to sever relations with the BJP for several
reasons, but particularly on the Ram mandir is-
sue, the anti-minority politics of the BJP and the
attempts by the RSS to Hinduise Sikhism. It is this
pressure which led top ranking Akali leader Su-
khdev Singh Dhindsa to openly declare that the
Akali Dal had nothing to do with the re-emphasis
on Ram mandir issue in the recent BJP politics. If
India as an Emerging Donor
Dweep Chanana
India has traditionally been
perceived, both domestically
and globally, as an important
aid receiver. But it has also had a
foreign aid programme of its own
which can be traced to the 1950s
and 1960s. India’s aid programme
was small, focused on building
local capacities and viewed as
benign. In the past few years,
there have been marked shifts
in the size, focus and strategic
thinking behind India’s foreign
aid programme. As an emerging
donor on the world stage, India
needs to align its aid strategy
not with its ambitions but with
a realistic assessment of its
strengths and historical roots.
Otherwise, it will open itself
up to the same criticisms which
are  often directed at the other
major donors.
Opinions expressed here are personal and
not those of the organisation the author
works with.
Dweep Chanana (dichanana@gmail.com) is
employed with the philanthropy services at
UBS AG and has worked previously with UNDP
in Kenya.
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   march 21, 2009  vol xliv no 12
a third front were to emerge as a successful alter-
native to the Congress, the main rival of the Aka-
lis in Punjab, the pressure on the Akali Dal leader-
ship for severing ties with the BJP and joining the
third front will intensify. The BJP’s state unit in
Punjab is also unhappy with the Akalis’ attempt to
expand their electoral base among the urban
Hindu groups. On Akali Dal (Badal)’s expanding
electoral base among the Punjabi Hindus and
the attempts by the Akali Dal to rebrand itself as
a Punjabi regional party, see Pritam Singh
(2007): “Punjab’s Electoral Competition”, EPW,
10 February.
4 Shiv Sena is the only regional party in India
that continuously aims to overcome the contra-
diction between regional nationalism and the
R
esidents in Kabul recently began to
enjoy near uninterrupted electri-­
city thanks to a new transmission
line that brings power from Uzbekistan.
They can thank India for it, as well as for a
road linking Afghanistan’s main cities to
Iran, and the new Afghan parliament
building – still under construction. If and
when a stable Afghanistan emerges, a fair
bit of it will be made by India. Further
away, India is busy in Africa too, commit-
ting recently to double lines of credit to
$5.2 billion.
To a certain extent, India’s benevolence
is inspired by competition with China,
which has used aid effectively to secure oil
interests in Africa and Asia. But even if it is
catch-up, it reflects a new consciousness of
aid as an instrument of foreign policy.
Through aid, India hopes to build new alli-
ances and further its trade, energy and po-
litical interests. It also hopes to present the
country as powerful and self-reliant.
This reveals a lot about India’s ambitions.
Yet, it is unclear if India has the c­apability
to deliver on those ambitions. So, is India’s
benevolence strategic or unabashed self-
promotion? What interests does India’s aid
strategy further. And most important, is it
realistic, taking into a­ccount both India’s
strengths and many weaknesses?
Critics will note that two questions are
not posed here. First, whether India should
have a foreign aid programme at all or use
its scarce resources for internal develop-
ment? For the second fastest growing
m­ajor economy the choice is no longer
b­etween domestic spending and foreign
commentary
Hindu-hegemonic Indian nationalism by project-
ing compatibility between Marathi regionalism
and Hindu nationhood.
5 For a very perceptive piece on this see Biswamoy
Pati (2009): “Biju Janata Dal: Signals for Change”,
EPW, 28 February.
6 A very fine example of left unity is the recent com-
ing together in Bihar of the CPI, CPI(M) and CPI
(M-L) (Liberation) to form a combined front to
jointly contest the coming parliamentary elec-
tions. See Chirashree Dasgupta (2009): ‘The Unit-
ed Left Bloc in Bihar’, EPW, 7 March. A true left
unity in India would, however, mean going be-
yond this three party bloc and a negotiated inclu-
sion of all left currents in India including the ones
rooted in the Indian socialist tradition.
policy, of which aid is a component.
R­ather, increasing trade, ensuring access
to energy resources, and building military
alliances are all necessary to ensure I­ndia’s
unhindered rise.
The second question is whether India’s
aid should be allocated where it is most
needed or will have the greatest impact.
As any aid sceptic will point out, aid
a­llocation has little to do with actual need.
Flows are determined more by factors
such as colonial and trade links and less
by the quality of governance or potential
for impact.1 However, as this analysis will
show, India’s approach to aid delivery does
avoid some of the most egregious p­roblems
associated with western aid delivery.
Aid Programme in Perspective
It would be a mistake to suggest that
I­ndia’s giving is new. India has been giv-
ing substantial military and economic aid
within south Asia since independence. In
1958 India had already committed Rs 100
million in multi-year grants to Nepal2 and
a Rs 200 million loan to Myanmar. The
UK’s foreign and commonwealth office es-
timates that India finances nearly 60% of
Bhutan’s budget.3
There are no consolidated estimates of
India’s overseas development assistance.
In its absence, annual budgetary alloca-
tions are a useful proxy – similar to the
United States’ Foreign Operations Appro-
priations Bill. In 2008, India allocated ap-
proximately Rs 26.7 billion (or $547
million)4 to aid-related activities, defined
here5 as grants, contributions to inter­
national organisations (IOs) and inter­
national financial institutions (IFIs), direct
loans, and subsidies for preferential bilat-
eral loans (see Table 1, p 12). In addition, it
also approved lines of credit through the
Exim Bank of $704 million in 2007-08,
11