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Source: Uluslararas Hukuk ve Politika

Review of International Law and Politics

Location: Turkey
Author(s): Roman Muzalevsky
Title: The War in Georgia and its Aftermath: Russian National Security and Implications for the
West
The War in Georgia and its Aftermath: Russian National Security and Implications for the
West
Issue: 19/2009
Citation Roman Muzalevsky. "The War in Georgia and its Aftermath: Russian National Security and
style: Implications for the West". Uluslararas Hukuk ve Politika 19:109-129.

https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=72305
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U lu s lar ara s H uk uk v e P o litika

Cilt 5, Say: 19 ss.109-129, 2009

The War in Georgia and Its Aftermath: Russian National

Security and Implications for the West
Roman MUZALEVSKY

Abstract
This paper analyzes Russian national security calculus evident in the 2008 war with
Georgia and assesses implications stemming from the war and the world financial
crisis for the international security and West-Russia relations. Specifically, issues of
Russian national identity, energy export routes, geography, democracy promotion,
territorial integrity, and humanitarian intervention are assessed in the context of the
war and Russian security. Recommendations are then provided for the Wests
relations with Russia following the conflict in Georgia. The paper concludes that while
Russia is responsible for the disproportionate use of force against Georgia, the West,
and particularly the US, should also be tougher with Georgia, which decided to
invade South Ossetia, and engage rather than alienate Russia to effectively maintain
international security and deal with the regional impacts of the global financial crisis.
Furthermore, recognizing the shift in global power to the East, the West ought to be
more realistic, but not less firm, when dealing with the traditional power that Russia
positions itself as.
Keywords: Security, Strategy, Russia, Georgia, the West.

INTRODUCTION: A COLLAPSED PEACE PROCESS

The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered separatist trends in the Caucasus
region. Peacekeeping missions and Russias military presence in the framework
of the CIS, however, helped bring stability and established an institutionalized
peace process in the region, the process that would remain frozen for more
than a decade.1 The conflicts in Moldova, Nagorny Karabah, and Georgia have
been most salient in this regard. The case of Georgia was especially difficult
given centrifugal forces within the country from three provinces: Adjaria,
Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. After ousting a rebellious Adjarias leader Aslan

1
H.G. Heinrich, Frozen Crisis in the Caucasus: Can the Circle Be Unsqaured?, in Promoting
Institutional Responses to the Challenges in the Caucasus: the OSCE, UN, EU and the CIS: Analysis - Case
Studies Outlooks, 31st Vienna Seminar, (Vienna: Diplomatic Academy, 2001), p. 109.

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Abashidze in May 2004, Georgian leadership undertook the strategy of

defreezing the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts.2 Though the case of
Adjaria was more or less successful, the other two proved bloody.
Following Abkhazian proclamation of its independence from Georgia and
ensuing conflict, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was established
to monitor the 1994 Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces
between Georgia and Abkhazia, known as Moscow Agreement. The latter
mandated the CIS Peacekeeping Force (CISPKF), estimated at 1,600 strong as of
2007 that would be monitored by UNOMIG from 1994 onwards.3 While a couple
of years earlier the war between Georgia and South Ossetia over the latters
autonomous status brought the two sides to the 1992 Agreement on the
Principles of Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict between Georgia and
Russia. Known as Sochi Accords, the agreement established ceasefire and Joint
Control Commission responsible for coordinating the 1,500 Joint Peacekeeping
Forces (JPKF) equally drawn from Russia, Georgia, North and South Ossetia. A
large scale humanitarian crisis following the conflicts resulted in 300,000
internally displaced persons and refugees. The breakaway provinces and
Georgia entered the situation of no peace, no war.4
Russias official position since the end of the hostilities was based on its
recognition of Georgias territorial integrity. Russia committed itself to seek an
agreement toward mutually acceptable model of reincarnation in common
state, or towards any other status acceptable for the parties to conflict and the
custodians.5 All the UN Security Council resolutions and positions of its
member states have unambiguously adhered to the territorial integrity of
Georgia.6 However, in practice Russia monopolized all the ensuing negotiations
in Georgia and exerted its influence within the UN Security Council on related
decisions. 7 Despite involvement of other states in the agreement supervision
process, Russia enjoyed a privilege of being the leading country in negotiations,
while the Group of Friends de facto let Georgia fall into Russias traditional
sphere of influence.8 Notwithstanding the ceasefire agreements and Russian
mediation no substantive agreement has been achieved, which partially
contributed to a collapsed peace process.9
Georgian leadership has increasingly viewed Russia as a manipulative
mediator in both conflicts since the 1900s. Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union a weakened Russia has exploited the conflict in order to maintain its
presence in the Caucasus and counterbalance the increasing influence of the

2
George Khutsishvili, Challenges to Peace-building: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, ed. E.
Newman and O. Richmond (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), p. 296.
3
Project of the Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008,
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), p. 90.
4
Khutsishvili, Op.cit, p. 282.
5
Ibid., p. 286.
6
Ibid., p. 295.
7
Ibid., p. 282.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.

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West.10 After Putin and Saakashvili assumed powers in respective countries, the
conflict intensified as asserting Russia experienced difficulties in keeping defiant
and pro-Western Georgia in its orbit. Following what many speculate was a
West-sponsored Rose Revolution in Georgia in November 2003, Saakashvili
pledged to restore Georgias territorial integrity by incorporating the breakaway
provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He publicly announced that Georgia
will be whole again.11 At the same time Saakashvili made clear that military
option was off the table.12 His desire to bring Georgia into military and political
Western institutions, NATO and the EU, significantly damaged its relations with
Moscow, whose growing power demanded a corresponding degree of allegiance,
increasingly so within the former Soviet space. Russia was uneasy about rising
Western influence and especially disliked Georgian leadership for its course.13
By the end of 2008 Russia had withdrawn its two remaining military bases
from Georgia following the latters demands. The polemic was accompanied by
Russias economic pressure on Georgia ranging from fruit and wine import bans
to allegedly purposeful cuts of energy delivery into the country. Angered by
NATOs decision to consider Georgias membership in the future, Russia
continued its trade and travel embargo on Georgia.14 The two provinces became
useful cards for Russia to promote its wider objectives in the region. At the
same time, Georgian attempts to run parallel administrations in South Ossetia
met great opposition from Russia that viewed Georgias actions as undermining
the peace process. After Saakashvili closed the Ergneti Market outside of
Tsihnval as part of anti-smuggling campaign, and ordered troops deployment at
the border with South Ossetia, violence increased significantly, threatening to
erupt into war.15
A point of no return came in August of 2008 when leadership of Georgia
violated the ceasefire agreement by attacking Russian peacekeepers and
launching heavy attacks on South Ossetia in the attempt to regain the
breakaway territory. To deter Georgian aggression, Russia responded with force
of its own into the Georgia proper. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put the
outcome of the War this way: Saakashvili himself put a cross on Georgias
territorial integrity.16
The question is why Russia chose to discard its mediating role and proceed
with substantial coercion? The ensuing analysis indicates that the Russian
military coercion was not only premised on the idea of stopping the violence
but on a variety of other imperatives, among which security, strategic, and

10
Heiemaria Gurer, Conflicts in the South Caucasus, an Overview, in Promoting Institutional
Responses to the Challenges in the Caucasus: the OSCE, UN, EU and the CIS: Analysis - Case Studies
Outlooks, 31st Vienna Seminar, (Vienna: Diplomatic Academy, 2001), p. 95.
11
Ibid., p.296.
12
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation 1246, 26 August 2008, http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRootrus/docs/off
_news/260808/newru2.htm.
13
After the War, The Economist, 16 October 2008, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?st
ory_id=12415100.
14
Ibid.
15
Project of the Center on International Cooperation, op.cit.
16
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, op.cit

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perceptional ones are especially salient. The August 2008 War in Georgia reveals
Russian national security considerations, tensions in West-Russia relations,
issues of national identity for some and democracy promotion for others.
Furthermore, the War generated discussions on the current world order and
concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity on the one hand, and
humanitarian intervention and individual self-defense, on the other. This
paper will analyze Russian national security considerations as evident in the
August War and elaborate on implications stemming from the War and world
financial crisis for the international system and security. While the paper admits
the existence of numerous factors driving Russias actions, such as Russias
humanitarian concerns during the war, it will exclusively focus on Western
political and military expansion in the context of Russian national security identity
as a major explanation for Russias decision to respond with overwhelming force
against Georgia. It will then proceed with assessment and recommendations for
West-Russia relations, summing up the major points in the conclusion.

WESTERN POLITICAL AND MILITARY EXPANSION: WHY GEORGIA DID

NOT FIT
NATOs expansion since 1990s and intentions of Georgia and Azerbaijan [as
well as the Ukraine] to join western political and security institutions have been
increasingly threatening Russias vision of its national interests, requiring it to
undertake more effective security measures in the Caucasus.17 Russia felt
betrayed by its American counterpart that vigorously pursued with Eastern
European countries a new course for NATO despite Clintons sharp
justifications of the 1990s: Some say we no longer need NATO because there
is no powerful threat to our security now. I say there is no powerful threat in
part because NATO is there.18
Russia was relieved to see Georgia and Ukraine denied NATO membership
plans in 2007 by France, Italy and Germany that constitute old Europe for US
but traditional partners for Russia. Still, the Baltic countries, with the legacy of
the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and Soviet domination during the Cold War,
were intensely promoting NATOs expansion and stood in solidarity with the
Georgian leader following the August war. The war sent a clearer signal to
Georgia and Ukraine, however, about Russias intentions to press the countries
to turn East rather than West, taking a firm control over its traditional sphere
of influence.19 Russia has long sought to establish security in the Trans-

17
Yuri Ivanov, Russias National Security Problems in the Transcaucasus in the Era of
Globalization, in ed. Ana K. Niedermaier, Countdown to War in Georgia: Russias Foreign Policy and the
Media Coverage of the Conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, (USA: The East View Press, 2008),
pp.437-451.
18
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 379.
19
Ariel Cohen, The Russian-Georgian War: A Challenge for the U.S. and the World, The Heritage
Foundation, 11August 2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/RussiaandEurasia/wm2017.cfm.

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Caucasus that serves as a strategic buffer zone in the south by ensuring that no
foreign military deployments are that close to its borders.20
Georgias ongoing attempts to bridge Europe with Central Asia 21 through
political and military integration with the West has especially concerned Russia
that wields immense power over Eurasian energy politics. As the worlds largest
gas producer, Russia deems it vital to maintain a near-monopoly on gas exports
from Central Asia, while also increasing its economic power and diversifying its
exports. Moreover, control over gas transit and export determines Russias
strategic influence over the Eurasian landmass, especially with regard to Europe,
which significantly depends on Russia for its gas imports. Positioning itself as an
alternative energy transit route to the West, defiant Georgia, however, has a
capability to frustrate Russias energy related designs in Europe and Central
Asia. Vasil Sikharulidze, former Georgian Ambassador to the US, supports this
reasoning by noting that Georgias commitment to freedom, democracy and
human rights, and the countrys destiny to be integrated with the West and
bridge Europe with Central Asia, threatened Russias ambitions, spurring its
aggressive response in the summer of 2008.22
Losing Georgia to the West would entail less monopoly for Russia on energy
routes and exports to Europe, on which the Russian commodity-dependent
economy relies. The military intervention in Georgia, therefore, sent a signal to
export countries in the neighborhood to depend on Russia for the delivery of
their energy commodities to western markets, seeking to make Europe more
dependent on Russia.23 The pipeline connecting Azerbaijan and Europe through
Georgia is one of the few routes that bypass Russian territory, depriving Russia
of its political leverage it allegedly exercised in regard to Ukraine. Thus, as the
country with existing and potential circumventing capacity and access to the
sea, Georgia is increasingly playing a major role in the energy politics among
Russia, the US, and the EU.24
Furthermore, unfriendly Georgia on the border is perceived as a link in a
Western chain of political and military encirclement that could significantly
contain Russias ambitions in the former Soviet states and Europe. The US has
been clear about its goals to create an independent Southern belt beneath
Russia, while various West-sponsored pipelines in the region provide the non-oil
exporters with transport and fuel fees, making them less dependent on the
Russian market.25

20
Stanislav Chernyavsky, The Caucasian Track of Russias Foreign Policy, in ed. Ana K.
Niedermaier, Countdown to War in Georgia: Russias Foreign Policy and the Media Coverage of the Conflict
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, (USA: The East View Press, 2008), pp. 423-36.
21
Vasil Sikharulidze, Georgia-Russia Conflict: The Latest, The Washington Post, 15 August 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/discussion/2008/08/15/DI2008081502199.html.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Heiemaria Gurer, op.cit, p.96.
25
G. Heinrich, op.cit, p. 110.

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As the above analysis demonstrates, the Western political and military

expansion in the form of the EU, NATO and general democracy promotion is a
critical factor in considering Russias use of force in response to Georgias
aggression in South Ossetia.
According to Russias major official strategic documents, Russian national
security rests on secure borders with no foreign military bases in the vicinity,
and friendly frontiers, with Russia supporting the CIS states as stable entities
with a pro-Russian policy line.26 Russia has also aimed to maintain peaceful
relations with the countries along its borderline and prevent conflicts in the
adjacent regions.27 Georgias pro-Western orientation, however, significantly
damaged its relations with Moscow, whose growing power demanded a
corresponding degree of allegiance, increasingly so within the former Soviet
space. Russia was openly uneasy about rising Western influence, and disliked
Georgian leadership for its substantial shift in foreign policy.28 Already by 2008
Russia had withdrawn its two remaining military bases from Georgia following
the latters demands.
Russia has always opposed NATOs expansion. It considers current NATO
strategy, which allows the use of force without the UN Security Council in the
territories not covered by the Washington Treaty, as threatening to its national
security.29 NATOs plans to incorporate Georgia and Ukraine into the Western
political and security architecture, especially pronounced before the war in
Georgia, have been mostly driven by the US and Eastern European countries
and perceived by Russia as a Western ploy to encircle Russia and contain its
further influence. Medvedevs plans to build a guaranteed nuclear deterrent
system and a new aerospace defense system following the August War
appears to be Russias response to this encirclement.30
The demise of the USSR left Russia vulnerable in terms of its buffer zones.
Russia perceives other states, especially the US, to be undermining its
emergence as a powerful pillar of the international system and containing its
influence in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasia and Central Asia.31 Only
Central Asia currently presents a cascade of countries whose leadership is not
absolutely anti-Russian. Losing Georgia, thus, would entail a loss of a political
and military buffer zone along Russias Caucasian borderline.

26
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Russias Strategic Course with Member-states of
the CIS, 1995, http://www.mid.ru/nsosndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/4e3d23b
880479224c325707a00310fad?OpenDocument.
27
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Russias Foreign Policy Concept, 12 July 2008,
http://www.ln.mid.ru/nsosndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/d48737161a0bc944c3
2574870048d8f7?OpenDocument.
28
After the War, op.cit.
29
Security Council of the Russian Federation, Russias National Security Concept, 2000,
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1.html.
30
Herbert Bix, Lessons from the War in Georgia, Asia Times Online, 22 October 2008.
http://atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JJ22Ag02.html.
31
Security Council of the Russian Federation, Op.cit.

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The recent US missile defense plans in Poland and Czechoslovakia have also
added fuel to Russias inflammatory rhetoric in regard to Georgian and
Ukrainian pro-Western aspirations. Medvedev did not exclude the possibility of
placing offensive mobile Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and use of radio
equipment to jam the planned missile defense system.32 While the US
containment strategy might by a relic of the Cold War given Russias relative
weakness, among other things, the US expansionist course has been clearly
evident, and this makes it unacceptable for Russia, however feeble. Medvedev
pointed out vividly that Russia has been confronted with construction of a
global Anti-missile Defense System, encirclement of Russia by military bases,
unrestrained expansion of NATO and other gifts to Russia.33 There are signs,
however, with the new US administration in power, that the missile defense
plans will either be shelved or used by the US as trading cards with Russia.
The military encirclement of Russia is accompanied by democratic
absorption of the Baltic and Central Europe, and ongoing democracy promotion
efforts in Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia. Regardless of the validity
of Georgias internal democratization, the Georgian leaderships intimate
relations with the US administration and its pro-Western course to the dislike of
Russia delivered a severe diplomatic blow to the Russian face - the blow Russia
was willing to repel with force in August. Russias actions in the War appear to
have been designed to challenge the US and NATOs policies in its backyard.34
They have also challenged European Security architecture.35
At the Russia-EU summit following the war, French President and EU
Chairman Nicolas Sarkozy called on the US, EU and Russia to ease tensions,
insisting on ending all talks about anti-missile defense systems until the 2009
Summit on the new Security Architecture for Europe.36 The new US
administration and Sarkozys hyperactive mediating role in the aftermath of the
August War, which already causes schisms within the EU between old and
new Europe, might well ease Russian national insecurity and maintain an
already fragile West-Russia relationship.
Russian military response against Georgias aggression, as seen through
these strategic underpinnings, sought to punish Georgia, signaling to countries
in the neighborhood where allegiance should be and to outside powers where
Russias privileged interests lie. As Medvedev noted after the August War, the

32
Ellen Barry, Russian President Sends Obama Warning on European Missile System, The New York
Times, 6 November, 2008, p. A6.
33
Dmitry Medvedev, State of the Union Address to the Russian Federal Assembly, 5 November 2008,
http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2008/11/05/1349_type63372type63374type63381type82634_2087
49.shtml.
34
Herbert Bix, Op.cit.
35
Svante Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, Niklas Nilsson, Russias War in Georgia: Causes and
Implications for Georgia and the World, Policy Paper, (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008), p.28, http://www.isdp.eu/files/publications/pp/08/0
808Georgia-PP2.pdf.
36
Steven Lee Myers, Russian Hopes Obamas Win Will Warm Relations, The New York Times, 15
November 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/world/europe/16medvedev.html?_r=1.

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future relations depended on our friends and partners that have a choice to
recognize Russias privileges.37 Shortly after, Azerbaijan decreased its reliance
on the trans-Caucasus oil pipeline going through Georgia, making permanent
increases in oil shipments to Russia and Iran. Kazakhstan, in its turn, started
negotiations with Moscow on new pipelines with Russia.38
That Russias actions during the war with Georgia sought strategic objectives
has been established above. But the picture would not be complete without
assessing other potential causes of Russias intervention in Georgia, such as its
humanitarian concerns and obligations to protect its citizens and South
Ossetians under its own domestic law, international law, and within the
framework of the regional peace agreement violated by Georgias aggression
against South Ossetia.

HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS: RUSSIAS LEGAL, MORAL AND

LEGITIMATE COVER FOR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
Apart from unfriendly borders, bypassing energy routes, and Western political
and military expansion pushed by the US and its Eastern European allies, Russia
was also driven by humanitarian considerations during the conflict. But while
these considerations seemed important in contributing to Russias decision to
intervene during the war, they were less significant than more strategic factors
presented and analyzed above, albeit very instrumental in promoting Russias
image of a regional savior and international law-abiding entity. To what extent
was Russia driven by humanitarian concerns during the conflict and, perhaps
more interestingly, was Russia dragged into the conflict as a result of
humanitarian considerations? Evidence suggests that Russia had been preparing
for a major military involvement in the region well before Georgias aggression
against South Ossetia and that it also pursued strategic goals when it chose to
undertake the intervention.39 Russia, however, extensively relied on
humanitarian and international law to gain legitimacy and legal grounds for
invading Georgia.
Indeed, Georgias denial of self-determination to both provinces in an
acceptable form and recent aggressive integration initiatives infringed on
human rights of South Ossetians, who Georgia claims to be their own people,
jeopardizing regional peace and security and further questioning the legitimacy
of the Georgian rule over the two breakaway provinces. By claiming the need to
defend the interests of its citizens and South Ossetians, some of whom
themselves were Russias citizens, and stressing its obligations under the
regional peace agreement to provide regional security in the event of any
hostilities, Russia presented a convincing legal and moral case for its initial
stage of the intervention short of reaching Tbilisi. Russia also claimed that

37
Pavel Felgenhauer, Medvedevs Plans for Military Rearmament, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 5,
Issue 190, 3 October 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373418.
38
Herbert Bix, op.cit.
39
Svante Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, Niklas Nilsson, Op.cit.

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Georgian aggression and genocide in South Ossetia led to 2,000 deaths.40

Russia, therefore, attempted to justify its actions on humanitarian, moral, and
legal grounds.
The UN charter makes clear that the member-states seek to develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples.41 And that they ensure with due
respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic,
social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection
against abuses; and aim to develop self-government, to take due account of
the political aspirations of the peoples.42 Georgia does not seem to have
followed the legal script.
Russias recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence, just as
that of Kosovo by about 50 states earlier, was an illegal act. Recommendation
of the UN Security Council for a final decision by the UN General Assembly is
required for a new state to come into being.43 That was absent in both cases.
Russias unilateral recognition of independence of the two provinces
undermined Georgias territorial integrity. As a former speaker of the Georgian
parliament and current opponent of Saakashvili Nino Burjanadze described
Russias actions, this would be like cutting off ones arms and legs.44 Despite
questions surrounding the legality of the concept of the humanitarian
intervention, which conflicts with issues of sovereignty and inviolability of
borders, Russias actions could actually receive political legitimacy, if not the
legal approval. To promote Russias national interests in Georgia, legal or illegal
from the perspective of the international law, Russia was invoking and
popularizing the R2P concept (Responsibility to Protect) to justify the
intervention.
But to what degree Russias actions in Georgia were driven by humanitarian
concerns and intentions to protect South Ossetian people? Obviously, Russia
wanted to provide for regional security and, having hostile relations with
Georgia, sided with South Ossetia on many issues. In addition, its obligations
under the regional peace treaty bound Russia to respond to the Georgian
aggression against South Ossetia should it occur. Russia also wanted to protect
its own citizens, including increasing number thereof among South Ossetians
themselves. But there is evidence suggesting that Russia, as was demonstrated
above, also sought to contain political and military expansion of the West into
its special sphere of interests. 45
Furthermore, a series of steps undertaken by Russia suggest that it was not
solely, and even less so, dragged into the war by concerns of humanitarian

40
After the War, op.cit.
41
The United Nations Organization, The UN Charter, Section on the Purposes of the UN,
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
42
The UN Charter, Article 73, op.cit.
43
Article 4, op.cit.
44
After the War, op.cit.
45
Svante Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, Niklas Nilsson, op.cit.

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emergency and protection of its citizens and South Ossetians. For instance,
Russias deployment of paratroopers and heavy equipment into Abkhazia and
military forces and hardware near Georgias borders, the conduct of Kavkaz-
2008 military exercises in the North Caucasus, stationing of railway troops to
rebuild the regional railway to speed troops deployment from Russia, opening of
a second front in Abkhazia, and perhaps most striking, extremely rapid
coordination of ground, air and naval operations within hours of Georgias
aggression all point to the premeditated plans for invasion.46 It appears,
therefore, that Russias humanitarian concerns during the war, while important
in themselves for contributing to the intervention, more so served as legal,
moral and legitimate cover for the pursuit of Russias strategic objectives in the
region.
Apart from the strategic and humanitarian considerations, the Russian
military intervention can and should also be assessed in the context of what I
would call Russian national security identity, and the concept of a multi-polar
world that Russia has been pursuing to challenge the US hegemony, especially
in the zone of its traditional interests.

RUSSIAS MULTI-POLAR WORLD AND NATIONAL SECURITY IDENTITY:

STILL IN THE MAKING?
Following the August war Medvedev told the Russian military that the old world
order was shattered and that a new one is emerging more secure and just.
Russia must be big and strong, or it will not exist at all.47 The Russian multi-
polar world is the world order not dominated by a single pole but upheld by
several influential and independent centers of authority, among which Russia, as
one of the poles, enjoys its desired recognition and responsibility for the world
order. For Russia to be able to embody an influential and independent pole is
equated with survival the goal, not power the means. Defiant and pro-Western
Georgia neither fit Russias conception of authority and power, nor
corresponded to its growing influence before the onset of the war.
The issue of Russian identity adds yet another complicating dimension. Not
only is it related to Russias national security, but it also can disorient Russia in
the world politics following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The latter has
been viewed as a failure by some members of the Russian leadership who
witnessed the disintegration of a huge country, collapse of military prowess and
dissipation of global political clout. What was more discomforting to Russia,
however, is that the Soviet collapse has been viewed as a victory in the West.
The view that Russia was defeated and not transformed predominated in the
1990s in Washington, profoundly shaping Russias policies up until these
days.48

46
Ibid.
47
Pavel Felgenhauer, Op.cit.
48
Dimitri Simes, Losing Russia: The Costs of Renewed Confrontation, Foreign Affairs, Vol.
86, No. 6, November December 2007, p.1.

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Russias history of imperial expansion and the notions of great power and
greatness in the national discourse have been inseparable from Russian
national security identity.49 Russia associates pro-Western reforms with its loss
of global prestige.50 To be a great power for Russia means to have an identity
with which to confidently proceed in the 21st century following the Soviet
demise and related psychological humiliation nurtured form within and without.
If Russia does not want to go back to the USSR and is not particularly willing to
join the ranks of Western democracies, who themselves have not displayed
sufficient willingness to embrace it, then what options are out there for Russia?
Corporate state, nationalism and imperialism are some, but there could be
others as time goes by.
Russias rising power under the Putin administration did not fully lead to the
prestige and appeal that Russia desired to be afforded in its new world of
politics. The case of ignorant Georgia irritated Russian leadership and stepped
on its weak spots: Russias own perception of its prestige and status, and the
perception thereof by other powers. Russia was much more willing to show its
resolve through the use of force in August to protect its national security
interests and relieve the psychological uneasiness and inconsistency generated
by Georgias defiance and Russias growing power.
Why Russia proceeded with military coercion into Georgia proper is
important. After all, it could have stopped at the pre-existing ceasefire lines and
inflict either proportional or slightly disproportional damage on Georgia for its
aggression against South Ossetia. Russia wanted to demonstrate prowess and
efficiency of its military forces to project power even within its own borders
following years of impotency, as the case of Chechnya demonstrated. Its easy
and decisive victory was to stand up well in comparison with the US operation
in the first Gulf War. Russias strong resolve also fits its pursuit of the multi-
polarity as an influential and independent great power, ready and willing to
employ force to defend its national interests in pursuit of its multi-polar world.
Russias use of force also aimed to devastate the military of the aggressor
and deter it from future similar endeavors. Georgia is punished and its military
forces are unraveled, said Medvedev.51 Russia followed its military response
with recognition of the two breakaway provinces as independent states on the
grounds of further protection of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples
threatened by Georgias invasion.52 Russias intentions to respond to the earlier
West-sponsored Kosovo precedent have been evident by Russias recognition of
the provinces. Dmitry Medvedev "now felt obliged to recognize South Ossetia

49
Valery Manilov, National Security of Russia, Occasional Paper Series of the Strengthening Democratic
Institutions Project at Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of Harvard Kennedy School, pp.1-
5, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/3029/national_security_of_russia.html.
50
Eduard Ponarin, Security Implications of the Russian Identity Crisis, Ponars Policy Memo, June
1999, p.3, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0064.pdf.
51
A Scripted War, The Economist, 16-22 August 2008, p.30.
52
Dmitry Medvedev, Speech at The Council on Foreign Relations in US, 15 November 2008,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/17779/conversation_with_dmitry_medvedev_video.html.

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and Abkhazia as other countries had done with Kosovo.53 Earlier in February
2008 Putin warned that recognition of Kosovos independence by Western
states would produce consequences for South Ossetia and Abkhazia.54
The military response was meant to inflict significant damage on the
countrys economy. According to the current Ambassador of Georgia to the
United States, Batu Kutelia, Russia also sought to deliver a blow to the Georgian
leadership and lay the ground for removal of Saakashvili from power.55 Thus far,
Saakashvili has been successful in employing Georgias victim status to gain
support for rebuilding Georgias dampened economy. His popularity rating rose
to 75% after the war.56 Saakashvili continues to remain in power, despite being a
political corpse in the eyes of the Russian leadership.57 Mounting opposition
protests and calls for new elections in Georgia, however, might blow wind in a
different direction.
Finally, Russias huge military deployment in the region was a sign of
seriousness with which Russia prepared for potential meddling and support to
Georgia by other powers.58 Utilizing navy, air and ground forces was a way to
prepare for potential escalation that could have deprived Russia of its ability to
achieve wider strategic objectives in respect to Georgia.
Following the August war Medvedev declared five foreign policy principles,
emphasizing that Russia will recognize the fundamental principles of
international law, and that it does not desire confrontation with any country
and isolation from the international system.59 The priorities rejected the current
single-pole world order as unstable and threatened by conflict, asserting
that Russia had unquestionable priority to protect the lives and dignity of [its]
citizens and its interests whenever they may be. They further claimed that
there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.60 Russias new
defense priorities accompanied the foreign policy principles, intending to
achieve permanent readiness status by 2020 for all combat units, improve the
social conditions of the military, and procure modern high-tech weapons
systems.61
All of the mentioned principles point to Russias recognition of the emerging
multi-polar world order. But how likely is it, and does the world financial crisis
conceal the end of unipolarity without Russias multi-polarity? At a meeting with
high officials in Kazakhstan, Condoleezza Rice responded to Russias rhetoric of
privileged interests: We dont see and dont accept any notion of a special

53
Sally McNamara, Russia's Recognition of Independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia Is
Illegitimate: They Are Not Kosovo, WebMemo No. 2037, The Heritage Foundation, 28 August
2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/Europe/wm2037.cfm.
54
Svante Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, Niklas Nilsson, op.cit.
55
Batu Kutelia, Georgias Hopes and Challenges, A Panel Discussion at Yale University, 7 April 2009.
56
After the War, Op.cit.
57
Cold Comfort, The Economist, 6-12 September 2008, p. 30.
58
Pavel Felgenhauer, Op.cit.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.

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sphere of influence.62 Bigger challenge to Russias long-term policies, however,

came shortly after, when the financial crisis within the US went global, shaking
Russias economy and with it, its confidence.
In the pre-war period Russia enjoyed rapid economic growth, albeit driven by
energy commodity exports. The price for oil, once standing at about $ 140 per
barrel, allowed Russia to accumulate billions in reserves and initiate
modernization of its military forces. Russias confidence, just as its economy,
was booming. It stepped up its rhetoric to emerge as one of the influential
financial centers of the world in which transactions would occur in Russian
rubbles rather than US dollars.
But the world financial crisis undermined Russias ability to pursue its
strategic goals. Russia has long been facing a threat of declining population and
disruption of its labor resources.63 With the accompanying declined price for oil,
Russia will find it particularly difficult to come out of the crisis unscathed and
strong. It will be in much weaker position to build a more diversified and
competitive economy given a lack of spare resources. The Head of the Russian
Ministry for Economic Development, Elvira Nabiullina, claims that the current
crisis proved the insolvency of national economic model that relied too much
on high oil prices and easy access of Russian banks and companies to cheap
long-term loans from abroad.64
The emerging BRIC economies, although being hit hard by the financial
crisis, will still be able to deflate the pressure. With its accumulated reserves,
Russia should be able to prevent a run on its currency.65 It does not have a
capital account deficit, and it earned $166 billion from oil and gas exports in
2007 alone. Russia also amassed $560 billion in foreign-exchange reserves from
2000 to 2008. Because Russia essentially lends money to Western governments
and then borrows funds from Western banks now facing liquidity shortages, it
will find it hard to borrow money as the crisis unfolds and will be forced to
deplete its accumulated reserves to bolster its weakening economy.66
Russias energy sector, however, will continue to remain its major source of
revenues and the basis for its national economic development for quite a long
time.67 To argue that Russian confidence and strategic designs have been
irreversibly undermined due to the financial crisis is to miss a bigger picture: the
whole world lost in absolute terms from the crisis. Russias amassed power,
tradition of prestige and greatness, and the US relative decline partly
associated with the world financial crisis provide it with tools and legitimacy to

62
Rice Meets Kazakh PM And President, The Associated Press, 6 October 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122325680713506603.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.
63
Security Council of the Russian Federation, op.cit.
64
Andrey Filatov, The Economy of Russia Recognized as Insolvent, Utro Newspaper, 19 November
2008, http://www.utro.ru/articles/2008/11/19/782140.shtml.
65
How the Emerging World Copes with the Tempest Will Affect the World Economy and Politics for
a Long Time, The Economist, 25-31 October 2008, p.16.
66
Emerging Markets: A Taxonomy of Trouble, The Economist, 25-31 October 2008, p. 88.
67
Dmitry Medvedev, op.cit.

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propose revisions to the international financial system at the 2008 G-20 Summit
and precipitate the coming of the multi-polar world. In other words, the world
financial crisis might mark the beginning rather than the end of multi-polarity for
Russia.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated after the August
war. Russias authoritarianism and imperialistic ambitions were readily invoked
to portray a barbarian power-seeking Russian state. Estonian President Toomas
Hendrik Ilves claimed that principles of international relations were seriously
damaged by Russias actions.68 Vasil Sikharulidze further asserted that by
attacking small democratic Georgia, Russia challenged the new world order of
freedom and democracy, and that Russias invasion was reminiscent of the
Soviet invasion of Finland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan.69
Condoleezza Rice vividly described the rebuilding of a Russian state as the one
that has taken a dark turn with the rollback of freedoms, lack of rule of law,
corruption, and a paranoid, aggressive impulse.70 How much more blame and
condemnation Russia is expected to before the West treats it as a partner, with
whom consultations rather than a policy of double standards might be more
desirable, remains to be seen.
As the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put it in the aftermath of the war,
by initiating attacks on South Ossetia and committing atrocities against the
South Ossetians Saakashvili himself put a cross on Georgias territorial
integrity.71 The question of whether Russia committed aggression in responding
unilaterally to a real threat produces two answers to it, depending on which part
of the Atlantic one asks. But neither the UN Security Council nor the UN
General Assembly could make that legal determination.72 Swedens Foreign
Minister Carl Bildt rebelled when he spoke of Georgias invasion of South
Ossetia: When you have a choice between doing nothing and doing a stupid
thing, it is better to do nothing.73 For some, Russia demonstrated its resolution
to prevent further security threats from developing on its own borders, and that
it would not undertake excessively drastic measures, like the US occupation
efforts in Iraq, for the sake of controlling foreign oil.74
Russia views the effects of the August war in the form of the emergence of a
new geopolitical situation, where Russia is able to defend its national interests

68
Eastern European Leaders Voice Concern about Georgia during UN Debate, The UN News Center,
24 September 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=28240&Cr=general+
assembly&Cr1=debate.
69
Vasil Sikharulidze, Georgia-Russia Conflict: The Latest, The Washington Post, 15 August 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/discussion/2008/08/15/DI2008081502199.html.
70
William Branigin, Rice Says Russia Has Taken a Dark Turn, The Washington Post, 19 September
2008, p. A14.
71
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, op.cit.
72
Herbert Bix, op.cit.
73
A Scripted War, op.cit.
74
Herbert Bix, op.cit.

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and protect its citizens using capable armed forces. It argues that a polycentric
international system emerged, where there is no single domination of any state
in any sphere. 75
Indeed, relative decline of the US has been demonstrated in the aftermath of
the war. The US and the Western responses in general were mixed and low-
pitched rather than concrete and resolute. No tough sanctions have been
implemented. Nor has Russia been excluded from major bodies, such as the G-
8. And the energy-dependent EU agreed to proceed with a strategic partnership
with Russia. There are also some concerns about the potential risk of war with
Russia should Article 5 of the NATO Treaty be invoked to defend the country,
subject to NATO membership, that so significantly contributed to the outbreak
of the August war. Russias military response in Georgia signaled to the US,
Europe, and Georgia that NATO expansion is inconceivable in the immediate
future.
Moreover, the West would lose a lot by not fully cooperating with Russia
following the war. The world needs Russias cooperation on major security
issues. The global economic and military landscape is being redefined, pushing
the US into multi-polarity as other states, including possibly Russia, are
emerging as additional major payers.76 When during the tensions between
Georgia and Russia John McCain says that We are all Georgians, Senator Bill
Bradley provides a rhetorical and equally relevant retort: But arent we all
Americans? And does not America have worldwide strategic interests? Are
Georgias interests more important to our long-term security than a Russia that
works with the US on nuclear non-proliferation and the War on Terror?77
The world financial crisis and the effects of the August war should be the
platform for the West to engage Russia, not alienate it, and provide Russia with
a larger steak and responsibility in the international system. The Wests earlier
recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, in light of Russias recognition
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states following the conflict with
Georgia, provide some important clues about the need to mitigate the policy of
double standards in the West-Russia relations and proceed with a renewed
cooperation.
The West needs to realize, and the EU in the face of Russias traditional
partners seems to do just that in respect to Russia, that it alone can hardly
remain as effective in shaping todays global politics. The era of its supremacy is
being overshadowed by the Asian century, and it has hardly a choice other
than to share power and responsibility for solving global problems with the rest
of the world.78 In this regard, working with non-Western partners, especially the

75
Dmitry Medvedev, State of the Union Address to the Russian Federal Assembly.
76
Paul Kennedy, The Distant Horizon: What Can Big History Tell Us About Americas Future?,
Foreign Affairs, May-June, 2008, p.132.
77
Bill Bradley, Last Call, The New-York Times, 14 October 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/
15/opinion/15debate.html?em.
78
Kishore Mahbubani, The Case against the West: America and Europe in the Asian Century,
Foreign Affairs, May-June, 2008, p.11, 121.

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BRICs, will be increasingly crucial for maintenance of global stability and

continuing prosperity in the future. Russia will most likely remain a major player
in global politics just as the US, the EU, and emerging powers of China and
India.79 The US success in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and North Korea will also
continue to depend on Russias continued cooperation.80 In short, the West,
just as Russia, still has a second choice.
Russia of the early and mid-1990s was no threat to the West, but it also was
of no particular benefit in its post-Soviet shape either. The collapse of the
totalitarian system and some liberal streams within Russian polity gave the West
a possibility to more effectively mold Russias nascent democratic course, the
opportunity the West missed. The assumption in the West, if it ever existed, that
democracy would come to Russia without stronger Western support, proved
illusionary. While admitting Russia to the IMF and the World Bank, the West also
started developing a new mission for NATO, while not incorporating Russia in a
new security architecture following the collapse of the Soviet Union.81
The view that Russia is not willing to proceed with democratic reforms is a
fallacy. Russia entertains concerns about too much premature democratic
expansion because the latter might entail the emergence of unfriendly regimes
within and without. If by democracy we mean the disintegration of the state,
then we do not need such democracy, - attests Putin.82 At the same time,
Russian perceptions of the importance of democratic development are
changing. Russia realizes that democratic development is a necessity for
Russias national competitive development. It cherishes the ideology of
socioeconomic advancement that rests on socialism and freedom of an
individual, who is serviced by the state and not the other way around.83
The West should reach out to Russia, agree on the major points of
contention given the new global trends, and further engage Russia into the
international economic system without antagonizing it with military
encirclement and other gifts, while also slowly pushing it to embrace a more
open democratic system down the road. Medvedev said in the aftermath of the
August war that Russia was absolutely not interested in confrontation with any
state in the system.84 All it seeks is a renewed trust in Russia-US relations that
has been gradually waning.85 Russia calls for new global security, where Russia,
EU and US can and should multilaterally control arms flows and regulate
conflicts around the world.86 The European Council also considers that with the
interdependence between the EU and Russia and the global problems there is

79
The US National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, Unclassified Report, December
2004, p.10, http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf.
80
Herbert Bix, op.cit.
81
Ibid.
82
Andrei P. Tsykangov, Russias Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, (Maryland:
Rowman & Ltlefield Publishers Inc., 2006), p.162.
83
Dmitry Medvedev, State of the Union Address to the Russian Federal Assembly
84
Herbert Bix, op.cit.
85
Steven Lee Myers, op.cit.
86
Dmitry Medvedev, State of the Union Address to the Russian Federal Assembly

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no better alternative to a strong relationship between Russia and the West

premised on trust and international law.87

CONCLUSION
Analysis of Russias disproportionate military response to Georgias aggression
against South Ossetia cannot be performed without considering the Russian
national security identity and the Western political and military expansion
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the latter fueled rising
expectations of smaller countries hoping to obtain additional Western security
guarantees through the NATOs expansion, the former put the idea of war with
Georgia into a logical design. The strong embrace by Georgia, Azerbaijan and
the Ukraine of the western political course following the wave of purportedly
democratic revolutions sweeping Eastern Europe and the Caucasus threatened
Russias perceived national security interests. Rooted in the premise of having
stable and friendly borders, these interests did not, and as the war
demonstrated will not, at least in Georgia, tolerate excessive foreign political
and military presence Russia perceives as hostile to its national interests in the
region.
It is important to recognize that the EU, dependent on Russian gas, did not
fully or homogenously serve as the US agent in the developments preceding and
following the war in Georgia. Germany, France, and Italy, which are Russias
traditional partners, differed markedly from other EU member-states in their
stance on the war and Russias actions, calling for the importance of
maintaining regional security and closely working with Russia on common
outstanding security concerns based on rather objective assessment of Russias
intervention. The EUs Eastern members, however, understandably, yet
shortsightedly and vigorously, propagated NATOs military expansion and
Western political orientation, standing in solidarity with Georgias leaders in the
aftermath of the war. Working in cooperation with the New Europe, the US
failed to deliver on its earlier non-expansion promises, increasingly preparing
the ground for clashes between Russia on the one hand and Georgia and the
Ukraine, on the other. The war in Georgia clearly demonstrated Russias
intentions to defend its perceived national interests, while also showing Russias
unwillingness to proceed with the Soviet-type occupations. Signaling to the
nearby countries its preeminence in the traditional backyard, Russias military
response also sent a message to the Western counterparts to be wary of
political and military expansion in Russias zone of privileged interests.
Apart from the strategic objectives of containing the Western political and
military expansion, Russias intervention in Georgia certainly sought to defend
the interests of its citizens and South Ossetians during the conflict, as well as to
provide regional security under the established regional peace treaty, Russias
domestic law and international legal framework. While instrumental in painting a

87
The EU at the UN, Georgia-Russia Conflict: Extraordinary European Council Presidency Conclusions,
http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_8116_en.htm .

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more comprehensive picture of Russias motivations during the war, Russias

humanitarian concerns were less important in causing its intervention in
Georgia. However, they were a necessary component for providing Russia with
moral, legal and legitimate grounds for what might later more clearly appear to
be a well pre-mediated invasion of Georgia in pursuit of larger strategic
objectives.
The war in Georgia came with costs to those involved, directly and indirectly.
Indeed, militarily devastated Georgia has witnessed its country torn apart
economically and politically, while Russia lost its investment appeal and
witnessed deteriorating relations with its perceived Western partners and
adversaries. The financial crisis unleashed in full force from within the US and
independently of the war further extorted a heavy toll on the observers and
accomplices, as it spread global. Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
facing tremendous international security challenges, the US, heretofore
perceived as the global hegemon, not only proved unchallenging in its initial
response to Russias actions in Georgia, but also unable to resolve international
issues without the support of emerging powers.
The new US administration, however, constrained as it will be despite its
multi-lateral diplomatic initiatives, has a chance to develop more
comprehensive, partnership-based and mutually beneficial relations with Russia.
Effectively shaping global politics will only be possible if the interests of other
major powers, including Russia, are taken into account. In this light, the
financial crisis, along with other numerous global challenges, presents an
opportunity for the West to engage Russia and other stakeholders in multi-
laterally managing the international system, build a trust-based global
partnership with Russia, and construct a more enduring international financial
and security architecture. Generational change within the ranks of Russias
leadership, efforts of the West to further integrate and accept Russias place in
the international system, while respecting its views on major global decisions,
are to ensure a more cooperative and enduring partnership that will promote
global prosperity for all and democratic development for some.

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