1. Zialcita et al vs Philippine Airlines, Inc.

FACTS:

Zialcita is a stewardess of PAL. She was fired from work because she had gotten married. PAL argued and cited its
policy that stewardesses must be single. The policy also states that subsequent marriage of a stewardess shall
automatically terminate employment.

Zialcita anchored on Article 136 of the Labor Code. PAL sought refuge from Article 132.

Article 132 provides, "Article 132. Facilities for women. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall establish
standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees. In appropriate cases, he shall, by regulations,
require any employer to: To determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination
in special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Zialcitas termination is proper?

LAW:

Article 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly
or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage."

CASE HISTORY:

This case is decided by the office of the President.

RESOLUTION:

The termination was improper. First of all, during the time Zialcita was terminated, no regulation had yet been
issued by the Secretary of Labor to implement Article 132. Second, even assuming that the Secretary of Labor had
already issued such a regulation and to the effect that stewardesses should remain single, such would be in violation
of Article 136 of the Labor Code.

Article 136's protection of women is broader and more powerful than the regulation provided under Article 132.

OPINION:
The policy of the Philippines Airlines which states that flight attendant applicant must be single and will be automatically
separated from employment in the event that they will subsequently get married is discriminatory and unconstitutional
and should not be served as an example to other companies or establishments.

2. REYES vs NLRC and KONG HUA SCHOOL

FACTS:

In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner, a former school teacher in the respondent Kong Hua School, assails the
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dismissing her claim for separation pay.

Petitioner started teaching in the respondent school in August 1972. She went on maternity leave effective August
26 up to October 10, 1982. In view of complications resulting from the delivery of her child, she asked for a leave
extension. On September 13, 1983, upon the advice of the school principal, she submitted the following letter of
resignation. When the school opened in June 1985, the petitioner, who had in the meantime fully regained her
health, applied for reinstatement, but the school refused to re-hire her.

ISSUE:

Is the petition of Reyes meritorious?

LAW:

CASE HISTORY:

Labor Arbiter: Dismissed the petition of Reyes.

NLRC: Dismissed Reyes appeal.

RULING:

Supreme court ruled in favor of Reyes. The respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion when
it disregarded facts in the records proving that the petitioner's supposed "resignation" was involuntary, that it was in
fact procured by her employer on the promise that she would be given priority for re-employment and in
consideration of immediately paying her two months vacation which she desperately needed then because she was
ill. As stated in her letter: "I wish to get my two months vacation salary dated April-May 1982. In connection with
this am (sic) tendering my resignation as advised and wished by the administration on conditions that I'll be given
priority to be accepted when the time comes when I will be ready to render service to the school."
 In the same letter, she expressed the hope that the school administration "will be true and sincere to their
promise," and that it would release her vacation pay "as soon as possible because I need it very badly." These
circumstances prove beyond cavil that the petitioner was forced to resign. Her resignation was involuntary.

The school had no right to disapprove petitioner's application for an indefinite leave of absence due to
illness caused by the delivery of her child and to force her to resign instead. Article 133(b) of the Labor Code
provides:

ART. 133(b). The maternity leave shall be extended without pay on account of illness medically certified to
arise out of the pregnancy, delivery, abortion, or miscarriage, which renders the woman unfit for work,
unless she has earned unused leave credits from which such extended leave may be charged.

The school must have realized that it could not dismiss the petitioner for health reasons under Art. 284 of
the Labor Code because apparently her illness was not "prejudicial . . . as well . . . to the health of her co-employees"
nor the kind that would have legally prohibited her continued employment, and, even if her service was terminable
on account of illness.

OPINION:

The schools refusal in bad faith to re-employ her despite its promise to do so, amounted to illegal
dismissal. Consequently, she is entitled to be reinstated with three years back wages. Therefore, the petition is
meritorious.

3. APEX MINING COMPANY vs NLRC

FACTS:

Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a regular employee of the said
firm? This is the novel issue raised in this petition.

Private respondent Sinclitica Candido was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973 to
perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid
on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was
ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.

On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she
accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila de la
Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with
her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P2,000.00 which
was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to
return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment
and got a favorable decision and ordered that APEX Mining should pay the complainant.

Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
where-in in due course a decision was rendered by the Fifth Division thereof on July 20, 1989 dismissing the appeal
for lack of merit and affirming the appealed decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a
resolution of the NLRC dated June 29, 1990.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a regular employee
of the said firm?

LAW:

Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms househelper or domestic
servant are defined as follows: The term househelper as used herein is synonymous to the term domestic
servant and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employers
home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and
ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family.

CASE HISTORY:

Private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment. After the parties
submitted their position papers as required by the labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24, 1988 the latter
rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, Conformably With The Foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent, Apex
Mining Company, Inc., Masara, Davao del Norte, to pay the complainant, to wit:

1. Salary Differential - P16,289.20

2. Emergency Living Allowance - 12,430.00

3. 13th Month Pay Differential - 1,322.32.

4. Separation Pay (One-month for every year of service [1973-1988]) - 25,119.30

or in the total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS AND 42/100 (P55,161.42).

SO ORDERED.1

Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
where-in in due course a decision was rendered by the Fifth Division thereof on July 20, 1989 dismissing the appeal
for lack of merit and affirming the appealed decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a
resolution of the NLRC dated June 29, 1990.
Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari, which appopriately should be a special civil action for certiorari,
and which in the interest of justice, is hereby treated as such.

RESOLUTION:

The petition is devoid of merit.

Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms househelper or domestic
servant are defined as follows:

The term househelper as used herein is synonymous to the term domestic servant and shall refer to any person,
whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employers home and which services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort
and enjoyment of the employers family.3

The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such house-helper or domestic servant who is employed in the
employers home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family. Such
definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar
househelps.

The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company,
like petitioner who attends to the needs of the companys guest and other persons availing of said facilities. By the
same token, it cannot be considered to extend to the driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the
company, the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be considered as within the meaning of a househelper or
domestic servant as above-defined by law.

The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer.
While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in
a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance
they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship
engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the
staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the
company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.

OPINION:

I strongly agree to the decision of the court that the complainant cannot be considered as a househelper or
domestic servant as contemplated under the Labor Code. She is regular employee of the employer and not as a
mere family househelper or domestic servant because she servant is working within the premises of the business of
the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business for its guest or even for its officers and employees.

4. DEL MONTE vs VELASCO

FACTS:

Lolita M. Velasco (respondent) started working with Del Monte Philippines (petitioner) on October 21,
1976 as a seasonal employee and was regularized on May 1, 1977. Her latest assignment was as Field Laborer.

Lolita Velasco, respondent herein was dismissed by the petitioner Del Monte Philippines due to excessive
absences without permission. The respondent alleged that her absences was due to urinary tract infection,
pregnancy-borne and that she filed an application for leave to her supervisor. She also went to see the company
doctor for check-up and was advised to rest for four days.

ISSUES:

Was Lolita Velasco illegally dismissed on account of her pregnancy?

LAW:

Art. 135 of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:

Labor Arbiter: Dismissed Velascos complaint for lack of merit.

NLRC: Ruled in favor of Velasco, dismissal is illegal.

CA: Affirmed NLRCs decision favoring Del Monte

RULING:

Yes. The respondents sickness was pregnancy-related and, therefore, the petitioner cannot terminate
respondents services because in doing so, petitioner will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an
employer to discharge an employee on account of the latters pregnancy.

The undeniable fact is that during her complained absences in 1994, respondent was pregnant and suffered
related illnesses. Again, it must be stressed that respondents discharge by reason of absences caused by her
pregnancy is covered by the prohibition under the Labor Code. Since her last string of absences is justifiable and had
been subsequently explained, the petitioner had no legal basis in considering these absences together with her prior
infractions as gross and habitual neglect.

OPINION:

The respondents sickness was pregnancy-related and, therefore, the petitioner cannot terminate respondents
services because in doing so, petitioner will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to
discharge an employee on account of the latters pregnancy.
5. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company
vs. NLRC

FACTS:

Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a Supernumerary Project Worker,
for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity
leave.1 Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be
immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and
from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondents services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner,
this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. After August 8, 1991, and
pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.

On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary
employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled
up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.

It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements
which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its
branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15,
1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the companys policy
of not accepting married women for employment.

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&Ts policy
regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.
Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the
company effective January 29, 1992, which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal,
coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch
of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&Ts policy
regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.
Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the
company effective January 29, 1992, which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal,
coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch
of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.

At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent volunteered the information,
and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of
P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. All of these
took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for violating Article 136 of the Labor Code?

LAW:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage.It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly
that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

CASE HISTORY:

On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private
respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her
reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor
arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent
was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company rules.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter
and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and
unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT&T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the
qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her
acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter,
including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT&T.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution of
November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and
respondent NLRC, as well as the denial resolution of the latter.

RESOLUTION:

In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers
by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the
company were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for
employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch
supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that youre fully aware that the company is
not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you.Again, in the termination notice
sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the
service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her
violation of the companys policy against marriage (and even told you that married women employees are not
applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.) Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made
to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by
its highest ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation.

Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain
a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company
policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a
just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee and not on the employers caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.

In the present controversy, petitioners expostulations that it dismissed private respondent, not because the latter got
married but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks
dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her dismissal. Petitioner would asseverate,
therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact.
This improbable reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent may well be
minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around.

Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a
woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise
assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a
privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true
that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient,
the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical
consequences, it may even be said that petitioners policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or
common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

OPINION:

I strongly agree to the decision of the Supreme Court that Philippine Telephone Company is not only in
derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code which gives a right to all women to be free from
any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it also assaults good morals
and public policy, which deprives a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all
accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.

6. ZAMORA vs SY

FACTS:

Zamora is a stewardess of PAL. She was fired from work because she had gotten married. PAL argued and cited its
policy that stewardesses must be single. The policy also states that subsequent marriage of a stewardess shall
automatically terminate employment.

Zialcita anchored on Article 136 of the Labor Code. PAL sought refuge from Article 132.
Article 132 provides, "Article 132. Facilities for women. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall establish
standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees. In appropriate cases, he shall, by regulations,
require any employer to: To determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination
in special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Zamoras termination is proper?

LAW:

Article 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly
or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage."

CASE HISTORY:

This case is decided by the office of the President.

RESOLUTION:

The termination was improper. First of all, during the time Zamora was terminated, no regulation had yet been
issued by the Secretary of Labor to implement Article 132. Second, even assuming that the Secretary of Labor had
already issued such a regulation and to the effect that stewardesses should remain single, such would be in violation
of Article 136 of the Labor Code.

Article 136's protection of women is broader and more powerful than the regulation provided under Article 132.

OPINION:

The policy of the Philippines Airlines which states that flight attendant applicant must be single and will be automatically
separated from employment in the event that they will subsequently get married is discriminatory and unconstitutional
and should not be served as an example to other companies or establishments.

6. STAR PAPER CORPORATION vs SIMBOL

FACTS:

According to the respondents, Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily. They were compelled to
resign in view of an illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with
co-worker Zuiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he got her pregnant, she
discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the
company policy.

On November 30, 1999, she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate
for twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work on December21, 1999 but she found out that her name was on-hold
at the gate. She was denied entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff handed
her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign
the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to explain.
The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of the explanation, she was
nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation
in exchange for her thirteenth month pay. Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive
dismissal, separation pay and attorneys fees.

ISSUES:

Is the 1995 Policy/Regulation of the company violative of the Constitutional rights towards marriage and
the family of employees and of article 136 of the Labor Code?

LAW:

Article 136 of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:

Labor Arbiter: Ruled in favor of Star Paper Corporation

NLRC: Affirmed Labor Arbiters decision

CA: Reversed and set aside NLRCs decision.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the 1987 Constitution under Article II, Section 18; Article XIII, Section 3
state our policy towards the protection of labor under the following provisions. The Civil Code likewise protects
labor with the following provisions such as articles 1700 and 1702.The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece
of legislation protecting labor.

The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides that it shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not
get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of her marriage. In denying the contention of the petitioner company, the SC applied the two
factors to justify a bona fide occupational qualification: Since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification
justifies an employers no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly. There must be a
compelling business necessity for which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice. To justify a
bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the
job.

The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify as a valid
exercise of management prerogative was also at issue in the 1997 case of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Company v. NLRC. In said case, the employee was dismissed in violation of petitioners policy of disqualifying
from work any woman worker who contracts marriage. We held that the company policy violates the right against
discrimination afforded all women workers under Article 136 of the Labor Code, but established a permissible
exception, viz.: A requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a bona fide
occupational qualification, or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on
the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that
nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.
The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to
uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable
business necessity. The burden was successfully discharged in Duncan but not in PT&T. The SC do not find a
reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. Petitioners sole contention that the company did not just want to
have two (2) or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity is lame.
That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the
valid reasonable business necessity required by the law. It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents
were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee.

Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit,
then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners
explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting
Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere
fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid
justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the
expense of an employee s right to security of tenure. Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one
employee marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy
may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate
impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the
discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in
imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based
upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company. Decision of the CA affirmed

OPINION:

The policy of the Starpaper Corporation which states that female applicant must be single and will be automatically
separated from employment in the event that they will subsequently get married is discriminatory and unconstitutional
and should not be served as an example to other companies or establishments.
8. Gualberto vs Marinduque Mining Corporation

FACTS:

The company employed plaintiff Olympia Gualberto as a dentist in 1971 while she was still single. She married
Roberto, another employee (electrical engineer) of the company, in 1972. The company informed her that she was
regarded to have resigned her office, invoking the firms policy that stipulated that female employees were regarded
to automatically terminate their employment the moment they got married. Olympia filed a claim for compensation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an employer may terminate an employee by reason of marriage.

LAW:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage.It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly
that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

CASE HISTORY:

The Court of Appeals not only upheld her claim for damages but also awarded exemplary damages, and held, inter
alia: No employer may require female applicants for jobs to enter into pre-employment arrangements that they
would be dismissed once they get married and afterwards expect the Courts to sustain such an agreement.

RESOLUTION:

No. The judgment of the Court of Appeals held that such policy is considered as void a policy. In said case,
respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to consider female
employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for
married women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral
understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as
an example of discriminatory chauvinism tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women
simply on account of their sex, the appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its
repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.

OPINION:
The contention of Marinduque Mining Corporation that they are not allowing female employees in their company
because they lack facilities for married women is absurd and their policy is void and unconstitutional. They also violated,
not only the provision of Article 136 of the Labor Code, but also their policy is against the law, morals and public policy.

9. REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. vs

CASTANEDA

FACTS:

Erlinda Castaneda instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of
overtime services, non-payment of SIL pay and non-payment of 13th month pay against Remington Industrial Sales
Corp. before the NLRC-NCR. Erlinda alleged that she started working in 1983 as company cook for Remington, a
corporation engaged in the trading business and that she continuously worked with Remington until she was
unceremoniously prevented from reporting for work when Remington transferred to a new site.

Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a
regular employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had nothing to do with Remingtons business of trading in
construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire rope products.

In a Decision, the LA dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondent was a domestic helper under
the personal service of Antonio Tan (the Managing Director), finding that her work as a cook was not usually
necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade and business of the petitioner corporation, and that the latter
did not exercise control over her functions. On the issue of illegal dismissal, the labor arbiter found that it was the
respondent who refused to go with the family of Antonio Tan when the corporation transferred office and that,
therefore, respondent could not have been illegally dismissed.

ISSUES:

Is Castaneda a regular employee or a domestic servant?

LAW:

Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:

Labor Arbiter: Ruled in favor of Remington.

NLRC: Reversed the Labor Arbiters decision.

 CA: Ruled in favor of Castaneda

RULING:

She is a REGULAR EMPLOYEE. In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that a
househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company was a regular employee of the said firm. We ratiocinated
that: Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms househelper or domestic
servant are defined as follows:

The term househelper as used herein is synonymous to the term domestic servant and shall refer to any
person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employers home and which
services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers
exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family.

The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the
employers home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family. Such
definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and similar
househelpers.

The criteria are the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said
employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a
home or in a company staff house may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former
instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered
in the staff houses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of
the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.

Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of
the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such an employee.
The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is
working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as
in its staff houses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper
or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and NOT as a mere family
househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.

In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper that respondent worked at the company
premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its employees lunch and meribendan. Clearly, the situs, as well as
the nature of respondents work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but also to
that of the petitioners employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee under the
doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. That she works within company premises, and that she does not cater
exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of the petitioners right
of CONTROL over her functions, which is the PRIMARY indicator of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.

OPINION:
Clearly, the situs, as well as the nature of respondents work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and
his family but also to that of the petitioners employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular
employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case.

10. Phil. Labor Assistance Corporation vs NLRC

FACTS:

Dissatisfied with her income as a DSWD social worker, Leonora Dayag applied with petitioner Philippine Integrated
Labor Assistance Corporation (PHILAC) for employment abroad. After complying with the requirements for
overseas employment, Dayag paid a placement fee of P22,500 on five different occasions. PHILAC, however, did
not issue complete receipts covering such payments informing Dayag that such receipts are unnecessary because
the payments were recorded in a log book.

On January 11, 1992, Dayag signed an employment contract with PHILAC providing for a fixed two-year term as a
domestic helper/babysitter in Hongkong with a monthly salary HK$3,200 and an allowance of HK$20/day. She left
for Hongkong on May 7, 1992 and started working the following day as the domestic helper of Roger Chan Hongs
family. On the seventh day of her work, Dayag was suddenly told by Mr. Hongs wife to pack-up and leave at
once. She was given HK$750 for the services rendered. Upon her return, Dayag filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, illegal exaction for non-issuance of receipts and payment of HK$76,000 (salary and allowance) for the
unexpired portion of the contract with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). PHILAC
countered that Dayags dismissal was for cause due to dishonesty and misrepresentation in her application that
she was previously employed as a househelper and that she is an experienced baby sitter thereby allegedly exposing
Mr. Hongs baby to risks.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dayag was illegally dismissed and also entitled to be given 15 day salary for the unexpired portion
of the contract.

LAW:

ART. 149. Indemnity for unjust termination of services.If the period of household service is fixed, neither the
employer nor the househelper may terminate the contract before the expiration of the term, except for a just cause. If
the househelper is unjustly dismissed, he or she shall be paid the compensation already earned plus that for fifteen
(15) days by way of indemnity.

If the househelper leaves without justifiable reason, he or she shall forfeit any unpaid salary due him or her not
exceeding fifteen (15) days.
CASE HISTORY:

The POEA found that Dayag was dismissed without cause and ordered PHILAC to pay her HK$76,053.18
or its peso equivalent for the unexpired portion of the contract.
PHILAC appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but limited its appeal on the
award of salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract.
The appeal was dismissed.
Hence, this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent NLRC for
affirming the findings of facts and conclusion of the POEA which are not supported by substantial
evidence

RESOLUTION:

The petition has no merit. The findings of the POEA that Dayag was dismissed without just cause can no longer be
reviewed. It is already final considering that PHILAC limited its appeal to the NLRC only on the monetary award.
Besides, findings of facts of the POEA and the NLRC, as quasi-judicial bodies exercising particular expertise, are
accorded great respect and even finality if supported by substantial evidence. Our review of the records failed to
convince us that the assailed findings of the agencies below are not supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore,
PHILAC has the burden of proving that the dismissal of Dayag was for a just or lawful cause,16 which burden
PHILAC failed to discharge.

The 15-day salary is awarded in the form of an indemnity due to unjust dismissal, i.e., dismissal without just cause
and notice and before the lapse of the contract term. The amount is in addition to and not a substitute for the
househelpers salary for the unexpired portion of the contract. The salary for the unexpired portion of the contract,
as a settled rule, is awarded as a result of the violation of her security of tenure under the contract term

Petitioners interpretation of the word payment under clause 12(b) to refer to the salary for the unexpired portion
of the contract is therefore misplaced. The payment contemplated by the parties in their contract is more in the
concept of a penalty or damages arising from the manner of the dismissal. In any event, ambiguities in a contract are
interpreted against the party that caused the ambiguity, which in this case is PHILAC, the party that drafted and
caused the inclusion of the subject clause.

Petitioner, as the recruiter and agent of the foreign employer, is solidarily liable with the latter for such violations
and for the corresponding award. However, considering that Dayag failed to appeal the monetary award given by the
POEA, we cannot therefore grant her the additional affirmative relief constituting the 15-day indemnity award
which the POEA and the NLRC failed to grant.

OPINIION:

I am saddened by the outcome of this case because Dayags counsel overlooked the monetary award and failed to appeal
to the POEA and deprives Dayag to have additional affirmative relief constituting the 15-day indemnity award in which
the POEA and the NLRC failed to grant.