B.M. No.

2540 September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 1
and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. 2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the
Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. 7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated
"under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys
was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; 8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of
Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten." 9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013. 13 The
OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioners gross negligence, gross misconduct
and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference,
petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medados prayer in the instant petition, subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing
upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Courts
attention to petitioners omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit
after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to
file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa yo, you dont know whats gonna happen. At the same time, its a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of whats gonna happen. And, finally its the right thing to do. I have to come
here sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law, 17
which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of
the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict
requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the
character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company,
and the Energy Development Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medados worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.1wphi1
While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this
privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the
profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
"neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment." 22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat;
ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake
of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already
the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an
attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point,
Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his
failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. 26
When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps
to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming to be an attorney or officer
of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court, 27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in
unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice
of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because
at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise
applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him
from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him
in the amount of 32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to
engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of 32,000 for his unauthorized practice of
law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED
that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be
dealt will be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1493 June 20, 2000
JAIME L. CO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE DEMETRIO D. CALIMAG, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
Respondent Judge Demetrio Calimag, Jr. stands charged with serious misconduct and inefficiency in
office in this administrative complaint filed by complainant Jaime L. Co.
On June 23, 1998, the Court designated respondent judge, then presiding over Branch 35 of the Regional
Trial Court stationed in Santiago City, as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Echague,
Isabela in addition to his regular duties. Later that year, however, Judge Bonifacio Ong took over as the
regular judge of the Echague court.
On December 2, a complaint for legal separation was filed by Eva Co against her husband, herein
complainant Jaime L. Co. The suit, wherein it was also prayed that a temporary restraining order be
issued, was filed with the Echague court. Despite Judge Ong's having already assumed office as
presiding judge thereof, respondent immediately took cognizance of the case. Considering the prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order to be one of extreme urgency, respondent in ex parte
proceedings, temporarily enjoined herein complainant "from incurring any obligations, collecting
rentals/overdue obligations from debtors, disposing, transferring, administering or managing the conjugal
properties and the family business of the spouses, real or personal found in the Philippines" (Rollo, p. 8).
In conjunction therewith, respondent set the summary hearing of the application for restraining order for
the next day, December 3. With complainant failing to appear, respondent extended the operation of the
temporary restraining order and set the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction for December
10, 1998.1wphi1.nt
On December 10, 1998, complainant filed a motion to suspend the hearing, raising Article 58 of the
Family Code as basis therefor. Likewise, he filed an Objection to the Temporary Restraining
Order/Injunction and Administration. Eva Co, on the other hand, filed a supplemental motion for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. Respondent required the parties to submit, within five days, their
respective affidavits or memoranda in support or denial of the aforesaid motion to suspend hearing.
Complainant now alleges that on December 26, 1998, respondent called him up at around 8 to 8:30 p.m.
to tell him that he (respondent) would not issue an injunction in exchange for some money to be
purportedly used for respondent's confinement in the hospital. Complainant claims that the next morning,
he gave an envelope containing P10,000.00 to Norma Cario, an employee of his, with instructions to
give the same to respondent. However, upon receiving the envelope and counting the cash contained
therein, respondent allegedly returned the same to Norma Cario, saying "This is not the amount we
talked about. You return this to Mr. Co" (TSN, Dec. 1, 1999, p. 15).
On December 29, 1998, respondent issued a writ of injunction and, immediately after signing the same,
furnished a copy to Eva Co. The latter likewise immediately disseminated said order to all the debtors of
the conjugal partnership.
Complainant anchors his charge of serious misconduct against respondent on the latter's alleged lack of
authority to take cognizance of the legal separation case filed by Eva Co against complainant, as well as
the respondent's alleged extortion attempt against complainant.
While it is true that Judge Bonifacio Ong formally assumed office on November 9, 1998, it must be
pointed out that, per the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the Echague court, Judge Ong did not
hear and/or try cases from November 9 to December, 1998 because he was still undergoing orientation
and immersion during said period. Thus, respondent still had the authority to take cognizance of old and
newly filed cases in the Echague court during that period, notwithstanding the appointment of a new
judge to said sala. In the words of the Court Administrator, in a memorandum dated August 9, 1999, "[a]n
Acting Presiding Judge can take action on old and newly field cases in the sala assigned to him,
especially so in this particular instance where the newly appointed judge was still undergoing orientation
and/or immersion program." The charge of misconduct due to lack of authority to take cognizance of
cases leveled against respondent, thus, has no leg to stand on.
Likewise, complainant claims that he was denied due process when respondent, instead of conducting a
hearing on the question of whether or not to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, required the parties to
submit their affidavits/counter-affidavits and thereafter, considered the motion submitted for resolution.
Under Section 5 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or party sought to be enjoined. . ." This does not
mean, however, that all petitions for preliminary injunction must undergo a trial-type hearing, it being
hornbook doctrine that "a formal or trial-type is not at all times and in all instances essential to due
process" (NFL vs. NLRC, 283 SCRA 275 [1997]). Due process means giving every contending party the
opportunity to be heard and the court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor (Ginete
vs. CA, 296 SCRA 38 [1998]). In the instant case, there is no dispute that complainant was given
opportunity to be heard, having submitted his counter-affidavit and memorandum in support of his
position. Complainant cannot, thus, claim that he was denied due process by respondent.
With respect to the charge of extortion, complainant's allegation is supported only by the affidavit and
testimony of Norma Cario to the effect that she delivered an envelope containing money to respondent
on December 27, 1998, but that the same was returned allegedly because it was not in the amount
agreed upon by complainant and respondent. In corroboration, complainant presented in evidence the
envelope which purportedly contained the money delivered to respondent.
Firstly, there is no proof that said envelope was even handled by respondent, complainant not having
subjected the same to fingerprint analysis by experts. Without the envelope, this case becomes a matter
of Norma Cario's word against that of respondent. We are, however, disinclined to believe Norma
Cario. Not only is she an employee of complainant, she was also earlier removed from employment by
Eva Co, complainant's wife. These circumstances render suspect the veracity of her uncorroborated
narrative.
As stated by this Court in Castaos vs. Escao, Jr. (251 SCRA 174 [1995]), "an accusation of bribery is
easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, thus, to our mind, the complainant must present a panoply of
evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge
connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, it would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of
proof required should be more than substantial." In the same case, we further declared that "[i]n order that
the allegation of a charge of this nature may not be considered a fairy tale, evidence other than the
doubtful and questionable verbal testimony of a lone witness should be adduced. Entrapment should
have been pursued. Evidence of a reasonable report to police authorities should been presented. Record
of where the bribe money came from, its specific denominations and the manner respondent accepted
and disposed of it should have been clearly shown." Complainant has failed to comply with any of the
above requirements, thereby constraining this Court to give but scant consideration to his charge of
extortion.
Finally, complainant charges respondent with bias in the issuance of a temporary restraining order, and
later, of a writ of preliminary injunction, in favor of complainant's wife, Eva Co. Other than his allegation
that respondent asked for money from him, complainant has failed to adduce any other evidence to
support his claim of partiality on the part of respondent. Complaint has not shown that animosity or
hostility exists between him and respondent as to disable the latter from exercising the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge. Nor has he shown that respondent is closely related to, or acquainted with,
complainant's wife or that respondent has a personal interest in the legal separation case as to suggest
that respondent could no longer be fair and impartial in deciding the case.
In the absence of proof, the fact that respondent believed the allegations of complainant's wife in the legal
separation case, enough to issue a temporary restraining order, is hardly ground for subjecting
respondent to disciplinary action. "Respondent, or any other member of the bench for that matter, is
presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process" (People vs. Castillo, 289 SCRA. 213 [1998]). As
a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action
even though such acts are erroneous, provided he acts in good faith and without malice (Equatorial
Realty v. Anunciacion, Jr., 280 SCRA 571 (1997).
Notwithstanding the above findings, however, we find sufficient ground to support the charge of
inefficiency filed against respondent, for his failure to observe proper court procedure in the issuance of
the order of injunction on December 29, 1998.
Sec. 8, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 8. General Docket. The clerk shall keep a general docket, each page of which shall be numbered
and prepared for receiving all entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases, numbered
consecutively in the order in which they were received, and, under the heading of each case and a
complete title thereof, the date of each paper filed or issued, of each order or judgment entered, and of
each other step taken in the case, so that by reference to a single page the history of the case may be
seen.
Pursuant to the above, respondent should have first endorsed the December 29, 1998 writ of preliminary
injunction to the clerk of court so that the same could be properly recorded in the general docket. Rather
than doing so, however, respondent personally and immediately furnished complainant's wife, Eva Co, a
copy of the order of injunction on the same date that he signed and issued the same. As correctly pointed
out by Investigating Justice Candido V. Rivera, citing Usman vs. Cabe (280 SCRA 7 [1997]), "there are
reasons for these rules and in this case, we cannot overemphasize the necessity for a regulated, orderly,
and careful handling of court records the loss, tampering, or any other form of alteration or destruction of
which does not only contribute to inordinate delay in judicial proceedings but more importantly erodes
upon the credibility and reliability of our courts." Respondent's act of personally furnishing a party copies
of orders issued, without the same passing through the court docket, is highly irregular, giving rise to the
suspicion that the judge is partial to one of the parties in the case pending before him. Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere
appearance of impropriety. They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for
reproach (San Juan vs. Bagalacsa, 283 SCRA 417 [1997]). A magistrate of the law must comport himself
at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny
of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice (Cortes vs. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA
423 [1998]). Respondent's act of immediately furnishing complainant's wife a copy of the injunction order
hardly qualifies with the above standard.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered imposing a FINE of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on
judge Demetrio Calimag, Jr. for inefficiency in office, with the WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN
OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN OROLA,
Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Courts resolution is a disbarment complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Joseph
Ador Ramos (respondent) for his violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
(Rules).

The Facts

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga
(Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the children of the late
Trinidad Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio).2cralaw virtualaw
library

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar)
and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named complainants and
the son of Emilio.3cralaw virtualaw library

In the settlement of Trinidads estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City,
Branch 18 (RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties were
represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf
of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty. Ely F.
Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other
heirs4 of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as collaborating counsel;
and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed
administrator of Trinidads estate. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad
and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead,
sought the appointment of the latters son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in an
Order5 dated September 20, 2007 (RTC Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007,
respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case
and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order.6cralaw virtualaw library

Due to the respondents new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment
complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated: (a)
Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the subject
case;7 and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and
confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio.8 Complainants further
claimed that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen,
consented to the withdrawal of respondents appearance, the same was obtained only on
October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered his appearance for Emilio on October 10,
2007.9 In this accord, respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as
such, was not able to obtain their written consent as required under the Rules. 10cralaw
virtualaw library

For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he never
appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed out that
the records of the case readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty.
Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively represented by Atty. Azarraga. 11 He
averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on her behalf
as their counsel of record could not attend the scheduled June 16 and July 14, 2006
hearings and that his appearances thereat were free of charge. 12 In fact, he obtained
Maricars permission for him to withdraw from the case as no further communications
transpired after these two hearings. Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to
represent Emilio in the same case.13 He added that he had no knowledge of the fact that the
late Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that no information was disclosed to
him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance.14 Finally, he clarified that his
representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator, rather than a
litigator,15 and that since no settlement was forged between the parties, he formally
withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007. 16 In support of his assertions, respondent
submitted the affidavits of Maricar17 and Atty. Azarraga18 relative to his limited appearance
and his consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel for Emilio.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15, 2008 submitted by IBP
Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),
respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen
as the records of the case show that he never acted as counsel for the other complainants.
The Investigating Commissioner observed that while respondent's withdrawal of appearance
was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the
consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated
under Rule 15.03 of the Code.20cralaw virtualaw library

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of
Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that respondent
did not acquire confidential information from his former client nor did he use against the
latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment. 21 Considering that
it was respondent's first offense, the Investigating Commissioner found the imposition of
disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he be severely
reprimanded for his act with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be
dealt with more severely.22cralaw virtualaw library

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the aforementioned
report in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated December 11, 2008 (Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-641), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules but imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-1725
dated January 3, 2013.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.

The Courts Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBPs finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code,
but reduced the recommended period of suspension to three (3) months.

Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new
clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they
are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on
the principles of public policy and good taste.26 It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.27 In Hornilla v. Salunat28
(Hornilla), the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:chanrobles
virtua1aw 1ibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two
or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of
the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on
matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after
the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.30cralaw virtualaw library

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBPs finding that
respondent represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held administratively
liable therefor.

Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as
claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the
course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio
as administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when
respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as
administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of
Antonio particularly, Karen in violation of the above-stated rule.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully
exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as
enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to
opposing parties in the same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot change his
representation from one party to the latters opponent in the same case. That respondents
previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly
accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if
the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith
and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.31cralaw virtualaw library

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a
mediator than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among the family
members render the rule inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise
improper since Rule 15.04,32 Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain
the written consent of all concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator
in settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records show that
respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending engagement as
Emilios counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio particularly, Karen and equally secure their
express written consent before consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out
that a lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to
it.33 Accordingly, for respondents violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is
warranted.

In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was increased
from severe reprimand to a suspension of six (6) months by the IBP Board of Governors in
its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is
bereft of any explanation showing the bases of the IBP Board of Governors modification; as
such, it contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules which specifically mandates that
[t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based.34 Verily, the Court looks with
disfavor the change in the recommended penalty without any ample justification therefor.
To this end, the Court is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of
the requirement to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that
its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on which the
same is based is akin to what is required of courts in promulgating their decisions. The
reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no lesser station than any other portion of the
ratio.35cralaw virtualaw library

In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
a period of three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the following
factors: first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is undisputed that respondent
merely accommodated Maricars request out of gratis to temporarily represent her only
during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her lawyers unavailability; third, it is
likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late Antonio had any other
heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first
appearance as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in
good faith; and fourth, complainants admit that respondent did not acquire confidential
information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against them any knowledge obtained
in the course of his previous employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner
prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin,
Jr.,36 the Court similarly imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of three months to the counsel therein who represented parties whose interests are
hostile to his other clients in another case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015
SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO AND AIDA AMATORIO, Complainants, v. ATTY.
FRANCISCO DY YAP AND ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This pertains to the complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Rogelio Amatorio and Aida
Amatorio (Aida) (complainants) against Attys. Francisco Dy Yap (Francisco) and Whelma
Siton-Yap (respondents) for violating Rules 1.01, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

In their complaint, the complainants alleged that the respondents employed deceit to obtain
favorable judgments, specifically by failing to inform the trial court that there was already
an out-of-court settlement between them and maliciously manifesting that their counsel,
Atty. Justo Paras (Atty. Paras) was suspended from the practice of
law.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The complainants asseverated that they are clients of Atty. Paras in two collection cases,
particularly, Civil Case No. 2000-319 and Civil Case No. 2000-321, which were filed against
them by the respondents. In Civil Case No. 2000-319, respondents sued the complainants
to compel them to pay their indebtedness of P18,000.00, which was evidenced by a
promissory note. After they filed their answer to the complaint, however, the respondents
filed a motion to strike out the same and to declare them in default on the ground that the
said pleading was prepared by a lawyer suspended from the practice of law and lacked
proper verification. The motion was however denied.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 2000-321, the respondents sued the complainants to
collect the amount of P94,173.44. The answer filed by Atty. Paras was however stricken off
the record for the reason that he was suspended from the practice of law at the time of its
filing.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the complainants decided to seek an out-of-
court settlement. On May 23, 2001, Aida went to the respondents law office. She appealed
for the respondents consideration and asked that they be allowed to pay their obligations
by way of installment. The parties agreed on the terms of payment and, on that same day,
Aida tendered her first payment of P20,000.00, which was received and duly acknowledged
by Francisco in a written document with the letterhead of Yap Law Office. When Aida asked
the respondents if they should still attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28,
2001 and June 18, 2001 in the civil cases filed against them, the latter told them they need
not attend anymore as they will be moving for the dismissal of the cases. Relying on the
respondents assurance, the complainants did not attend the scheduled hearings.
Subsequently, they were surprised to receive copies of the decisions of the trial court in the
two civil cases filed by the respondents, declaring them in default for non-appearance in the
pre-trial conference and ordering them to pay the amount of their indebtedness and
damages. The decision however did not mention the out-of-court settlement between the
parties. Nonetheless, the complainants continued tendering installment payments to the
respondents upon the latters assurance that they will disregard the decision of the trial
court since they already had an out-of-court settlement before the rendition of said
judgment. They were surprised to learn, however, that the respondents filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2000-319 and were in fact issued said
writ.4 This prompted them to seek legal advice to address their predicament. They went to
Atty. Jose V. Carriaga who, after learning of the factual milieu of their case, told them that
they have a good ground to file a disbarment case against the respondents. He, however,
declined to handle the case himself as he disclosed that his wife is a relative of the
respondents. Instead, he referred the complainants to Atty. Paras, who had just resumed
his practice of law after his suspension.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As advised, the complainants went to Atty. Paras to engage his services as their counsel.
Initially, Atty. Paras refused to handle their case as he revealed that the personal animosity
between him and the respondents may invite unwelcome repercussions. Even then, the
complainants insisted to retain his services as their counsel. Thus, Atty. Paras proceeded to
file a disbarment case against the respondents with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As foretold by Atty. Paras, the complainants experienced unpleasant backlash which were
allegedly instigated by the respondents who come from a very powerful and affluent clan.
They received threats of physical harm and Aidas continued employment as a public school
teacher was put in jeopardy. Also, suspicious-looking individuals were seen loitering around
their house. When they refused to yield to the respondents intimidation, the latter resorted
to the filing of charges against them, to wit: (1) an administrative case against Aida for
failure to pay the same debts subject of this case; and (2) a criminal case for perjury
against the complainants. To alleviate their situation, they filed a Joint-Affidavit,7 seeking
the assistance of this Court to warn the respondents and to stop them from employing
deplorable acts upon them.

In their Comment on the Complaint and Counter-Petition for Disbarment dated March 14,
2003, the respondents denied having resorted to deceitful means to obtain favorable
judgments in Civil Case Nos. 2000-319 and 2000-321. They admitted that they agreed to
an out-of-court settlement, through the intercession of Rosa Yap Paras, estranged wife of
Atty. Paras, but denied that the complainants ever tendered any installment payment. They
claimed that Atty. Paras merely employed cajolery in order to entice the complainants to file
the instant case to retaliate against them. They asseverated that Atty. Paras resented the
fact that the respondents served as counsel for his former wife, who previously filed the
administrative case for immorality, abandonment of family, and falsification and use of
falsified documents which resulted to his suspension.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On their counter-petition for disbarment, the respondents asserted that Atty. Paras clearly
defied the authority of this Court when he represented the complainants and filed an answer
on their behalf during the period of his suspension from the practice of law. They alleged
that he appeared in several cases and filed numerous pleadings despite his
suspension.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the Investigating Commissioner
of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline issued a Report and Recommendation 10 dated June
23, 2005, which pertinently states as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is substantial evidence that Respondent Francisco Yap ha[s] deliberately neglected, at
the very least, offered and/or pleaded inaccurate allegations/testimonies to purposely
mislead or confuse the civil courts in Dumaguete City. Francisco Yap failed to controvert the
existence and the authenticity of the Acknowledgment Receipt dated May 21, 2001 which
bore his signature and written in a Yap Law Office letterhead. Such documentary evidence
supports the theory of the Complainants that there was indeed an out-of-court settlement
prior to the pre-trial hearings and that they were most likely assured that these cases would
be dismissed. Their absence during the pre-trial hearings evidently resulted to decisions
adverse to them. Moreover, the Motions for the Writ of Execution did not fail to mention the
existence of partial payments and the prior agreement which, if disclosed, would have led
the court not to issue such writs. Since Respondent Francisco Yaps signature appear in all
the Acknowledgement Receipts and in all Motions filed in the civil courts, he alone should be
penalized. On the other hand, Respondent Whelma Siton Yap should not be penalized in the
absence of any evidence of her participation in such conduct. x x x.

All told, this Commissioner recommends that only Respondent Francisco Yap should be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. At the same time, the Counter
Petition for Disbarment filed by herein Respondents against Atty. Justo Paras, which appears
to be VERY meritorious, be given due course in another proceeding with utmost dispatch. 11
Upon review of the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, the IBP
Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-15912 dated December 17, 2005,
disposing thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A, and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and for deliberately neglecting, offering inaccurate allegations to purposely mislead or
confuse the courts, Atty. Francisco D. Yap is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months. Atty. Whelma F. Siton-Yap is exonerated in the absence of any
evidence of her participation in such conduct; however Respondents are Warned for
indirectly misleading the Commission.13
On March 27, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Petition for
Review.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On August 9, 2007, the complainants filed a Manifestation,15 terminating the services of

Atty. Paras and/or Paras-Enojo and Associates as their counsel for the reason that they can
no longer afford the services of a private counsel.

Surprisingly, on the same day, the complainants executed a Judicial Affidavit, 16 disclaiming
knowledge and participation in the preparation of the complaint and the pleadings filed on
their behalf by Atty. Paras in connection with the disbarment case against the respondents.
They claimed that they merely signed the pleadings but the contents thereof were not
explained to them in a dialect which they understood. They likewise expressed lack of
intention to file a disbarment case against the respondents and that, on the contrary, they
were very much willing to settle and pay their indebtedness to them. Further, they asserted
that it was not the respondents, but Atty. Paras who instructed them not to attend the pre-
trial conference of the cases which eventually resulted to a judgment by default against
them. They claimed that Atty. Paras told them that he will be the one to attend the pre-trial
conference to settle matters with the respondents and the court but he did not show up on
the scheduled date. They also asseverated that most of the statements contained in the
complaint for disbarment were false and that they wished to withdraw the said complaint.

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XIX-2011-172,17 which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent reason
to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No.
XVII-2005-159 dated 17 December 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.18
On August 18, 2011, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the
admission of the complainants in the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007 proved that the
disbarment case filed against them was just fabricated by Atty. Paras. They pointed out the
complainants statement that they were just made to sign the complaint for disbarment by
Atty. Paras to retaliate against them for having filed a case against him for falsification of
documents which sent him to prison for some time.
On August 18, 2011, the complainants sent a letter19 to the IBP, expressing disappointment
over the fact that the IBP Board of Governors did not dismiss the disbarment case against
Francisco. The letter pertinently stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We are very concerned and saddened by the fact that the disbarment case against ATTY.
FRANCISCO DY YAP was NOT DISMISSED. The reason is that we have submitted our
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT relating the facts and circumstances wherein the said
disbarment complaint was prepared by our former legal counsel, ATTY. JUSTO J.
PARAS consisting of fabrications and not on facts. It was upon the machination
and instigation of ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, that the simple collection case of
P94,000.00 more or less, became a multifaceted case in several forums.20
(Emphasis in the original)
The instant case is now referred to this Court for final action.

The Court notes that on September 16, 2011, the complainants filed a Motion to Admit
Judicial Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss and/or Withdraw Complaint,21 reiterating their claim
that the filing of the disbarment was a product of Atty. Paras maneuverings and that the
allegations against the respondents stated therein were false.

After a careful examination of the facts of this case, the Court finds no compelling reason to
deviate from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Notably, the respondents seek a reconsideration of the resolutions of the IBP Board of
Governors primarily on the basis of the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007, wherein the
complainants cleared them of the charges of misconduct and turned the blame on their own
counsel, Atty. Paras, for allegedly having made up the allegations in the disbarment
complaint. When the IBP Board of Governors sustained the imposition of suspension to
Francisco, the complainants themselves submitted a motion to admit the said judicial
affidavit to this Court, together with a motion to dismiss and withdraw complaint.

The question now is whether the statements of the complainants, specifically contesting the
truthfulness of the allegations hurled against the respondents in their own complaint for
disbarment necessarily results to Franciscos absolution. The answer is in the negative.

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good
moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in
a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal
profession.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated to guide the members of the bar
by informing them of the deportment expected of them in leading both their professional
and private lives. Primarily, it aims to protect the integrity and nobility of the legal
profession, to breed honest and principled lawyers and prune the association of the
unworthy.

It is for the foregoing reason that the Court cannot simply yield to complainants change of
heart by refuting their own statements against the respondents and praying that the
complaint for disbarment they filed be dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any misconduct
on the part of the lawyer not only hurts the clients cause but is even more disparaging on
the integrity of the legal profession itself. Thus, for tarnishing the reputation of the
profession, a lawyer may still be disciplined notwithstanding the complainants pardon or
withdrawal from the case for as long as there is evidence to support any finding of
culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack
of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.23 It follows that the
withdrawal of the complainant from the case, or even the filing of an affidavit of desistance,
does not conclude the administrative case against an erring lawyer.

This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is deemed a violation of his oath to keep
sacred the integrity of the profession for which he must be disciplined. The power to
discipline lawyers who are officers of the court may not be cut short by compromise and
withdrawal of the charges. This is as it should be, especially when we consider that the law
profession and its exercise is one impressed with public interest. Proceedings to discipline
erring members of the bar are not instituted to protect and promote the public good only
but also to maintain the dignity of the profession by the weeding out of those who have
proven themselves unworthy thereof.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of culpability
against the respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive them or
settle matters amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP.
The complainants forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto
obliterate the misconduct committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the
day for the complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already
presented and supported their claims with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP
has promulgated a resolution on the basis thereof.

To be clear, [i]n administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the
quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant.25 In the present case, it was clearly established that Francisco
received P20,000.00 as initial payment from the complainants in compliance with the terms
of their out-of-court settlement for the payment of the latters outstanding obligations. The
amount was duly received and acknowledged by Francisco, who drafted the same in a paper
with the letterhead of his own law office, a fact he did not deny. While the respondents deny
that they told the complainants not to attend the pre-trial of the case anymore and that
they will be the one to inform the trial court of the settlement, they did not bring the said
agreement to the attention of the court. Thus, the trial court, oblivious of the settlement of
the parties, rendered a judgment by default against the complainants. The respondents
even filed a motion for execution of the decision but still did not inform the trial court of the
out-of-court settlement between them and the complainants. They deliberately failed to
mention this supervening event to the trial court, hence, violating the standards of honesty
provided for in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.cralawred
The complainants belated claim that the respondents were faultless and that the allegations
stated in the disbarment complaint were just fabricated by their former counsel cannot
stand against the clear and preponderant evidence they earlier presented. It is inexplicable
how the complainants could now claim that the respondents were blameless when the
records tell otherwise. That they were simply duped by Atty. Paras into signing the
numerous pleadings he filed on their behalf is hardly believable considering that Aida is
well-lettered, being a public school teacher. They also do not claim that they were
prevented from reading the contents of the pleadings or that their signatures were simply
forged. At any rate, while it may be true that Atty. Paras fabricated some of the facts stated
in the disbarment complaint, these matters are trivial and do not relate to the facts material
to the charge of misconduct against Francisco. What clearly appears is that the facts
material to the violation committed by Francisco are well-established notwithstanding Atty.
Paras supposed fabrication of some insignificant particulars.

WHEREFORE, for deliberately misleading the Court, Atty. Francisco Dy Yap is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective upon
receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
act in the future shall be dealt with severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator which shall circulate the same in all courts in the country,
and spread upon the personal records of the respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED.
BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO
S. SALUNAT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort filed an administrative complaint [if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif] with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, against

respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They alleged
that respondent is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, which was the retained counsel of the
Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). Respondents brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a
member of the PPSTA Board which approved respondents engagement as retained counsel of PPSTA.
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the
Board of Directors for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the Securities and Exchange
Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of
real property of the PPSTA. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board
members in the said cases. Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest
because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and was being paid out
of its corporate funds where complainants have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of
the said conflict of interest, respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in the said cases.
Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.06[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA Board and assured its
members that he will win the PPSTA cases.
In his Answer,[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the
PPSTA Board Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a partner in the said law
firm, he only filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
On the other hand, SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled by another partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin
V. Agustin. Respondent claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated, orchestrated and
indiscriminately filed the said cases against members of the PPSTA and its Board.
Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial; and that when he
entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in his individual capacity, but in
representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory of the PPSTA Board in the
case he was handling. He merely assured the Board that the truth will come out and that the case before
the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, considering that respondents therein are not
public officials, but private employees. Anent the SEC case, respondent alleged that the same was being
handled by the law firm of Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA.
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that complainant Atty. Ricafort was
himself guilty of gross violation of his oath of office amounting to gross misconduct, malpractice and
unethical conduct for filing trumped-up charges against him and Atty. De Mesa. Thus, he prayed that the
complaint against him be dismissed and, instead, complainant Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred.
The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and referred to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline. After investigation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Board of Governors thereafter adopted
Resolution No. XV-3003-230 dated June 29, 2002, approving the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence
has been bestowed or will be used.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance
of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Another test
of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
In this jurisdiction, a corporations board of directors is understood to be that body which (1) exercises all
powers provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts all business of the corporation; and (3)
controls and holds all property of the corporation. [if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Its members have been
characterized as trustees or directors clothed with a fiduciary character.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] It is clearly
separate and distinct from the corporate entity itself.
Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or
negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a stockholder
may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about
a redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders.[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif] This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the doctrine that in a

derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while the stockholder filing suit for the
corporations behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should be included as a party in the suit. [if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif]

Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles pertaining to derivative suits, we come
now to the threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a corporation defend members of the board of
the same corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue, the following disquisition is enlightening:
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Although early cases found joint representation
permissible where no conflict of interest was obvious, the emerging rule is against dual representation in all
derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to represent one of the defendants. The cases and ethics
opinions differ on whether there must be separate representation from the outset or merely from the time the
corporation seeks to take an active role. Furthermore, this restriction on dual representation should not be waivable
by consent in the usual way; the corporation should be presumptively incapable of giving valid consent.[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif]
(underscoring ours)
In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the
corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. The interest of the
corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the individual corporate
officials.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon us. After due
deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged as
counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board of directors in a
derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests,
which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled Philippine Public School
Teachers Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public School Teachers
Assn. (PPSTA), et al., was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that
the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he
appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent
was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the
PPSTA, filed suit.
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB Case No. 0-97-
0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By filing the said pleading, he
necessarily entered his appearance therein.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] Again, this constituted conflict of
interests, considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the individual members
of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the corporation.
Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Considering however, that this is his
first offense, we find the penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP Resolution No. XV-2002-230 dated
June 29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish respondent to observe a higher degree
of fidelity in the practice of his profession.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. He is
further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.