G.R. No.

174321 October 22, 2013

ROLANDO GANZON, Petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO ARLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A government employee who is found guilty of grave misconduct may be dismissed from the service even upon the first
offense.
The Case
Petitioner Rolando Ganzon, an employee of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), seeks the reversal
of his dismissal from the service and the accessory penalties on the ground of grave misconduct.
Antecedents
The DILG Regional Office in Port San Pedro, Iloilo City held its Christmas party on December 17, 1999 at the office
parking lot. When the Christmas party was about to end at 7:30 in the evening, respondent Fernando Arlos (Arlos), then
the OIC Provincial Director of DILG, left to get some documents from the Office of the Operations Division located at the
second floor of the building. While Arlos was making his way to the stairs, Ganzon suddenly approached and pulled out a
short firearm of unknown caliber from his waist and with no provocation pointed the firearm at Arlos, angrily shouting in
Ilongo: Nanding, hulat anay. Diin ang boss mo? Nga-a nga wala man nya ako guin-patawag? 1 Arlos responded: Ato ti sir
Orendez sa may program. May kuhaon lang ako sa ibabaw. 2 Arlos parried Ganzons firearm-wielding hand and tried to
proceed towards the stairs, but Ganzon blocked his path, pushed him back, and again pointed the firearm at Arlos chest.
Sensing that Ganzon would shoot him then, Arlos quickly warded off Ganzons firearm-wielding hand. At that instant, the
firearm exploded and the bullet hit the floor. Ganzon again aimed the firearm at Arlos, prompting the latter to run away as
fast as he could. Ganzon followed Arlos, and when they got to the gate of the building, Ganzon once more pushed him
back and pointed the firearm at him, saying: Patay ka! 3 Ganzon held the firearm close to his waistline to conceal it from
the view of the other people present at the time.
At around 9:45 in the morning of December 21, 1999, Arlos went to the DILG office to see the Regional Director upon the
latters instruction. Ganzon, who was then standing near the entrance to the building, shouted upon seeing Arlos enter the
gate: O, ti ano?,4 obviously still referring to the incident of December 17, 1999. Arlos answered: Ang kadto ko diri indi
away, kundi makigkita ako sa kay Director.5
The incidents of December 17, 1999 and December 21, 1999 impelled Arlos to administratively charge Ganzon with grave
misconduct.
On his part, Ganzon denied the charge and elected to undergo a formal investigation. During the formal investigation
conducted by Regional Office No. 6 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC Regional Office), the parties agreed that in
order to dispense with the presentation of witnesses and other evidence, they would just adopt the evidence presented in
the pending criminal prosecution for attempted homicide (Criminal Case No. 648-2000 entitled People v. Ganzon ) in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (Branch 1) in Iloilo City arising from the same incident. 6 Accordingly, Arlos was directed to
submit the complete transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 648-2000.
The witnesses for the Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 648-2000 were Arlos, DILG employee Nestor Sayno, DILG
Provincial Director Eliseo Orendez, and Fernando Totesora, Jr., the security guard then assigned at the DILG Regional
Office. They attested to what had transpired in the evening of December 17, 1999, specifically, that Ganzon had
threatened and aimed a firearm at Arlos.7
In his turn, Ganzon presented himself and two others, namely, Bobby Pepino, also an employee of the DILG Regional
Office, and Voltaire Guides.8 They described a different version of the incident, to wit:
ROLANDO GANZON testified that he is presently assigned with the Planning Unit of DILG. He has been connected with
the DILG for twenty-five (25) years. From 1994 to 1999 he was assigned as DILG Officer of the Municipality of Barotac
Viejo, Iloilo. In September 1999, he transferred to the Regional Office. On December 17, 1999, about 7:30 in the evening,
he was with Bobby Pepino and Voltaire Guides waiting for the drinks to be served to guests in their Christmas Party.
Fernando Arlos arrived and asked them what they were doing at the lobby. He answered that they were waiting for the
drinks to be served.
Fernando said that they should be getting better performance ratings. He immediately responded that sometimes
performance ratings are disregarded or even changed. Fernando got angry, and in order to avoid further discussion,
Rolando stood up. At that time, guests were starting to arrive. Fernando pushed his body against Rolando at the same
time raising his right hand. Rolando held his hand; Fernando raised his left but again Rolando held it. They then pushed
and shoved each other to the gate.
At the gate, Fernando immediately left. Rolando went back to the administrative office to take his dinner. After eating, he
went to the quadrangle to watch the program. At the quadrangle, he saw Provincial Director Orendez, Regional Director
Reyes, and Presidential Consultant Jonathan Sanico. He stayed there up to 2 oclock in the morning. During that time no
policeman came to arrest him.
He further testified that before the incident he had no grudge or ill feeling against Fernando Arlos. He also testified about
the hole located at the lobby of the Regional Office. He said that no shell or slug was recovered in connection with the
subject incident. He testified about the change made on his performance rating and that he would often meet Fernando
Arlos and no altercation or heated argument transpired between them. 9
Ruling of CSC Regional Office
On February 7, 2002, the CSC Regional Office rendered its decision finding Ganzon guilty of grave misconduct, ruling
thusly:
WHEREFORE, Rolando Ganzon is hereby found guilty of Grave Misconduct and meted out the penalty of dismissal from
the service with all its accessory penalties.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished Fernando Arlos, Rolando Ganzon, Atty. Virgilio Teruel, Atty. Rey Padilla, Director
Rexdito Reyes of DILG Regional Office No. 6, Iloilo City, the GSIS Branch Manager in Iloilo City and Director Purita H.
Escobia of CSC Iloilo Provincial Office at their known addresses. 10
Ruling of CSC Main
Ganzon appealed to the Civil Service Commission Main Office (CSC), which affirmed the contested ruling of the CSC
Regional Office on January 27, 2004, to wit:
WHEREFORE , the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED . The decision of the Civil Service Regional Office No. VI finding
Rolando Ganzon guilty of grave misconduct and penalizing him with dismissal from the service, is affirmed in all aspects.
It should be understood that the penalty of dismissal as imposed in this case carries with it such accessory penalties as
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and disqualification from public employment. 11
Ganzon moved for a reconsideration, but his motion to that effect was denied through the resolution dated November 9,
2004.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Ganzon appealed by petition for review in the Court of Appeals (CA), submitting the following issues, namely:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER WAS ESSENTIALLY
CONNECTED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFENSE CHARGED CAN BE CONSIDERED AS SERVICE CONNECTED
DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT ESSENTIALLY CONNECTED WITH THE OFFICE OF THE PETITIONER
AND WAS NOT PERPETRATED WHILE IN PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL FUNCTION.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CAN HOLD LIABLE THE PETITIONER FOR
GRAVE MISCONDUCT DESPITE HIS ACQUITTAL IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FILED AGAINST HIM.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL IS UNJUST AND EXCESSIVE. 12
On February 15, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision affirming the ruling of the CSC, 13 thus:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the present petition, the same is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed judgments
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
On August 3, 2006, the CA denied Ganzons motion for reconsideration. 14
Issues
Hence, Ganzon has appealed to the Court upon the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT ATTENDING A CHRISTMAS PARTY AS REQUIRED BY THE OFFICE IS AN OFFICIAL
FUNCTION AND THAT ANY UNTOWARD INCIDENT COMMITTED DURING SUCH CHRISTMAS PARTY IS
AUTOMATICALLY CONSIDERED SERVICE RELATED AND THAT THE OFFENDER COULD BE LIABLE FOR
GRAVE MISCONDUCT?
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ACT COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER WAS INTIMATELY RELATED
TO HIS OFFICE IN ORDER TO CONSIDER IT AS GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE
LAW.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL IS UNJUST AND EXCESSIVE. 15
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and
duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. 16
In accordance with Section 46 of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292),
misconduct is among the grounds for disciplinary action, but no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. It is cogent to mention that the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service , which governs the conduct of disciplinary and non-
disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, classifies grave misconduct as a grave administrative offense. 17
Did Ganzons act of aiming his loaded firearm at Arlos and menacing him with it constitute grave misconduct in the context
of the foregoing provisions?
Undoubtedly it did. Drawing and pointing the loaded firearm at Arlos evinced the intent on the part of Ganzon to cause
some harm upon Arlos on whom he vented his resentment of the poor performance rating he received. Considering that
Ganzon pointed his loaded firearm at Arlos not only once, but four times, Ganzons menacing acts engendered in the mind
of Arlos the well-founded belief that Arlos life could be in imminent danger. That the firearm exploded when Arlos parried
Ganzons firearm-wielding hand did not help dissipate the belief.
Nonetheless, Ganzon projects that his acts did not constitute grave misconduct in the contemplation of the law because
they were not committed in relation to his performance of duty; and that the Christmas party was not an official function as
to render any untoward incident committed on the occasion thereof a misconduct. He posits that his offense could exist
without the office; and that the holding of the office was not a constituent element of his offense.
We disagree.
The Court stressed in Largo v. Court of Appeals18 the criteria that an act, to constitute a misconduct, must not be
committed in his private capacity and should bear a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official
duties.
Ganzons acts met the criteria in Largo v. Court of Appeals . To begin with, he was not acting in a private capacity when he
acted menacingly towards Arlos, it being clear that his resentment of his poor performance rating, surely a matter that
concerned his performance of duty, motivated his confronting the latter. Moreover, it did not matter that his acts were
committed outside of office hours, because they were intimately connected to the office of the offender. An act is intimately
connected to the office of the offender if it is committed as the consequence of the performance of the office by him, or if it
cannot exist without the office even if public office is not an element of the crime in the abstract. This was the thrust in
Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 with the Court citing ample jurisprudence.20
In Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan , one of the two main issues was whether the crime of grave threats charged against the
accused had been committed in relation to his office. The resolution of the issue would determine whether or not it was
the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction to try him. The accused contended that it was not established that the crime
charged had been committed by him while in the discharge of or as the consequence of his official functions as municipal
mayor. He pointed out that public office was not an essential ingredient of grave threats, the crime charged, which could
be committed with the same facility by a public officer and a private individual alike. The Court resolved that the crime
charged was properly within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because the amended information contained
allegations showing that Alarilla had taken advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor when he committed the
crime of grave threats against the complainant, a municipal councilor, by aiming a gun at and threatening to kill the latter
on the occasion of a public hearing during which the latter delivered a privilege speech critical of Alarillas administration.
The Court explained that the crime charged was "intimately connected with the discharge of Alarillas official functions"
because the crime charged was Alarillas response to the complainants attack against his performance as a mayor; and
that if Alarilla was not the mayor, "he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might
have said during said privilege speech."21
Considering that Ganzon resented the poor performance rating he had received, and his resentment caused his
aggressive confrontation of Arlos, it definitely appears that Ganzons offense could not be separated from his performance
of duty. Indeed, under Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan and its progenitor rulings, an act that is the consequence of the discharge
of the employees official functions or the performance of his duties, or that is relevant to his office or to the discharge of
his official functions is justly considered as service-related.
The fact that the acts of Ganzon were committed within the premises of the DILG Regional Office No. 6 strengthens our
view that such acts could not but be connected to Ganzons public employment. Verily, the Court has regarded the
commission of offensive overt acts by public officials and employees within the premises of their public offices to be
deserving of administrative reprobation.
For instance, in Quiroz v. Orfila,22 the court employees conduct of shouting at each other and quarreling within the court
premises and during working hours were considered as exhibiting discourtesy and disrespect to their co-workers and to
the court itself. Their behavior was held to be contrary to the ethical standard demanded by Republic Act No. 6713 (Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
Another illustrative instance is Baloloy v. Flores,23 where the respondent Sherwin M. Baloloy was charged with misconduct
because:
x x x complainant alleged that as he was going back to his office after delivering court documents, he noticed respondent
sitting on a bench, staring menacingly at him. Without any warning, respondent stood up and boxed him several times in
the face. To avoid further harm, complainant ran towards room 315 and once he was inside, the secretary therein locked
the door. Respondent pursued him and started kicking and banging at the door, all the while shouting invectives at him.
Respondent left after apparently sensing the alarm he was causing.
A few minutes after respondents left, complainant left room 315 accompanied by a friend named Demet. They went to
respondents office to report the incident to respondents superior. When they got there, however, they saw respondent
holding a screwdriver, provoking them to fight. The branch clerk of court intervened and requested Demet to take
complainant to the hospital. x x x.
Finding both the complainant as legal researcher and the respondent as process server guilty of misconduct, the Court
ruled that:
We have time and again emphasized that the conduct and behavior or everyone connected with an office charged with
the administration of justice must at all times be characterized by propriety and decorum. This Court will not tolerate
misconduct committed by court personnel, particularly during office hours and within court premises. Such misconduct
shows a total lack of respect for the court, and erodes the good image of the judiciary in the eyes of the public.
Both complainant and respondent have fallen short of the standard of conduct required of court employees. Fighting with
each other during working hours shows disrespect not only of coworkers but also of the court. 24(Emphasis supplied)
Although court employees were involved in the foregoing situations, while the conduct of an employee of the DILG is the
focus herein, the same considerations taken into account in the former are applicable herein.
Even if the affair occurred outside of the regular work hours, Ganzons menacing attitude towards Arlos still had no
excuse, particularly as Arlos was his superior in the office hierarchy. Section 4(c) of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct Standards
for Public Officials and Employees) fittingly provides:
(c) Justness and sincerity. Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with
justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at
all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
It is almost superfluous to remind all public employees like Ganzon that the law of good manners and proper decorum
was law during as well as outside office hours.
Another ground for Ganzons appeal was that the administrative case should not have been resolved independently of the
criminal case; and that his eventual acquittal in the criminal case precluded his administrative liability.
Again, the Court disagrees.
We uphold the CAs following rumination on the matter, viz:
x x x. The mere fact that he was acquitted in the criminal case (said criminal case was based on the same facts or
incidents which gave rise to the instant administrative case) does not
ipso facto absolve him from administrative liability. Time and again, the Supreme Court has laid down the doctrine that an
administrative case is not dependent on the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case because the evidence required in
the proceedings therein is only substantial and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. 25
An administrative case is, as a rule, independent from criminal proceedings.1wphi1 The dismissal of a criminal case on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence or the acquittal of an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative case
does not necessarily preclude the administrative proceeding nor carry with it relief from administrative liability. This is
because the quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings is substantial evidence, unlike in criminal cases
which require proof beyond reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence, according to Section 5 of Rule 133, Rules of Court, is
"that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." In contrast,
proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty; moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 26
Finally, Ganzons insistence that the penalty of dismissal from the service imposed on him was unjustified and excessive
is unwarranted.
After being duly found guilty of grave misconduct, Ganzon was rightly meted the penalty of dismissal from the service for
his first offense conformably with the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 27 to wit:
RULE IV
Penalties
Section 52. Classification of Offenses. Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave,
less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
A The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:
1. Dishonesty;
xxxx
3. Grave Misconduct;
1st offense Dismissal (Emphasis supplied)
In this regard, Section 56 and Section 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
respectively state that the penalty of dismissal shall result in the permanent separation of the respondent from the service,
with or without prejudice to criminal or civil liability, and shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits and the perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in
the decision.
The Court deems it worthwhile to emphasize as a final word that the imposition of the correct disciplinary measures upon
erring public officials and employees has the primary objective of the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the public s faith and confidence in the Government. The punishment of the erring public officials and
employees is secondary, but is nonetheless in accord with the Constitution, which stresses in Section 1 of its Article XI
that a public office is a public trust, and commands that public officers must at all times be accountable to the people,
whom they must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. WHEREFORE the Court AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals and ORDERS petitioner Rolando Ganzon to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 192074 June 10, 2014

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A. ROBLES, Petitioner,
vs.
AURORA A. SALVAA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
An administrative agency has standing to appeal the Civil Service Commission's repeal or modification of its original
decision. In such instances, it is included in the concept of a "party adversely affected" by a decision of the Civil Service
Commission granted the statutory right to appeal:
We are asked in this petition for review1 filed by the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government-owned and
-controlled corporation, to modify the Civil Service Commissions finding that respondent was guilty only of simple
dishonesty.
This case developed as follows:
On May 12, 2006, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles, issued Office Order No. 119,
series of 2006.2 The order revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaas designation as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the LRTA
Administrative Department. It "direct[ed] her instead to handle special projects and perform such other duties and
functions as may be assigned to her"3 by the Administrator.
Atty. Salvaa was directed to comply with this office order through a memorandum issued on May 22, 2006 by Atty. Elmo
Stephen P. Triste, the newly designated OIC of the administrative department. Instead of complying, Salvaa questioned
the order with the Office of the President.4
In the interim, Salvaa applied for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006 and from May 15 to May 31, 2006. 5 In support
of her application, she submitted a medical certificate 6 issued by Dr. Grace Marie Blanco of the Veterans Memorial
Medical Center (VMMC).
LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical certificate. Dr. Blanco also denied having seen or treated
Salvaa on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her medical certificate. 7 On June 23, 2006, Administrator Robles issued a
notice of preliminary investigation. The notice directed Salvaa to explain in writing within 72 hours from her receipt of the
notice "why no disciplinary action should be taken against [her]" 8 for not complying with Office Order No. 119 and for
submitting a falsified medical certificate.9
Salvaa filed her explanation on June 30, 2006. 10 She alleged that as a member of the Bids and Awards Committee, she
"refused to sign a resolution"11 favoring a particular bidder. She alleged that Office Order No. 119 was issued by
Administrator Robles to express his "ire and vindictiveness" 12 over her refusal to sign.
The LRTAs Fact-finding Committee found her explanation unsatisfactory. On July 26, 2006, it issued a formal charge
against her for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.13
On August 5, 2006, "Salvaa tendered her irrevocable resignation." 14 None of the pleadings alleged that this irrevocable
resignation was accepted, although the resolution of the Fact-finding Committee alluded to Administrator Robles
acceptance of the resignation letter.
In the meantime, the investigation against Salvaa continued, and the prosecution presented its witnesses. 15Salvaa
"submitted a manifestation dated September 6, 2006, stating that the Committee was biased and that [Administrator]
Robles was both the accuser and the hearing officer." 16
On October 31, 2006, the Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution "finding Salvaa guilty of all the charges against her
and imposed [on] her the penalty of dismissal from . . . service with all the accessory penalties." 17 The LRTA Board of
Directors approved the findings of the Fact-finding Committee 18
Salvaa appealed with the Civil Service Commission. "In her appeal, [she] claimed that she was denied due process and
that there [was] no substantial evidence to support the charges against her." 19
On July 18, 2007, the Civil Service Commission modified the decision and issued Resolution No. 071364.The Civil
Service Commission found that Salvaa was guilty only of simple dishonesty. She was meted a penalty of suspension for
three months.20
LRTA moved for reconsideration21 of the resolution. This was denied in a resolution dated May 26, 2008. 22 LRTA then filed
a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.23
On November 11, 2009, the Court of Appeals24 dismissed the petition and affirmed the Civil Service Commissions finding
that Salvaa was only guilty of simple dishonesty. The appellate court also ruled that Administrator Robles had no
standing to file a motion for reconsideration before the Civil Service Commission because that right only belonged to
respondent in an administrative case.25 LRTA moved for reconsideration26 of this decision but was denied.27
Hence, LRTA filed this present petition.
Petitioner argues that it has the legal personality to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission before the Court
of Appeals.28 It cites Philippine National Bank v. Garcia29 as basis for its argument that it can be considered a "person
adversely affected" under the pertinent rules and regulations on the appeal of administrative cases. 30 It also argues that
respondents falsification of the medical certificate accompanying her application for sick leave was not merely simple but
serious dishonesty.31
Respondent agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner had no legal personality to file the appeal since it
was not the "person adversely affected" by the decision. She counters that Administrator Robles had no authority to file
the appeal since he was unable to present a resolution from the Board of Directors authorizing him to do so. 32 She also
agrees with the Civil Service Commissions finding that she was merely guilty of simple dishonesty. 33
In its reply,34 petitioner points out that it presented a secretarys certificate 35 dated July 17, 2008 and which it attached to
the petitions before the Civil Service Commission, Court of Appeals, and this court. It argues that the certificate authorizes
the LRTA and its Administrator to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or appeal regarding this case, and this
authorization has yet to be revoked.36
Both parties filed their respective memoranda before this court on May 23, 2012 37 and December 6, 2012.38
The legal issues that will determine the results of this case are:
1. Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the standing to appeal the modification by the Civil
Service Commission of its decision
2. Whether Salvaa was correctly found guilty of simple dishonesty only
We grant the petition.
The parties may appeal in administrative cases involving members of the civil service
It is settled that "[t]he right to appeal is not a natural right [or] a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law." 39 If it is not granted by the
Constitution, it can only be availed of when a statute provides for it. 40 When made available by law or regulation, however,
a person cannot be deprived of that right to appeal. Otherwise, there will be a violation of the constitutional requirement of
due process of law.
Article IX (B), Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that the Civil Service Commission shall be "the central personnel
agency of the Government."41 In line with the constitutionally enshrined policy that a public office is a public trust, the
Commission was tasked with the duty "to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules governing the selection,
utilization, training, and discipline of civil servants." 42
Civil servants enjoy security of tenure, and "[n]o officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed
except for cause as provided by law and after due process." 43 Under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative
Code, it is the Civil Service Commission that has the power to "[h]ear and decide administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on appeal."
The grant of the right to appeal in administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service Law of
1959, appeals "by the respondent"44 were allowed on "[t]he decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service rendered in an
administrative case involving discipline of subordinate officers and employees." 45
Presidential Decree No. 807, while retaining the right to appeal in administrative cases, amended the phrasing of the party
allowed to appeal. Section 37, paragraph (a), and Section 39, paragraph (a),of Presidential Decree No. 807 provide:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
Sec. 39. Appeals. - (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within
fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition shall be decided within fifteen days. (Emphasis supplied)
Additionally, Section 47, paragraph (1), and Section 49, paragraph (1), of the Administrative Code provide:
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
SECTION 49. Appeals.(1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision
within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall
be decided within fifteen days.(Emphasis supplied)
The phrase, "person adversely affected," was not defined in either Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Administrative
Code. This prompted a series of cases46 providing the interpretation of this phrase.
The first of these cases, Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, 47 declared:
Based on [Sections 37 (a) and 39 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807], appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an
administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent
employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days salary demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining
authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. 48 (Emphasis supplied)
This ruling was repeated in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission49 where this court stated that:
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
....
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of
the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no
occasion for appeal.50 (Emphasis supplied)
The same ratio would be reiterated and become the prevailing doctrine on the matter in Magpale, Jr. v. Civil Service
Commission,51 Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone, 52 University of the Philippines v. Civil
Service Commission,53 and Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.54
In these cases, this court explained that the right to appeal being merely a statutory privilege can only be availed of by the
party specified in the law. Since the law presumes that appeals will only be made in decisions prescribing a penalty, this
court concluded that the only parties that will be adversely affected are the respondents that are charged with
administrative offenses. Since the right to appeal is a remedial right that may only be granted by statute, a government
party cannot by implication assert that right as incidental to its power, since the right to appeal does not form part of due
process.55
In effect, this court equated exonerations in administrative cases to acquittals in criminal cases wherein the State or the
complainant would have no right to appeal.56 When the Civil Service Commission enacted the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, or the URACCS, on September 27, 1999, it applied this courts definition. Thus,
Section 2, paragraph (l),Rule I, and Section 38,Rule III of the URACCS defined "party adversely affected" as follows:
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.
....
(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been
rendered.
For some time, government parties were, thus, barred from appealing exonerations of civil servants they had previously
sanctioned. It was not until the promulgation by this court of Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy 57 on April 29, 1999 that
the issue would be revisited.
Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoyand Philippine National Bank v. Garcia
In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,58 an administrative complaint for habitual drunkenness, misconduct, and
nepotism was filed against the Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and Trade in Allen, Northern
Samar. The Civil Service Commission found Dacoycoy guilty, but the Court of Appeals overturned this finding and
exonerated Dacoycoy of all charges. The Civil Service Commission then appealed the ruling of the appellate court. This
court, in addressing the issue of the Commissions standing, stated that:
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty
of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the
respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness
for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling,
which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court
of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the
phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee against whom the administrative
case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary,
transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not
more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is exonerated of
the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service
Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges"
enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service
Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v.
Civil Service Commission.59 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In his concurring opinion, then Chief Justice Puno summed up the rationale for allowing government parties to appeal,
thus:
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the law declares as
"final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty (30) days salary.
But there is a clear policy reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are
numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow their multiple level
appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat the expectation of
fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its deleterious
effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic
acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especially judicial review. It is
thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses cannot be
appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be
appealed.60 (Emphasis supplied)
The decision in Dacoycoy would be reiterated in 2002 when this court promulgated Philippine National Bank v.
Garcia.61 Philippine National Bank categorically allowed the disciplining authority to appeal the decision exonerating the
disciplined employee.
In that case, the bank charged Ricardo V. Garcia, Jr., one of its check processors and cash representatives, with gross
neglect of duty when he lost P7 million in connection with his duties. Both the Civil Service Commission and the Court of
Appeals reversed the bank and exonerated Garcia from all liability.
This court, however, upheld Philippine National Banks right to appeal the case. Citing Dacoycoy, this court ruled:
Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously undermined if we bar appeals of
exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in which acquittals are final
and unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy.
Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to prevent appeals of
administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and pervertedly erode this constitutional grant.
Finally, the Court in Dacoycoy ruled that the CSC had acted well within its rights in appealing the CAs exoneration of the
respondent public official therein, because it has been mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the
integrity of our civil service system. In the same light, herein Petitioner PNB has the standing to appeal to the CA the
exoneration of Respondent Garcia. After all, it is the aggrieved party which has complained of his acts of dishonesty.
Besides, this Court has not lost sight of the fact that PNB was already privatized on May 27, 1996. Should respondent be
finally exonerated indeed, it might then be incumbent upon petitioner to take him back into its fold. It should therefore be
allowed to appeal a decision that in its view hampers its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can
protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in our country. 62 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the Civil
Service Commission issued Resolution No. 021600 published on December 29, 2002, which amended the URACCS, to
allow the disciplining authority to appeal the decision exonerating the employee:
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.
....
(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been
rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee.
Subsequent decisions continued to reiterate the rulings in Dacoycoy and Philippine National Bank.
In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,63 this court explained the rationale of allowing the Civil Service Commission
to appeal decisions of exonerations as follows:
That the CSC may appeal from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals reversing or modifying its resolutions which
may seriously prejudice the civil service system is beyond doubt. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy[,] this Court
held that the CSC may become the party adversely affected by such ruling and the aggrieved party who may appeal the
decision to this Court.
The situation where the CSCs participation is beneficial and indispensable often involves complaints for administrative
offenses, such as neglect of duty, being notoriously undesirable, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties, and the like, where the complainant is more often than not acting merely as a witness for the government
which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In cases of this nature, a ruling of the Court of Appeals favorable to the
respondent employee is understandably adverse to the government, and unavoidably the CSC as representative of the
government may appeal the decision to this Court to protect the integrity of the civil service system.
The CSC may also seek a review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals that are detrimental to its constitutional
mandate as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to establish a career service, adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service, strengthen the
merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to appeal the
adverse decision does not preclude the private complainant in appropriate cases from similarly elevating the decision for
review.64
Then in Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan,65 this court declared:
At the outset, it should be noted that the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the central personnel agency
of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed
to the civil service. Thus, the CSC, as an institution whose primary concern is the effectiveness of the civil service system,
has the standing to appeal a decision which adversely affects the civil service. We hold, at this juncture, that CSC has the
standing to appeal and/or to file its motion for reconsideration. 66
The right to appeal by government parties was not limited to the Civil Service Commission.
In Pastor v. City of Pasig,67 this court ruled that the City of Pasig had standing to appeal the decision of the Civil Service
Commission reinstating a city employee to her former position, despite the city government having reassigned her to
another unit.
In Geronga v. Varela,68 this court ruled that the Mayor of Cadiz City had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of a
decision by the Civil Service Commission exonerating a city employee on the ground that "as the appointing and
disciplining authority, [he] is a real party in interest." 69
In Department of Education v. Cuanan,70 this court ruled that the Department of Education "qualifie[d] as a party adversely
affected by the judgment, who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case." 71
There are, however, cases, which sought to qualify this right to appeal.
In National Appellate Board v. Mamauag,72 an administrative complaint for grave misconduct was filed by Quezon City
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles against several members of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Central Police District
Command (CPDC) of Quezon City, upon investigation, dismissed the complaint. Dissatisfied, Judge Angeles moved for a
reinvestigation by then PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II.
PNP Chief Sarmiento issued a decision finding the accused police officers guilty of the offenses charged. Some were
meted the penalty of suspension while others were dismissed from service. Upon motion for reconsideration by Judge
Angeles, Chief Sarmiento modified his ruling and ordered the dismissal of the suspended police officers.
One of the officers, Police Inspector John Mamauag, appealed the decision with the National Appellate Board of the
National Police Commission. The National Appellate Board, however, denied the appeal. Mamauag appealed the denial
with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the National Appellate Board and ruled that it
was the Philippine National Police, not Judge Angeles, which had the right to appeal the decision of PNP Chief Sarmiento,
as it was the party adversely affected. The National Appellate Board then appealed this decision with this court.
This court, while citing Dacoycoy, declared that Judge Angeles, as complainant, had no right to appeal the dismissal by
CPDC of the complaint against Mamauag. It qualified the right of government agencies to appeal by specifying the
circumstances by which the right may be given, thus:
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case
and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is
prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the
disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant
in prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:
To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of Appeals, the Civil
Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be
likened to a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review."
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and
became an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it
directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies,"
not to litigate.73 (Emphasis supplied)
The ruling in National Appellate Boardwas applied in Montoya v. Varilla, 74 Pleyto v. PNP-CIDG,75 and Ombudsman v.
Liggayu.76
The present rule is that a government party is a "party adversely affected" for purposes of appeal provided that the
government party that has a right to appeal must be the office or agency prosecuting the case.
Despite the limitation on the government partys right to appeal, this court has consistently upheld that right in Dacoycoy.
In Civil Service Commission v. Almojuela,77 we stated that:
More than ten years have passed since the Court first recognized in Dacoycoy the CSCs standing to appeal the CAs
decisions reversing or modifying its resolutions seriously prejudicial to the civil service system. Since then, the ruling in
Dacoycoy has been subjected to clarifications and qualifications but the doctrine has remained the same: the CSC has
standing as a real party in interest and can appeal the CAs decisions modifying or reversing the CSCs rulings, when the
CA action would have an adverse impact on the integrity of the civil service. As the governments central personnel
agency, the CSC is tasked to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; it has a stake in ensuring that the proper disciplinary action is imposed
on an erring public employee, and this stake would be adversely affected by a ruling absolving or lightening the CSC-
imposed penalty. Further, a decision that declares a public employee not guilty of the charge against him would have no
other appellant than the CSC. To be sure, it would not be appealed by the public employee who has been absolved of the
charge against him; neither would the complainant appeal the decision, as he acted merely as a witness for the
government. We thus find no reason to disturb the settled Dacoycoy doctrine. 78 (Citations omitted)
Indeed, recent decisions showed that this court has allowed appeals by government parties. Notably, the government
parties right to appeal in these cases was not brought up as an issue by either of the parties.
In Civil Service Commission v. Yu,79 this court allowed the Civil Service Commission to appeal the Court of Appeals
decision granting the reinstatement of a government employee whose appointment had been revoked by the Commission.
In National Power Corporation v. Civil Service Commission and Tanfelix, 80 the National Power Corporation had previously
filed an administrative complaint against one of its employees, Rodrigo Tanfelix, resulting in his dismissal from service.
When the Civil Service Commission exonerated Tanfelix and the Court of Appeals affirmed the exoneration, the National
Power Corporation was allowed to appeal.
These cases, however, allowed the disciplining authority to appeal only from a decision exonerating the said employee. In
this case, respondent was not exonerated; she was found guilty, but the finding was modified. This court previously stated
that:
If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the
employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the
same.81
Dacoycoy, Philippine National Bank, and the URACCS failed to contemplate a situation where the Civil Service
Commission modified the penalty from dismissal to suspension. The erring civil servant was not exonerated, and the
finding of guilt still stood. In these situations, the disciplinary authority should be allowed to appeal the modification of the
decision.
The LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision
The employer has the right "to select honest and trustworthy employees." 82 When the government office disciplines an
employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law, it exercises its discretion. This discretion is inherent in the
constitutional principle that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 83 This is
a principle that can be invoked by the public as well as the government office employing the public officer.
Here, petitioner already decided to dismiss respondent for dishonesty. Dishonesty is a serious offense that challenges the
integrity of the public servant charged. To bar a government office from appealing a decision that lowers the penalty of the
disciplined employee prevents it from ensuring its mandate that the civil service employs only those with the utmost sense
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.
Honesty and integrity are important traits required of those in public service. If all decisions by quasi-judicial bodies
modifying the penalty of dismissal were allowed to become final and unappealable, it would, in effect, show tolerance to
conduct unbecoming of a public servant. The quality of civil service would erode, and the citizens would end up suffering
for it.
During the pendency of this decision, or on November 18, 2011, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service or RACCS was promulgated. The Civil Service Commission modified the definition of a "party adversely affected"
for purposes of appeal.
Section 4. Definition of Terms.
....
k. PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in an administrative case has been
rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original decision.
(Emphasis supplied)
Procedural laws have retroactive application. In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery: 84
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are
remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the following language:
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in
nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
....
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do
not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights,
ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes.
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision to that effect.
Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment. In fact, statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.85 (Emphasis supplied)
Remedial rights are those rights granted by remedial or procedural laws. These are rights that only operate to further the
rules of procedure or to confirm vested rights. As such, the retroactive application of remedial rights will not adversely
affect the vested rights of any person. Considering that the right to appeal is a right remedial in nature, we find that
Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the RACCS applies in this case. Petitioner, therefore, had the right to appeal the
decision of the Civil Service Commission that modified its original decision of dismissal.
Recent decisions implied the retroactive application of this rule. While the right of government parties to appeal was not
an issue, this court gave due course to the appeals filed by government agencies before the promulgation of the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
In Civil Service Commission v. Clave,86 the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) found one of its
employees, Aurora M. Clave, guilty of simple neglect of duty. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the GSISs findings.
The Court of Appeals, however, while affirming the Civil Service Commission, reduced the penalty. Both the GSIS and the
Civil Service Commission were given standing to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In GSIS v. Chua,87 the GSIS dismissed Heidi R. Chua for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of service. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the GSIS, but the Court of Appeals, while affirming the
findings of the Commission, modified the penalty to simple misconduct. The GSIS was then allowed to bring an appeal of
the modification of the penalty with this court.
Thus, we now hold that the parties adversely affected by a decision in an administrative case who may appeal shall
include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the employee was either overturned or modified by the Civil
Service Commission.
The offense committed was less serious dishonesty, not simple dishonesty
Dishonesty has been defined "as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of
integrity . . . ."88 Since the utmost integrity is expected of public servants, its absence is not only frowned upon but
punished severely.
Section 52, Rule IV of the URACCS provides:
Section 52. Classification of Offenses. Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave,
less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:
1. Dishonesty - 1st Offense Dismissal
....
In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,89 this court explained the rationale for the severity of the penalty:
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in
order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The
rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct,
even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The
Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by
reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow
men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his
office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct,
oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private
life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or
employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service. 90 (Emphasis supplied)
However, on April 4, 2006, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 06-0538 or the Rules on the
Administrative Offense of Dishonesty.
Resolution No. 06-0538 recognizes that dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from service. 91 It, however,
also recognizes that "some acts of Dishonesty are not constitutive of an offense so grave as to warrant the imposition of
the penalty of dismissal from the service."92
Recognizing the attendant circumstances in the offense of dishonesty, the Civil Service Commission issued parameters
"in order to guide the disciplining authority in charging the proper offense" 93 and to impose the proper penalty.
The resolution classifies dishonesty in three gradations: (1) serious; (2) less serious; and (3) simple. Serious dishonesty is
punishable by dismissal.94 Less serious dishonesty is punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one year
for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. 95 Simple dishonesty is punishable by suspension of one month
and one day to six months for the first offense, six months and one day to one year for the second offense, and dismissal
for the third offense.96
The medical certificate respondent submitted to support her application for sick leave was falsified. The question remains
as to whether this act could be considered serious dishonesty, less serious dishonesty, or simple dishonesty.
According to the Civil Service Commissions finding in its resolution:
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that the medical certificate submitted by Salvaa was spurious
or not genuine as the physician-signatory therein, Dr. Blanco[,] testified that she did not examine/treat the appellant nor
did she issue a medical certificate on May 15, 2006 since she was on sick leave of absence on that particular day. Worthy
[of] mention is that the appellant never bothered to submit any evidence, documentary or otherwise, to rebut the testimony
of Blanco.
Thus, the Commission rules and so holds that the appellant is liable for Dishonesty but applying the aforementioned CSC
Resolution No. 06-0538, her dishonest act would be classified only as Simple Dishonesty as the same did not cause
damage or prejudice to the government and had no direct relation to or did not involve the duties and responsibilities of
the appellant. The same is true with the falsification she committed, where the information falsified was not related to her
employment.97 (Emphasis supplied)
In Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit,98 this court previously ruled that "it is the general policy of this Court to sustain the
decisions of administrative authorities not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed knowledge ability and even expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce." 99 The same case also stated
that:
. . . . we reaffirmed the oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded not only respect
but also finality when the decision and order . . . are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. The findings off acts must be respected, so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant. 100
Petitioner insists that respondent committed serious dishonesty when she submitted the falsified medical certificate.
Under Section 3 of Resolution No. 06-0538, serious dishonesty comprises the following acts:
Section 3. Serious Dishonesty. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of
the dishonest act would constitute the offense of Serious Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act causes serious damage and grave prejudice to the government.
b. The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest act.
c. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves property, accountable forms
or money for which he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an intent to commit material gain, graft
and corruption.
d. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the respondent.
e. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the commission of the dishonest act
related to his/her employment.
f. The dishonest act was committed several times or in various occasions.
g. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination, irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but
not limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets.
h. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
Simple dishonesty, on the other hand, comprises the following offenses:
Section 5. The presence of any of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest act would
constitute the offense of Simple Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act did not cause damage or prejudice to the government.
b. The dishonest act had no direct relation to or does not involve the duties and responsibilities of the respondent.
c. In falsification of any official document, where the information falsified is not related to his/her employment.
d. That the dishonest act did not result in any gain or benefit to the offender.
e. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
This court previously ruled that "[f]alsification of an official document, as an administrative offense, is knowingly making
false statements in official or public documents." 101 Respondent, in her defense, states that she merely relied on her
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) advice that it was going to issue her a medical certificate after she had gone to
the hospital complaining of hypertension.102 She maintains that she did not know that her medical certificate was falsified.
We do not find this defense credible.
Respondent knew that she was not examined by Dr. Blanco, the medical certificates signatory. She knew that she would
not be able to fully attest to the truthfulness of the information in the certificate. Despite this, she still submitted the
certificate in support of her application for leave.
The Civil Service Commission, however, found that the medical certificate was falsified. Dr. Blanco repudiated the
certificate. Respondent did not present any evidence to defend its validity. Her application for sick leave, therefore, should
not have been granted since it was unaccompanied by the proper documents. The Commission correctly found
respondent guilty of dishonesty.
However, it would be wrong to classify this offense as simple dishonesty.
By law, all employees in the civil service are entitled to leave of absence for a certain number of days, with or without
pay.103 Under Section 1, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code, government
employees are entitled to 15 days of sick leave annually with full pay.
The grant of sick leave with pay is an exception to the principle of "no work, no pay," i.e., entitlement to compensation only
upon actual service rendered. As such, applications for leave must be properly filled out and filed accordingly. Section 16,
Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code provides the rules for an application for
sick leave:
SECTION 16. All applications for sick leaves of absence for one full day or more shall be on the prescribed form and shall
be filed immediately upon the employee's return from such leave. Notice of absence, however, should be sent to the
immediate supervisor and/or to the office head. Application for sick leave in excess of five days shall be accompanied by a
proper medical certificate.
Respondents application for sick leave, if approved, would allow her to be absent from work without any deductions from
her salary. Being a government employee, respondent would have received her salaries coming from government funds.
Since her application for sick leave was supported by a false medical certificate, it would have been improperly filed,
which made all of her absences during this period unauthorized. The receipt, therefore, of her salaries during this period
would be tantamount to causing damage or prejudice to the government since she would have received compensation
she was not entitled to receive.
This act of causing damage or prejudice, however, cannot be classified as serious since the information falsified had no
direct relation to her employment. Whether or not she was suffering from hypertension is a matter that has no relation to
the functions of her office.
Given these circumstances, the offense committed can be properly identified as less serious dishonesty. Under Section 4
of Resolution No. 06-0538, less serious dishonesty is classified by the following acts:
Section 4. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest act would
constitute the offense of Less Serious Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not so serious as to qualify under
the immediately preceding classification.
b. The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act.
c. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
We hold, therefore, that respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvaa is guilty of less serious dishonesty.
A final note
The records showed that respondent tendered her irrevocable resignation on August 5, 2006. Petitioners acceptance of
respondents resignation was not mentioned in any of the pleadings. However, the resolution by the Fact-finding
Committee stated that "[o]n 16 August 2006, the Office of the Administrator received the resignation." 104 On the issue of
whether respondents resignation mooted its proceedings, it concluded that:
[I]n the response of the Administrator to the letter of resignation filed by Respondent there was no unconditional
acceptance of the same. In fact it was specified therein that her resignation is "without prejudice to any appropriate action
on any malfeasance or misfeasance committed during her tenure[."]There can [sic] be no other conclusion from the above
that her resignation does not prevent the administration from proceeding with any charge/s appropriate under the
circumstances.105 (Emphasis in the original)
Resignation from public office, to be effective, requires the acceptance of the proper government authority. In Republic v.
Singun,106 this court stated:
Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender,
renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and
operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of
relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
....
In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective. Without
acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be accepted by
competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment of the
successor. A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to
the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive act of a resignations acceptance is
the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation
unless he had been duly notified therefor.107 (Emphasis supplied)
If there was evidence to show that petitioner did not, in fact, accept respondents resignation, her resignation would have
been ineffective. Respondents continued absence from her post would have been deemed abandonment from her office,
of which she could be criminally charged.
Although the response of Administrator Robles was not attached to the record, it can be concluded from the resolution of
the Fact-finding Committee that he accepted the resignation, albeit with the qualification that it be "without prejudice to any
appropriate action on any malfeasance or misfeasance committed during her tenure." 108
The qualified acceptance of Administrator Robles, however, did not affect the validity of respondents
resignation.1wphi1Section 1, Rule XII of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, as
amended by Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999, requires:
Sec. 1. Resignation. The following documents shall be submitted to the Commission for record purposes:
a. The voluntary written notice of the employee informing the appointing authority that he is relinquishing his
position and the efffectivity date of said resignation; and,
b. The acceptance of resignation in writing by the agency head or appointing authority which shall indicate the
date of effectivity of the resignation.
An officer or employee under investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his case without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings until finally terminated.
The qualification placed by Administrator Robles on his acceptance does not make respondents resignation any less
valid. The rules and regulations allow the acceptance of resignations while the administrative case is pending provided
that the proceedings will still continue.
We also note that the unauthorized absences were incurred after the issuance of Office Order No. 119. Atrespondents
refusal to comply, she was administratively charged, which prompted her resignation from office. If there were
irregularities in the issuance of Office Order No. 119, what respondent should have done would be to occupy the new
position and then file the proper remedies. She should not have defied the orders of her superiors.
Because of her resignation on August 5, 2006, any modification as to the service of her suspension became moot. Her
permanent employment record, however, must reflect the modified penalty. Considering that she is also a member of the
Bar, this court furnishes the Office of the Bar Confidant with a copy of this decision to initiate the proper disciplinary action
against respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated November 11, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 104225 and Resolution No. 071364 dated July 18, 2007 of the Civil Service Commission is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that respondent, Atty. Aurora A. Salvaa, is found guilty of Less Serious Dishonesty. The Civil Service
Commission is DIRECTED to attach a copy of this decision to respondent's permanent employment record.
Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate the proper disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvaa.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 173277 February 25, 2015

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PRUDENCIO C. QUIMBO, COURT OF APPEALS, 20TH DIVISION, CEBU CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the May 2, 2006 Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 54737, which denied the motion for intervention and reconsideration of its January 21, 2005
Decision,2 filed by petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman).
The Antecedents
The present controversy stemmed from the administrative complaint lodged by Gilda D. Daradal (Daradal), a clerk in the
Provincial Engineering Office of Catbalogan, Samar, against private respondent Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo (Quimbo),
Provincial Engineer of Samar, with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman-Visayas) for Sexual Harassment
and Oppression, docketed as OMB-VIS-ADM-96-04846.
In her complaint, Daradal alleged that on July 19, 1996, at about 10:00 oclock in the morning at the Motor Pool Division of
the Provincial Engineering Department, Catbalogan, Samar, Quimbo asked her to massage his forehead and nape. In the
course thereof, he said, "You had been lying to me you have already seen my manhood. When shall I have to see yours?"
She was appalled as the utterance was made in the presence of her co-employees. She added that by virtue of a
Memorandum,3 dated August 6, 1996, Quimbo ordered her detail to the Civil Service Commission in Catbalogan, Samar,
to perform the tasks of a male utility personnel. Her name was removed from the payroll of the personnel of the Provincial
Engineering Office from August 16-31,1996 because of her refusal to submit to his sexual advances.
In his defense, Quimbo retorted that the charge instituted against him was fictitious. He claimed that Daradal enjoyed a
"very important person" (VIP) treatment for a long period of time and, when required to work, rebelled against him. He
asserted that the charge of sexual harassment and oppression was intended to embarrass and ridicule him and that the
discretion to order her detail was validly exercised.
On March 26, 1996, Daradal filed a motion for withdrawal of the complaint. The motion, however, was denied by the
Ombudsman-Visayas in its Order, dated August 11, 1998.
The Ombudsman-Visayas Ruling
On December 9, 1998, after due proceedings, the Ombudsman Visayas issued a resolution4 dismissing the case of
sexual harassment against Quimbo but finding him guilty of oppression. The Ombudsman- Visayas imposed the penalty
of suspension for six (6) months without pay.
The dispositive portion of the said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, this Office finds Prudencio C. Quimbo, guilty of Oppression, thus mete
upon him, the penalty of SUSPENSION for SIX (6) MONTHS without pay, in accordance with Memorandum Circular No.
30, Series of 1989 of the Civil Service Commission.
SO RESOLVED.5
Engr. Quimbo moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Ombudsman-Visayas in its Order, 6dated April
15, 1999.
The CA Ruling
Aggrieved, Quimbo elevated the case before the CA by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The case, entitled "Prudencio C. Quimbo vs. Gilda D. Daradal," was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54737.
On January 21, 2005, the CA reversed the December 9, 1998 Resolution and the April 15, 1999 Order of the
Ombudsman-Visayas. In reversing the said ruling, the CA ratiocinated:
The Office of the Ombudsman has no power to directly impose sanctions against government officials and employees
who are subject of its investigation as its power is only limited to recommend the appropriate sanctions but not directly to
impose the same.
In Tapiador vs. Office of the Ombudsman, the Supreme Court pronounced:
"x x x
Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were (sic)administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly
dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13,
subparagraph (3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public
official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.
x x x"
There is no gainsaying the fact that the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with the jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not public servants have committed administrative offenses. However,
their power is only to recommend to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out and it is best left to
the proper disciplining authority to impose such penalty, which in this case is the Office of the Governor of the Province of
Samar.7
Accordingly, the fallo of the January 21, 2005 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this
case and SETTING ASIDE the Resolution dated December 9, 1998 and the Order dated April 15, 1999 issued by the
Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-ADM-96-0486 in so far as it directly imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of
suspension from the service.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
On February 14, 2005, the Ombudsman filed an omnibus motion for intervention and reconsideration of the CA decision,
dated January 21, 2005.
In its Resolution,9 dated May 2, 2006, the CA denied the said motion. In so doing, the CA explained:
For one, we have noted that the person adversely affected by our ruling in SP No. 54737 is respondent Gilda D. Daradal
who opted not to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. Basic is the rule that "every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest."
x x x x.
For another, as a quasi-judicial body, the office of the Ombudsman can be likened to a judge who should detach himself
from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review.
In filing a motion for intervention and reconsideration, the Ombudsman dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator
and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to hear, investigate and decide administrative and appropriate criminal
cases against public official[s] or employee[s] instituted by or brought before it directly, and not to litigate. Therefore, we
rule that the Office of the Ombudsman has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bench.
xxxx
Not in conformity with the pronouncement of the CA, the Ombudsman instituted a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the CA.
It posited that there was no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge
the validity of the assailed CA Resolution, dated May 2, 2005. Thus, it was constrained to resort to the filing of the said
petition.
The Ombudsmans Position
In its Memorandum,10 the Ombudsman stressed that, as the champion of the people, it had the right and legal interest to
seek redress on the apparent erroneous reversal by the CA of its decision in an administrative disciplinary case. It insisted
that, as the disciplining authority, it has the power and prerogative to directly impose any administrative penalty. It
asserted that the obiter dictum in the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsma (Tapiador) 11 heavily relied upon by the
CA, to declare its disciplinary powers as merely recommendatory had been rejected by the Court in numerous cases.
Respondent Quimbos Position
In his Memorandum,12 Quimbo contended that the Ombudsman had no legal standing to intervene or to seek
reconsideration of the assailed CA decision because the real party in interest was Daradal. He further stated that the
assailed CA decision was based on prevailing jurisprudence at the time the said decision was rendered.
ISSUES
Based on the parties respective contentions, the issues for this Courts resolution are as follows:
I. Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the Ombudsman lacks the power to directly
impose administrative penalties against erring public officials or employees.
II. Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in denying the Ombudsmans plea to validly intervene in its
proceedings for lack of legal interest.
The Courts Ruling
The Court grants the Ombudsmans petition.
Preliminary matters
The Ombudsman has the power
to directly impose
administrative penalties against
public officials or employees.
In the case of Ombudsman v. Apolonio,13 the Court categorically delineated the Ombudsmans power to directly impose,
not merely recommend, administrative sanctions against erring public officials or employees, viz:
The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of
a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsmans
power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had
already been rejected by this Court.
The Court first rejected this interpretation in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, where the Court, speaking through Mme.
Justice Ynares-Santiago, held:
The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and his
deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute cases
involving public officers and employees, thus:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its
own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on November 17, 1989
and provided for the structural and functional organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the
Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil and
criminal liability of government officers and employees in every case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people.
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations as in the present case is settled. Section 19 of
RA 6770 provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or
omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates from the Office of the Ombudsman
after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: x x x x
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis, underscoring
and italization in the original.)
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals (Ledesma),14 the Court definitively stated that the statement in Tapiador regarding the
Ombudsmans power was merely an obiter dictum and, as such, could not be cited as a doctrinal pronouncement. Thus:
x x x [A] cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to
present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the
power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is
susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.
The import of the Ledesma ruling is crystal clear. Although the tenor of the text in Section 13(3), Article XI 15 of the
Constitution merely indicates a "recommendatory" function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary legislative power
to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those stated in the Constitutional provision. Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)No.
6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose
administrative penalties against errant public servants. Further, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the
Ombudsman-like agencies of the past, the powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and
recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who might file and prosecute
criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the current
Ombudsman, under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of
laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The Ombudsman
is to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to enable him to implement his
own actions.16
The Ombudsman has the legal
interest to intervene in the
proceedings before the CA.
The issue of whether or not the Ombudsman possesses the requisite legal interest to intervene in the proceedings where
its decision is at risk of being inappropriately impaired has been laid to rest in Ombudsman v. De Chavez. 17 In the said
case, the Court conclusively ruled that even if the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, part of
its broad powers include defending its decisions before the CA. And pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court,18 the Ombudsman may validly intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest on the matter is beyond cavil.
The Court elucidated, thus:
x x x the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because the people under its jurisdiction are public officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations directed against them. Its function is critical because public interest (in the accountability of
public officers and employees) is at stake.
xxx
The Office of the Ombudsman sufficiently alleged its legal interest in the subject matter of litigation.1wphi1 Paragraph 2
of its motion for intervention and to admit the attached motion to recall writ of preliminary injunction averred:
"2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the right to seek redress on the apparently erroneous issuance
by this Honorable Court of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint
Decision x x x x."
In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the Office of the Ombudsman correctly summed up its legal
interest in the matter in controversy. In support of its claim, it invoked its role as a constitutionally mandated "protector of
the people," a disciplinary authority vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative disciplinary cases against
public officials. To hold otherwise would have been tantamount to abdicating its salutary functions as the guardian of
public trust and accountability.
Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in the inquiry into whether respondent committed acts
constituting grave misconduct, an offense punishable under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. It was in keeping with its duty to act as a champion of the people and preserve the integrity of public service that
petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its authority.
It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to the sound
discretion of the court after a consideration of the appropriate circumstances. However, such discretion is not without
limitations. One of the limits in the exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the
Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the Ombudsman's powers as provided in the Constitution and
RA 6770.
xxxx
Both the CA and respondent likened the Office of the Ombudsman to a judge whose decision was in question. This was a
tad too simplistic (or perhaps even rather disdainful) of the power, duties and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral specially when defending its decisions.
Moreover, in administrative cases against government personnel, the offense is committed against the government and
public interest. What further proof of a direct constitutional and legal interest in the accountability of public officers is
necessary? (Italics supplied. Citations omitted.)
As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, the CA, in the present case, gravely erred in disallowing the
Ombudsmans motion to intervene. It failed to consider the essence of the Ombudsmans constitutionally and statutorily
conferred powers establishing its clear legal interest in ensuring that its directive be implemented.
Substantive Aspect
Significantly, Section A, Subsection 13 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1989 (CSC
MC No. 30), the applicable rule then, expressly provides:
A. Grave Offenses
xxxx
13. Oppression
1st Offense - Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;
2nd Offense - Dismissal.
In the present case, the Ombudsman found Quimbo administratively liable for the grave offense of Oppression and
correspondingly meted out a penalty of suspension for six ( 6) months without pay. While his administrative liability for
Oppression is undisputed, it behooves the Court to adjust the penalty imposed upon him to conform to CSC MC No. 30.
Accordingly, the Court finds it necessary to modify the penalty to suspension for six ( 6) months and one ( 1) day without
pay to accurately reflect the classification of the offense for which he was found liable. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The January 21, 2005 Decision and the May 2, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City in CA-
G.R. SP No. 54737 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The December 9, 1998 Resolution and the April 15, 1999
Order of the Office of the Ombudsman, in OMB-VIS-ADM-96-0486, are hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that
the penalty of SUSPENSION to be imposed upon Prudencio C. Quimbo be for SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
without pay.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice