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Personal Details

Principal Investigator Prof. A. Raghuramaraju Department of Philosophy,

University of Hyderabad
Paper Coordinator Prof. Raghunath Ghosh Department of Philosophy,
University of North Bengal
Content Writer Prof. Ranjana Mukherjee Retired Professor of Philosophy,
Rabindra Bharati University
Content Reviewer Prof. Pradeep Gokhale Central University of Tibetan Studies,
Sarnath
Language Editor Mr. Raghavendra Harnoor Freelancer, Hyderabad

Description of Module

Paper Name Epistemology-II

Subject Name Philosophy
Module Name/ Title The Concept of Vypti in earlier Nyya
Module Id 6.26
Prerequisites General understanding of the invariable relation technically called
vypti in Indian form of Inference.
Objectives To generate an awareness among scholars regarding Indian concept
of vypti and its importance in Anumna.
Key words Shacaryaniyama, avyabhicr sambandha, sadhyavadanya,
kevalnavay
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The Concept of Vyapti in earlier Nyaya

The general meaning of Vypti is the state of pervasion. It implies a co-relation between two facts
of which one is pervaded (vypya) and the other pervades (vypaka). One is said to pervade another when
it accompanies the other. And one is said to be pervaded by another when it is accompanied by the other.
In this sense, smoke is pervaded by fire as it is always accompanied by fire but all the fiery objects are not
smoky. This relation of vypti (i.e., the relation of invariable concomitance between the hetu and the
sdhya) is the logical ground of anumiti (inference). In inference, our knowledge of the sdhya (the thing
to be inferred) as related to the paka (the subject of inference), depends on the cognition of the hetu (the
smoke) in the paka (the hill). That there is fire in the hill is a conclusion which we can know only if we
know that there is an invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. Annambhatta opines that the
invariability remaining in the coexistence between hetu (smoke) and sdhya (fire) in the form: wherever
there is smoke there is fire is called vypti or invariable concomitance (yatra dhmastatravahniriti
shacaryaniyamo vyptih). Between fire and smoke there is no doubt coexistence called shacarya, but
it has not become a niyama, i.e., invariable having vitiated by one or two exceptional cases which are
called vybhicr cases, e.g., red-hot iron ball, electric heater etc. The Vypti relation is called avyabhicr
sambandha, i.e., a relation not vitiated by deviation. Vypti is otherwise called by the Buddhists
avinbhva which also shows an affinity between vypti and avinbhva. The term vinbhva means
remaining without the other and 'avinbhva means not remaining without the other . For example,
smoke cannot remain without the association of fire and hence an invariable relation called vyapti.
Vivantha has given the following preliminary definition of vypti.

The first definition (lakaa) of Vypti is sdhyavadanyasminnasambandha, i.e., the invariable

concomitance is described as the absence of relation of the mark (hetu) to anything which is different
from the substratum of the thing to be inferred (sdhya). For example, The hill has fire, because it has
smoke , fire is the thing to be inferred, a kitchen etc. are objects having the thing to be inferred, a
lake etc. are objects other than the kitchen etc., smoke is the mark and the hill is the subject of
inference. Now the smoke is absent in the lake, etc., which are objects other than the thing to be inferred.
Hence the definition is applicable.1

1
ParvatahVahnimndhmt.Paka = parvatah
Sdhya = vahni
hetu = dhmah
Sdhyavat = mahnasa etc.
Sdhyavadanya jalahrada.
Now dhma, i.e., hetu,is absent in jalahrada which is other than the places like mahnasa(sdhyavat). The
definition is applicable, as it is a sathetusthala.
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Let us take another fallacious inference like The hill has smoke, because it has fire , smoke is
the thing to be inferred; kitchen etc. are objects having the thing to be inferred; a heated iron ball is the
object other than the kitchen etc. fire' is the mark and the hill is the subject of inference. Now fire is
present in objects other than the thing to be inferred, viz., in a heated iron ball, i.e., smoke is absent and
fire is present. Hence the definition is good enough to exclude such fallacious cases.2

Now the question before us is: how should we interpret the expression the locus of the thing to be
inferred (sdhyavat)? Should we accept any and every relation by which the thing to be inferred abides in
its substratum? If we do so, then the definition would be too narrow. For example, The hill has fire ,
because it has 'smoke . We can take parts of fire as the substratum of fire, because fire as a whole abides
in its parts by the relation of inherence.3 In order to avoid this defect it is essential to interpret locus of
sdhya (sdhyavat) in a different manner. The locus has to be taken through the limiting relation of
sdhyat (sdhyatvachhedakasambandha),andnot arbitrarily. The relation remaining in between sdhya
and paka is called limiting relation of sdhyat. In this context such relation is contact or samyoga, but
not inherence or samavya, because between fire and hill there is the relation called samyoga. If it is so,
then a part of fire cannot be taken as a locus of sdhya. As a locus we can take kitchen, field etc. and
different from is water, lake, etc., and hence there does not occur any defect of avypti.

The meaning of the term sdhyavadanya is difference4 or mutual non-existence, the counter
positiveness5 of which is characterized6 by the possession of just the thing to be inferred. Otherwise, the
definition would be too narrow. Let us explain this with the help of an example. The hill has fire, because
it has smoke , if in this case, by the expression things other than the possessors of the thing to be
inferred we mean just what is different from the substratum of the thing to be inferred, then we can take
cowshed etc. as things other than the substratum of the thing to be inferred. But smoke is present there.
Hence lake etc. would be the things other than the possessors of the thing to be inferred, because here the

2
ParvatahdhmavnvahnehPaka = parvatah
Sdhya = dhma
hetu = vahni
sdhyavat = mahnasa etc.
sdhyavadanya = taptaayahpinda
Now vahni (hetu) is present in tapta ayah pinda which is other than the sdhya. The definition is not
applicable as it is an asathetusthala.
3
Since according to Naiyyika the relation between parts and the whole is the relation of inherence.
4
That is, a broad distinction of the form It has not the thing to be inferred (sdhyavn na)
5
An attribute of the counter positive
6
Having the thing to be inferred as such, neither more nor less, otherwise definition would be futile.
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counter positiveness of the non-existence is characterized by the possession of just the thing to be inferred
and the definition is intact7.

Now in the inferential cognition of the form The hill has fire, because it has smoke , the parts of
smoke can be taken as the things other than the thing to be inferred8 because here the counter-positiveness
of the non-existence is characterized by the possession of just the thing to be inferred. But the smoke is
present by the relation of inherence in its parts and as a result the definition becomes too narrow. In order
to remove the extreme narrowness of the definition it is suggested that the absence of the mark in objects
other than those having the thing to be inferred is to be understood in respect of the relation that the mark
bears to the subject of inference. Smoke (the mark) is present in the hill (the subject of inference) by the
relation of conjunction. So the absence of smoke in things other than the thing to be inferred is to be
understood by the relation of conjunction. Although smoke is present by the relation of inherence in its
parts, there is no harm as smoke is not present in its parts by the relation of conjunction. Here lake etc. are
the things other than the possessors of the thing to be inferred, for smoke is absent in lake by the relation
of conjunction.

The absence of mark in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred is to be
understood not only in respect of particular objects, but only in respect of objects in general. Otherwise,
the definition would be applicable to the fallacious inference, The hill has smoke, because it has fire .
Fire is not present in a lake etc which are objects other than those having the thing to be inferred, the
definition is too wide. But this is not correct. Although fire is absent in a lake, it is present in a red-hot
iron ball which is also an object other than the thing to be inferred, smoke. Hence the invariable
concomitance between fire and smoke is vitiated.

Again the definition of invariable concomitance (vypti) is not applicable to inferential cognition
of the form It is a substance, because it has existence possessed of difference from that of qualities and
actions.9 Substance-hood is the thing to be inferred and existence possessed of difference from that of
qualities and actions is the mark and it inheres in substance only. Substance is the substratum of
substance-hood and things other than the thing to be inferred are quality and action. As qualified
existence (existence possessed of difference from that of qualities and actions) and pure existence are one,
so existence (mark) inheres in quality and action as well as in substance. Hence there is non-absence of

7
Although smoke may be present in a cowshed, for instance, which is other than any particular object
having fire such as kitchen, there will be harm.
8
For fire is absent in parts of smoke.
9
Idamdravyamgunakarmnyatva-viia-sattvt
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mark in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred. This difficulty can be overcome by
saying that the absence of mark in objects other than the thing to be inferred is to be understood in respect
of the delimiter of the mark-ness. In the aforesaid inference the delimiter of the mark-ness is the existence
qualified as different from that of qualities and actions which abides in substance alone. So quality and
action are to be regarded as objects other than those having the thing to be inferred. Hence the definition
is all right.

The definition of invariable concomitance (vypti) with the above amendments again is not applicable to
the inference, of the form It is knowable, because it is namable.10 Here knowability the thing to the
inferred, is exclusively affirmative (kevalnvay) (universally present), there are no such things as objects
other than those having the thing to be inferred. Hence the definition fails to apply. Moreover, in
inferential cognition like It has existence,11 because it has a generic attribute, existence is the thing to
be inferred and it inheres in substance, quality and action. The generic attribute is the mark and class
essence (smnya) particular (viea), inherence (samavya) and non-existence (abhva) are the objects
other than the thing to be inferred. The definition is not applicable as nothing is known to exist in objects
other than those having the thing to be inferred by the relation, (here inherence) that delimits the mark-
ness.

10
Jeyatvamvcyatvt
11
Sattvnjteh