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AmericanMilitaryEthicsin WorldWarH:
The BombingofGermanCivilians
RonaldSchaffer
Theybelievedthatbombingmightactuallystrengthen civiliandetermination
to fight.But even ifit werepossibleto destroycivilianmorale,theythought
thatthefeelingsofthepopulacecouldnotbringan earlyend to the war since
no grouporcombinationofgroupsin Germanywas strongenoughto overcome
Nazi control.One memberof the committee,told that morale was bad in
Berlin,remarkedthatthe "onlymoraleworthconsidering now is themorale
ofthepeoplein highplaces-the peoplein power,theHighCommand."'5
While none of these officersraised anythingbut pragmaticobjectionsto
morale bombing,other persons,outside the armed forces,had begun to
criticizeareaattacksas immoral,andtheircomplaintshad an important effect
on the AAF. In March 1944 twenty-eight noted clergymenand antiwarac-
tivistssignedan introduction to an articlein Fellowship,the journalof the
pacifist organizationFellowship of Reconciliation,stating,among other
things,that "Christian people should be moved to examine themselves
concerning in thiscarnivalofdeath." The New YorkTimes
theirparticipation
printeda frontpage storyabout the incidentand a flurryof controversy
followedin religiousand secularmedia.16
This showofdissentalarmedofficialsin theWarDepartmentand theAAF.
Undersecretary ofWarRobertP. Pattersonpubliclydenouncedtheprotestors,
claiming that they were encouragingthe enemy. RobertA. Lovett, the
assistantsecretaryof war forair, visitedAAF leadersin Europeand briefed
themon the problemof adversepublicityat home. ShortlyafterD-Day, he
informed Spaatzat theheadquarters oftheUnitedStatesStrategic AirForcesin
Europe (USSTAF),7 that therewas genuinefeelingin the countryand in
Congressabouttheinhumanity ofindiscriminate bombingandadvisedutmost
caution in pursuingsuch a program.Lovettpredictedserioustroubleif in-
discriminate attacksbecametheannouncedpolicyoftheAAF.18
Lovetttouchedon an issue ofthe highestimportanceto air commanders
thepublicimageoftheAAF.Duringtheyearsbetweenthewars,officers like
Spaatz, Eaker,and William L. ("Billy") Mitchellhad workeddiligentlyto
develop a favorableimage, testifyingat congressionalhearings,staging
exhibitionsofflightenduranceand bombingdemonstrations, and cultivating
journalistswho could help themmake the Americanpeople feel positively
'5 Officeof AssistantChiefof Air Staff,
Intelligence,"The StrategicAerialBombardment of
Europe," Dec. 10, 1943: "Morale," file 142.042-11,1 July-15Nov. 1943, vol. 3 (Simpson
HistoricalResearchCenter);F. L. Andersonto ColonelsWilliamson,Hughes,et al., Feb. 12, 1944,
file519.4511-14,Feb-Aug1944,ibid.; "ProspectforEndingWarby AirAttackagainstGerman
Morale,"March5, 1944,file519.318-1,ibid.; interviewofRichardD. HughesbyBruceHopper,
March20, 1944,box 135,CarlSpaatzPapers(Library ofCongress).
16 New YorkTimes,March6, 1944,p. 1; VeraBrittain, "MassacrebyBombing,"Fellowship,X
(March1944),50-64.
II UnitedStatesStrategicAirForces,formed in January1944,coordinated strategic
bombingby
theU.S. Eighthand Fifteenth AirForces.In Aprilit passedfromformalcontrolbytheCombined
ChiefsofStaffto controlbythesupremeAlliedcommander. In September it reverted
backto the
CombinedChiefsof Staff.Even afterthatdate,however,DwightD. Eisenhowercontinuedto
influenceitsactivitiesthroughunderstandingswithCarlSpaatz.
'8 New YorkTimes,March11, 1944,p. 7; Daily Journal (Personal),June9, 1944,box 15,Spaatz
Papers; MemorandumfromHughes, July5, 1944 (POINTBLANK folder),file 519.4511-14,
Feb-Aug1944(SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter).
324 The Journalof American History
Spaatz was also worriedabout the effectsof the raid on the way people
thoughtabout the AAF. This is evidentfromhis suggestionto Doolittlethat
news summariesof the operationstressthe effortto create administrative
confusionand disruptreinforcements. He saidnothingaboutbreakingmorale,
thoughhe knew thatthis was one of the chiefobjectivesforthose who ad-
vocated THUNDERCLAP. The Britishfeltthat way and so, as Spaatz had
recentlylearned,didChiefofStaffMarshall.Not onlydidMarshallwantto hit
Berlin,but when its inhabitantswere evacuatedto places like Munich, he
wantedto attackMunichtoo,showingtheevacueestherewas no hope.
Aftersome hesitation Spaatz proceeded with the bombing of Berlin,
arranging forit to occuras a radar-guided, blind-bombingoperation.He also
had his staffprepareforthe attackon MunichthatMarshallhad requested.39
FollowingSpaatz's instructions, nearlya thousandB-17s blasted targetsin
Berlinon February3, 1945. AlthoughAmericanbombardiers were able to do
visual bombingthroughholes in the clouds and hit severalmilitarytargets,
perhaps25,000civilianswerekilled.
Otherraidson east Germancitiesfollowed,climaxingFebruary13 and 14 in
an attackon Dresden,whereBritishplanescreateda vastfirestorm thatswept
acrossthecity.Then morethanthreehundredAmericanbombersroaredhigh
overthe still flamingruins,aimingthroughdense clouds at the marshalling
yards,whileAmericanfighters movingtargetsdownbelow.40
strafed
The east Germanraids,particularly theattackon Dresden,producedjustthe
kindofpublicitythatSpaatz and Doolittlewishedto avoid. At Eisenhower's
headquarters, RAFAirCommodoreC. M. Griersontold a pressbriefing that
one objectof these raidswas to disrupt the German economy by forcing the
Germangovernment tomovesuppliesaroundto careforbombed-out civilians,
by attackingtownsfromwhichreliefwas beingsent,and bydestroying places
to which refugeeswere evacuated. An Associated Press storybased on
Grierson'sinterviewwas passed by a SHAEF censor,and soon people in the
UnitedStateswerereadingthat"Allied air commandershave made the long-
awaited decision to adopt deliberateterrorbombingof the great German
populationcentersas a ruthlessexpedientto hastenHitler'sdoom."'41
The briefingand news story,both essentiallycorrect,caused considerable
alarmat AAFheadquarters."Whatdo we say?" Arnold'schiefofinformation
asked Spaatz. "This is certainto have a nation-wideseriouseffecton the Air
Forcesas we have steadfastlypreachedthegospelofprecisionbombingagainst
military and industrialtargets."Anderson,Spaatz's deputycommanderfor
39 Spaatzto Doolittle,JD104CS,Jan.30, 1945,and UA53649,Feb. 2, 1945,ibid.; Andersonto
Spaatz,Feb.2, 1945,box20, SpaatzPapers;Minutesofstaffmeeting,Feb.2, 1945,ibid.;Anderson
to Spaatz,Feb. 1, 1945, Special Projects-CLARION,file 519.430A,Dec 44-Mar 45 (Simpson
HistoricalResearchCenter).
40 Cravenand Cate, eds., ArmyAir Forces,HI, 725-26; Irving,Destructionof Dresden,155,
164-67,196-97.
41 HowardCowan,"AlliesDecide on New PolicyofTerror Raids,"St.LouisPost-Dispatch,Feb.
18, 1945, p. 1. AAF Headquartersquoted an almost identicalversionof this storyfromthe
Washington Star in Rex Smithto Spaatz, WAR 39722, Feb. 18, 1945, box 20, Spaatz Papers.
Grierson toWarDept.,UA 64471,Feb. 19, 1945,ibid.
is quotedin F. L. Anderson
332 The Journal
ofAmericanHistory
AirForces.
334 The Journalof American History