THE DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
Villahermosa also
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr., against
Atty. Isidro L. Caracol for deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27,2 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving cancellation of emancipation patents and
transfer certificates of title, cancellation of special power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale
and recovery of ownership and possession of parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 433 which covered 23.3018 hectares of land in Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on
record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel Aquino.
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando and
Efren. As legal heirs of Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square meters while Efren received
33,296 square meters. Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in their
respective names.
When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation patents and titles
were issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program,who in turn sold
the parcels of land to complainants spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. A deed of absolute sale was
executed in favor of Raymunda.
On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a
decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No.
433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and
affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as "Addl Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant," filed a
motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full
implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision.5
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of
Execution and Demolition6 which he signed as "Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela"7.
Villahermosa filed this complaint8 alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions
since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited
that Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had
already been dead9 for more than a year. He claimed that Atty. Caracols real client was a certain
Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Villahermosa presented
affidavits of Efrens widow10 and daughter11 both stating that Efren never executed a waiver of
rights and that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa through a deed of sale. Both also stated
that they werefamiliar with Efrens signature. They state that the signature inthe waiver was
different from his usual signature. Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol committed deceit and
gross misconduct.
In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and manufactured
evidence intothe proceedings. Atty. Caracol, in introducing a document denominated asWaiver of
Rights where Efren waived all his rights in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to secure the
execution of the judgment in one of the cases12 in favor of Ernesto Aguirre.
filed a case13 for falsification of public document and use of falsified document against Ernesto
Aguirre and Atty. Caracol.14
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as "additional counsel". He
said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover, he
stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirres favor.
In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. It found
that respondent did not present credible evidence to controvert the allegation that he was not
authorized by plaintiff or counsel of record. Respondent admitted that at the time of the filing of
the second motion, Efren was dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained the
authority nor did he present any proof of the authority. However, there was insufficient evidence
to hold him liable for falsification.
The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB, Region
X that he was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating
his oath as a lawyer. It thus recommended that Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of five years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but modified the penalty to
one year suspension from the practice of law.16 Atty. Caracol moved for reconsideration17 but was
denied.18
Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court returned to him since no legal fees are
required in administrative cases.20
We adopt the findings of the IBP.
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyers
appearance on behalf of his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to
represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney isrequired to authorize
him to appear in court for his client, butthe presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in
a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such
order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being
employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contemptas an officer of the court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions. (Emphases supplied)
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Devt. Co.,21 this Court said that while a lawyer is
not required to present proof of his representation, when a court requires that he show
suchauthorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to act. Thus:
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the
absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the
counsel in his clients name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other
party may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.22
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without
being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court.23 If an
attorney appears on a clients behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant
whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance
unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority.24 If a lawyer
corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party toa case without authority, he may be
disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transaction.25
We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an attorney-client
relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.26
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the proceedings before
the DARAB. The records are unclear at what point his authority to appear for Efren was
questioned. Neither is there any indication that Villahermosa in fact questioned his authority
during the course of the proceedings.
However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion
for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and
conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his clients passing and presented
authority that he was retained by the clients successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have
been substituted.27
We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v. Mendoza28 where he stated:
I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop, presumably upon
the adviceof his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem that
this lawyer was less than conscientious when he advised his indigent client to admit a crime the
man did no[t] commit. As the ponenciaobserves, "outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is
absolutely no evidence against him presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the
prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could have been implicated."
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an
incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any moral
compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause.1wphi1 The
defense counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he prodded
Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to submit evidence in his behalf.29
While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracols liability under the present
circumstances, we would like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our judicial system.
Because of the particular nature of an attorneys function it is essential that they should act with
fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his clients.30 Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyer's oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the law and
court processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor
and attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial system.
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his
representation. We also observe that he has used underhanded means to attain his purpose. Atty.
Caracol's blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced. In view of his actions
of contravening his lawyer's oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from the practice of law for a
period of one year.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality
of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This refers to the administrative complaint1 filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a.
Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public
Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable Commissioners,
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that he
was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito
Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23, 2006, during
Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with
pending cases before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was
assigned, to attend her speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following
during her speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana
kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera
ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay
kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa
drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."3
Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should
prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their
cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment for their transcript of
stenographic notes.4
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and filing
motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined his capability, to
wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the latter
was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic Act No.
8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latters criminal case for rape, which was pending
 before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda retorted that he
allowed Areola to file the motion for him since there was nobody to help him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for
Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the Complainant and
alleged that the respondent asked for P2,000.00 to represent them.
(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead
Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded
Mirador and discredited Areola.5
In her unverified Answer6 dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the
administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the latter had also filed
several administrative cases against judges in the courts of Antipolo City including the jail warden
of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously detained. These actuations show that Areola has a
penchant for filing various charges against anybody who does not accede to his demand.7 Atty.
Mendoza contended that Areola is not a lawyer but represented himself to his co-detainees as
one.8 She alleged that the motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were not proper.
After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on August 15,
2008, the Investigating Commissioner considered the non-appearance as a waiver on their part.
Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required to submit their respective position
papers.9
On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation.10 The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is
knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he must,
however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He however found
no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from Areolas co-detainees
as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also uncorroborated, viz:
There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money from the
inmates since the charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not the proper party to
file the instant case since he was not directly affected or injured by the act/s being complained of.
No single affidavits of the affected persons were attached to prove the said charges. Hence, it is
simply hearsay in nature.11
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their relatives
to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be granted and
their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner, this is highly
unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the
confidence of the public in the judiciary.12 The Investigating Commissioner recommended that
Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.13
In a Notice of Resolution14 dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution15 dated November 19, 2011 but the IBP Board
of Governors denied her motion in its Resolution16 dated May 10, 2013. The Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section
12, Paragraph b17 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint against
Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained therein. All Areola
has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she demanded money from his co-detainees.
The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint against
Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the Complaint on
behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses Perez, but it is apparent that no
document was submitted which would show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They
did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No affidavit was even executed by the said co-detainees to
substantiate the matters Areola raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areolas statements,
especially as regards Atty. Mendozas alleged demands of money.
The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola initiated
this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to acknowledge the pleadings
and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are PAO clients of Atty. Mendoza.18 It appears
that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine laws. However, no matter how good he thinks
he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings by
himself before the courts. His familiarity with Philippine laws should be put to good use by
cooperating with the PAO instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other
government authorities. It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more intelligent and
better than Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her. In his Reply19, he made fun of her
grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao english20. He also called the PAO as "Pa-
Amin Office"21 which seriously undermines the reputation of the PAO. While Areola may have
been frustrated with the way the PAO is managing the significant number of cases it deals with, all
the more should he exert efforts to utilize his knowledge to work with the PAO instead of
maligning it.
Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead
for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to one of
Areolas charges against Atty. Mendozathat she told her clients " Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that
the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order
for their cases to be dismissed.
As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07
states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness."
Atty. Mendozas improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system.
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendozas careless remark is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice.1wphi1 To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and
must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause,
is condemnable and unethical.23
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as
excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendozas infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a
lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution
and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.24 The Court notes
that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain
na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her
remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as
to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the
presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondents length of service, the respondents
acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances,
humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondents advanced age, among other things, have
had varying significance in the Courts determination of the imposable penalty.25 The Court takes
note of Atty. Mendozas lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her
main source of livelihood.26 Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly baseless and the
only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty. Mendozas own admission.
For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and reduce the penalty recommended by the
IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of
giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-
Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral
Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of
Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another
marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San
Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal
existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never
been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a
comment on the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the
Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a
Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint
against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's
failure to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the
case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative
case was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's
Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent,
however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife
from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against
Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show
Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B
Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of
Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's
husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to
him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from
defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to P2,000,000.00 to
his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death
threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in
Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint
and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent
with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require
respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No.
2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of
the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of
the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order,
otherwise, he would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to
furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of
the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly
undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig
asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the
actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing
stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in
Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated
July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry
Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct
and present address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City
as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned
with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his
appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City."16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE
of P1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not
paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing
the comment required thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the
Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE
with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty.
Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a)
ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008;
and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to
REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located
because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be
located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given
address cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's
whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution,
reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View
Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several
notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the
IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and
recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry
return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence,
an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to
answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise
its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary
to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the
certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted
marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine,
Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the
Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila,
states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma.
Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent
entered into a second marriage while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. We note that
the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which
is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the
second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof,
are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in
evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first
marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by
respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing
the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed
bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His
act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondents defiant stance
against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file
his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10
years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent
seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The
Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against
him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a
copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically,
however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention.
Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however,
feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he
could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this
case; accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy
of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service,
have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's
Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential addresses of
respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however
conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed
no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondents acts were
deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and
to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondents deplorable
disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension
or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme
Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution is "not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively."
Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant
flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only
too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful
orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A.
CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering
him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED
from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.1wphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith
record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, A.C. No. 6368
Complainants,
-versus-
ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and Teresita
N. Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit,
malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a
lawyer.
The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:
That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo
Bernardo with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat
[wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein
complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses,
deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the
Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance of complainants herein and
they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and deliver to him the
amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite the titling of the subject
land and further by means of other similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer
of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject land, who is the owner of
Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is the one handling
William Gatchalians business transaction and that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR,
CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were false,
fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainant[s] to give and deliver the said
amount ([P]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from complying with
his obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully
and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his personal
use and benefit and despite demand upon him to return the said amount, he failed and
refused to do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar and Violation of Duties and Oath as a lawyer.[2]
In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions dated
December 7, 1998[3] and June 22, 1999[4] of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding probable cause for the filing of the criminal
information[5] against both Atty. Bernardo and Andres Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them with the crime of Estafa
punishable under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The respondent was required to file his Comment.[6] On September 24, 2004, the respondent filed
an undated Comment,[7] wherein he denied the allegations against him and averred the following:
2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15,
1997 to July 22, 1997 for purposes of getting from them the amount of
[P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they contacted and who in turn sought
the legal services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who received the said
money from them.
3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and
respondent. The arrangement for titling of the land was made by Teresita N.
Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent.
4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and
allowed in law practice.[8]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified comment pursuant to
Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court as it appeared that the respondents undated comment
filed with the Court was not verified.[9]
On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen (15) days from
March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005, within which to comply due to his medical confinement.[10]
Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion[11] for extension praying for
another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still recovering from his illness.
On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference.[12] The respondent failed to appear;
thus, the IBP considered the respondent in default for his failure to appear and for not filing an
answer despite extensions granted. The case was then submitted for report and
recommendation.[13]
Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
made the following findings:
[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the
help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat (Magat), by using
false pretenses and deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent acts
to the effect that respondent would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the
Miranda family of Tagaytay City, who were the acquaintance of complainants.
Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and
deliver to them the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money, they would expedite
the titling of the subject land. Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer of
William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, who was allegedly the buyer of the subject land once it has been
titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that they have contacts at NAMREA,
DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be
false, fraudulent and were only made to induce complainants to give and deliver to
them the amount of [P]495,000.00. Once in possession of the said amount, far from
complying with their obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land,
respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the said amount to their personal use and benefit and despite demand
upon them to return the said amount, they failed and refused to do so.
In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed
a complaint for Estafa against the former before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary
investigation conducted by the said court, it finds sufficient grounds to hold
respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was transmitted to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7
December 1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga conducted a re-investigation of the case. During the re-investigation
thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse to complainants the amount of [P]200,000.00
because according to him the amount of [P]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by
respondent considering that the said amount was turned over to respondent for
expenses incurred in the documentation prior to the titling of the subject land. Both
respondent and Magat requested for several extensions for time to pay back their
obligations to the complainants. However, despite extensions of time granted to them,
respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their promise to pay back their
obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the offer of compromise was construed to be an
implied admission of guilt. The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no
reason to disturb the findings of the investigating judge and an Information for Estafa
was filed against respondent and Magat on 8 July 1999 before the Regional Trial
Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.
The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on
several occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of
office as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.
From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent
committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his attorneys oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility under both of which he was bound to obey the laws of
the land. The commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral
turpitude, acts of dishonesty in violation of the attorneys oath, grossly immoral
conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138,
Section 27, RRC).
The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case
only on 16 April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission
of Bar Discipline, as amended, dated 24 March 2004, A complaint for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the
professional misconduct (Section 1, Rule VIII).[14]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period
of TWO YEARS from receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer
and as a member of the Bar. [15]
On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-
065, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby ordered, the
restitution of the amount of [P]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from receipt of
notice with Warning that if he does not return the amount with in sixty days from
receipt of this Order then he will be meted the penalty of Suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.[16]
On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] of the aforesaid
Resolution of the IBP. The respondent averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the
rules considering that the complaint was filed more than two (2) years from the alleged
misconduct and therefore, must have been dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any
misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give him money to finance the titling of the land; (3) he
was hired as a lawyer through Magat who transacted with Teresita as evidenced by a
Memorandum of Agreement[18] signed by the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the
Investigating Commissioner considered him as in default after having ignored the representative
he sent during the hearing on August 3, 2005; and (5) he long restituted the amount
of P225,000.00 not as an offer of compromise but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due to
Teresitas declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel sometime in the third quarter
of 1997. The respondent pointed out the admission made by Fidela in her direct testimony before
the RTC that she received the amount, as evidenced by photocopies of receipts.
In an Order[19] dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required to comment
within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

In her Comment,[20] Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the administrative
case because they took into consideration the possibility of an amicable settlement instead of a
judicial proceeding since it would stain the respondents reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent
went into hiding which prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas
in order to trace the respondents whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded the
opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no restitution of the P200,000.00 plus corresponding
interest has yet been made by the respondent.
On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation[21] stating that the RTC rendered a decision in the
criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat guilty of conspiracy in the
commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are
sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.[22]
In a Letter[23] dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution of the
present action as she was already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve the
Case[24] dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the complainants. In another Letter dated October
26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for Atty. Bernardos restitution of the amount
of P200,000.00 so she can use the money to buy her medicine and other needs.
The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.
It is first worth mentioning that the respondents defense of prescription is untenable. The
Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of
considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative
complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer.Otherwise, members of the bar
would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the
fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance
of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.[25]
Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for several
extensions of time to file the same, the respondent failed to appear during the mandatory
conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is considered as an officer of the
court who is called upon to obey and respect court processes. Such acts of the respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the courts authority which can not be countenanced.
It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As
vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined whether in their
professional or in their private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty,
probity and good demeanor.[26]
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications or legal services.
There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admitted in
his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the
purported titling of land supposedly purchased. While he begs for the Courts indulgence, his
contrition is shallow considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive
the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never
denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants in the amount
of P495,000.00.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and
law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be
a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be
the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves.[27]
It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action
filed against a lawyer despite having involved the same set of facts.Jurisprudence has it that
a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, the respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively.[28]
In Yu v. Palaa,[29] the Court held that:
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not
constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are
attendant in the administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial
policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a
lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to
apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final
disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
 public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration
of persons unfit to practice law. The attorney is called to answer to the court for
his conduct as an officer of the court.[30] (Citations omitted)
As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of
Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines the respondents moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides that:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment
commensurate to all his acts and to accord the complainants, especially the 88-year old Fidela,
with the justice they utmost deserve.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.
Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount
of P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of
this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court, through the Office
of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that
failure to do so shall merit him the additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
NESTOR B. FIGUERAS and BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the February 19,
2009 Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule
12.03,2 Canon 12,3 Canon 17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and Canon 186 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution7 of the IBP Board of Governors
denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the
homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico
and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely
Mabanag8 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a
concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The spouses
Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance
No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the
public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street.9 The
Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association,
with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC
rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association,
represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA
issued a Resolution11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the
original period to file the appellants brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for
extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the
said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not
meritorious. The CA resolution became final.
Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr.,
as members of the Association, filed a Complaint12 for Disbarment against respondent before the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence
in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.
In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint,13 respondent denied administrative liability. He
claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowners association in CA-G.R. CV No.
55577, the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in
charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the
pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling
lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally
took responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at
no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.
Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for
President of the homeowners association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant
Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other
delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued
by the association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation,
complainants filed the present disbarment case against him and several other cases against him and
other officers of the association before the HLURB to question, among others, the legitimacy of
the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association. Thus, he
concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent added that complainants
have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was
likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.
As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of
merit, the imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment of damages for the filing of
the baseless complaint for disbarment.
On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon
17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.14
On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-
1415 adopting the recommendation with modifications as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as] Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months. The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby deleted.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP Resolution
No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011.16 The IBP Board of Governors noted that respondents
motion was a mere reiteration of matters already discussed and there were no substantial grounds
to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.
Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP correctly found
him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law is proper.
The Court finds no merit in respondents contention that complainants have no personality to file a
disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit was merely
instituted to harass him.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-
interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the
attention of the court to a lawyers misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest
in the outcome."17
In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that "[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio
may initiate disciplinary proceedings." The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not
confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.
The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as
counsel for Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. Records show that respondent
filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellants brief 95 days after the expiration of
the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of the
homeowners association. To justify his inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that he was
merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention,
however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA an Urgent
Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous
motion had been filed but "due to the health condition of the undersigned counselhe was not
able to finish said Appellants Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by
him."19 Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters
interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellants brief on behalf of his client,
respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,20 Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly
delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that:
Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyers failure to file brief for his
client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held:
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence.1wphi1 (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for
his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA
107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as
well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice.
(Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs.
Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).
It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely
suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.22 The penalties for a
lawyers failure to file a brief or other pleading range from reprimand,23 warning with
fine,24 suspension25 and, in grave cases, disbarment.26 In the present case, we find too harsh the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six months. Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension for
one month from the practice of law to be more commensurate with the extent of respondents
violation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively
liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month effective from finality
of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of respondent
lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M.
Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty.
Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as
prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio)
for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for
direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis
A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and
recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice modified
Comm. Funas recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a suspension of two
years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y
Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which case
Atty. Catalan was one of the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosas
manner of prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a
case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.1Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa
and the accused are relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest
bias in the accuseds favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case
by arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo
Ching granted Atty. Catalans request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The
RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005,
Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail
pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case for
frustrated murder where Atty. Catalans brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed the
findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to less
serious physical injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that,
while still a public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her
findings and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayans decision in
Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo
Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a
homicide case in favor of Lanticses father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still
remained in detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for
the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation
for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7s television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual
entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the
Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosas defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.
Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one
month and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six
months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor from
the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in the Esperon case on
16 November 2005 and cancelled the accuseds bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was
only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship
between himself and the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribios allegations as "self-serving"
and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and
is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since the act involved do [sic] not
amount to a crime." He further claims that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted,
but his capacity as a public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted
falling under the category of crimes against public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00.
[Atty. Silvosas] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he
is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of said case and has made himself familiar
with the parties of the case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that,
subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is
sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more
than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the word
of one person against the word of another. With [Atty. Silvosas] vehement denial, the accusation
of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged
incident occurred more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was
filed on November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the veracity
of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be ascertained and verified with
certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no personal
knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was he ever involved in said case.
The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The findings in a
criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented
relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First
Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given the
penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from
the practice of law for six months. In another Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosas suspension from the practice of law to two
years. The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the
case on 1 March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides
that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the
oppressed" and on Canon 14 which provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the
needy."
We agree with Comm. Funas finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot
Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosas attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions can only
be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was only to appear in
the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his subsequent participation as
collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will
do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his
clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as
the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer
from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy,
on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of
the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance
in the administration of justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the
attorneys intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribios accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by
emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that there
is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with Atty.
Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funas ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an
attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a
day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President
of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies
against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the accusation and dismissed
it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.
He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not
prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and
bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funas ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding
in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no doubt of
the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely
the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge
of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring attorneys including those in government service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that
Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in the present case. There is no
doubt that the Sandiganbayans judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record
and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of
the Sandiganbayans decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against
his interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11
we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct
bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer
with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept
a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official
duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege
on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender
takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It
is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good
morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Italicization in the
original)
Atty. Silvosas representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros.
Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension.1wphi1 Atty. Silvosas final conviction of the
crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of
Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosas conviction of the crime. We are
constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is
predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the
Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is
unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is
a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his
name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as
attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the
Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
OFFICE OF THE COURT A. C. No. 5355
ADMINISTRATOR,
Petitioner,
- versus -
ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Per Curiam:
The Case
This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) against respondent Atty. Daniel B. Liangco.
In a per curiam En Banc Resolution in Gozun v. Hon. Liangco,[1] dated 30 August 2000,
this Court ordered the dismissal from service of respondent as judge of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga and as acting judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. His dismissal was with forfeiture of all his retirement
benefits and accumulated leave credits; and with prejudice to his reinstatement or reemployment
in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned or -
controlled corporations. The Court further directed the OCA to initiate disbarment proceedings
against him for misconduct as a member of the bar. Hence, this present case for resolution by the
Court.
The Facts
We quote the facts as stated in A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136,[2] as follows:
Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Gozun) was in
open and adverse possession of subject land for a period of more than thirty
years. His familys house was erected on the land. The house was made of old
vintage lumber, cement, hollow blocks, G. I. sheet roofing and other strong
materials. Gozun inherited the house and lot from his parents.
The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot.
On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued
Resolution No. 26-96, stating:
RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga do hereby consider (sic) the
lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the Municipal Government of San
Luis, Pampanga, specifically the lot where Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and
family were squatting (sic) as the new site of the Rural Health Center
will rise (sic).
On May 17, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 34-96 to amend
the correct Resolution No. 26-96.
On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang
Bayan, filed with the MTC, San Luis, Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief.
We quote the petition:
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
THE HONORABLE
JUDGE DANIEL LIANGCO
In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, We would
like to petition your good office to render legal opinion on the following
matters, to wit:
1. The validity of the attached Resolution.
2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said Resolution.
3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal Mayor in
implementing said Resolution.
These request are (sic) in connection with our plan to construct
a new site for the Rural Health Center of San Luis, Pampanga. However,
the designated place thereof is presently being squatted (sic) by a certain
Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and inspite of the official notice of Atty. Benlfre
S. Galang, our Provincial Legal Officer, and personal request of our
Municipal Mayor Jovito C. Bondoc to Mr. Gozun to vacate his (sic)
premises, he continues to defy such notices and request to the detriment
of the proposed project.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this petition will
merit your favorable consideration and appropriate action for the sake of
public interest.
On the very same day, May 24, 1996, respondent judge issued a resolution,
reasoning: First, the municipality of San Luis, Pampanga through its
Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use of
property within its jurisdiction. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not contrary to
law, morals and public policy. Third, the municipal mayor through an executive
order may order the Philippine National Police or any government law
enforcement agency to enforce or implement the resolution, using reasonable
force if necessary and justified. Fourth, squatting in government property is
considered a nuisance per se. Respondent judge ruled:
With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an
executive order, the municipality of San Luis may order the
Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis,
Pampanga to effect the eviction of Hermogenes Gozun and all
other persons who may be claiming any right under him from
Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030 (underscoring
ours).
Again, on the same day, March 24, 1996, the municipal mayor, Jovito C.
Bondoc, pursuant to the aforequoted resolution, issued Executive Order No. 1,
series of 1996, ordering the PNP to implement Resolution No. 34-96.
Note that complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice
of the petition for declaratory relief.
On June 2, 1996, complainant Gozun learned about the resolution.
On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozuns wife together with other public school
teachers went to the office of the respondent judge. When asked about the
resolution, respondent judge answered, Ing Apung Guinu yu y Mayor Bondoc at
kaya ko makisabi (Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should talk to him).
On August 8, 1996, agents of the municipal government demolished
complainant Gozuns house, using respondent judges resolution and the mayors
executive order as basis.
On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative
complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator. He averred that respondent
judges issuance of the resolution amounts to gross misconduct, gross inefficiency
and incompetence. Complainant Gozun further accused the municipal mayor of
having bribed respondent judge. Mayor Bondoc told complainant Gozun that the
respondent judge is in his pocketbecause he (Mayor Bondoc) has given him
(respondent judge) a lot of things (dacal naku a regalo kaya).
On January 20, 1997, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted the
petition to this Court for its consideration, recommending that the complaint be
given due course.

On March 21, 1997, the Court resolved to require respondent judge to
comment thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
On May 15, 1997, respondent judge submitted his comment, denying the
charges and urging that the case be dismissed.
On June 23, 1997, we referred the case back to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
On April 13, 2000, after investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo L.
Benipayo submitted a memorandum, recommending the dismissal from office of
respondent judge.[3]
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136
Dismissal of Respondent from the Bench
The OCA Resolution was forwarded to this Court for evaluation and action and docketed as A.M.
No. MTJ-97-1136. On 30 August, 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a per curiam Resolution
adopting the report and recommendation of the Court Administrator. It ruled that respondent had
blatantly ignored the basic rules of fair play, in addition to acting without jurisdiction in
entertaining a Petition for Declaratory Relief despite his being a judge of a first-level court.[4] The
Court also pointed out that his ruling on the said Petition resulted in the demolition of the house of
complainant Gozun, thus rendering his family homeless.[5] It described respondents acts as biased
and maleficent and ruled that those acts merited the punishment of dismissal from the
service,[6] viz:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of
respondent Judge Daniel B. Liangco, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal
Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga, and Acting Judge Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga, from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accumulated leave
credits, if any, and with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in
any branch, instrumentality or agency of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Court directs the Court Administrator to initiate disbarment
proceedings against respondent Judge for misconduct as a member of the
bar within thirty (30) days from finality of his decision.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.[7]
A.C. No. 5355
Disbarment
On 10 November 2000, the OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent.[8] In its
Complaint dated 06 November 2000, docketed as Administrative Case No. (A.C.) 5355, the OCA
charged him with gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias and partiality towards a party, as
well as for inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedure that challenged his
competence to remain a member of the legal profession. Thus, it prayed that he be disbarred, and
that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On 28 November 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a Resolution requiring respondent to file
his Comment on the Complaint for Disbarment against him.[10] On 01 June 2001, he filed his
Comment on/Answer to Complaint for Disbarment,[11] appealing for understanding and asking that
the Court allow him to continue practicing as a lawyer. He reasoned that when he acted on the
Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis,
Pampanga, he was merely rendering a legal opinion honestly and in good faith;[12] and that his
actions were not attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive.[13] He further pleads
for compassion from this Court and for permission to remain a member of the bar, because the
practice of law is his only means of livelihood to support his family.[14]
On 07 August 2001, the Court En Banc noted the submission of respondent and referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within
ninety (90) days from receipt of the records of the case.[15]
IBPs Report and Recommendation
The IBP held a series of hearings on the disbarment case with respondents participation. On 03
October 2003, the investigating commissioner issued her Report and Recommendation[16] finding
justification for the disbarment of respondent and recommending that his name be struck off the
Roll of Attorneys. The investigating commissioner found that, based on the facts of the case, there
was clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of respondent.[17] She
observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established rules and
procedures. She also observed that the present Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed
against him. She further noted that before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent was
suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four (54) cases
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 a violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated
23 September 1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases
filed against him for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery case,
he was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in an entrapment operation.[18]
On 30 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[19] of the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP. He alleged that the evidence presented in the proceedings for his
dismissal as judge was the same as that which was used in the disbarment case against him. Thus,
because he did not have the chance to cross-examine the witnesses, he claimed to have been
deprived of due process.[20] In addition, respondent emphasized the submission by Gozun of an
Affidavit of Desistance from the Complaint the latter had originally filed against him and
contended that the case should have been dismissed.[21] Lastly, respondent averred that he had
endeavored to improve himself as a devout Catholic by joining religious organizations. He also
impressed upon the IBP his effort to improve on his knowledge of the law by attending Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).[22]
On 12 May 2009, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[23] wherein
he implored the IBP to take a second look at his case. He emphasized the submission by Gozun of
an Affidavit of Desistance and the fact that the former had already suffered the supreme penalty of
dismissal as MTC judge.[24] Respondent also reiterated the grounds already stated in his first
Motion for Reconsideration.
On 09 October 2008, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
525,[25] which adopted the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner, who
found that respondent had acted with manifest bias and partiality in favor of a party-litigant and
shown inexcusable ignorance of the Rules of Procedure. The Resolution likewise adopted the
recommendation to disbar respondent.
On 30 June 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the case records of
A. C. No. 5355 to this Court, which noted it on 16 August 2011.[26]
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
We find his statements hard to believe.
The undue haste with which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his
part. Moreover, the testimonial evidence on record indicates that he maintained close relations
with the municipal vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a party-litigant who had an obvious
interest in the outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vice-mayor of San
Luis, Pampanga, showed that respondent denigrated his impartiality as a judge is as follows:
COMM. SANSANO:
You dont remember therefore that at any time at all you were with the
mayor in going to see the respondent?
WITNESS: (Mr. Batu)
I do not know any instance that the mayor visited the respondent, Your
Honor. I do not know any instance that I was with him.
COMM. SANSANO:
But other than the occasion of the filing of this request there were times
when you went to see the respondent also in his office?

The evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that respondent is guilty of WITNESS:
gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures.
There was no other visit, Your Honor.
Gross Misconduct
COMM. SANSANO:
In Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr.[27] citing Yap v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez,
Jr.,[28] this Court explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or So May 24, 1996 was the first time you went to see him in his office?
flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e.,
conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The WITNESS:
motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.
Before that, Your Honor, nagpupunta na kami doon kung minsan may
In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by nagpapatulong na mga may kaso.
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun who
would be affected by the action. The records show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, COMM. SANSANO:
had it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed
of the matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice Yon ang tanong ko kanina sa iyo kung bago May 24 pumupunta ka na sa
and hearing. Respondent admitted that, to his mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at the opisina niyang datihan?
local governments behest, which he gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this fact in
his Comment, he admitted that he had erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that his WITNESS:
actions were not attended by malice or bad faith.[29]
Yes, Your Honor. [30]

The testimony of respondents own witness clearly showed his wanton disregard of Canon 1,
Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which requires
the observance of judicial independence and its protection from undue influence, whether from
private or from public interests.[31]
In Edao v. Judge Asdala,[32] we explained the rationale behind this imposition:
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the
respondent, are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance
the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only
maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid
any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in
the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are
deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the
personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself,
but also to the process by which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2,
specifically mandates judges to ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable
observers.Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence, integrity
and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their decisions,
but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the
people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges
must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the
dispensation of justice. To further emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon 2
states:
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges
as follows:
In view of the increasing number of reports reaching
the Office of the Court Administrator that judges have been
meeting with party litigants inside their chambers, judges are
hereby cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without the
other party and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at
all times in their conduct to the end that they only act
impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be
impartial and proper.
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies
not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is
made. As such, judges must ensure that their conduct, both in and out of the
court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession
and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. In the same vein,
the Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all their activities, as such is essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge in order to maintain the trust and
respect of the people in the judiciary.
Also relevant is Canon 3, particularly Section 2 of the new code, which exhorts judges not only to
be impartial in deciding the cases before them, but also to project the image of
impartiality.[33] Unfortunately, as shown by the facts of the case, these rules were not properly
observed by respondent as a judge of a first-level court.
Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law
We are appalled by respondents ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton use
of court processes in this case without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property of
others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar.
A cursory look at the Resolution dated 24 May 1996 issued by respondent would prompt
an ordinary person to conclude that an action in the form of a Petition for Declaratory Relief was
indeed filed, because it bears the name and the branch of the court of law that issued it. It had a
docket number and the names of the parties involved. The Resolution even states the justiciable
question to be resolved and accordingly makes a judicial determination thereof. In reality, though,
there was no notice sent to Gozun, the named respondent in the Petition; nor was a hearing held to
thresh out the issues involved. As far as respondent was concerned, he simply issued a legal
opinion, but one with all the hallmarks of a valid issuance by a court of law, despite the absence of
mandatory processes such as notice especially to Gozun and hearing. Even this excuse is
unacceptable. Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal opinions. Their opinions are
always in the context of judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions in the case of
collegiate courts, and always in the context of contested proceedings.
What is most unfortunate is that the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on the Resolution
respondent issued, caused the demolition of the house of Gozun and his family, who were thus
ejected from the property they had been occupying for decades. In effect, Gozun was deprived of
his property without due process. To us, this is precisely the injustice that members of the bench
and the bar are sworn to guard against. Regrettably, respondent as judge was even instrumental in
its commission. When his liability for his act was invoked, he casually justifies them as honest
mistakes not attended by malice or bad faith. His justification is unacceptable to us.
As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in the
Rules of Procedure. This expectation is imposed upon members of the legal profession, because
membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate for public service of the highest order.
Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible
norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and
justice, for which they have sworn to be fearless crusaders.[34]
As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction
to entertain a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity
as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an
utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the publics confidence in the
competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and
responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of the
bar should know.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold
the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes.[35] Contrary to this edict, respondent
malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of Gozun not to be deprived of a right or
property without due process of law.
Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of
Procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.[36] In this case, however, the
opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used the powers of the court to inflict injustice.
Should the misconduct of respondent as judge also warrant his disbarment from the legal
profession? We answer in the affirmative.
In Collantes v. Renomeron,[37] we ruled therein that the misconduct of the respondent
therein as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer:
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
"A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is
designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes
an officer of the court on whose shoulders rest the grave responsibility of
assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a
rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion
be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the
law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer,
to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of
truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty,
and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility - all of which,
throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as 'moral
character.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of
Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable,
and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA
293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of
his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
Recently, in Samson v. Judge Caballero,[38] we ruled that because membership in the bar
is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects
the latters moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also
violates the lawyers oath.
We note that on 25 August 2011, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525 dated 09 October 2008 promulgated by the IBP board of
governors, which adopted and approved the findings of the investigating commissioner
recommending his disbarment. Respondent alleged therein that he had served as assistant
provincial prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for thirteen (13)
years prior to his dismissal as MTC judge of San Luis, Pampanga and as acting MCTC judge of
Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. He also complains that he was deprived of due process by the IBP
board of governors when it approved and adopted the findings of the investigating commissioner
recommending his disbarment; and he prays for a second look at his case, considering the
withdrawal of the Complaint originally filed by Gozun.
In the light of our ruling in this case, we can no longer consider the undocketed Petition
for Review on Certiorari filed by respondent. In the first place, such kind of petition is not
available to assail the resolution of the IBP in an administrative case. His remedies from an
adverse resolution is to seek a reconsideration of the same, and when denied, to raise the same
defenses against administrative liability before this Court. He has availed of both remedies in this
case.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they render the underlying motives of
complainant unimportant and of little relevance. The purpose of disbarment proceedings is mainly
to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant
in the dispensation of justice an issue which the complainants personal motives have little
relevance. For this reason, upon information of an alleged wrongdoing, the Court may initiate the
disbarment proceedings motu proprio.[39]
Recently in Garrido v. Atty. Garrido,[40] we reiterated the unique characteristic of
disbarment proceedings and their purpose in this wise:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of
 offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not
apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership
in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves
service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like
criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a
direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;
effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to
the attention of the Court.
Thus, despite Gozuns desistance in A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136, from whence this case
originated, respondent is not exonerated.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the
following offenses:
1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of
Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Daniel B.
Liangco in the Office of the Bar Confidant and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
The Bar Confidant is hereby directed to strike out the name of Daniel B. Liangco from the
Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
DISCIPLINE OF FILIPINO LAWYERS PRACTICING ABROAD
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ,
Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA,
Respondent.
x-------------------------x
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
x-------------------------x
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM
THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
GOVERNOR
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE
VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP
RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY
REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR
ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a
disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine
Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National
President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP
by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP
for the term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report
and recommendation on subject case,[1] summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez
moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera
based on the following grounds:
1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in
concealing the suspension order rendered against him
by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called
rotation rule enunciated in Administrative Matter No.
491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own
benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting
 moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San
Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-
18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or
surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the
recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent
lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the countrys most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-
called rotation rule provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he
transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed
to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of
Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondents transfer was intended only
for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed
that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the
issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an
earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact,
according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and
categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in
Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De
Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed
following the principle of res judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar
Confidant for presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant
maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondents moral baseness,
vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his
disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used
his clients money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present
evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latters resignation and
even if such was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the
respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not
apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against
the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to this
Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other
hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP
President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBPs Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing
Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the
IBP Board and the IBP in general.[2]
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting
of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in
favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court
docketed as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the
Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108. The Petition was
intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the
increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.[3]
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-
described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L.
Valdez.[4]
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP
Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP
Boards 14 January 2005 Resolution.[5]
On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request for oathtaking as
National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the
disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.[6]
On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-
Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera
allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP
Boards Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.[7]
On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera
from assuming office as IBP National President.[8]
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter
wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having
committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.[9]
On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel,
Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP
Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.[10] Quoted hereunder is the dispositive
portion of said Resolution:
 NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of
the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts
inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and members of the
IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP
10th National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay
Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the
decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION
docketed as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary
Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108,
was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of
the Philippines;
2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP as a
whole in public contempt and disrepute;
3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that A lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others, by making
untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary
Session of the IBP 10thNational Convention of Lawyers in Baguio
City;
4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to
embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in order to
coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;
5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the 10th National
Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of
Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting the
withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong
impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented
him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus
compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National
President and the IBP as a whole.[11]
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then
Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring
Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly
Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due
Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution
Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24)
Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation.[12]
In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical
to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP
Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete
disregard of even the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:
It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and
serious injustice against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice
President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as National President
of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x
I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the
Supreme Court even in administrative cases:
1. The denial of the right to answer the
charges formally or in writing. The complaint against
me was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges
within a reasonable period of time after receipt of the
complaint.
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and
the witnesses against me. I challenged Gov. Rivera to
testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I
offered to testify under oath so I could be
questioned. My request was denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my
behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial
judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor,
and judge all at the same time.

7. Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my case becomes
even more evident because when his motion to expel
me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to
vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of
voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and
motion to expel me.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring in
original.)
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de
Vera.[14] In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty.
de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant
member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:
(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and
solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of
Governors for its decision to withdraw the PETITION, all with the end in
view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to
reconsider the decision to withdraw the PETITION.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board
of Governors and the IBP National President in public or during the
Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at the
plenary session), Atty. de Vera fanned the fire, so to speak, and went to
the extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies
about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of
Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the
members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an
acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of Governors to
public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant
lies, e.g., that some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted
in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without mentioning names)
because nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang
Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court. He made it
appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution,
withdrawing the petition, due to influence or pressure from the Supreme
Court.[15]
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary Session was the
last straw that broke the camels back. He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board
and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a
position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP
Board and as IBP EVP.[16]
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special
meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board
took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Veras
removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared
as IBP EVP.[17]
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago.[18] On 20
June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to
the IBP Board.[19] Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a
new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief
Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazars election.[20] IBP National President Cadiz
also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazars election be approved and that he be
allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended
from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as
EVP is approved by this Court.[21] Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of
Atty. Salazar.[22]
In his Extended Comment[23] dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was
absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board
because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the
same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed
without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of due process
of law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges
filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although
undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not
once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in
particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the
Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the
IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of
speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.
 Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this
Courts Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act
No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new
IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was contrary to the
provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice
President shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their
election until 30 June of their second year in office and until their successors
shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and
duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of
death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall
serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of
death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive
Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold
office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and
employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold
office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.[24]
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP
die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an
Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election
for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his
replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the
Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel,
submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and
authority to protect itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article
VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;
(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as
IBP EVP not because of his disagreement with the IBP Boards position
but because of the various acts that he committed which the IBP Board
determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his
constitutional right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is
his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;
(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed
the fundamental principles of due process. As the records would bear,
Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board
held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Riveras Letter-
Complaint the day before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the
said Meetings Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and
his accuser, Gov. Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of
votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a
member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;
(vi) Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern
Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section
47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied with when
Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP;
and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be
practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now
be allowed to take his oath as IBP National President.[25]
The Courts Ruling
AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum[26] dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues
for the consideration of the Court:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA
(sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL
T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE
PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.
II.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED
TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)
WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE
THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF
RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO
ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27]
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth
issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present
administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against
respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:
1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the
suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar
in California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule
enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October
1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier
administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued
upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by
this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No.
6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:
As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients
when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to
surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot
serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run
for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final
judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records
relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing
referee which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the
Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in
the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he
misappropriated the complainants money, but unfortunately the retraction
was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera
while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final
judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty
of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he
suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to
pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the
absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges
a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not
shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral
fitness to run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the
post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence
is in Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter.
He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his
ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national
presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership,
respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article
II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can
register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not
automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his
place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the
 particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does
not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of
the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in
registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more
than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this
Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer
complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer
must be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in
the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP
membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP
National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador
Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J.
Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of
respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary
notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance
with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de
Vera's transfer was made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3
September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter
Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by
Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter
Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of
every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003,
seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer
valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections
held on 27 February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco
(Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Courts] administrative
powers.
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for
grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting
the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to
only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the
respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent, interposing res
judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same
incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being indicted
twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as both
proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in
the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel
under the Courts supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was
disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts plenary authority over membersof the
legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still
applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs.
Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court
ruled that:
While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it
would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize
respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already
answered for.
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs.
Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes
(Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held
that:
Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment,
the present administrative case becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a
court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been
finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent
litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It
provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties
and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of
action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be
affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated
the same matter in the former action in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again.

This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again
the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same
time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets.Equally important,
res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the
complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative
case. The complainants contention that the principle of res judicata would not
apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification
while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment
should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant
administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment,
it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead
merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National
President.[28]
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, In Re:
Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected
IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election and promulgated on 11
December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the
parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities
in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application
of res judicata.
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions
must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be
between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of
causes of action.[29] In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res
judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of
action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as
a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative
complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case,
complainants cause of action was Atty. de Veras alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-
laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Veras alleged
violation of lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants
sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In
the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought
is Atty. de Veras suspension or disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the
basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de
Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present
IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we
stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants
therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only
nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest
against the candidate. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on
the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not
allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on
the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California
suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case that
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must
be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because
the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of
the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard
of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter
possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the
disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate
from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or
conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.[30]
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper
case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is
presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive
audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary
disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is
sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052,
the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred
under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the
State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of
malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty.
Leon G. Maquera,[31] we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the
Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended
from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine
Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was
admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and
against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However,
unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted
against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his
license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in
a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in
the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and
suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute
into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts
action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise
held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical
acts as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of
a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,[32] we explained that [a]
foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due
notice in the foreign forum.
In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima
facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial
evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is
successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the
part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer
of the State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has
also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if
the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension.[33]
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[34] The statutory enunciation of the grounds for
disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be
restricted.[35]
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a
lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term Malpractice.[36] That meaning
is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a
business.[37]
 Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of
his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.[38]
Now, the undisputed facts:
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of
California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case
Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident
in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given
authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San
Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera
received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal
account;[39]
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera
be suspended from the practice of law for three years;[40] and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the
Supreme Court of California.[41]
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his clients funds as the latters father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use
the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation
notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he expected de Vera might
use the money for a few days.
By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father and attorney-in-fact to use the
funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.
In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters memorandum that
he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his
personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for
personal purposes.[42]
At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[43] It
means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be
reasonably inferred.[44]
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly
unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep[45] we held that
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature.
Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on
the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the
client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold
in trust all money and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional
Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for
his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other
trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted for promptly and should not
under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used
by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or
property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he
has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of
the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross
violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in
the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his clients money for
personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than
substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting
the evidence which he himself supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the
funds intended for the latters son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full
amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State
Bar of California.[46]
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the
records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his
client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera[47] we declared that
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had
indeed testified that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days. As Atty. de Vera
had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now
estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis expected de Vera might use the
money for a few days was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera
of his clients funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use
his clients funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way
such character was perceived.
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money without the latters
acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera,
by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior.He caused dishonor, not only to
himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of
litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays
their trust and confidence.[48] Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of
law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.[49] Where any lesser penalty can
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his
practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the
latters knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;[51] Castillo v. Taguines;[52] Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo
IV,[53] the respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their clients
monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for
their clients without the latters permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,[54] we indefinitely
suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00
representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount
involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is
appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the
lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for his
suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque,
Las Pias and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of
the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National
President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he
hold office therein.
In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of transferring to another IBP
Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed
under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less
than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said
that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal
act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to
an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule will produce the next IBP EVP who will
automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as the Lawyers Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be
IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.
Bar Matter No. 1227
Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues
must be addressed:
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in
removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with
administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and
valid cause.
 II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June
2005, and can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-
2007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of
Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power
to remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which
states:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after
proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason
become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of
the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval
of the Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed
for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings
without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the
remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the
delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among
the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve
as governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by
resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the
approval of this Court.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on
procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied very basic rights of due process
recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases like the right to answer formally
or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a
fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant,
IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion
which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the
fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when
his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered,
Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session,
and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing
was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he
was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They
emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the
Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the
agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did
argue his case.
We are in agreement with the IBP Board.
First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and
property.[55] It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the
constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position as, in
fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side.[56] At the
outset, it is here emphasized that the term due process of law as used in the Constitution has no
fixed meaning for all purposes due to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a
fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than
one general statement.[57] The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,[58] because it depends on
circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.[59]
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in court is
not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings,
it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due
process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not
technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing
are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a
fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that
hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and
tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be
raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for
hearing may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.[60]
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.[61] Nor is an actual
hearing always essential[62] especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of
the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP
governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court all witnessed Atty. de Veras
actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.
It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was
present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May
2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair
opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.
Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the
complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at
the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself
from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote, he
agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de
Veras expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for
cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without
justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of
the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by
2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase remaining members refers to the members exclusive of
the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members
are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This
being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only
the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five
voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for
expulsion.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP
Governor for just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of
an IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues
that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member
whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts
committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and
the IBP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the
Resolution of the Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or
expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only
shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP
Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental
objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that
Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.
Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity,
are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said
to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are
brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which
speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an
authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBPs prestige and repute with the lawyers
as well as with the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing
board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made
public.
The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and
resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given an
opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a
contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so that
the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to
implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the
board.[63]
The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latters
actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board
as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a
cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code
of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of
the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution approved
by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a
governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.
Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should
resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his hearts
content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board
of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as
well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal
as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation
basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty.
de Veras removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP
EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the
IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was
rendered without grave abuse of discretion
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over
the IBP,[64] it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its
reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the
provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to
define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure,
and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in
place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day
affairs, without the Courts interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in
the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of the
nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws.[65] The Board acts as a collegiate body and
decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the
possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual
members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the
disputable presumption[66] of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by
substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any
allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority
or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Boards
action or resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in
Article VI, Section 44[67] of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board
abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP
Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de Veras removal from the
IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority
and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws.There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Boards resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP
EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was conducted
in accordance with the authority granted to the Board
by the IBP By-Laws
In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP
Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the
removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done
without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of
the IBP.
With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution
dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant
vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill
vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the
Integration Rule,[68] and Section 11 (Vacancies),[69] Section 44 (Removal of members),[70] Section
47 (National officers),[71] Section 48 (other officers),[72]and Section 49 (Terms of Office)[73] of the
By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how
to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the
intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007
Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume
the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to
the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that [t]he EVP
shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The phrase for the next
succeeding term necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President
for the next succeeding term (i.e.,2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005
IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano
Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the
question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.
Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and
thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of
Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.
Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal
as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern
Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-
Laws.
According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the
Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a
rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:
ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President
elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9]
IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original
IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the
Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year
term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of
governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among
the nine (9) IBP regions.One who has served as president may not run for
election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after
the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been
completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated
among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result
of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains
in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the
Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic
succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of
Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus,
the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Veras
removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency.
The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption
by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and
purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The
automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP
National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time
for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends
assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable
preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further
underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of
Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is
intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have
been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession
rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP
from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the
experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would have served in
a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if
the EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of
Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera
in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005
Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a
national capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable to clearly
indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling
and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP
national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanaoregion from where
he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a
nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one who is
honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.
We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-
Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the
IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume
the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the
practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this
 Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal
record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18
May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the
Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as
Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave
abuse of discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose
Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having
been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing
of grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath
of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic
succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon
receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE
PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United
States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several
documents in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:
1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;
2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;
4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).
In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar
petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of
law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in
March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments
and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired
his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to
resume his practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioners membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right
to resume the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends
to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice.3
It can not be overstressed that:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1wphi1 It is so delicately affected
with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy
of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of
his professional privilege.4
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following
documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
 2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau
of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good
moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator,
UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with
the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE.
After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the
petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to
the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to
the payment of appropriate fees.
Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the
re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.
SO ORDERED.
REINSTATEMENT AFTER DISBARMENT
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The
death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the
course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his
co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This
plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen
(14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the
lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years,
counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his
then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's
oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his
probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3)
Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of
which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the
elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an
absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired,
or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he
must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or
should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following
the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if
it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor,
and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An
attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to
aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191
Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to
deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral
standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as
an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further
 argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny
must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself
for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very
source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has
pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult
situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment
and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in
the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege
granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in
intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set
up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit.
Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those
who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private
and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy
applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character,
like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not
only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in
the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could
such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the
agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the
due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that
both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having
had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid
in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than
the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288,
10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the
practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The
possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning.
Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant
passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances
are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a
disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead
of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead
of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry
into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his
admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the
California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character
unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in
its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any
evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty,
integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs
that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for
disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the
bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the
general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal
profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of
law and in our legal system as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who
inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to
protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity
involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten
and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty
and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was
then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself
of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character
is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for
permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application
for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn
certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth Percentage Percentage Weight Relative
and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the Weight Weight Weight
judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has Political and
tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student International
and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to Law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%
show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient Labor and
and learned profession of the law. Social
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written Legislation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers Civil law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%
and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Taxation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan. Criminal law 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS Remedial
RESOLUTION Law 20% 23.529% 4 4.71%
Legal Ethics
PER CURIAM:
and Practical
On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Exercises 5% 5.882% 1 1.18%
Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored 100% 20%
leakage in the examination on the subject. After making his own inquiries, Justice Vitug reported
In another resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the Court designated the following retired
the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other members of the Court,
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the Investigating Committee:
recommending that the bar examination on the subject be nullified and that an investigation be
conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Chairman: Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino
Vitug, and resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another examination Members: Justice Jose A.R. Melo
on 04 October 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
the De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The resolution was issued without prejudice to The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the source of leakage, the
any action that the Court would further take on the matter. parties responsible therefor or who might have benefited therefrom, recommend sanctions against
Following the issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous petitions and motions all those found to have been responsible for, or who would have benefited from, the incident in
from the Philippine Association of Law Schools and various other groups and persons, expressing question and to recommend measures to the Court to safeguard the integrity of the bar
agreement to the nullification of the bar examinations in Mercantile Law but voicing strong examinations.
reservations against the holding of another examination on the subject. Several reasons were On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report and recommendation
advanced by petitioners or movants, among these reasons being the physical, emotional and to the Court, herein reproduced in full; thus -
financial difficulties that would be encountered by the examinees, if another examination on the In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar examinations, the
subject were to be held anew. Alternative proposals submitted to the Court included the spreading examination in commercial law was held in De la Salle University on Taft Avenue, Manila, the
out of the weight of Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar subjects, i.e., to determine venue of the bar examinations since 1995. The next day, the newspapers carried news of an
and gauge the results of the examinations on the basis only of the performance of the examinees in alleged leakage in the said examination.[1]
the seven bar subjects. In a resolution, dated 29 September 2003, the Court, finding merit in the Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C. Vitug,
submissions, resolved to cancel the scheduled examination in Mercantile Law on 04 October 2003 chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, reported the matter to the Chief Justice and
and to allocate the fifteen percentage points among the seven bar examination subjects. In the recommended that the examination in mercantile law be cancelled and that a formal investigation
same resolution, the Court further resolved to create a Committee composed of three retired of the leakage be undertaken.
members of the Court that would conduct a thorough investigation of the incident subject of the 23 Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution dated
September 2003 resolution. September 23, 2003, nullified the examination in mercantile law and resolved to hold another
In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court adopted the computation in the allocation examination in that subject on Saturday, October 4, 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the
of the fifteen percentage points for Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar examination earliest available time and date) at the same venue. However, because numerous petitions,
subjects, to wit: protests, and motions for reconsideration were filed against the retaking of the examination in
Subject Original Adjusted Relative Adjusted mercantile law, the Court cancelled the holding of such examination. On the recommendation of
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to allocate the fifteen (15) percentage
points for mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar examination subjects (Resolution
dated October 7, 2003).
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an Investigating Committee
composed of three (3) retired Members of the Court to conduct an investigation of the leakage and
to submit its findings and recommendations on or before December 15, 2003.
The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose
the Committee:
Chairman: Justice CAROLINA GRIO-AQUINO
Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO
Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA
The Investigating Committee was directed to determine and identify the source of the leakage, the
parties responsible therefor and those who benefited therefrom, and to recommend measures to
safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.
The investigation commenced on October 21, 2003 and continued up to November 7, 2003. The
following witnesses appeared and testified at the investigation:
1. Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee;
2. Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, law clerk in the office of Justice Vitug
3. Atty. Marcial O. T. Balgos, examiner in mercantile law;
4. Cheryl Palma, private secretary of Atty. Balgos;
5. Atty. Danilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos & Perez;
6. Atty. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner of Balgos & Perez;
7. Eduardo J. F. Abella, reviewer in commercial law at the Lex Review Center;
8. Silvestre T. Atienza, office manager of Balgos & Perez;
9. Reynita Villasis, private secretary of Atty. De Guzman;
10. Ronan Garvida, fraternity brother of Atty. De Guzman;
11. Ronald F. Collado, most illustrious brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity;
12. Jovito M. Salonga, Asst. Division Chief of Systems Development for Judicial
Application, MlSO;
The Committee held nine (9) meetings - six times to conduct the investigation and three
times to deliberate on its report.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VITUG, chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee, testified
that on Monday morning, September 22, 2003, the day after the Bar examination in mercantile or
commercial law, upon arriving in his office in the Supreme Court, his secretary,[2] Rose Kawada,
informed him that one of the law clerks, Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, told her that a friend of
hers named Ma. Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar examinee from Xavier University in Cagayan
de Oro City, who was staying at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, confided to her that something
was wrong with the examination in mercantile law, because previous to the examination, i.e., on
Saturday afternoon, the eve of the examination, she received a copy of the test questions in that
subject. She did not pay attention to the test questions because no answers were provided, and she
was hard-pressed to finish her review of that subject, using other available bar review materials, of
which there were plenty coming from various bar review centers.
However, upon perusing the questions after the examinations, Cecilia noticed that many of them
were the same questions that were asked in the just-concluded-examination.
Justice Vitug requested Marlo to invite her friend to his office in the Supreme Court, but
Carbajosa declined the invitation. So, Justice Vitug suggested that Marlo and Rose invite
Carbajosa to meet them at Robinsons Place, Ermita. She agreed to do that.
Cecilia Carbajosa arrived at Robinsons Place at the appointed time and showed the test questions
to Rose and Marlo. Rose obtained a xerox copy of the leaked questions and compared them with
the bar questions in mercantile law. On the back of the pages, she wrote, in her own hand, the
differences she noted between the leaked questions and the bar examination questions.
Rose and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked questions to Justice Vitug who compared them
with the bar examination questions in mercantile law. He found the leaked questions to be the
exact same questions which the examiner in mercantile law, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had
prepared and submitted to him as chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee. However, not all
of those questions were asked in the bar examination. According to Justice Vitug, only 75% of the
final bar questions were questions prepared by Atty. Balgos; 25% prepared by Justice Vitug
himself, were included in the final bar examination. The questions prepared by Justice Vitug were
not among the leaked test questions.
Apart from the published news stories about the leakage, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and
Justice Vitug received, by telephone and mail, reports of the leakage from Dean Mariano F.
Magsalin, Jr. of the Arellano Law Foundation (Exh. H) and a certain Dale Philip R. De los Reyes
(Exh. B -B-3), attaching copies of the leaked questions and the fax transmittal sheet showing that
the source of the questions was Danny De Guzman who faxed them to Ronan Garvida on
September 17, 2003, four days before the examination in mercantile law on September 21, 2003
(Exh. B-1).
ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR was subpoenaed by the Committee. She
identified the copy of the leaked questions that came from Cecilia Carbajosa (Exh. A). She
testified that, according to Carbajosa, the latter received the test questions from one of her co-bar
reviewees staying, like her, at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, and also enrolled in the review
classes at the Lex Review Center at the corner of P. Faura Street and Roxas Boulevard, Ermita.
She did not pay for the hand-out because the Lex Review Center gives them away for free to its
bar reviewees.
ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71 years of age, senior partner in the law firm of
BALGOS AND PEREZ with offices in Rm. 1009 West Tektite Tower, Exchange Road, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City, testified that in November 2002, Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chair of the
Committee on the 2003 Bar Examinations, invited him to be the examiner in commercial law. He
accepted the assignment and almost immediately began the preparation of test questions on the
subject. Using his personal computer in the law office, he prepared for three consecutive days,
three (3) sets of test questions which covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law (pp. 3-5,
tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). As he did not know how to prepare the questionnaire in final form, he asked
his private secretary, Cheryl Palma, to format the questions (p. 13, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). And, as he
did not know how to print the questionnaire, he likewise asked Cheryl Palma to make a print-out
(Id., pp. 14-15). All of this was done inside his office with only him and his secretary there. His
secretary printed only one copy (Id., p. 15). He then placed the printed copy of the test questions,
consisting of three sets, in an envelope which he sealed, and called up Justice Vitug to inform him
that he was bringing the questions to the latters office that afternoon. However, as Justice Vitug
was leaving his office shortly, he advised Atty. Balgos to give the sealed envelope to his
confidential assistant who had been instructed to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in the office
of Justice Vitug, he was met by Justice Vitugs confidential assistant to whom he entrusted the
sealed envelope containing the test questions (pp. 19-26, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer except to type on it. He
does not know how to open and close his own computer which has a password for that purpose. In
fact, he did not know, as he still does, the password. It is his secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened
and closed his computer for him (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
Atty. Balgos testified that he did not devise the password himself. It was Cheryl Palma who
devised it (Id., p. 71).
His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is located inside his room which is locked when he
is not in the office. He comes to the office every other day only.
He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and that he alone had access
to it. He was surprised to discover, when reports of the bar leakage broke out, that his computer
was in fact interconnected with the computers of his nine (9) assistant attorneys (tsn, pp. 30,45).
As a matter of fact, the employees - Jovito M. Salonga and Benjamin R. Katly - of the Courts
Management Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the request of Atty. Balgos, were
directed by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in his office, reported that
there were 16, not 9, computers connected to each other via Local Area Network (LAN) and one
(1) stand-alone computer connected to the internet (Exh. M). Atty. Balgos law partner, former
Justice Secretary Hernando Perez, also had a computer, but Perez took it away when he became
the Secretary of Justice.
The nine (9) assistant attorneys with computers, connected to Attorney Balgos computer, are:
1. Zorayda Zosobrado (she resigned in July 2003)
2. Claravel Javier
3. Rolynne Torio
4. Mark Warner Rosal
5. Charlynne Subia
6. Danilo De Guzman (resigned on October 22, 2003 [Exh. D])
7. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner
8. Concepcion De los Santos
9. Pamela June Jalandoni
Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by him in
mercantile law, Atty. Balgos immediately called together and questioned his office staff. He
interrogated all of them except Atty. Danilo De Guzman who was absent then. All of them
professed to know nothing about the bar leakage.
He questioned Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, Atienza is only a second year law student at
MLQU. But he is an expert in installing and operating computers. It was he and/or his brother
Gregorio who interconnected the computers in the law office, including Attorney Balgos
computer, without the latters knowledge and permission.
Atienza admitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated in the bar operations or bar ops of the
Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity of which he is a member, but he clarified that his participation
consisted only of bringing food to the MLQU bar examinees (Tsn, pp. 46-47, Oct. 24, 2003).
The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a member of the
Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU chapter. De Guzman admitted to him that he downloaded the
test questions from Attorney Balgos computer and faxed a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney
Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was the source of the leakage of his test questions in
mercantile law (Tsn, p. 52, Oct. 24, 2003).
Attorney Balgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh. E) of the juxtaposed final bar questions and his
proposed test questions, with marginal markings made by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Ret.),
indicating whether the questions are similar: (S); or different: (D), together with the percentage
points corresponding to each question. On the basis of this comparative table and Atty. Balgos
indications as to which questions were the same or different from those given in the final
questionnaire, Justice Mendoza computed the credit points contained in the proposed leaked
questions. The proposed questions constituted 82% of the final bar questions. Attached to this
Report as Annex A is the comparative table and the computation of credit points marked as Exh.
E-1.
CHERYL PALMA, 34 years old, private secretary of Attorney Balgos for the past six years,
testified that she did not type the test questions. She admitted, however, that it was she who
formatted the questions and printed one copy as directed by her employer. She confirmed Atty.
Balgos testimony regarding her participation in the operation of his personal computer. She
disclosed that what appears in Atty. Balgos computer can be seen in the neighborhood network if
the other computers are open and not in use; that Silvestre Atienza of the accounting section, can
access Atty. Balgos computer when the latter is open and not in use.
ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, managing partner of the firm, testified that on October 16,
2003, he sent De Guzman a memo (Exh. C) giving him 72 hours to explain in writing why you
should not be terminated for causing the Firm an undeserved condemnation and dishonor because
of the leakage aforesaid.
On October 22, 2003, De Guzman handed in his resignation effective immediately. He explained
that:
Causing the firm, its partners and members to suffer from undeserved condemnation and
humiliation is not only farthest from, but totally out of, my mind. It is just unfortunate that the
incident subject matter of your memorandum occurred. Rest assured, though, that I have never
been part of any deliberate scheme to malign the good reputation and integrity of the firm, its
partners and members. (Exh. D)
DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000. He obtained his
LLB degree from FEU in 1998. As a student, he was an awardee for academic excellence. He
passed the 1998 bar examinations with a grade of 86.4%. In FEU, he joined the Beta Sigma
Lambda law fraternity which has chapters in MLQU, UE and MSU (Mindanao State University).
As a member of the fraternity, he was active during bar examinations and participated in the
fraternitys bar ops.
He testified that sometime in May 2003, when he was exploring Atty. Balgos computer, (which he
often did without the owners knowledge or permission), to download materials which he thought
might be useful to save for future use, he found and downloaded the test questions in mercantile
law consisting of 12 pages. He allegedly thought they were quizzers for a book that Atty. Balgos
might be preparing. He saved them in his hard disk.
He thought of faxing the test questions to one of his fraternity brods, a certain Ronan Garvida
who, De Guzman thought, was taking the 2003 bar examinations. Garvida is also a law graduate
from FEU. He had taken the 2002 bar examinations, but did not pass.
On September 17, 2003, four days before the mercantile law bar examination, De Guzman faxed a
copy of the 12-page-test questions (Exhs. I, I-1, I-2, I-3) to Garvida because earlier he was
informed by Garvida that he was retaking the bar examinations. He advised Garvida to share the
questions with other Betan examinees. He allegedly did not charge anything for the test questions.
Later, after the examination was over, Garvida texted (sent a text message on his cell phone) him
(De Guzman), that he did not take the bar examination.
Besides Garvida, De Guzman faxed the mercantile law bar questions to another fraternity brother
named Arlan (surname unknown), through Reynita (Nanette) Villasis, his secretary (Tsn, pp. 20-
28, Oct. 29, 2003). But he himself faxed the questions to still another brod named Erwin Tan who
had helped him during the bar ops in 1998 when he (De Guzman) took the bar examinations (Id.,
p. 28). He obtained the cell phone numbers of Arlan and Erwin Tan from Gabby Tanpiengco
whom he informed by text message, that they were guide questions, not tips, in the mercantile law
examination.
When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on Wednesday after the examination, (news of the
leakage was already in all the newspapers), De Guzman admitted to Attorney Velasco that he
faxed the questions to his fraternity brothers, but he did not reveal where he got the test questions.
De Guzman received a text message from Erwin Tan acknowledging that he received the test
questions. However, Erwin informed him that the questions were kalat na kalat (all over the place)
even if he did not share them with others (Tsn, pp. 54-55, Oct. 29, 2003).
De Guzman also contacted Garvida who informed him that he gave copies of the test questions to
Betans Randy Iigo and James Bugain.
Arlan also texted De Guzman that almost all the questions were asked in the examination. Erwin
Tan commented that many of the leaked questions were asked in the examination, pero hindi
exacto; mi binago (they were not exactly the same; there were some changes).
De Guzman tried to text Garvida, but he received no response.
De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to operate a computer from Silvestre Atienza, the office
manager, and through self-study, by asking those who are knowledgeable on computers. He has
been using computers since 1997, and he bought his own computer in 2001, a Pentium 3, which he
uses at home.
REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old legal secretary of Attorney De Guzman, submitted her
affidavit (Exh. F) and orally affirmed her participation in the reproduction and transmittal by fax
of the leaked test questions in mercantile law to Ronan Garvida and Arlan, as testified by De
Guzman.
RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the Investigating Committee in compliance with the
subpoena that was issued to him. Garvida graduated from FEU College of Law in 2000. He is
about 32 years of age. While still a student in 1998, he was afflicted with multiple sclerosis or MS,
a disease of the nervous system that attacks the nerve sheaths of the brain and spinal cord. It is a
chronic disabling disease although it may have periods of remission. It causes its victim to walk
with erratic, stiff and staggering gait; the hands and fingers may tremble in performing simple
actions; the eyesight can be impaired, and speech may be slow and slurred (p. 737, Vol. 2, Readers
Digest Medical Encyclopedia, 1971 Ed., compiled by Benjamin F. Miller, M.D.). All these
symptoms were present when Garvida testified before the Committee on November 6, 2003 to
answer its questions regarding his involvement in the leakage of the examiners test questions in
mercantile law.
Garvida testified that when he was a freshman at FEU, he became a member of the Beta Sigma
Lambda fraternity where he met and was befriended by Attorney De Guzman who was his senior
by one and a half years. Although they had been out of touch since he went home to the province
on account of the recurrence of his illness, De Guzman was able [to] get this cell phone number
from his compadre, Atty. Joseph Pajara. De Guzman told Garvida that he was faxing him possible
questions in the bar examination in mercantile law. Because the test questions had no answers, De
Guzman stressed that they were not tips but only possible test questions.
Garvida had intended to take the 2003 bar examinations. He enrolled in
the Consortium Review Center in FEU, paying P10,000.00 as enrollment fee. However, on his
way to the Supreme Court to file his application to take the bar examination, he suffered pains in
his wrist - symptoms that his MS had recurred. His physician advised him to go to
the National Orthopedic Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. This he did.
He gave up his plan to take the 2003 bar examinations. Nevertheless, he continued to attend the
review classes at the Consortium Review Center because he did not want to waste completely the
P10,000-enrollment fee that he paid for the review course (Nahihinayang ako). That was
presumably why De Guzman thought that Garvida was taking the bar exams and sent him a copy
of the test questions in mercantile law.
Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida faxed a copy to his brod Randy Iigo who was
reviewing at the Consortium Review Center. Randy photocopied them for distribution to other
fraternity brods. Some of the brods doubted the usefulness of the test questions, but Randy who
has a high regard for De Guzman, believed that the questions were tips. Garvida did not fax the
questions to any other person than Randy Iigo. He allegedly did not sell the questions to Randy. I
could not do that to a brod, he explained.
In view of the fact that one of the copies of the leaked test questions (Exh. H) bore on the left
margin a rubber stamp composed of the Greek initials BEA-MLQU, indicating that the source of
that copy was the Beta Sigma Lambda chapter at MLQU, the Committee subpoenaed Ronald
Collado, the Most Illustrious Brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity of MLQU.
RONALD COLLADO is a senior law student at the MLQU. He admitted that his fraternity
conducted Bar Ops for the 2003 bar exams. Bar Ops are the biggest activity of the fraternity every
year. They start as soon as new officers of the fraternity are elected in June, and they continue
until the bar examinations are over. The bar operations consist of soliciting funds from alumni
brods and friends to be spent in reproducing bar review materials for the use of their barristers (bar
candidates) in the various review centers, providing meals for their brod-barristers on examination
days; and to rent a bar site or place near De la Salle University where the examinees and the frat
members can convene and take their meals during the break time. The Betans bar site for the 2003
bar examinations was located on Leon Guinto Street, Malate. On September 19 and 21, before
[the] start of the examination, Collados fraternity distributed bar review materials for the
mercantile law examination to the examinees who came to the bar site. The test questions (Exh. H)
were received by Collado from a brod, Alan Guiapal, who had received them from Randy Iigo.
Collado caused 30 copies of the test questions to be printed with the logo and initials of the
fraternity (BEA-MLQU) for distribution to the 30 MLQU examinees taking the bar exams.
Because of time constraints, frat members were unable to answer the test questions despite the
clamor for answers, so, they were given out as is - without answers.
DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of the Jose Rizal University law school in Mandaluyong City,
was the reviewer in Mercantile Law and Practical Exercises at the Lex Review Center which is
operated by the Lex Review & Seminars Inc., of which Dean Abella is one of the incorporators.
He learned about the leakage of test questions in mercantile law when he was delivering the pre-
week lecture on Legal Forms at the Arellano University. The leaked questions were shown to him
by his secretary, Jenylyn Domingo, after the mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday lecture
in mercantile law because he was suffering from a touch of flu. He gave his last lecture on the
subject on Wednesday or Thursday before the exam. He denied having bought or obtained and
distributed the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law to the bar reviewees in
the Lex Review Center.
FINDINGS
The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions which
the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug,
as chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee. The questions constituted 82% of the
questions asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003,
Sunday, in some cases with slight changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as
proposed by Atty. Balgos. Hence, any bar examinee who was able to get hold of the leaked
questions before the mercantile law examination and answered them correctly, would have been
assured of passing the examination with at least a grade of 82%!
The circumstance that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions prepared by
Atty. Balgos, proves conclusively that the leakage originated from his office, not from the Office
of Justice Vitug, the Bar Examinations Chairman.
Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer.
Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was Atty. Balgos computer. The culprit
who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer without the latters knowledge and
consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Attorney Danilo
De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman
revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his secretary Reynita Villasis, to his
fraternity brods, namely, Ronan Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could not recall), and Erwin
Tan.
In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James Bugain.
Randy Iigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions to another Betan, Alan Guiapal, who
gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigma [Lambdas] Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald F. Collado,
who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQUs 30 bar candidates.
Attorney Danilo De Guzmans act of downloading Attorney Balgos test questions in mercantile
law from the latters computer, without his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of
larceny. It was theft of intellectual property; the test questions were intellectual property of
Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal knowledge.
Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos right to
privacy of communication, and to security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search
and seizure - rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3,
Article III, 1987 Constitution).
He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma
Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue advantage over the
other examiners in the mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by
his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the law
instead of promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession of law instead of upholding
its dignity and integrity. His actuations impaired public respect for the Court, and damaged the
integrity of the bar examinations as the final measure of a law graduates academic preparedness to
embark upon the practice of law.
However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was solely responsible
for the leakage of Atty. Balgos proposed test questions in the mercantile law examination. The
Committee does not believe that he acted alone, or did not have the assistance and cooperation of
other persons, such as:
Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos private secretary, who, according to Atty. Balgos himself, was the
only person who knew the password, who could open and close his computer; and who had the
key to his office where his computer was kept. Since a computer may not be accessed or
downloaded unless it is opened, someone must have opened Atty. Balgos computer in order for De
Guzman to retrieve the test questions stored therein.
Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity brod of De Guzman, who was responsible for interconnecting
Atty. Balgos computer with the other computers outside Atty. Balgos room or office, and who was
the only other person, besides Cheryl Palma, who knew the password of Atty. Balgos computer.
The following persons who received from De Guzman, and distributed copies of the leaked test
questions, appear to have conspired with him to steal and profit from the sale of the test questions.
They could not have been motivated solely by a desire to help the fraternity, for the leakage was
widespread (kalat na kalat) according to Erwin Tan. The possible co-conspirators were: Ronan
Garvida,Arlan,Erwin Tan,Randy Iigo,Ronald Collado, and Allan Guiapal
The Committee does not believe that De Guzman recklessly broke the law and risked his job and
future as a lawyer, out of love for the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity. There must have been an
ulterior material consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud of secrecy that, he
very well knows, covers the bar examinations.
On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions from Atty. Balgos
computer could have been avoided if Atty. Balgos had exercised due diligence in safeguarding the
secrecy of the test questions which he prepared. As the computer is a powerful modern machine
which he admittedly is not fairly familiar with, he should not have trusted it to deep secret the test
questions that he stored in its hard disk. He admittedly did not know the password of his computer.
He relied on his secretary to use the password to open and close his computer. He kept his
computer in a room to which other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use of the machine
whose potential for mischief he could not have been totally unaware of, he should have avoided its
use for so sensitive an undertaking as typing the questions in the bar examination. After all he
knew how to use the typewriter in the use of which he is quite proficient. Atty. Balgos should
therefore have prepared the test questions in his trusty typewriter, in the privacy of his home,
(instead of his law office), where they would have been safe from the prying eyes of secretaries
and assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos negligence in the preparation and safekeeping of his proposed
test questions for the bar examination in mercantile law, was not the proximate cause of the bar
leakage; it was, in fact, the root cause. For, if he had taken those simple precautions to protect the
secrecy of his papers, nobody could have stolen them and copied and circulated them. The
integrity of the bar examinations would not have been sullied by the scandal. He admitted
that Mali siguro ako, but that was what happened (43 tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
RECOMMENDATION
This Honorable court in the case of Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA
276, pronounced the following reminder for lawyers: Members of the bar must do nothing that
may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty and
integrity of the profession. In another case, it likewise intoned: We cannot overstress the duty of a
lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. (Reyes v.
Javier, A.C. No. 5574, February 2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538). It goes without saying that a lawyer
who violates this precept of the profession by committing a gross misconduct which dishonors and
diminishes the publics respect for the legal profession, should be disciplined.
After careful deliberation, the Investigating Committee recommends that:
1. Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally unfit to
continue as a member of the legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of integrity, and criminal
behavior. In addition, he should make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY and pay DAMAGES to the
Supreme Court for involving it in another bar scandal, causing the cancellation of the mercantile
law examination, and wreaking havoc upon the image of this institution.
2. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by the Court and likewise be
required to make a written APOLOGY to the Court for the public scandal he brought upon it as a
result of his negligence and lack of due care in preparing and safeguarding his proposed test
questions in mercantile law. As the Court had to cancel the Mercantile Law examination on
account of the leakage of Attorney Balgos test questions, which comprised 82% of the bar
questions in that examination, Atty. Balgos is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner
for that subject.
3. FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan
Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal by the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police, with a view to their criminal
prosecution as probable co-conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test questions in mercantile
law.
With regard to recommending measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations and
prevent a repetition of future leakage in the said examinations, inasmuch as this matter is at
present under study by the Courts Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, as an aspect of
proposals for bar reforms, the Investigating Committee believes it would be well-advised to refrain
from including in this report what may turn out to be duplicative, if not contrary,
recommendations on the matter.[3]
The Court adopts the report, including with some modifications the recommendation, of the
Investigating Committee. The Court, certainly will not countenance any act or conduct that can
impair not only the integrity of the Bar Examinations but the trust reposed on the Court.
The Court also takes note that Mr. Jovito M. Salonga and Mr. Benjamin R. Katly, two of its
employees assigned to the Management Information Systems Office (MISO), who were tasked by
the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in the office of Atty. Balgos, found
that the Courts Computer-Assisted Legal Research (CALR) database[4] was installed in the
computer used by Atty. Balgos. Mr. Salonga and Mr. Katly reported that the system, which was
developed by the MISO, was intended for the exclusive use of the Court. The installation thereof
to any external computer would be unauthorized without the permission of the Court. Atty.
Velasco informed the two Court employees that the CALR database was installed by Atty. De
Guzman on the computer being used by Atty. Balgos. The matter would also need further
investigation to determine how Atty. De Guzman was able to obtain a copy of the Courts CALR
database.
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee,
hereby resolves to -
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his
receipt of this RESOLUTION;
(2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from
receiving any honorarium as an Examiner in Mercantile Law;
(3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further investigation of
Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan,
Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal with a view to
determining their participation and respective accountabilities in the bar examination
leakage and to conduct an investigation on how Danilo De Guzman was able to
secure a copy of the Supreme Courts CALR database.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De Guzman in the Office
of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Office of the Court Administrator to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L.
Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Records show that in the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from
the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves
and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was
still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the
subject Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory
evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he is supporting or has
made provisions for the regular support of his two children by complainant.
Let respondents name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.2
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and
Mercy3 which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution4 dated June 1, 2004. Eight years
after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy)5 seeking
judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the
present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in
the Resolution dated September 4, 2012.6 On December 18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed
to this Court by the Office of the Vice President7 for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look
into the substantive merits of the case.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Clemency,8 the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.9 (Citations omitted)
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.10
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition meritorious.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal
profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant
Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached
pictures.11 Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in
Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until
her death in 2008.12 In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile,
Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-
In-Charge in the Assessors Office, which office he continues to serve to date.13 Moreover, he is a
part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the
School Year 2011-2012.14 Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by
helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
The following documents attest to respondents reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.
Mabborang;15 (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez;16 (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud;17 (4)
Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office;18 (5) Certification by the Office of the
Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development Officer;19 (6) Certification
from the Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan;20 (7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T.
Tuddao;21 (8) Certifications from nine (9) Barangay Chairpersons;22 (9) Certification from the
Office of the Provincial Assessor;23 (10) Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca
Multi-Purpose Cooperative;24 and (11) Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior
Citizens, Enrile Chapter.25The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent has
no monetary accountabilities in relation to his office26 while the Office of the Human Resource
Management Officer attested that he has no pending administrative case.27 He is not known to be
involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) attested that he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011.28
Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cagayan Chapter29 and by his former and present colleagues.30 His parish priest, Rev.
Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of
the Catholic Church.31 He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer.32 Records further reveal
that respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles,33 as in fact, no opposition to the
instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support34 to his children in
compliance with the Courts directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred
and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School,35 and
his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the
Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice.36 From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that
respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 5837 years of age, he still has
productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law
profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline
and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who
have reformed their ways,38 as in this case.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law.1wphi1 He is,
however, reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence. to the rigid
standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are
continuing requirements.39
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L.
Macarubbo is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
RE: LETTER OF JUDGE AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and all
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 37, APPEALING FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY. personnel thereof,12the Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
RESOLUTION clemency:
CORONA, J.: 1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.13 These shall include but should not
In a letter dated July 18, 2007, Judge Augustus C. Diaz, presiding judge of Branch 37 of the be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, informed the Court that he is an applicant for judgeship Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
in one of the vacant Regional Trial Court branches in Metro Manila. In connection therewith, he community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
was interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council on July 10, 2007. He was told to seek judicial administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
clemency due to the fact that he was once fined P20,000 "for not hearing a motion for demolition." presumption of non-reformation.
He claims that this lapse happened only once as a result of "oversight." He requests judicial 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty14 to ensure a period
clemency and, in particular, that he be allowed to "again be nominated to one of the vacant of reformation.
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila or in any of the cities where [his] application [is 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
being] considered." ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.15
In a subsequent letter,1 Judge Diaz stated that he has been the presiding judge of Branch 37 of the 4. There must be a showing of promise16 (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City since March 1, 1995. He expressed deep remorse for the acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
lapse for which he was held administratively liable in Alvarez v. Diaz.2 He confessed that "[t]he administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.17
stain of the penalty has taught [him] a bitter lesson" and promised to avoid the commission of the 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
same or similar acts. He submitted himself to the judicious discretion of this Court for whatever In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past malfeasance. He humbly
action the Court may take on his plea for judicial clemency. accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have elapsed since the promulgation
In Alvarez, Judge Diaz was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he granted the of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12
following motions: (1) a motion for execution which was fatally defective for lack of notice to the years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedication to the institution. Thus, the
defendant and (2) a motion for demolition without notice and hearing. His action on the motion for Court may now open the door of further opportunities in the judiciary for him.
demolition also made him liable for grave abuse of authority.3 He was fined P20,000.4 Accordingly, the letter dated July 18, 2007 of Judge Augustus C. Diaz is hereby NOTED. His
Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides: request for judicial clemency is GRANTED.
SEC. 5. Disqualification. The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment SO ORDERED.
to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case,
where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been
granted judicial clemency. 5 (emphasis supplied)
Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any
judicial post, until and unless his request for judicial clemency is granted.
Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has come down hard6 and
wielded the rod of discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen short of the
exacting standards of judicial conduct.7This is because a judge is the visible representation of the
law and of justice.8 He must comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff
of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his official duties but also as to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.9 His character must be able to withstand the
most searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system.101wphi1
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the
preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing
that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.11