ANG BENG, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs.

THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-

appellee.

FACTS: The petitioners, both Chinese nationals, were prosecuted in and convicted by the Court of First
Instance for violation of the Import Control Law (Republic Act No. 650. They were also charged before
the Deportation Board. Pending appeal of the criminal case in the Court of Appeals, the Import Control
Law expired, in view of which and with the conformity of the Solicitor General, petitioners' motion for
dismissal was granted and they were ordered discharged.
The Deportation Board, however, submitted to the President of the Philippines its finding in the
Deportation Case and recommended petitioners' deportation. On January 18, 1954, the President issued
the corresponding order of deportation. On March 1, 1955, the petitioners filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition and certiorari, praying that the President's order of
deportation be declared illegal and that they be released. From the dismissal of the petition the
petitioners have appealed before us.

ISSUE: whether the order deporting the petitioners should be set aside, because the law defining the
crime of which they were convicted had already expired. The pertinent legal provisions are therefore
Articles 366 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Article 22 of this Code, felonies and
misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance
with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their Commission.
ART. 22. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of felony, who
is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time
of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

RULE: NO.
We cannot subscribed to petitioners' contention that the expiration of the Import Control Law should be
considered favorable to them in the sense that it erases the stigma of their conviction. There is no law
upholding such proposition. The benefit of retroactivity and liberal construction accrues when penal laws
are repealed. There is no subsequent repealing law that petitioners could mention. The law violated by
them expired in virtue of its own force. The case of Tamayo, 6 Phil., 225, invoked by petitioners is
irrelevant, as it involved absolute repeal.
What is more, the order of deportation emanated from a branch of the government which exercises
jurisdiction independent from the judiciary. The President, in the exercise of his executive prerogative
and as an act of State, is vested with full power and discretion to issue orders of deportation.
The power to expel or exclude aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the
political department of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or act of Congress, and to be
executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except as far as the
judicial department has been authorized by treaty or statute, or required by the paramount law of the
Constitution, to intervene. (In re Paterson, 1 Phil., 95; In Re McGulluch Dick, 38 Phil. 41.)
To spearhead all other consideration, it is fundamental that an executive order for exportation is not
dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case. This axiom of law was reiterated in the decision
in the case of Tan Tong vs. Deportation Board, (96 Phil., 934) which pertinently ruled as follows:
The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President of the Republic of the Philippines. As an act of state,
it is vested in the Executive by virtue of this office, subject only to the regulations prescribed in section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code or to such future legislation as may be promulgated on the subject.
(In Re McGulluck Dick, 38 Phil., 41)
xxx xxx xxx
By no form or manner of reasoning can the inference be made that by section 2702 of the Revised
Administrative Code the Legislature intended that an alien can be deported for illegal importation only
upon conviction therefor in a competent Court, and thereby deprived the Deportation Board of its power
to investigate charges of unlawful importation of merchandise against an alien, especially, when as it
appears from the record, no criminal action for unlawful importation has been filed against him. The
language of the provision and the chapter in which it is found do not justify petitioner's contention. No
derogation of a power vested in the Chief Executive or a limitation thereof can be presumed by the
implication from the mere addition of the Clause he may be subject to deportation at the end of Section
2702. This section punishes illegal importation and imposes, in addition to the penalty prescribed, the
liability to deportation if the person found guilty is an alien. Its sole import is that if a competent court
has found an alien guilty of a violation of section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
proceedings outlined in section 69 of the said Code are no longer necessary for deportation. Beyond this
it is unreasonable if not absurb, to presume that the legislature intended more. It could not have intended
that if there is not conviction for a crime of unlawful importation, or if no charges have been filed against an
alien therefor, the Deportation Board may not proceed to investigate said charges against him and
recommend deportation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Board of Commissioners (CID) v dela Rosa (1991)

Bidin, J.

FACTS:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the SolGen for the Board of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Immigration (formerly the CID) and Board of Special Inquiry to set aside two orders
issued by different judges of RTCs and to enjoin public respondent judges from acting on the ff.
civil cases:
o 1st case: filed by Gatchalian in the RTC of Manila. Judge dela Rosa issued an order that
denied the Motion to Dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or continuing
with any proceedings that will lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian
o 2nd case: filed by Gatchalians wife and minor children in the RTC of Valenzuela. Judge
Capulong issued an that enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges
against Gatchalian
July 12, 1960: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino Citizen. He also testified that he had 5 children with his wife
Chu Gim Tee: Jose, Gloria, Francisco (Williams father), Elena, and Benjamin.
June 27, 1961: Then 12-year old William arrived in Manila from Hongkong with Gloria, Francisco,
and Johnson Gatchalian with Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
July 12, 1961: the Board of Special Inquiry admitted William and his companions as Filipino
Citizens.
July 6, 1962: Board of Commissioners, after reviewing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of respondent Gatchalian
o The 1967 case of Arocha v Vivo sustained the validity of said order.
1973: Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of exclusion filed a motion for re-hearing
with the Board of Special Inquiry. Acting Commissioner Nituda later issued an order recalling the
warrant of arrest against Gatchalian.
1990: acting director of NBI wrote to the DOJ recommending that Gatchalian and others covered
by the warrant of exclusion be charged with violation of the Immigration act. The SOJ indorsed the
recommendation and a mission order was issued by Commissioner Domingo of the CID ordering
the arrest of Gatchalian.
o Gatchalian filed the present civil cases that are being assailed in the case at bar.
Petitioners arguments:
o The judges have no jurisdiction over petitioner and the subject matter;
 o That assuming the judges had jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion by
hearing the deportation case and in effect determined Gatchalians citizenship;
o That respondent judges disregarded the cases of Arocha v Vivo and Vivo v Acra which put to
finality the order of the Board of Commissioners
o Respondent committed forum-shopping
Private respondents arguments:
o Petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts have
resolved the issue of his citizenship;
o Petitioners cannot fairly and judiciously dispose of the deportation case;
o Ground for deportation has already prescribed

ISSUES + RULING:

WoN the RTCs had jurisdiction over the cases. YES.

Under 21 of BP 129, the RTC has concurrent jurisdiction with the SC and CA to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
While 9(3) of BP 129 vests the CA with exclusive jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, board or commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-
paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the same does not provide that the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction extends to all quasi-judicial agencies.
o The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of
Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are
specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals.
o RA 5434 does not include the Bureau of Immigration. The decisions of the Bureau of
Immigration are subject to judicial review in accordance with 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of
the Administrative Code:

Sec. 25. Judicial Review.(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in
accordance with this chapter and applicable laws.

xxx xxx xxx

(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in
any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the
RTC except those specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of
Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be
reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
While it is true that Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and
hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship and that a
mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction
in deportation proceedings, the Court carved out an exception in Chua Hiong v Deportation Board:
o When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the
deportation proceedings.
Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the claim of citizenship is so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct.
 Hence, Gatchalians petitions before the RTCs contained a proper and ripe controversy for the
disposition of the courts. He also presented sufficient documents and other evidence to his
petitions.

WoN Arocha v Vivo and Vivo v Arca already settled the respondents alienage (i.e., res judicata). NO.
The party to the case was Pedro Gatchalian (Williams uncle). Moreover, the cases did not
categorically make any statement that William Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen. Generally, res
judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship except in the following case (stated in Burca v
Republic):
o A person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party;
o The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and
o The finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Such elements are not present in the case at bar.

WoN the arrest of respondent based on the warrant of exclusion is valid. NO.
Pursuant to 37(a) of the Immigration Act, an arrest can only be effected after a determination
by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien.
Moreover, the mission ordered issued by petitioner only for purposes of investigation. The
mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final
order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
Petitioners also omitted the fact that Acting Commissioner Nituda issued a memorandum in 1973
that recommended the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of
Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No.
1 and the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against applicants.
Such was the last official act of the government that is the basis of which respondent William
Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the
presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.
Also took note that the basis for the warrant of exclusion is that the cablegram issued by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs was forged. Even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the
mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country.

WoN the ground for deportation already prescribed. YES.

The warrant of arrest came 28 years after the alleged cause of action arose in 1962. The warrant
was issued by Commissioner Domingo only in 1990.
37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest
in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation
arises."
In any case, the warrant of exclusion was already recalled by Acting Commissioner Nituda in 1973.
45 of the Immigration Act imposes the penalty of a fine not more than one thousand
pesos, imprisonment for not more than two years, and deportation if he is an alien. For such
correctional penalties, the prescriptive period is 10 years.
The Court also cited 1 of Act No. 3326 that states:
o "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years
 o No prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the
Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, it being a
special law.
Deportation actions are not imprescriptible. In Lao Gi v CA, the Court stated:
o Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting
the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process
should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly
on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.
o Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the
lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory.
Since his entry into the country, Gatchalian also contributed to the economy by providing jobs and
investing.

WoN there is proof that Santiagos children were born out of wedlock. NO.
Following the principle of lex loci celebrationis: a marriage formally valid where it is celebrated is
valid everywhere.
Santiagos attestation that the marriage was valid is competent evidence as statements or
declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (34, Rule 130 of the
RoC).
Since the marriage is valid, it follows that Williams father Francisco (Santiagos son) follows the
Filipino citizenship of his father. And since William is also a legitimate child of Francisco, he is a
Filipino citizen.

DISPOSITION: Petitions dismissed.

Feliciano, J. Dissenting Opinion:

The warrant of exclusion remains valid. Respondent and his co-applicants failed to substantiate
and prove their claim to Filipino citizenship.
Respondent William Gatchalian does not claim Philippine citizenship by any mode of
entitlement subsequent to his application for entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by
any act or circumstance subsequent to his birth and supposed filiation as a legitimate son of
Francisco Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines.
The validity of Pedro Gatchalians citizenship, which was the controversy in Arocha v Vivo,
included that of his other co-applicants (William et al).
The Court in that decision upheld that validity of the July 6, 1962 order. Since respondent William
Gatchalian does not claim to have been naturalized as a Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6
July 1962 BOC Decision, he must accordingly be held to be not a Philippine citizen.
The prescriptive period does not apply. Deportation may be effected at any time after entry. The
NBI recommended the filing of charges in 1990.
Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country
by the simple passage of time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to admission as
Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, after having been
initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which rendered them liable to
deportation.
Reliance on Act. No. 3266 is also misplaced. The Act refers to criminal prosecutions under special
laws.
 The recall of arrests in the memorandum issued by Nituda has no effect. The Commissioner is not
higher than the BOC itself, hence the appellate proceedings vested in the BSI.
Respondents petition for rehearing was filed more than 10 years after the 1962 order.
In Arocha, the Court held that individual actions of members of the BOC are legally ineffective:
o Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its
constitution as a Board. The Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely in
order that they should deliberate collectively and in order that their views and Ideas should
be exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion.

Davide, J. Dissenting Opinion:

The questioned acts of the Boards were done absolutely within their quasi-judicial functions,
hence 9(3) of BP 129 is applicable.
Gatchalian committed forum shopping. Since he is a resident of Valenzuela, there is no reason for
him to file the petition with the RTC of Manila.

Lao Gi v CA (1989) 180 SCRA 756

J. Gancayo
Facts:
Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice.
However, this was revoked when his fathers citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and
misrepresentation.
Charges of deportation were filed against the Chias. Charges also alleged that they refused to register as
aliens and that they committed acts of undesirability.
The Chias said that the CID has no authority to deport them which was denied by the CID.
They filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of preliminary injunction which was dismissed for
lack of merit. Their MFR was also denied.
Earlier, Manuel Chias case of falsification of public documents in alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He
was alleged to have done this for the sale of real property. The trial court acquitted him by saying that
Opinion 191 was res judicata and cant be contravened by Opinion 147.
The CID set the hearing for the deportation case against the Chias and told them to register as aliens. The
Chias tooks further action. Their petition for injunctive relief was denied by the CFI of Manila.
They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias mfr was denied.
In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They argued that they werent subject to
immediate deportation, the presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CAs overstepping of appellate
jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didnt make a ruling that the petitioner entered the Philippines
by false pretenses.

Issue:
1. Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the deportation?

Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine if they are really aliens

Ratio:
Section 37 of the Immigration act states:
SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence
of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry. (As amended by Sec. 13,
Rep. Act No. 503.) ...
There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged, particularly illegal entry into the
country. Only after the hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive finding from the
CID that they are aliens before compelling them to register as such. This power is the police power to
protect the state from undesirable aliens injurious to the public good.
Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same law, it is provided
that:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without
being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary language for the person to be
informed and for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst must be in
accordance with the rules on criminal procedure.
On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is the sole concern of the state. There
is no justification for a private party to intervene.

MIRANDA VS DEPORTATION BOARD

FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to restrain respondent from hearing the
Deportation case filed against petitioners and, incidentally, to have an order issued requiring respondent
to show cause why petitioners should not be released on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

On November 17, 1952, petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board with having entered the
Philippines through fraud and misrepresentation in that, being the children of Chinese parents, they
succeeded in showing through misrepresentation that they are the legitimate children of Faustino
Miranda, a Filipino citizen, had with a woman named Puy Siok and that, by reason of such
misrepresentation, they were landed in this country as children of a Filipino citizen. Because of these
charges, petitioners were arrested and detained at the detention station of the Bureau of Immigration
although later they were set at liberty upon posting a bond of P1,000 each.

On June 18, 1953, petitioners filed a motion to quash the case alleging that they are Filipino citizens and,
therefore, the Deportation Board has no jurisdiction over them.

ISSUE: Is the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board is confined to persons who are admittedly aliens and
are found to be undesirable? NO

HELD: The mere plea of citizenship does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners
should make "a showing that his claim is not frivolous" (Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S., 275), and must
prove by sufficient evidence that they are Filipino citizens. [Kessler v. Strecker (1939) 307 U. S., 21, 35-
36. ] If such is the primary duty of petitioners, it follows that the Deportation Board has the necessary
power to pass upon the evidence that may be presented and determine in the first instance if petitioners
are Filipino citizen or not. This is inherent in, or essential to the efficient exercise of, the power of the
Deportation Board (Laurencio v. Collector of Customs, 35 Phil., 37.) It is not therefore correct to state that
the question of citizenship should be determined exclusively by the courts.

regard to the contention that the Deportation Board has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in allowing the taking of a blood test upon the persons of petitioners to prove that
they are not Filipino citizens, the same need not now be considered, it being a matter that said Board can
look into in the exercise its incidental power to pass upon the citizenship of petitioners.