[G.R. No. 106763. May 9, 2001.
] LIWANAG JAVIER, married to Anastacio Dominguez;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF MARCELA FRANCISCO, NAMELY:
ROSARIO BERNARDO and PACIFICO BERNARDO; HEIRS OF JUANA
FRANCISCO NAMELY: BUENAVENTURA CRISOSTOMO, ANDRES
CRISOSTOMO, FELICITAS CRISOSTOMO; HEIRS OF BRIGIDA
FRANCISCO, NAMELY: LIWANAG JAVIER, EUDOSIA JAVIER, ANAPURA
JAVIER, AURORA JAVIER, DOMINADOR JAVIER and FRANKLIN
JAVIER; and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAVITE, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition to annul the decision of the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Cavite, Branch III, 2 in Reg. Case No. N-440, LRC Rec. No. 26961.
This case stems from proceedings to annul a 1965 decision of the said land
registration court which adjudicated to private respondents certain parcels of
land.
The antecedents are as follows: On April 22, 1964, the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite, represented by its Mayor, Pablo G. Sarino, sold Lot Nos. 317,
318, 330 and 356, Psu-164199, with an approximate combined area of
3.1437 hectares, located at Barrio Salinas, 3 in the said municipality, to
private respondents' predecessors-in-interest for P188.20 pursuant to Act
No. 3312 4 and Municipal Resolution No. 89 as amended by Resolution No.
289. Prior to the sale, private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Brigida
Francisco, had been in possession of the subject lot and paid the real estate
taxes thereon as early as 1907. On October 27, 1964, private respondents
filed an application for land registration before the above-mentioned CFI of
Cavite, covering the aforesaid lots, docketed as LRC Case No. N-440, LRC
Record No. N-26961. On August 4, 1965, a decision was rendered
adjudicating to the applicants, herein private respondents, the subject parcels
of land, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court, confirming its previous order of general default,
hereby adjudges and decrees lots 356, 318, 319 and 330 of plain AP-1377,
AP-1378, AP-1379 and AP-1380, respectively, situated in the barrio of
Salinas, municipality of Bacoor, province of Cavite, free from any liens and
encumbrances to applicants, jointly and equally in undivided shares, in the
following manners: TDESCa
1. to MARCELA FRANCISCO, widow 1/3 undivided share.
2. to the HEIRS OF JUANA FRANCISCO, namely:
BUENAVENTURA CRISOSTOMO, married to Librada Crisostomo;
ANDRES CRISOSTOMO, married to Esperanza Legaspi;
FELICITAS CRISOSTOMO, married to Gregorio Javier;
PEDRO CRISOSTOMO, single (these four own 1/3 undivided share.)
3. to the HEIRS OF BRIGIDA FRANCISCO, namely:
1
EUDOSIA JAVIER, married to Ernesto de la Cruz;
AMAPURA JAVIER, married to Angel Sebastian;
AURORA JAVIER, single;
DOMINADOR JAVIER, married to Luz Manalili;
FRANKLIN JAVIER, married to Elina Jose (These six own 1/3 undivided
share.)
All applicants are Filipinos, of legal ages, and residents of Mabolo, Bacoor,
Cavite.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration
be issued.
SO ORDERED." 5
Pursuant to said judgment, Decree No. N-105464 and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. O-468 were issued on October 7, 1965.
Twenty-five years later, or on October 15, 1990, the Office of Solicitor
General (OSG) filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the decision
of the CFI of Cavite, Decree No. N-105464 and OCT No. O-468 issued
pursuant thereto; and to order the restoration or reversion of the subject
parcels of land to the mass of the public domain. The OSG alleged that the
registration proceedings were null and void for lack of jurisdiction because
the parcels of land subject thereof were still classified as forest land, having
been released therefrom only on February 21, 1972; that the OSG was not
furnished with a copy of the application for registration and other records as
mandated by Section 51, of the Public Land Act; and that the applicants have
not shown possession and occupation of the lands in the manner and for the
length of time required by section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
On August 13, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, dismissing
for lack of merit as aforesaid, the petition to annul the Decision dated August
4, 1965 of the CFI of Cavite, Br. III in Reg. Case No. N-440, LRC Rec. No.
26961. 6 The Court of Appeals ruled that "by virtue of Act 3312 enacted by
the Philippine Legislature on December 2, 1926, the subject lots were
previously classified as communal in character; that the predecessors-in-
interest of private respondents were able to purchase subject lots as
authorized by said Act; that there is no question about the validity of Act 3312
especially the power of the Philippine Legislature at that time to authorize the
sale of land then classified as communal land; and that the predecessors-in-
interest of private respondents acquired the subject lots pursuant to this law
and their right has acquired the sanctity of a vested right which cannot be
adversely affected by the subsequent passage of C.A. 141."
Hence, the instant petition questioning whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in: (1) relying solely on Act No. 3312 as basis for its conclusion that
subject lots are alienable and disposable, in total disregard of the Public
Land Act; (2) in holding that the registration court had jurisdiction to
adjudicate subject lots as private property of private respondents'
predecessors-in-interest despite their being "communal lands" and, hence,
not agricultural lands subject to disposition; (3) in holding that a vested right
had been acquired by the predecessors-in-interest of private respondent over
the subject lots which could no longer be affected by the Public Land Act; (4)
in not finding that the Office of the Solicitor General was never furnished with
a copy of the application and other records in the registration proceedings as
mandated by Section 51 of the Public Land Act; (5) in considering as non-
issue the lack of approval of the provincial board of Cavite and the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the sale of subject lots to private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest; (6) in not declaring that the subject
lots were only classified and released as alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain in February, 1972, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the
registration court; (7) in not holding that the applicants' predecessors-in-
interest had no registrable title over the subject lots at the time the same
were adjudicated to them by the registration court; (8) in not declaring the
sale of the subject lots by the municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, a mere trustee
thereof, as void ab initio for lack of approval or consent of the provincial
board of Cavite and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as
required by law.
As the Court sees it, the assigned errors cognizable by this Court may be
reduced into the following, to wit:
1. Whether the sale of communal lands of the Municipality of Bacoor to
private respondents' predecessors-in-interest was authorized by law; and
2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the parcels of
land covered by the decree issued on October 7, 1965 pursuant to the
decision of said court of August 4, 1965.
The petition is not impressed with merit. ScAaHE
First of all, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Act No. 3312, known as
the "Act Authorizing the Sale of the Communal Lands in the Municipality of
Bacoor, Province of Cavite, and for other purposes," which was enacted into
law on December 2, 1926, was the law governing the sale and acquisition by
private respondents of the subject parcels of land. It provided:
"SECTION 1. The sale to private parties of the communal lands situated in
the municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippine Islands, and held in
trust by the municipal council thereof for the benefit of the inhabitants of said
municipality, is hereby authorized: Provided, That the present tenants and
lessees of the different parcels composing said lands shall have the right to
buy their respective leaseholds subject to such rules and regulations which
shall be adopted by the municipal council of Bacoor subject to the approval of
the Provincial Board of Cavite and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources: Provided, further, That if any parcel of land is the subject of
litigation in court the sale thereof shall be suspended until after the litigation
is finally terminated.
xxx xxx xxx."
2
ACT 3312 authorized and recognized the sale of communal lands in the
municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, to qualified applicants. By express declaration
of Section 1 of Act 3312 quoted above, lands designated as communal lands
of the municipality of Bacoor were open to disposition to private parties.
Pursuant thereto, the Municipality of Bacoor issued Resolution No. 289,
Series of 1962, entitled, "A Resolution to Amend Resolution No. 89, Series of
1956 Authorizing the Sale of Communal Lands in the Municipality of Bacoor,
Province of Cavite, and Prescribing Rules and Regulations for the Purpose
of Implementing the Provisions of Philippine Legislature Act No. 3312 as
approved on December 2, 1926." Among others, Resolution No. 289
imposed as conditions, the following: 1. Buyers should be tenants and
lessees as of December 2, 1926 of the different parcels composing said
lands as recorded in the communal lands register in the Office of the Mayor;
and 2. they must pay the corresponding rental in arrears and other
obligations due to the municipality. Presumably, with no proof to the contrary
shown, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents have met all the
requirements of the law and the rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto for the execution of the sale.
Notably, petitioner's petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of
Appeals contended that the decree in favor of the private respondents was
issued at the time when the subject land was still forest land, based primarily
on the Final Report of Investigation of Senior Land Management Officer
Romeo B. Manicat dated December 28, 1989. According to his report, the
subject parcels of land were found, among others, to be within the forest
zone at the time they were adjudicated to the applicants by the land
registration court in 1965, as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 2376
under Project No. 6-A. However, a scrutiny of the foregoing documents fails
to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land prior to its
release as alienable and disposable in February 21, 1972. The aforesaid
Land Classification Map drawn several years after the issuance of the decree
in 1965 merely shows that the subject lots were part of Project 6-A, a big
tract of land in Bacoor, Cavite which was certified and declared as alienable
or disposable land on February 21, 1972 under Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-1253. Contrary to petitioner's posture, the Report of Senior Land
Management Officer Romeo B. Manicat who conducted an investigation of
the parcels of land does not prove the real nature and character of the
subject lots at the time of their sale and registration. In fact, he indicated in
said report that the lands were cleared, converted into a modern community,
with permanent improvements. More important, the subject lots were
previously classified as communal lands, which were then held in trust by the
Municipal Council of Bacoor, Cavite, for the benefit of the inhabitants of said
municipality. The private respondents were able to purchase the same
pursuant to Act No. 3312 and Resolution No. 289 of the Municipal Council of
Bacoor prescribing the Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of Act
3112.
Secondly, it is error to say that private respondents, as qualified applicants,
could no longer avail of the benefits of Act 3312, due to the subsequent
passage of C.A. 141. True, the sale was perfected and consummated only on
April 22, 1964 and the application for registration was filed only on October
27, 1964. But we agree with the Court of Appeals that the right of private
respondents had already acquired the sanctity of "vested or acquired rights"
which cannot be defeated or adversely affected by the passage of C.A. 141.
The right was vested by the fact that their predecessors-in-interest have been
occupying the said communal lands embraced by the law since 1907, as
found by the registration court. While petitioner contests this finding of fact,
we cannot depart from the well-entrenched rule that uniformly holds that
findings of facts of the trial court particularly when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals are binding upon the Supreme Court. 7 Further, review by the
Supreme Court in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally
limited only to questions of law. 8
Thirdly, we are not persuaded by petitioner's argument that Act 3312 was
repealed by C.A. 141. According to petitioner, as between Act No. 3312, an
earlier enactment passed by the Philippine Legislature on December 2, 1926,
on one hand, and C.A. 141, enacted on November 7, 1936 on the other, the
latter should prevail over the former because the assailed disposition of the
subject lots took place in 1964-65, or at a time when C.A. 141 had long been
in force and effect. Petitioner adds that while the sale of communal lands
situated in the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, was authorized under Act No.
3312, the same should now bow to C.A. 141 limiting the disposition of the
lands of the public domain only to agricultural lands. There can be no implied
repeal of Act 3312 by the subsequent enactment of C.A. 141 as it is a well-
settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are
not favored. 9 If repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the
proper step is to so express it. 10 The Public Land Act is a general law
governing the administration and disposition of the lands of the public
domain; while Act 3312 is a special law on the sale of lands designated as
communal situated in the Municipality of Bacoor in Cavite. The presumption
against implied repeal is stronger when of two laws, one is special and the
other general; and this rule applies even though the terms of the general act
are broad enough to include the matter covered by the special
statute. 11 Therefore, we apply the rule that unless otherwise repealed by a
subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, a law
will always be presumed valid and the first and fundamental duty of the court
is to apply the law. 12 The other issues raised by petitioner pertaining to the
non-transmittal of the records in the registration proceedings to the Solicitor
General and that the sale did not bear the approval of the Provincial Board of
3
Cavite and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources deserve scant
consideration as these are not jurisdictional prerequisites for the valid
exercise of jurisdiction by a court in a land registration case. It must be stated
that a petition to annul judgment which is void, is anchored on want of
jurisdiction or that it has been obtained by extrinsic fraud. 13 Conformably
with this rule, the issues raised must be limited to a discussion of lack of
jurisdiction or fraud.
Finally, the Republic as petitioner, does not stand to be deprived of its
patrimony, as the said parcels of land had already been declared alienable
and disposable and if there is any reversion in favor of the Republic, the land
recovered would not be for public use, but for eventual disposition to other
private persons. It would be grave injustice and would not serve any declared
national land policy to dispossess private respondents of the said parcels of
land at this point, where possession has been found to date as far back as
1907, only to enable the government to dispose anew the lands covered
thereby to subsequent applicants. 14 Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30)
years since the land was released in 1972. In a few more months, the
possessors of the land would acquire title to the portions they adversely
possess through acquisitive prescription, without need of title or good faith,
pursuant to the Civil Code. 15
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and
challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. aIEDAC
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106763, [May 9, 2001], 409 PHIL
695-706)
[G.R. No. L-40402. March 16, 1987.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, and EMILIO BERNABE, SR., EMILIO BERNABE, JR., LUZ
BERNABE, AMPARO BERNABE, and ELISA BERNABE, respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision of
Respondent Court of Appeals 1 dated February 5, 1975 in CA-G.R. No.
50076-R, entitled "EMILIO BERNABE, SR., et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES," affirming the order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan
dated August 14, 1971 in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No.
1097, which dismissed petitioner Republic's petition for review of the decrees
of registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered on December 17,
1968 adjudicating in favor of the private Respondents herein, the lots applied
for by them, and the Resolution of Respondent Court dated March 19, 1975
denying herein Petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision
rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral
Record No. 1097.
On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest zone and released
and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition
under the Public Land Act (Record on Appeal, p. 7).
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Bataan
a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097,
under Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061, concerning a
portion of Lot No. 622 Lot Nos. 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798 and a
portion of Lot No. 324 Lot Nos. 791 and 799 more particularly identified
and delineated in the segregation plans of Sgs-3343, Sgs-3440, Sgs-3340,
Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342 and Sgs-3339, approved by the Director of Lands, to
perfect their rights and register their titles to said lots, having allegedly
acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase from
the original owners thereof, whose possession of the same including that of
the herein Respondents, has always been continuous, open, active,
exclusive, public, adverse, and in the concept of owners thereof for more
than 30 years (Record on Appeal, pp. 3-5 and 11).
On May 17, 1967, the lower court issued an Order setting the petition for
hearing and directing that the Republic of the Philippines be notified thereof
by furnishing the Solicitor-General, the Director of Lands and the Director of
Forestry, a copy of said Order together with Respondents' petition by
registered mail (Record on Appeal, p. 6).
On August 24, 1967, the Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the petition
praying for the denial of the petition once the area involved is found to be
within the timberland and therefore inalienable under the Constitution
(Record on Appeal, p. 7). Upon verification, however, the Director of Forestry
found the area to be the portion of the timberland already released by the
government from the mass of public forests and promptly withdrew his
Opposition (Record on Appeal, p. 8).
On September 1, 1967, the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, for and in
behalf of the Director of Lands, filed his opposition to the petition alleging that
the land is still, in truth and in fact, public land and as such cannot be the
subject of a land registration proceeding under Act 496.
The lower court found that the petitioners have complied with all the terms
and conditions which would entitle them to a grant. Thus, the dispositive
portion of its decision dated December 17, 1968 (Record on Appeal, p. 19),
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the segregation plans, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3339, Sgs-3341, Sgs-
3342, Sgs-3343 and Sgs-3340 and their technical descriptions are hereby
4
APPROVED, and pursuant to Sec. 11 of Act 2259, the court hereby
adjudicates in favor of petitioners Emilio Bernabe, Sr., married; Emilio
Bernabe, Jr., married; Luz Bernabe, single; Amparo Bernabe, single and
Elisa Bernabe, single, all Filipinos and residents of Balanga, Bataan, the lots
herein applied for as follows:
Luz Bernabe Sgs-791 82,771 sq. m.
3339
Elisa Bernabe Sgs-793 71.596 sq. m.
3341
Amparo Bernabe Sgs-794 43,399 sq. m.
3342 795 100,439 sq. m.
Josefina Bernabe Sgs-796 69,355 sq. m.
3343 797 75,100 sq. m.
Emilio Bernabe, Jr. Sgs-798 100,183 sq. m.
Sgs-3440 Sgs-799 64,052. sq. m.
and upon this decision having become final, the Commissioner of Land
Registration is hereby directed to issue the corresponding decrees of
registration therefor."
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the Commissioner of Land Registration
issued Decrees Nos. N-124813-124818, all dated May 7, 1969 (Record on
Appeal, pp. 20-25).
On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, acting in its behalf
and in behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, through
the Solicitor-General, filed a petition for review of the decrees of registration
under Section 38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the corresponding
decision of the lower court, on the grounds that the entire proceeding was
vitiated by lack of notice to the Solicitor General of the subsequent hearings
of the petition for re-opening of the cadastral proceedings; that the parcels of
land subject matter of the petition to re-open cadastral proceedings are
portions of the public domain, admittedly within the unclassified public forest
of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition only on or about July 6, 1965;
that subsequently, respondents do not have a registerable title to the land
subject matter of the proceedings; and the lower court, without jurisdiction to
decree the confirmation of registerable title to respondents over portions of
the public domain, as respondents do not qualify under the provisions of
Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended, and that under the circumstances,
respondents employed actual fraud in procuring title over the parcels of land
(Record on Appeal, p. 25).
On May 29, 1979, respondents moved to dismiss the Petition for Review on
the grounds that: (1) The trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or suit as there is no fraud to justify the setting aside on review of a
decree of registration. If the Solicitor General was not notified of the
subsequent hearings, it was because he delegated his appearance to the
Provincial Fiscal of Bataan. Besides the setting aside or review was filed out
of time. (2) The petition states no cause of action, the parcels of land
involved in the actions having been already transferred to innocent
purchasers for value long before the Solicitor-General even filed the petition
for review (Record on Appeal, pp. 27-40).
Their motion to dismiss having been held in abeyance until the hearing of the
merits of the case which was set for August 16, 1970, respondents filed their
answer to the Petition for Review on August 4, 1970. In their answer,
respondents reiterated their grounds in their motion to dismiss (Record on
Appeal, pp. 40-44).
On November 12, 1970, Petitioner filed an amended Petition for Review, with
the additional allegation that after having fraudulently secured title over the
parcels of land involved, the petitioners executed simulated deeds of sale
purporting to convey various lots composing portions of the parcels involved
to third parties for fictitious considerations in an obvious attempt to remove
the parcels of land involved from the coverage of Section 38 of Act 496, but
in truth, the aforementioned third parties are not innocent purchasers for
value, being mere dummies of the petitioners, holding the parcels of land
involved only in trust for the petitioners. On November 23, 1970, respondents
filed their answer to the Amended Petition for Review (Record on Appeal, p.
56).
On August 14, 1971, the lower court issued its Order denying petitioner's
Amended Petition for Review (Record on Appeal, p. 56).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals on September 20, 1971, the questioned
Order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I was affirmed (Rollo,
p. 33).
On February 25, 1975, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit, in the Resolution of a
special Division of Five, promulgated on March 19, 1975.
Hence this petition.
Without giving due course to the Petition, the Court, through its First Division,
resolved on May 5, 1975 to require the respondents to comment thereon. On
May 30, 1975, respondents filed their comment, alleging that the decision of
respondent Court and the questioned resolution were not rendered without or
in excess of its jurisdiction. Neither was the discretion exercised by
respondent Court arbitrary or despotic.
In its Resolution dated June 4, 1975, the Court resolved to give due course to
the Petition and denied the urgent motion of respondents for leave to file a
supplemental and/or amended comment. Petitioners filed its Brief on
November 29, 1975; respondents, on March 2, 1976. Petitioner filed its Reply
Brief on March 25, 1976 and on May 5, 1976, the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT
5
THE LOTS CLAIMED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BECAME
AGRICULTURAL ONLY ON JULY 6, 1965 WHEN THE SAME WERE
RELEASED FROM THE FOREST ZONE AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY
THEY LACK THE REQUISITE THIRTY (30) YEARS POSSESSION TO
ENTITLE THEM TO A GRANT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ENTIRE
PROCEEDING FOR REOPENING OF THE CADASTRAL CASE OVER THE
LOTS IN QUESTION WAS VITIATED BY LACK OF NOTICE TO THE
SOLICITOR-GENERAL.
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
ALLEGED TRANSFER OF THE LOTS IN QUESTION BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TO THIRD PARTIES WHEN THEIR TITLES WERE STILL
SUBJECT TO THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD OF REVIEW CONSTITUTES
FRAUD SCHEMED BY THE TRANSFERORS AS A MEANS OF
FRUSTRATING ANY ACTION AIMED AT NULLIFYING THEIR TITLES
THERETO.
The government's cause is meritorious.
I
It is evident from the facts of the case at bar that private respondents did file
a claim for Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre and in fact a decision was
rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19 LRC Cadastral
Record No. 1097, declaring the lot in question as public land. It must be
stressed that said lot was declared public land by virtue of a court decision
which has become final and as held by the Supreme Court aforesaid decision
is res judicata. (Republic v. Estenzo, 120 SCRA 222 [1983]). It is therefore
beyond question that the trial court has no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral
proceeding under R.A. 931 as amended by R.A. 2061 and the decision
therein rendered is null and void ab initio.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that aforesaid Lot No. 622 was released as an
agricultural land for disposition under Public Land Act only on July 6, 1965.
The lower court ordered the issuance of the corresponding decrees of
registration for the lots, pursuant to Sec. 48(b), C.A. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, providing for
the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, which reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
As pointed out by petitioner, the question is whether or not the lots claimed
by respondents could legally be the subject of a judicial confirmation of title
under the aforequoted provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended.
The answer is in the negative.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public
agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded.
They are incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title, whether such
title be one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present
Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title (Li Seng Giap v. Director of
Lands, 55 Phil. 693 [1931]; Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 [1975]).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Vano v. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable v. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183
[1968]; Director of Lands v. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 [1975]). A parcel of forest
land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond
the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens
System (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]; Republic v. Vera
(120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689
[1984].
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible,
private respondents have not qualified for a grant under Sec. 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private respondents could
only be credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession and
occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965, the date when the
land area in sitio San Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as
Bataan PMD No. 267, which includes the lots claimed by respondents, had
been segregated from the forest zone and released by the Bureau of
Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
(Record on Appeal, p. 19). Consequently, under the above mentioned
jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest
could have possessed the lots for the requisite period of thirty (30) years as
disposable agricultural land.
II
Petitioner argues that the government, being a necessary party in the
cadastral case, as reopened, its counsel, the Solicitor-General, should have
been furnished copies of all court orders, notices and decisions, as in
ordinary cases, in order to bind the government. Failure to give such notice
deprives the State of its day in Court, and renders the decision void. (Brief for
Petitioner, pp. 16-17).
The records show that the Solicitor-General was duly notified of the initial
hearing on the petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19 but thereafter, notice
of subsequent hearings as well as a copy of the decision itself promulgated
by the lower court on December 19, 1968 was sent instead to the Provincial
Fiscal of Bataan, admittedly the duly authorized representative of the
6
Solicitor-General in the cadastral proceeding as shown in a telegram dated
January 19, 1968. (Record on Appeal, p. 47).
In the case of Republic v. Director of Lands (71 SCRA 426 [1976], the
Supreme Court, applying the time-honored principle of agency ruled that the
service of the questioned decision on the Provincial Fiscal must necessarily
be service on the Solicitor-General, and added that technical transgressions
relative to the filing and service may be brushed aside when the adverse
party (this time the Director of Lands and Forestry and their counsel, the
Solicitor-General) is aware of the matter which his adversary would want the
court to act upon. Once it appears that the party is already informed by one
means or another of what he is to be notified, the required service becomes
an empty gesture and strict observance thereof is considered waived. (Citing
Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890 [1969]).
In the case at bar, it does not appear that the Solicitor General was so
apprised of the decision of the lower court in question as there is no proof
that the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan ever sent the Solicitor-General a copy
thereof. Furthermore, after the 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed a notice of
appeal from the decision of the trial court, the Provincial Fiscal on March 21,
1969 manifested that he was withdrawing the appeal upon the intervention of
the District Forester. (Respondent's Brief, p. 44).
It will be observed however that later decisions of the Supreme Court tend to
be more strict in the matter of giving notice to the Solicitor General. In a more
recent case, Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 161 [1985], it was
established that the Solicitor-General is the only legal counsel of the
government in land registration cases and as such, he alone may withdraw
the Government's appeal with binding effect on the latter. He is entitled to be
furnished copies of all court orders, notices and decisions and as held the
reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the time
the Solicitor-General's Office is apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not
from the time the special counsel or the fiscal was served with that order.
Thus, representatives of the Solicitor General in the case at bar, had no
power to decide whether or not an appeal should be made. They should have
referred the matter to the Solicitor-General and without copies of court
orders, notices and decisions, having been provided by either the trial court
or the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan to the Solicitor-General, the assailed
decision has no binding effect on the government.
III
The petition for review of Decrees Nos. N-124813 to N-124818 under Sec. 38
of Act No. 496 as amended was filed by the Solicitor General on May 7, 1970
in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, in the same Cadastral
Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, exactly a year after the
issuance of aforesaid decrees of registration, on the ground of actual fraud.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 43-44).
The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree,
are: (1) that the petitioner has real or dominical right; (2) that he has been
deprived thereof through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one year
from the issuance of the decree and (4) that the property has not as yet been
transferred to an innocent purchaser. (Libudan v. Gil, 45 SCRA 27 [1972];
Rubico, et al. v. Orellana, 30 SCRA 513 [1969]). It has been held however
that the action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud would be
unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which
it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. (Libudan v. Gil, supra).
Review of the decree demands a showing of actual (not constructive) fraud,
i.e. actual malice. (Rublico v. Orellana, supra).
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that private respondents employed actual
fraud in procuring titles over parcels of land of the public domain as it is a
matter of record that the land in question was opened for disposition and
alienation only on July 6, 1965. The matter was threshed out in the lower
court and the decision of the latter was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Actual malice is therefore absent.
However, it has been held that, if a decree issued in pursuance of a valid
decision, obtained by fraud, may be annulled within one (1) year from entry of
said decree, there is more reason to hold that the same is true if entered in
compliance with a decision suffering from a fatal infirmity, such as want of
due process, (Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sangbengoo, 110 Phil. 118
[1960] or lack of jurisdiction of the court that decided the cadastral case.
(Republic v. De Kalintas, 25 SCRA 720 [1969]). Thus, on both counts, the
case at bar can properly be the subject of review, it having been shown that
the Solicitor-General was not properly furnished the requisite notices and
copy of the assailed decision but more importantly, the lower court as
previously stated had no jurisdiction to re-open the cadastral proceeding
under Republic Act 931 as amended by R.A. No. 2061.
IV
As to whether or not the transferees of the lot in question are innocent
purchasers for value, it is a well settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his
eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then
claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in
the title of the vendor. (Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machiner Co., et al., 37 Phil.
651[1918]. Without the needed verification, he cannot claim to be an innocent
purchaser for value in contemplation of law.
Moreover, it is well-settled that a certificate of title is void, when it covers
property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands.
Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged
innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. (Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company v. Dumyung, 89 SCRA 540 [1979] underscoring supplied).
7
In the case at bar, it will be noted that in granting titles to the land in dispute,
the lower court counted the period of possession of private respondents
before the same were released as forest lands for disposition, which release
is tantamount to qualifying the latter to a grant on said lands while they were
still non-disposable. Thus, under the foregoing rulings, even assuming that
the transferees are innocent purchasers for value, their titles to said lands
derived from the titles of private respondents which were not validly issued as
they cover lands still a part of the public domain, may be cancelled.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
and the decision of the Court of First Instance are hereby SET ASIDE and
REVERSED, because the lots in question still form part of the public domain.
The certificates of title issued over them are hereby ordered CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40402, [March 16, 1987], 232
PHIL 444-458)
[G.R. Nos. L-30263-5. October 30, 1987.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. ANDRES REYES, Presiding Judge,
Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, GODOFREDO R. EUSEBIO,
URBANO C. LARA, GIL VENZUELA, RODOLFO CENIDOZA, RAMON
OROSA, AND JOSEFINA OROSA (Spouses), THE PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF RIZAL, respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking the
annulment of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial
District, Branch VI, Pasig, Rizal dated December 16, 1968 in Civil Case No.
10047 entitled Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara vs. Director of
Lands.
The dispositive portion of the questioned order reads:
"Wherefore, the orders of this court dated May 8, 1968, June 29, 1968 and
August 27, 1968 are hereby set aside and the Motion to Admit Petition to
Reopen Proceedings is hereby denied."
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
Sometime on April 17, 1956 respondents Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R.
Eusebio filed with the Bureau of Lands their Free Patent Applications for the
parcels of land designated as Free Patent Applications Nos. 7-207 and 7-208
for Lot No. 1 (10.3629 hectares) and Lot No. 2 (15.2892 hectares), Psu-
152606, respectively, situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal. After the posting of
notices and upon favorable recommendation of a representative of the
Bureau of Lands, said free patent applications were approved on June 14,
1956 as shown by the order of approval of applications and issuance of
patents. Thus, on June 16, 1956, Free Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854
were issued to respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara,
which patents were transcribed and registered on June 21, 1956 by the
respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal in the Registration Book for the
Province of Rizal in accordance with Section 122 of Act No. 496, as
amended, as Original Certificates of Title Nos. 140 and 139, respectively. cdll
In a subsequent investigation conducted by the Anti-Graft and Corruption
Board of the Bureau of Lands, it was discovered that the parcels of land
patented and titled in the names of respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and
Urbano C. Lara were actually under water and form part of the Laguna de
Bay. Neither were private respondents able to occupy or possess said lots.
Evidence clearly showed that there were no signs of cultivation or of any
improvement thereon.
On March 16 and March 22, 1960, respondents Urbano C. Lara and
Godofredo R. Eusebio executed separate affidavits, admitting that they have
not complied with certain requirements of the Public Land Act and expressly
agreed to have their patents and certificates of title cancelled (Rollo, pp.
13-14). prLL
By virtue of the findings of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau
of Lands, the affidavits and the surrender of the owner's copy of the
certificate of title, the herein petitioner, represented by the Director of Lands,
as plaintiff, filed separate complaints against herein respondents Godofredo
R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara and the respondent Register of Deeds of
Rizal as defendants, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as
Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 in said court, for the cancellation of Free
Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 and Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 140
and 139 (Rollo, pp. 15-20).
Accordingly, summons together with copies of the complaints were duly
served upon all the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 as shown
by the returns (Rollo, pp. 21-22) dated August 16, 1961 submitted by the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. However,
notwithstanding their receipt of the summons and copies of the complaint, the
defendants, herein respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara,
failed to file their answers to the complaint. As a result thereof and upon
proper motion of the plaintiff (herein petitioner) the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, 7th Judicial Region, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal, entered an order on
November 25, 1961 (Rollo, p. 23) declaring defendants (herein respondents)
in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 in default. On October 6, 1962, on the
basis of evidence submitted by the plaintiff (herein petitioner) the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, rendered separate decisions * declaring null and void
8
Free Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 and their corresponding Certificates
of Title Nos. 140 and 139 and ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
cancel said patents and titles (Rollo, pp. 24-29) and for failure of defendants
to move for reconsideration or appeal, said decisions became final and
executory (Rollo, p. 5).
On December 12, 1962, respondent Register of Deeds addressed separate
and identical letters to respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C.
Lara, informing them of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 and advising them to surrender their
owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 139 and 140 for
cancellation pursuant to the directive of the Court (Rollo, pp. 30-31). On
December 27, 1962, said respondents wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds
stating that the owner's duplicate of title called for had long been surrendered
to Atty. Eduardo Javier of the Investigation Section of the Bureau of Lands
(Rollo, p. 32).
On June 3, 1967, after the lapse of almost five (5) years, respondents
Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, this time, as plaintiffs, instituted
Civil Case No. 10047 against the Director of Lands, as defendant (herein
petitioner) for the annulment of the aforementioned decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch II in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, alleging
as grounds therefor that the Court had not acquired jurisdiction over their
persons and that the decision was procured through fraud (Rollo, pp. 33-36).
Although, the records show that the Director of Lands had not been properly
served with summons in Civil Case No. 10047, the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, 7th Judicial District, Branch VI, acting upon an Ex-Parte Motion to
Declare Defendant in Default filed by herein respondents Godofredo R.
Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara declared defendant (herein petitioner) Director
of Lands in default and allowed the plaintiffs (respondents herein) to adduce
their evidence before the Special Clerk of Court (Rollo, p. 38). LLjur
On July 6, 1967, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District,
Branch VI, rendered a decision declaring the decision dated October 6, 1962
of the Court of First Instance, 7th Judicial District, Branch II in Civil Cases
Nos. 6747 and 6748 null and void. The decretal portion of said decision
reads as follows:
"Wherefore, the decision rendered in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 is
hereby declared null and void and the Director of Lands is hereby ordered to
reinstate Free Patents Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 issued in the names of
Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio respectively, and the Register of
Deeds of Rizal is likewise ordered to reinstate OCT No. 139 and 140 issued
in the names of the patentees pursuant to the aforesaid patents.
"SO ORDERED."
On March 14, 1968, a Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings with
Additional Parties was filed by defendant (herein petitioner) Director of Lands
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, wherein it alleged that the
said court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
(petitioner) among other things (Rollo, pp. 43-44). On the same day, the
Director of Lands filed A Petition to Reopen Proceedings in the same court
(Rollo, pp. 45-48). The aforestated petition averred that on July 3, 1967, even
before the promulgation of the aforementioned decision and notwithstanding
the fact that their patents and certificates of title had long been declared null
and void in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, respondents Eusebio and Lara,
in consideration of P10,000.00 for their respective parcels of land, executed
separate deeds of absolute sale involving the alleged lands in question in
favor of respondents Gil Venzuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon Orosa
(Rollo, p. 46). Subsequently, on August 9, 1967, immediately upon securing
the certification of the Clerk of Court that the decision in the instant case had
become final and executory, respondents caused the cancellation of Original
Certificates of Titles Nos. 139 and 140 and the issuance in lieu thereof of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 196349 and 196348, respectively, in the
names of respondents Gil Venzuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon Orosa.
Accordingly, on August 22, 1967, in consideration of P25,000.00 for each
alleged parcel, respondents Gil Venzuela and Rodolfo Cenidoza executed
separate deeds of transfer of rights in favor of respondents spouses Ramon
Orosa and Josefina Orosa, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 196348 and 196349 were cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-211957 and T-211958 to respondents spouses
Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa. Respondents spouses, Ramon Orosa
and Josefina Orosa, in consideration of a loan in the amount of P800,000.00
executed a deed of mortgage of the aforestated on December 27, 1967 in
favor of respondent Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (Rollo, pp. 46-
47).
On March 28, 1968, intervenors spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa
filed their motion for leave to intervene in opposition to the Motion to Admit
Petition to reopen proceedings with additional parties filed by the Director of
Lands on March 16, 1968 (Rollo, p. 178) and the Intervenors' Opposition on
the aforesaid petition to reopen proceedings of the petitioner (Rollo, p. 181).
Respondent Gil, Venzuela filed his opposition on April 17, 1968 (Rollo, p.
104) and his Supplemental Opposition while respondent Rodolfo Cenidoza
filed his separate opposition to the petition to reopen proceedings on June 3,
1968 (Rollo, p. 239). LLphil
The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, after consideration of the
motion to admit petition to reopen proceedings with additional parties as well
as the oppositions interposed thereto granted the motion on May 8, 1968
(Rollo, p. 49). Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order by the court
was filed by the intervenors spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa on
May 27, 1968 (Rollo, p. 190) while respondent Gil Venzuela filed his urgent
manifestation and motion for reconsideration on June 6, 1968 (Rollo, p. 114).
9
On June 8, 1968, the Director of Lands (petitioner herein) filed his opposition
to the intervenors' and Gil Venzuela's motion for reconsideration of the Order
dated May 8, 1968 (Rollo, p. 195). Consequently on June 12, 1968 the
intervenors spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their Intervenors'
Reply to the Defendants' Opposition (Rollo, p. 203).
On June 29, 1986, the Court of First Instance of Rizal denied, in an order, the
motion for reconsideration filed by the intervenors and set the hearing on July
29, 1968 (Rollo, p. 50). A motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of
the Order of June 29, 1968 and Motion for Second Reconsideration of the
Order of May 8, 1960 was filed by the intervenors on July 22, 1968 (Rollo, p.
205). However this was denied by the court in an order dated August 27,
1968 (Rollo, p. 51). Meanwhile, the intervenors filed their third motion for
reconsideration of the order of May 8, 1968 and/or Clarification and
Reconsideration of the Order of August 27, 1968 on November 2, 1968
(Rollo, p. 217), which was opposed by herein petitioner in its Opposition to
Intervenors' Third Motion for Reconsideration on November 23, 1968 (Rollo,
p. 228).
On December 16, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Rizal granting the said
third motion for reconsideration, set aside its Orders dated May 8, 1968, June
29, 1968 and August 27, 1968 and denied the Motion to Admit Petition to
Reopen Proceedings. The court ruled that the petition is not the proper
course of action available to the Director of Lands, who has not availed of the
remedies provided by the Rules of Court or the Land Registration Court such
as relief from the order of default or appeal from judgment or review thereof,
and has consequently lost his personality when he was declared in default,
and the Court, its jurisdiction to entertain the afore-mentioned Petition to
Reopen (Rollo, pp. 52-53).
Hence, this petition.
Notice of lis pendens was given to the Register of Deeds on March 10, 1969
(Rollo, p. 57). On March 11, 1969, in a resolution promulgated by this Court,
the respondents were required to file their answers and a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued without bond (Rollo, p. 60). Respondents except the
Register of Deeds of Rizal were restrained from entering into any transaction
in connection with Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-211957 and T-211958
and specifically prohibited the respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal to
accept, record, transcribe and register any transaction concerning the free
patents and certificates of title subject matter of Civil Cases Nos. 6747-48
(Rollo, pp. 60-61).
On March 26, 1969, respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa
manifested that they be furnished with a copy of the petition for certiorari so
that they may file their answer thereto (Rollo, pp. 65-66). Respondent
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank filed its answer on April 2, 1969
(Rollo, pp. 71-73) while respondent Gil Venzuela and respondent spouses,
Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their answers on April 24, 1969 and
April 16, 1969, respectively (Rollo, pp. 95-103; 120-137). Respondent
Rodolfo A. Cenidoza filed his answer on May 2, 1969 (Rollo, pp. 236-238),
but respondents patentees Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara did
not file their answers.
In the Resolution of May 12, 1969, the hearing of these cases was set for
June 18, 1969 (Rollo, p. 235). At said hearing, counsel for petitioner was
given twenty (20) days within which to submit its memorandum in lieu of oral
argument while counsel for respondents was granted leave to submit a reply
thereto and petitioner was allowed to submit a rejoinder (Rollo, p. 242). The
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands filed its
memorandum on August 16, 1969 (Rollo, p. 253). Respondent spouses,
Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their reply memorandum on October
21, 1971 (Rollo, p. 315) while a supplemental reply was filed by Gil Venzuela
on October 30, 1971 (Rollo, p. 394). On June 26, 1987, respondent spouses
Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed an urgent motion to resolve (Rollo, p.
409). LLjur
In his memorandum the Director of Lands assails the following acts of
respondent Judge as constituting grave abuse of discretion:
"A. Taking cognizance of and giving due course to the complaint of
Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara against the Director of Lands
instead of dismissing the complaint outright.
"B. Declaring the Director of Lands in default notwithstanding non-service of
summons and a copy of the complaint upon said defendant.
"C. Setting aside and declaring null and void the two (2) previous, valid, final
and fully implemented decisions of the same Court in Civil Cases Nos. 6747
and 6748.
"D. Granting, after two (2) previous denials thereof, the third pro
forma motion for reconsideration of respondents Orosa spouses.
"E. Denying the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings of the
Director of Lands after having previously granted said motion." (Rollo, p.
262).
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether or not a decision which has long
become final and executed, can be annulled on the grounds that the Court
lacks jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant and that the decision was
procured through fraud.
The petition is impressed with merit.
There is no question that the Court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
the defendants, respondents herein, Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C.
Lara in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, respectively, as clearly adduced
from the evidence presented that personal service was made on them. As
shown by the Sheriff's returns, in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748,
respondent Godofredo R. Eusebio was duly served with summons and a
copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 6747, while Urbano C. Lara was
personally served with summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case
10
No. 6748. Both services were made on August 16, 1961 upon the
respondents at Bambang, Pasig, Rizal their recorded address (Rollo, pp.
265-266).
Apart from the fact that Deputy Sheriff Maximo de Silva enjoys the
presumption that he had regularly performed his duty, the records amply
show that, contrary to respondents Eusebio's and Lara's claim that they were
completely unaware of the proceedings, they were duly summoned in Civil
Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 on August 16, 1961; that copies of the decisions
in these cases were furnished them by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal; that the Register of Deeds in separate letters informed
them of the decisions in these cases and in reply to the request of the
Register of Deeds to surrender their owners' duplicate certificates of OCT
Nos. 140 and 139, they alleged in a joint letter that they had long surrendered
their owner's duplicates certificates to the Bureau of Lands (Rollo, p. 267).
Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired when he actually
receives the summons (Fuentes vs. Bautista, 53 SCRA 420 [1979]). prcd
Thus, it is beyond dispute that all the proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. 6747
and 6748 are regular and that the trial court rendered valid judgment on the
aforestated cases which have become final and executory and are res
adjudicata. This Court ruled in the case of (Zansibarian Residents
Association vs. Municipality of Makati, 135 SCRA 235 [1985]), that once
judgment has become final, the issue therein should be laid at rest. Final
judgment was promulgated and a writ of execution was issued. Respondents
herein did not avail of any remedies available to them until after five (5) long
years when they filed Civil Case No. 10047 in another court.
As held by this Court in Bayer Philippines, Inc. vs. Agana, 63 SCRA 355
[1975], "Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or
among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial function as
regards any matter related to the controversy litigated comes to an end. The
execution of its judgment is purely a ministerial phase of adjudication. Indeed
the nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the prevailing party is fully
satisfied from the properties of the loser is generally ministerial." A judgment
whether correct or not becomes final when the plaintiff did not appeal said
judgment (Malia vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 116 [1985]) and courts are without
jurisdiction over the case once judgment has become final (Vda. de Emmas
vs. Emmas, 95 SCRA 470 [1979]). The doctrine of finality of judgment is
grounded on Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice
that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of the courts must become
final at some definite date fixed by law (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs.
Arciaga, 148 SCRA 433 [1987]).
Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 10047 is improper and there can be no
justification for respondent Judge's taking cognizance of and giving due
course to the complaint filed therein by respondents Eusebio and Lara
against the Director of Lands; much less his setting aside of final, executory
and fully implemented judgments resulting in the cancellation of original
certificates of titles issued by respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal. Where
judgment had long become final and executory and absent a showing that
respondents were deprived of due process or that said judgment was
procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud, the judgment can no longer be set
aside (Gaba vs. Castro, 120 SCRA 505 [1983]).
Moreover, the doctrine of non-interference has been regarded as an
elementary principle of higher importance in the administration of justice that
the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened,
modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction (30-A Am Jur
605). As this Court ruled in the case of Mas vs. Dumara-og, 12 SCRA 34
[1964], a Judge of a branch of one should not annul the order of a judge of
another branch of the same court. Any branch even if it be in the same
judicial district that attempts to annul a judgment of a branch of the CFI either
exceeds its jurisdiction (Cabigo vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 84 [1949]) or acts
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (PNB vs.
Javellana, 92 Phil. 525 [1952]). Thus, in the case of Parco vs. CA, 111 SCRA
262, this Court held that the various branches of the Court of First Instance
being co-equal cannot interfere with the respective cases of each branch,
much less a branch's order or judgment. llcd
Pertinent thereto is Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
"The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide,
final judgments and decrees of the inferior courts as herein provided."
(Emphasis supplied).
Respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa, Gil Venzuela and
Rodolfo Cenidoza contend that they are buyers in good faith. Besides the
fact that such contention is belied by the records which show that on July 3,
1967, even before the promulgation of the decision in Civil Case No. 10047,
and while their patents and titles remained cancelled, respondents Eusebio
and Lara, in consideration of P10,000.00 paid to them for their respective
parcels, executed separate deeds of absolute sale over the lands in question
in favor of Gil Venzuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon Orosa (Rollo, p. 259).
The Court ruled in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480
[1987]). That it is well settled that any title issued on non-disposable lots even
in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. In
the case at bar, the free patents and certificates of title issued to Eusebio and
Lara cover areas which form parts of Laguna de Bay. These are neither
agricultural nor disposable. Subject patents and titles were erroneously
issued due to misrepresentations and false reports and must therefore be
cancelled. Any false statement in an application for public land shall ipso
facto produce the cancellation of the title granted. This rule applies even after
the issuance of the certificate of title (Chacon Enterprises vs. Court of
11
Appeals, 124 SCRA 784 [1983]). A certificate of title cannot be used as a
shield to perpetuate fraud, and the doctrine of indefeasibility of torrens title
does not apply to free patent secured through fraud (De Leon vs. Abanilla,
124 SCRA 358). Likewise, the Court ruled in Cuevas vs. Pineda, 143 SCRA
674 [1986], that mere possession of land does not itself divest the land of its
public character.
Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its
ownership of the land nor operate to change the public character of the land
to private (Director of Lands vs. Gonzales, 120 SCRA 375 [1983]).
Under the same principle, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
although an innocent mortgagee for value, acquires no protection under the
Land Registration Law. LibLex
While it is true that a bank is not required, before accepting a mortgage, to
make an investigation of the title of the property being given as security
(Philippine National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang-Villalon, 139 SCRA
570 [1985]), and that where the torrens title of the land was in the name of
the mortgagor and later given as security for a bank loan, the subsequent
declaration of said Title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the
mortgage rights of the bank which has acted in good faith (Philippine National
Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang-Villalon, supra; Penullar vs. PNB, 120
SCRA 171 [1983]), it is apparent that the law on innocent purchasers for
value does not apply insofar as non-disposable public lands are concerned.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby rule that: (1) the decision dated July
6, 1967 and order dated December 16, 1968 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; (2) the decisions in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 dated October 6,
1962 are reinstated; (3) the Register of Deeds of Rizal is directed to cancel
all Certificates of Titles issued in connection with the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 10047; and (4) the real estate mortgage executed by the
respondent spouses Orosa in favor of the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank is SET ASIDE, but their indebtedness must be paid to the
Bank.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. L-30263-5, [October 30, 1987], 239 PHIL
304-319)
[G.R. No. 104296. March 29, 1996.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF IRENE
BULLUNGAN, represented by her husband DOMINGO PAGGAO and
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ISABELA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; FREE PATENT; THE STATE MAY BRING AN
ACTION UNDER SECTION 101 OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT FOR
REVERSION TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF LANDS WHICH HAVE BEEN
FRAUDULENTLY GRANTED TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. It is settled that
once a patent is registered under Act No. 496 (now P.D. No. 1529) and the
corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the
public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of
Lands will no longer have either control or jurisdiction. The Torrens Title
issued on the basis of a free patent or homestead patent becomes as
indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one
year from date of issuance of patent as provided in P.D. No. 1529, 32
(formerly Act No. 496, 38). However, as held in Director of Lands v. De
Luna, even after the lapse of one year, the State may still bring an action
under 101 of the Public Land Act for the reversion to the public domain of
lands which have been fraudulently granted to private individuals. This has
been the consistent ruling of this Court.
2. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL FACTS IN THE
APPLICATION CONSTITUTES FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION AND
IS A GROUND FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE. The failure of Irene
Bullungan to disclose that Vicente Carrabacan was in possession of the
portion of land in dispute constitutes fraud and misrepresentation and is a
ground for annulling her title. Under 91 of the Public Land Act where public
land is acquired by an applicant through fraud and misrepresentation, as in
the case at bar, the State may institute reversion proceedings even after the
lapse of the one-year period.
3. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THAT ONE WHO OBTAINS TITLE
TO A PUBLIC LAND THROUGH FRAUD SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
BENEFIT THEREFROM. Nor is there merit in the claim of private
respondents that the action taken by the Republic in this case is "not in
keeping with the policy of State to foster families as the factors of society, to
give them a sense of protection and permanency in their homes." Public
policy demands that one who obtains title to a public land through fraud
should not be allowed to benefit therefrom. Vicente Carabbacan had been in
possession of the land even before Irene Bullungan bought the possessory
rights to the land. It was therefore a misrepresentation for her to state in her
application for a free patent that she had been in possession of the lot in
question when the fact is that Carabbacan had been there ahead of her.
12
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX, 2 Cauayan,
Isabela declaring Free Patent No. V-79740 and Original Certificate of Title
No. P-8817 in the name of Irene Bullungan null and void so far as the portion
of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 involved in this case is concerned.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On September 10, 1955, Irene Bullungan (now deceased) applied for a free
patent covering lots situated in Fugaru (now San Guillermo), Angadanan,
Isabela. The lots included a portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801, between Lot
No. 763 and Lot No. 764, consisting of 1.04 hectares, which Vicente
Carabbacan claimed. In her application, Irene Bullungan stated that the land
applied for by her was not claimed or occupied by any other person and that
it was public land which had been continuously occupied and cultivated by
her since 1925. 3
Upon certification of Assistant Public Land Inspector Jose M. Telmo at Ilagan,
Isabela that Irene Bullungan had been in actual, continuous, open, notorious,
exclusive and adverse possession of the land since 1925, the Director of
Lands approved Bullungan's application on June 4, 1957. On December 26,
1957, Original Certificate of Title No. P-8817 was issued in the name of Irene
Bullungan.
Alleging that a portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 covered by the free patent
issued to Irene Bullungan overlapped the lot between Lot No. 763 and Lot
No. 764, which he was occupying, Vicente Carrabacan filed a protest on
September 7, 1961. The District Land Officer at Ilagan, Isabela
recommended the dismissal of the protest on the ground that the Bureau of
Lands no longer had jurisdiction over the matter as a result of the grant of a
free patent to Irene Bullungan. But the Director of Lands on March 23, 1982
ordered an investigation of the protest.
Vicente Carabbacan also brought an action for the reconveyance of the
portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 and the cancellation of free patent against
Irene Bullungan on September 5, 1961, although this was dismissed by the
court without prejudice.
The heirs of Irene Bullungan in turn sought to recover possession of the land
in an action which they brought in the Court of First Instance of Isabela on
April 13, 1972. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Br. II-1102. On the
other hand, refusing to give up his claim, Vicente Carabbacan filed a case for
reconveyance on August 15, 1972, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
1108. The cases were thereafter tried jointly.
On November 22, 1972 the court rendered a decision, dismissing the
complaint of Vicente Carabbacan and ordering him to vacate the land, even
as it upheld the ownership of Irene Bullungan. Carabbacan, who had been in
possession of the land in question, was finally ousted on December 10, 1981.
As already stated, the Director of Lands ordered on March 23, 1982 an
investigation of Carabbacan's protest. The investigation was undertaken by
Senior Special Investigator Napoleon R. Dulay, who found that Vicente
Carabbacan had been in actual cultivation of the land identified as Lot No.
763, Pls-594 since 1947, having acquired the same from Tomas Tarayao on
May 4, 1947. In his report dated September 17, 1985, the land investigator
stated that due to a big flood which occurred in December 1947, the
Cagayan River changed its course by moving north-east, resulting in the
emergence of a piece of land, which is the subject of this dispute.
Carrabacan took possession of the land and cultivated it. He was in the
continuous, peaceful, open and adverse occupation and cultivation of the
land from December 1947 until 1981 when he was ejected by virtue of the
decision in Civil Cases No. 1088 and 1102. 4
Based on these findings, the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of
Lands recommended on March 10, 1986 that steps be taken to seek the
amendment of Free Patent No. V-79740 and Original Certificate of Title No.
P-8817 of the late Irene Bullungan so as to exclude the disputed portion and
for the reversion of the same to the State.
On November 28, 1986, the Solicitor General filed in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines a complaint for the cancellation of Free Patent No. V-79740
and OCT No. P-8817 on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation in
obtaining the free patent. The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela which, on September 25, 1989, rendered a decision
declaring Free Patent No. V-79740 and OCT No. P-8817 null and void insofar
as the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 between Lot No. 763 and Lot No.
764, is concerned. The lower court found that Irene Bullungan made
misrepresentations by claiming in her application for a free patent that she
was in possession of the disputed portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801, when in
fact Vicente Carabbacan was occupying and cultivating the land. The court
justified the reversion of the land in question as an assertion of "a
governmental right."
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling
on the ground that, after the lapse of one year from the date of issuance of
the patent, the State could no longer bring an action for reversion. The
appellate court held that the certificate of title issued in the name of Irene
Bullungan became incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the lapse of one
year from the issuance of the free patent.
The Republic controverts the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It contends that
the doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens Titles does not bar the filing of an
action for cancellation of title and reversion of land even if more than one
year has elapsed from the issuance of the free patent in case of fraud in
obtaining patents.
We agree with petitioner. To begin with, there is no question that Free Patent
No. 79740 and Original Certificate of Title P-8817 were obtained through
13
fraud. The trial court found that Irene Bullungan falsely stated in her
application for a free patent that Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 was not claimed or
occupied by any other person. The trial court found that a portion of the lot in
question had been in the possession and cultivation of Vicente Carabbacan
since December 1947. 5Indeed private respondents admit that before Irene
Bullungan filed her application for a free patent, she had filed a complaint for
forcible entry against Vicente Carrabacan. The complaint, which was filed in
the Justice of the Peace Court of Angadanan, Isabela, was dismissed
precisely because the court found that Carabbacan had been in possession
of the land long before it was sold to Irene Bullungan by Leonida Tarayao. 6
The Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial court's finding in this case that
Irene Bullungan committed fraud and misrepresentation. Its decision rests
solely on the ground that after the lapse of one year from the date of
issuance of a free patent an action for the cancellation of patent and title on
ground of fraud and misrepresentation can no longer be maintained.
We think that this is error. It is settled that once a patent is registered
under Act No. 496 (now P.D. No. 1529) and the corresponding certificate of
title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes
private property over which the Director of Lands will no longer have either
control or jurisdiction. 7 The Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent
or homestead patent becomes as indefeasible as one which was judicially
secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent as
provided in P.D. No. 1529, 32 (formerly Act No. 496, 38). However, as held
in Director of Lands v. De Luna, 8 even after the lapse of one year, the State
may still bring an action under 101 9 of the Public Land Act for the reversion
to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private
individuals. This has been the consistent ruling of this Court. 10
The failure of Irene Bullungan to disclose that Vicente Carrabacan was in
possession of the portion of land in dispute constitutes fraud and
misrepresentation and is a ground for annulling her title. 11 Thus 91 of the
Public Land Act provides:
91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as
essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on
the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or omission of
facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth
in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change
of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of
the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it
advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or
whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good
faith, and for the purpose of such investigation, the Director of Lands is
hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if
necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every
investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith,
fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts
shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail
to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director
of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give
direct and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such
presumption, an order of cancellation may issue out further proceedings.
The appellate court said in its decision:
We are not, of course, unaware of cases where the patent and the certificate
of title issued pursuant thereto were declared null and void notwithstanding
the expiration of the aforementioned period of one (1) year simply because of
false statement of material and essential facts made in the application
therefor. Be it noted, however, that in these cases the lots patented or
granted were no longer part of the public domain but private ones segregated
from the mass thereof. Consequently, no right whatsoever was awarded in
said cases for it is already settled that a free patent which purports to convey
land to which the government did not have any title at the time of its issuance
does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner (Suva v.
Ventura, 40 O.G. 8, 4th sup. August 23, 1941; Vital v. Anore, 90 Phil.
855; Director of Lands v. Abanilla, G.R. No. L-26324, August 31, 1983). This
does not obtain in the present case for it is beyond dispute that the subject
land was still a part of the public domain when the same was patented by the
Government in favor of appellants' predecessor in interest. Accordingly, there
was indeed a title awarded such that when the same was brought under
operation of Land Registration Act in 1957, it became incontrovertible in
1958. 12
This is not so. Where public land is acquired by an applicant through fraud
and misrepresentation, as in the case at bar, the State may institute reversion
proceedings even after the lapse of the one-year period.
Nor is there merit in the claim of private respondents that the action taken by
the Republic in this case is "not in keeping with the policy of State to foster
families as the factors of society, to give them a sense of protection and
permanency in their homes." 13 Public policy demands that one who obtains
title to a public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit therefrom.
Vicente Carabbacan had been in possession of the land even before Irene
Bullungan bought the possessory rights to the land. It was therefore a
misrepresentation for her to state in her application for a free patent that she
had been in possession of the lot in question when the fact is that
Carabbacan had been there ahead of her.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the decision
dated September 25, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela,
Branch XIX is REINSTATED.
14
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104296, [March 29, 1996], 325
PHIL 636-645)
[G.R. No. 128531. October 26, 1999.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and VICENTE L. YUPANGCO, JR., respondents.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the
Philippines, as represented by the Solicitor General, questioning the decision
of the Court of Appeals in affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati in an action for the issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in
lieu of the lost copy. The issue in this case is whether in a proceeding for the
issuance of an owner's duplicate copy of title, the Solicitor General is
required to be notified, such that failure to give such notice would render the
proceedings void.
The petition was devoid of merit. The Court ruled that considering that the
law does not impose such notice requirement in proceedings for the issuance
of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title, the lack of notice to the Solicitor
General was at most a formal and not a jurisdictional defect. Moreover,
nothing in Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires that the Office of the
Solicitor General be notified and heard in proceedings for the issuance of an
owner's duplicate certificate of title. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of
Appeals was affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES; PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D.
NO. 1529); SOLICITOR GENERAL NOT REQUIRED TO BE NOTIFIED IN
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN OWNER'S DUPLICATE
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. Nothing in the law, however, requires that the
Office of the Solicitor General be notified and heard in proceedings for the
issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of title. In contrast, 23 of the
same law, involving original registration proceedings, specifically mentions
the Solicitor General as among those who must be notified of the petition.
Similarly, 36 provides that the petition for registration in cadastral
proceedings must be filed by the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of
Lands.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF NOTICE TO SOLICITOR GENERAL IN
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A NEW OWNER'S DUPLICATE
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT. Considering
that the law does not impose such notice requirement in proceedings for the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title, the lack of notice to
the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Registrar of Deeds, was at most only
a formal and not a jurisdictional defect. This case should be distinguished
from our rulings in cadastral registration cases and original land registration
proceedings which require that the Solicitor General be notified of decisions
and hold as decisive, for the purpose of determining the timeliness of the
appeal filed by the government, the date of his receipt of the decisions
therein and not that of the Director of Lands or of his other representatives.
The issue and the applicable laws in those cases are different.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
The question for decision in this case is whether in a proceeding for the
issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, the Solicitor General is
required to be notified, such that failure to give such notice would render the
proceedings void. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
ruled in the negative. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. dctai
The facts are as follows:
Private respondent Vicente Yupangco is the owner of a unit in a
condominium building in Legaspi Street, Makati City, as evidenced by
Certificate of Title No. 7648. Because his aforesaid certificate could not be
located, he filed, on January 28, 1994, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
136, Makati, a petition for the issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in
lieu of his lost copy, pursuant to 109 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree). The trial court ordered the Registrar of Deeds of Makati to comment
on the petition and thereafter set the case for initial hearing.
On February 11, 1994, the Registrar of Deeds of Makati filed a manifestation
that she had no objection to the petition. After hearing private respondent's
evidence, the trial court rendered, on December 15, 1995, its decision
granting the petition, declaring as invalid the missing copy of the certificate of
title, and ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati to issue a new owner's
duplicate certificate of title in the name of private respondent. A copy of this
decision was furnished the Solicitor General.
On February 5, 1996, the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration of the
trial court's decision on the ground that no copy of private respondent's
petition or notice thereof had been given to him. His motion was, however,
denied. The Office of the Solicitor General then elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, which, in a decision 1 dated March 5, 1997, affirmed the
order of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Private respondent's petition before the trial court was anchored on 109
of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides:
SECTION 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In
case of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice
15
under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the
loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to
him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the facts of
such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person
in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court
may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate
certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in
place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to
like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded
as such for all purposes of this decree. 2 (Emphasis added) LibLex
Nothing in the law, however, requires that the Office of the Solicitor General
be notified and heard in proceedings for the issuance of an owner's duplicate
certificate of title. In contrast, 23 of the same law, involving original
registration proceedings, specifically mentions the Solicitor General as
among those who must be notified of the petition. Similarly, 36 provides that
the petition for registration in cadastral proceedings must be filed by the
Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Lands.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, invokes 35(5), Chapter 12, Title III,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code which provides:
SECTION 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by
the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent
government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Represent the Government in all land registration and related
proceedings. . .
He contends that, in view of this provision, it was mandatory for the trial court
to notify him of private respondent's petition and that its failure to do so
rendered the proceedings before it null and void. 3
The contention has no merit. The provision of the Administrative Code relied
upon by the Solicitor General is not new. It is simply a codification of 1(e)
of P.D. No. 478 (Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the
Solicitor General) which similarly provided:
SECTION 1. Powers and Functions. (1) The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by
the President or head of the Office concerned, it shall also represent
government owned and controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following
specific powers and functions: LexLib
xxx xxx xxx
e. Represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings.
...
It is only now that the Solicitor General is claiming the right to be notified of
proceedings for the issuance of the owner's duplicate certificate of title.
Indeed, the only basis for such claim is that the Office of the Solicitor General
represents the government in land registration and related proceedings. Even
so, however, the request for representation should have come from the
Registrar of Deeds of Makati who was the proper party to the case. Here,
there is no dispute that the Registrar of Deeds of Makati was notified of
private respondent's petition, but she manifested that her office had no
objection thereto. The Solicitor General does not question the propriety of the
action and manifestation of the Registrar of Deeds, nor does he give any
reason why private respondent's petition for the issuance of a new owner's
duplicate certificate of title should be denied. Instead, he claims that the fact
that he was given a copy of the decision is an admission that he is entitled to
be notified of all incidents relating to the proceedings.
This is not correct. Considering that the law does not impose such notice
requirement in proceedings for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
certificate of title, the lack of notice to the Solicitor General, as counsel for the
Registrar of Deeds, was at most only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect.
This case should be distinguished from our rulings in cadastral registration
cases 4 and original land registration proceedings 5 which require that the
Solicitor General be notified of decisions and hold as decisive, for the
purpose of determining the timeliness of the appeal filed by the government,
the date of his receipt of the decisions therein and not that of the Director of
Lands or of his other representatives. 6 The issue and the applicable laws in
those cases are different. cdrep
The important role of the Office of the Solicitor General as the government's
law office cannot be overemphasized. Its powers and functions, however,
should not be rigidly applied in such a manner that innocuous omissions, as
in the case at bar, should be visited with so grave a consequence as the
nullification of proceedings. After all, no prejudice to the government has
been shown.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128531, [October 26, 1999], 375
PHIL 950-956)
16
[G.R. No. 158449. October 22, 2004.]
LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES IGTIBEN, JOSE
DEL ROSARIO IGTIBEN, JR. and THERESA TOPACIO
MEDINA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68546, 1 which set aside the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Silang-Amadeo, Cavite in LRC Case No. 98-133 (LRA Record No. N-
69787) 2 and dismissed petitioners' application for registration of a parcel of
land.
On 08 January 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court an application for
registration of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel
of land with an area of 2,988 square meters, situated in Barangay Malabag,
Silang, Cavite, and more particularly described as Lot 5442, Cad 452-D,
Silang Cadastre, Ap-04-007007 (hereinafter referred to as the Subject
Property). Petitioners alleged that they acquired the Subject Property by
purchase, and that they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and
adverse possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner for more
that 30 years. 3
No opposition was filed against the application and so petitioners proceeded
with the presentation of their evidence. The State was represented in the
proceedings by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose M. Velasco, Jr. 4
Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, the trial
court traced the history of possession of the Subject Property back to 1958,
when the Subject Property was first declared for tax purposes by Justina
Hintog. 5
Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject Property in 1968. In
the same year, the Subject Property was transferred to spouses Alfredo
Tonido and Agatona Calanog. Agatona Calanog allegedly inherited the
Subject Property from Teodoro Calanog, her father; on the other hand,
Alfredo Tonido supposedly purchased the same property also from Teodoro
Calanog, his father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido planted the Subject Property with
palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano and other fruit bearing trees. After the
demise of Agatona Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family, consisting of
Alfredo and his children, Samuel, Elizabeth, Benjamin, Imelda and Esther,
shared possession of the Subject Property.6
On 21 November 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to
petitioners, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. 7
The history of possession of the Subject Property, as related above, was
supported by tax declarations in the name of petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to 1998. 8
On 15 August 2000, the trial court rendered a decision approving petitioners'
application for registration of the Subject Property. The Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the
decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. EACIcH
In its appeal, the Republic alleged that the trial court erred in approving the
application for registration despite petitioners' failure to prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
Subject Property since 12 June 1945, or earlier, as required by Section 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as
amended by PD No. 1073. Moreover, petitioners also failed to produce
muniments of title to tack their possession to those of their predecessors-in-
interest in compliance with the prescriptive period required by law. 9
On 20 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finding the
appeal meritorious, setting aside the decision of the trial court, and
dismissing the application for registration of petitioners. 10 The Court of
Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration in its resolution dated
22 May 2003. 11
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals be set aside
and that the decision of the trial court, approving petitioners' application for
registration of the Subject Property, be reinstated. 12
In the original application filed by petitioners before the trial court, they claim
that they are entitled to confirmation and registration of their title to the
Subject Property in accordance with Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, although they had not identified under which specific paragraph of
the said Section. 13
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree reads
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
17
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river
beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
By the allegation of petitioners in their application of actual, continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the Subject Property
in the concept of owner, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-
interest, for a given period of time, it can be logically presumed that their
claim to the right to register the Subject Property was based on Section 14,
paragraph (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
However, subsequent pleadings filed by both petitioners and respondent
Republic before the Court of Appeals and this Court, discuss mainly the
Public Land Act, thus, establishing that the application for registration filed by
petitioners before the trial court is essentially an application for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Property,
governed by Sections 47 to 57 of the Public Land Act. TCaADS
Proceedings under the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land
Act are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the
nature of judicial proceedings, and the decree of registration issued for both
is conclusive and final. They differ mainly in that under the Property
Registration Decree, there already exists a title which the court only needs to
confirm. On the other hand, under the Public Land Act, there exists a
presumption that the land applied for still pertains to the State, and that the
occupants and possessors can only claim an interest in the land by virtue of
their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession thereof.
Nonetheless, in the end, the two laws arrive at the same goal, namely, a
Torrens title, which aims at complete extinguishment, once and for all, of
rights adverse to the record title. 14
In general, an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title under the Public Land Act must be able to prove that: (1) the land is
alienable public land; and (2) his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. 15
The finding of fact of the trial court that the Subject Property is alienable
public land is undisputed. What is to be determined herein is whether
petitioners have complied with the period of possession and occupation
required by the Public Land Act.
The provision of the Public Land Act that is particularly relevant to petitioners'
application is Section 48(b). Through the years, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act has been amended several times. The case of Republic v.
Doldol 16 provides a summary of these amendments, as follows
. . . The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As
amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, presently
requires, for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title, the
possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicants, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree heretofore cited.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners have
failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of the Subject
Property, as required by both the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that
Indeed, the earliest period that the applicants could claim ownership over the
property is in 1958, which is the earliest date Justina Hintog, the previous
owner/occupant, declared the property for taxation purposes. This is far later
than June 12, 1945, the date prescribed by law that the applicants'
possession under claim of ownership should have begun at the latest. 17
Petitioners maintain, however, that RA No. 6940, enacted on 28 March 1990,
has repealed by implication Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by PD No. 1073, and has effectively reduced the required period of
possession and occupation of the land to thirty years prior to the filing of the
application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
Petitioners' arguments are without merit. This Court has already laid down
the standard for repeals by implication, as follows
It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by implication are
not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the
legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v.
Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed
to exist, that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the
same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There
18
must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The
language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable
with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that
standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the
legislative purpose to repeal. 18
In herein case, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the provisions of RA
No. 6940 do not even address the same subject matter. DISTcH
In the Public Land Act, the ways by which the State may dispose of
agricultural lands is enumerated, to wit
SEC. 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of
only as follows
1. For homestead settlement;
2. By sale;
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization;
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters
of the Public Land Act since the specific requirements and application
procedure differ for every mode. More particularly, the confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles may be done two ways, either by: (a)
administrative legalization or free patents under Chapter VII of the Public
Land Act; or (b) judicial legalization or judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles under Chapter VIII of the same Act. Having filed their
application before the courts, petitioners have pursued a judicial legalization
or judicial confirmation of their title to the Subject Property.
Petitioners primarily base their arguments on the amendment by RA No.
6940 of Section 44 of the Public Land Act, to read as follows
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of
more than twelve (12) hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to
the effectivity of this amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a tract or
tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition, who shall have paid
the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any
person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter, to have a free
patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve
(12) hectares.
While the above-quoted provision does provide for a 30-year period of
occupation and cultivation of the land, Section 44 of the Public Land
Act applies to free patents, and not to judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title to which Section 48(b) applies.
The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was
recognized by Mr. Justice Puno, in his separate opinion in the case of Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 19 in which he discussed
the development of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine legal system
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes
the concept of ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on
adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the
Public Land Acton administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or
incomplete titles and Section 48(b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. DCISAE
The remaining provisions of RA No. 6940 amend Sections 44 and 47 of the
Public Land Act by extending the periods for filing of applications for free
patents and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles,
respectively, to 31 December 2000. Except for extending the period for filing
of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, RA
No. 6940 does not touch on the other provisions under Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act, such as Section 48(b) and the prescriptive period provided
therein.
Consequently, applying the standard provided by this Court on repeal by
implication, there can be no conflict or inconsistency between Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act and the provisions of RA No. 6940 that would give rise
to a repeal of the former by the latter.
The subsequent effectivity of RA No. 9176 on 01 January 2001 does not
affect the position of this Court on the issues discussed herein. Once again,
Section 47 is the only provision under Chapter VIII of the Public Land
Act amended by RA No. 9176 by further extending the period for filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to 31
December 2020. The other provisions of the Public Land Act amended by RA
No. 9176, such as Sections 44 and 45, already refer to free patents under
Chapter VII. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No.
1073, and the prescriptive period provided therein still remain unchanged.
IN ALL:
(1) Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 6940, which
provides for a prescriptive period of thirty (30) years possession, applies only
to applications for free patents;
(2) The case at bar is a judicial application for confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title over the Subject Property covered by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act; and
(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for judicial confirmation of
an imperfect or incomplete title the continuous possession of the land since
12 June 1945, or earlier, which petitioners herein failed to comply with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court
AFFIRMS the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68546, which reversed the decision of the lower court in LRC Case No. 98-
133 (LRA Record No. N-69787) and dismissed the application for land title of
petitioners. No cost.
19
||| (Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, G.R. No. 158449, [October 22, 2004],
484 PHIL 145-159)
[G.R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002.]
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE
AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES, JOSEPH L.
NUEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T.
TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C.
TORRES, JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA
ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION, NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA
MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L.
MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO
ECO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands,respondents.
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA,
MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA
MOISES, respondents/intervenors.
Britanico Law Office for petitioners.
J.P. Villanueva & Associates for private respondents.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYNOPSIS
On April 25, 1985, petitioners filed with the Land Registration Court an
application for registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. At the time
petitioners filed their application, the lot has been reserved as a watershed
under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioner's application. The
Republic of the Philippines opposed the application. Thereafter, the Land
Registration Court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to
establish their registrable rights over the lot. Accordingly, it rendered a
decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. The Solicitor General
sought the annulment of the decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the case, specifically over the lot, which he claimed to be not alienable
and disposable. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared the
decision of the Land Registration Court null and void ruling that the Director
of Lands has jurisdiction over the subject property inasmuch as the subject
lot is part of the public domain.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Supreme Court found the petition bereft of merit. The Court held that the
Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties,
such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and
cannot validly adjudged the registration of title in favor of private applicant. In
this case, the Court found that the subject lot, being a watershed reservation,
is not alienable and disposable public land. It held that once a parcel of land
is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive
Proclamation, a presumption arises that the land continues to be a part of
such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent
reclassification is shown. The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and
convincingly show that the lot had been officially released from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. Hence, any title to the lot is void ab initio. The Land
Registration Court never acquired jurisdiction over the subject lot. Thus, all
proceedings of the Land Registration Court involving the subject lot were,
therefore, null and void.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; REGISTRATION OF PUBLIC
LANDS; JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE; APPLICANT
MUST OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND HE IS
APPLYING FOR IS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. An applicant for
confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and
that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may have been derived from
old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, aconcession
especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or
a titulo de compra or title through purchase. Or, that he has had continuous,
open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years
preceding the filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES; CASE AT BAR. Originally, Section 48(b)
of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an
applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The same, however,
has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners' application for
registration was filed on April 25, 1985. As amended, Section 48 (b) now
reads: . . . "(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
20
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land
Act requires that the applicant must prove the following: "(a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued." Petitioners do not claim to
have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the Lot is
predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902. Clearly,
petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title
because of the failure to complete the required period of possession, whether
under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141prior to the issuance of EO 33, or
under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073. There is no proof that prior
to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or title
to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State,
as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had
only been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed
the parcel of land in the manner and for the number of years required by law
for the confirmation of imperfect title.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSION OF FOREST LANDS OR OTHER
INALIENABLE PUBLIC LANDS CANNOT RIPEN INTO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP; LOT RESERVED AS WATERSHED IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE
TO OCCUPANCY, DISPOSITION, CONVEYANCE OR ALIENATION.
Assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the
issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since
then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time
petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved
as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners'
application. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904
could no longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was
no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation.
Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and
disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed
reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands
or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership.
In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals, the Court declared
that inalienable public lands ". . . cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run
against the State. 'The possession of public land, however long the period
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because
the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against
the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute
a grant from the State.''
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES WITH RESPECT THERETO DO NOT APPLY
UNLESS AND UNTIL THE LAND CLASSIFIED AS WATERSHED
RESERVATION IS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION SO THAT
IT MAY FORM PART OF THE DISPOSABLE AGRICULTURAL LANDS OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended
by Proclamation No. 1637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No.
1637 revised the area and location of the proposed townsite. According to
then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot
A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and
reverted it to MWR coverage. A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of
the Executive Department is needed to declassify land which had been
earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Unless and until the land
classified as such is released in an official proclamation so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONCE A PARCEL OF LAND IS INCLUDED WITHIN A
WATERSHED RESERVATION DULY ESTABLISHED BY EXECUTIVE
PROCLAMATION, A PRESUMPTION ARISES THAT THE LAND
CONTINUES TO BE PART OF SUCH RESERVATION UNTIL CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT DECLASSIFICATION IS
SHOWN. The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the
private character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest
Development dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the
Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The certification on which petitioners rely that a
reclassification had occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the
reclassification, is contradicted by several documents submitted by the
Solicitor General before the land registration court. The Solicitor General
submitted to the land registration court a Report dated March 2, 1988, signed
by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that the Lot described in Psu-
162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus recommended the dismissal of the
application for registration. Likewise, in a letter dated November 11, 1991, the
Deputy Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is
within the MWR. Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to
petitioner Edna T. Collado's [as original applicant] application is the technical
description of the Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of
the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description
21
categorically stated that the Lot "is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." The
evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show
clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included
within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation,
as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part
of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent
declassification is shown.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICANT MUST BE IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF THE
LOT FOR AT LEAST THIRTY YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
FILING OF THE APPLICATION. It is obvious, based on the facts on
record that neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had
been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No.
1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners' possession as of the filing of their
application on April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven years counted
from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not change
even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the
Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners' case falters
even more because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18,
1977. According to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No.
1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is
supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; A FORESTED AREA CLASSIFIED AS FOREST LAND OF
PUBLIC DOMAIN DOES NOT LOSE SUCH CLASSIFICATION SIMPLY
BECAUSE LOGGERS OR SETTLERS MAY HAVE STRIPPED IT OF ITS
FOREST COVER. It is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now
fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The
following ruling may be applied to this case by analogy: "A forested area
classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forest lands' do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish
or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply."
8. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; LAND REGISTRATION COURT; NO
JURISDICTION OVER NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES. It is now
established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and
disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and
convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a
portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the public
domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged
procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of
judgment are immaterial since the land registration court never acquired
jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court
involving the Lot are therefore null and void. We apply our ruling in Martinez
vs. Court of Appeals, as follows: "The Land Registration Court has no
jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers
which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the
registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of
Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either
directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive
period provided for by the Statute of Limitations."
9. ID.; ACTIONS; DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA AND ESTOPPEL; DOES
NOT APPLY TO SILENCE THE STATE'S CLAIM OVER PUBLIC LANDS;
RIGHT OF REVERSION OR RECONVEYANCE TO THE STATE OF PUBLIC
PROPERTIES REGISTERED AND WHICH ARE NOT CAPABLE OF
PRIVATE APPROPRIATION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE. We also hold that
environmental consequences in this case override concerns over
technicalities and rules of procedure. In Republic vs. De los Angeles, which
involved the registration of public lands, specifically parts of the sea, the
Court rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to silence the
Republic's claim over public lands. The Court said: "It should be noted further
that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the. Government
sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or
laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res
judicata is to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of
justice to technicality." The Court further held that "the right of reversion or
reconveyance to the State of the public properties registered and which are
not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not
prescribe."
10. ID.; INTERVENTION; RULE; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. As a rule,
intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial court," as
Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has recognized
exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of
Appeals reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, where
22
the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when the case had
already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that: "It is quite
clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this
stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded . . . and on
appeal . . . the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition
for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the
Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period
prescribed under . . . Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. But Rule 12 of
the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of
procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of
the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure
is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice
to the rival claims of contending parties. It was. created not to hinder and
delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In
other words, it is a means to an end."
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This Petition 1 seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, 2 dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared
null and void the Decision 3 dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-
59179, confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration
court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate
area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The
Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso),
Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the
application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed
by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau
of Lands, which stated, "[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed." On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an
Amended Application to include additional co-applicants. 4 Subsequently,
more applicants joined (collectively referred to as "petitioners" for brevity). 5
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners' application. In due course, the
land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole
world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial.
Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of
owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared
the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes.
According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-
indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners
submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights
among them and their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
"1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of
the Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious and continuous possession
of the property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his
name on22 March 1902 (Exhibit "W" and "W-1" testimonies of J. Torres on 16
December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the
property. He had the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28,
1928 (Exhibit "X" and "X-1"; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado
Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva
before the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II. He
owned and possessed the property until 1958. He declared the property for
tax purposes, the latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued
on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit "I" and testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by
virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit "H"). During the
ownership of the property by Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson
of Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the farm. (Testimony of
Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name
under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax Declaration
No. 8775 on 3 August 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15
December 1975, and under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16
October 1982through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "G").
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of
Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit "P-1" to "P-3").
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE
AMO, VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who
bought portions of the property from Edna Collado through a Deed of
Sale on 6 November 1985 (Exhibit "Q" to "Q-3").
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS,
DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA,
CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE
TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO,
CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE,
DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA
23
M. MALAPAD bought portions of the property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May
1986 (Exhibit "S" to "S-3").
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA
MARCIANO and AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new
OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO
CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO through aDeed of Sale dated 18 January
1987 (Exhibit "T" to "T-9")." 6
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial
prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For failure of the
oppositors to present their evidence, the land registration court issued an
order considering the case submitted for decision based on the evidence of
the petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing to
January 14, 1991 for the presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On
this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due notice.
Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for decision
based on the evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Court's Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration
court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a decision
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions of
the court's decision, as follows:
"From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the
witnesses presented by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual,
open, public and notorious possession by the applicants and their
predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and said possession had
been testified to by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio
Montealegre, Jose Amo and one Chona who were all cross-examined by
Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation
purposes in the names of the previous owners and the corresponding taxes
were paid by the Applicants and the previous owners and said property was
planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing
purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to
establish registrable title over said property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed,
the Court can only add that all Presidential Proclamations like the
Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to "private
rights."
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734,
1983 "private rights" is proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of
acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by "private
rights" means that applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that
the property in question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either
by composition title from the Spanish government or by Possessory
Information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands . . ."
(Italics supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated,
Applicants have acquired private rights to which the Presidential
Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed should be subject to such
private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants
that as per Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated
March 18, 1980, the area applied for was verified to be within the area
excluded from the operation of the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on
June 21, 1974 which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation,
amended by Proclamation No. 1637dated April 18, 1977 known as the
Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit "K")." 7
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6,
1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming
their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of the
decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration
court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary decree in
their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court had already rendered
a decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an
appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of
the land registration court's decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on
February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order
directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg.
129 on the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had
been previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to
private appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) under its
Integrated Social Forestry Program ("ISF" for brevity), filed with the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
24
They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is
situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They
claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the
certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree
planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the
preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary
conference, all the parties as represented by their respective counsels
agreed that the only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is
part of the public domain. 8
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition
and declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land
registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec.
1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands
of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private
respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part
of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
(Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence
whatsoever that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been
segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent
authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description of
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey
Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private
respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed.""
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is
confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a
Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case
No. 269-A. These documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in
private respondent Collado's application that "said parcel of land known as
Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land
application and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8,
Application; Italics supplied). The respondent court could not have missed
the import of these vital documents which are binding upon the courts
inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to
classify public lands. They should have forewarned the respondent judge
from assuming jurisdiction over the case.
". . . inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the
public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the
disposition of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural
Resources and Environment), and not the courts. . . . Even assuming that
petitioners did have the said properties surveyed even before the same was
declared to be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it
was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason that
this action must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no
matter how long, cannot convert the same into private property. And courts
are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of
Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Italics supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA
387, 391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA
339)." 9
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 13 Upon the Spanish
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR
CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS'
PETITION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR
LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME
FINAL.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 ("EO 33" for brevity) dated
July 26, 1904 10 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation ("MWR"
for brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even
concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical,
literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners' claim
25
over the Lot is that "all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private
rights." They point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the
reservations are "subject to existing private rights, if any there be."
Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership goes all the way back to
1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim
and ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then
prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was
that the land possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are
agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable. They conclude that
private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO
33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners' arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 11 The
Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the
Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 12 which laid the foundation
that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and
possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. 14
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage
Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal
Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the Mortgage Law as
well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law
promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of
all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state. 15
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all
rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands
through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States
colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No.
926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for
the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land
Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the government's title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between
Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of
the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown
open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands." 16
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After
the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141"
for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this
day as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 17
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which
recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the
legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in
the Philippines under the Torrens system. 18 The Torrens system requires
the government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in
the title is the owner of the property described therein, subject to liens and
encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of
title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are
quieted upon issuance of the certificate. 19 PD 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978, 20 amended and updated Act
496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands
and waters of the public domain. 21 Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate
opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, 22 explained thus:
"One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources
of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in
favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the
adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was
seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power
to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The
delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of
State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the
26
Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and
applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved
the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine."
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII 23 of the 1935 Constitution, on "Conservation
and Utilization of Natural Resources" barred the alienation of all natural
resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural
resources the State could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the
Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV 24 on the "National Economy and
the Patrimony of the Nation". The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian
doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII25 "National Economy and Patrimony."
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987
Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as
well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong
to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals,
lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need
and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are
essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted
to park and recreational purposes." 26
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the
Court had occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved the
issue of whether the parcel of land which the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is exempt from the
coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law ("CARL" for brevity). 28 The Court defined watershed as "an area
drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide
which separates it from adjacent watersheds." However, the Court also
recognized that:
"The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The
most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most
important human necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods
that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an "intergenerational" responsibility that needs to be answered
now."
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural
Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated
by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or
occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the
investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such
waters."
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed
areas and took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and
Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the
environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the
heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the
Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict
with proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger
the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge
detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the
Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the
Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as
recharged areas of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people
have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures
they couldn't care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life
support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by
it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource
water. . . .
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed
management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road
building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious
agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would
not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact
of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people
dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive
watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and
implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens."
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and
Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and determine the nature of the
parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by
the CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of
natural resources such as watershed reservations which are akin to forest
zones. Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the
environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities
could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence, by
constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties
of the State.
27
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they
vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance
of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as
amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for
is part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect
title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or
royal grant, aconcession especial or special grant, a composition con el
estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through
purchase. 29 "Or, that he has had continuous, open and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his
application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation
of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded
by RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The
same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time
petitioners' application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985. 30 As
amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land
Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:
"(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either
be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land,
by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued." 31
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to
register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or
title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession,
whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance
of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had
acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of
acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of
1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily,
petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the
number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the
issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since
then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time
petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved
as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners'
application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer
be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48
(b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable
public agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are
excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other
inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals, 32 the Court declared that inalienable
public lands
". . . cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both
acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
'The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State,
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute
a grant from the State.'"
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals 33 is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did
not contest the nature of the land. They admitted that the land lies in the
heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No.
573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners in Gordula contended, however,
that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior
to the reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the
subject land. The Court ruled:
"We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that
there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner
Gordula did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under
Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January,
1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573
28
in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River
Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been
classified as public forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights," in Proclamation
No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it
suffices if the claimant "had occupied and cultivated the property for so many
number of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the
corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and
[his] occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and
recognized by the government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners
urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969,
albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession required
under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest
upon petitioner Gordula the "private rights" recognized and respected in
Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs.
Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection of "private rights" to
exclude his land from a military or forest reservation must show ". . . by clear
and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any] .
. . means for the acquisition of public lands."
In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied
with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for
acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and possession of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The
rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied
for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an
interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and
notorious possession."
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the
Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently
segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and
disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974.
Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an area
of 3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso
Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small part
of this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town sites are
considered alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33,
DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14
AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE
WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN
PORTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE
SAME, TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the
operation of Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by
Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915, which established the
Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and reserve
the same, together with the adjacent parcel of land, of the public domain, for
townsite purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Public Land Act,
subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision survey in
accordance with the development plan to be prepared and approved by the
Department of Local Government and Community Development, which
parcels are more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Man's Baguio, being a portion of the
Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province
of Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked "1" on sketch plan,
being N-74'-30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal;
thence N 33' 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40' 26 W 1538.50 m. to
point 3; thence N 30' 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75' 02 W 704.33 m.
to point 5; thence N 14' 18 W 1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43' 25 W
477.04 m. to point 7; thence N 71' 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31' 05
W 1025.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence
Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12;
thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to
point 14; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East 1000.00
m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East
1075.00 m. to point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence
Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21;
thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to
point 23; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South
1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due
West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of
beginning. Containing an area of three thousand seven hundred eighty
(3,780) Hectares, more or less.
29
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Man's Baguio, being a portion of
alienable and disposable portion of public domain) situated in the
municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a
point marked "1" on sketch plan being N 74' 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less,
from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence
Due West 1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4;
thence Due West 1000.00. m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to
point 6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00
m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due
North 509.62 m. to point 12; thence S. 31' 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13;
thence S 71' 38 E 458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43' 25 E 477.04 m. to point
15; thence S 14' 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75' 02 E 704.33 m. to
point 17; thence S. 30' 50 E 503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40' 26 E 1538.50
m. to point 19; thence s 33' 23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing
an area of one thousand two hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or
less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal
of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 637
issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and
location of the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor
O. Ramos,Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed
by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR
coverage. 34 Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES
OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF
LUZON BY INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING
PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED
PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant
to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21,
1974 which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of
Antipolo and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the
area and revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced therein,
subject to private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is more
particularly described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation
amending the area under SWO-41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan
Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo,
and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along
lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the
Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by
the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the
Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-
33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed Reservation.
Beginning at a point marked "1" on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of
1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future
survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely
within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal
of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines"
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is
needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed
reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes. 35 Unless and until the land classified as such is released
in an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply. 36
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private
character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development
dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed
(Exh. R). The Certification reads:
"Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
30
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square meters, as shown
and described on the reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer
Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area
excluded from the operation of Marikina Watershed Reservation established
under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No.
1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the Boso-Boso
Townsite Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18,
1977 known as Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D.
1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human
Settlements, to the exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as
contained in his internal memorandum dated March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section"
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had
occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted
by several documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land
registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a
Report 37 dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G.
Bonifacio of the then National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration, confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part of
the MWR. He thus recommended the dismissal of the application for
registration. The Report states:
"COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court respectfully reports
that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of
San Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for
registration of title in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found
that a portion of the SW, described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was
previously the subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC
Record No. N-55948 and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986
in the name of Apolonia Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for
Issuance of the Decree dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984,
respectively, and the remaining portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12
Marikina Watershed. . . .
"WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court
for its information and guidance with the recommendation that the application
in the instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Italics supplied)."
Likewise, in a letter 38 dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector,
DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,
Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The letter
states:
"That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso),
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO
SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-
162620, which is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation (IN-12) . . . .
"xxx xxx xxx
"That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the
Registration Applicant but part of the public domain, not subjected to
disposition and is covered by Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social
Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended for
rejection (Italics supplied)." Copy of the letter is attached herewith as Annex
"3" and made an integral part hereof."
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T.
Collado's [as original applicant] application is the technical description 39 of
the Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey
Division of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically
stated that the Lot "is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show
clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included
within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation,
as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part
of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent
declassification is shown.
31
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title.
Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from
the MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974,
petitioners' possession as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985
would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the
proclamation in 1974. The result will not change even if we tack in the two
years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the
issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners' case falters even more because of
the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then
DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637reverted Lot A or the
townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to
the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated
and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may
be applied to this case by analogy:
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply." 40
Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment should have
been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republic's
petition for annulment of judgment which was filed long after the decision of
the land registration court had allegedly become final and executory. The
land registration court rendered its decision on January 30, 1991 and the
Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on April 23,
1991. 41 Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of
Appeals the petition for annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP
Blg. 129 42 only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly
become final and executory. Moreover, petitioners further point out that the
Solicitor General filed the petition for annulment after the land registration
court issued its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority
to issue the corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground
that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically,
over the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General
maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer
available because it is barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that
the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves
private land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning
the land registration court's jurisdiction considering that the Republic
participated in the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not
alienable and disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not
clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620,
ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of
the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the
alleged procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment
of judgment are immaterial since the land registration court never acquired
jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court
involving the Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 43 as follows:
"The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable
properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public
domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private
applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of
petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the
State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the
Statute of Limitations."
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override
concerns over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles, 44 which involved the registration of public
lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res
judicata and estoppel to silence the Republic's claim over public lands. The
Court said:
"It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not
apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental
rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or
public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application would
involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality."
The Court further held that "the right of reversion or reconveyance to the
State of the public properties registered and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe."
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
32
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of
certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social
Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which
petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their
forefathers had occupied, developed and tilled belong to the Government,
they filed a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to
take steps for the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for
development under the DENR's ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430
hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the
DENR's Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26,
1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION
(IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS
EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN,
VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY
OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON
C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the
operation of Executive Order No. 33, which established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of land of the public domain embraced
therein situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San
Joseph and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place
the same under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules
and regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as
follows:
"A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in
the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at point "1" on plan,
being identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (9,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as
amended, not otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall remain in force
and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF; I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal
of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines"
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through
the Regional Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued sometime
between the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona
fide residents of the barangays mentioned in the proclamation as qualified
recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were intervenors. The
certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the
DENR to actual occupants of parcels of land under its ISF programs for a
period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25)
years. 45 The DENR awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in
Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on the
Inventory of Forest Occupants the DENR had conducted. 46
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the
pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Opposition in Intervention before the land registration court to assert
their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that
the land registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30,
1991 confirming petitioners' imperfect title. Intervenors' counsel received a
copy of the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for
new trial before the land registration court. According to intervenors, the land
registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order
issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land
registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor
General in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus
constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals
which allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 47 provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or, an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-
33
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original
parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial
court," as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has
recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago
vs. Court of Appeals 48 reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when the
case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
"It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the
movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been
concluded . . . and on appeal . . . the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already
submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly
late, beyond the period prescribed under . . . Section 2, Rule 12 of the rules
of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is
simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make
the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The
purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created
not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving
to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end."
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of
intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the
validity of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly
possessed inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In fact,
intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that
the Lot in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot
fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide the
rival groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has
already claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival
camps of the petitioners on one side and those of the DENR awardees on
the other. It also spawned a number of criminal cases between the two rival
groups including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application of
the rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated January 30,
1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A,
LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, [October 4, 2002], 439
PHIL 149-191)

[G.R. No. 132963. September 10, 1998.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National
Secondary Technical School), petitioner, vs. NICANOR
DOLDOL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Amado Y. Mabulay for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pantacan, Municipality of
Opol, Misamis Oriental in 1959. He filed an application for saltwork purposes
for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development on October 23,
1963, but it was rejected on April 1, 1968. However, in 1965, the Provincial
Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving lot 4932, Cad-237
Opol Cadastre which included the area occupied by Doldol as a school site.
Accordingly, in 1970, the Opol High School, now called as Opol National
Secondary Technical School, transferred to the said area. And on November
2, 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving
the said area for the said school. The school, then, made several demands to
Doldol to vacate the portion occupied by him but he refused to do so. As a
consequence, an accion possessoria was filed by the school against him,
and the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro ruled in the school's favor
and ordered him to vacate the land. cdasia
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court a quo.
Hence, this petition.
The petition is meritorious.
The original Section 48 (b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 16, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. AaIDCS
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had
been occupying the portion reserved for the school site only since 1959. The
law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public
domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired
through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
34
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the
disputed lot since his occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later
than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set by law,
Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to
segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert
a right superior to the school. In sum, Opol National School has the better
right of possession over the land in dispute. aHESCT
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1073 IS
NOW THE PREVAILING LAW. The original Section 48 (b) of C.A. No.
141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided
for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977.
2. ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT GRANT OF PUBLIC DOMAIN; REQUISITES.
We stated that Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that
the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When
the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSION; MUST BE FROM JUNE 12, 1945 OR
EARLIER. The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of
lands of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the
same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. DHITSc
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 27, 1997, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
dismissing herein petitioner's complaint, as well as its resolution of March 5,
1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. prcd
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in
Barrio Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23,
1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area with the
Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of Forestry, however, rejected
the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of Misamis
Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol
Cadastre as a school site. This reserved lot unfortunately included the area
occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the
site in 1970. Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then President
Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including
the portion in dispute, for the Opol High School, now renamed the Opol
National Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol National School).
Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the school
made several demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to
move.
In view of Doldol's refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a
complaint for accion possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro. The trial court ruled in the school's favor and ordered Doldol to vacate
the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he occupied, he
having possessed the same for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of
the filing of the complaint in 1991.
Opol National School's motion for reconsideration of said decision having
been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of March 5, 1998, Opol
National School elevated its case to this Court, claiming that the Court of
Appeals erred on a question of law when it held, contrary to the evidence on
record, that respondent had been in open, continuous, notorious and
exclusive possession of the land in dispute for thirty-two years. Cdpr
The petition is meritorious.
In ruling in Doldol's favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision
on Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (otherwise known as the Public
Land Act). Said provision, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, provides
ac follows:
"Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certification of title therefor
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis
ours)
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred that a
citizen of the Philippines may acquire alienable land of the public domain if
he has possessed the same for thirty years. Finding Doldol to have occupied
the disputed lot for thirty-two years, it ruled that the former had acquired
35
ownership of the same, thereby negating Opol National School's claim over
the questioned area.
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs.
CA 1 where this Court, citing Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200
SCRA 606 (1991) declared that: cdasia
"The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private properly."
xxx xxx xxx
. . . with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years
since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land
has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land.
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases
to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced
by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent. cdtai
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the parties
had a better right to possess the lot through the erroneous application of an
outdated version of Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Likewise, Solicitor
Renan E. Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor General erred in assuming that
the thirty-year proviso in the aforementioned section was still good law. The
original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942, 2 which provided for a simple thirty year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As
amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
(Emphasis ours)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land
Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public
land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right
to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. LLphil
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and
disposable, in accordance with the District Forester's Certification dated
September 20, 1978, that the subject area is within Project 8, an alienable
and disposable tract of public land, as appearing in Bureau of Forest Land
Classification Map No. 585. Doldol, thus, meets the first requirement.
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had
been occupying the portion reserved for the school site only since 1959. The
law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public
domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired
through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the
disputed lot since his occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later
than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set by law,
Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to
segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert
a right superior to the school, given that then President Corazon Aquino had
reserved the lot for Opol National School. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General: LibLex
"(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers
no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the
President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to
reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title
thereof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler.
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful
settlement on them can be acquired." 3
In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land
in dispute.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 27, 1997, and Resolution dated March 27, 1998, are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
dated August 25, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.
||| (Republic v. Doldol, G.R. No. 132963, [September 10, 1998], 356 PHIL
671-678)
36
[G.R. No. 157466. June 21, 2007.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHERYL
B. BIBONIA and JOSELITO G. MANAHAN, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeking to
reverse the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2003 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 54874 affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte dated September 17, 1996
in Land Registration Case No. N-775 (LRA Record No. N-61762).
The facts are:
On September 1, 1994, Cheryl B. Bibonia, respondent, and Ricardo L.
Fernandez, substituted by Joselito G. Manahan, also a respondent, filed with
the RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte, an application for registration of
two parcels of land, docketed as LRA Record No. N-61762.
Respondent Bibonia's application covers Lot 1, while that of respondent
Manahan covers Lot 2. Both lots, included in Plan Psu-05-006012, are
located in Vinzons, Camarines Norte.
Respondent Bibonia alleged in her application that she bought Lot 1 from
Marita King as shown by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 29,
1992. Marita, in turn, received the property from her father, Mariano Morales,
by virtue of a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos dated November 23, 1987.
Morales, on the other hand, purchased the same lot from Sisenando Barco
who, in turn, bought it from Restituto Paraon on September 10,
1955. cAISTC
For his part, Ricardo L. Fernandez, substituted by respondent Manahan,
alleged in the same application that he bought Lot 2 on September 29, 1992
from Remedios Cribe. It was donated to the latter by her father, Mariano
Morales, on December 18, 1987, who purchased the same lot from Basilia
Barco and the heirs of Liberato Salome on July 31, 1968.
In the course of the proceedings, or on August 3, 1995, the trial court ordered
the substitution of Fernandez by respondent Manahan, the former having
transferred his rights and interest over Lot 2 in favor of the latter by virtue of a
Deed of Assignment dated May 25, 1995.
In its Decision, 3 dated September 17, 1996, the trial court granted
respondents' application for registration, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the applicants, Cheryl B. Bibonia, of legal age, single,
Filipino [C]itizen, with address at 84 Esteban Abada cor. Gonzales Street,
Loyola Heights, Quezon City, and Joselito G. Manahan, of legal age, single,
Filipino citizen with address at 2501 CM Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila to have
registrable titles over Lot 1 and Lot 2, respectively, of Plan PSU-05-006012
with their corresponding technical descriptions, judgment is hereby rendered
confirming their respective titles thereto and ordering the registration thereof
in their respective names.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal by the Republic of the Philippines, herein petitioner, the Court of
Appeals, in a Decision 4 dated February 28, 2003, affirmed in toto the trial
court's judgment.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner Republic contends, among others, that the Court of Appeals erred
when it departed from settled jurisprudence by ruling that respondents have
occupied the lots for thirty (30) years; and that they could not have
maintained abona fide claim of ownership because at the time of the filing of
their application on September 1, 1994, the lots had been alienable for only
eight (8) years, per Certification from the Community and Environment
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
For their part, respondents maintain that the petition should be denied for
lack of merit.
In sum, the issues presented before us are: (a) whether respondents were
able to prove that the lots subject of their application were then disposable
and alienable land of the public domain; and (b) whether they were able to
show that they have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession of the lots in the concept of owners. aACHDS
Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Accordingly, applicants for registration of land must prove: (a) that it forms
part of the alienable lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been
in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of
the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial
or since June 12, 1945. 5
Relative to the first requisite, it is undisputed that the subject lots have been
declared as alienable and disposable by a positive government act. The
37
evidence on record shows that a Certification 6 was issued by the CENRO,
DENR to the effect that the lots are "within Camarines Norte Project No. 4-
E, alienable and disposable area, certified as such on January 17, 1986."
Petitioner Republic argues, however, that since the lots were declared
alienable only on January 17, 1986, respondents could not have occupied
and possessed the same in the concept of owners since June 12, 1945.
We disagree.
Adopting petitioner's view would lead to an absurd situation wherein all lands
of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before
June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,
notwithstanding the occupant's length of unchallenged possession. This
could not have been the intent of the law since it is anathema to the State's
policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands
to spur economic growth.AScTaD
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 7 a case with similar factual antecedents, we
held:
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If
the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already
been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then
there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property. (Emphasis ours)
Here, when respondents filed their application in 1994, the lots were already
declared alienable and disposable by the DENR 49 years ago, or in 1945.
As to the second requisite, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found
that respondents were able to prove, through testimonial and documentary
evidence, that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession of the lots for the period
required by law. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual. It is basic
that matters of proof and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to
review except in some meritorious circumstances. We find one such
circumstance in this case.
In granting respondents' application for registration, the trial court concluded:
The foregoing facts contain all the essential requirements for the acquisition
and confirmation of an imperfect title to an agricultural land in favor of the
applicants whose possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest
is more than thirty (30) years, hence sufficient to confer a registrable title to
the applicants.
However, the trial court overlooked the fact that the required thirty-year
period of occupation by an applicant for registration has already been
amended by P.D. No. 1073, 8 that took effect on January 25, 1977. Thus,
instead of the thirty-year requirement, applicants, by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest, must prove that they have been in open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Unfortunately, evidence on record shows that their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the disputed
property only since 1955. On this point, the Court of Appeals held: TEcAHI
In the present case, applicants-appellees' predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive possession of the disputed land as early
as 1955 (Commissioner's Report, p. 2; Record, p. 123), thus, they only
stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof,
acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what would otherwise be
deemed as an imperfect title. 9
Although respondents' possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest
was more than 39 years when they filed their application for registration in
1994, that period of possession will not suffice for purposes of registration of
title. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 10 Much as we want
to conform to the State's policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution
of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the
ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the law's stringent safeguards
against registering imperfect titles. 11
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54874 affirming in toto the
Decision dated September 17, 1996 of the RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines
Norte in Land Registration Case No. N-775 (LRA Record No. N-61762) is
REVERSED. Respondents' application for registration of title is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Bibonia, G.R. No. 157466, [June 21, 2007], 552 PHIL 345-
354)
[G.R. No. 177797. December 4, 2008.]
38
SPS. PEDRO TAN and NENA ACERO TAN, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision 1 dated 28 February 2006 and Resolution 2 dated 12 April 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71534. In its assailed Decision, the
appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated 9 May 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial Region,
Branch 39, Cagayan de Oro City, in LRC Case No. N-2000-055, and ordered
herein petitioners, spouses Pedro and Nena Tan (spouses Tan), to return the
parcel of land known as Lot 1794, Ap-10-002707, Pls-923, with an area of
215,698 square meters, located in Calingagan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental
(subject property) to herein respondent, Republic of the Philippines
(Republic). In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied the spouses
Tan's Motion for Reconsideration. aEcHCD
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
The spouses Tan were natural-born Filipino citizens, who became Australian
citizens on 9 February 1984. 4 They seek to have the subject property
registered in their names.
The subject property was declared alienable and disposable on 31
December 1925, as established by a Certification 5 dated 14 August 2000
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cagayan
de Oro City.
Prior to the spouses Tan, the subject property was in the possession of Lucio
and Juanito Neri and their respective spouses. Lucio and Juanito Neri had
declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their names under Tax
Declarations No. 8035 (1952), 6 No. 1524 7 and No. 1523 (1955). 8
The spouses Tan acquired the subject property from Lucio and Juanito Neri
and their spouses by virtue of a duly notarized Deed of Sale of Unregistered
Real Estate Property 9 dated 26 June 1970. The spouses Tan took
immediate possession of the subject property on which they planted rubber,
gemelina, and other fruit-bearing trees. They declared the subject property
for taxation purposes in their names, as evidenced by Tax Declarations No.
5012 10 (1971); No. 11155, 11 No. 10599, 12 No. 10598 13 (1974); No.
11704 14 (1976); No. 01224 15 (1980); No. 06316 16 (1983); and No.
943000 17 (2000); and paid realty taxes thereon.
However, a certain Patermateo Casio (Casio) claimed a portion of the
subject property, prompting the spouses Tan to file a Complaint for Quieting
of Title against him before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-204. On 29 August 1989, the
RTC rendered a Decision 18 in Civil Case No. 88-204 favoring the spouses
Tan and declaring their title to the subject property thus "quieted". Casio
appealed the said RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 26225. In a Resolution 19 dated 15 November
1990, the appellate court dismissed CA-G.R. CV No. 26225 for lack of
interest to prosecute. Casio elevated his case to this Court via a Petition for
Review on Certiorari, docketed as UDK-10332. In a Resolution 20 dated 13
March 1991 in UDK-10332, the Court denied Casio's Petition for being
insufficient in form and substance. The said Resolution became final and
executory on 3 June 1991. 21
Refusing to give up, Casio filed an Application for Free Patent on the
subject property before the Bureau of Lands. 22 On 8 December 1999,
Casio's application was ordered cancelled 23 by Officer Ruth G. Sabijon of
DENR-CENRO, Cagayan de Oro City, upon the request of herein petitioner
Pedro Tan, the declared owner of the subject property pursuant to the 29
August 1989 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 88-204. Similarly, survey
plan Csd-10-002779 prepared in the name of Casio was also ordered
cancelled 24 by the Office of the Regional Executive Director, DENR, Region
X, Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City. IcTaAH
In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title 25 to
the subject property before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 39,
where it was docketed as LRC Case No. N-2000-055. The application of the
spouses Tan invoked the provisions of Act No. 496 26 and/or Section 48
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, 27 as amended. In compliance with the
request 28 of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) dated 29 August 2000,
the spouses Tan filed on 5 October 2000 an Amended Application for
Registration of Title 29 to the subject property.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in LRC
Case No. N-2000-055 on behalf of the Republic, but failed to submit a written
opposition to the application of the spouses Tan.
When no opposition to the application of the spouses Tan was filed by the
time of the initial hearing of LRC Case No. N-2000-055, the RTC issued on
23 April 2001 an order of general default, except as against the Republic.
Thereafter, the spouses Tan were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.
After the establishment of the jurisdictional facts, the RTC heard the
testimony of John B. Acero (Acero), nephew and lone witness of the spouses
Tan. Acero recounted the facts already presented above and affirmed that the
spouses Tan's possession of the subject property had been open, public,
adverse and continuous. 30
After Acero's testimony, the spouses Tan already made a formal offer of
evidence, which was admitted by the court a quo. 31
On 9 May 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision in LRC Case No. N-2000-055
granting the application of the spouses Tan, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
39
WHEREFORE, [Spouses Tan] having conclusively established to the
satisfaction of this Court their ownership of the [subject property], Lot 1794,
Pls-923, situated in Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, should be as it is hereby
adjudicated to the [Spouses Tan] with address at #166 Capistrano Street,
Cagayan de Oro City.
Once this judgment becomes final, let the Order for the issuance of decree
and corresponding Certificate of Title issue in accordance with Presidential
Decree No. 1529, as amended. 32
In its appeal of the afore-mentioned RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 71534, the Republic made the following
assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in ruling that [herein petitioners Spouses Tan] and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and notorious
possession of subject property for the period required by law. aSHAIC
II. The trial court erred in granting the application for land registration despite
the fact that there is a disparity between the area as stated in [the Spouses
Tan's] application and the tax declarations of Juanito Neri, Lucio Neri, and
[herein petitioner Pedro Tan].
III. The trial court erred in granting the application for land registration despite
the fact that [the Spouses Tan] failed to present the original tracing cloth plan.
IV. The trial court erred in relying on the Decision dated [29 August 1989] by
the RTC-Branch 24, Cagayan de Oro City which declared [the Spouses
Tan's] "title" on the subject [property] "quieted."
V. The trial court erred in not finding that [the Spouses Tan] failed to
overcome the presumption that all lands form part of the public domain. 33
On 28 February 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71534 granting the appeal of the Republic, and reversing and setting
aside the 9 May 2001 Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses
Tan failed to comply with Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1073, which requires possession of the subject property to start on or
prior to 12 June 1945. 34 Hence, the appellate court ordered the spouses
Tan to return the subject property to the Republic.
The spouses Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision
of the Court of Appeals. To refute the finding of the appellate court that they
and their predecessors-in-interest did not possess the subject property by 12
June 1945 or earlier, the spouses Tan attached to their Motion a copy of Tax
Declaration No. 4627 covering the subject property issued in 1948 in the
name of their predecessor-in-interest, Lucio Neri. They called attention to the
statement in Tax Declaration No. 4627 that it cancelled Tax Declaration No.
2948. Unfortunately, no copy of Tax Declaration No. 2948 was available even
in the Office of the Archive of the Province of Misamis Oriental. The spouses
Tan asserted that judicial notice may be taken of the fact that land
assessment is revised by the government every four years; and since Tax
Declaration No. 4627 was issued in the year 1948, it can be presupposed
that Tax Declaration No. 2948 was issued in the year 1944. cDTCIA
The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the spouses
Tan in a Resolution dated 12 April 2007.
The spouses Tan now come before this Court raising the sole issue
of whether or not [the Spouses Tan] have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject [property],
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since [12 June 1945], or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title. 35
The Court rules in the negative and, thus, finds the present Petition devoid of
merit.
To recall, the spouses Tan filed before the RTC their Application for
Registration of Title to the subject property in the year 2000 generally
invoking the provisions of Act No. 496 and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended.
The Public Land Act, 36 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, 37 governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral
lands, friar lands, and privately owned lands which reverted to the State. 38 It
explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed of,
to wit:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization.
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). 39
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters
of the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and
application procedure for every mode. 40 Since the spouses Tan filed their
application before the RTC, then it can be reasonably inferred that they are
seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or
incomplete title over the subject property. ADCEaH
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land,
not exceeding 144 hectares, may be availed of by persons identified under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, 41 which reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
40
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable
to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, spouses Tan may only
be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
The Court notes that Presidential Decree No. 1073, amending the Public
Land Act, clarified Section 48, paragraph "b" thereof, by specifically declaring
that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Thus, based on the said provision of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, the two requisites which the applicants must comply with for the
grant of their Application for Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for
is alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-
interest have occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely since 12 June 1945. 42 HTScEI
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order or
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation
of imperfect title do not apply. 43
In the case at bar, the spouses Tan presented a Certification from the DENR-
CENRO, Cagayan de Oro City, dated 14 August 2000, to prove the
alienability and disposability of the subject property. The said Certification
stated that the subject property became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1925. A certification from the DENR that a lot is alienable and
disposable is sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the
property and enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence. 44 Considering that no evidence was presented to
disprove the contents of the aforesaid DENR-CENRO Certification, this Court
is duty-bound to uphold the same.
Nonetheless, even when the spouses Tan were able to sufficiently prove that
the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain as early as 31 December 1925, they still failed to satisfactorily
establish compliance with the second requisite for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title, i.e., open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier.
Through the years, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act has been amended
several times. Republic v. Doldol 45 provides a summary of these
amendments:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive periodof occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended
by Presidential Decree 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended,
Section 48(b) now reads: ACTESI
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, presently
requires, for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title, the
possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicants, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree heretofore cited. (Emphasis ours.)
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty years
or more is not sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and
occupation had started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. 46
It is worth mentioning that in this case, even the spouses Tan do not dispute
that the true reckoning period for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title is on or before 12 June 1945. They also admit that based on
the previous evidence on record, their possession and occupation of the
subject property fall short of the period prescribed by law. The earliest
evidence of possession and occupation of the subject property can be traced
back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest
only in 1952. However, the spouses Tan are now asking the kind indulgence
of this Court to take into account Tax Declaration No. 4627 issued in 1948,
which they had attached to their Motion for Reconsideration before the Court
41
of Appeals but which the appellate court refused to consider. Just as they had
argued before the Court of Appeals, the spouses Tan point out that Tax
Declaration No. 4627 was not newly issued but cancelled Tax Declaration
No. 2948; and should the Court take judicial notice of the fact that tax
assessments are revised every four years, then Tax Declaration No. 2948
covering the subject property was issued as early as 1944. ECTIcS
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified.
On the basis thereof, it is clear that evidence should have been presented
during trial before the RTC; evidence not formally offered should not be
considered. In this case, it bears stressing that Tax Declaration No. 4627 was
only submitted by the Spouses Tan together with their Motion for
Reconsideration of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
The reason given by the Spouses Tan why they belatedly procured such
evidence was because at the time of trial the only evidence available at hand
was the 1952 tax declaration. More so, they also believed in good faith that
they had met the 30-year period required by law. They failed to realize that
under Section 48 (b) ofCommonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, a mere
showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient because what
the law requires is possession and occupation on or before 12 June 1945.
This Court, however, finds the reason given by the spouses Tan
unsatisfactory. The spouses Tan filed their application for registration of title
to the subject property under the provisions of Section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. It is incumbent upon them as
applicants to carefully know the requirements of the said law.
Thus, following the rule enunciated in Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, this Court cannot take into consideration Tax Declaration No. 4627 as
it was only submitted by the Spouses Tan when they filed their Motion for
Reconsideration of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the appellate court.
And even if this Court, in the interest of substantial justice, fairness and
equity, admits and take into consideration Tax Declaration No. 4627, issued
in 1948, it would still be insufficient to establish open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property by the
Spouses Tan and their predecessors-in-interest since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. ADHcTETax Declaration No. 4627 was only issued in 1948, three
years after 12 June 1945, the cut-off date under the law for acquiring
imperfect or incomplete title to public land. For the Court to conclude from the
face of Tax Declaration No. 4627 alone that the subject property had been
declared for tax purposes before 12 June 1945 would already be too much of
a stretch and would require it to rely on mere presuppositions and
conjectures. The Court cannot simply take judicial notice that the government
revises tax assessments every four years. Section 129 of the Revised Rules
of Evidence provides particular rules on which matters are subject to judicial
notice and when it is mandatory 47 or discretionary 48 upon the courts or
when a hearing is necessary. 49 It is unclear under which context this Court
must take judicial notice of the supposed four-year revision of tax
assessments on real properties. Moreover, the power to impose realty taxes,
pursuant to which the assessment of real property is made, has long been
devolved to the local government units (LGU) having jurisdiction over the
said property. Hence, the rules pertaining to the same may vary from one
LGU to another; and regular revision of the tax assessments of real property
every four years may not be true for all LGUs, as the spouses Tan would
have this Court believe. Given the foregoing, Tax Declaration No. 4627 is far
from the clear, positive, and convincing evidence required 50 to establish
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject property by the Spouses Tan and their predecessors-in-interest since
12 June 1945 or earlier.
In addition, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proofs of ownership of
the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual,
public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership. 51 They may be good supporting or
collaborating evidence together with other acts of possession and ownership;
but by themselves, tax declarations are inadequate to establish possession
of the property in the nature and for the period required by statute for
acquiring imperfect or incomplete title to the land.
As a final observation, the spouses Tan purchased the subject property and
came into possession of the same only in 1970. To justify their application for
registration of title, they had to tack their possession of the subject property
to that of their predecessors-in-interest. While the spouses Tan undoubtedly
possessed and occupied the subject property openly, continuously,
exclusively and notoriously, by immediately introducing improvements on the
said property, in addition to declaring the same and paying realty tax thereon;
in contrast, there was a dearth of evidence that their predecessors-in-interest
possessed and occupied the subject property in the same manner. The
possession and occupation of the subject property by the predecessors-in-
interest of the spouses Tan were evidenced only by the tax declarations in
the names of the former, the earliest of which, Tax Declaration No. 4627,
having been issued only in 1948. No other evidence was presented by the
spouses Tan to show specific acts of ownership exercised by their
predecessors-in-interest over the subject property which may date back to 12
June 1945 or earlier.TCADEc
For failure of the Spouses Tan to satisfy the requirements prescribed by
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, this Court has no other
option but to deny their application for judicial confirmation and registration of
their title to the subject property. Much as this Court wants to conform to the
42
State's policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable
public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social
justice, our hands are tied by the law's stringent safeguards against
registering imperfect titles. 52
The Court emphasizes, however, that our ruling herein is without prejudice to
the spouses Tan availing themselves of the other modes for acquiring title to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for which they may be
qualified under the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated 28 February 2006 and Resolution dated 12 April 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71534 are hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
||| (Spouses Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 177797, [December 4, 2008], 593
PHIL 493-508)
[G.R. No. 146527. January 31, 2005.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MANNA PROPERTIES,
INC., Represented by its President, JOSE TANYAO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Chavez, Miranda, Aseoche Law Office for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529,
SECTION 23 THEREOF; DUTY AND POWER TO SET THE HEARING
DATE LIES WITH THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT. The pertinent
portion of Section 23 of PD 1529reads: Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing,
publication etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which
shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the
date of the order. . . . . The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies
with the land registration court. After an applicant has filed his application, the
law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The
notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is
signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to
the LRA. This involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has
no participation.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LAND
REGISTRATION CASES MUST BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH; AN
APPLICANT SHOULD NOT BE PUNISHED FOR ACT OR OMISSION OVER
WHICH HE HAS NEITHER RESPONSIBILITY NOR CONTROL,
ESPECIALLY IF HE HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE LAW. Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the
applicant must strictly comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In this
case, the applicant complied with the jurisdictional requirements. The facts
reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date was set
beyond the 90-day maximum period. The records show that the Docket
Division of the LRA repeatedly requested the trial court to reset the initial
hearing date because of printing problems with the National Printing Office,
which could affect the timely publication of the notice of hearing in the Official
Gazette. Indeed, nothing in the records indicates that Manna Properties
failed to perform the acts required of it by law. We have held that "a party to
an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as
a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such
official in the performance of his duties". A party cannot intervene in matters
within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such
party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to
punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has
neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with
all the requirements of the law.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT COMPLIED WITH
WHERE THE NOTICE OF HEARING WAS PUBLISHED BOTH IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE AND A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
WELL AHEAD OF THE DATE OF HEARING. Petitioner limited itself to
assailing the lapse of time between the issuance of the order setting the date
of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself. Petitioner does not
raise any other issue with respect to the sufficiency of the application.
Petitioner does not also question the sufficiency of the publication of the
required notice of hearing. Consequently, petitioner does not dispute the real
jurisdictional issue involved in land registration cases compliance with the
publication requirement under PD 1529. As the records show, the notice of
hearing was published both in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation well ahead of the date of hearing. This complies with the
legal requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the
registration proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT; SECTION 48 THEREOF; OPEN,
EXCLUSIVE AND UNDISPUTED POSSESSION OF ALIENABLE PUBLIC
LAND FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW IPSO JURE CONVERTS
SUCH LAND INTO PRIVATE LAND. Lands that fall under Section 48
of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the public domain by virtue of
acquisitive prescription. We have held that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed byCA 141 ipso
jure converts such land into private land. Judicial confirmation in such cases
43
is only a formality that merely confirms the earlier conversion of the land into
private land, the conversion having occurred in law from the moment the
required period of possession became complete.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RECKONING POINT. Under CA 141, the reckoning
point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-interest of Manna Properties
have been in possession of the land in question since this date, or earlier,
Manna Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land.
Following our ruling in Director of Lands v. IAC, Manna Properties, a private
corporation, may apply for judicial confirmation of the land without need of a
separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-interest first. We
rule, however, that the land in question has not become private land and
remains part of the public domain.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICANT FOR CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLE HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT HE IS QUALIFIED TO HAVE
THE LAND TITLED IN HIS NAME. Under the Regalian doctrine, the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. This is premised on
the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Any applicant for
confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified
to have the land titled in his name. Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise
to a right that is only subject to formal recognition, it is still incumbent upon
any claimant to first prove open, continuous and adverse possession for the
requisite period of time. It is only when the applicant complies with this
condition that he may invoke the rights given by CA 141. TAIaHE
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHILE A TAX DECLARATION BY ITSELF IS
NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE OWNERSHIP, IT MAY SERVE AS
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR INFERRING POSSESSION; CASE AT BAR.
The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of
possession consists of the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest,
Manuel Sobrepea ("Manuel"), transferee's affidavits, and several tax
declarations covering the land in question. We have ruled that while a tax
declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as
sufficient basis for inferring possession. However, the tax declarations
presented by Manna Properties do not serve to prove their cause. Although
Manna Properties claimed during trial that they were presenting the tax
declaration proving possession since 12 June 1945, a scrutiny of the tax
declaration reveals that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed
it to be. Exhibit Q-16 was in fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued
on 28 November 1950. The annotation at the back of this tax declaration
indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax declaration covering the
land in question. A substitute is not enough. The 1945 tax declaration must
be presented considering that the date, 12 June 1945, is material to this
case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. A tax
declaration simply stating that it replaces a previous tax declaration issued in
1945 does not meet this standard. It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax
declaration was issued on, before or after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are
issued any time of the year. A tax declaration issued in 1945 may have been
issued in December 1945. Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is
stated, compliance with the reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRED LENGTH OF POSSESSION NOT
PROVED IN CASE AT BAR. Other than the mentioned pieces of
evidence, Manna Properties did not present sufficient proof that its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and adverse
possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945. At best, Manna
Properties can only prove possession since 1952. Manna Properties relied
on shaky secondary evidence like the testimony of Manuel and substitute tax
declarations. We have previously cautioned against the reliance on such
secondary evidence in cases involving the confirmation of an imperfect title
over public land. Manna Properties' evidence hardly constitutes the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse
occupation under CA 141.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEALS; PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI; LIMITED TO THE REVIEW AND REVISION OF
ERRORS OF LAW; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE
COURTS ARE BINDING ABSENT ANY OF THE ESTABLISHED GROUNDS
FOR EXCEPTION. The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the review and revision of errors of law.
This Court is not bound to analyze and weigh evidence already considered in
prior proceedings. Absent any of the established grounds for exception, this
Court is bound by the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts. The
issue of whether Manna Properties has presented sufficient proof of the
required possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership, raises a question
of fact. It invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record. Petitioner invites us
to re-evaluate the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial
and appellate courts. Generally, Rule 45 does not allow this. Matters of proof
and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review under a Rule 45
petition, except in the presence of some meritorious circumstances. We find
one such circumstance in this case. The evidence on record does not
support the conclusions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for review 1 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals'
Decision 2 dated 20 December 2000. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union
("trial court") dated 21 February 1996 in Land Registration Case No. N-2352
("LRC No. N-2352") approving the application of respondent Manna
44
Properties, Inc. ("Manna Properties") for the registration in its name of a
parcel of land located in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union.
Antecedent Facts
As culled by the Court of Appeals from the evidence, the facts of the case are
as follows:
On September 29, 1994, applicant-appellee filed an Application for the
registration of title of two (2) parcels of land, specifically:
a) Lot No. 9515, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434; and
b) Lot No. 1006, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434, located in Barangay
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union measuring around 1,480 square
meters.
Initial hearing was set on February 16, 1995 by the court a quo.
Copies of the application, postal money orders for publication purposes and
record were forwarded to the Land Registration Authority by the Court a
quo on October 7, 1994. TCHcAE
However, per Report dated November 21, 1994 of the Land Registration
Authority, the full names and complete postal addresses of all adjoining lot
owners were not stated for notification purposes. As a result thereto, per
Order dated December 5, 1994, the applicant was directed to submit the
names and complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners of Lots 9514
and 9516. On December 14, 1994, the applicant filed its compliance, which
was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority on December 22, 1994
together with the notice of the Initial Hearing, which was reset to April 13,
1995.
On January 31, 1995, the Land Registration Authority requested for the
resetting of the initial hearing since April 13, 1995 fell on Holy Thursday, a
non-working day to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353 or ninety
(90) days from date of the Order to allow reasonable time for possible mail
delays and to enable them to cause the timely publication of the notice in the
Official Gazette.
The initial hearing was, accordingly, reset to April 20, 1995 by the court a
quo.
On March 14, 1995, the court a quo received a letter dated March 6, 1995
from the LRA with the information that the notice can no longer be published
in the Official Gazette for lack of material time since the National Printing
Office required submission of the printing materials 75 days before the date
of the hearing. It was again requested that the initial hearing be moved to a
date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353.
Per Order dated March 15, 1995, the initial hearing was reset to July 18,
1995.
The Opposition to the application stated, among others, that the applicant is
a private corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to
hold alienable lands of public domain. cAEaSC
Per Certificate of Publication issued by the LRA and the National Printing
Office, the Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the June 12, 1995 issue
of the Official Gazette officially released on June 19, 1995. The same notice
was published in the July 12, 1995 issue of the The Ilocos Herald.
Applicant-appellee presented its president Jose [Tanyao], who testified on the
acquisition of the subject property as well as Manuel Sobrepea, co-owner of
the subject property, who testified on the possession of the applicant-
appellee's predecessors-in-interest.
The [documentary] evidence presented were:
1. Plan AS-013314-001434 of Lots No. 9515 and 1006;
2. Technical Description of Lot No. 9515;
3. Technical Description of Lot No. 1006;
4. Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyor's Certificate;
5. Certificate of Latest Assessment;
6. Notice of Initial Hearing;
7. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the LRA;
8. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the National
Printing Office;
9. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the Circulation
Manager of the Ilocos Herald;
10. Clipping of the Notice of Initial Hearing;
11. Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12, 1995;
12. Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12, 1995; DASEac
13. Sheriff's Return of Posting;
14. Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners of the Notice of Initial
Hearing on July 18, 1995.
Thereafter, the court a quo rendered a Decision dated February 21, 1996
granting the application. (sic) 3
The Office of the Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of petitioner Republic
of the Philippines ("petitioner"), promptly appealed the trial court's decision to
the Court of Appeals. On 20 December 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner's appeal.
Hence, this petition.
The Regional Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court found that Manna Properties has substantiated by clear and
competent evidence all its allegations in the application for original land
registration. The Land Registration Authority ("LRA") did not present any
evidence in opposition to the application. The trial court ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby approves the
application, and orders that the parcels of land identified as Lots 9515 and
1006 of Cad. 5[3]9-D San Fernando Cadastre with a total area of One
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters, situated in Barangay
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union and embraced in Plan AS-1331434
(Exh. "A" and the technical description described in Exhibit "B" and "B-1")
45
shall be registered in accordance withPresidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree in the name of the
applicant Manna Properties, Inc., represented by its President Jose [Tanyao],
Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Marry [Tanyao] with residence and
postal address at Jackivi Enterprises, Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union,
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529. 4
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling and dismissed petitioner's
argument that the applicant failed to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529 5 ("PD 1529"). The Court of
Appeals pointed out that the 90-day period for setting the initial hearing under
Section 23 of PD 1529 is merely directory and that it is the publication of the
notice of hearing itself that confers jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals stated
that the records of the case reveal that the testimony of Manuel Sobrepea
was not the sole basis for the trial court's finding that Manna Properties'
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question as
early as 1953. The Court of Appeals added that while tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of ownership, they are "the best indicia" of possession.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION; and
2. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE REQUISITE PERIOD.
The Ruling of the Court
On Whether Manna Properties Failed
to Comply with the Jurisdictional
Requirements for Original Registration
Petitioner contends that PD 1529 sets a 90-day maximum period between
the court order setting the initial hearing date and the hearing itself. Petitioner
points out that in this case, the trial court issued the order setting the date of
the initial hearing on 15 March 1995, but the trial court set the hearing date
itself on 18 July 1995. Considering that there are 125 days in between the
two dates, petitioner argues that the trial court exceeded the 90-day period
set by PD 1529. Thus, petitioner concludes "the applicant [Manna Properties]
failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original
registration." ADECcI
The petitioner is mistaken.
The pertinent portion of Section 23 of PD 1529 reads:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication etc. The court shall, within
five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and
hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later
than ninety days from the date of the order.
xxx xxx xxx
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration
court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the
issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial
hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the
judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA. This
involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no
participation.
Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly
comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the applicant
complied with the jurisdictional requirements.
The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date
was set beyond the 90-day maximum period. The records show that the
Docket Division of the LRA repeatedly requested the trial court to reset the
initial hearing date because of printing problems with the National Printing
Office, which could affect the timely publication of the notice of hearing in the
Official Gazette. Indeed, nothing in the records indicates that Manna
Properties failed to perform the acts required of it by law.
We have held that "a party to an action has no control over the Administrator
or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly
with the business of such official in the performance of his duties." 6 A party
cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No
fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole
power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the
applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has
complied with all the requirements of the law. EHCDSI
Petitioner limited itself to assailing the lapse of time between the issuance of
the order setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing
itself. Petitioner does not raise any other issue with respect to the sufficiency
of the application. Petitioner does not also question the sufficiency of the
publication of the required notice of hearing. Consequently, petitioner does
not dispute the real jurisdictional issue involved in land registration cases
compliance with the publication requirement under PD 1529. As the records
show, the notice of hearing was published both in the Official Gazette and a
newspaper of general circulation well ahead of the date of hearing. This
complies with the legal requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient
notice of the registration proceedings.
On Whether Manna Properties Sufficiently
Established Possession of the Land
For the Period Required by Law
Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to prove its possession of
the land for the period of time required by law. Petitioner alleges that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals based their findings solely on their evaluation
of the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties.
46
The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is limited to the review and revision of errors of law. 7 This Court
is not bound to analyze and weigh evidence already considered in prior
proceedings. Absent any of the established grounds for exception, this Court
is bound by the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.
The issue of whether Manna Properties has presented sufficient proof of the
required possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership, raises a question
of fact. 8 It invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record. Petitioner invites
us to re-evaluate the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial
and appellate courts. Generally, Rule 45 does not allow this. Matters of proof
and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review under a Rule 45
petition, except in the presence of some meritorious circumstances. 9 We
find one such circumstance in this case. The evidence on record does not
support the conclusions of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. aAHISE
Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of Manna Properties
that, as a private corporation, Manna Properties is disqualified from holding
alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease. Petitioner cites the
constitutional prohibition in Section 3 of Article XII in the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part of the public
domain.
On the other hand, Manna Properties claims that it has established that the
land in question has been in the open and exclusive possession of its
predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s. Thus, the land was already private
land when Manna Properties acquired it from its predecessors-in-interest.
The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141") otherwise
known as the "Public Land Act." Section 48(b) of the said law, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(Emphasis supplied)
Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from
the public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. We have held that
open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land into private
land. 10 Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely
confirms the earlier conversion of the land into private land, the conversion
having occurred in law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. 11
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-
interest of Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in question
since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully apply for
confirmation of title to the land. Following our ruling in Director of Lands v.
IAC, 12 Manna Properties, a private corporation, may apply for judicial
confirmation of the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding
for its predecessors-in-interest first. DASCIc
We rule, however, that the land in question has not become private land and
remains part of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. 13 Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears
the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the land titled in his
name. 14 Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a right that is only
subject to formal recognition, it is still incumbent upon any claimant to first
prove open, continuous and adverse possession for the requisite period of
time. 15 It is only when the applicant complies with this condition that he may
invoke the rights given by CA 141.
The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of
possession consists of the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest,
Manuel Sobrepea ("Manuel"), 16 transferee's affidavits, and several tax
declarations covering the land in question.
We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove
ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring
possession. 17 However, the tax declarations presented by Manna
Properties do not serve to prove their cause. Although Manna Properties
claimed during trial that they were presenting the tax declaration proving
possession since 12 June 1945, 18 a scrutiny of the tax declaration reveals
that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed it to be. Exhibit Q-
16 was in fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28 November
1950. The annotation at the back of this tax declaration indicates that it was
issued to replace the 1945 tax declaration covering the land in question. A
substitute is not enough.
The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12
June 1945, is material to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12
June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply stating that it replaces a
previous tax declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this standard. It is
unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on, before or
after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax
declaration issued in 1945 may have been issued in December 1945. Unless
47
the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the
reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established. CTSAaH
There is another reason why the application for registration of Manna
Properties must fail. The tax declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and
marked as Exhibit Q-16 bears several irregularities. A small annotation found
at the bottom of the back page of Exhibit Q-16 states it cancels a previous
tax declaration. Beyond stating that the cancelled tax declaration was issued
in 1945, Exhibit Q-16 does not provide any of the required information that
will enable this Court or any interested party to check whether the original
1945 tax declaration ever existed. 19 The blanks left by Exhibit Q-16 render
any attempt to trace the original tax declaration futile. Moreover, on its face
Exhibit Q-16 lacks any indication that it is only a substitute or reconstituted
tax declaration. The net effect is an attempt to pass off Exhibit Q-16 as the
original tax declaration.
The form used to prepare the tax declaration marked as Exhibit Q-16 states
that it was "FILED UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160." Republic Act No.
7160 is the Local Government Code of 1991.The sworn undertaking by the
Deputy Assessor who allegedly prepared the tax declaration reads,
"Subscribed and sworn before me this 28 (sic) day of Nov. 1950. . ." This
means that the tax declaration was issued more than forty (40) years before
the form used came into existence. Manna Properties gave no explanation
why its tax declaration used a form that did not exist at the time of the alleged
issuance of the tax declaration. The totality of these circumstances leads this
Court to conclude that Exhibit Q-16 was fabricated for the sole purpose of
making it appear that Manna Properties' predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945.
The earliest of the "un-cancelled" tax declarations presented by Manna
Properties is dated 1950. This is clearly insufficient to prove possession of
the land since 12 June 1945. The same can be said of the transferee's
affidavit, which was dated 1955. Manna Properties' reliance on Manuel's
testimony is similarly misplaced. Not only is such evidence insufficient and
self-serving on its own but, Manuel did not also specifically testify that he, or
his parents or predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the land since
12 June 1945 or earlier. The only clear assertion of possession made by
Manuel was that his family used to plant rice on that piece of land. 20
Other than the mentioned pieces of evidence, Manna Properties did not
present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and adverse possession of the land in question since 12 June
1945. At best, Manna Properties can only prove possession since 1952.
Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the testimony of
Manuel and substitute tax declarations. We have previously cautioned
against the reliance on such secondary evidence in cases involving the
confirmation of an imperfect title over public land. 21 Manna Properties'
evidence hardly constitutes the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence
necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation under CA 141. 22
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We REVERSE the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52562.
The Application for Registration filed by Manna Properties, Inc. over Lots No.
9515 and 1006 of Cad. 539-D, with a total area of One Thousand Four
Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan,
San Fernando, La Union, is DENIED. cACTaI
||| (Republic v. Manna Properties Inc., G.R. No. 146527, [January 31, 2005],
490 PHIL 654-670)
[G.R. No. 160421. October 4, 2004.]
SPOUSES PHILIP RECTO and ESTER C. RECTO, represented by their
Attorney-in-fact, GENEROSO R. GENEROSO, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari challenging the January 16, 2003
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65407 which reversed
the September 7, 1998 decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-320. Likewise assailed
is the appellate court's October 17, 2003 resolution 3 denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration. TcDHSI
On February 19, 1997, petitioner spouses Philip Recto and Ester C. Recto,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6, an
application for registration of title over a 23,209 square meter
lot, 4 designated as Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-
010485, situated in Barangay San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas,
Province of Batangas, under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. They also prayed in the
alternative that their petition for registration be granted pursuant
to Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act. 5
48
Petitioners alleged that on June 4, 1996, they purchased Lot 806 from sisters
Rosita Medrana Guevarra and Maria Medrana Torres for the amount of
P6,943,534.40. 6 The two, in turn, inherited the lot from their deceased
parents, Vicente and Eufemia Medrana. Maria, born on October 22, 1917,
declared that since 1945, her father was already the owner of Lot 806. She
became aware of her father's possession of the subject lot in the concept of
owner in 1930 when she was 13 years of age. The possession of the subject
lot by the Medrana family prior to 1945 was corroborated by Rosita, 7 who
testified that in 1935 when she was 13 years of age, she first came to know
that her father was the owner of Lot 806. The sisters added that during the
lifetime of Vicente, he planted rice and corn on the lot with the help of their
tenant. After his demise, they continued to plant the same crops through
hired farmers. 8
Petitioners presented the following documentary evidences
(1) Blue Print Copy of the Plan 9 and Technical Description 10 of Lot 806,
both certified by Land Management Services (formerly the Bureau of Lands),
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);
(2) Tax Declarations 11 of the lot for the years 1948, 1955, 1968, 1974, 1980,
1987, 1989 and 1994 (in the name of Vicente Medrana); 1996 (in the name
of Rosita Guevarra and Maria Torres); and 1998 (in the name of Philip and
Ester Recto).
(3) Certification of Non-Delinquency for the year 1998 from the Municipal
Treasurer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas; 12
(4) Report 13 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) stating,
among others, that
(a) the entire area is within the alienable and disposable zone as classified
under Project No. 30 L.C. Map No. 582 and released and certified as such
on December 31, 1925; (Emphasis, supplied)
(b) the lot is not within a reservation area nor within the forest zone;
(c) the lot is not within a previously issued patent, decree or title.
(d) there is no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant
or any other person;
(e) the land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 021-02166-A in the name of
the predecessor-in-interest and that there is no difference in area;
(f) the lot is agricultural in nature; and
(g) the lot does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed and
river bank protection.
(5) Report from the Land Management Bureau that the land involved is not
covered by any land patent or by land application pending issuance of
patent. 14
(6) Report from the Forest Management Service, DENR that the subject lot
falls within Alienable and Disposable lands, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, per BFD LC Map No. 582 certified on December 31, 1925. 15
(7) Report from the Land Management Sector, DENR that Plan Ap-04-
010485, Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of
San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, is not a
portion of nor identical to any previously approved isolated survey. 16
There being no opposition to the petition from any private individual, an Order
of General Default was issued by the trial court. 17
On September 7, 1998, the court a quo rendered a decision granting the
petition for registration. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General
Default, this Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre on plan Ap-04-010485, situated in San Rafael, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, with an area of 23,209 square meters, in favor of and in the names
of Spouses Philip Recto and Ester C. Recto, Filipino citizens and residents of
1322 Palm Avenue, Dasmarias Village, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final let the corresponding decree of
registration be issued.
SO ORDERED. 18
The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals contending that petitioners failed to (1) offer in evidence the
original tracing cloth plan of the land; (2) prove possession of the lot for the
period required by law; and (3) overthrow the presumption that subject
property forms part of the public domain. 19
On January 16, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court on the sole ground of failure to offer in evidence the original tracing
cloth plan of the land. 20
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying that in view of their
compliance with all the substantive and procedural requirements for
registration, save for the submission of the tracing cloth plan, the case be
remanded to the trial court for the presentation of the said tracing cloth plan.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, interposed no objection to
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 21
On October 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. 22 Hence, the instant petition praying for the remand of the
case before the trial court. ASIDTa
In its Comment, the Solicitor General manifested that in the interest of justice,
he will not oppose the petition. 23
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance [now the Regional Trial Court] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
49
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant
must show that (a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fideclaim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. 24
In the instant case, Rosita and Maria the predecessors-in-interest of
petitioners, categorically testified that they, and prior to them their father, had
been cultivating and possessing Lot 806 in the concept of owners. Maria,
having been born on October 22, 1917, and Rosita on October 29, 1922,
were 13 years of age when they became aware of their family's possession
of Lot 806 in 1930 and 1935, respectively. At 13, they were undoubtedly
capable and competent to perceive their father's possession of Lot 806 in the
concept of owner. Moreover, the trial court found their testimonies to be
worthy of belief and credence. Considering that the judge below is in a better
position to pass judgment on the issue, having personally heard the
witnesses testify and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, her
findings deserve the highest respect. 25
The fact that the earliest Tax Declaration of the subject lot was for the year
1948 will not militate against petitioners. Note that said 1948 Tax Declaration
cancels a previous Tax Declaration (No. 26472), 26 thus substantiating
petitioners' possession of Lot 806 through their predecessor-in-interest even
prior to said date. At any rate, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 27 it was held
that the belated declaration of the lot for tax purposes does not necessarily
mean that possession by the previous owners thereof did not commence in
1945 or earlier. As long as the testimony supporting possession for the
required period is credible, the court will grant the petition for registration.
Pertinent portion of the decision, reads
Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor who testified on the
possession of Marcial Listana for the period required by law. The issue of
credibility is unavailing considering that the judge below is in a better position
to pass judgment on the issue having personally heard the witnesses testify
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Being in a better
position to observe the witnesses, the trial court's appreciation of the witness'
testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [A] person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving
at the time of the occurrence of the fact and (b) he can make his perception
known. True, in 1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was four
years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where the subject lot is located.
As his testimony goes, he and Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he
usually passes by the subject land. The fact that Divinaflor was only a child at
the required inception of possession does not render him incompetent to
testify on the matter. It is well-established that any child regardless of age,
can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving can make
known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully
facts for which he is examined. The requirements of a child's competence as
a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c)
capacity of communication. There is no showing that as a child, claimant did
not possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a witness'
knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained in adulthood. He
may have first acquired knowledge of the fact during childhood, that is, at the
age of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the years, up until he
testified in court in 1990. There is reason to reject petitioner's claim that
Divinaflor is incompetent to testify regarding Listana's possession since it
appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had
occasion to see Listana possessing the land.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the belated declaration of the
property for tax purposes does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
predecessors were not in possession of the land as required by law since
1945. Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the earliest tax declaration
presented took effect only in 1980 while the certificate of tax payment is
dated 1990. While this Court has held in a long line of cases that tax
declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner, it does not necessarily follow that belated declaration of the same for
tax purposes negates the fact of possession, especially in the instant case
where there are no other persons claiming any interest in Lot 10739.
So also, there is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable land of the public
domain having been released and certified as such on December 31, 1925.
As further certified by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of the DENR, the entire area of Lot 806 is an agricultural land; within
an alienable and disposable zone; not within a reservation area nor within a
forest zone; and does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed,
and riverbank protection. 28 Petitioners were thus able to successfully meet
the requisite for original registration of title, to wit: open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of an alienable and
50
disposable land under a bona fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. EIaDHS
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
granting the petition for registration on the ground of petitioners' failure to
submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of Lot 806. Indeed, the
submission of the tracing cloth is a mandatory requirement for
registration. 29 However, it was held that while the best evidence to identify a
piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from
the Bureau of Lands, blue print copies and other evidence could also provide
sufficient identification. 30 In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 31 the Court ruled
that the blueprint copy of the cloth plan together with the lot's technical
description duly certified as to their correctness by the Bureau of Lands (Now
the Land Management Bureau of the DENR) 32 are sufficient to identify the
land applied for registration, thus
On the first challenge, the petitioner invokes the case of Director of Lands
v. Reyes, where it was held that "the original tracing cloth plan of the land
applied for which must be approved by the Director of Lands" was "a
statutory requirement of mandatory character" for the identification of the
land sought to be registered. As what was submitted in the case at bar to
identify the subject property was not the tracing cloth plan but only the
blueprint copy of the survey plan, the respondent court should have rejected
the same as insufficient.
We disagree with this contention. The Court of Appeals was correct when it
observed that in that case the applicant in effect "had not submitted anything
at all to identify the subject property" because the blueprint presented lacked
the approval of the Director of Lands. By contrast
In the present case, there was considerable compliance with the requirement
of the law as the subject property was sufficiently identified with the
presentation of blueprint copy of Plan AS-06-000002 (San Pedro v. Director
of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 65332-R, May 28, 1981). It should be noted in this
connection that the Bureau of Lands has certified to the correctness of the
blueprint copy of the plan including the technical description that go with
it. Hence, we cannot ignore the fact, absent in the Reyes case, that applicant
has provided ample evidence to establish the identity of the subject property.
(Emphasis supplied)
Such a view was affirmed by the Court in Republic of the Philippines
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where we held that while the best evidence
to identify a piece of land for registration purposes was the original tracing
cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, blueprint copies and other evidence
could also provide sufficient identification. This rule was bolstered only
recently in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, where the Court
declared through Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan:
We affirm. No reversible error was committed by the appellate court in ruling
that Exhibit "O," the true certified copy of the white paper plan, was sufficient
for the purpose of identifying the land in question. Exhibit "O" was found by
the appellate court to reflect the land as surveyed by a geodetic engineer. It
bore the approval of the Land Registration Commission, and was re-verified
and approved by the Bureau of Lands on April 25, 1974 pursuant to the
provisions ofP.D. No. 239 withdrawing from the Land Registration
Commission the authority to approve original survey plans. It contained the
following material data: the barrio (poblacion), municipality (Amadeo) and
province (Cavite) where the subject land is located, its area of 379 square
meters, the land as plotted, its technical descriptions and its natural
boundaries. Exhibit "O" was further supported by the Technical Descriptions
signed by a geodetic surveyor and attested by the Land Registration
Commission. In fine, Exhibit "O" contained all the details and information
necessary for a proper and definite identification of the land sought to be
registered, thereby serving the purpose for which the original tracing cloth
plan is required. The fact therefore that the original survey plan was recorded
on white paper instead of a tracing cloth should not detract from the probative
value thereof. . . ..
In the case at bar, Lot 806 was sufficiently identified by the blue print copy of
the plan (Exhibit "R") 33 and the technical description (Exhibit "S") 34 thereof
both approved by Land Management Services, DENR. Also, per report of the
Land Management Sector, Plan Ap-04-010485, Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Rafael, Municipality of Sto.
Tomas, Province of Batangas, is not a portion of, nor identical to any [G.R. No. 157683. February 11, 2005.]
previously approved isolated survey. 35 Petitioners also submitted before the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPS. NAPOLEON &
Court of Appeals a certified true copy 36 of the original tracing cloth plan as EMILIA HUBILLA, respondents.
well as a certification 37 from the Land Registration Authority attesting to the DECISION
fact that the original plan of Plan-Ap-04-010485 in Diazo Polyester film is on PUNO, J p:
file with their office. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Court of Appeals Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
erred in reversing the decision of the trial court solely on the ground that review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67929 dated
petitioners failed to present the original tracing cloth plan. March 21, 2003.
Having met all the requirements for registration of title including the The facts are as follows.
presentation of sufficient evidence to identify the land sought to be On March 5, 1999, respondents filed an application for registration of title for
registered, there is no more need to remand the case before the trial court for Lot No. 6218-B in Subdivision Plan Csd-04-004665-D situated in Alaminos,
the presentation of the tracing cloth plan. Laguna (the Property). 1 Respondents alleged that they have been in open,
WHEREFORE, the January 16, 2003 decision and October 17, 2003 continuous, public, peaceful and notorious possession and occupation of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65407 are REVERSED Property, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, prior to June 12,
and SET ASIDE. The September 7, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial Court 1945. Among others, the respondents presented the following documents to
of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-320, support their application: 1) a blue print copy of the subdivision plan 2 Csd-
ordering the issuance of a decree of registration over Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. 04-004665-D approved by the Director of Lands through Assistant Regional
Tomas Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-010485 in the name of petitioners is Director Ernesto Viquiera; 2) a technical description 3 approved by the Land
REINSTATED. Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
No pronouncement as to costs. Resources (DENR); 3) a certification from the DENR Community
||| (Spouses Recto v. Republic, G.R. No. 160421, [October 4, 2004], 483 Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) which states that the
PHIL 81-93) Property is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as of December

51
31, 1925 and has not been previously titled; 4 4) a report of the Land
Management Bureau stating that the Property is not covered by any previous
land registration case; 5 and 5) tax declarations dating from 1999 back to
1945 in the names of Mateo Abrigo and Rodrigo Abrigo after the former's
death. 6
The trial court rendered its decision on May 8, 2000, approving the
respondents' application for registration. 7 On May 30, 2000, the petitioner
appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals. 8 The petitioner,
through the Solicitor General, argued that the trial court erred when it granted
the application despite the failure of respondents to submit the original
tracing cloth plan and prove that they complied with the period of possession
and occupation required by law. 9
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on March 21, 2003,
dismissing the petitioner's appeal. The appellate court deemed the
submission of the blueprint of the subdivision plan as sufficient to support
respondents' claim of ownership as it contained material data such as the
technical description and location of the Property. 10 Moreover, the appellate
court observed that the blueprint of the subdivision plan was identical to the
original tracing cloth plan which respondents submitted to them on June 19,
2001. 11 As to the petitioner's contention that respondents failed to prove
possession of the land as required by law, the appellate court ruled that they
were bound by the findings of the trial court. 12 The appellate court also
noted that the land in question was declared for taxation purposes by
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1945. 13 Hence,
the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ACETIa
The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it deemed the
submission of a blueprint copy of the survey plan as sufficient compliance
with the requirements under the Property Registration Decree. 14 In this
regard, petitioner avers that submission in evidence of the original tracing
cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory
requirement in cases of application for original registration of land. Since
respondents failed to offer the original tracing cloth plan or
the diazo polyester film duly approved and certified by the Bureau of Lands,
petitioner concludes that respondents failed to comply with a jurisdictional
requirement and the trial court's decision is null and void. The petitioner also
maintains that even if the blueprint was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
trial court, the respondents failed to prove that the property was alienable and
disposable land.
We rule in favor of the respondents.
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in evidence of the
original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a
mandatory requirement, this Court has recognized instances of substantial
compliance with this rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint
copies of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other
52
evidence could also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land
for registration purposes. 15 The Court concluded that the subject property
was sufficiently identified by: 1) the blueprint copy of the plan and technical
description which were both approved by the Land Management Services of
the DENR; and 2) the report of the Land Management Sector stating that the
subject property is not a portion of, nor identical to any previously approved
isolated survey. The applicants in that case also submitted a certified true
copy of the original tracing cloth plan to the Court of Appeals as well as a
certification from the Land Registration Authority attesting that the original
plan in diazo polyester film was on file.
Similarly, the respondents in this case offered as evidence before the trial
court: 1) a blueprint copy of the subdivision plan 16 approved by the Director
of Lands; 2) a technical description 17 approved by the Land Management
Bureau of the DENR; 3) a certification from the DENR CENRO which states
that the Property has not been forfeited for non-payment of real estate taxes,
is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as of December 31,
1925, has not been previously titled and is not covered by any previous
public land application; 18 and 4) a report of the Land Management Bureau
stating that the Property is not recorded in their lot and plan index cards as
being subject of a previous public land application. 19 The respondents also
filed a motion to admit original tracing cloth plan with the Court of Appeals
during the pendency of the appeal and attached thereto the original
plan. 20 We likewise note that the original tracing cloth plan submitted to the
Court of Appeals is the same as the blueprint subdivision plan offered as
evidence before the trial court. 21
The petitioner's contention that the Property's status as alienable and
disposable land was unsubstantiated is likewise unavailing. As stated earlier,
the respondents offered as evidence before the trial court a certification from
the DENR CENRO stating that the Property is entirely within the alienable
and disposable zone classified under Project No. 8, Land Classification Map
No. 582 and certified on December 31, 1925. 22
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition is DISMISSED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated March 21, 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED. ICT
||| (Republic v. Spouses Hubilla, G.R. No. 157683, [February 11, 2005], 491
PHIL 370-374)

[G.R. No. 103727. December 18, 1996.]
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y
ESTEBAN, represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(Second Division), AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN,
TERESA C DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.
[G.R. No. 106496. December 18, 1996.]
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON,
VICENTE PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN
PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA
NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN PEDRO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Emerito M. Salva & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No. 103727.
Romeo R. Bringas for petitioners in G.R. No. 106496.
Rodolfo G. Dimaisip for A. D. Ocampo.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dilag Blanes Alvarado Sillano Jurado Cudiamat Riollo and Basar for T. C.
dela Cruz.
Benjamin C. Sebastian for D. D. Buhain.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE COURT;
JURISDICTION; THE PROBATE COURT'S JURISDICTION IS NOT
LIMITED TO THE DETERMINATION OF WHO THE HEIRS ARE AND WHAT
SHARES ARE DUE THEM AS REGARDS THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED
PERSON. Before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not
petitioners' Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal
force and effect, it is best that we first determine whether or not the lower
court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of administration,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
settling the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo
Propriedad No. 4136. Petitioners-heirs, in G.R. No. 106496, on the one hand,
contend that the lower court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no
jurisdiction as an "intestate court", to resolve the question of title or
ownership raised by the public respondent Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. The public respondent, on the other
hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae, argues that
petitioners' contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic
questioned the existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the
lower court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of
Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers the said estate,
otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be mistakenly
53
dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the State's patrimony or
improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased. A probate
court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and
what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person.
Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of wills. We held in the case
of Maningat v. Castillo, that "the main function of a probate court is to settle
and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through
the process of administration." Thus, its function necessarily includes the
examination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule
on whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for
purposes of distribution of the net assets of the estate of the deceased to the
lawful heirs. In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, we stated, thus: ". . .
questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the
deceased maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with the consent of all
the parties, without prejudice to third persons . . ." Parenthetically, questions
of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain
properties ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and
accounting of the estate subject of a petition for letters of administration, as in
the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In view of these disquisitions
of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any reversible error
when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge
Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the
said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban. ETISAc
2. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; SPANISH TITLES; P.D. NO. 892 HAS
ABOLISHED THE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION UNDER THE SPANISH
MORTGAGE LAW; SPANISH TITLES CAN NO LONGER BE
COUNTENANCED AS INDUBITABLE EVIDENCE OF LAND OWNERSHIP.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect
on February 16, 1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage
Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause
their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration
Act within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until
August 16, 1976. Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-
classification of their lands. Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as
indubitable evidence of land ownership. In the case of Director of Lands v.
Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., we took cognizance of this Decree and thus
held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and
admission of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that
have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to
World War II. In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to
show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D.
892 despite their allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. Time and
again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the party who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Proof of compliance with P.D.
892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered. Moreover,
in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we
categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative value as evidence of land
ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution dated
February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v.
Ortigas docketed as G.R. No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final
judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343. Under the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court relating to
the issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from
adjudicating otherwise. In the Muoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulo's
validity. In the WIDORA case, the TItulo's nullification was definitive. In both
cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban were on
opposite ends before this bench. The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied
upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of ownership. In the
petition for letters of administration the inventory submitted before the
probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there
can be no "net estate" to speak of after the Titulo's exclusion from the
intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro. cCaDSA
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J p:
The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of
controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership
of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of
approximately 173,000 hectares or "214,047 quinones," 1 on the basis of a
Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April 25,
1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in
the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such
Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig
and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos,
Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan
Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south. 2
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up
and land swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in
various trial courts, in the appellate court and in the Supreme Court, 3 in
connection therewith.
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al.
v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA
357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368
54
[1986]; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88
[1990]; Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
144 SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156
[1985]; and Director of Lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336
[1994] 4 terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands covered by
Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest
Tribunal of the land, has spoken, there the matter must rest:
"It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation
must end. Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been
undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or
terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be
sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement
with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment,
indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must
prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the
issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded
absolute finality." 5 [Cited cases omitted]
It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we
render judgment herein writing finis to these controversies by laying to rest
the issue of validity of the basis of the estate's claim of ownership over this
vast expanse of real property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out
cases:
G.R. NO. 103727
G.R. No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint 6 for
recovery of possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its decision 7 dated July 7,
1989, the dispositive portion 8 of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint
against the defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela
Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the sum of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorney's fees, and to pay
the costs of suit."
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or
reconveyance with damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was
filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator
of the "Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" against Jose
G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera,
Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen
Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes
S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment &
Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F.
Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch
104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro
discovered that the aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject estate,
particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977,
313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all
emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 9 and Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original
Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to
acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain portions of the subject
estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation;
(3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by
and through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation
to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest
Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to
Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971, September 12,
1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity and
genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers
the subject estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a
decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1
of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special Proceeding No.
312-B. 10
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants,
namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador
Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 11
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint
against Mareco, Inc. for improper service of summons and against Manuel
Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action considering that the
registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic
Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria
Chung Tiu. 12
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo,
Buhain and Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint
based on the following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are
already the registered owners of the parcels of land covered by Torrens titles
which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No.
4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" specifically stated in its dispositive
portion that all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under
55
the Torrens System by private persons shall be excluded from the coverage
of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. 13
The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, 14 and so, the petitioner
estate interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992,
the appeal was dismissed 15 for being unmeritorious and the lower court's
decision was affirmed with costs against the petitioner estate. The appellate
court ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was
presented in the proceeding below;
(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered under
the Torrens System hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly
excluded from the Titulo titled lands of private individuals:
(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain and
Dela Cruz as correctly ruled by the lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of
Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz originated was already cancelled, hence, the
lower court did not err in not declaring the same as null and void. 16
Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on
March 16, 1992, filed the present petition 17 docketed as G.R. No. 103727.
G.R. NO. 106496
G.R. No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a petition 18 for
letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban which eventually resulted to an Order 19 dated November
17, 1978 declaring inter alia, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void
and of no legal force and effect.
The dispositive portion 20 of the said Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:
1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.
2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal
force and effect and that therefore no rights could be derived therefrom.
3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other
transactions involving the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
are declared invalidated, void and of no force and effect.
4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the
inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate
of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from representing or
exercising any acts of possession or ownership or from disposing in any
manner portions of all the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
and to immediately vacate the same.
6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in
Court within twenty days their final accounting and inventory of all real and
personal properties of the estate which had come into their possession or
knowledge under oath.
7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue
with the presentation of their evidence in order to rest their case.
The consideration and approval of the administrator's final accounting and
inventory of the presentation of movants-intervenors' evidence as well as the
consideration of all other incident are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at
8:30 a m."
The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29,
1971 with the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial
District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
312-B was initiated by Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought
to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator, respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established,
evidence for the petitioners was received by the lower court without any
opposition. 21
On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order
appointing Engracio San Pedro as Administrator of the subject estate. 22
On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of
Engracio San Pedro upon posting of a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00). 23
On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to
furnish copies of the letters of administration and other pertinent orders
approving certain dispositions of the properties of the estate to the following
entities:
(a) The Commanding General
Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City
(b) The Solicitor General
Manila
(c) The Government Corporate Counsel
A. Mabini St., Manila
(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan
(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan
(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and Caloocan
(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan and Rizal
(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City
(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various municipalities in
which properties of the estate are located; and
(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon City and
Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 24
56
The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any
confusion brought about by various persons who had been misrepresenting
themselves as having been legally authorized to act for the subject estate
and to sell its properties by virtue thereof.
On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the
Petition was filed by the Republic of the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
"4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976,
Spanish titles like the TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and ineffective as
proof of ownership in court proceedings, except where the holder thereof
applies for land registration under Act 496, which is not true in the
proceedings at bar;
5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE
PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as invalid;
6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his
supposed heirs have lost whatever rights of ownership they might have had
to the so-called Estate on the ground of inaction, laches and/or prescription;
7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for
purposes of inventory, settlement or distribution in accordance with law, and
all the inventories so far submitted, insofar as they embraced lands within the
TITULO, are deemed ineffective and cannot be legally considered; and
8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land subject
matter of the petition considering that, except such portions thereof had been
(sic) already the subject of valid adjudication or disposition in accordance
with law, the same belong in State ownership." 25
On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings.
26
On February 16, 1977, the Republic's Opposition to the Petition for Letters of
Administration was dismissed by means of the following Order issued by
Judge Benigno Puno:
"WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised,
the Court hereby DISMISSES the 'Opposition' dated August 30, 1976, filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General; likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings dated February 15, 1977, filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General is DENIED.
The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the co-administrator Justino Z.
Benito are ordered to furnish the office of the Solicitor General all copies of
inventories already filed in Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof." 27
On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Republic. 28
On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C.
Bagasao, rendered a 52-page decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April 29,
1984, in the name of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,
covering a total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or 173,000
hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City
and Caloocan City;
(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa
Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro,
Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true and
lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and entitled
to inherit the intestate estate left by the said deceased, consisting of the
above-mentioned tract of private land covered and described by said above-
mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands which have already been legally
and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private persons, or the
Republic of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all
lands declared by the government as reservations for public use and
purposes; (c) all lands belonging to the public domain; and, (d) all portions
thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed and/or previously excluded by the
Administrator and duly approved by a final order of the Court, except those
which may hereafter be set aside, after due consideration on a case to case
basis, of various motions to set aside the said Court order which approved
the said sales, quitclaims, and/or exclusions;
(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co-administrator, is hereby
revoked to take effect immediately, to obviate any confusion in the
administration of the Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of administration to
the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose appointment as such is
hereby confirmed. The said co-administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby
ordered to render his final accounting of his co-administration of the Estate,
within thirty (30) days from receipt of copy hereof;
(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to
amass, collate, consolidate and take possession of all the net estate of the
deceased Don Marino San Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets and
credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take appropriate legal action
to recover the same in the proper Courts of Justice, government offices or
any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due from the estate to
the Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter, to submit
a project of partition of the estate among the lawful heirs as herein
recognized and declared.
It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President Ferdinand
E. Marcos that, to avoid the concentration of too much land to a few persons
and in line with the projected urban land reform program of the government,
corollary to the agricultural land reform program of the New Society, the
above intestate estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban should
57
be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by the government to be
used in its human settlements and low cost housing projects.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED." 29
On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above
decision. 30
On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and
Petition for the Inhibition of the then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar
Fernandez. On July 12, 1978, after the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition
for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez denied the said petition. 31
After hearings were conducted on the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration,
Judge Fernandez issued the aforestated Order 32 dated November 17, 1978
which, in essence, set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978
by declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal
force and effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to
the Court of Appeals and alleged that the lower court did not act with
impartiality when it granted the Republic's motion for reconsideration which
was merely pro forma, thereby overturning a prior declaration by the same
court of the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro. 33
On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the
petitioners-heirs. 34 In affirming the assailed Order dated November 17,
1978, the appellate court focused its discussion solely on the issue of
whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 null and void. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed
to controvert the Republic's claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is
invalid on the following bases; (a) non-production of the original of the subject
title; (b) inadmissibility of the photostat copies of the said title; and (c) non-
registration of the subject Spanish title under Act No. 496 (Land Registration
Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892 (Discontinuance of the
Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as
Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals'
decision by invoking certain cases wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 had been allegedly recognized. The Court of Appeals refused to be
swayed and denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 35
Hence, the herein petition, 36 docketed as G.R. No. 106496, was filed on
September 18, 1992.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and
106496, this Court resolved to consolidate both cases on September 15,
1994. 37
While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate
motions for intervention which we denied on different occasions for lack of
merit.
In G.R. No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are
as follows:
"I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC,
Branch 104 was denied due process of law due to gross negligence of
lawyer, which respondent court grossly failed to take cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial and in affirming the
lower court's null and void judgment." 38
In G.R. No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of
errors, to wit:
"First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which
resolved a question of title or ownership over which the lower court as an
intestate court has no jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated
objections of the petitioners. 39
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of Judge
Fernandez setting aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and Bagasao;
Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an appellate court reviewing, revising,
amending or setting aside the order and decision of Judges of equal rank. 40
Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the order of
Judge Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the order of Judge Puno
and the decision of Judge Bagasao, both of which were already final. 41
Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge
Fernandez was appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao,
regardless of the evidence, thereby unmindful that petitioners were denied
the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal. 42
Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence
presented before Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted
the order of Judge Fernandez who never received a single piece of evidence,
notwithstanding the 1906 Guido title over Hacienda Angono in Binangonan,
Rizal, the boundary owner stated therein being Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision of the Supreme Court
upholding the Guido title " 43
Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative
value of the petitioners' Spanish title in these cases is the propriety of the
lower court's resolution of the question of ownership of the subject San Pedro
estate in the special proceedings case. Thus, before we address ourselves to
the issue of whether or not petitioners' Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null
and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that we first determine
whether or not the lower court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for
letters of administration, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
58
lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate
covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R. No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the
lower court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an "intestate
court", 44 to resolve the question of title or ownership raised by the public
respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban. 45
The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity
as parens patriae, argues that petitioners' contention is misplaced
considering that when the Republic questioned the existence of the estate of
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound to rule on
the genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly
covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings
would be mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the
State's patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the estate of the
deceased. 46
A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the
heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased
person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of wills. We held in
the case of Maningat v. Castillo, 47 that "the main function of a probate court
is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or
through the process of administration." Thus, its function necessarily includes
theexamination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to
rule on whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for
purposes of distribution of the net assets of the estate of the deceased to the
lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 48 we stated, thus:
". . . questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of
the deceased maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with the consent of
all the parties, without prejudice to third persons . . ."
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima
facie of whether certain properties ought to be included or excluded from the
inventory and accounting of the estate subject of a petition for letters of
administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In this
light, we echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia 49 that:
". . . The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased
person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision
and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its
inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator
appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law
requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this
duty, the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights
and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the
inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased
person duly call the court's attention to the fact that certain properties, rights
or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court's duty to
hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should
be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima
facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature
as to the ownership of the said properties." 50 [Emphasis Supplied]
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did
not commit any reversible error when it issued the Order dated November 17,
1978 which set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 and
declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently
excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards
the assailed Order of November 17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge
Fernandez' act of granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the public
respondent Republic since, Judge Fernandez did not personally hear the
intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a "reviewing judge." By setting
aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI, Branch
IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C.
Bagasao, respectively, Judge Fernandez, acting as a "reviewing judge,"
proceeded without authority and/or jurisdiction. 51
There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the
decision arrived at is fair and just, a newly appointed judge who did not try
the case can decide the same as long as the record and the evidence are all
available to him and that the same were taken into consideration and
thoroughly studied. The "reviewing judge" argument of the petitioners-heirs
has no leg to stand on considering that "the fact that the judge who penned
the decision did not hear a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling
reason to jettison his findings and conclusion inasmuch as the full record was
available to him for his perusal." 52 In the case at bar, it is evident that the
41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a
knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering
and setting aside Judge Bagasao's Decision dated April 25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of
Judge Fernandez' disposition of the case, i.e., the issuance by the lower
court of the assailed Order of November 17, 1978, we now focus on the core
issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R. No. 106496 committed
reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate of the deceased
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 primarily on the ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal
force and effect. Juxtaposed with this is the issue of whether or not the
appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred in not
59
recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership
by the late Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on
February 16, 1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage
Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause
their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration
Act 53 within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or
until August 16, 1976. 54 Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a
re-classification of their lands. 55 Spanish titles can no longer be
countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. 56
Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
"SECTION 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is
discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet
covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish
titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration
proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the
Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344."
The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies
for its passage, to wit:
"WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of
large tracts of public and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers
appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming
ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting
claims and litigations between legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or
applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and the holders of, or person
claiming rights under the said Spanish titles or grants, on the other, thus
creating confusion and instability in property ownership and threatening the
peace and order conditions in the areas affected;
WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that
recording in the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is
practically nil and that this system has become obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under
the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now
ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens system;"
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., 57 we took
cognizance of this Decree and thus held that caution and care must be
exercised in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into
account the numerous fake titles that have been discovered after their
supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo
de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite
their allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. 58 Time and again we
have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it. 59 Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should
be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of
Judge Bagasao who rendered the reconsidered Decision dated April 25,
1978 to have declared the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban despite the effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting
aside Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136, under P.D. 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private
ownership in the special proceedings case. He made the following
observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:
"The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of recognizing
the nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership underscored the fact that
during the pendency of this case, smart speculators and wise alecks had
inveigled innocent parties into buying portions of the so-called estate with
considerations running into millions of pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to
charitable and religious organizations, including veterans' organizations as
smoke screen to the gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood wink
further other gullible and unsuspecting victims." 60
In the same light, it does not escape this Court's onomatopoeic observation
that the then heir-judicial administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the
complaint for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages in
G.R. No.103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasao's Decision of
April 25, 1978 in support of the Titulo's validity notwithstanding the fact that,
by then, the said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez'
Order of November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts'
holding in G.R. No. 103727 insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was
not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private respondents
Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
60
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the
Titulo under the Torrens system is the lack of the necessary documents to be
presented in order to comply with the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not
discount the possibility that the Spanish title in question is not genuine,
especially since its genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In
both cases, the petitioners-heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special
proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite
a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. "Q-RP") to produce it as requested by the
Republic from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate,
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As
an alternative to prove their claim of the subject intestate estate, the
petitioners referred to a document known as "hypoteca" (the Spanish term is
'hipoteca') allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was
neither properly identified nor presented as evidence. Likewise, in the action
for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the
petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead,
only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was presented. (Exhs. "C-9" to "C-
19").
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules
of Court is stated in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said
Rule read:
"SEC. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. There can be no
evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than
the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;"
xxx xxx xxx
Sections 4 and 5 of the same Rule further read:
"SEC. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. When the
original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its
contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses."
SEC. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse party's custody. If
the writing be in the custody of the adverse party, he must have reasonable
notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the writing, the contents thereof may be proved
as in the case of its loss. But the notice to produce it is not necessary where
the writing is itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully obtained or
withheld by the adverse party."
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary
in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be
had. In the absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been lost
or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu
thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and
being an inadmissible piece of evidence. 61
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent
proof the existence and due execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to
why the original copy of the Titulo could not be produced was not satisfactory.
The alleged contents thereof which should have resolved the issue as to the
exact extent of the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro
were not distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Hing Po v. Court of
Appeals, 62 we pointed out that:
"Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were
actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary
evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss;
contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the
court. 63
In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136, Judge Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI
expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January 28,
1963 denominated as "Questioned Documents Report No. 230-163"; (2) a
photostat copy of the original of the Titulo duly certified by the then Clerk of
Court of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3)
the hipoteca registered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on December 4,
1894.
Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge
Bagasao's April 1978 decision correctly clarified that the NBI report
aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the two signatures of
Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado appearing on the last page of
the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of the petitioners-
heirs to admit the existence and due execution of the Titulo, the handling
Solicitor testified:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BRINGAS:
With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished
counsel for the government whether he admits that there is actually a titulo
propiedad 4136.
COURT:
Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
61
We are precisely impugning the Titulo and I think the question of counsel is
already answered by witness. The parties have not yet established the due
existence of the titulo.
ATTY. BRINGAS:
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the
question. The witness is a witness for the government, so with the testimony
of this witness for the government to the effect that there is actually in
existence Titulo Propiedad 4136; we are asking the question candidly to the
government counsel whether he is prepared to state that there is really in
existence such Titulo Propiedad 4136.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are now stating before this court that there was such a document
examined by the NBI insofar as the signatures of Alejandro Garcia and
Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and they are found to be
authentic." 64
The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence
to our pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious validity:
". . . the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated
September 2, 1977 (Exhibit 'O-RP') concluded that the document contained
material alterations as follows:
a) On line 15 of 'p. 1, Title' and on line 5 of 'p. 2, Title,' the word
'Pinagcamaligan' was written after 'Pulo;'
b) On line 16, 'p. 1, Title,' 'un' was converted to 'mil;'
c) On Line 18, 'p. 1, Title,' 'mil' was written at the end of 'tres' in 'tres mil;'
d) On line 19 of 'p. 1, Title,' a semblance of 'mil' was written after 'setentay
tres;'
e) On line 6, 'p. 2, Title,' 'un' was formed to a semblance of 'uni;' and
f) On line 8, 'p. 2, Title,' 'un' was formed to 'mil.'
The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the titulo.
According to Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still "pieces of black ashes
around the rings of the portions which are indications of burnings. The
burnings were made on the very portions where there were previous
erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably, the burnings were
done to erase traces of the criminal act." 65
In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et
al. 66 Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial court's
judgment therein, sustained the finding that:
". . . The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in the
name of Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations and intercalations in
an attempt to vastly increase the area and change the location of the land
described in the original title . . ."
Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we
sustain the lower court's analysis, as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:
"To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never
presented in Court. Upon request of the Government, a subpoena duces
tecum (Exhibit "Q-RP'") was issued to the two administrators, Engracio San
Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other interested parties to produce the
original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But no one produced the Titulo.
What the parties did was to pass the buck to one another.
Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could not be
produced, the Court cannot take cognizance of any secondary evidence.
It was explained that the Titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the
hands of a certain Moon Park of Korea but who later disappeared and that
his present whereabouts could not be known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts on
the part of the claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this document of vital
importance despite the Court order to produce it in order to determine its
authenticity.
It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Park's whereabouts are
unknown or that there are not enough funds to locate him. The only logical
conclusion would be that the original would be adverse if produced." 67
As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the
subject intestate estate, the petitioners-heirs have not established the
conditions required by law for their admissibility as secondary evidence to
prove that there exists a document designated as Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136. Hence, the same acquires no probative value. 68
At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et
al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch I, et al. 69 is enlightening. In said case, private respondent,
Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (PIADECO),
claimed to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the
municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of
Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its
ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28,
1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is of doubtful validity, 70 Justice
Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated that:
"But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two
undisputed facts. First. The Title embraces land 'located in the Provinces of
Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City.' Second. The title was signed only
by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land Registry
of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible
answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private
ownership of land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title
but also with a clear identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil.
494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13
Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil 51, 54-
62
56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case involving
a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely
measured per hectare or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez
v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree of August
31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests
that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In
Piadeco's 'Rejoinder to Opposition' dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case
3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000
hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its 'Opposition' of May 13, 1964 in the
same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48).
Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadeco's
land. Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal
at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner
appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription
under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-
24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By this
decree, applications for adjustment showing the location, boundaries
and area of land applied for were to be filed with the Direccion General de
Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the
land with the assistance of the interested party or his legal representative
(Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications
for adjustment at one year from the date of publication of the decree in
the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another year by
the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought adjustment
within the time prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be
considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October
26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500
hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands
(See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98
Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the
area that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares, with allowable
error up to 5%. Ponce, op. cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should
be stated again that Piadeco's Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000
hectares of land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February
13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26;
Ventura, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a second petition for
adjustment within six months from publication, for those who had not yet
secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law (Ibid.). Said law
also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established
by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of
August 31, 1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors,
the provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal Organization
issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they may hold in
their possession (Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).
Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that title
was either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the
publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly
acquired its rights under the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon
was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From Piadeco's explanation not
its evidence(Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188) we cull the following: On
December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de retro,
redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This
transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on December 4,
1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his
only heir, adjudicated the land to herself. At about the same time, Piadeco
was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don
Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to
Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration
of a certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada
assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian
Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the
land. Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the
same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was
paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration
to Fabian Castillo made to depend on the registration of the land under the
Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de
Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great clouds
of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadeco's title."
Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 71 we categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative value as
evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our
Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and
WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R. No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an
entry of final judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by
this Court relating to the issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
preclude us from adjudicating otherwise. In the Muoz case, we had cast
doubt on the Titulo's validity. In the WIDORA case, the Titulo's nullification
was definitive. In both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San
63
Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench. In the case en
banc of Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 72 the Court
explained the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, viz:
". . . conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was
in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are
concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such
parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a
judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another
action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue
be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action,
and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue
and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732
[1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required by merely identity of
issues."
The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now
be laid to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or
their privies as evidence of ownership. In the petition for letters of
administration the inventory submitted before the probate court consisted
solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no "net estate" to
speak of after the Titulo's exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
In G.R. No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of
private respondents Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No.
372592 (Exh. "2", Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. "2" De Ocampo) and TCT
No. 269707 (Exh. "2" Dela Cruz). 73 Under the Torrens system of
registration, the titles of private respondents became indefeasible and
incontrovertible one year from its final decree. 74 More importantly, TCT Nos.
372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoy
the conclusive presumption of validity. 75 As a last hurrah to champion their
claim to the vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title, the petitioners-
heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to prove on the part of the
private respondents as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own
counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the proper witnesses
from the Bureau of Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs' claim that
OCT No. 614 from which private respondents were derived is null and void. It
is an elementary legal principle that the negligence of counsel binds the
client. 76 The records show that the petitioners-heirs were not at all
prejudiced by the non-presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is
a nullity considering that their ownership itself of the lands being claimed was
not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al., 77 we
held:
"It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities
to his client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the
client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the client, the herein petitioner.
As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel ( Que v.
Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980]. Only when the application of the
general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be
called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue
prejudice against the petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At
most, there is only an unsupported claim that the petitioner had been
prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that
effect."
Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the
petitioners-heirs were denied due process on account of the negligence of
their counsel, the writ of certiorari is unavailing.
It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban are not without recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892,
quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish Titles the right to apply for
registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Decree.
Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession,
cannot be used as evidence of ownership in any land registration
proceedings under the Torrens system.
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish
Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General
to be more vigilant in handling land registration cases and intestate
proceedings involving portions of the subject estate. It is not too late in the
day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest the Torrens titles of those
who have acquired ownership of such portions of land that rightfully belong to
the State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor
of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino
San Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 is a matter not ripe for adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino San
Pedro is not a party in any of the two cases before us for review, hence, this
Court in a Resolution dated May 10, 1993, 78 denied Catalino's motion for
leave to reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the aforementioned bonds
were not included in the inventory of the subject estate submitted by then
administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito before the probate
court.
64
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R.
Nos. 103727 and 106496 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, in G.R. No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 20, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In G.R. No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no
rights could be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the
inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to
exercise any act of possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in
any manner the whole or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the
same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.
This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
||| (Intestate Estate of San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
103727, 106496, [December 18, 1996], 333 PHIL 597-637)
[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from
Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World.
And it has many consequences. STHDAc
xxx xxx xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in
Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have
not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state
systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru,
the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other which
are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The
informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their
own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps
which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you
walk by field after field in each field a different dog is going to bark at you.
Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does
not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law"
and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not
know how to recognize.
Hernando De Soto 1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of
persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to
provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions
of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground.
The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of
informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with
benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own
circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is
primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the
legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our social
obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
Silang Cadastre, 2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting
of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, 3 and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. HaSEcA
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-
Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly
designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to
appear on behalf of the State. 4 Apart from presenting documentary
evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at
the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged * to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban the
fourth being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the
death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged
to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo
Velazco to Malabanan. 5
65
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine
Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the property
and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." 6 The Republic
of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the
application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-
1656 on March 15, 1982." 7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration
and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as
supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this
case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO
MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at
Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite. HcDaAI
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree
of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 reversing
the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court
held that under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree any period
of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that
since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos'
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the
period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section
14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Court's ruling
in Republic v. Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of
Appeals; 10 hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the
appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v.
Naguit, 11 which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto.
Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of
Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein
which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the
first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the
hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling
doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land.
Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the
declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title underthe Public Land
Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 12 and on 11 November
2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the
principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit: HICEca
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land
and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with
the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both? 13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14 (1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the
Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be
considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia, 14 promulgated in
June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation
66
that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14 (1) was patently
absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14 (1) to
apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of
12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent
rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic, 15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v.
Republic 16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation, 17 as well as the
earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals. 18 ACTEHI
With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain
for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14 (2). According to them, it would
not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified
as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the
application, the property had already been "converted" into private property
through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively
from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties. 19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14 (2) are
more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the
acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial
property", while Section 14 (2) speaks of "private lands". It observes that the
Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14 (2) as a ground for
application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to
the period of possession under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, and not
the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits
that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public
lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was
declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular
factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership
thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a
full understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public
Land Act. HSEIAT
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since
its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral
lands. 20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further
classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for
public and quasi-public uses. 21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land
Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through
"judicial legalization". 22 Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right,
subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. DEHcTI
Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977
when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments
were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was
changed to "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain". The OSG
submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be
registered. 23 This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public
Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public
domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands".
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession
for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to
possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier". The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years.
Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this
67
time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. . .
.
It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No, 141 is
virtually the same as Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said
Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property,
including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14 (1) that operationalizes
the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. SDTIaE
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the
inclusion of Section 14 (1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in
effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest
who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That
circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a
redundancy, or that Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of
the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The
following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the
nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right,
rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert
that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25
January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who
has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect
or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of
his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of
title. DCSETa
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11
of the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is
indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive
ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration
Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration
procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48 (b). Section
47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the
right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended
several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads
thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail
of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only
where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided,
further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in
accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at
any time prior to the period fixed by the President. 24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted
under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
and Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has
adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the
applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable
character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945.
Following the OSG's approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable
after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14 (1) of
theProperty Registration Decree or Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as
68
amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed
in Naguit. EcTDCI
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership". Generally speaking, qualifying
words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. 25 Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not
yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property. EIcSTD
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that
which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as
pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the
point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared
alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor
is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
under abona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona
fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles
than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages
from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein
is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the
notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it
suffices that the Court's acknowledgment that the particular line of argument
used therein concerning Section 14 (1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura, 26 the Court,
citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date
when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period
of possession. . ." That statement, in the context of Section 14 (1), is certainly
erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again
be considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing
Section 14 (2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not
establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby
precluding the application of Section 14 (1). It is not even apparent from the
decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original
registration following Section 14 (1), their position being that they had been in
exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50)
years, but not before 12 June 1945. aCHDST
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has
any precedental value with respect to Section 14 (1). On the other hand, the
ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14 (1), since it precisely involved
situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court's
interpretation of Section 14 (1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the
case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final
word of the Court on Section 14 (1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals 27 since in the latter, the application for registration had been
filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent
though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two
years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 28 which involved a claim
of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was
declared alienable and disposable only
1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the
mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration inCeniza should have
failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November
25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to
be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification
Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980". This is
sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private
respondents' application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case.
Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the
application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the
public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal
land. . . . IDASHa
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of
public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a
confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private
respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving
the alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to
prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions,
petitioner did not show that this is one of them. 29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48 (b) of public
domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180
days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the
application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had
been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application
was filed nine (9) yearsbefore the land was declared alienable or
disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to
contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to
belittle.
in III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section
14 (2). The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
69
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14
(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter
dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced
only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those
who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws." DEcSaI
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.
[ 30 ] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. [ 31 ]
With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
"private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June
12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive,
then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14 (2), unlike in this case
where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision,
and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only
as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the
nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the
possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14 (2).
Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On
the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution
itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands. caTESD
70
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property
may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, 32 or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years. 33 Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith, 34 as well as just title. 35
When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides
that persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws", it unmistakably refers to
the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is
the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of
private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the
critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14 (2) does
encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the
State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence
holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession
of at least thirty (30) years. 36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-
year" period, additional complexities relating to Section 14 (2) and to how
exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins
of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original
registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an
owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit: TDCaSE
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(emphasis supplied) 37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which
made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time.
Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have
invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by
implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code,
particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two
kinds of prescription under the Civil Code ordinary acquisitive prescription
and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is
completed "through uninterrupted adverse possession. . . for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith".
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No.
1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the
thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as
mandated under Section 14 (2). However, there is a material difference
between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and
how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did
not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It
merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately
preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as
to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and
continue as such, throughout the entire thirty (30) years. There is neither
statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated
such a requirement, 38 similar to our earlier finding with respect to the
present language of Section 48 (b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the
point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period
as basis for original registration became Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to
apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the
rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the
same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription
under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section
14 (1).
B.
Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the
civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our
interpretation of Section 14 (2). There is no similar demand on our part in the
case of Section 14 (1). DSHTaC
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus:
"[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription". The identification what consists of
71
patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in
full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property
belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be
subject of the commerce of man. 39 Lands of the public domain, whether
declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and
thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property
of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce
of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription. IEcDCa
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2)
makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when * it is "intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable
of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects
the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to
the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the
lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its
concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared
alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the
Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to
apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and
intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the
legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14
(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles. aATEDS
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual
example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The
Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.", is
more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the
sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro
Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of
effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President to
transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA) 40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer
them. 41 The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in
whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military
lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the
provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government
properties." 43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have
become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that
these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the
former American bases at Clark and Subic. 44 Such purpose can be tied to
either "public service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article
420 (2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public
dominion under Article 420 (2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and
disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a
72
private person or entity that such lands become private property and cease to
be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared
as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public
dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in
favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the
period of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial
may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period.
Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot
be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application
for registration under Section 14 (2) falls wholly within the framework of
prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the
time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be
counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify
registration. EHTSCD
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14 (1) and
Section 14 (2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates
registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14 (2) entitles
registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14
(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14 (2)
is made available both by theProperty Registration Decree and the Civil
Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and
the thirty-year period available through Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period
under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the
period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of
possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the
registration under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree is
founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code
should not apply as well to Section 14 (1). Notwithstanding the vaunted
status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither
superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration
Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set
forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14 (2)
manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that
provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section
14 (1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing
how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription,
which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership
over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by
Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription", and that [p]roperty of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription".
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be
acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title;
and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years.
There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring
patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor
is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there
are indispensable requisites good faith and just title. The ascertainment of
good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as
Article 1127 of the Civil Code, 45 provisions that more or less speak for
themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under
Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription "when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights,
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right". Dr.
Tolentino explains: ITCcAD
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership,
and which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been
the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples:
sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in
payment. 46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The
major premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor,
could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the
required period of possession". 47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it
assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor
is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription
73
derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any
other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. SIEHcA
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for
the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been
become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the
possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events
ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land;
and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil
Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the
property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration
of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
confirmation of ownership. 48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then
did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial
property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of
possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years
following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act 49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for
alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil
Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration. 50 Still, the gap
was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes
ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the
prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of theProperty Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14 (2)
thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now. AcDaEH
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those
who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public
Land Act. 51
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin
to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person's uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48 (b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish
that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence
the Tax Declarations they presented in particular is to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree. EaCDAT
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national
74
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain
does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal
doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of today's ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled
property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The
social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be
abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied
the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is
a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is
common among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm
powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on
the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative
means of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through
homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due to limitations
imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said
properties. 52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the
most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal
settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even
that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or
exclusively held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their
families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State
with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families
and their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said
about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not
for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such
lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to
set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the
settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain
before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite
two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the
conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-
being not only of that individual, but also to the person's family. Once that
sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the
political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering
problem. caHIAS
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., joins J. Nazario.
Quisumbing, J., is on official business.
Corona, J., joins the dissent of Mr. Justice Brion.
Chico-Nazario, J., Pls. see Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice
Nazario.
Brion, J., dissents see Opinion.
Separate Opinions
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application for registration
of a piece of land originally filed by the late Mario Malabanan (Malabanan),
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the instant Petition,
being alienable and disposable land of the public domain, may not be
acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code, nor registered
pursuant to Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. CTIEac
At the outset, it must be made clear that the Property Registration
Decree governs registration of land under the Torrens system. It can only
identify which titles, already existing or vested, may be registered under the
Torrens system; but it cannot be the source of any title to land. It merely
confirms, but does not confer ownership. 1
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree allows "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws", to apply for registration of their title to the lands.
Petitioners do not fall under such provision, taking into account that the land
they are seeking to register is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, a fact which would have several substantial implications.
First, Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree clearly and explicitly
refers to "private lands", without mention at all of public lands. There is no
other way to understand the plain language of Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree except that the land was already private when the
applicant for registration acquired ownership thereof by prescription. The
prescription therein was not the means by which the public land was
converted to private land; rather, it was the way the applicant acquired title to
what is already private land, from another person previously holding title to
the same. 2 The provision in question is very clear and unambiguous. Well-
settled is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical
75
language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application. 3
With the understanding that Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree applies only to what are already private lands, then, there is no
question that the same can be acquired by prescription under the provisions
of the Civil Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil Code which governs rights
to private lands. ECcTaS
Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, as amended, reads:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed
of only as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis ours.)
The afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural public lands may be
disposed of by the State, and at the same time, mandates that the latter
can only do so by the modes identified in the same provision. Thus, the
intent of the legislature to make exclusive the enumeration of the modes by
which agricultural public land may be disposed of by the State in Section 11
of the Public Land Act, as amended, is not only readily apparent, but explicit.
And, undeniably, the enumeration of the modes for acquiring agricultural
public land in the said provision does not include prescription, in the concepts
described and periods prescribed by the Civil Code.
Neither the Civil Code nor the Property Registration Decree can overcome
the express restriction placed by the Public Land Act, as amended, on the
modes by which the State may dispose of agricultural public land.
The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law specifically applying to
lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands. The Public Land
Act, as amended, being a special law, necessarily prevails over the Civil
Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefor specially should prevail." Generalia specialibus non
derogant. 4
As for the Property Registration Decree, it must be stressed that the same
cannot confer title to land and can only confirm title that already exists or has
vested. As has already been previously discussed herein, title to agricultural
public land vests or is acquired only by any of the modes enumerated in
Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended. TcADCI
And, third, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended several times,
changing the period of possession required for acquiring an imperfect title to
agricultural public land:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required
possession en concepto de dueo since time immemorial, or since July
26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained. However, on
June 22, 1957,Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141.
This later enactment required adverse possession for a period of only thirty
(30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073,
further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987.
Under this decree, "the provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c),
Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that
these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable land of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-
in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945." 5 (Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to agricultural land of
the public domain could be acquired by adverse possession of 30
years. Presidential Decree No. 1073, issued on 25 January 1977, amended
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by requiring possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable land of the public domain since 12 June 1945 or
earlier for an imperfect title. Hence, by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
1073, the requisite period of possession for acquiring imperfect title to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain is no longer determined
according to a fixed term (i.e., 30 years); instead, it shall be reckoned from
a fixed date (i.e., 12 June 1945 or earlier) from which the possession should
have commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the
public domain by prescription under the Civil Code, and registration of title to
land thus acquired under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,
it would be sanctioning what is effectively a circumvention of the amendment
introduced by Presidential Decree No. 1073 to Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act. Acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public domain
by possession would again be made to depend on a fixed term (i.e.,10 years
for ordinary prescription and 30 years for extraordinary prescription), rather
than being reckoned from the fixed date presently stipulated by Section 48
(b) ofthe Public Land Act, as amended. DCcIaE
There being no basis for petitioners' application for registration of the public
agricultural land in question, accordingly, the same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in the majority opinion
concerning the contradictory pronouncements of the Court in Republic v.
Court of Appeals 6 and Republic v. Herbieto, 7 on imperfect titles to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, acquired in accordance with
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and registered pursuant
to Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
76
According to Naguit,a person seeking judicial confirmation of an imperfect
title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, need only
prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and
occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the
subject land is alienable and disposable at the time of filing of the
application for judicial confirmation and/or registration of title. On the other
hand, it was held in Herbieto that such a person must establish that he and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the
subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land was
likewise already declared alienable and disposable since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The majority opinion upholds the ruling in Naguit, and declares the
pronouncements on the matter in Herbieto as mere obiter dictum.
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception to the dismissive treatment of
my elucidation in said case on the acquisition of imperfect title to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, as mere obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon
some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case
before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause, "by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and
not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily
involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent. 8
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed in Herbieto the registration
of certain parcels of land of the public domain in the names of Jeremias and
David Herbieto, based on two grounds, one substantive and the other
procedural, i.e., (1) the applicants for registration failed to prove that they
possessed the subject parcels of land for the period required by law; and (2)
the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the
application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately
owned by two applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural issue first, and held that
the alleged infirmity in the application constituted a misjoinder of causes of
action which did not warrant a dismissal of the case, only the severance of
the misjoined causes of action so that they could be heard by the court
separately. The Court though took note of the belated publication of the
notice of hearing on the application for registration of Jeremias and David
Herbieto, the hearing was already held before the notice of the same was
published. Such error was not only procedural, but jurisdictional, and was
fatal to the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto.
The Court then proceeded to a determination of the substantive issue
in Herbieto, particularly, whether Jeremias and David Herbieto possessed the
parcels of land they wish to register in their names for the period required by
law. The Court ruled in the negative. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, on judicial confirmation of imperfect title, requires possession of
alienable and disposable land of the public domain since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. Given that the land sought to be registered was declared alienable
and disposable only on 25 June 1963, and the period of possession prior to
such declaration should not be counted in favor of the applicants for
registration, then Jeremias and David Herbieto could not be deemed to have
possessed the parcels of land in question for the requisite period as to
acquire imperfect title to the same.
The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, which could be the subject of
judicial confirmation, was not unnecessary to the decision of said case. It
wasnot a mere remark made or opinion expressed upon a cause, "by the
way", or only incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon a question
before the Court; or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause; or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument, as to constitute obiter dictum. ECaHSI
It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain under Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, was directly raised as an issue in the Petition
inHerbieto and discussed extensively by the parties in their pleadings. That
the application of Jeremias and David Herbieto could already be dismissed
on the ground of lack of proper publication of the notice of hearing thereof,
did not necessarily preclude the Court from resolving the other issues
squarely raised in the Petition before it. Thus, the Court dismissed the
application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto on two grounds:
(1) the lack of jurisdiction of the land registration court over the application, in
light of the absence of proper publication of the notice of hearing; and (2) the
evident lack of merit of the application given that the applicants failed to
comply with the requirements for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. This is only in
keeping with the duty of the Court to expeditiously and completely resolve the
cases before it and, once and for all, settle the dispute and issues between
the parties. Without expressly discussing and categorically ruling on the
second ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto could have easily believed that
they could re-file their respective applications for registration, just taking care
to comply with the publication-of-notice requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the following discourse in Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals 9 on what constitutes, or more appropriately, what
does not constitute obiter dictum:
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented
by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all
pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented
and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up
to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on which the
decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose
77
its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have
been, made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points
in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had
held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. A decision which the case
could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing
to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another
question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after
the case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So,
also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is
sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all
such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided,
and none of such points can be regarded as having the status of
a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because
another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor
does a decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding
other propositions dicta. IcHTCS
An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot
be considered a dictum; and this rule applies as to all pertinent questions,
although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the
regular course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final
conclusion, and to any statement in the opinion as to a matter on which the
decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose
its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is or might have
been made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points
in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had
held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. 10
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear provisions of the law and
established jurisprudence on the matter, and is binding as a precedent.
Section 14 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, explicitly requires for the
acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, possession by a Filipino citizen of the said parcel of land since 12
June 1945 or earlier, to wit:
Section. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours.) SCIcTD
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, by substantially
reiterating Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, recognizes the
imperfect title thus acquired and allows the registration of the same, viz.:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis
ours.)
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that possession of the land by the
applicant for registration prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable
and disposable cannot be credited to the applicant's favor. 11
Given the foregoing, judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect title,
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1)
of the Property Registration Decree, respectively, should only be granted
when: (1) a Filipino citizen, by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2)
the land in question, necessarily, was already declared alienable and
disposable also by 12 June 1945 or earlier.
There can be no other interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, which
would not run afoul of either the clear and unambiguous provisions of said
laws or binding judicial precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the majority opinion that the interpretation
of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, adopted
in Herbieto, would result in absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation forecloses a
person from acquiring an imperfect title to a parcel of land declared alienable
and disposable only after 12 June 1945, which could be judicially confirmed.
Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that the intention of the law is to
dispose of agricultural public land to qualified individuals and not simply to
dispose of the same. It may be deemed a strict interpretation and application
of both law and jurisprudence on the matter, but it certainly is not an
absurdity.
Stringency and prudence in interpreting and applying Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, is well justified by the significant
consequences arising from a finding that a person has an imperfect title to
78
agricultural land of the public domain. Not just any lengthy occupation of an
agricultural public land could ripen into an imperfect title. An imperfect title
can only be acquired by occupation and possession of the land by a
person and his predecessors-in-interest for the period required and
considered by law sufficient as to have segregated the land from the
mass of public land. When a person is said to have acquired an
imperfect title, by operation of law, he acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant to the land, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. As such, the land ceased to be part of the public
domain and goes beyond the authority of the State to dispose of. An
application for confirmation of title, therefore, is but a mere
formality. 12 EIAHcC
In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto, Section 11 of the Public Land
Act, as amended, has identified several ways by which agricultural lands of
the public domain may be disposed of. Each mode of disposing of
agricultural public land has its own specific requirements which must be
complied with. If a person is not qualified for a judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title, because the land in question was declared alienable and
disposable only after 12 June 1945, he is not totally without recourse for he
could still acquire the same by any of the other modes enumerated in the
afore-quoted provision.
Regardless of my dissent to the affirmation by the majority of the ruling
in Naguit on Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section
14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, I cast my vote with the majority,
toDENY the Petition at bar and AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 February
2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals
dismissing, for absolute lack of basis, petitioners' application for registration
of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
BRION, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia's modified positions on the application of
prescription under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree (PRD),
and on the denial of the petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan.
I dissent in the strongest terms from the ruling that the classification of a
public land as alienable and disposable can be made after June 12, 1945, in
accordance with this Court's ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Naguit(Naguit). 1 Effectively, what results from this decision is a new law,
crafted by this Court, going beyond what the Constitution ordains and beyond
the law that the Legislature passed. Because the majority has not used the
standards set by the Constitution and the Public Land Act (PLA), 2 its
conclusions are based on a determination on what the law ought to be an
exercise in policy formulation that is beyond the Court's authority to make.
The discussions of these grounds for dissent follow, not necessarily in the
order these grounds are posed above. HDTCSI
Prefatory Statement
Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the reading of the hierarchy of
laws that govern public lands to fully understand and appreciate the grounds
for dissent.
In the area of public law, foremost in this hierarchy is the Philippine
Constitution, whose Article XII (entitled National Economy and Patrimony)
establishes and fully embraces the regalian doctrine as a first and overriding
principle. 3 This doctrine postulates that all lands belong to the State, 4 and
that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the State. 5
In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the classification, grant, and
disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and, other
than the Constitution, is the country's primary law on the matter. Section 7 of
the PLA delegates to the President the authority to administer and dispose of
alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands open to disposition
or concession, and the requirement that they should be officially delimited
and classified and, when practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very significant
section, states that
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title;
(5) By judicial legalization;
(6) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Section 48 covers confirmation of imperfect title, and embodies a grant of
title to the qualified occupant or possessor of an alienable public land. This
section provides: cHAIES
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of
lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force
and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith,
but have, with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not
received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have
occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their
applications.
79
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July
twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Significantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b) has
been amended by PD 1073 as follows:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII
of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-
in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945.
Complementing the PLA is the PRD. 6 It was enacted to codify the various
laws relating to property registration. It governs the registration of lands
under the Torrens System, as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages. Section 14 of the PRD provides:
SEC. 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river
beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law. SEDIaH
Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to have been lifted
from, Section 48 (b) of the PLA. The two provisions, however, differ in intent
and legal effect based on the purpose of the law that contains them. The
PLA is a substantive law that classifies and provides for the disposition
of alienable lands of the public domain. The PRD, on the other hand,
specifically refers to the manner of bringing registerable lands, among
them alienable public lands, within the coverage of the Torrens
system. Thus, the first is a substantive law, while the other
is essentially procedural, so that in terms of substantive content, the PLA
should prevail. 7
Significantly bearing on the matter of lands in general is the Civil Code and
its provisions on Property 8 and Prescription. 9 The law on property assumes
importance because land, whether public or private, is property. Prescription,
on the other hand, is a mode of acquiring ownership of land, although it is not
one of the modes of disposition mentioned in the PLA.
Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is entitled "Property in Relation
to the Person to Whom it Belongs". On this basis, Article 419 classifies
property to be property of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420
proceeds to further classify property of public dominion into those intended
for public use, for public service, and for the development of the national
wealth. Article 421 states that all other properties of the State not falling
under Article 420 are patrimonial property of the State, and Article 422 adds
that property of public dominion, no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. Under
Article 425, property of private ownership, besides patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of all property belonging
to private persons, either individually or collectively.
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is not mentioned as one of the
modes of acquiring alienable public land under the PLA, (Significantly, the
PLA under its Section 48 provides for its system of how possession can
ripen into ownership; the PLA does not refer to this as acquisitive prescription
but as basis for confirmation of title.) Section 14 (2) of the PRD, however,
specifies that "[t]hose who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws" as among those who may
apply for land registration. Thus, prescription was introduced into the
land registration scheme (the PRD), but not into the special law
governing lands of the public domain (the PLA).
A starting point in considering prescription in relation with public lands is
Article 1108 of the Civil Code, which states that prescription does not run
against the State and its subdivisions. At the same time, Article 1113 provides
that "all things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided; property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription." The provisions of Articles 1128 to 1131 may also come into play
in the application of prescription to real properties.
In light of our established hierarchy of laws, particularly the supremacy
of the Philippine Constitution, any consideration of lands of the public
domain should start with the Constitution and its Regalian doctrine; all
lands belong to the State, and he who claims ownership carries the
burden of proving his claim. 10 Next in the hierarchy is the PLA for
purposes of the terms of the grant, alienation and disposition of the
lands of the public domain, and the PRD for the registration of lands.
The PLA and the PRD are special laws supreme in their respective
spheres, subject only to the Constitution. The Civil Code, for its part, is
80
the general law on property and prescription and should be accorded
respect as such. In more concrete terms, where alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are involved, the PLA is the
primary law that should govern, and the Civil Code provisions on
property and prescription must yield in case of conflict. 11
The Public Land Act
At the risk of repetition, I start the discussion of the PLA with a reiteration of
the first principle that under the regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
Otherwise expressed, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 12 Thus, all lands
that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain. 13 We should never lose sight of the impact of this first principle
where a private ownership claim is being asserted against the State.
The PLA has undergone many revisions and changes over time, starting from
the first PLA, Act No. 926; the second public land law that followed, Act No.
2874; and the present CA 141 and its amendments. Act No. 926 was
described in the following terms:
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed
rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the
Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers
upon public lands", for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots
therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the
Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in
the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the
government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and
other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and
the friar lands. 14
This basic essence of the law has not changed and has been carried over to
the present PLA and its amendments. Another basic feature, the requirement
for open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the alienable and disposable public land under a bona fide claim of
ownership also never changed. Still another consistent public land feature is
the concept that once a person has complied with the requisite possession
and occupation in the manner provided by law, he is automatically given a
State grant that may be asserted against State ownership; the land, in other
words, ipso jure becomes private land. 15 The application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title shall then follow, based on the procedure for
land registration. 16 It is in this manner that the PLA ties up with the PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has been the period for reckoning the
required occupation or possession. In the first PLA, the required
occupation/possession to qualify for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
was 10 years preceding the effectivity of Act No. 926 July 26, 1904 (or
since July 26, 1894 or earlier). This was retained up to CA 141, until this law
was amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942 (enacted on June 22,
1957), 17 which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive period for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. This period did not last; on January 25,
1977, Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073) 18 changed the required 30-
year possession and occupation period provision, to possession and
occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. PD
1073 likewise changed the lands subject of imperfect title, from agricultural
lands of the public domain to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. PD 1073 also extended the period for applications for free patents
and judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to December 31, 1987.
The significance of the date "June 12, 1945" appears to have been lost to
history. A major concern raised against this date is that the country was at
this time under Japanese occupation, and for some years after, was suffering
from the uncertainties and instabilities that World War II brought. Questions
were raised on how one could possibly comply with the June 12, 1945 or
earlier occupation/possession requirement of PD 1073 when the then
prevailing situation did not legally or physically permit it.
Without the benefit of congressional records, as the enactment of the law (a
Presidential Decree) was solely through the President's lawmaking powers
under a regime that permitted it, the most logical reason or explanation for
the date is the possible impact of the interplay between the old law and the
amendatory law. When PD 1073 was enacted, the utmost concern, in all
probability, was how the law would affect the application of the old law which
provided for a thirty-year possession period. Counting 30 years backwards
from the enactment of PD 1073 on January 25, 1977, PD 1073 should have
provided for a January 24, 1947 cut-off date, but it did not. Instead, it
provided, for unknown reasons, the date June 12, 1945.
The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal concerns; vested rights acquired
under the old law (CA 141, as amended by RA 1942) providing for a 30-year
possession period could not be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment. We
recognized this legal dilemma in Abejaron v. Nabasa, 19 when we said:
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and
occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A.
1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in
1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession
should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to
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him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b)
takes place by operation of law, then upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the
requirements of this law, he would have already gained title over the disputed
land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair vested
rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who
by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may
apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title
under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus provided January 24, 1947
and not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet the latter date is the express
legal reality. The reconciliation, as properly defined by jurisprudence, is that
where an applicant has satisfied the requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA
141, as amended by RA 1942, prior to the effectivity of PD 1073, the
applicant is entitled to perfect his or her title, even if possession and
occupation does not date back to June 12, 1945. For purposes of the
present case, a discussion of the cut-off date has been fully made to
highlight that it is a date whose significance and import cannot be
minimized nor glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial
social policy concerns; the full legislative intent must be respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its amendments were not
confined to RA 1942 and PD 1073. These decrees were complemented
by Presidential Decree No. 892 (PD 892) 20 issued on February 16,
1976 which limited to six months the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
land registration proceedings. 21 Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered
lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code,
as amended by Act No. 3344. Section 3 of PD 1073 totally disallowed the
judicial confirmation of incomplete titles to public land based on unperfected
Spanish grants.
Subsequently, RA 6940 22 extended the period for filing applications for free
patent and judicial confirmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2000. The
law now also allows the issuance of free patents for lands not in excess of 12
hectares to any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of
more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of
the amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural
public lands subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for filing applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000
under RA 6940 to December 31, 2020. 23
Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which defines the
administrative grant of title to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain through homestead settlement and sale, among
others), RA 6940and RA 9176 signify that despite the cut-off date of
June 12, 1945 that the Legislature has provided, ample opportunities
exist under the law for the grant of alienable lands of the public domain
to deserving beneficiaries.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree
As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended Act No. 496 on June 11, 1978
to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. Its Section 14
describes the applicants who may avail of registration under the Decree,
among them
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
These subsections and their impact on the present case are separately
discussed below.
Section 14 (1)
Section 14 (1) merely repeated PD 1073 which sets a cut-off date of June 12,
1945 and which, under the conditions discussed above, may be read to be
January 24, 1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation with Section 14
(1) of the PRD and, noted among others, that "under the current state of the
law, the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only
until December 31, 2020". This is in light of RA 9176, passed in
2002, 24 limiting the filing of an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title to December 31, 2020. The amendatory law apparently refers
only to the use of Section 14 (1) of the PRD as a mode of registration. Where
ownership right or title has already vested in the possessor-occupant of the
land that Section 48 (b) of the PLA grants by operation of law, Section 14 (2)
of the PRD continuous to be open for purposes of registration of a "private
land" since compliance with Section 48 (b) of the PLA vests title to the
occupant/possessor and renders the land private in character.
The ponencia likewise rules against the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General that the public land to be registered must have been classified as
alienable and disposable as of the cut-off date for possession stated in
Section 48 (b) June 12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and reiterates its
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continuing support for the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Naguit that held: 25
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership". Generally speaking, qualifying
words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not
yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective
of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the
property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
xxx xxx xxx
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals, wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in
possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question
were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at
registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed
his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was
declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the
application was made years after the property had been certified as
alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as well discredits Bracewell. It does
the same with Republic v. Herbieto 26 that came after Naguit and should
have therefore overtaken the Naguit ruling. In the process, the ponencia cites
with approval the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 27 penned by the
same ponente who wrote Bracewell.
While the ponencia takes pains to compare these cases, it however
completely misses the point from the perspective of whether possession of
public lands classified as alienable and disposable after June 12, 1945
should be credited for purposes of a grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA,
and of registration under Section 14 (1) of the PRD. These cases, as
analyzed by the ponencia, merely granted or denied registration on the basis
of whether the public land has been classified as alienable and disposable at
the time the petition for registration was filed. Thus, except for Naguit, these
cases can be cited only as instances when registration was denied or
granted despite the classification of the land as alienable after June 12, 1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as shown in the quotation above,
this is one case that explained why possession prior to the classification of
public land as alienable should be credited in favor of the possessor who
filed his or her application for registration after the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable, but where such classification occurred after June
12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that the ponencia relied upon are its
statutory construction interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the PLA and the
observed ABSURDITY of using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for the
classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly disagree with Naguit and its
reasons.
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The Constitution classifies
public lands into agricultural, mineral, and timber. Of these, only agricultural
lands can be alienated. 28 Without the requisite classification, there can be
no basis to determine which lands of the public domain are alienable and
which are not; hence, classification is a constitutionally-required step
whose importance should be given full legal recognition and effect.
Otherwise stated, without classification into disposable agricultural land, the
land forms part of the mass of the public domain that, not being agricultural,
must be mineral or timber land that are completely inalienable and as such
cannot be possessed with legal effects. To allow effective possession is to do
violence to the regalian doctrine; the ownership and control that the doctrine
denotes will be less than full if the possession that should be with the State
as owner, but is elsewhere without any authority, can anyway be recognized.
From the perspective of the PLA under which grant can be claimed
under its Section 48 (b), it is very important to note that this law does
not apply until a classification into alienable and disposable land of the
public domain is made. If the PLA does not apply prior to a public land's
classification as alienable and disposable, how can possession under its
Section 48 (b) be claimed prior such classification? There can simply be no
83
imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or
alienable because, in the absence of such classification, the land remains
unclassified public land that fully belongs to the State. This is fully supported
by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of CA 141. 29 If the land is either mineral or
timber and can never be the subject of administration and disposition, it
defies legal logic to allow the possession of these unclassified lands to
produce legal effect. Thus, the classification of public land as alienable and
disposable is inextricably linked to effective possession that can ripen into a
claim under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is essentially a civil law term
that can best be understood in terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any
specific definition in the PLA other than in terms of time of
possession. 30Article 530 of the Civil Code provides that "[O]nly things and
rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession." Prior to the declaration of alienability, a land of the public
domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot have
legal effects. This perspective fully complements what has been said above
under the constitutional and PLA reasons. It confirms, too, that the critical
difference the ponenciasaw in the Bracewell and Naguit situations does not
really exist. Whether an application for registration is filed before or after the
declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if, in one as in the other, no
effective possession can be recognized prior to the declaration of alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date June 12, 1945.
The ponencia assumes, based on its statutory construction reasoning and its
reading of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, that all that the law requires is
possession from June 12, 1945 and that it suffices if the land has been
classified as alienable at the time of application for registration. As heretofore
discussed, this cut-off date was painstakingly set by law and should be given
full significance. Its full import appears from PD 1073 that amended Section
48 (b), whose exact wordings state:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII
of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-
in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945.
Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD 1073 did not expressly state
what Section 48 (b) should provide under the amendment PD
1073 introduced in terms of the exact wording of the amended Section 48
(b). But under the PD 1073 formulation, the intent to count the alienability to
June 12, 1945 appears very clear. The provision applies only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain that is described in terms of the
character of the possession required since June 12, 1945. This intent
 seen in the direct, continuous and seamless linking of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain to June 12, 1945 under the wording of
the Decree is clear and should be respected.
Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of lands under the
PLA. Naguit's absurdity argument that the ponencia effectively adopted is
more apparent than real, since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for
the declaration of alienability will not render the grant of alienable public
lands out of reach. The acquisition of ownership and title may still be
obtained by other modes under the PLA. Among other laws, RA 6940,
mentioned above, now allows the use of free patents. 31 It was approved on
March 28, 1990; hence, counting 30 years backwards, possession since April
1960 or thereabouts may qualify a possessor to apply for a free patent. The
administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the PLA are also open,
particularly, homestead settlement and sales.
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom the absurdity of the law. This Court
acts beyond the limits of the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers
in giving Section 48 (b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation beyond
its plain wording. Even this Court cannot read into the law an intent that is not
there even your purpose is to avoid an absurd situation. If we feel that a law
already has absurd effects because of the passage of time, our role under
the principle of separation of powers is not to give the law an interpretation
that is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity. We thereby dip into
the realm of policy a role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature.
If only for this reason, we should avoid expanding through Naguit and the
present ponencia the plain meaning of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as
amended by PD 1073.
In standing by Naguit, the ponencia pointedly discredits the ruling
in Herbieto; it is, allegedly, either an incorrect ruling or an obiter dictum. As to
legal correctness, Herbieto is in full accord with what we have stated above;
hence, it cannot be dismissed off-hand as an incorrect ruling. Likewise, its
ruling on the lack of effective legal possession prior to the classification of a
public land as alienable and disposable cannot strictly be obiter because it
responded to an issue directly raised by the parties. Admittedly, its ruling on
jurisdictional grounds could have fully resolved the case, but it cannot be
faulted if it went beyond this threshold issue into the merits of the claim of
effective possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than the Naguit ruling that
the ponencia passes off as the established and definitive rule on possession
under Section 14 (1) of the PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason that
no definitive ruling touching on Section 14 (1) can be deemed to have
been established in the present case since the applicant Heirs could
only prove possession up to 1948. For this reason, the ponencia falls
back on and examines Section 14 (2) of the PRD. In short, if there is a
84
perfect example of a ruling that is not necessary for the resolution of a
case, that unnecessary ruling is the ponencia's ruling that Naguit is
now the established rule.
Section 14 (2)
Section 14 (2), by its express terms, applies only to private lands. Thus,
on plain reading, it does not apply to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain that Section 14 (1) covers. This is the difference
between Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way of expanding the coverage
of Section 14 (2) via the Civil Code by directly applying civil law provisions on
prescription on alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To quote
the obiter dictum in Naguit that the ponencia wishes to enshrine as the
definitive rule and leading case on Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2): 32
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.
There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
"private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June
12, 1945, and such possession being open, continuous and exclusive, then
the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code should be
considered in the interpretation of Section 14 (2). Article 1113 of the Civil
Code provides:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1) the Civil Code
fully applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; (2)
assuming that the Civil Code fully applies, these properties are patrimonial
and are therefore "private property"; and (3) assuming that the Civil Code
fully applies, that these properties are within the commerce of men and can
be acquired through prescription.
I find the Naguit obiter to be questionable because of the above assumptions
and its direct application of prescription under Section 14 (2) to alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. This Section becomes relevant only
once the ownership of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain vests in the occupant or possessor pursuant to the terms of
Section 48 (b) of the PLA, with or without judicial confirmation of title,
so that the land has become a private land. At that point, Section 14 (2)
becomes fully operational on what had once been an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRD's
Section 14 (2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the public domain is clear from
Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution. There are matters that the
Constitution itself provides for, and some that are left for Congress to deal
with. Thus, under Section 3, the Constitution took it upon itself to classify
lands of the public domain, and to state that only agricultural lands may be
alienable lands of the public domain. It also laid down the terms under which
lands of the public domain may be leased by corporations and individuals. At
the same time, it delegated to Congress the authority to classify agricultural
lands of the public domain according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Congress likewise determines, by law, the size of the lands of the
public domain that may be acquired, developed, held or leased, and the
conditions therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the choice on how it will act,
specifically, whether it will pass a general or a special law. On alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, Congress has, from the very
beginning,acted through the medium of a special law, specifically, through the
Public Land Act that by its terms "shall apply to the lands of the public
domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws."
Notably, the Act goes on to provide that nothing in it "shall be understood or
construed to change or modify the administration and disposition of the lands
commonly called 'friar lands' and those which, being privately owned, have
reverted to or become property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
which administration and disposition shall be governed by laws at present in
force or which may hereafter be enacted." 33 Under these terms, the PLA
can be seen to be a very specific act whose coverage extends only to lands
of the public domain; in this sense, it is a special law on that subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that covers general rules on the
effect and application of laws and human relations; persons and family
relations; property and property relations; the different modes of acquiring
ownership; and obligations and contracts. 34 Its general nature is best
appreciated when in its Article 18, it provides that: "In matters which are
governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall
be supplied by the provisions of this Code."
The Civil Code has the same relationship with the PRD with respect to the
latter's special focus land registration and fully applies civil law
provisions in so far only as they are allowed by the PRD. One such case
where the Civil Code is expressly allowed to apply is in the case of Section
14 (2) of the PRD which calls for the application of prescription under existing
laws.
85
As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD have their own specific
purposes and are supreme within their own spheres, subject only to what the
higher Constitution provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what the PLA
provides when the matter to be registered is an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.
Application of the Civil Code
In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules on property, including State
property. It classifies property as either of public dominion or of private
ownership, 35 and property for public use, public service and those for the
development of the national wealth as property of the public dominion. 36 All
property not so characterized are patrimonial property of the State 37 which
are susceptible to private ownership, 38 against which prescription will
run. 39
In reading all these provisions, it should not be overlooked that they refer to
the properties of the State in general, i.e., to both movable and immovable
properties. 40 Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property do not refer to
land alone, much less do they refer solely to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. For this specie of land, the PLA is the
special governing law and, under the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code
provisions shall apply only in case of deficiency. 41
This conclusion gives rise to the question can alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain at the same time be patrimonial property of the
State because they are not for public use, public purpose, and for the
development of national wealth?
The answer to this question can be found, among others, in the interaction
discussed above between the PLA and PRD, on the one hand, and the Civil
Code, on the other, and will depend on the purpose for which an answer is
necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to determine whether a grant or
disposition of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain has
been made, then the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only
suppletorily. The possession and occupation that the PLA recognizes is
based on its Section 48 (b) and, until the requirements of this Section are
satisfied, the alienable and disposable land of the public domain remains a
State property that can be disposed only under the terms of Section 11 of the
PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the question of whether for purposes
of prescription an alienable and disposable land of the public domain is
patrimonial or not becomes immaterial; a public land, even if alienable and
disposable, is State property and prescription does not run against the
State. 42 In other words, there is no room for any hairsplitting that
would allow the inapplicable concept of prescription under the Civil
Code to be directly applied to an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain before this land satisfies the terms of a grant under
Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion of the patrimonial character of
alienable and disposable public lands under the norms of the Civil Code is
rendered moot and academic.
From the prism of the overriding regalian doctrine that all lands of the public
domain are owned by the State, an applicant for land registration invoking
Section 14 (2) of the PRD to support his claim must first clearly show that the
land has been withdrawn from the public domain through an express and
positive act of the government. 43
A clear express governmental grant or act withdrawing a particular land from
the mass of the public domain is provided both in the old and the prevailing
Public Land Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance with the
required possession of agricultural public land (under the first and second
PLAs) or alienable and disposable land of the public domain (under the
prevailing PLA) in the manner and duration provided by law is equivalent to a
government grant. Thus, the land ipso jure becomes private land. It is only at
that point that the "private land" requirement of Section 14 (2)
materializes. 44
Prescription
In my original Dissent (in response to the original ponencia), I discussed
ordinary acquisitive prescription as an academic exercise to leave no stone
unturned in rejecting the ponencia's original conclusion that prescription
directly applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
Section 14 (2) of the PRD. I am happy to note that the present ponencia has
adopted, albeit without any attribution, part of my original academic
discussion on the application of the Civil Code, particularly on the subjects of
patrimonial property of the State and prescription.
Specifically, I posited assuming arguendo that the Civil Code applies
that the classification of a public land as alienable and disposable does
not per se signify that the land is patrimonial under the Civil Code since
property, to be patrimonial, must not be for public use, for public purpose or
for the development of national wealth. Something more must be done or
shown beyond the fact of classification. The ponencia now concedes
that "[T]here must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use or the
development of the national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And
only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run."
I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case when the property has
become private by the government's own declaration so that prescription
under the Civil Code can run. Note in this regard that there is no
inconsistency between this conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on lands of
the public domain that I expounded on. To reiterate, the PLA applies as a
special and primary law when a public land is classified as alienable
and disposable, and remains fully and exclusively applicable until the
86
State itself expressly declares that the land now qualifies as a
patrimonial property. At that point, the application of the Civil Code and
its law on prescription are triggered. The application of Section 14 (2) of
the PRD follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that:
1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain must be given full application in
considering lands of the public domain. Top consideration should be
accorded to the Philippine Constitution, particularly its Article XII, followed by
the consideration of applicable special laws the PLA and the PRD, insofar
as this Decree applies to lands of the public domain. The Civil Code and
other general laws apply to the extent expressly called for by the primary
laws or to supply any of the latter's deficiencies.
2. The ruling in this ponencia and in Naguit that the classification of public
lands as alienable and disposable does not need to date back to June 12,
1945 at the latest, is wrong because:
a. Under the Constitution's regalian doctrine, classification is a required step
whose full import should be given full effect and recognition; giving legal
effect to possession prior to classification runs counter to the regalian
doctrine.
b. The Public Land Act applies only from the time a public land is classified
as alienable and disposable; thus, Section 48 (b) of this law and the
possession it requires cannot be recognized prior to any classification.
c. Under the Civil Code, "[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of
being appropriated may be the object of possession." Prior to the
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable, a land of the
public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed possession
cannot have legal effects.
d. There are other modes of acquiring alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under the Public Land Act; this legal reality renders
the ponencia's absurdity argument misplaced.
e. The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the law and is a
matter for the Legislature, not for this Court, to address.
Consequently, Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for being based on
legally-flawed premises and for being an aberration in land registration
jurisprudence. At the very least, the present ponencia cannot be viewed as
an authority on the effective possession prior to classification since this
ruling, by the ponencia's own admission, is not necessary for the resolution
of the present case.
||| (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, [April 29, 2009], 605
PHIL 244-326)

[G.R. No. 148338. June 6, 2002.]
ANGEL DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Ramel A. Aguinaldo for petitioner.
Solicitor General for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner filed an application for registration of a parcel of land, identified as
Lot No. 1891, Cad-457-D, Maragondon Cadastre, Ap-04-0011601, consisting
of 772,329 square meters in Brgy. Pinagsanhan, Maragondon, Cavite. On the
day he filed his application, petitioner submitted to the Branch Clerk of Court
the original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891. Sometime thereafter, the clerk
of court transmitted to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) the duplicate
copy of petitioner's application, the original tracing cloth plan, and other
documents submitted by petitioner in support of his application. After trial and
submission of evidence, the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite rendered its
decision granting the application of petitioner. Respondent appealed to the
Court of Appeals which rendered its decision reversing the decision of the
trial court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was
denied. EAHcCT
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the
application of petitioner. The submission in evidence of the original tracing
cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of
original registration of land, is a mandatory requirement. The reason for this
rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not
overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous
land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The failure to comply with this
requirement is fatal to petitioner's application. The Court further ruled that
petitioner failed to establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest had met
the legal requirements as to the nature and length of possession leading to a
registrable title over the land. Assuming that petitioner had planted the
bamboo and mango trees thereon, this fact would hardly suffice to prove
possession as it would constitute "a mere casual cultivation" of that large
tract of land. The Court stressed that possession of public land, however long
the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does
not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF
LANDS; SUBMISSION OF ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN IS A
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF MANDATORY CHARACTER. The
87
submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by
the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is
a mandatory requirement. The reason for this rule is to establish the true
identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a
portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to
forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration
of any adjoining land. The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to
petitioner's application for registration. Petitioner contends, however, that he
had submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court, but
the latter submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner
is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to present it
in evidence in the trial court. The Court of Appeals appropriately quoted from
our decision in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, in which it
was similarly claimed that applicant failed to present the tracing cloth plan of
the land applied for because it had been forwarded to the Land Registration
Authority. Rejecting the contention, this Court, through Justice Nocon,
held: . . . It is undisputed that the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied
for was not submitted in evidence by respondent, which omission is fatal to
his application. The submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character. . . . Neither does the advance survey
plan, which was attached to petitioner's application and marked in evidence,
suffice to comply with the requirement of the law. Although in one case it was
ruled that a mere blueprint copy of the cloth plan, together with the lot's
technical description, was sufficient to identify the land applied for
registration, both the blueprint copy and the technical description were
certified as to their correctness by the Director of Lands. In this case, what
was marked in evidence, the advance survey plan and the technical
description, lacked the necessary certification from the Bureau of Lands.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AS TO THE NATURE AND
LENGTH OF THE POSSESSION LEADING TO A REGISTERABLE TITLE
OVER LAND; MERE CASUAL CULTIVATION OF SOME PORTIONS OF
THE LAND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE POSSESSION UNDER A CLAIM OF
OWNERSHIP. Petitioner failed to establish that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had met the legal requirements as to the nature and length of
possession leading to a registrable title over the land. Petitioner claims that
he and his family cultivated the subject land, without the help of tenants, in
order to plant bamboo and mango trees thereon. His witness also testified
that the land was for a time planted with coconut trees andpalay. However,
from the testimonies of petitioner and his witness, it appears that petitioner is
a businessman who, while born in Maragondon, Cavite, has actually been a
resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite from childhood until the present.
Moreover, it appears that the land was only planted with bamboo trees, which
do not require much tending to. There is also doubt as to how many mango
trees, if any, existed on the land or to the volume of fruits harvested from
these trees, since there was no testimony to that effect and the tax
declaration offered in evidence stated that the improvements found on the
land were only bamboo trees. Raymundo Telia testified he remembered that
there existed on the land some coconut trees, but these were no longer there
at the time of his testimony. He also testified that the land was planted
with palay, but not by petitioner or his predecessors or his family but
by kaingeros, including himself, who only asked permission from petitioner to
use the land. Assuming that petitioner had planted the bamboo and mango
trees thereon, this fact would hardly suffice to prove possession as it would
constitute "a mere casual cultivation" of that large tract of land. A mere casual
cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive
and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The
possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute
of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state,
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required number of years. DEcITS
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TAX DECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS ARE NOT
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP BUT ARE MERE INDICIA OF A
CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. Although petitioner claims that he possessed
Lot No. 1891 by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest since the
1930s, his tax declaration and tax payment receipt belie the same. It is
noteworthy that the land subject of the application was declared for taxation
purposes only on September 8, 1997 and the taxes due thereon covered only
a period of 10 years beginning 1988 and was paid only on September 9,
1997, or a little more than a month prior to the filing of the application. There
is no other tax declaration or receipt for tax payments by petitioner's
predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership but are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership. TcHCDI
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERTY STILL UNCLASSIFIED AT THE TIME
PETITIONER AND HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST ALLEGEDLY
BEGAN POSSESSION OF THE LAND. It is also noteworthy that the
certification submitted by petitioner shows that the land became alienable
and disposable only on certain dates. Thus, one portion of the land was
certified on November 12, 1971, while the remaining portion was certified on
June 21, 1983. As petitioner's application was filed only on October 13, 1997,
almost 26 years from the time one portion was certified as alienable and
disposable and 14 years from the time the remaining portion was certified,
the property was still unclassified at the time petitioner and his predecessors-
in-interest allegedly began their possession of the same. As held in Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: A person cannot enter into forest land
and, by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
88
towards the eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must
first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land
before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession
can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; NO BASIS REOPENING OF THE
CASE ON THE GROUND OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. For
evidence to be admitted under Rule 53, 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the same must comply with the following requisites: (a) the
evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is
of such weight, that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. In the
present case, the original tracing cloth plan could not be considered as newly
discovered evidence since it was already available upon the filing of the
application for registration. Although it could not be produced during the trial
because it was still in the custody of the LRA at that time, it was petitioner's
failure to exercise reasonable diligence in producing the same that accounts
for its non-presentation in evidence. With regard to the "sepia copy" of the
cloth plan, it is apparent that the prayer to allow its presentation is a mere
afterthought because it was never offered in evidence during the trial and
petitioner had already turned over his original tracing cloth plan to the branch
clerk of court for submission to the LRA. Petitioner should have submitted in
evidence the "sepia copy" duly approved by the Bureau of Lands in lieu of
the original tracing cloth plan while the case was still on trial, and not now as
he belatedly offers it on appeal.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals, reversing the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XV,
Naic, Cavite and denying the application of petitioner Angel del Rosario for
registration of title over a large tract of land in Maragondon, Cavite.
On October 13, 1997, petitioner filed an application 3 for registration of a
parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1891, Cad-457-D, Maragondon Cadastre,
Ap-04-0011601, consisting of 772,329 square meters in Brgy. Pinagsanhan,
Maragondon, Cavite. In his application, petitioner stated that he is a Filipino,
married to Agustina Catalasan, and a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite;
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question,
which was alienable and disposable land, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since the 1920s or even earlier; and that such land was being
occupied and cultivated by him and his family. Petitioner further alleged that
there was no mortgage or encumbrance on the land; that the same was not
bound by any public or private road or by any river or creek; and that there
was no person having any interest therein, legal or equitable, or having
possession thereof other than himself. Petitioner indicated the
owners/claimants/occupants of the adjoining properties [(a) the Municipal
Engineer (northern boundary), Ternate, Cavite; (b) Juan Angeles (or his
heirs/successors; for Lot 1890), Brgy. Sapang, Ternate, Cavite; (c) Madiano
Villanueva (or his heirs/successors; for Lots 1286 & 1291), Brgy. Bucal,
Maragondon, Cavite; (d) Agripino Villanueva (or his heirs/successors; for Lot
1290), Brgy. Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; (e) Lucas Arcival (or his
heirs/successors; for Lot 1482), Maragondon, Cavite; (f) Danilo Sisayan (for
Lot 1287), Brgy. Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; and (g) the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for the Republic of the
Philippines (Lot 1692), Plaza Cervantes, Binondo, Manila], and annexed to
his application the following documents: (a) an advance survey plan of the
land applied for with technical descriptions, Survey Plan, Ap-04-
0011601; 4 (b) Technical Description of Lot No. 1891; 5 (c) Certification in
lieu of Geodetic Engineer's certification issued for registration purposes,
attesting to the genuineness of the survey plan; 6 (d) Certification, dated
August 14, 1997, that the subject land is alienable and disposable; 7 (e)
Certification, dated October 7, 1997, that the property is not covered by any
public land application or patent; 8 (f) Tax Declaration No. 7414, Series of
1998, covering the parcel of land; 9 and (g) Official Receipt No. 1038951S,
dated September 9, 1997, showing petitioner's payment of the realty taxes
on the said lot up to 1997. 10
On the same day he filed his application, petitioner also submitted to the
Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Jameswell M. Resus, the original tracing cloth
plan for Lot No. 1891. 11 On October 15, 1997, the clerk of court transmitted
to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) the duplicate copy of petitioner's
application for registration of title of Lot No. 1891, the original tracing cloth
plan, and the other documents submitted by petitioner in support of his
application. 12
During the initial hearing on February 24, 1998, no oppositor appeared
except for the provincial prosecutor of Maragondon, Cavite, who appeared on
behalf of the Solicitor General in representation of the Republic of the
Philippines through the Bureau of Lands. Accordingly, the trial court issued
an order of general default against the whole world, with the exception of the
Bureau of Lands, after which petitioner submitted documentary evidence to
establish the jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, the case was referred to a trial
commissioner for the reception of further evidence. 13
Aside from himself, petitioner presented Raymundo Telia before the trial
commissioner to prove his claim of ownership and title over the parcel of land
applied for registration. Both of them were subjected to cross-examination by
the provincial prosecutor.
In his testimony, petitioner reiterated the allegations in his application and
identified the annexed documents. He claimed he and his family planted in
89
the subject lot mango and bamboo trees and raised animals on it. Petitioner
testified that he inherited the land from his grandfather, who caused the
survey of the said lot to be made in his name as the original claimant. He
said that he possessed the subject property from 1984, the time the cadastral
survey was made thereon, but also claimed that the first survey on the land
was made in 1930. Petitioner also stated that his predecessors-in-interest
started cultivating the property in 1940, planting kakawati trees along its
boundaries. He claimed that he and his family alone were the ones who
gathered the fruits and forest products of the land and that no one had ever
disturbed his possession over the lot or questioned his ownership of the
same. 14
To corroborate petitioner's testimony, Raymundo Telia, then 59 years old,
testified that he personally knew the real property subject of the application
since he went there with petitioner, whom he recognized as the owner of the
lot. Telia stated that when he was still young, the property was already
planted with kakawati trees along its boundaries. According to him, when he
came of age, he already knew that petitioner owned the property and that
anybody who needed to get bamboo, gather firewood, or do kaingin farming
could do so only upon petitioner's permission. Furthermore, Telia stated that
he and his parents stayed in the property during the Japanese occupation
and settled there until the 1950s with leave from petitioner. Telia said he
stayed on the land for about three years more engaging in kaingin farming.
He further claimed that, although he did not personally know Madiano
Villanueva, Lucas Arcival, and Danilo Sisayan, who allegedly were the
owners of the adjoining lots, it was public knowledge that they were indeed
such. 15
On August 25, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision granting the
application of petitioner. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous
Order of General Default hereby decrees and adjudge[s] that certain parcel
of land as herein above identified, described, and bounded, consisting of
772,329 square meters, described as Lot No. 1891, Cad-457-D, Maragondon
Cadastre, Ap-04-0011601 situated in Barangay Pinagsanhan, Maragondon,
Cavite and its technical description, pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 496, as amended by P.D. No. 1529, in the name of the applicant,
Angel del Rosario, Filipino, married to Agustina Catalasan, and a resident of
Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of
registration be issued by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA).
SO ORDERED. 16
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, putting in issue the failure of
petitioner to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891
and to establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, and notorious possession of the land applied for registration for
the period required by law. 17
On January 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision 18 reversing the decision of the trial court on the ground that
petitioner indeed failed to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of
the land applied for registration. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his
motion was denied for lack of merit. 19
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that
1. THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION WAS UNJUSTIFIED.
2. IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE
BEEN REOPENED TO ADMIT THE ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN IN
EVIDENCE, TO AVOID A REPETITION OF THE SAME PROCEEDINGS
ALREADY HAD IN THIS APPLICATION. 20
The petition is without merit.
First. Petitioner argues that the denial of his application because of his failure
to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of Lot No. 1891 was
unjustified. He claims that he should not be faulted for such failure since he
turned over the same to the trial court on the day he filed his application, but
it was submitted to the LRA by the branch clerk of court and could not be
produced during the trial.
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved
by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land
is a mandatory requirement. 21 The reason for this rule is to establish the
true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a
portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to
forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration
of any adjoining land. 22 The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to
petitioner's application for registration.
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original tracing cloth
plan to the branch clerk of court, but the latter submitted the same to the
LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve the tracing
cloth plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. 23 The
Court of Appeals appropriately quoted from our decision in Director of Lands
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 24 in which it was similarly claimed that
applicant failed to present the tracing cloth plan of the land applied for
because it had been forwarded to the Land Registration Authority. Rejecting
the contention, this Court, through Justice Nocon, held:
It is undisputed that the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was
not submitted in evidence by respondent, which omission is fatal to his
application. The submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character.
90
Respondent's counsel on the other hand contends that he submitted the
original tracing cloth plan, together with other documents, to the Clerk of
Court when he filed the application. The application and supporting
documents were then elevated to the Land Registration Commission (now
the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration) for approval
of the survey plan by the Director of Lands. Respondent argues the fact that
the Commissioner of Land Registration issued a Notice of Initial Hearing
would indicate that respondent had submitted all the pertinent documents
relative to his application.
This argument had already been disposed of in Director of Lands vs.
Reyes [68 SCRA 177, 189 (1975)], wherein this Court held
Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-submission of the original
tracing cloth plan by claiming that the same must be with the Land
Registration Commission which checked or verified the survey plan and the
technical description thereof. It is not the function of the LRC to check the
original survey plan as it had no authority to approve original survey plans. If,
for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the
applicant may easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the same in
evidence. This was not done.
Respondent further contends that petitioner failed to object to the blue print
copy of the survey plan when the same was offered in evidence, thereby
waiving the objection to said evidence.
We do not agree. Rule 143 of the Rules of Court provides:
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. 25
Neither does the advance survey plan, which was attached to petitioner's
application and marked in evidence, suffice to comply with the requirement of
the law. Although in one case 26 it was ruled that a mere blueprint copy of
the cloth plan, together with the lot's technical description, was sufficient to
identify the land applied for registration, both the blueprint copy and the
technical description were certified as to their correctness by the Director of
Lands. In this case, what was marked in evidence, the advance survey plan
and the technical description, lacked the necessary certification from the
Bureau of Lands.
Second. Petitioner prays that the trial court proceedings be reopened in order
for him to be able to present in evidence either the original tracing cloth
plan 27 or the "sepia copy" (Diazo Polyester Film) in lieu thereof 28 pursuant
to theNALDTRA (LRC) Circular No. 66 dated May 2, 1985. 29 Petitioner
contends that the original tracing cloth plan or the "sepia copy" thereof may
be considered as newly discovered evidence which, when admitted in
evidence, may alter the result of the case.
The argument is without merit. For evidence to be admitted under Rule 53,
1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the same must comply with the
following requisites: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight, that, if admitted, will
probably change the judgment. 30 In the present case, the original tracing
cloth plan could not be considered as newly discovered evidence since it was
already available upon the filing of the application for registration. Although it
could not be produced during the trial because it was still in the custody of
the LRA at that time, it was petitioner's failure to exercise reasonable
diligence in producing the same that accounts for its non-presentation in
evidence. 31 With regard to the "sepia copy" of the cloth plan, it is apparent
that the prayer to allow its presentation is a mere afterthought because it was
never offered in evidence during the trial and petitioner had already turned
over his original tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court for submission
to the LRA. 32 Petitioner should have submitted in evidence the "sepia copy"
duly approved by the Bureau of Lands in lieu of the original tracing cloth plan
while the case was still on trial, and not now as he belatedly offers it on
appeal.
Third. Petitioner failed to establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had met the legal requirements as to the nature and length of possession
leading to a registrable title over the land. Petitioner claims that he and his
family cultivated the subject land, without the help of tenants, in order to plant
bamboo and mango trees thereon. His witness also testified that the land
was for a time planted with coconut trees and palay. However, from the
testimonies of petitioner and his witness, it appears that petitioner is a
businessman who, while born in Maragondon, Cavite, has actually been a
resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite from childhood until the present.
Moreover, it appears that the land was only planted with bamboo trees, which
do not require much tending to. There is also doubt as to how many mango
trees, if any, existed on the land or to the volume of fruits harvested from
these trees, since there was no testimony to that effect and the tax
declaration offered in evidence stated that the improvements found on the
land were only bamboo trees. 33
Raymundo Telia testified he remembered that there existed on the land some
coconut trees, but these were no longer there at the time of his testimony. He
also testified that the land was planted with palay, but not by petitioner or his
predecessors or his family but by kaingeros, including himself, who only
asked permission from petitioner to use the land. Assuming that petitioner
had planted the bamboo and mango trees thereon, this fact would hardly
suffice to prove possession as it would constitute "a mere casual cultivation"
of that large tract of land. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by
the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For
91
him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however
long the period thereof may have, extended, never confers title thereto upon
the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required number of years. 34
Although petitioner claims that he possessed Lot No. 1891 by himself and
through his predecessors-in-interest since the 1930s, his tax declaration and
tax payment receipt belie the same. It is noteworthy that the land subject of
the application was declared for taxation purposes only on September 8,
1997 and the taxes due thereon covered only a period of 10 years beginning
1988 and was paid only on September 9, 1997, or a little more than a month
prior to the filing of the application. There is no other tax declaration or
receipt for tax payments by petitioner's predecessors-in-interest. Moreover,
tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership but
are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. 35
It is also noteworthy that the certification submitted by petitioner shows that
the land became alienable and disposable only on certain dates
. . . the area shaded in orange color is within the Alienable or Disposable
(sic), Project No. 15 of Maragondon, Cavite per Lc Map No. 2720; cert. on
November 12, 1971.
2. the remaining portion of the area is within the Alienable or Disposable
(sic), Block-1, Project No. 15-A, of Maragondon, Cavite per LC Map No.
3091; cert. on June 21, 1983. 36
Thus, one portion of the land was certified on November 12, 1971, while the
remaining portion was certified on June 21, 1983. As petitioner's application
was filed only on October 13, 1997, almost 26 years from the time one
portion was certified as alienable and disposable and 14 years from the time
the remaining portion was certified, the property was still unclassified at the
time petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest allegedly began their
possession of the same. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals: 37
A person cannot enter into forest land and, by the simple act of cultivating a
portion of that land, earn credits towards the eventual confirmation of
imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be
alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation,
and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.
Hence, in view of the lack of sufficient evidence of the 30-year open,
notorious, and conclusive possession in the concept of an owner, as required
by C.A. No. 141, 48 (b), as amended, petitioner's application for original
registration of Lot No. 1891 cannot be granted. 38
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the application
of petitioner Angel del Rosario for original registration of Lot No. 1891,
Cadastral 457-D, Maragondon, Cavite, Ap-04-0011601, is
AFFIRMED. AECIaD
SO ORDERED.
||| (Del Rosario v. Republic, G.R. No. 148338, [June 6, 2002], 432 PHIL 824-
839)
[G.R. No. 154953. June 26, 2008.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.T.A.N. PROPERTIES,
INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 21 August 2002
Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision 3 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration
Case No. T-635. AcISTE
The Antecedent Facts
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed
by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-
04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or
56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m.
on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the
Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793
to 6794, 4 and in the 18 October 1999 issue of People's Journal Taliba, 5 a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial
Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the
Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous
place on the land. 6 All adjoining owners and all government agencies and
offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing. 7
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing,
there was no oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of
the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands
(petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order 8 of
General Default against the whole world except as against petitioner.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang)
appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang until 29 November
1999 within which to file his written opposition. 9 Carandang failed to file his
written opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an
Order 10 dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of
General Default. CDISAc
92
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent
presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres),respondent's
Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo
Evangelista (Evangelista),a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA),Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondent's witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga
(Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession
of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang
Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27
September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in
favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however,
Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961,
Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was
adjudicated to one of Antonio's children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). 11 On
8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor
of respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for
registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts
showed that respondent's predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the
concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted the
land to private property. cEaCAH
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General
Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to
Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated
in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of
Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the
name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws with principal office at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank
Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of
registration be issued.
SO ORDERED. 12
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision. Petitioner alleged that the
trial court erred in granting the application for registration absent clear
evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied
with the period of possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner
alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature.
Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses
should have been presented to corroborate Evangelista's testimony. IESDCH
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial
court's Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista's knowledge of the possession
and occupation of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked
there for three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were
practically neighbors. On Evangelista's failure to mention the name of his
uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that
Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle
when he testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that at the outset,
Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunato's relation to Kabesang Puroy,
but this did not affect Evangelista's statement that Fortunato took over the
possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroy's death. The
Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and
disposition of the land became public knowledge because San Bartolome
was a small community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration
of the sole witness' testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since
he was only testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing of the
application for registration and that respondent acquired the land from
Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision.
Petitioner raises the following grounds in its Memorandum: IATHaS
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title
to applicant corporation despite the following:
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of
land. 13
The Issues
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the
concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and SAHIaD
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land
under the Public Land Act.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the public domain.
93
Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer
part of the public domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumably belong to the State. 14 The onus to overturn,
by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
applicant. 15 AHDacC
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June
1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, 16 certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas
with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582
certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second certification 17 in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical
Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated
"that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project
No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the
offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO
issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares.
The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues
certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.
DAO No. 38, 19dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988.
DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well
as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification
status for lands covering over 50 hectares. 20 In this case, respondent
applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is
over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered
the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per
DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify
as alienable and disposable. AcISTE
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO
Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20,
the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits
except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for
public infrastructure projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and
lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits
except rattan; EcSCAD
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and
lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity
declared areas for public infrastructure projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five
hectares for public infrastructure projects. ASIDTa
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-
DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative
value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established
to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager, identified the certifications
submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the
certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their
contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative
value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. DSATCI
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by
law to be entered therein.
94
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to
in Section 19 (a),when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy . . . . The CENRO is not the official
repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary
declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have
attached an official publication 21 of the DENR Secretary's issuance
declaring the land alienable and disposable. cASTED
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents
are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do
not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first
sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries
in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer", such
as entries made by the Civil Registrar 22 in the books of registries, or by a
ship captain in the ship's logbook. 23 The certifications are not the certified
copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal
custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of
public documents. 24 The certifications are conclusions unsupported by
adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. 25 Certainly, the
certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do
not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not,
by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. 26 Such government
certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the
second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are
prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do
not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. EHIcaT
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the
testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated
therein. 27 Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent's representative,
identified the certifications but the government officials who issued the
certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the
certifications cannot be given probative value. 28 The contents of the
certifications are hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the
veracity of the contents of the certifications. 29 Torres did not prepare the
certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not
conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within the area
classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly
became alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based
on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and
disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print
plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent
show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states
that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent
alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location
and the metes and bounds of the land described therein . . . and does not in
any way certify the nature and classification of the land involved." 30 It is true
that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the
land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is
not sufficient proof of the land's classification. 31 However, respondent
should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in
the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the
documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the
technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the
Geodetic Engineer's certification were faithful reproductions of the original
documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates.
Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of
classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications
submitted by respondent. DAcaIE
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious Possession
and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of
Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelista's
statement that the possession of respondent's predecessors-in-interest was
open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a
general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of title.
Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-
interest had held the land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30
years after it was declared alienable and disposable.
We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land
before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three years.
Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy's land.
The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelista's
knowledge of Kabesang Puroy's possession of the land stemmed "not only
from the fact that he had worked thereat but more so that they were
practically neighbors." 32The Court of Appeals observed:
95
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas,
it is not difficult to understand that people in the said community knows each
and everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each other, news or
events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract
of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became of
public knowledge to them. 33
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato.
However, he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between
Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a
small community. He did not also know the relationship between Fortunato
and Porting. In fact, Evangelista's testimony is contrary to the factual finding
of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not
by Fortunato who was one of Antonio's children. Antonio was not even
mentioned in Evangelista's testimony. EHcaDT
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the
testimony of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we
find Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in
the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the
testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on
the fact of respondent's acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be
related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was
hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While
tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute
proof of claim of ownership. 34 Respondent did not present any credible
explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the
claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before
1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the
presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the
land only in that year.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for
registration of the land of the public domain in this case. cHDEaC
We agree with petitioner.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines
may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than
twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and
development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor. aCSHDI
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, 35 the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the
public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against
private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973
Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals
who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private
corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer
allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987
Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 36 The Court
explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973
Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease....
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings,
the Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the
public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have
followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution,
and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing
the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing
the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a
corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the
corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent
the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one
generation to the next. ISCaTE
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional
limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of
alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban,
individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable
public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means
would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation
96
by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation
is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to
transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public
domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by
the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is
removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the
face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful
adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the
public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit
arising from the constitutional ban. 37
In Director of Lands v. IAC, 38 the Court allowed the land registration
proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels
of land with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which
Acme acquired from members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case
was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the
proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which
prohibited private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The
Court ruled that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it
from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under
the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural
lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not more
than 144 hectares. 39 HAISEa
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and
undisputed possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law
created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period,ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to
be public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed
by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "...shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ...." No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and
length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert
the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete.
. . . [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure.Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed
facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the
time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a
registrable title,there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation's holding or owning private land. .... 40 (Emphasis
supplied) HTCIcE
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of
Lands, the "land ...was already private property at the time it was
acquired ...by Acme". In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8
August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has
not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when
respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was not yet private
property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration
of alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the
land when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation
of title to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession
of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June
1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 41 the Court declared:
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of
land in question had already been converted to private ownership through
acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the
latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of
the titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition
in the 1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973
Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of
the public domain but private property.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the
corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the
land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the
statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The
length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to
complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an
individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973
97
and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the
public domain. EASCDH
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of
land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176 42 (R.A.
9176) further amended the Public Land Act 43 and extended the period for
the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete
titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31
December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail
of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only
where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided,
further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in
accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this Chapter
at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory
Act shall be treated as having been filed in accordance with the provisions of
this Act. HacADE
Under R.A. 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12
hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a
private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable
and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an
individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of
12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application
for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab
initio.In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any
right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right.
This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not
exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by
operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any
portion of the land was already private land when respondent acquired it from
Porting in 1997.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration
Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. HcSCED
||| (Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 154953, [June 26, 2008], 578
PHIL 441-464)

[G.R. No. 144773. May 16, 2005.]
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner, vs. LAURENCIO
AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS
OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN
BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF SIMEON AYING, AND WENCESLAO
SUMALINOG, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER
HEIRS OF ROBERTA AYING, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking the modification of
the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 7, 2000 which
affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 2930-L; and the Resolution
dated August 2, 2000 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned decision.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters
located at Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the
issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of land. After her
death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance
of a decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy-on's eight children, namely:
Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and
Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was, however, lost during
the war.
Subsequently, all the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1964,
conveying the subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Aznar Brothers
Realty Company. Said deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Lapu-Lapu City on March 6, 1964 under Act No. 3344 (the law governing
registration for unregistered land), and since then, petitioner had been
religiously paying real property taxes on said property.
In 1988, herein petitioner filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original
Title as the original title over the subject property had been lost during the
war. On April 12, 1988, the court granted said petition, thereby directing the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to issue a reconstituted title in the name
of the abovementioned Aying siblings. Thus, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. RO-2856 was issued.
In 1991, petitioner, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject property,
sent out notices to vacate, addressed to persons occupying the property.
98
Unheeded, petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment against the
occupants before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Lapu-Lapu
City. DIETHS
On February 1, 1994, the MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the property.
The case eventually reached this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 128102,
entitled Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. Court of Appeals, Luis Aying,
Demetrio Sida, Felomino Augusto, Federico Abing, and Romeo
Augusto. 2 On March 7, 2000, a Decision was promulgated in favor of herein
petitioner, declaring it as the rightful possessor of the parcel of land in
question.
Meanwhile, herein respondents, along with other persons claiming to be
descendants of the eight Aying siblings, all in all numbering around 220
persons, had filed a complaint for cancellation of the Extra-Judicial Partition
with Absolute Sale, recovery of ownership, injunction and damages with the
RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. The complaint was dismissed twice without
prejudice. Said complaint was re-filed on August 19, 1993, docketed as Civil
Case No. 2930-L.
In their amended complaint, herein respondents (plaintiffs before the RTC)
alleged that: they are co-owners of subject property, being descendants of
the registered owners thereof under OCT No. RO-2856; they had been in
actual, peaceful, physical, open, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
possession in concept of owner of subject parcel of land since time
immemorial; their possession was disturbed only in the last quarter of 1991
when some of them received notices to vacate from petitioner and several
weeks thereafter, earthmoving equipment entered the disputed land,
bulldozing the same and destroying plants, trees and concrete monuments
("mohon"); respondents discovered that such activities were being
undertaken by petitioner together with Sta. Lucia Realty and Development,
Inc.; petitioner claimed to be the owner of subject property by virtue of an
extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute sale executed in
petitioner's favor by the alleged heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on; the
aforementioned extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute
sale is a fraud and is null and void ab initio because not all the co-owners of
subject property affixed their signature on said document and some of the co-
owners who supposedly signed said document had been dead at the time of
the execution thereof; petitioner entered subject land in bad faith, knowing
fully well that it did not have any right to the land and used force, threat and
intimidation against respondents; and they suffered moral damages. 3
Petitioner (defendant before the RTC) filed its Answer, denying that
respondents are the lawful owners of subject parcel of land by virtue of their
being descendants or heirs of the registered owners of subject property.
Instead, petitioner alleged that it had been in actual possession of subject
land as owner thereof by virtue of the extra-judicial partition of real property
and deed of absolute sale executed in its favor; that in fact, it had been
paying taxes thereon religiously; that it tolerated about 6 persons to live on
said land but said persons were eventually ejected by court order. Petitioner
then raised the affirmative defenses of failure to state cause of action and
prescription, as it took respondents 27 years, 10 months and 27 days to file
the action to recover subject property, when an action to recover property
based on an implied trust should be instituted within 4 years from discovery
of the fraud. 4
In the Pre-Trial Order dated January 30, 1995 of the RTC, the issues were
narrowed down to the following:
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the heirs of the
registered owners of Lot No. 4399.
2. Whether or not plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 4399.
3. Whether or not the defendant Aznar [herein petitioner] is estopped to make
any claim on Lot No. 4399.
4. Whether or not the defendant Aznar is a builder in bad faith.
5. Whether or not the defendants are liable for damages and attorney's fees
in favor of the plaintiffs.
6. Whether or not the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale is valid and had, in effect, validly conveyed to defendant Aznar
Lot No. 4399.
7. Whether or not the plaintiffs' action has prescribed. 5
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated July 4, 1997, ruling that
respondents' evidence failed to prove that the extra-judicial partition with
deed of absolute sale was a totally simulated or fictitious contract and
concluded that said document is valid, thus, effectively conveying to
petitioner the property in question. It further held that respondents' action had
prescribed in that the action is considered as one for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust, it prescribed in 10 years from the registration of
the deed on March 6, 1964; and if the action is considered as one for
annulment of contract on the ground of fraud, it should have been filed within
4 years from discovery of the fraud. The trial court also ruled that
respondents failed to present any admissible proof of filiation, hence, they
were not able to prove that they are indeed heirs of the eight Aying siblings
who appear as the registered owners under OCT No. RO-2856. TaDSHC
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the amended
complaint on the ground of prescription, and declaring the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1964 as
valid and binding, adjudging that Lot 4399 with an area of 34,325 square
meters located at Dapdap, Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City had been validly
conveyed to and in favor of Aznar Brothers Realty Company, and directing
the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to register the above-mentioned
deed in accordance with law and to cancel Original Certificate of Title No.
RO-2856, and to issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of Aznar
99
Brothers Realty Company upon payment of the necessary registration fees
pursuant thereto.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued in this case is hereby ordered
dissolved.
The Motion for Contempt filed by the plaintiffs against defendants is
dismissed for want of factual and legal basis.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED. 6
Herein respondents appealed the foregoing decision to the CA and on March
7, 2000, said court promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
is reproduced hereunder:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested Decision while AFFIRMED
is hereby MODIFIED. The heirs of Emiliano Aying, Simeon Aying and
Roberta Aying are hereby declared as the lawful owners of the contested
property but equivalent only to 3/8.
SO ORDERED.
In modifying the RTC judgment, the CA ratiocinated that "an action for
recovery of possession of registered land never prescribes in view of the
provision of Section 44, Act No. 496 (now Sec. 47, PD 1520), to the effect
that no title to registered land in derogation to that of a registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription." The CA further ruled that even if the action is
deemed to be based on implied trust, prescription did not begin to run since
there is no evidence that positive acts of repudiation were made known to the
heirs who did not participate in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition of
Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, striking down the RTC's ruling
that the respondents' complaint is dismissible on the ground of prescription,
the CA held instead that herein respondents' action had not prescribed but
upheld the validity of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale, except as to the shares of the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and
Roberta, who did not participate in the execution of said document.
Herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA decision was denied
per Resolution dated August 2, 2000.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision
on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT AN HEIR OF THE ORIGINAL REGISTERED OWNER MAY LOSE HIS
RIGHT TO RECOVER A TITLED PROPERTY BY REASON OF LACHES;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT THE ACT OF REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF PARTITION WITH
SALE MAY BE CONSIDERED AN UNEQUIVOCAL REPUDIATION OF THE
TRUST GIVING RISE TO PRESCRIPTION;SaICcT
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1104 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO THE EFFECT
THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF BAD FAITH OR FRAUD, THE PARTITION
WITH PRETERITION OF ANY COMPULSORY HEIR SHALL NOT BE
RESCINDED. 7
In their Comment, respondents argue that this case is an action to declare as
null and void the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale, hence, under Article 1410 of the Civil Code, an action for declaration of
an inexistent contract does not prescribe. Respondents further posit that the
principle of laches should be applied against petitioner and not against them,
as they (respondents) had been in actual possession of the subject property,
while petitioner merely brought action to eject them more than 29 years after
the alleged execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed
of Absolute Sale. They also refuted petitioner's arguments regarding the
application of the principles of implied and constructive trusts in this case.
At the outset, it should be stressed that not all the plaintiffs who filed the
amended complaint before the trial court had been impleaded as
respondents in the present petition. The only parties impleaded are the heirs
of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying, whom the CA adjudged as owners of
a 3/8 portion of the land in dispute for not having participated in the execution
of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.
It is significant to note that herein petitioner does not question the CA
conclusion that respondents are heirs of the aforementioned three Aying
siblings. Hence, the trial court and appellate court's findings that the Extra-
Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was not forged
nor simulated and that the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying did
not participate in the execution thereof, are now beyond cavil.
The issues raised by petitioner for the Court's resolution are (1) whether or
not respondents' cause of action is imprescriptible; and (2) if their right to
bring action is indeed imprescriptible, may the principle of laches apply.
Respondents alleged in their amended complaint that not all the co-owners of
the land in question signed or executed the document conveying ownership
thereof to petitioner and made the conclusion that said document is null and
void. We agree with the ruling of the RTC and the CA that the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and binding only
as to the heirs who participated in the execution thereof, hence, the heirs of
Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying, who undisputedly did not participate
therein, cannot be bound by said document.
However, the facts on record show that petitioner acquired the entire parcel
of land with the mistaken belief that all the heirs have executed the subject
document. Thus, the trial court is correct that the provision of law applicable
to this case is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:
100
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
In Vda. De Esconde vs. Court of Appeals, 8 the Court expounded thus:
Construing this provision of the Civil Code, in Philippine National Bank v.
Court of Appeals, the Court stated:
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical
sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is
named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust,
respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui
que trust. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate
from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary
and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive
trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the
so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property
for the beneficiary. 9
The concept of constructive trusts was further elucidated in the same case,
as follows:
. . . implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible
from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,
independently of the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts
are either resulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from
each other as follows:
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable
consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and
are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise
from the nature of circumstances of the consideration involved in a
transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but
is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the
other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in
order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They
arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, to hold. 10 (Emphasis supplied) DTAHSI
Based on such concept of constructive trusts, the Court ruled in said case
that:
The rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over
property entrusted to him until and unless he repudiates the trust, applies to
express trusts and resulting implied trusts. However, in constructive implied
trusts, prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the
relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a condition precedent
to the running of the prescriptive period. 11
The next question is, what is the applicable prescriptive period?
In Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 12 the Court expounded on the prescriptive
period within which to bring an action for reconveyance of property based on
implied or constructive trust, to wit:
. . . under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or
constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the
corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis--vis prescription, Article 1144
of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must
perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of
this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of
the Torrens title over the property. 13
It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from
the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property, but if the person claiming to be the owner
thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. 14
In the present case, respondents Wenceslao Sumalinog, an heir of Roberta
Aying; Laurencio Aying, an heir of Emiliano Aying; and Paulino Aying, an heir
of Simeon Aying, all testified that they had never occupied or been in
possession of the land in dispute. 15 Hence, the prescriptive period of ten
years would apply to herein respondents.
The question then arises as to the date from which the ten-year period
should be reckoned, considering that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and
not under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), despite the fact the land in
dispute was already titled under Act No. 496 in the names of the Aying
siblings at the time the subject document was executed.
In Spouses Abrigo vs. De Vera, 16 it was held that registration of instruments
must be done in the proper registry, in order to affect and bind the land and,
thus, operate as constructive notice to the world. 17 Therein, the Court ruled:
. . . If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has
therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent sale is registered
not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such
sale is not considered REGISTERED . . . 18
101
In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496,
said document is deemed not registered. Accordingly, the ten-year
prescriptive period cannot be reckoned from March 6, 1964, the date of
registration of the subject document under Act No. 3344. The prescriptive
period only began to run from the time respondents had actual notice of the
Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. IaAHCE
The only evidence on record as to when such prescriptive period
commenced as to each of the respondents are Wenceslao Sumalinog's (heir
of Roberta Aying) testimony that about three years after 1964, they already
learned of the existence of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with
Deed of Absolute Sale; 19 and Laurencio Aying's (heir of Emiliano Aying)
admission that he found out about the sale of the land in dispute a long time
ago and can only estimate that it must be after martial law. 20 Paulino Aying
(heir of Simeon Aying) gave no testimony whatsoever as to when the children
of Simeon Aying actually learned of the existence of the document of sale.
On the other hand, petitioner did not present any other evidence to prove the
date when respondents were notified of the execution of the subject
document.
In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the heirs of Emiliano
Aying and Simeon Aying discovered the existence of the document of sale, it
must be determined which party had the burden of proof to establish such
fact.
The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party
to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the
facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain. 21 Moreover, one
alleging a fact that is denied has the burden of proving it and unless the party
asserting the affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof of that issue
by a preponderance of the evidence, his cause will not succeed. 22 Thus, the
defendant bears the burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses which he
sets up in answer to the plaintiff's claim or cause of action; he being the party
who asserts the truth of the matter he has alleged, the burden is upon him to
establish the facts on which that matter is predicated and if he fails to do so,
the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor. 23
In the case at bar, it was petitioner, as the defendant before the RTC, which
set up in its Answer the affirmative defense of prescription. It was, therefore,
incumbent upon petitioner to prove the date from which the prescriptive
period began to run. Evidence as to the date when the ten-year prescriptive
period began exists only as to the heirs of Roberta Aying, as Wenceslao
Sumalinog admitted that they learned of the existence of the document of
sale in the year 1967. As to the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying,
there is no clear evidence of the date when they discovered the document
conveying the subject land to petitioner. Petitioner miserably failed to adduce
proof of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying were notified of
the subject document. Hence, with regard to said heirs, the Court may
consider the admission in the amended complaint that they learned of the
conveyance of the disputed land only in 1991 when petitioner sent notices to
vacate to the occupants of the subject land, as the date from which the ten-
year prescriptive period should be reckoned.
Respondents filed their Amended Complaint on December 6, 1993. 24 Thus,
with regard to respondent heirs of Roberta Aying who had knowledge of the
conveyance as far back as 1967, their cause of action is already barred by
prescription when said amended complaint was filed as they only had until
1977 within which to bring action. As to the respondent heirs of Emiliano and
Simeon Aying, they were able to initiate their action for reconveyance of
property based on implied or constructive trust well within the ten-year
prescriptive period reckoned from 1991 when they were sent by petitioner a
notice to vacate the subject property.
Evidently, laches cannot be applied against respondent heirs of Emiliano and
Simeon Aying, as they took action to protect their interest well within the
period accorded them by law.
With regard to petitioner's argument that the provision of Article 1104 of the
Civil Code, stating that a partition made with preterition of any of the
compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, should be applied, suffice it to say
that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is
not being rescinded. In fact, its validity had been upheld but only as to the
parties who participated in the execution of the same. As discussed above,
what was conveyed to petitioner was ownership over the shares of the heirs
who executed the subject document. Thus, the law, particularly, Article 1456
of the Civil Code, imposed the obligation upon petitioner to act as a trustee
for the benefit of respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying who, having
brought their action within the prescriptive period, are now entitled to the
reconveyance of their share in the land in dispute.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2000 is MODIFIED, as
follows: The amended complaint of the heirs of Roberta Aying is DISMISSED
on the ground of prescription. However, the heirs of Emiliano Aying and
Simeon Aying, having instituted the action for reconveyance within the
prescriptive period, are hereby DECLARED as the LAWFUL OWNERS of a
2/8 portion of the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
RO-2856. caCTHI
||| (Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Aying, G.R. No. 144773, [May 16, 2005],
497 PHIL 788-805)
102
[G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002.]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the
Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then
on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The
petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with
AMARI involving such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of
Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP' for brevity) to reclaim certain
foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the
construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP
obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the
total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA
"to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop,
improve, acquire, . . . lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." 1 On the
same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore
of the Manila Bay " 2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum
directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in
MCCRRP . . . shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and
CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981,
which stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works
in the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according
to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be
agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and
conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing
required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx xxx xxx
(iii) . . . CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to
cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and
participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in
the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold,
transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas
consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three
(99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge
No. 5 and approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand
Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at
varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level located outside the
Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit." 3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so
reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen
thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters."
Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in
the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
"Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area
of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and
Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for
brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.
The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of
submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in
the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-
MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without
public bidding. 4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its
Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. 5 On June 8, 1995, then President
Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved
the JVA. 6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother
of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The
Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. 7 Among the
conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer
to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot
103
alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands
are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to
conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee
Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of
Justice, 8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, 9 and the Government
Corporate Counsel. 10 The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA,
contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees. 11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published
reports that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI
under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these
reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired
Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to
nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard
of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the
proper court." 12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a
taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the
sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section
28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the
sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of
the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he
seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are
of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time, 13 PEA and AMARI filed their
Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile,
on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require
PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for
issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing
on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO
dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22,
1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the
President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada
approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void." 14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA 15 and AMARI 16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION
ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO
OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION
INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS
BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,
RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS
GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot
and academic because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the
on-going negotiations for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the
Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing
any new agreement with AMARI.
"PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because
AMARI furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended
JVA containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations.
Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the
renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed
the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President
has approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue
by simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before
104
the Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the
constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its
approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the
Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended
JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional
grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the
meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution.
Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its
violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
government from alienating lands of the public domain to private
corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the
duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to
annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which
seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands
and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now
becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue too insure the
government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to
safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a
grave violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA
runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title
and ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI.
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public. 17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of
the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its
counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, 18 covered agricultural
lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private
parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the
right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles 19 under Title II of
Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case,
AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and
submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No.
1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by
AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the
purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their
titles because the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or
still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier.Besides,
the deadline for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
expired on December 31, 1987. 20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised
in this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI
of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended
JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent
proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses.
The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time
the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project. 21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the
principle governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking
relief directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies
generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the
Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case,
however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the
public. 22 The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual
issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition
for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court
under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise
primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to
disclose publicly certain information without first asking PEA the needed
information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule
that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera 23 where the Court
granted the petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially
demand from the Office of the President the publication of the presidential
decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the Executive Department had
an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code 24 and Section
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 25 to publish the presidential decrees.
There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in Taada to make an initial
demand from the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it
has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its
renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the instant case in view
of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed
information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a
government corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing
105
Code, 26 the disposition of government lands to private parties requires
public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public
the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA
make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA,
like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public
bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the
public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the
right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone, is determinative of this issue, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue
involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. 27 The principal issue in
the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in
view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public
domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit.
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to
institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to
information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty
imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not
shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or
implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition
seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two
constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information
on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional
provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to
compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands
worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law
mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA
from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain
in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional
duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the
public. In Chavez v. PCGG, 28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring
a taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus
"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He
asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions
questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if
they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the
people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, such as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which
have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the
case involved public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a
public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and
because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in
the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners
sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a
right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in
connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must
be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In
ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they
sought to be enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further
declared that 'when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact
that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which
possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds
may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the
development, management and operation of the Manila International
Container Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved considering the
important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of
the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We
concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the
Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's
standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to
information and access to official records, documents and papers a right
guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a
former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the
two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino
citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed."
106
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights to information and to the equitable
diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance,
the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to
information on matters of public concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or, decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
(Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public
interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public
concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest." (Italics supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in
policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights.
These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression.
If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and
decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any
restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions
are also essential to hold public officials "at all times . . . accountable to the
people," 29 for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold
public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of
government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry
is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As
explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. 30
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and
be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective
only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its
will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the
issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG, 31 that in cases of on-going
negotiations the right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the
government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-
agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the
stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or
are in the 'exploratory stage.'"
Also AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-
decisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. To support its
contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished
from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman
refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he
refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it
can cover both steps leading to a contract and already consummated
contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you." 32 (Italics supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner
can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their
deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-
making in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express
their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public
dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure
before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding
requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to
information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation
of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone,
disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These
include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property
being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties
qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare
all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition
process, long before the consummation of the contract, because
the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make
this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time
during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals
being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately
accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is
107
still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the
bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the
government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches,
and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such
definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG, 33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public informations on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-
agency recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
"exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to observe the same
restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier
such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations,
intelligence and other classified information." (Italics supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986
Constitutional Commission understood that the right to
information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not
a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the
people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one
is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even
illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers
of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent
the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of
any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill
of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor
a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public
concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data
used in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is
part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials.
The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third
category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned
by the government and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA
includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions,
minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to
such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to
information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords
access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to
inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also
subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records
and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying
when and how to conduct the inspection and copying. 35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as
privileged information under the separation of powers. 36 The right does not
also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information
affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts
have long recognized as confidential. 37 The right may also be subject to
other limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is
privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information
does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondence, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress, 38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of
information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A
frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential,
Legislative and Judicial Power. 39 This is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should
not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order. 40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to
information in several legislations. 41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to
AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is
rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and
108
waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed
to the Spanish Crown. 42 The King, as the sovereign ruler and
representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in
the Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private
individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands
and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of
the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain." 43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article
420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the
ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18,
1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for
the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine
Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which
authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government
to corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public
Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of
the government to corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this
day as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of
the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets
and all waters within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to
the public domain for public use. 44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
allowed the reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works
constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons,
with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing
such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to
the party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the
necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the
State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as
follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and
that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general
public use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the
national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of
the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the
public. In contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property
used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to
use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public
use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop the national
wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion
although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the
national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of
property of public dominion into private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use
or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property
of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the
executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer
needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could
lease or alienate the property to private parties. 45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which
regulated the lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions
of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing
law, and the title to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the
Government by dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine
Islands,shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested
rights and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the
Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or
public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or
otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and
alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys
to be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give
notice to the public that such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are
109
not needed for public purposes will be leased for commercial and business
purposes, . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and
best bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the
Governor-General may by executive order prescribe." (Italics supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands
reclaimed by the government. The Act also vested in the government control
and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands
reclaimed by the government only if these lands were no longer needed for
public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandate public bidding in the lease of
government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed
lands sui generis in that unlike other public lands which the government
could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were available only for
lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of
the sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from
the sea by private parties with government permission remained private
lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the
Public Land Act. 46 The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed
lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, . . .
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been officially delimited or classified. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber
nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed
of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or
banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
xxx xxx xxx.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six
shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as
soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not
necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this
chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease
under the provisions of this Act." (Italics supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands
of the public domain into . . . alienable or disposable" 47 lands. Section 7 of
the Act empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited
and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title 48
shall be classified" as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands,
as well as other lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for
residential, commercial, industrial or other productive non-
agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the Governor-General
the power to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into disposable
lands of the public domain. These provisions also empowered the Governor-
General to classify further such disposable lands of the public domain into
government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as
well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of
the public domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these lands
to private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary
for the public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and
not to sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public
domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain that the government could
not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their
inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the
government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to
110
private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public
service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section
56 (d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-
agricultural purposes the government could sell to private parties. Thus,
under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed
a law allowing their sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea
pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands
reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government permission
remained private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the
Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine,
declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration
of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant." (Italics supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except
public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State
could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural
resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease
for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could alienate
foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands,
fell under the classification of public agricultural lands. 50 However,
government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification
as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to
private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory
prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition.
The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from
acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that
were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section
2, Article XIII of the1935 Constitution provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold
public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares,
nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one
hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and
twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares.
Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be
leased to an individual, private corporation, or association." (Italics supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the
legislature continued the long established State policy of retaining for the
government title and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands
of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act
No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing
laws on lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this
day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the
public domain into "alienable or disposable" 52 lands of the public domain,
which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what lands
are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that
the government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands
that are "officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No.
141 read as follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, 53 for the purpose of their administration and disposition.
111
"Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what
lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable,
surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses,
nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private
property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this
Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. . . . ."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public
domain, the President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or
disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. There
must be no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy lands of the public domain, are as follows:"
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber
nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural,
and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or
banks of navigable lakes rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as
the case may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to
purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. . . . .
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine
shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as
soon as the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public
service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in
class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this
Act." (Italics supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All
these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such
lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties only
lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-
agricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however,
became inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease
of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public
domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive
purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the provisions of
this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term
"disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural
purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141, 54 unless a
subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 55 Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized
succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So
too are lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other
means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the foreshore
and lands under water remained in the national government. Said law
allowed only the 'leasing' of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919
and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the
government were to be "disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise." Before leasing, however, the Governor-General, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, had
first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the public
service. This requisite must have been met before the land could be
disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and lands under water were not to
be alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land
was only by lease. The land remained property of the State."(Italics supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act
No. 141 has remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first
implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935
Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands,
however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution,
Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the State,
unless reclaimed by the government and classified as agricultural lands of
the public domain, in which case they would fall under the classification of
government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased
and not sold to private parties. 56 These lands remained sui generis, as the
112
only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could
not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private
parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No.
141 does not authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands
classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for
non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional
authority before lands under Section 59 that the government previously
transferred to government units or entities could be sold to private parties.
Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that
"Sec. 60. . . . The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the
judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be
reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is
requested, and shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares:
Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or
transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government for the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public
interest; but the land so granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be
alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its
title, except when authorized by Congress: . . . ." (Italics supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the
legislative authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No.
141 exempted government units and entities from the maximum area of
public lands that could be acquired from the State. These government units
and entities should not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties
in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of
lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be
used to circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. In the same manner, such transfers
could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the
sale of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to
private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a
lien on these lands. 57
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under
Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding.
Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not
needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for
authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director
of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in
the case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, . . .
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication
shall be made to the highest bidder. . . . ." (Italics supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all
leases or sales of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. 58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still
reclaim portions of the sea with government permission. However,
the reclaimed land could become private land only if classified as
alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition under CA
No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of
public dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the
Civil Code of 1950 state that
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
xxx xxx xxx.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use
or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public
dominion is no longer needed for public use or public service, before the
same could be classified as patrimonial property of the State. 59 In the case
of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the
declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their
disposition, is governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of
public dominion those properties of the State which, without being for public
use, are intended for public service or the "development of the national
wealth."Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if
not employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the
national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
113
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise
adopted the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution stated that
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception
of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of
the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Italics supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with
the exception of "agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and
resettlement lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935
Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except "public
agricultural lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935
Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and
resettlement lands of the public domain. 60 If the land of public domain were
neither timber nor mineral land, it would fall under the classification of
agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural
lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public
domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private
corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer
allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935
Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation,
ecological, and development requirements of the natural resources, shall
determine by law the size of land of the public domain which may be
developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any qualified individual,
corporation, or association, and the conditions therefor. No private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor may any
citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire
by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares. No
private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license or
permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess
of one hundred thousand hectares. However, such area may be increased by
the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic
and Development Authority." (Italics supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable
lands of the public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now
acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations
became absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands
of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only
to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public
domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled
corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests
PEA with the following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging,
filling or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide,
dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and
other forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by
the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary
for the efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying
out the purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and
functions:
(a) To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx xxx xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to
private corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary
for the attainment of the purposes and objectives herein specified." (Italics
supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas
of the public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by
the ebb and flow of the tide. 61 Submerged areas are those permanently
under water regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide. 62 Foreshore and
submerged areas indisputably belong to the public domain 63 and are
inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to
disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then,
114
and until today, a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban
applied then, as it still applies now, only to "private corporations and
associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of the
public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations
by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands
of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable
lands of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering
PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of
Section 60 of CA No. 141, which states
"Sec. 60. . . . ; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be
alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its
title, except when authorized by Congress; . . . ." (Italics supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.
Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional
ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private
individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has
adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all
natural resources are "owned by the State," and except for alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be
alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State. . . . .
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines
may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than
twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and
development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor." (Italics supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973
Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the
general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No.
141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring,
except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well
understood. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3,
line 5 which says:
'No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this
was introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private
corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very
clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases
decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to
prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were
instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-
square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it
would be in violation of this." (Italics supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi, 64 the Court explained the rationale behind this
constitutional ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of
public agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land
ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-
size farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the
Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public
115
domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed
the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of
alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not
more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing
the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing
the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a
corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the
corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent
the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one
generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional
limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of
alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban,
individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable
public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means
would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation
by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation
is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to
transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public
domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by
the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is
removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the
face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful
adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the
public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit
arising from the constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas
clause, consists of three properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio
Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paraaque and Las Pias, Metro Manila, with a
combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three
islands;" and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares
more or less to regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area." 65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the
Freedom Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares . . . ," plus an
option "granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350
hectares . . . ." 66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only
157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed,
and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of
Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of
P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom
Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the
Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all
the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and
PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively,
the total net usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total
reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to
AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued
in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that
". . . , PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed
of transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based
on the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall
then cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title
covering AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, . . . ; provided, that if
more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given time pertains
to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the
titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding
proportionate area of additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled."
(Italics supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a
maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-
AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim
foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended
JVA states that
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to
perform Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own
the Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and
exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance
with the Master Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated
April 25, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire
and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and
116
submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State.With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3. . . . Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, . . . ." (Italics supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged
areas of Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
In its Memorandum, 67 PEA admits that
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
xxx xxx xxx.'" (Italics supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force 68 constituted under
Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 admitted in its Report and
Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." 69 The
Legal Task Force concluded that
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory
authority, the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have
been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly
convey the same to any qualified person without violating the Constitution or
any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding
public land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII, 70 1987 Constitution), does
not apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by
statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain,
waters . . . and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the
State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated,"
unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The
mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable
natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying
these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as
alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-
public use. 71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared
open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified." 72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia, 73 the Executive
Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which
was acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred to another
location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 422 74 of
the Civil Code, a property of public dominion retains such character
until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public
use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership 'until there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of Lands,
108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Italics supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special
land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged
areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares
comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9,
1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued TCT
Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD
No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land
patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also
constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for
public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had
already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were
partial erosion on some areas. The government had also completed the
necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no
longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural,
117
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber,
mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily
fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under
the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All
other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by
the State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP,
then a private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated
November 20, 1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI,
citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the
ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing the
works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public
domain which the State may not alienate." 75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of
Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works
constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private
persons, with proper permission shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant
of authority." (Italics supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could
reclaim from the sea only with "proper permission" from the State. Private
parties could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the
terms of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim
from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property
of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold
ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea
from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private person
reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire
ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain property of public
dominion like the sea it replaced. 76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands
that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain." 77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws
subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No.
141 requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as
alienable or disposable before the government can alienate them. These land
must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes. 78 Moreover, the
contract between CDCP and the government was executed after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This contract could
not have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private
corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws
authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the
National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-
A declared that
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of
areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the
National Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract.
(Italics supplied)
xxx xxx xxx."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
because reclamation of areas under water could now be undertaken only by
the National Government or by a person contracted by the National
Government. Private parties may reclaim from the sea only under a contract
with the National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as
provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as
the National Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation
projects of the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or
through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity." Under
such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation services
rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind
consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land
is first classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then
declared no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an
additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of
Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these
submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open
to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or
certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form
part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these
submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters . . . owned by the
State," forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only
when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be
classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the
only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially
classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition.
118
Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for
public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA
is tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of
lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of
PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and
other kinds of land transportation, . . . ; [T]o construct, maintain and operate
such systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct,
maintain and operate such storm drains as may be necessary." PEA is
empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary for the
proper use by private parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities,
buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for
their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held
by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since many of
the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public
services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects and on behalf of the National Government." The same
section also states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the
President upon the recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by
the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity;
. . . ." Thus, underEO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No. 1084,
PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National Government
to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No.
525 recognized PEA as the entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands and
ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and
interests." 79 Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously
be needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration segregating
reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from those still needed
for public service.
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall
belong to or be owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to
classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of the public
domains would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA,
whether or not classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No.
1084 or EO No. 525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising
such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such
form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development,
utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of
licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other privileges
concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the country's
marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the
country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural
resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon failure, non-
compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other causes
which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and
supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all
lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for
classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation
with appropriate agencies." 80 (Italics supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State,
DENR exercises "supervision and control over alienable and disposable
public lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the
management and disposition of all lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR
decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of
Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs
authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in
Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of
the public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA
should be classified as alienable under Sections 6 81 and 7 82 of CA No.
141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it
then recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying
the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to
disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.
countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised
Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas
under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical
reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President.
On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain.
119
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or
submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the
mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to
PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands
of the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal
declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title
III 83 of CA No. 141and other applicable laws. 84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance
with CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141,
admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the
government "shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in
a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by
Congress: . . . ." 85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia, 86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the
following: . . . ."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property
belonging to the Government. The Court declared that
"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his
or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved
by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative
concurrence." (Italics supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative
authority allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on
February 4, 1977, provides that
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila
Bay pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and construction of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Project between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated
November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the
same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership
and administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD
No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the
aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume
the obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public
Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates
Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the
corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said
shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public
Estates Authority shall execute such contacts or agreements with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be
necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural
Resources in favor of the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the
subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such portion or
portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the
above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land
Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate of
title." (Italics supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979,
provides that
"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the
PEA which shall be responsible for its administration, development, utilization
or disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use
of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for
PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership
and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No.
525declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by
PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed
lands "in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084,"
the charter of PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the
government." 87 (Italics supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority
granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in
120
accordance with the PEA charterfree from constitutional limitations. The
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to
private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any
statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not
apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The
legislative authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain
barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain,
including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands
could be transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Italics
supplied) would not apply to private corporations but only to individuals
because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No.
1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed
for public service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or
leasing these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67
of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting
PEA from holding a public auction. 88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly
states that the patent is issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No.
1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This is
an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the
disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless
otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654, 89 which authorizes
PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its
assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public
auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment,
whether in kind and in installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense
with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as
the Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable
government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No.
1445 mandates that
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any
cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer
accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if
found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If
found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest
bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar
body in the presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized
representative of the Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the
Official Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in any
newspaper of general circulation, or where the value of the property does not
warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted for a like period in at
least three public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In the
event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale
at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and
approved by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in
which case the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price. 90 The
Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing
Codethrough Circular No. 89-296 91 dated January 27, 1989. This circular
emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only through public
auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of
public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for
PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on
December 10, 1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should
reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of
the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed areas
in favor of the winning bidder. 92 No one, however, submitted a bid. On
December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it
could sell the Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another
public bidding, because of the failure of the public bidding on December 10,
1991. 93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom
Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted
an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a
negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. 94 The
failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84
hectares, 95 is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares,
almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public
bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three years before the
signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the
country had greatly improved during the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is absolute and clear: "Private corporations or associations may
121
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, . . . ." EvenRepublic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by
PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private
parties, recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. For the financing, construction, operation
and maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-
operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the
provisions of this Act, the project proponent . . . may likewise be repaid in the
form of a share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary
payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of
the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to
the ownership of the land: . . . ." (Italics supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a
government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain in view of the constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and
AMARI, authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the
contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed
land, to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and
Management of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the
repayment plan may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the
reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a
proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land
ownership automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the
Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the
contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds
on portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an
individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares 96 of
non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the
legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only way these
provisions of the BOT Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a
direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the
reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the
public domain to private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which
maintains that the "issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual
issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain
and converts the property into patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA
and AMARI contend that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and
the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising the
Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of their
theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato, 97 where the Court held
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was
issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David, 98 where the Court declared
"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate
of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically
comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards
provided therein."
3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas, 99 where the Court
ruled
"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he
may do so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and
continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered
and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public
domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has
neither control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 100 where the Court held
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and
free patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private
respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and,
therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the same."
5. Republic v. Court of Appeals, 101 where the Court stated
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay
legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of
Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for
initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is
constitutive of a 'fee simple' title or absolute title in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the
registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that
'Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the
Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines are
alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this
Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands."
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the
corresponding certificates of titles issued to private parties. These four cases
uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands
or that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically comes
under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under
122
the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National
Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the
Department of Health. The National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare
public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other facilities of
Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The Court
affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of
Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is
an example of a public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the
land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in
the name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public
as well as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been
issued to any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel
PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is
that PEA's certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered
by these certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not
be sold to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the
registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode
of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously
conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership.
Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the
registrant had prior to the registration. 102 The registration of lands of the
public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public
lands into private lands. 103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the
certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically
becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.
The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the
provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517
issued by then President Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the
Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are
hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid
tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen
thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical
description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof."
(Italics supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters
not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except
when authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain that are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA
No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien
affecting title" of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of
title. 104 Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entitles
under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be
alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their
disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private
corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of
the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with
Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of
the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the
public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to
government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands
can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban
will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as
private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to
dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly
from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law,
are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the
National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible
for all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being
proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be
evaluated for consistency with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the
Government's declared policy to provide for a coordinated, economical and
efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas
shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it
under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National
Government which shall ensure a coordinated and integrated approach in
the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority
as a government corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and ensure
their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with
continuing authority to reorganize the national government including the
transfer, abolition, or merger of functions and offices.
123
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution
and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct
the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible
for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved
by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken
by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or
entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national government
agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in
consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President.
xxx xxx xxx."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of
DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed
lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA
are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of
other alienable lands does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of
the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands
will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency
tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the
public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the
public domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both
lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that
alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred
to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not
automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred
to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional
ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the
Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed
and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse
equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among
Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands
of the public domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."
This will open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise
that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in
corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country
creating the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent.
This will completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development
in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire
not more than 1,024 hectares of public lands. 105 The 1973
Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of public
land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered
under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is
contrary to existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain
to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529,
without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496,
and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to
the . . . Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or
conveyed to persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered
lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the
Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Italics supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in
Section 103 of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public
corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a
province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as
provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens
System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however,
is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land
"shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This provision refers
to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain
that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless
expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents
the registered land of the public domain from becoming private land that can
be disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the
public domain may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48,
Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states
"Sec. 48 Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property
of the government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
124
(1) . . .
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the
name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality."
(Italics supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion
of a public wharf may be titled in the name of a government corporation
regulating port operations in the country. Private property purchased by the
National Government for expansion of an airport may also be titled in the
name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport. Private
property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school
site may likewise be titled in the name of the municipality. 106 All these
properties become properties of the public domain, and if already registered
under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no
requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration of land
from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its own power of
eminent domain become unquestionably part of the public domain.
Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to
issue in the name of the National government new certificates of title
covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states
"Sec. 85 Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or
interest therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National
Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper
Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by an
adequate description, the particular property or interest expropriated, the
number of certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A memorandum
of the right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate of title by the
Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a new certificate shall
be issued in favor of the National Government, province, city, municipality, or
any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right for the land so
taken. The legal expenses incident to the memorandum of registration or
issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of the authority
taking the land or interest therein." (Italics supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not
exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also
be registered pursuant to existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of
the Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas
of Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a
joint venture with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred
by PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the
CDCP under its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA
is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires
PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying
AMARI's Land Share on the name of AMARI." 107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which provides that private corporations "shall not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease." the transfer of title and
ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold' the reclaimed lands
other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of
the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA
No. 141, 108 theGovernment Auditing Code, 109 and Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore
and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable.
Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the
public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands
reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private
parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their
inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of
the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be
distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such
equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State,
or seek to circumvent the conditional ban on alienation of lands of the public
domain to private corporations, do so at their own risks.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows;
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
125
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares 110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitutionwhich
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares 111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitutionwhich
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and
further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in
view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. under Article 1409 112 of the Civil Code, contracts
whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the
commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court
must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore
declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio. EcICDT
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of
whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no
necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts,
and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY
ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which
is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio. HSIaAT
||| (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, [July 9, 2002], 433
PHIL 506-592)
[G.R. No. L-54094. August 30, 1982.]
ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and RAMON D.
BAGATSING, petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, (Presiding
Judge, CFI, Rizal, Pasay City, Branch XXIX), and NICOLAS A. PASCUAL,
CRISANTO F PASCUAL, ANSELMO F. PASCUAL, MAMERTO F
PASCUAL, PASCUALA A. MEJIA, DAMIANA A. MEJIA, CIRILO S.
PASCUAL, CATALINA S. PASCUAL and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
RIZAL, MAKATI BRANCH, respondents.
R.D. Bagatsing & Associates for petitioners.
Ramon S. Nieves for respondent.
Dennis E. Angeles and Oscar Herrera, Jr. for intervenor Greenfield Dev.
Corp.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners filed this petition against the decision of the CFI of Pasay City,
Branch XXIX granting the reconstitution of the certificate of title, original land
owner's duplicate copy in the name of Manuela Aquial supposedly covering
Lots 2 and 4 of Survey Plan 11-4374 on the ground that the said decision
suffers from jurisdictional infirmity fatal to the petition for reconstitution since
said petition-and the notice thereof lacked essential data mandatorily
required by law (Secs. 12-13 R. A. 26) and, that the said decision was
invalidly issued without actual and personal notice having been served upon
possessors, actual occupants and adjoining owners of the property involved
who are indispensable parties in interest and without whom a valid judgment
cannot be rendered. Aside from alleging ownership over the lands in question
subsequently sold to innocent purchasers in good faith and for valuable
consideration as part of the Alabang Hills Village, a subdivision which it
owned, petitioners claimed that on the basis of the technical descriptions
contained in their titles and as appear in the alleged title sought to be
reconstituted, the latter overlap the parcels owned and registered in their
names. A temporary restraining order was issued to restrain respondents
from enforcing the challenged decision and specifically the Register of Deeds
of Rizal from issuing a reconstituted title in their name.
Respondents, among others, aver that the petition is barred by laches due to
the failure of petitioners to appeal from the trial court's orders denying their
belated intervention and motion for new trial; that the question for ownership
over the alleged overlappings cannot be sweepingly adjudicated in a
certiorari proceeding or a reconstitution case; and that the existence of their
title is established by government documents.
Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court noted
that some essential data required in Sections 12 and 13, R. A. 26 have been
omitted. Neither do these data appear in the Notice of Hearing such that no
adjoining owner, occupant or possessor was ever served a copy thereof by
registered mail or otherwise. Following the ruling in the Bernal case, (L-
45168, 93 SCRA 238) the Supreme Court ruled that "said defects have not
invested the Court with authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the ease
because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the
statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering
all proceedings utterly null and void.
The Court likewise observed that the lots involved in the reconstitution case
are covered by the same survey plan in the Bernal case and they are
contiguous. Thus the finding as to the non-veracity and falsity of the survey
plan submitted in support of reconstitution in the Bernal case is likewise
warranted to reject the evidence presented by respondents in support of their
petition for reconstitution.
The argument that petitioners are guilty of laches is unavailing for here, there
is no finality of any decision to speak of since the decision under question is
126
pronounced null and void far having been rendered without jurisdiction and
the judgment of reconstitution is "ineffective'' against the owners of the land
covered thereby who were not joined as parties in the proceedings.
The judgment ordering the Register of Deeds, Metro Manila, Makati, Branch
IV to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170 and the plan and technical
descriptions submitted, the alleged certificate of title, original and owner's
duplicate copy in the name of Manuela Aquial was annulled and set aside;
the petition for reconstitution was ordered dismissed; the temporary
restraining order made permanent and a copy of the decision at bar was
ordered to be furnished the Minister of Justice for the institution of
appropriate criminal proceedings against private respondents and all others
who have assisted or conspired with them as may be warranted by the
evidence of record.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES; REQUIREMENTS OF; JURISDICTION
NOT CONFERRED ON THE COURT WHEN SAME NOT COMPLIED WITH;
CASE AT BAR. Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution,
the Court notes that some essential data required in Sections 12 and 13
of Republic Act 26, have been omitted; the nature and description of the
buildings or improvement, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and
the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings, and
improvements, and the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of
all persons who may have any interest in the property. Neither do these data
appear in the Notice of Hearing, such that no adjoining owner, occupant or
possessor was ever served a copy thereof by registered mail or otherwise.
Following the pronouncement in the Bernal case, We rule that said defects
have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with
the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction at prescribed
by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby
rendering all proceeding utterly null and void.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER'S INACTION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
LACHES WHEN QUESTIONED DECISION WAS RENDERED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION. Respondents cannot attribute laches to the petitioners for
not appealing from the order of the lower court denying their motion to
intervene and motion for new trial for there is no laches nor finality of any
decision to speak of since the decision under question is herein pronounced
null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LANDS COVERED BY DULY ISSUED SUBSISTING TITLES,
NOT PROPER SUBJECT FOR A PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION FILED
BY THIRD PARTIES. The Court stresses once more that lands already
covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible
upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under section 38 of the
Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by
final judgment the cancellation of such existing tides (and as the Court
reiterated in the recent case of Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. Nos. L-
32694 and L-33119, July 16, 1982, "in cases of annulment and/or
reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely by a
preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the
land sought to be reconveyed is his.") The courts simply have no jurisdiction
over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting
titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of
stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of
registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over
the same land to two different holders thereof. A fortiori; such proceedings for
"reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly registered owners and
holders of Torrens Tides to the land are null and void. Applicants, land
officials and judges who disregard these basic and fundamental principles
will be held duty accountable therefor.
DECISION
TEEHANKEE, J p:
On the authority of relevant and controlling pronouncements in the related
case of "Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta.
Maria Vda. de Bernal, respondents; Greenfield Development Corporation,
intervenor; Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing,
intervenors," * the Court declares as null and void the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXIX in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P,
Land Registration Case No. 9368 granting the reconstitution of the certificate
of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela Aquial
supposedly covering Lots 2 and 4 of Survey Plan II-4374. As in the
authoritative case above mentioned, the said decision suffers from
jurisdictional infirmity, fatal to the petition for reconstitution since said petition
and the notice thereof lacked essential data mandatorily required by the
law, 1 and just as importantly, the decision was invalidly issued without actual
and personal notice having been served upon possessors, actual occupants
and adjoining owners of the property involved who are indispensable parties
in interest and without whom a valid judgment cannot be rendered. LexLib
The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against the order of
reconstitution alleges that the petitioners are registered owners as evidenced
by certain Transfer Certificates of Title 2 all issued by the Register of Deeds
of Rizal covering parcels of land located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila; that TCT Nos. 175223 to 175235 were the subject of petition for
Consolidation-Subdivision Plan PCS-5878, LRC Record No. 6137 after
approval by the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission on
petition of Alabang Development Corporation with the Court of First Instance
127
of Rizal, Branch XIII; that after hearing the Court issued an order dated April
19, 1969, by virtue of which the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued among
others sixty-seven (67) Transfer Certificates of Title 3 ; that said parcels of
land surrounded by a high perimeter wall on their boundaries were sold to
innocent purchasers in good faith for valuable consideration as part of
Alabang Hills Village Subdivision, owned by petitioner Alabang Development
Corporation, many of whom were already issued in turn the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title in their favor; and that these innocent purchasers
for value have been in open, actual, adverse, continuous, notorious and
uninterrupted possession of their respective lands since 1969.
Petitioners further alleged that in the reconstitution case below, filed only in
1977, herein respondents as petitioners therein sought to reconstitute a lost
certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy (allegedly lost or
destroyed over 30 years earlier in the last World War II) and issued allegedly
pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914 in the name of their
predecessor-in-interest, deceased Manuela Aquial, covering two lots, 2 and
4, indicated in Plan II-4374, situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Rizal, now Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal; that on the basis of the
technical descriptions contained in petitioners' titles and as appear in the
alleged title sought to be reconstituted, the latter overlap the parcels of land
owned by petitioners and duly registered in their names; that petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, actual, continuous,
adverse, notorious possession since time immemorial of these parcels of
land and that they have been paying religiously the real estate taxes thereon
up to the present time; that petitioners being actual possessors and
registered owners were not served with notice of the hearing of the petition
for reconstitution in violation of Republic Act 26 such that the court a
quo acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the reconstitution
and that there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
As prayed for, the Court issued on June 27, 1980 a temporary restraining
order upon the filing of the petition and restrained the respondents from
enforcing the challenged decision, and specifically the Register of Deeds of
Rizal from issuing a reconstituted title based on Decree No. 15170 in the
name of the respondents-members of the Aquial-Pascual family.
Respondents on the other hand alleged that the petitioners filed in the court
below a belated intervention and motion for new trial which were denied by
respondent judge, and since neither appealed therefrom nor did they
question such denials by way of certiorari, the petition is barred by laches;
that the petition is not accompanied by copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto as required by Rule 65, section 1
and 2, Rules of Court; that certiorari being a remedy against jurisdictional
infirmity, the absence of any allegation of ultimate facts tending to show such
infirmity is fatal to the petition; that there is no allegation that private
respondents knew of such alleged facts and the addresses of petitioners'
vendees and/or that they have better rights than the alleged boundary
owners who were notified, that petitioner Alabang Development Corporation
is an intangible juridical person incapable of physical possession of the
property and petitioner Bagatsing who is publicly known to be residing in
Manila is not in physical possession or occupation of any property adjacent to
the property in question; that the question of boundary owners not having
been notified is a factual question not determinable a priori but in a proper
action for ownership of any overlapping; that if there is any "sensible
question" (sic) raised in the petition, the same is ownership over the alleged
overlappings which cannot be sweepingly adjudicated in a certiorari
proceeding or a reconstitution case "especially if a good issue is on the
validity of petitioners' titles;" "that non-joinder of some alleged owners would
render ineffective any judgment petitioners may get in these proceedings;"
that the existence of respondents' title is indubitably established with the
existence of the corresponding decree in the Land Registration Commission
which was examined and found authentic and genuine by NBI and PC
handwriting experts, approved plans reproduced from the microfilm (the
plans dub approved by the Director of Lands on July 25, 1911), survey plan,
and relocation and verification plans in the Bureau of Lands all
government document; and that private respondents have been in
continuous possession of the land and have been up to date in the payment
of land taxes thereof.
After both parties had submitted their respective memoranda, Greenfield
Development Corporation moved to intervene in the proceedings stating, in
brief, that upon comparison of the technical descriptions of the two parcels of
land with an aggregate area of 43 hectares designated as Lots 2 and 4 of
Plan II-4374, as set forth in the alleged copy of Decree No. 15170, Land
Registration Case 9368, relied upon by respondents in their petition for
reconstitution, with those technical descriptions set forth in the certificates of
title in the name of said intervenor 4 , it appears that the lots supposedly
covered by the title sought to be reconstituted overlap and include a
substantial portion of intervenor's land covered by its titles. As in
the Bernal case, supra, 5 the Court is called upon to allow such intervention
of an indispensable party "in view of the higher and greater interest of the
public and in order to administer justice consistent with a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of the respective claims of the parties and their
numerous successors-in-interest," in view of the overlapping titles that
respondent judge would authorize in his questioned decision in derogation of
the underlying indefeasibility and stability of the Torrens System of
registration. As the Court therein stressed, "the sprawling area of the property
in question where various subdivisions, residential houses and homes and
infrastructures have mushroomed and the great number of people living or
128
having proprietary rights and interests in such a vast property would
certainly bring about the swamping of the courts and the clogging of their
dockets with cases involving not only the original parties and the movants but
also their successors-in-interest. This litigation will have no end, which this
Court will not allow nor tolerate." 6
Unlike in the Bernal case, however, the Director of Lands need not be
directed to conduct anew a relocation-verification survey of the properties
involved in this case, as the petition before us is simply a special civil action
attacking the jurisdiction of the lower court, and not a petition for review
where the court would need to delve deep into the issues on the merits. But
even if the Court found some need to do so, the land involved insofar as
herein petitioners and intervenor are concerned refers to one and same area
involved in the Bernal case, and the report of the Bureau of Lands in that
sister case would suffice to enlighten us on the question of surrounding
improvements, boundaries and overlappings.
The basic issue in the case at bar is the jurisdiction of the lower court to act
upon the petition for reconstitution.
Section 12 and 13 of Republic Act 26 entitled "An Act Providing a Special
Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Titles Lost or
Destroyed," read
"Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in section
2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the
proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any
person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain,
among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's,
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been
issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and
boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the
names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e)
the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who
may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the
encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no
deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been
accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to
be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be
attached thereto and filed with the same; Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section
2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan
and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description
taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
"Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the
preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in
successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main
entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the
provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days prior to
the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be
sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to
every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the
number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested
parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on
which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim
or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof
of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court."
Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court notes
that some essential data required in section 12 and section 13 of Republic
Act 26 have been omitted: the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names
and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements, and the
names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who
may have any interest in the property. Neither do these data appear in the
Notice of Hearing. 7 such that no adjoining owner, occupant or possessor
was ever served a copy thereof by registered mail or otherwise. On these
glaringly conspicuous omissions, the Court repeats its pronouncement in
the Bernal case, to wit.
"And since the above data do not appear in the Amended Petition, the same
data do not also appear in the Notice of Hearing of the petition published in
the Official Gazette. Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which enumerates
mandatorily the contents of the Petition for Reconstitution and Section 13
which similarly require the contents of the Notice have not been complied
with. In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance
with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not
invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case
because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the
statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering
all proceedings utterly null and void. We hold that the mere Notice that 'all
interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show cause if any they
have why said petition should not be granted' is not sufficient for the law must
129
be interpreted strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with exactness and
precision. We agree with the ruling of the trial court granting the motion to
amend the original petition provided all the requisites for publication and
posting of notices be complied with, it appearing that the amendment is quite
substantial in nature. As We pointed above, respondent Demetria Sta. Maria
Vda. de Bernal failed to comply with all the requirements for publication and
posting of notices, which failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of the
Court. (Emphasis supplied).
"The rule on notification to the possessor or one having interest in the
property whose title is sought to be reconstituted is laid down explicitly
in Manila Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al., L-17913, June
22, 1965, 14 SCRA 358, thus:
'Where a petition for reconstitution would have the certificates of title
reconstituted from the plans and technical descriptions of the lots involved,
which sources may fall properly under section 3(e) or 3(f) of Republic Act No.
26, the possessor thereof or the one who is known to have an interest in the
property should be sent a copy of the notice of the petition at the expense of
the petitioner, pursuant to section 13 of the said Act.
'If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a
possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of
his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if
otherwise the said order should have been final and executory.
'Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice by publication is not
sufficient but such notice must be actually sent or delivered to parties
affected by the petition for reconstitution.'
"The rule We have stated and quoted from Manila Railroad Company vs.
Hon. Jose M. Moya et al., supra, is rightly so because one who seeks the
reconstitution of his title to the property is duty-bound to know who are the
occupants, possessors thereof, or persons having an interest in the property
involved, specially where the property is so vast and situated in a suitable
residential and commercial location, where buildings and improvements have
been or are being constructed openly and publicly. As stated earlier,
indispensable parties have appeared, claiming ownership, possession, and
valuable interests in the property, which are not only numerous but also
patently conspicuous that private respondent cannot feign ignorance, much
less unawareness, nor blindness as to their existence of her or within her
claimed property." (Emphasis supplied)
After passing upon the jurisdiction issue, the Court cannot just let go
unmentioned its observation that the lots 8 involved in this reconstitution
case are part of the survey plan (Plan II-4373) allegedly covering also Lots 1
and 3 which are involved in the Bernal case. In other words, these lots are
covered by the same survey plan and they are contiguous. As a matter of
fact, "Annex 6-A" 9 of respondents' memorandum which they claim to be a
survey plan for their mother Manuela Aquial is actually entitled "Plan of
Property of Olimpia D. Sta. Maria." Olimpia Sta. Maria is supposed to be the
predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, the
petitioner in the Bernal reconstitution case involving Lots 1 and 3. Also, in
each of the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 embodied in
the petition for reconstitution filed by Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal 10 ,
Manuela Aquial consistently appears to be an adjoining owner. This
remarkable coincidence warrants a reproduction here of the Court's findings
as to the non-veracity and falsity of the survey plan II-4374 submitted in
support of reconstitution in the Bernal case.
It is to be remembered that per resolution of this Court dated September 25,
1979 in the Bernal case, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Bureau of
Lands was directed to conduct a relocation survey of the property involved
therein. Pursuant to such directive, a "Final Report" on the matter was
submitted by Amante R. Dumag, Officer-in-Charge, National Capital Regional
Office of the Bureau of Lands, based upon a memorandum addressed to him
by the Staff Supervisor for Technical Plan and Standards of said Bureau.
Excerpts from both the report and the memorandum as reproduced in the
decision in the Bernal case are hereunder quoted.
I. From the Final Report:
"3. That while making a research on the survey data of the lands involved in
this case the surveyors of the Bureau of Lands found out that the properties
claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal consisting
of lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374, does not have an original copy of a plan in the
Records Division of the Bureau of Lands. Attached with this Report is a
certified photocopy of a letter dated January 30, 1978 marked as Annex 'A' to
form an integral part of this Report sent by the Staff Supervisor for Technical
Plan and Standards, Bureau of Lands, Manila, addressed to the Officer-in-
Charge, Region IV, Bureau of Lands, Metro Manila, informing the latter of the
non-existence of the original copy of plan II-4374. However, he further
informed that there exists a microfilm copy of plan 11-4374 with Accession
No. 385637, but he expressed his doubts as to its source and authenticity,
and gave his reasons for his apprehension in his aforementioned letter dated
January 30, 1978 to the Officer-in-Charge of Region IV, Metro Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
"6. That it was ascertained during the verification survey that the lands known
as Lots 1 and 3, plan II-4374 claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta.
Maria Vda. de Bernal does not actually exist on the ground;
"7. That the properties claimed by private respondent Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bernal consisting of Lots 1 and 3, plan II-4374, were platted on the plan Vs-
04-000153 using the xerox copies of uncertified technical descriptions
furnished by the Office of the Solicitor General;
"8. That as directed by this Honorable Court, the location of industries,
factories, warehouses, plants and other commercial infrastructures,
residential buildings, public or private roads and other landmarks found
130
inside the areas concerned are properly indicated on the white print copies of
plan Vs-04-000153 (Annex 'D')."
II. From the Memorandum:
"1. Inventory record book of the maps and plans salvaged after the last world
war and subsequently microfilmed during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton
Consultancy, clearly shows that Plan II-4374 was not among those salvaged.
Indeed, there is no copy of this plan in the file of Technical Reference Section
records were recently turned over to the Records Division. A perusal of the
folder of the case in the Records Division also shows that on July 17, 1972
Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the Records Division certified that his
division (Survey Records Section in particular) has no copy of II-4374 (page
183 of the folio).
"2. A further perusal of the records (pages 1 and 2) shows that on May 15,
1970 Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued technical descriptions of
Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374 allegedly approved on July 25, 1911. This record was
submitted to the Court. Stated therein is the alleged source of data
Accession No. 195551. This record turns out to be Plan 11-4005 approved
on February 7, 1911 and the land is the property of the Municipality of Liloan,
Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.
"3. Apparently because of this finding, on November 5, 1971, Mr. Anselmo
Almazan, then Chief of Reconstruction Section upon request of the interested
party, issued technical descriptions for Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374. (This
document was submitted to the Court as part of the petition for reconstitution
of title [pp. 1 and 2 of folio]). As to how the data were reconstituted by the
then Chief of Reconstruction Section in the absence of the original copy of
the plan is not known. This not our standard operating procedure since we
always issue technical descriptions based on available approved survey
records.
"4. It appears in the records of the case that later Mr. Modesto Eloriaga, then
Chief, Reproduction Section, certified a copy of the microfilm enlargement of
a frame with Accession No. 385637 which frame bears the survey number II-
4374. As to how a record that was not salvaged after the war not microfilmed
is a mystery. Furthermore, as to how this frame is pinpointed without the
locator card indeed confounds us. We are not now privy to the testimonies
made in Court regarding this microfilm.
"5. We are surprised to learn that Reel No. 560 now bears II-4374. For this
reason, we caused the preparation of an enlargement of said microfilm for
further examination and evaluation.
"6. A closer examination of said microfilm enlargement showed the following
significant discrepancies and deviations from similar survey plans on
record . . .
"7. Considering the discrepancies and deviations of the microfilm
enlargement of the frame that purports to be that of survey plan II-4374
bearing Accession No. 385637, our conclusion is that said plan is not
authentic and does not and has never represented any parcel of land
properly surveyed and approved by this Bureau." (Emphasis supplied)
As the Court accepted and approved in the Bernal case the above final
report on the relocation-verification survey of the regional officer of the
Bureau of Lands and admitted it as evidence of the falsity of the survey plan
in question, there is no reason for this Court not to use it likewise as basis for
reaching the conclusion that Lots 2 and 4 supposedly covered by the same
Survey Plan II-4374 are purely imaginary and "do not actually exist on the
ground."
There are a number of other observations in the Bernal case that would
warrant rejection of the totality of the evidence presented by respondents in
support of their petition for reconstitution 11 but a discussion thereon would
be superfluous since the weight of all such other evidence is anchored upon
the veracity or falsity of Survey Plan II-4374 as determined by the office of
the Bureau of Lands commissioned by the Court for that purpose, and also
considering, as stated earlier, that this is a special civil action wherein a ruling
on jurisdiction is sufficient to adjudicate the matter in controversy. cdphil
The herein respondents attribute laches to the petitioners for not appealing
from the order of the lower court denying their motion to intervene and motion
for new trial hence allowing the said order/decision to become final. There is
no laches nor finality of any decision to speak of since the decision under
question is herein pronounced null and void for having been rendered
without jurisdiction. Prescinding therefrom, as admitted by themselves in their
comment, the judgment of reconstitution is "ineffective" against the owners of
lands covered thereby who were not joined as parties in the proceeding. As
the Court ruled in the Bernal case on the matter of intervention 12 "a valid
judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable
parties" such as petitioners who hold subsisting Torrens Titles to the
properties in question and "this aspect of the case commands the joinder of
indispensable parties to allow them to uphold their interests based upon the
Torrens titles they hold overrides any question of late intervention."
Petitioners have precisely availed of the proper, speedy and adequate
remedy of the present special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to annul
and set aside for want of jurisdiction the decision and all proceedings of
respondent judge.
If there is any laches at all to speak about, it is the respondents who should
be held culpable thereof. For they appear to have slept on their supposed
rights to the property claimed by them. It is of record that the petition for
reconstitution was prepared and filed in September 1977, more than thirty
years after the alleged loss or destruction of the alleged certificate of title in
the last World War II. During this long span of time, herein respondents never
protested the development and building of residential subdivisions as well as
factories, roads and infrastructures in the area which unexplained inaction
131
taken together with the falsity of their basic survey plan, supra, impress upon
their petition a most dubious character to say the least.
To repeat what the writer hereof said in his concurring opinion in the Bernal
Case, "The first lesson to be drawn here is that courts must exercise
the greatest caution in entertaining such petitions for reconstitution of
allegedly lost certificates of title, particularly where the petitions are filed, as
in this case, after an inexplicable delay of 25 years after the alleged loss.
Furthermore, the courts must likewise make sure that indispensable
parties, i.e. the actual owners and possessors of the lands involved, are duly
served with actual and personal notice of the petition (not by mere general
publication), particularly where the lands involved constitute prime developed
commercial land including a part of the South Superhighway. The stability
and indefeasibility of the Torrens System would have been greatly imperiled
had the appellate court's judgment granting reconstitution prevailed, resulting
in two holders of Torrens certificates over the same lands. We can take
judicial notice of innumerable litigations and controversies that have been
spawned by the reckless and hasty grant of such reconstitution of alleged
lost or destroyed titles as well as of the numerous purchasers who have been
victimized only to find that the 'lands' purchased by them were covered by
forged or fake titles or their areas simply 'expanded' through 'table surveys'
with the cooperation of unscrupulous officials." (Emphasis copied).
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued
existing Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of
one year from their issuance under section 38 of the Land Registration Act)
cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment
the cancellation of such existing titles. (And as the Court reiterated in the
recent case of Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, 13 "in cases of annulment
and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely by
a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the
land sought to be reconveyed is his.") The courts simply have no
jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly
lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued
subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very
concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens
System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates
of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. Afortiori, such
proceedings for "reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly registered
owners and holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and void. Applicants,
land officials and judges who disregard these basic and fundamental
principles will be held duly accountable therefor. prcd
WHEREFORE, the subject judgment of the lower court ordering the register
of deeds of Metro Manila, Makati Branch IV to reconstitute from Decree No.
15170 and the plan and technical descriptions submitted, the alleged
certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of
Manuela Aquial, is hereby annulled and set aside, and the petition for
reconstitution is ordered dismissed.
The temporary restraining order of June 27, 1980 issued against respondents
is hereby made and declared permanent. With costs jointly and severally
against private respondents.
The Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish the Honorable
Minister of Justice a copy of the decision at bar (as well as a copy, for ready
reference, of the decision of January 27, 1981 in the related Bernal case,
G.R. No. L-45168, previously ordered furnished to him) for the institution of
appropriate criminal proceedings against private respondents and all others
who have assisted or conspired with them as may be warranted by the
evidence of record.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Alabang Development Corp. v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-54094, [August 30,
1982], 201 PHIL 727-745)
[G.R. No. 55771. November 15, 1982.]
TAHANAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS; HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, NICOLAS A. PASCUAL, CRISANTO F. PASCUAL, ANSELMO F.
PASCUAL, MAMERTO F. PASCUAL, PASCUALA A. MEJIA, DAMIANA A.
MEJIA, CIRILO S. PASCUAL, and CATALINA S. PASCUAL, respondents.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner.
Ramo S. Nievo for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE;
RECONSTITUTION OF LOST TITLE; NOTICE OF HEARING; PETITIONER
NOT NOTIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. Upon a cursory reading of both the
petition for reconstitution and the notice of hearing, it is at once apparent that
Tahanan has not been named, cited or indicated therein as the owner,
occupant or possessor of property adjacent to Lot 2, title to which is sought to
be reconstituted. Neither do the petition and the notice state or mention that
Tahanan is the occupant or possessor of a portion of said Lot 2. The result of
this omission or failure is that Tahanan was never notified of the petition for
reconstitution and the hearings or proceedings therein.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POSTING REQUIREMENT IS MANDATORY
UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY;
CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, the notice of hearing issued by the trial
court directed that copies thereof be posted only in the bulletin board of the
CFI of Pasay City and no more, whereas the law (R.A No. 26) specifically
requires that the notice of the petition shall be posted on the main entrance of
the municipality or city on which the land is situated, at the provincial building
and at the municipal building at least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing.
The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or
132
occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having an
interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less)
of Lot 2, as well as the failure or omission to post copies of the notice of
hearing on the main entrance of the municipality on which the land is
situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat are
fatal to the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court as ruled in
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 438 and stressed in
Alabang Development Corp., et al. vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et al.,
G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; INTERVENTION; ALLOWED
DURING PENDENCY OF APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, AS
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE; CASE AT BAR. In the case of Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 93 SCRA 238, the Supreme Court allowed
the intervention of adjacent owners even during the pendency of the appeal
in the Supreme Court from the decision granting reconstitution in the
paramount interest of justice and as an exception to Section 2, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner Tahanan having sought to intervene in the court
below and alleging material and substantial interest in the property to which
title is sought to be reconstituted in its Motion to Set Aside Decision and Re-
Open Proceedings duly verified and attaching therewith xerox copies of its
adjoining transfer certificates of title of its properties adjoining and even
overlapped by that of the Pascuals to the extent of some 9 hectares in area,
the trial court ought to have admitted said motion. There was reversible error
in refusing to do so.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERVENTION IN LOWER COURT IS MORE
EXPEDIENT THAN IF FILED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT. The
holding of the respondent Court of Appeals that our resolution in Director of
Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238, allowing intervention is not applicable to the
case at bar because there was no motion to intervene filed before the
Supreme Court by Tahanan is without merit. Such holding fails to see that the
intervention of Tahanan while the reconstitution was still in the trial court
below was more expedient for the trial court is in better and more suitable
position to hear and decide the question of encroachment and overlapping
raised by Tahanan in its Motion to Set Aside Decision and Re-Open
Proceedings and where the witnesses may be examined and cross-
examined by the parties and the court, whereas the Supreme Court is not
trier of facts.
5. ID .; ID.; ID.; ID.; INFERIOR COURTS SHOULD NOT IGNORE OR
CIRCUMVENT THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT. Since the
highest Tribunal has allowed intervention almost at the end of the
proceedings, there should and there ought to be no quibbling, much less
hesitation or circumvention on the part of subordinate and inferior courts to
abide and conform to the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court. A well-
becoming sense of modesty and a respectful awareness of its inferior
position in the judicial hierarchy is to be expected of trial courts and the
appellate court to the end that a well-ordered and disciplined administration
of justice may be preserved and maintained. We cannot allow, permit or
tolerate inferior courts to ignore or circumvent the clear and express rulings
of this Court.
6. ID.; ID.; PARTIES TO ACTION; INDISPENSABLE PARTY; JOINDER OF
PETITIONER INDISPENSABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. The trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering Tahanan as an
indispensable party to the proceedings, it having been shown positively that it
has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in its absence, without injuring or affecting
such interest. In Director of Lands vs. CA,supra, and Alabang Development
Corporation vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 54094, August 30,
1982, the Supreme Court ruled that "The joinder must be ordered in order to
prevent multiplicity of suits so that the whole matter in dispute may be
determined once and for all in one litigation. The evident aim and intent of the
Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and necessary parties is a
complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties
themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the
judgment. A valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of
indispensable parties."
7. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE; INTEGRITY AND
INVIOLABILITY MUST BE UPHELD BY COURTS; DUTY TO EXAMINE
CAREFULLY ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR RECONSTITUTION OF
TITLES. Time and again, the integrity and inviolability of Torrens titles
issued pursuant to the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and Presidential
Decree No. 1529 have been shaken by the very courts whose unwavering
duty should be to protect the rights and interests of title holders but instead
have favored claimants under the guise of reconstitution filed after a long
lapse of time after the Japanese occupation, alleging the existence of original
and duplicate certificates of title issued pursuant to a court decree but have
subsequently been lost or destroyed including the records of the land
registration case on account of the war and lay claim and title to valuable
parcels of land previously titled and registered under the Torrens registration
system and are even able to dispose these properties to unsuspecting
homelot buyers and speculating land developers. The courts must be
cautious and careful in granting reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates
of title, both original and duplicate owner's, based on documents and decrees
made to appear authentic from mere xerox copies and certifications of
officials supposedly signed with the seals of their office affixed thereon,
considering the case and facility with which documents are made to appear
as official and authentic. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize and verify
carefully all supporting documents, deeds and certifications. Each and every
133
fact, circumstance or incident which corroborates or relates to the existence
and loss of the title should be examined.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT THEREOF;
NO PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF TORRENS TITLE SOUGHT TO BE
RECONSTITUTED IN CASE AT BAR. The claim of the Pascuals that their
predecessor-in-interest, Manuela Aquial, had an original certificate of title to
Lots 2 and 4 of Plan II-4374 is extremely difficult to believe and sustain.
There are too many omissions and blanks, too many failures and
unanswered questions that belie such a claim. Thus, it is at once noted that
the number of the certificate of title issued to and registered in the name of
respondents' mother and predecessor-in-interest, Manuela Aquial, is
unknown. Nowhere in the voluminous records do the Pascuals cite, state, or
mention the number of said certificate of title. Not even in the tax declaration
of Lot 2 (Tax Declaration No. 15423, Exh. "S" and Tax Declaration No. 10187,
Exh. "S-1") and Lot No. 4 (Tax Declaration No. 15424, Exh. "T" and Tax
Declaration No. 10188, Exh. "T-1") is the number of the certificate of title
indicated. And there is absolutely no document, private or official, presented
by the Pascuals mentioning the number of the certificate of title. There is also
no proof as to when the certificate of title was issued.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO PROOF AS TO HOW RESPONDENTS ACQUIRED TITLE
TO THE LOTS IN QUESTION; CASE AT BAR. In the instant petition at
bar, We find no claim of Aquial nor her successors, the Pascuals, as to how
they acquired title in fee simple to Lots 2 and 4, whether thru sales
patent, composicion con el estado, or informacion possesoria. The only
allegation of the basis of their ownership is paragraph 3 of the petition for
reconstitution which alleges "That the petitioners, by themselves and thru
their predecessors-in-interest Manuela Aquial have been and still are in the
actual, public, exclusive, adverse, continuous and peaceful occupation of the
afore-described lands as owners in fee simple since time immemorial,
devoting a small portion thereof to agriculture."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO PRESENT ANY COPY OF CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE IN CASE AT BAR RENDERS CLAIM TO TITLE SUSPICIOUS.
Since the Tuason-Changco property was issued Certificate of Title No. 724
pursuant to Decree No. 15170 Issued in Land Registration Case No. 9368
whereas Aquial, claiming the same decree number and the same land
registration case number, cannot present her owner's duplicate copy nor the
original certificate which she claims were lost or destroyed, including the
records of Land Registration Case No. 9368 (which is not true as the Notice
of Hearing therein was shown and exhibited in copies of the Official Gazette),
We find and so hold that it is the Aquial certificate of title that is suspicious, if
not non-existent, and not that of the Tuason-Changco Certificate No. 724.
11. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE;
PETITIONER'S TITLE MUST BE RESPECTED. The Torrens titles of
petitioner Tahanan and the numerous transfers therefrom to innocent
purchasers for value must be respected and protected in order to achieve the
"real purpose of the Torrens System which is to quiet title to the land . . . and
once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid
the possibility of losing his land." (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65, 84; Legarda
and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 451).
AQUINO, J., concurring:
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE; CASE AT BAR, A
LANDGRABBING CASE; HOW IT IS PERPETRATED. The case at bar is
a landgrabbing case and it may be perpetrated by (1) actual and physical
usurpation, (2) expanded survey, (3) fake Spanish titles and (4) reconstitution
of fake Torrens titles, registration decrees or judgments in land registration
cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR RELATED TO BERNAL CASE.
The Bernal case (Director of Lands vs. Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal and CA, L-
45168, January 27, 1981, where the Supreme Court dismissed the petition
for reconstitution) to which the instant case is related involves the
reconstitution) to which the instant case is related involves the reconstitution
of a fictitious Torrens title over parcels of land existing only on paper and
which, when verified on the ground, covers land already titled in the name of
other persons.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BERNAL CASE RULING APPLIED IN BAGATSING AND
ALABANG CASE; DECISION IN THE LATTER CASE RENDERED MOOT
AND ACADEMIC THE CASE AT BAR. The Supreme Court in its decision
of August 30, 1982, in G.R. No. 54094, entitled "Alabang Development
Corporation, et al. vs. Judge Valenzuela, et al." using findings and rulings in
the Bernal case, reversed Judge Valenzuela's decision and dismissed the
petition for reconstitution. Said decision rendered the instant case moot and
academic.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J p:
There are three cases recently decided by the Supreme Court that are
directly related to and squarely identified with the petition at bar, namely, (1)
Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, et al., respondents,
Greenfield Development Corporation, intervenor, Alabang Development
Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors, No. L-45168, September
25, 1979, 93 SCRA 238, (2) The Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. The Court
of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, respondents, Greenfield
Development Corporation, intervenor, Alabang Development Corporation and
Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors, L-45168, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA
370, and (3) Alabang Development Corp. and Ramon D. Bagatsing,
134
petitioner, vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et al., respondents, G.R. No.
54094, August 30, 1982.
In the first case, Our Resolution admitted the intervention of the intervenors
filed before the Supreme Court at the stage of the proceedings where trial of
the petition for judicial reconstitution had already been concluded, the
judgment thereon granting the reconstitution had been promulgated and on
appeal by the losing party, the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and the petition for certiorari to review said judgment was already submitted
for decision in the Supreme Court. The second case is Our decision on the
merits of the certiorari petition wherein We ruled, among others, that the
judgment of the lower court granting the petition for judicial reconstitution of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal in the
name of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal covering two parcels of land
located in Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Rizal (now Barrio
Cupang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Rizal) denominated as Lots 1 and 3 of
Plan II-4374 based on a survey approved July 25, 1911 with an area of
717,523 square meters and 717,539 square meters, respectively, was null
and void for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Republic
Act No. 26. We further held that TCT No. 42449 was fake and spurious.
In the third case, the Supreme Court directly ruled that the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch XXIX, in Reconstitution
Case No. 504-P Land Registration Case No. 9368, Hon. Manuel E.
Valenzuela, presiding, ordering the reconstitution from Decree No. 15170 and
the plan and technical descriptions, the alleged certificate of title, original and
owner's duplicate copy over Lots 2 and 4 indicated in Plan II-4374 situated in
Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, now Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa,
Rizal, in the name of Manuela Aquial, was null and void.
The instant petition for review similarly assails the validity of the same
judgment ordering the reconstitution of the Certificate of Title, original and
owner's duplicate copy, over the same lots, Lots 2 and 4, of the same plan,
Plan II-4374, in the name of the said Manuela Aquial, promulgated in the
same Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368,
Court of First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXIX, Judge Manuel E.
Valenzuela, presiding. The said case at bar was brought by petitioner
Tahanan Development Corporation while the third case was instituted by
Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing as petitioners.
Whereas the third case categorically ruled and decided the questions of law
raised therein, the proceedings being the special civil action of certiorari
attacking the jurisdiction of the lower court, the petition at bar being a petition
for review, a more extended discussion of the issues on the merits is
necessary and more appropriate. Thus, We start by noting that herein
petition for review seeks to set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
promulgated April 30, 1980 reversing an earlier decision of the same Court
dated November 16, 1979 in CA-G.R. No. SP-08680-R entitled "Tahanan
Development Corporation, petitioner, versus Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et
al., respondents," as well as the subsequent resolution dated December 8,
1980 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Tahanan
Development Corporation, hereinafter referred to as TAHANAN, claiming
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge, further seeks
the setting aside of the decision rendered by the latter in Reconstitution Case
No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368, dated October 5, 1978 in favor
of herein private respondents Nicolas A. Pascual and his co-heirs, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Register of Deeds of Metro
Manila, Makati Branch IV, is hereby ordered to reconstitute from Decree No.
15170, Exhibit X, the plan and technical descriptions submitted to the Court
the certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of
Manuela Aquial, single, Filipino, with residence at 307, 15th Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City, giving the certificate appropriate number which will not conflict
with other titles already issued upon payment of the prescribed fees. The
Branch Clerk of Court is directed to forward a certified copy of this decision
and all documents necessary for the reconstitution." (Rollo, p. 66).
The records of the case show that on October 5, 1977, private respondents
hereinafter referred to as the Pascuals, claiming as intestate heirs of
Manuela Aquial who died on January 26, 1967, filed a petition for judicial
reconstitution of lost certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26 docketed as
Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368 in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City, presided by
respondent Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela, alleging that:
"xxx xxx xxx
2. That Manuela Aquial, the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, while yet
single and up to the time she got married, was the registered owner of those
contiguous lands, Lots 2 and 4 as shown in Plan II-4374, situated in Bo. San
Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal now Bo. Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal, and more
particularly bounded as follows:
1). A parcel of land (Lot 2 of Plan II-4374, L.R.C. No. _______), situated in
the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (Now
BO. CUPANG, Muntinlupa, Rizal) ( . . . containing an area of Three Hundred
Seventy Five Thousand Six Hundred and Twenty-Two (375,622) Square
Meters. Bounded on the NE., NW., and W., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 by
Pedro L. Flores who is in occupation of the same and of which notice maybe
served at his office address at No. 959 C. Lerma Street, Sampaloc, Manila or
at his residence at No. 707 A. Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila; and on
the SE., along lines 7-8-9-10-1 (portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) by Maglana &
Sons Management Corporation, a private corporation existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines which is in occupation of the same and of
which notice may be served to it C/O Constancio B. Maglana, its President
135
and Chairman of the Board at No. 513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills
Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal;
2) A parcel of land (Lot 4 of Plan II-4374, L.R.C. Record No.______), situated
in the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal
(Now Bo. Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal) ( . . . containing an area of Fifty-Six
Thousand Two Hundred Ninety-Five (56,295) Square Meters. Bounded on
the NW., and SW., along lines 1-2-3 (portion of Lot I, Plan II-4374) and on the
SE., NE., and NW., along lines 3-4-5-1 (Portion of Lot 3, Plan II-4374), all by
Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, a private corporation existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines which is in occupation of
the same and of which notice may be served to it C/O Constancio B.
Maglana, its President and Chairman of the Board, at No. 513 Lafayette
Street, Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal. The above lots are more
particularly described in herein attached Decree No. 15170 issued on March
4, 1914 with the same boundaries and description contained in the
corresponding original certificate of title (original and owner's duplicate copy)
issued therefor in Land Registration Case No. 9368 on file with the Land
Registration Commission; that said lands have not been included in any
cadastral survey;
3. That the petitioners, by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest
Manuela Aquial have been and still are in the actual, public, exclusive,
adverse, continuous and peaceful occupation of the afore-described lands as
owners in fee simple since time immemorial, devoting a small portion thereof
to agriculture;
4. That the said original certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate
copies, covering said lands have been lost or destroyed in the last World War
II and diligent efforts to locate the same have been all in vain; that said title
was subsisting and in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, free from
liens and encumbrances of any kind and nature up to the present; that the
records of the land registration case of the same lots have likewise been lost
and destroyed except such records as hereinafter set forth;
5. That there is no record of any sales patent, sales certificate or any land
grant over said lands to any person or entity; that no Co-owner's,
Mortgagee's, Lessee's or any lien holder's copy of said Original Certificate of
Title have ever been issued; that Manuela Aquial as well as her first and
second husbands, Esteban Pascual and Cornelio Mejia and petitioners
herein have not at any time delivered the Owner's Duplicate copy of subject
certificate of title to any person or entity to secure the payment of or
performance of any obligation whatsoever nor any transaction entered into by
them by which certain deed or other instruments related to or affecting the
subject lands presented for or pending registration in the office of the
Register of Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila;
6. That said Manuela Aquial died intestate in Cubao, Quezon City on January
26, 1967 leaving the aforementioned estate to the herein petitioners as her
heirs, without debts;
7. That for purposes of said inheritance, the petitioners desire in this petition
to reconstitute the lost original certificate of title, Original and Owner's
duplicate copies, covering said Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 herein above
described, on the basis of: (1) Said Decree No. 15170 issued on March 4,
1914 (Annex "A") and the certification thereof by the Chief, Docket Division,
Land Registration Commission (Annex "A-1"); (2) Survey Plan II-4374 from
microfilm Reel 560 under Accession No. 385657 on file with the Bureau of
Lands (Annex "B"); and certification thereof (Annex "B-1"), and the
corresponding affidavit of the Chief, Reproduction Section, Bureau of Lands,
attesting to such fact (Annex "B-2"); (3) Certified Technical Description of
Lots 2 and 4 under said Plan II-4374, by the Chief, Surveys Division, Bureau
of Lands (Annexes "C" and "C-1"); (4) Certification by the Acting Chief,
Records Division, Bureau of Lands, that there is no record of any Sales
Patent, Sales Certificates or any land grant affecting or embracing the
subject lands to any person (Annex "D"); (5) Tax Declaration (Annexes "E",
"E-1", "E-2" and "E-3"); (6) Tax Receipts (Annexes "F" and "F-1 "); (7)
Affidavit of adjoining owner Pedro L. Flores executed before Notary Public
Atty. F.S. Guanco for Quezon City (Annex "G"); (8) White print copy of
Relocation Plan dated July 7-12, 1974, with the certification of Geodetic
Engineer Restituto L. Beltran who conducted said relocation survey of Lots
Nos. 7 and 4, Plan II-4374 in the presence of the adjoining owners (Annex
"H"). All of which are xerox copies and made integral parts of this petition but
the originals thereof shall be presented at the hearing."
On October 5, 1977, the Notice of Hearing was issued by the Court and
likewise, for its materiality in resolving the issue of jurisdiction, We quote the
material portions thereof below:
"NOTICE OF HEARING
A verified petition dated September 2, 1977 has been filed by petitioners, thru
counsel, alleging, among others, that:
(Paragraphs 1 to 7 are omitted, being the same allegations in the Petition for
Reconstitution hereinbefore quoted.)
Now, therefore, notice is hereby given that this petition will be heard before
this Court, sitting on the 2nd floor, New City Hall Building, F.B. Harrison,
Pasay City, Metro Manila, on the 18th day of November, 1977, at 8:30 o'clock
in the morning, at which date, time and place, all interested parties are
hereby cited to appear and show cause, if any why said petition should not
be granted.
Let copies of this Notice be published in the Official Gazette and in the
Newspaper of general circulation in the Greater Manila Area, once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioners, and likewise
posted in the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City.
136
Let the Office of the Land Registration Commission and the Bureau of Lands
be furnished this Notice and copies of the petition, together with its annexes.
WITNESS the HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, presiding Judge of this
Court, this 5th day of October, 1977.
(SGD.) BASILIO B. BOLANTE
Branch Clerk of Court"
The above notice was published in the Official Gazette in the issues of
November 14, 21 and 28, 1977 (Exhibits "A", "B", "B-1", "C", "C-1", "D", "D-1"
"E" and "E-1"). Copies of the same notice were also posted by Deputy Sheriff
Arsenio de Guzman of Pasay City in the Bulletin Board of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch located at the Hall of Justice, City Hall
Building, Pasay City on October 5, 1977 (Exhibit "F"). On the same date,
copies of the notice were served to the Office of the Solicitor General and on
November 9, 1977, to the Commissioner of Land Registration by Deputy
Sheriff De Guzman (Exhibit "F"), together with copies of the petition and its
annexes. The proofs submitted of notice to the adjacent owners indicated in
the Petition and Notice of Hearing, namely, Pedro L. Flores with address at
959 C. Lerma Street, Sampaloc, Manila and Constancio B. Maglana as
President and Chairman of the Board of Maglana & Sons Management
Corporation with office and postal address at 513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills
Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal, are their respective affidavits dated July 17,
1974 and August 6, 1974 (Exhibits "H" and "I").
The Director of Lands thru counsel, Atty. Daniel C. Florida, Special Attorney
of the Office of the Solicitor General, filed on April 14, 1978 an Opposition to
the petition on the following grounds:
"1. That the same petitioners in this Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Nicolas
A. Pascual, et al., claiming to be the heirs of the late Manuel Aquial, had
previously filed a similar petition for reconstitution of the alleged lost original
certificate of title supposed to have been issued in Land Registration Case
No. 9368 under Decree No. 15170 in the name of Manuela Aquial over the
same parcels of land, Lots 2 and 4, Plant II-4374 situated at Bo. San
Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, which previous petition, docketed as
Reconstitution Case No. 77 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXVI, Makati, Rizal, appears to have been dismissed. Oppositor Director of
Lands hereby reserves his right to present later a certified copy of the order
of dismissal, as he has not yet received a reply of the Clerk of Court of the
Court of First Instance, Branch XXXVI, to our letter to him dated March 14,
1978, duplicate copy hereto attached as Annex "A", requesting for a certified
copy of the order or decision resolving said Reconstitution Case No. 77,
which order or decision may be a dismissal with prejudice and may thus be a
bar to the filing of the instant Reconstitution Case No. 504-P based on the
principle of res judicata;
2. That contrary to the claim of petitioners that the aforementioned Lots 2 and
4, Plan II-4374 situated at Bo. San Dionisio. Paraaque, Rizal were issued
Decree No. 15170 on March 4, 1914 in the name of Manuela Aquial in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 and that the corresponding original certificate of
title for said Decree were registered and issued under the said Decree, the
truth is that said Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration Case No. 9368 was
issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and
Eugenio T. Changco, married to Romana Gatchalian, covering a parcel of
land with an area of 422 square meters situated at Bambang, Pasig, Rizal,
and not for Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 with a total area of 431,917 square
meters situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal. These facts are
evidenced by the letter dated February 28, 1978 of the Acting Register of
Deeds of Rizal, the letter dated March 9, 1978 of the same Acting Register of
Deeds of Rizal, and the Report dated November 11, 1974 of the then
Register of Deeds of Rizal submitted to him as required by the court in the
previous Reconstitution Case No. 77 filed with Branch XXXVI of this
Honorable Court at Makati, Rizal, xerox copies of said letters and report are
hereto attached as ANNEX "B", ANNEX "C" and ANNEX "D", respectively;
3. That from the documents ANNEXES "B", "C" and "D", it is very clear that
no original certificate of title had or has been issued to Manuela Aquial
covering Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374, situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Rizal; that consequently, no original certificate of title in the name of Manuela
Aquial has been lost; and that therefore, this instant petition for reconstitution
of an alleged lost original certificate of title has no basis in fact and in law,
there being no title to be reconstituted under Republic Act No. 26;
4. That the applicants for land registration in Land Registration Case No.
9368, Decree No. 15170, of the then Court of Land Registration were
Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eusebio T. Changco,
married to Romana Gatchalian, and not Manuela Aquial; and that the land
subject thereof was a parcel of land in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, and not a
parcel of land in San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal;
5. That the same Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration Case No. 9368
issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason, et al. for a parcel of land in Bambang,
Pasig, Rizal could not have been also issued in the name of Manuela Aquial
for a parcel of land in San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal;
6. That the genuineness or authenticity of ANNEX "A" of the petition in this
case which is alleged to be a copy of Decree No. 15170 issued in the name
of Manuela Aquial is very questionable on the following grounds and points:
(a) ANNEX "A" is a xerox copy not of the original of Decree No. 15170 or of
an authenticated copy thereof but only of an unauthenticated true copy of
said decree as indicated by the typewritten words 'A true copy:' at the bottom
of the left hand corner of page (2) of said document;
(b) The said typewritten words 'A true copy': is not signed or even initialed by
any competent officer of the court of the Land Registration Commission to
give it authenticity;
137
(c) That ANNEX "A" is a xerox copy of the original of Decree No. 15170 of an
authenticated copy thereof but only of a true copy is also seen from the first
line on top of the document on page 1 which reads: 'Copy of Decree No.
15170.' An original of a Decree is issued without the words 'Copy of' prefixed
before the Decree Number;
(d) ANNEX "A" being a mere xerox copy of an authenticated 'true copy,' it is
very questionable why the true copy which was reproduced by the xerox
copy marked ANNEX "A" bears the written signature of the Clerk of Court,
Enrique Altavas by way of attestation of the decree. It is well known that a
mere true copy of any document, public or private, does not bear the written
signature of the party or officer signing or issuing the document. Only the
original or duplicate of the document may bear the written signature of the
party or officer signing or issuing the document;.
(e) In ANNEX "A-1" of the petition in the instant case, alleged to be a
certification of Decree No. 15170, what appears to have been certified by the
Chief, Docket Division of the Land Registration Commission is that the
document (Decree No. 15170) 'is a true and correct reproduction of a true
copy of Decree No. 15170.' Where is the original or an authentic signed
duplicate of Decree No. 15170?
(f) ANNEX "F", either the xerox copy of a true copy, or the true copy
reproduced by the xerox copy, is an UNAUTHENTICATED copy of the
alleged decree, and therefore, it cannot be the valid basis for reconstitution
under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 26;
7. That contrary to the allegation in paragraph 3 of the petition, petitioners by
themselves and thru their predecessor-in-interest Manuela Aquial have not
been in the actual, exclusive and continuous occupation of the lands subject
of their petitions since time immemorial, the truth of the matter being that
their alleged occupation is only of recent vintage, having declared the lots for
taxation only in 1973, beginning with the year 1970 (ANNEXES "E", "E-1",
"E-2", and "E-3"), and paid the taxes for 1970 to 1973 in lump sum on
September 6, 1973 (ANNEXES "F" and "F-1");
8. That Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 have never been applied for and registered
under the Land Registration Law, Act No. 496, the same being lands of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and are portions
of the adjoining public land as indicated in Plan II-4374, subject to disposition
only under the pertinent and applicable provisions of the Public Land
Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended;
9. That not all the jurisdictional facts of the instant case have been
established and therefore, this Honorable Court has not acquired jurisdiction
to hear and resolve the case under Republic Act No. 26, for the reason that
petitioners thru counsel have failed to serve notice of the petition in this case
to the owners of the adjoining properties. The affidavits of the alleged
adjoining owners, Constancio B. Maglana and Pedro L. Flores submitted by
petitioners as Exhibits "H" and "I" respectively, and which were executed in
1974 before the petition in the instant case was filed on November 15, 1977,
cannot be validly admitted as substitute for service of notice of the petition to
the adjoining owners as required under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26;
and
10. That the instant petition for reconstitution should be dismissed outright for
lack of factual and legal basis, the Decree No. 15170 involved by petitioners
having been issued in favor of other persons named Eugenio Tuason, et al.
for a different parcel of land located in another barrio and municipality."
On November 18, 1977, the date scheduled for the hearing as indicated in
the Notices, the Court re-set the hearing of the case to February 27, 1978, it
appearing that the Notice of Hearing had not been published in the Official
Gazette as per information relayed to the Court by the petitioners. Again, the
hearing set on February 27, 1978 was re-scheduled to April 14, 1978 in view
of the manifestation of the representative of the Bureau of Lands that they
have not received copy of the petition. Once more, the latter setting was
cancelled and re-set to June 2, 1978 on the ground that the counsel for
petitioner informed the Court that they have just received the Opposition
dated April 11, 1978 filed by Solicitor Daniel Florida.
Meanwhile, the Pascuals filed their Reply to the Opposition alleging, among
others, that they had filed a previous petition docketed as Reconstitution
Case No. 77 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati,
Rizal which was voluntarily withdrawn by them on grounds stated by their
counsel in his Motion to Withdraw without prejudice and granted by the Court
in its Order dated May 30, 1975; that the report of the Register of Deeds of
Pasig, Rizal mentioning that Decree No. 15170 appears in the name of
Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco in Original Certificate of Title No.
724 does not preclude the existence of Decree No. 15170 issued in the name
of Manuela Aquial in Land Registration Case No. 9368 since, assuming the
report of the Register of Pasig to be accurate, it could have been a clerical
error or mistake of the clerk in the office of the Register of Deeds in typing on
the Original Certificate of Title No. 724 the same Decree No. and the same
Registration No. as that issued in favor of Manuela Aquial; and that there
may be two decrees bearing the same number but involving different parcels
of land is nothing unusual or surprising, in the same manner that there may
be two or three certificates of titles bearing the same number but in the
names of different owners covering properties in different places and issued
at different periods of time.
The trial court granted the petition for reconstitution in its decision dated
October 5, 1978. The court said:
"The documents presented by the petitioners to establish the existence of the
prerequisites to reconstitution of the title in the name of their predecessor-in-
interests were either admitted or not objected to by Atty. Rodolfo J. Flores in
representation of the Director of Lands, except Exhibits O and P on Plan II-
4374 on the alleged ground that they were reproduced from a microfilm reel
138
and not from available approved records, as well as Exhibits X, X-1 and X-2
(Decree No. 15170), on the ground that they were mere xerox copies not of
the original of the Decree or an authenticated copy thereof.
Counsel for oppositor overlooks the realities that forced the petitioners to
seek reconstitution of the title of their predecessor-in-interests. The original of
the Decree was sent to the register of deeds for the issuance of the
certificate of title. It was in the latter office that it was lost. The copy left in the
Land Registration Commission is authenticated by the signature of the Clerk
of Court of the Land Registration Court, Enrique Altavas. To limit the bases of
reconstitution to originals of the official documents is to defeat the purpose of
the law. Reason and the law would not justify private properties to remain
forever with their titles unreconstituted.
The grounds for the objection disregards the destruction of many government
records during the last world war and defeats the purpose of the law on
reconstitution. If those records were not destroyed, there would be no need
for reconstitution. The loss and destruction underscore the need for
reconstitution. Reconstitution or reconstruction relates to lost original records
in the government offices. Any data available may suffice if the Court is
convinced of the existence of the title being reconstituted. This is in accord
with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Villa vs. Fabricante, L-
5531, June 30, 1953. If the law allows reconstitution from testimony a
fortiori it must allow reconstitution upon xerox copies of documents
microfilmed in anticipation of possible loss thereof. The microfilm
underscores the existence of the documents, for without them there would be
nothing to microfilm. The Government has enjoined by Decree the
microfilming of important documents.
By and large, the presence of the signature of the Clerk of Court of the land
registration court on the Decree attests to its genuineness and authenticity.
He is too dead to falsify the Decree Exhibit X.
Except Exhibit 5 which is a xerox copy of a cancelled owner's duplicate copy
of Certificate of Title No. 724 and which mentions Decree No. 15170, the
oppositor's documentary evidence are letters of inquiry and replies thereto.
By their very nature, they are too weak a basis to establish any fact. The
writers thereof were not presented as witnesses to be cross-examined on
their contents. The witness who was presented to identify the exhibits was
not the receiver nor custodian of said communications. He admittedly does
not know the contents thereof.
Exhibit 5, a supposed cancelled owner's duplicate of the title of Eugenio
Tuason which mentions Decree No. 15170 refers to a 422-square meter lot
in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, which is different from the Decree Exhibit X for the
two lots inCupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal, having a total area of 431,917 square
meters. The existence of the owner's duplicate copy in the office of the
register of deeds without the original is a suspicious circumstance never
explained by anybody. The mystery goes deeper if we consider that no other
document, private or public, was presented to support the existence of the Copy of the above decision was served the Land Registration Commission
original title or the decree upon which the title was based. Nobody even on October 16, 1978.
testified on the existence of this Exhibit 5 in the office of the register of deeds. On November 15, 1978, herein petitioner Tahanan Development Corporation
filed with the Court a quo a verified Petition To Set Aside Decision and Re-
The Decree Exhibit X enjoys the probative value of an official document Open Proceedings, alleging that:
existing in the proper depositary unaccompanied by any circumstance of "xxx xxx xxx
suspicion. The law reposes probative force upon the official documents as it "2. Sometime in 1971, in the course of its operations, Oppositor acquired and
presumes fidelity in the discharge of duties of public officers. The authenticity became the registered owner of six (6) parcels of land situated in Barrio San
of the Decree issued in favor of petitioners' predecessor having been Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and aggregating some sixty
established, the Decree Exhibit X 'shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto' (60) hectares in area; xerox copies of the certificates of title, all of the
and 'shall be conclusive upon all persons, including the Insular Government Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, covering said parcels of land and
and all branches thereof,' and 'incontrovertible' after one year from the issued in Oppositor's name are attached to and made an integral part of this
issuance of the Decree (Sec. 30, Act 496). Petition as follows:
Reconstitution of destroyed certificates of title is mandatory (Director vs. Gan Annex "A" T.C.T. No. 324558
Tan, L-2664, May 30, 1951). The bases for judicial reconstitution of Annex "B" T.C.T. No. 324559
certificates of title are numerous (Secs. 2 and 3, Rep. Act 26). Among them Annex "C" T.C.T. No. 324560
are: Annex "D" T.C.T. No. 324561
'(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration . . . (Sec 2, Rep. Act Annex "E" T.C.T. No. 324562
26). Annex "F" T.C.T. No. 351775.
'(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and All of said certificates of title originated from the 'mother title' Original
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title' (Secs. Certificate of Title No. 6567 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, issued
2, 3, Rep. Act 26). pursuant to Decree No. 515888 issued in Land Registration Case No. 776, a
In the light of the foregoing impressive and overwhelming evidence adduced copy of said O.C.T. No. 6567 is attached to and made an integral part of this
by the petitioners in support of their petition for the reconstitution of the title in Petition as Annex "A";
the name of Manuela Aquial, the court has no alternative to granting the 3. The aforementioned certificates of title, Annexes "A" to "F", were later
petition. Republic Act 26 provides: wholly or partly superseded by individual certificates of title, about one
'SEC. 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as thousand four hundred (1,400) in all, and also in Oppositor's name, covering
supported by parole evidence, or otherwise, are sufficient and proper to the individual home lots, street lots and other spaces into which the lands
warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, and that above referred to were subdivided in the course of the development of what
the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest are now known as Phase I and Phase II of Oppositor's 'Tahanan Village'; and
therein, that the said certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or while ownership, of and registered title to, some of the home lots have since
destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the property are passed to individual buyers by virtue of final sales, a considerable number of
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate said certificates of title still remain in the name of Oppositor;
of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued.' 4. Under date of October 5, 1978, this Honorable Court rendered a Decision
The requirements of Sections 5, 12, and 13 of Republic Act 26 have been in the above-entitled proceedings, granting the Petitioners' petition for
complied with. The Court has no reason to doubt the credibility of the reconstitution of a lost certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate,
witnesses for the petitioners, particularly the government officials allegedly issued pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914 in Case
subpoenaed who had occasion and reason to know the facts they testified to, No. 9368 of the Land Registration Court, and directing the register of deeds
being parts of their functions and duties in their respective offices. of Metro Manila, Makati Branch IV:
The Court discerns nothing from the opposition which Atty. Florida filed for ' . . . to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170, Exhibit K, the plan and technical
the Director of Lands except his seal to protect possible interests of the descriptions submitted to the court the certificate of title, original and owner's
Government. From the sparks created by his opposition, the Court saw the duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela Aquial, single, Filipino, with residence
crystal truth." at 307, 15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, giving the certificate appropriate

139
number which will not conflict with other titles already issued upon payment
of the prescribed fees. . . . '
5. The land supposedly covered by the certificate of title thus ordered
reconstituted appears to consist of two (2) parcels located in Barrio San
Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, with an aggregate area of forty three (43)
hectares, more or less, the technical descriptions of which are set forth in the
alleged copy of Decree No. 15170, Land Registration Case No. 9368 relied
upon by Petitioners;
6. Upon a comparison of said technical descriptions with those set forth in
the certificates of title, Annexes "A" to "F" of the present Petition, it would
appear that the land supposedly covered by the certificate of title ordered
reconstituted overlap and include substantial portions of Oppositor's lands
covered by the titles, Annexes "A" to "F"; the location and extent of the
overlapping, as plotted on the basis of the respective technical descriptions
referred to, is shown on the sketch plan, marked Annex "H", which is
attached to and made an integral part of this Petition;
7. Oppositor, therefore, has a substantial, material and proprietary interest in
the subject matter of these proceedings which is directly and adversely
affected by the Decision already referred to;
8. Oppositor, as the owner of lands not only adjacent to, but in fact
overlapped by, the land supposedly covered by the title sought to be
reconstituted, was entitled to personal notice of the petition for reconstitution;
such requirement of notice is jurisdictional, being mandated by Section 13
of Republic Act No. 26, and the consequence of failure to comply therewith is
that the court never acquires jurisdiction to entertain and hear the petition or
render valid judgment thereon.
The salient feature of this method (of judicial reconstitution under Republic
Act No. 26) is a petition and a hearing after two successive insertions in
the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing. It partakes of the nature of an
original registration proceedings, personal service of the notice of hearing to
the adjoining owners and occupants being essential, as well as posting of the
notice in main entrances of the Provincial and Municipal Buildings where the
land lies at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. (Ponce, The
Philippine Torrens System, p. 272).
9. Oppositor, as such adjoining owner, was not given notice of the petition for
reconstitution; these proceedings were instituted, set for hearing, were heard
and went to judgment without Oppositor's knowledge; indeed, it was only on
or about November 9, 1978, more than one month after the date of the
Decision allowing and ordering reconstitution, and only because another
adjoining owner similarly affected saw fit to so inform it, that Oppositor first
learned of the existence of the present proceedings;
10. Oppositor was denied due process and deprived its day in court through
fraud, accident or mistake, consisting in that Petitioners, knowing or being
chargeable with knowledge that the 'Tahanan Village' is a privately-owned
140
and operated residential subdivision and that Oppositor is the
owner/developer thereof, failed and to all indications by deliberate design
to name Oppositor as adjoining owner or occupant in their petition for
reconstitution; and Petitioners did more than fail to name Oppositor as an
adjoining owner and to serve it notice of these proceedings, it would appear
that they actively concealed or sought to conceal such fact; in the survey
plan, Exhibit "V", submitted by them to the Court which, by its terms, is based
on a survey made as late as July 7-12, 1974, the area where Oppositor's
'Tahanan Village' would lie is described as public land; and these
circumstances directly led to and produced the results already stated,
namely, that Oppositor, never having been notified of the petition for
reconstitution, was not able to oppose the same or to be heard thereon;
11. The gravity and inexcusable character of Petitioners' conduct above
complained of is made manifest by the fact that for several years now, the
existence of 'Tahanan Village' as a privately-owned and occupied residential
subdivision has been made apparent to all and sundry by such prominent
features as the perimeter fence or wall separating it from adjacent estates,
the roads, streets and constantly increasing volume of home construction
within the subdivision itself, the very visible electrical lighting and water
supply installations, the presence of private security guards guarding the
premises, to mention only a few; moreover, it has a number of signs of
conspicuous size and location identifying and advertising it as a housing
development owned and/or managed by Oppositor; all of said circumstances
render it hardly conceivable that Petitioners, who hold themselves out as
actual possessors of the property involved in these proceedings (p. 3
Decision), could even innocently misapprehend the adjoining development
('Tahanan Village') as ownerless and untenanted;
12. Oppositor has good and meritorious grounds to oppose the petition for
reconstitution; one of such grounds and a principal one is that Land
Registration Case No. 9368 and Decree No. 15170 issued therein, which
Petitioners invoke and rely upon, in actual fact refer, not to the lands claimed
by said Petitioners, but to another parcel of land only some 422 square
meters in area and located in Barrio Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, that by virtue of
said Decree, Original Certificate of Title No. 724 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal was issued in the names of Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco,
and that said land eventually passed to its present owners, Pedro Tuason, et
al., under the current Transfer Certificate of Title No. 77516 (Rizal) and
Agripino Changco, et al., under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 77515 (Rizal)
which was later superseded by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 150102 and
150103;
13. Oppositor is ready, if its present Petition is granted, to produce
persuasive evidence of the facts above averred, evidence which perforce will
also show the proofs, both oral and documentary, adduced by Petitioners in
support of the petition for reconstitution to be untrustworthy and wanting in
requisite integrity, hence inadequate and insufficient to warrant grant of the
reconstitution sought;
14. The Decision allowing and ordering reconstitution is not yet final, the
Land Registration Commission having been served with copy thereof on
October 16, 1978; the thirty-day period for finality prescribed in Section 110,
2nd paragraph, of Presidential Decree No. 1529 has not yet expired;
xxx xxx xxx"
On the same day, November 15, 1978, Alabang Development Corporation
and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed a Petition To Set Aside The Decision of
October 5, 1978, claiming that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant the
petition for reconstitution since they have not been personally notified of the
pendency of the reconstitution case to which they are entitled under Republic
Act No. 26 not only as adjoining owners but as actual possessors thereof;
that grantingarguendo that the title subject to be reconstituted is valid, which
it is not, the same cannot prevail over the earlier titles of Alabang
Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing under TCT No. 45397
and TCT No. 45398 which are transfers from the Original Certificate of Title
No. 684 in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands issued on
September 20, 1913 pursuant to Decree No. 4552 issued August 27, 1910;
and that the overlapping of the area of the title sought to be reconstituted on
the area of the parcels of land evidenced by the titles of Alabang
Development Corporation and Bagatsing would result in a case of the same
land registered in the name of two different persons.
The Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General, filed Notice of Appeal and a
Motion for Extension to File Record on Appeal on November 16, 1978.
Respondent Judge in his Order of November 23, 1978 granted the Solicitor
General's motion, extending the period for appeal for another thirty days from
date of its issuance but did not pass upon nor resolve the petitions to set
aside and re-open proceedings filed by Tahanan, Alabang Development
Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing, the Court ruling that:
"The oppositor Director of Lands, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, was a party in the proceedings before this Court. Said oppositor had
adopted to resort to appeal as the appropriate remedy. The Court finds it,
therefore, unnecessary to resolve the Petition To Set Aside Decision and To
Re-Open Proceedings filed by Tahanan Development Corporation and the
Petition to Set Aside The Decision of October 5, 1978 filed by the Alabang
Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing."
Copy of the above Order was served on Tahanan thru counsel on December
12, 1978. On December 14, 1978, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said Order of November 23, 1978 alleging that the
"shelving" of its Petition To Set Aside Decision was equivalent to a denial
thereof; that the effect of such "shelving" if maintained up to the perfection of
the appeal of the Director of lands would be to deny petitioner recourse both
141
in the court of the respondent Judge and in the appellate court, because the
respondent Judge would then lose jurisdiction over the proceedings and
petitioner, not yet actually a party to the proceedings but only seeking to be
admitted as such, could not intervene in the appeal to protect its interest; that
the Petition To Set Aside, the purpose of which was precisely to effect the
admission of petitioner as a party and to allow it an opportunity to present
evidence opposing the reconstitution, was sufficient in form and substance to
merit resolution and approval; and that considerations of justice, fairness,
due process and correct procedure dictated that the Petition To Set-Aside be
first resolved before allowing the appeal of the Director of Lands to proceed
to perfection.
The Motion for Reconsideration was set for hearing and submitted on
December 19, 1978. As of December 21, 1978, when the period for appeal
extended in favor of oppositor Director of Lands was about to expire on
December 23, 1978 and said Director of Lands had not yet filed a record on
appeal, the possibility that once the record on appeal is filed, the approval
thereof with the consequent perfection of appeal and transfer of jurisdiction to
the appellate court can come at any moment. Since the Petition to Set Aside
and the Motion for Reconsideration were still pending or awaiting resolution,
the same would be rendered moot and academic and petitioner left without
remedy in both the trial court and the appellate court. To forestall that
eventuality and to preserve recourse in the matter, petitioner opted to file a
Petition for Certiorari with the appellate court without further awaiting
resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, the petition docketed as CA-
G.R. No. SP-08680.
The Director of Lands failed to perfect its appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing did not
interpose any appeal.
Petitioner in its Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-08680) claiming
arbitrariness and grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge
for by-passing its Petition To Set Aside, and for not acting on its Motion for
Reconsideration after hearing and submission despite awareness of the fact
that the period of appeal extended by the Court was about to lapse and
raising the issue of whether the Court acquired jurisdiction over the
reconstitution case despite absence of personal notice to it as adjoining
owner, prayed for preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order for
the preservation of the status quo in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P by
prohibiting and restraining the respondent Judge, and his successors in
office, from scheduling, conducting or otherwise entertaining, setting in
motion, or continuing, all and any further proceedings and incidents in said
case, particularly, but not limited to, proceedings relative or leading to the
perfection of the final judgment on the Petition for Certiorari or until further
orders from the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals gave due course to Tahanan's petition in the
Resolution of December 29, 1978. Respondent Judge was likewise ordered
to resolve petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. A bond was filed by
petitioner on January 9, 1979 and thereupon a restraining order was issued
"enjoining the respondent Judge from taking any action in Reconstitution
Case No. 504-P which will make him lose jurisdiction over said case such
that he can no longer act on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, dated
December 14, 1978. If any such action has already been taken, the same
shall be set aside by respondent Judge."
Under legal compulsion, respondent Judge resolved Tahanan's Motion for
Reconsideration on January 4, 1979. He denied it.
On November 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of the
petitioner, ruling that respondent Judge did not exercise sound discretion in
refusing to re-open the case below so that Tahanan could protect its property
rights which could possibly be impaired by the reconstitution. The appellate
court granted the Petition for Certiorari on the basis of the following
considerations:
"1. The PROPERTY must now be of substantial value because, even at
P100.00 per square meter, its more than 43 hectares could be worth some
P43 million.
According to TAHANAN (Annex H of its Motion to Reopen), Lot No. 2 of the
PROPERTY overlaps a substantial part of its own land. Although the exact
area of the overlap has been given, it can be estimated at about 10 hectares,
which can he worth P10 million. The value of the land which TAHANAN
seeks to protect is such as should have induced the lower court to reopen the
CASE BELOW to give an opportunity to TAHANAN to prove its contentions.
Denial of reopening, even if technically possible as a matter of law, would not
be equitable.
2. It is more or less of public knowledge that the Land Registration
Commission has been charged with anomalies. The lower court should have
reopened the CASE BELOW if only to assure itself that Exh. X is not an
anomaly committed by the Commission, a possibility which TAHANAN might
he able to show.
The lower court had already shoved aside the proposition advanced by the
Director of Lands that Exh. X issued in Land Registration Case No. 9368 was
issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco covering a parcel
of 422 sq.m. situated in the Municipality of Pasig. Respondent Judge
conclude that the title allegedly issued (Exh. 5) was a result of that Decree
was only a photostat and was weak evidence, as the supposed original could
not be found in the office of the Register of Deeds. But TAHANAN could
prove through the Official Gazette of December 13, 1913 (pp. 198, 200,
Rollo) that in Land Registration Case No. 9368, the applicants were Eugenio
Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco, and not MANUELA Aquial. While Exh. X
could be a forgery, the Official Gazette cannot be spurious. Accidentally, if
142
respondent Judge found that Exhibit 5 was weak as it was only a copy, under
the same token he should neither have given credence to Exh. X, which was
also merely a xerox copy.
3. It has been noted that the certification made by the deceased Enrique
Altavas of Exh. X bears no date. That is an important factor to ascertain; not
only for the determination of the genuineness of his signature, but also for the
determination of the plausible reason why the certification was made. As a
rule, signatures can be established as genuine by comparison with accepted
true signatures executed around the same date.
4. It has also been further noted that there is no record that a Torrens title
had been issued in the name of MANUELA as no mention of the number
thereof is in the record. It certainly would be strange if no title had been
issued since 1914. If a title had been issued, the number thereof should have
been mentioned in one document or other, executed after 1914. For
example, in the tax declarations submitted by MANUELA before and after the
war, the number of her title (or the fact that it had been lost) would have been
mentioned.
5. Exh. X was supposed to have been issued to MANUELA on March 4,
1914 when she was still single. However, her son, Nicolas A. Pascual,
testified in 1977 or 1978 that he was then 67 years old. He must have been
born in 1910 which would belie that MANUELA was still single in 1914.
6. In a re-opening, TAHANAN may ask for a relocation survey to be actually
made of the PROPERTY by placing new monuments. It should be advisable
that such a relocation survey in the presence of the parties be made so that
possible occupants and adjoining owners will have direct and personal
knowledge of the reconstitution proceedings.
7. The appeal by the government will not adequately protect the rights of
TAHANAN and other land owners who may be affected by the reconstitution.
For one thing, the Government did not introduce its own handwriting expert,
which TAHANAN might do, in order to assail the authenticity of Exh. X.
Ordinarily, whether a signature in a xerox copy is genuine or forged is difficult
to determine."
The Court of Appeals further sustained the right of Tahanan to be heard in
the case below on the basis of and in accordance with the Resolution of the
Supreme Court of September 25, 1979 in Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., L-45168, the first case mentioned at the beginning hereof as
one of the three cases recently decided by Us that are directly related to and
squarely identified with the petition at bar wherein We admitted the
intervention of the intervenors filed before Us even as of the time that the
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals granting reconstitution
of the lost and/or destroyed certificate of title was already submitted for
decision in the Supreme Court. "We are duty-bound to abide with the rulings
of the Supreme Court," said the appellate court, and it concludes with the
dispositive part, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court of November 23, 1978 and
January 4, 1979, as well as the Decision of October 5, 1978, are hereby set
aside and respondent Judge is hereby directed to reopen the CASE BELOW
so that TAHANAN can present its evidence and cross-examine the witnesses
of private respondents.
SO ORDERED."
Private respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration dated December 4,
1979 of the CA Decision penned by Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava, arguing
that the decision being set aside by the appellate court had long become final
and executory; that the lower court had proper jurisdiction over the
reconstitution case; that petitioner's remedy should not be a petition for
certiorari but an ordinary action for determination of the alleged overlapping
of land areas; and that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the
Supreme Court resolution in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-45168, September 25, 1979.
Through a Special Division of Five, respondent Court of Appeals granted the
Pascual's Motion for Reconsideration and reversed its previous decision of
November 16, 1979, through its Resolution promulgated April 30, 1980. The
petition for certiorari filed by Tahanan was thereby dismissed and the
restraining order issued on January 9, 1979 was ordered dissolved.
With obvious vehemence, Justice Agrava dissented from the findings of the
majority, unequivocally observing that "the alleged difference between that
case (Director of Lands vs. CA) and the present case (is) pure casuistry and
a failure to abide by decisions of the Supreme Court."
In the instant appeal before Us, petitioner Tahanan assigns numerous errors
committed by the appellate court but the principal and fundamental issues to
be resolved is whether or not the trial court properly acquired and was
invested with jurisdiction to hear and decide Reconstitution Case No. 504-P
in the light of the strict and mandatory provisions of Republic Act No. 26.
Upon resolving this pivotal issue, the corollary issue as to respondent
Judge's grave abuse of discretion in denying Tahanan's Petition To Set Aside
Decision and To Re-Open the Proceedings of Reconstitution Case No. 504-P
as well as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the decision of
respondent Judge, will find the correct and appropriate answers.
Republic Act No. 26 entitled "An act providing a special procedure for the
reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed" approved on
September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First
Instance to hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act
specifically provides the special requirements and mode of procedure that
must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire
jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed
for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The Petition for
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Reconstitution must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the notice of
hearing must be published in the Official Gazette and posted in particular
places and the same sent or notified to specified persons. Sections 12 and
13 of the Act provide specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure
to be followed. These sections state as follows:
"Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitutions from sources enumerated in Sections
2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with
the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or
any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or
contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of
the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's,
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been
issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and
boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the
names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e)
the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who
may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the
encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no
deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been
accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to
be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be
attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section
2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan
and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description
taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property."
"Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the
preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in
successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main
entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the
provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days prior to
the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be
sent by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every
person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to
the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number
of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered
owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property,
the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the
location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all
persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim of
objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of
the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court."
As We have earlier quoted in full the petition for reconstitution in
Reconstitution Case No. 504-P and substantially the Notice of Hearing
issued by the court published in the Official Gazette together with the
Certification of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff, it would not be a difficult task to
check and verify whether the strict and mandatory requirements of Sections
12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26 have been faithfully complied with by
therein petitioners Pascuals, now the private respondents here.
Upon a cursory reading of both the petition for reconstitution and the notice of
hearing, it is at once apparent that Tahanan has not been named, cited or
indicated therein as the owner, occupant or possessor of property adjacent to
Lot 2, title to which is sought to be reconstituted. Neither do the petition and
the notice state or mention that Tahanan is the occupant or possessor of a
portion of said Lot 2. The result of this omission or failure is that Tahanan was
never notified of the petition for reconstitution and the hearings or
proceedings therein.
According to petitioner Tahanan, this omission was deliberate on the part of
the Pascuals who actively concealed or sought to conceal the fact that
Tahanan is the owner, occupant and possessor of properly adjacent to the
alleged properties of the Pascuals as well as the fact that Tahanan is in
possession or occupancy of portions of the land claimed by the Pascuals.
Indeed, as pointed out by petitioner Tahanan, to which We agree, the
Pascuals made it appear in the survey plan, Exhibit "Y" submitted by them to
the Court based on a survey made as of July 7-12, 1974, that the area where
"Tahanan Village" would lie is described as public land.
That the Pascuals deliberately omitted, concealed or sought to conceal the
fact that Tahanan is the owner, occupant and possessor of property adjacent
to the former's alleged property may be deduced by their failure to comply
with the order of Judge Leo Medialdea issued in the original petition for
reconstitution, Case No. 77, dated July 10, 1974 (the records of which We
ordered forwarded to the Court) wherein "the petitioners are hereby required
to amend their petition, within ten days from receipt hereof, by indicating
therein the names and addresses of all boundary owners of the parcels of
land in question as well as the names and addresses of all persons
occupying the same."
In complying with the above order, the Pascuals simply filed an Amended
Petition and although they allegedly undertook relocation survey on the
subject land by which the supposed adjoining owners and claimants may be
definitely ascertained as well as their actual occupation and respected
addresses, they only included Pedro L. Flores as the occupant on the NE.,
NW., and W., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 with address at 959 C. Lerma St.,
Sampaloc, Manila; and on the SE., along lines 7-8-9-10-1 (portion of Lot 1,
144
plan II-4374) by Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, c/o Constancio
B. Maglana, President and Chairman of the Board, with address at No. 513,
Lafayette St., Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
And as far as Lot 4 is concerned, the Amended Petition then mentioned the
boundary owner on the NW., SW., along lines 1-2-3 (portions of Lot 1, Plan II-
4374) and on the SE., NE. and NW., along lines 3-4-5-1, the same Maglana
& Sons Management Corporation as boundary owners.
The amended Petition notwithstanding, the omission of Tahanan as adjoining
owner and even as occupant of portions of the supposed Pascual property is
palpable and conspicuous.
It is all too evident that the Pascuals in refiling their Petition for Reconstitution
in October, 1977 docketed as Case No. 504-P, had no intention to notify nor
give cause for notification and knowledge to all adjacent or boundary owners,
particularly Tahanan.
The Pascuals are duty-bound to know who are their actual adjacent
boundary owners on all sides and directions of their property. They are
charged with the obligation to inquire who their neighbors are in actual
possession and occupancy not only of portions of their own property but also
of land adjacent thereto. This duty or obligation cannot be ignored or simply
brushed aside where the location or the properties involved is a prime site for
land development, expansion, suitable for residential, commercial and
industrial purposes and where every square inch of real estate becomes a
valuable and profitable investment. It is of public knowledge in the community
of Paraaque that "Tahanan Village" is a privately-owned and occupied
residential subdivision, plainly visible to the general public by reason of the
perimeter fence or wall separating it from adjacent estates the roads and
streets therein and leading thereto, the numerous home constructions and
buildings going on, the visible electrical, lighting and water supply
installations, the presence of private security guards thereat and the
numerous signs and billboards advertising the estate as a housing
development owned and/or managed by petitioner Tahanan. It is
preposterous to claim that the area is public land.
We also find that the Notice of Hearing directed that copies thereof be posted
only in the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City and no
more, whereas the law specifically require that the notice of the petition shall
be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or city on which the land
is situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building at least 30
days prior to the date of hearing. In the instant case as certified to by Deputy
Sheriff Arsenio C. de Guzman, the Notice of Hearing was posted on the
bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch
located at the Hall of Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay City. Evidently, the
Notice of Hearing was not posted at the Main entrance of the provincial
building in Pasig, Rizal; it was not posted at the main entrance of the
municipal building of Muntinlupa where the land is now comprised in Barrio
Cupang, or at least in the municipal building of Paraaque where Barrio San
Dionisio was then embraced. LLjur
Adverting again to the original records of the Petition for Reconstitution No.
77, We find and note that Judge Leo Medialdea correctly directed in his order
of September 27, 1974 the service of process, thus:
"Service of process in this proceedings shall be made as follows: (a) by
publication of a copy of this Order in two (2) successive issues of the Official
Gazette, (b) by posting of copies of this Order at the entrance of the
Provincial Capitol of Rizal and the Municipal Buildings of Muntinlupa and
Paraaque, Rizal, (c) by furnishing every person named in the amended
petition with copies of this Order by registered mail, (d) by furnishing Pedro L.
Flores and the Maglana & Sons Management Corporation with copies of this
Order personally, and (e) by furnishing the Director of Lands, the
Commission of the Land Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds
of Rizal with copies of this Order personally, the publication, posting and
notices shall be made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of the hearing,
at the expense of the petitioners.
The Deputy Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to implement the directives
herein set forth."
Further proceedings in this original petition show that the above directives
were faithfully and strictly followed. Nevertheless, this Reconstitution Case
No. 77 was withdrawn by the Pascuals, apparently for the reason that there
having been filed conflicting reports by the Director of Lands and the Land
Registration Commission favorable to the Pascuals and another submitted by
the Register of Deeds which was adverse to them and the reports could not
be reconciled, the case "would only clog the calendar of the court" pending
continued research by the government offices concerned and availability of
certain documentary evidence of the Pascuals. The Court granted the Motion
to Withdraw in its Order of May 30, 1975.
It is necessary that We quote hereunder the Report of the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Rizal submitted in the original Reconstitution Case No. 77
as follows;
"R E P O R T
COMES NOW, the undersigned Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal
and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully manifests;
1. That on June 4, 1974, the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal has
been furnished a copy of the petition in the above entitled reconstitution case;
2. That on October 8, 1974, the Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy
of the Order of the Court dated September 27, 1974, by way of service of
process in the proceedings;
3. That the property subject of the petition for reconstitution, known as Lot 2
and Lot 4 of Plan II-4374 are situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio,
Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (Now as Bo. Cupang,
Muntinlupa, Rizal) containing an area of 375,622 sq. meters, and 56,295 sq.
145
meters, respectively, was allegedly covered by Decree No. 15170 issued on
March 4, 1911;
4. That a verification of the records of this office, show that Decree No. 15170
of the Court of Land Registration in Case No. 9368 was issued in favor of
Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo and Eusebio T. Changco,
married to Romana Gatchalian, under Original Certificate of Title No. 724,
Book A-7-B, and covers a property situated at Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, with
an area of 422 sq. meters."
The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or
occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having an
interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less)
of Lot 2, as well as the failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of
Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality on which the land is
situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat, are
fatal to the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court. This was
Our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 438. It
was also stressed in Alabang Development Corp., et al. vs. Hon. Manuel E.
Valenzuela, et al., G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982. And We reiterate it
herein, to wit:
"In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the
above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested
the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because
the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute
which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all
proceedings utterly null and void. We hold that the mere Notice that 'all
interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show cause if any they
have why said petition should not be granted' is not sufficient for the law must
be interpreted strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with exactness and
precision. We agree with the ruling of the trial court granting the motion to
amend the original petition provided all the requisites for publication and
posting of notices be complied with, it appearing that the amendment is quite
substantial in nature. As We have pointed above, respondent Demetria Sta.
Maria Vda. de Bernal failed to comply with all the requirements for publication
and posting of notices, which failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of the Court."
The above rule is a reiteration of the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad
Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al., L-17913, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA
358, thus:
"Where a petition for reconstitution would have the certificates of title
reconstituted from the plans and technical descriptions of the lots involved,
which sources may fall properly under Section 3(e) or 3(f) of Republic Act No.
26, the possessor thereof or the one who is known to have an interest in the
property should be sent a copy of the notice of the petition at the expense of
the petitioner, pursuant to Section 13 of the said Act.
If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a
possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of
his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if
otherwise the said order should have been final and executory.
Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice by publication is not
sufficient but such notice must be actually sent or delivered to parties
affected by the petition for reconstitution."
Having resolved the fundamental issue that the trial court had not properly
acquired nor was it duly invested with jurisdiction to hear, determine and
decide the petition for reconstitution and accordingly all proceedings
conducted thereon were rendered null and void including the judgment
issued granting the reconstitution, the resolution of the corollary issues need
no extended discussion but considering the obvious intent to circumvent the
ruling of the Supreme Court laid down in the case of Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 93 SCRA 238, We find it imperative to
make a reiteration of the pertinent doctrines applicable to the case at
bar. LLpr
In the above-cited case, We allowed the intervention of adjacent owners
even during the pendency of the appeal from the decision granting
reconstitution, the appeal then in the Supreme Court, in the paramount
interest of justice and as an exception to Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner Tahanan having sought to intervene in the court below and
alleging material and substantial interest in the property to which title is
sought to be reconstituted, in its Motion To Set Aside Decision and Re-Open
Proceedings duly verified and attaching therewith xerox copies of its transfer
certificates of title of its properties adjoining and even overlapped by that of
the Pascuals to the extent of some 9 hectares in area, the trial court ought to
have admitted said motion. There was reversible error in refusing to do so.
Once more, We must emphasize the reasons in relaxing the strict application
of the Rule above-cited as We did in Director of Lands vs. CA, et al., 93
SCRA 238, in this wise:
"But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court like all other Rules therein promulgated is
simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make
the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The
purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created
not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving
to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict application of
the Rule due to alleged lack of notice, or the alleged failure of, movants to act
seasonably will lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to
their successors-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith
146
and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should
intervenors' claims be proven to be true. For it cannot be gainsaid that if the
petition for reconstitution is finally granted, the chaos and confusion arising
from a situation where the certificates of title of the movants covering large
areas of land overlap or encroach on properties the title to which is being
sought to be reconstituted by private respondent, who herself indicates in her
Opposition that, according to the Director of Lands, the overlapping
embraces some 87 hectares only, is certain and inevitable. The aggregate
area of the property claimed by respondent covering Lot 1 and Lot 2 is
1,435,062 sq. meters which is situated in a fast-growing, highly residential
sector of Metro Manila where growth and development are in rapid progress
to meet the demands of an urbanized, exploding population. Industries,
factories, warehouses, plants, and other commercial infrastructures are rising
and spreading within the area and the owners of these lands and the
valuable improvements thereon will not simply fold their hands but certainly
will seek judicial protection of their property rights or may even take the law
into their own hands, resulting to multiplicity of suits."
The holding of respondent Court of Appeals that Our resolution in Director of
Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238, allowing intervention is not applicable to the
case at bar because there was no motion to intervene filed before the
Supreme Court by Tahanan is without merit. Such holding fails to see that the
intervention of Tahanan while the reconstitution case was still in the trial court
below was more expedient for the trial court is in a better and more suitable
position to hear and decide the question of encroachment and overlapping
raised by Tahanan in its Motion to Set Aside Decision and Re-Open
Proceedings, and where the witnesses may be examined and cross-
examined by the parties and the court, whereas the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts. LibLex
Since the highest Tribunal has allowed intervention almost at the end of the
proceedings, there should and there ought to be no quibbling, much less
hesitation or circumvention on the part of subordinate and inferior courts to
abide and conform to the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court. A well-
becoming sense of modesty and a respectful awareness of its inferior
position in the judicial hierarchy is to be expected of trial courts and the
appellate court to the end that a well-ordered and disciplined administration
of justice may be preserved and maintained. We cannot allow, permit or
tolerate inferior courts to ignore or circumvent the clear and express rulings
of this Court.
There is grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court when it denied
Tahanan's Petition To Set Aside Decision and Re-Open Proceedings. While
said petition is not captioned "Motion for Intervention" the allegations of the
petition clearly and succinctly aver Tahanan's legal interest in the matter in
litigation, which interest is substantial and material, involving as it does the
boundaries, possession and ownership of about 9 hectares of land covered
by certificates of title registered under the Torrens System in Tahanan's name
and issued from the mother title "Original Certificate of Title No. 6567 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued pursuant to Decree No. 515888, Land
Registration Case No. 776 dated September 18, 1930."
Aside from arbitrarily refusing to admit Tahanan's intervention sought in the
trial court below, We find also grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge in not considering Tahanan as an indispensable party to
the proceedings, it having been shown positively that it has such an interest
in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made,
in its absence, without injuring or affecting such interest. Again, We refer to
Our ruling in Director of Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238, and more recently in
Alabang Development Corp. vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 54094,
Aug. 30, 1982, that: "The joinder must be ordered in order to prevent
multiplicity of suits, so that the whole matter in dispute may be determined
once and for all in one litigation. The evident aim and intent of the Rules
regarding the joinder of indispensable and necessary parties is a complete
determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves
but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A
valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of
indispensable parties."
Time and again, the integrity and inviolability of Torrens titles issued pursuant
to the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and Presidential Decree No.
1529 have been shaken by the very courts whose unwavering duty should be
to protect the rights and interests of title holders but instead have favored
claimants under the guise of reconstitution filed after a long lapse of time
after the Japanese occupation, alleging the existence of original and
duplicate certificates of title issued pursuant to a court decree but have
subsequently been lost or destroyed including the records of the land
registration case on account of the war and lay claim and title to valuable
parcels of land previously titled and registered under the Torrens registration
system and are even able to dispose these properties to unsuspecting
homelot buyers and speculating land developers. The courts must be
cautious and careful in granting reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates
of title, both original and duplicate owner's, based on documents and decrees
made to appear authentic from mere xerox copies and certifications of
officials supposedly signed with the seals of their office affixed thereon,
considering the ease and facility with which documents are made to appear
as official and authentic. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize and verify
carefully all supporting documents, deeds and certifications. Each and every
fact, circumstance or incident which corroborates or relates to the existence
and loss of the title should be examined.
The claim of the Pascuals that their predecessor-in-interest, Manuela Aquial,
had an original certificate of title to Lots 2 and 4 of Plan II-4374 is extremely
difficult to believe and sustain. There are too many omissions and blanks, too
147
many failures and unanswered questions that belie such a claim. Thus, it is
at once noted that the number of the certificate of title issued to and
registered in the name of respondents' mother and predecessor-in-interest,
Manuela Aquial, is unknown. Nowhere in the voluminous records do the
Pascuals cite, state, or mention the number of said certificate of title. Not
even in the tax declaration of Lot 2 (Tax Declaration No. 15423, Exh. "S" and
Tax Declaration No. 10187, Exh. "S-1") and Lot No. 4 (Tax Declaration No.
15424, Exh. "T" and Tax Declaration No. 10188, Exh. "T-1") is the number of
the certificate of title indicated. And there is absolutely no document, private
or official, presented by the Pascuals mentioning the number of the certificate
of title.
There is also no proof as to when the certificate of title was issued. Assuming
that the certificate of title was issued pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated
March 4, 1914, the date of issue of the certificate of title must be subsequent
thereto. Assuming further that her duplicate copy was lost in 1944 during the
Japanese occupation, why did she wait until 1974 [when the first petition for
reconstitution was filed which was after thirty (30) years] to seek
reconstitution of her owner's copy.
The survey plan allegedly conducted January 9-29, 1911 and approved July
25, 1911 as shown in Exhibit "O" is titled "Plan of Property of Olimpia B. Sta.
Maria, et al., Case No. ______, Court of Land Registration. Unperfected Title
No. _______, Bureau of Lands." In the case of Director of Lands vs. CA and
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, et al., 102 SCRA 370 which involved the
reconstitution of the certificate of title to Lots 1 and 3 Plan II-4374, Bernal,
petitioner therein, claimed ownership to Lots 1 and 3 by virtue of a sales
patent issued to her by the Government, which patent, however, We ruled as
fictitious. In the instant petition at bar, We find no claim of Aquial nor her
successors, the Pascuals, as to how they acquired title in fee simple to Lots 2
and 4, whether thru sales patent, composicion con el estado, or informacion
possesoria. The only allegation of the basis of their ownership is paragraph 3
of the petition for reconstitution which alleges "That the petitioners, by
themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest Manuela Aquial have
been and still are in the actual, public, exclusive, adverse, continuous and
peaceful occupation of the afore-described lands as owners in fee simple
since time immemorial, devoting a small portion thereof to agriculture."
Decree No. 15170 which supposedly decreed Lots 2 and 4 to Manuela Aquial
is claimed by the Pascuals to have been issued in Land Registration Case
No. 9368. On its face, the attestation clause of the decree reads:
"Witness: the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge of said Court of
Land Registration, the 10th day of January, A.D. nineteen hundred and
fourteen.
Entered at Manila, P.I., the 4th day of March, A.D. 1914, at 8:38 A.M.
Attest:
Seal of the Court (SGD.) ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Clerk of the Court
(SGD.) ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
A true copy." Clerk of the Court
In the official report submitted to the court by the Register of Deeds of Pasig,
Rizal in the original petition for reconstitution, No. 77, CFI of Rizal, Branch
XXXVI, Makati, Rizal, marked Exhibit "2", Decree No. 15170 was issued in
Land Registration Case No. 9368 in the name of Eugenio Tuason, married to
Maximina Geronimo, and Eusebio T. Changco, married to Romana
Gatchalian, in whose names the Original Certificate of Title No. 724, Book A-
7-B of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal covering a property situated at Barrio
Bambang, Pasig, Rizal with an area of 422 sq. meters was likewise issued.
The Tuason-Changco decree is dated January 10, 1914 and entered on
March 4, 1914 at 8:38 A.M. and the Certificate of Title No. 724 was issued
January 10, 1914. The attestation clause of the certificate of title reads:
"Witness: the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge of said Court of
Land Registration, the 10th day of January, A.D. nineteen hundred and
fourteen.
Entered at Manila, P.I., the 4th day of March, A.D. 1914 at 8:38 A.M.
Attest: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Clerk of the Court
Received for transcription at the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, this 7th day of March, nineteen hundred
and fourteen, at 9:15 o'clock in the A.M.
(SGD.) (unintelligible)
Register of Deeds"
Comparing the Aquial decree and the Tuason-Changco title, both appears to
have been entered at Manila on the same day, that is March 4, 1914, and at
the same hour, 8:38 A.M. That the Tuason property and that of Aquial would
bear the same decree number (15170), the same land registration case
number (9368), the same land registration court (Pasig, Rizal), the same
presiding judge (The Honorable Dionisio Chanco) is indeed incredible, if not
incomprehensible.
But contrary to the claim of the Pascuals that the records of Land
Registration Case No. 9368 have been lost, destroyed or missing, there was
presented copies of the Official Gazette of December 10 and 17, 1913,
Volume 11, Nos. 50 and 51, duly certified by the Librarian of the Ministry of
Justice wherein the Notice of Hearing in Land Registration Case No. 9368
was published, the applicants for the registration and confirmation of their title
to a parcel of land situated in Barrio Bambang, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal being Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Tuason (sic). The
Notice of Hearing set the date on December 22, 1913 and "Witness the
Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge of the Court this 14th day of
November, in the year 1913."
148
Since the Tuason-Changco property was issued Certificate of Title No. 724
pursuant to Decree No. 15170 Issued in Land Registration Case No. 9368
whereas Aquial, claiming the same decree number and the same land
registration case number, cannot present her owner's duplicate copy nor the
original certificate which she claims were lost or destroyed, including the
records of Land Registration Case No. 9368 (which is not true as the Notice
of Hearing therein was shown and exhibited in copies of the Official Gazette),
We find and so hold that it is the Aquial certificate of title that is suspicious, if
not non-existent, and not that of the Tuason-Changco Certificate No. 724.
At the back of Certificate of Title No. 724, We find annotated therein a
number of documents registered by the heirs of Tuason and also the heirs of
co-owner Changco. The deeds or transactions executed on different dates
and registered thereon appear normal and there is no reason to doubt their
authenticity. On the other hand, no deed, document or transaction had been
shown by the Pascuals relating to or affecting their land from which We can
infer or deduce the existence of the original certificate of title if one was in
truth and in fact issued to Aquial. LibLex
The Pascuals claim that they have paid taxes on the land but they can only
present Exhibits "U", "U-1", "V" and "V-1" to prove their payment in lump sum
of the taxes thereon for four (4) years only, from 1970 to 1973. They have not
presented proof of tax payment from 1914 to 1969, more than five (5)
decades. All these omissions and failures cannot but show the spuriousness
and falsity of their claim that they were granted a decree by the Land
Registration Court, that a certificate of title was issued in their name and that
said certificate of title was existing and subsisting at the time they filed the
petition for reconstitution.
We reject the trial court's finding that the absence in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal of the Original Certificate of Title No. 724, although the
owner's duplicate is on file therein, is suspicious, for it is satisfactorily
explained in the letter of the Acting Register of Deeds Guillermo San Pedro,
Exhibit "4", that.
"Original Certificate of Title No. 724 was cancelled on June 24, 1960 and
transferred to the heirs by virtue of the settlement of the estate of the
deceased registered owners. The original copy of OCT No. 724 is no longer
available but the cancelled owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 724 is still
existing in our files.
xxx xxx xxx"
Likewise, We do not agree with the holding of the trial court that "in the light
of the foregoing impressive and overwhelming evidence adduced by the
petitioners in support of their petition for reconstitution of the title in the name
of Manuela Aquial, the Court has no alternative to granting the petition," the
Court having "no reason to doubt the credibility of the witnesses for the
petitioner, particularly the government officials subpoenaed who had
occasion and reason to know the facts they testified to, being parts of their 1. Inventory record book of the maps and plans salvaged after the last world
functions and duties in their respective offices." war and subsequently microfilmed during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton
It is to be noted that the supposedly impressive and overwhelming evidence Consultancy, clearly shows that Plan II-4374 was not among those salvaged.
adduced by the petitioners centered on showing the alleged authenticity and Indeed, there is no copy of this plan in the file of Technical Reference Section
genuineness of the survey plan denominated Plan II-4374. The list of which records were recently turned over to the Records Division. A perusal of
petitioner's exhibits is indeed long but the basic, specific and relevant piece the folder of the case in the Records Division also shows that on July 17,
of evidence is Exhibit "O" with the certification of Roman Mataverde, Chief, 1972 Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the records division certified that
Survey Division, Bureau of Lands dated October 27, 1972 that "Exhibit "O" is his division (Survey Records Section in particular) has no copy of II-4374
a photographic copy of the original plan as reproduced from the microfilm (page 183 of the folio).
negative which is on file in the Bureau of Lands, Manila." 2. A further perusal of the records (pages 1 and 2) shows that on May 15,
This is the crucial question on which hinges the veracity of respondents' 1970 Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued technical descriptions of
claim of title and ownership to 431,917 sq. meters of prime land (Lots 2 and Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374 allegedly approved on July 25, 1911. This record was
4) in Paraaque, Rizal - is there such an original survey plan known as Plan submitted to the Court. Stated therein is the alleged source of data Accession
II-4374? No. 195551. This record turns out to be Plan II-4005 approved on February
The oppositor Director of Lands strongly and stoutly maintains that there is 7, 1911 and the land is the property of Municipality of Liloan, Island of
no such plan and in support thereof Exhibit "7" is submitted to the Court, the Pandan, Province of Leyte.
same being the official communication of Amante R. Dumag, Officer-In- 3. Apparently because of this finding, on November 5, 1971, Mr. Anselmo
Charge, Metro Manila Region, Bureau of Lands, stating "that Plan II-4374 Almazan, then Chief of Reconstruction Section upon request of the interested
could not be the basis for any verification because the original plan thereof is party, issued technical descriptions for Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374. (This
not subsisting in the files and records of this Bureau." Enclosed with said document was submitted to the Court as part of the petition for reconstitution
communication is the xerox copy of the letter dated 30 January 1978 of Staff of title (pp. 1 and 2 of folio). As to how the data were reconstituted by the
Supervisor Privadi JG. Dalire. Said Exhibit "7" further states: "However, then Chief of Reconstruction Section in the absence of the original copy of
assuming that Plan II-4374 exists and using its technical description, the the plan is not known. This is not our standard operating procedure since we
same overlaps Muntinlupa Estate and Plan 61581, Lot I, Decree No. N- always issue technical descriptions based on available approved survey
515888, O.C.T.-6567 identical to Lot 4762, Cad-299, Paraaque Cadastre." records.
Exhibit "8" of the Director of Lands is the xerox copy of the letter referred to 4. It appears in the records of the case that later Mr. Modesto Eloriaga, then
above, which for its materiality and relevance to the vital question herein Chief, Reproduction Section, certified a copy of the microfilm enlargement of
before stated and stressed, is reproduced in full below: a frame with Accession No. 385637 which frame bears the survey number II-
"Republic of the Philippines 4374. As to how a record that was not salvaged after the war got microfilmed
Department of Natural Resources is a mystery. Furthermore, as to how this frame is pinpointed without the
BUREAU OF LANDS locator card indeed confound us. We are not now privy to the testimonies
Manila made in Court regarding this microfilm.
5. We are surprised to learn that Reel No. 560 now bears II-4374. For this
SUBJECT: Plan II-4374 reason, we caused the preparation of an enlargement of said microfilm for
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal further examination and evaluation.
Paraaque, Rizal 6. A closer examination of said microfilm enlargement showed the following
30 January 1978 significant discrepancies and deviations from similar survey plans on record:
Mr. Amante Dumag a) The date of approval appears to be July 25, 1911 and the signature
Officer-in-charge appearing as the approving official (Director of Lands) of the alleged plan II-
Region IV, Metro Manila 4374 is not the same official approving plans during the period. Samples of
Anent your Memorandum of 17 January 1978 requesting for an authenticated surveys and inventoried original survey plans on file in this Bureau clearly
plan of II-4374 Lot 1 and Lot 3 situated in Paraaque, Metro Manila, please show that on July 25, 1911 or thereabouts the Acting Director of Lands and
be informed of the following: therefore proper approving official for survey plans was John R. Wilson. The
following original plans (partial list) available in our records and approved

149
within the month of July 1911 or thereabouts all bear the signature of Acting B.L. Form No. 52-A which appears on upper left hand corner and on upper
Director of Lands John R. Wilson. center which is unusual.
Survey No. Accession No. Date of (2) Authentic plans indicate the name of the surveyor immediately below the
Approval line that shows the date of survey, followed by the designation (surveyor) and
1. I-1817a 369826 July 25, 1911 thereunder Bureau of Lands; the questionable plan, on the other hand, does
2. II-4142 385736 July 25, 1911 not conform with the said format.
3. II-4141 385735 July 25, 1911 (3) Authentic plans do not contain the paragraph "The original field notes, . . .
4. II-4110g 385833 July 25, 1911 " as in the case of the questioned plan II-4374 but immediately "Bureau of
5. II-4110j 385832 July 25, 1911 Lands" below the surveyor's name is Approved:_____(date)_____ followed
6. II-4110e 385834 July 25, 1911 by the title and signature of the approving official.
7. II-4110d 385830 July 25, 1911 7. Considering the discrepancies and deviations of the microfilm enlargement
8. II-4110c 385829 July 25, 1911 of the frame that purports to be that of survey plan II-4374 bearing Accession
9. II-4110b 385828 July 25, 1911 No. 385637, our conclusion is that said plan is not authentic and does not
10. II-4897 186222 July 25, 1911 and has never represented any parcel of land properly surveyed and
11. I-41696 July 11, 1911 approved by this Bureau.
12. II-4172 July 5, 1911 8. Nevertheless, our investigation is still continuing purposely to find out how
13. I-1415 379513 July 25, 1911 the frame of such microfilm got inserted into microfilm Reel No. 560 of this
14. II-1410 446936 Aug. 22, 1911 Bureau.
b) Authentic plans like that of II-4858 (original copy on file) approved on 9. Records of the Case show that this was handled by the late Atty. Pedro
December 19, 1911 show the BL Form No. 52 and the format then in use Flores in collaboration with Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr.
during the period. Likewise, this plan (marked O) shows the signature of the and Trial Attorney Antonio G. Castro. This pertains to the petition of Demetria
Director of Lands at that time, Chas H. Sleeper. What is being represented as Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal for the reconstitution of T.C.T. No. (12/T-79) 42449
'the signature of Chas H. Sleeper as Director of Lands on the microfilm of II- (Sales Patent) covering area of 143.5062 hectares. The case is opposed in
4374 appears to be very far from the genuine signature of Chas H. Sleeper the sala of CFI, seventh Judicial District, Branch XIII of Rizal by the Director
appearing on original plans on file. Chas H. Sleeper was the incumbent of Lands and Aurora R. Favila, et al. In cases like this, we take action in close
Director of Lands from November 1, 1905 up to October 15, 1913. However, collaboration with the Legal Division.
during his term of office, the then Assistant Director of Lands in the person of 10. Enclosed for your ready reference are.
John R. Wilson had occasion to assume duties as Acting Director of Lands a) Enlargement copy of alleged II-4374 whose original copy was not
as evidenced by the above-listed survey plans mostly approved on July 25, inventoried as salvaged after the war;
1911 by Acting Director of Lands John R. Wilson. Considering the fact that on b) Microfilm copies of Authentic Plans;
various dates within the month of July 1911, specifically those of July 25, c) Xerox copies of relevant papers in the Folio:
1911, the original survey plans available in the file show John R. Wilson as 1) Certification of Mr. Gabriel Sansano, dated 17 July 1972
the approving official in his capacity as Acting Director of Lands, and the 2) Petition for Reconstitution of Title (Filed with the Court)
observation that the signature appearing on microfilm II-4374 is very far from 3) Opposition of the Director of Lands
the genuine signature of the incumbent Director of Lands Chas H. Sleeper, 4) Motion to dismiss the petition for reconstitution of title filed by the other
the appearance now of the microfilm of II-4374 purportedly approved on July oppositors.
25, 1911 showing Chas H. Sleeper as the approving official is highly For the Director of Lands:
questionable. For this reason and the facts stated elsewhere in this (SGD.) PRIVADI JG. DALIRE
memorandum, we cannot certify authenticity of the microfilm copy of II-4374. Staff Supervisor for
c) The form used for the questionable plan II-4374 differs from the standard Technical Plans & Standards"
survey plans approved during the time (year 1911) in the following respects: From the evidence submitted by the Director of Lands, it is officially and
(1) Authentic plans during the time are prepared on B.L. Form No. 52 which clearly shown that Plan II-4374 was not among those salvaged after the last
is on upper left hand corner; the questionable plan (II-4374) was prepared on World War and subsequently microfilmed during the Booz, Allen and
Hamilton Consultancy; that Plan II-4374 bearing Accession No. 385637 is not

150
authentic and does not and has never represented any parcel of land
properly surveyed and approved by the Director of Lands; that on July 17,
1972, Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the Survey Records Division,
certified that his division has no copy of Plan II-4374 and that on May 15,
1970, Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued technical descriptions of
Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374, the alleged source of data being Accession No.
195551 which, however, turned out to be Plan II-4005 approved on February
7, 1911 and the land pertaining thereto is the property of the Municipality of
Liloan, Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.
Subsequent certifications issued by Anselmo Almazan, Chief, Survey
Reconstruction Section, Bureau of Lands dated November 24, 1971 marked
Exhibits "M" and "N" indicating the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of
Plan II-4374 with Accession No. 385637 cannot be relied upon because said
plan was not among those salvaged after the last World War. Our ruling in
the Bernal case, 102 SCRA 370, 447 that "the technical descriptions cannot
have two accession numbers as sources thereof" stands. LLphil
Incidentally, We must point out that the above official report (marked Exhibit
"8") was submitted to the Supreme Court in the Bernal case as Annex "A" to
the Final Report of Amante R. Dumag, Officer In-Charge, NCR, Bureau of
Lands, pp. 425-428, in compliance with Our resolution of September 25,
1979, which was accepted and approved by Us and admitted as evidence of
this Court. In the case at bar, it is part of the evidence of the oppositor
Director of Lands, admitted by the trial court and hence, reviewable on
appeal in the petition at bar, he being a respondent herein.
The Torrens titles of petitioner Tahanan and the numerous transfers
therefrom to innocent purchasers for value must be respected and protected
in order to achieve the "real purpose of the Torrens System which is to quiet
title to the land . . . and once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court or sitting in
the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land."
(Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65, 84; Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil.
590, 593; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 451).
In summation, We find no factual and legal basis for the judgment granting
the petition for reconstitution in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land
Registration Case No. 9368, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX,
Pasay City. Fundamentally, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and
decide said petition for reconstitution and for this jurisdictional infirmity, its
decision including all proceedings therefrom are null and void, including the
assailed Resolutions of April 30, 1980 and December 8, 1980 of the
respondent Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City in Reconstitution
Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368 is hereby REVERSED
151
and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions of April 30, 1980 and December 8, 1980 of
the respondent Court of Appeals are likewise declared null and void. Costs
against private respondents.
Petition granted.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur with the recommendation that this case be referred to the NBI for
investigation and possible prosecution.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., concurs.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. This is a landgrabbing case. Landgrabbing may be
perpetrated by (1) actual and physical usurpation, (2) expanded survey, (3)
fake Spanish titles and (4) reconstitution of fake Torrens titles, registration
decrees or judgments in land registration cases.
The Bernal case, to which this Tahanan case is related, involves the
reconstitution of a fictitious Torrens title over parcels of land existing only on
paper and which, when verified on the ground, covers land already titled in
the names of other persons.
The Bernal case. Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal of 102 Sixto Antonio
Street, Barrio Rosario, Pasig, Rizal claimed that her mother, Olimpia B. Sta.
Maria, bought in 1942 from the Government a tract of land with an area
of 186 hectares located at Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal. Mrs. Sta.
Maria allegedly obtained a sales patent dated September 15, 1942 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 42392 dated September 29, 1942.
The said land was allegedly surveyed in 1911 for Mrs. Sta. Maria as shown
in Plan II-4374. It consisted of four lots, Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Lots 1 and 3,
with an area of 143 hectares, were supposedly sold by Mrs. Sta. Maria to her
daughter, Mrs. Bernal, for P10,000 in November, 1943. The register of deeds
of Greater Manila issued to Mrs. Bernal Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449
for Lots 1 and 3.
In 1970, or more than twenty-six years after the issuance of that title, Mrs.
Bernal filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the
reconstitution of the original thereof. She averred that her owner's duplicate
of that title, which she first identified as TCT No. 12 and later as TCT No.
42449, was not lost.
Judge Pedro A. Revilla denied the petition for reconstitution. Mrs. Bernal
appealed to the Court of Appeals which in a decision dated October 1, 1976
allowed the reconstitution (Per Crisolito Pascual, J., with Bautista and
Santiago, JJ., concurring).
The case was brought to this Court on petition for review and by means of a
special civil action for certiorari since the Solicitor General's motion for an
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration was filed one day late in
the Court of Appeals and it was denied.
During the pendency of the case in this Court, or on December 7 and 28,
1978, Greenfield Development Corporation, Alabang Development
Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed motions for intervention on the
ground that the 143 hectares claimed by Mrs. Bernal included substantial
portions of the lands already registered in their names.
As an exceptional case and in the interest of expeditious justice, the
interventions were allowed in this Court's resolution of September 25, 1979.
Also in the interest of justice, although unprecedented, this Court ordered the
chief of the survey division of the Bureau of Lands to relocate the boundaries
of the lots claimed by Mrs. Bernal and the intervenors and to report on the
overlapping and the improvements in the said areas (93 SCRA 238, 249 and
102 SCRA 421).
In his report of February 25, 1980, the officer-in-charge of the national capital
region of the Bureau of lands categorically stated that Lots I and 3, Plan II-
4374, claimed by Mrs. Bernal, do "not actually exist on the ground" or, as
found by the chief of the technical services section of the same bureau, the
said lots "could not be located in the locality by all technical means" and that
the original copy of Plan II-4374 does not exist.
Consequently, this court dismissed Mrs. Bernal's petition for reconstitution
(Director of Lands vs. Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal and CA, L-45168, January
27, 1981, 102 SCRA 370).
This case of the heirs of Manuela Aquial. As already stated, Mrs. Sta.
Maria's alleged 186-hectare land in Barrio San Dionisio supposedly consisted
of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of which Lots 1 and 3, with a total area of 143 hectares,
were claimed by her daughter, Mrs. Bernal. That claim was found to be
fictitious in the reconstitution case already discussed above.
Now, the other two lots, Lots 2 and 4, of Mrs. Sta. Maria's land were
supposedly acquired by Manuela Aquial of 307 15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon
City. She died on January 26, 1967.
On October 5, 1977, her legal heirs named Nicolas, Crisanto, Anselmo,
Mamerto, Cirilo and Catalina, all surnamed Pascual, and Pascuala A. Mejia
and Damiana A. Mejia filed in the Pasay City branch of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (the Bernal case was filed in the Pasig branch) a petition for
the reconstitution of Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914 issued in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 and the original and owner's duplicate of the
original certificate of title issued pursuant to the said decree allegedly in the
name of Manuela Aquial, covering the said Lots 2 and 4, with a total area
of 43 hectares located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, formerly Barrio San
Dionisio, Paraaque and described inPlan II-4374, the same non-
existing plan involved in the 143-hectare land, Lots 1 and 3 claimed by Mrs.
Bernal.
152
It should be noted that 43 hectares plus 143 hectares equal 186 hectares,
the total area of the land allegedly surveyed for Mrs. Sta. Maria in 1911 in the
fictitious Plan II-4374. It should be further noted that in the description of Lots
1 and 3, as set forth in the Bernal case, Manuela Aquial is cited as one of the
boundary owners. cdphil
In the description of Lots 2 and 4 set forth in the petition for reconstitution
filed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial, Lots 1 and 3 and the names of Mrs. Sta.
Maria and Mrs. Bernal are not mentioned at all.
The Director of Lands opposed the said petition for reconstitution filed by the
heirs of Manuela Aquial. He alleged that a prior reconstitution proceeding
filed by the Pascuals was dismissed by the Makati branch of the lower
court; that Decree No. 15170, LRC Case No. 9368, was issued to Eugenio
Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco for a 422-square meter land in Barrio
Bambang, Pasig, Rizal and that the photostatic copy attached to the petition
is a copy of a fake decree.
After hearing, Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela in his decision of October 5, 1978
granted the petition. On November 15, 1978, the Tahanan Development
Corporation filed a petition to set aside the decision and for the reopening of
the proceeding on the ground that Lots 2 and 4, claimed by the heirs of
Manuela Aquial, include substantial portions of the subdivision lots of the
Tahanan Village covered by transfer certificates of title derived from OCT No.
6576, Decree No. 515888, LRC Case No. 776.
Also on that same date, November 15, 1978, Alabang Development
Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed a motion to set aside the decision
on the ground that the land claimed by the Aquial heirs overlaps the lots of
Bagatsing and Alabang Development Corporation covered by Torrens titles
derived from OCT No. 684, Decree No. 4552 issued on August 27, 1910.
The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal but did not perfect his appeal to
the Court of Appeals. As the trial court failed to resolve the petition to set
aside filed by the Tahanan Development Corporation, it filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals which later ordered Judge Valenzuela to
resolve Tahanan's petition. He denied it in his order of January 4, 1979.
The Court of Appeals in its decision of November 16, 1979 ordered Judge
Valenzuela to reopen the case and allow Tahanan to present its evidence
(Per Agrava, J.). The Pascuals filed a motion for reconsideration. In a
resolution dated April 30, 1980, the Court of Appeals set aside its decision
and dismissed Tahanan's petition for certiorari. The Tahanan Development
Corporation appealed to this Court.
On the other hand, Bagatsing and Alabang Development Corporation filed in
this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein they assailed Judge
Valenzuela's decision. llcd
This Court in its decision of August 30, 1982 in G.R. No. 54094, Alabang
Development Corporation, et al. vs. Judge Valenzuela, et al., using the
findings and rulings in the Bernal case, reversed Judge Valenzuela's decision
and dismissed the petition for reconstitution.
That decision in the Bagatsing and Alabang case rendered
this Tahanan case moot and academic. This case has to be decided in the
same manner as the Alabang and Bagatsing case because this Court had
already set aside Judge Valenzuela's decision and dismissed the petition for
reconstitution. All that is necessary is to set aside the above-mentioned
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1980.
As in the Bernal case, the decree and title sought to be reconstituted and the
land claimed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial are imaginary or pure
fabrications. See J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano, L-33140, October 23,
1978, 85 SCRA 644, where the sisters Manuela and Maria Aquial
unsuccessfully assailed OCT No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and Diliman
Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., concurs.
||| (Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55771,
[November 15, 1982], 203 PHIL 652-707)
[G.R. No. 85515. June 6, 1991.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIA
MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner. J. Renato V. Leviste for private
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; PROPERTY REGISTRATION
DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529); VIEW OF RESPONDENT COURT THAT
SECTION 13 OF R.A. NO. 26 APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN IMPLIEDLY
AMENDED BY SAID DECREE, TOTALLY UNFOUNDED. We further find
to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13
of R.A. No. 26 "appears to have been at least impliedly amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1529." There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No.
1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to
amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or read
out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529reading as follows: ".
. . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court." Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it
used this clause to support its proposition of implied amendment of Section
13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF SAID VIEW. The above view of the
Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree, which
is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens
System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property. It
opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in land registration
153
proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of certificates of title.
Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to or
could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few copies only per issue.
If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both
proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, owners
of both unregistered and registered lands may someday painfully find out that
others have certificates of title to their land because scheming parties had
caused their registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto
and sold the property to third parties.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLICATION
IF NOTICE IS PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE. Section 23
of P.D. No. 1529 was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice
by mailingand by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as
publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is
published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be
published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter alone would
not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication. That such
proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of giving notice,
which remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself.
If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have
stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named
in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining
properties, and occupants of the land.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; FUNCTION; LAPSES ON THE PART OF
COURTS OR THEIR PERSONNEL, NOT A REASON OR JUSTIFICATION
FOR NON-OBSERVANCE OF LAWS. The belabored argument of
respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the
private respondent the duty to comply with the requirement of service of
notice because it was not through her fault that the original copy of the
Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable since the law does not
make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous
proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the
duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and private respondent
should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests, quite unfortunately,
and gives the wrong impression that mandatory requirements of notices may
be dispensed with if the failure to comply with them is attributable to the
court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency which the Constitution directs public officials and employees to
faithfully observe. We should stress here that lapses on the part of courts or
their personnel cannot be made a reason or a justification for non-
observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the
first to obey the laws.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the Decision of 29 August 1988 1 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 15163 2 and its Resolution of 18 October 1988 3 which, respectively,
affirmed the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental
Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region, of 17 June 1987 4 granting the petition of
private respondent for the reconstitution of the original and the owner's
duplicate copies of a transfer certificate of title despite lack of service of
notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, and denied
petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the Decision. 5
The issue in this petition is whether notices to adjoining owners and the
actual occupants of the land are mandatory and jurisdictional in judicial
reconstitution of certificates of title.
On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of
Epifania Alcano, registered owner of a parcel of land located in Canubing,
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the Registry of Deeds
of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for the reconstitution of "the
original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on
the basis of the owner's duplicate copy. 6 She alleged therein that she is in
possession "of the title subject matter of' the petition but she, however, did
not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution.
In its Order of 4 November 1986 the trial court set the petition for hearing and
required its publication in the Official Gazette, which was done. Required
notices, except to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land,
were given.
Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of private respondent's
evidence was made by the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. Thereafter, on 17
June 1987, the trial court handed down an Order 7 which made the following
findings of facts:
"From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of
the vendees of a certain parcel of land situated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, embraced in and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 and registered in the
name of Epifania Alcano (Exh. "B") as evidenced by a document of sale
executed by the registered owner (Exh. "I"). The original copy of said title
which was usually kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province
was destroyed by reason of the fire which razed to the ground the entire
Capitol Building then housing said office on August 12,1977 (Exh. "C"). It
appears further that there are no co-owner's, mortgagee's, lessee's duplicate
copy of said certificate of title which had been previously issued by the
Register of Deeds of this province; that the petitioner is in actual possession
of the area of 16,647 square meters which was sold to her and that she is
154
benefitting from the produce of the improvements existing on the area
belonging to her."
and disquisition:
"Accordingly, finding the instant petition to be well-founded and there being
no opposition to its approval, same is hereby granted. The Register of Deeds
of this province is hereby directed to reconstitute the original and the owner's
duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the name of
the registered owners (sic) thirty days after receipt of this Order by the
Register of Deeds of this province and the Commissioner of the Land
Registration Commission, on the basis of the existing owner's duplicate copy
thereof."
Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from
said Order to the Court of Appeals and made the following assignment of
errors:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE
INSTANT PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE
OWNER'S DUPLICATE COPIES OF TCT NO. T-66062 WITHOUT THE
REQUISITE SERVICE OF NOTICE OF HEARING TO THE ADJOINING
OWNERS AND ACTUAL OCCUPANTS OF THE LAND AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION." 8
The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163.
In support of the first assigned error, petitioner maintained that the
requirement of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional as held in MWSS vs. Sison, et al., 124 SCRA 394.
In its Decision of 29 August 1988 9 respondent Court of Appeals brushed
aside the arguments of petitioner and held that:
1) Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which "requires the sending out of notices to the
adjoining owners and actual occupants to vest jurisdiction," appears to have
been "at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529" because
it is inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which provides that in original
registration cases publication of notices of initial hearing in the Official
Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. Section 110 of said
Decree provides:
"SEC. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens Title.
Original copies of certificates of title lost or destroyed in offices of Register of
Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting such titles shall be
reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed
in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with this Decree."
(emphasis supplied)
2) The MWSS vs. Sison case is not on all fours with the instant case for in
the former both the original and the owner's duplicate copies of the certificate
of title were claimed to be lost, unlike in the instant case where the duplicate
copy is intact; it was not shown that the original copy in the custody of the
Register of Deeds was destroyed; the copies of the titles alleged to have
been lost were later found intact in the names of other persons; and, more
importantly, the Petition was not published in the Official Gazette but in the
Manila Daily Bulletin, unlike in the instant case.
3) The duty to send notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants is
imposed upon the court, not the party filing the petition for reconstitution
(herein private respondent); any lapse in regard thereto should not prejudice
or injure the latter.
4) Finally, in the instant case, the private respondent cannot be blamed for
the loss of the original copy of the transfer certificate of title; it was lost by
reason of the burning of the Capitol Building; she should not, therefore, be
put to trouble, anxiety and expenses.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the Decision having been denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 18 October 1988, petitioner filed the
instant petition on 22 December 1988 alleging therein that:
"a. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law when it
did not consider that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the instant
petition for reconstitution of the original owners (sic) duplicate copies of TCT
No. 66062 as there is no requisite service of notice of hearing to the adjoining
owners and actual occupants of the land as required by Section 13 of R.A.
No. 26;
b. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law in
granting the petition for reconstitution of the original and duplicate copies of
TCT No. 66062."
In Our resolution of 16 January 1989, 10 We required the respondents to
comment on the petition. Private respondent filed her comment on 10
February 1989. 11 She practically copied therein the questioned decision of
respondent Court of Appeals.
In Our resolution of 15 March 1989 We gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda,
which petitioner complied with on 3 July 1989 12 and private respondent on
10 June 1989. 13
The petition is impressed with merit.
The questioned Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18
October 1988 of respondent Court of Appeals, as well as the Order of Branch
39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro of 17 June 1987, must be
set aside.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered, modified or amended. Since
the requirement therein of service of notice of the initial hearing to the
adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land was not complied with
in this case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over the
petition for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66062.
Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the
155
Order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that said Section
13 has been "at least impliedly amended" by Section 23 in relation to Section
110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect on 11 June 1978. prLL
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 14 We ruled that the
requirements of Section 12 and Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 reading as follows:
"SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2
(c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3 (e) and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the
proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any
person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain,
among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been
issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and
boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the
names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e)
the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who
may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the
encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no
deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been
accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to
be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be
attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section
2 (f) or 3 (f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan
and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description
taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of petition, filed under the preceding
section, to be published, at the expense of the petition, twice in successive
issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the
provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in
which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The
court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail
or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein
whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said
notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed
certificates of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of
the occupants or person in possession of the property, the owner of the
adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and
boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any
interest therein must appear and file their claim or objection to the petition.
The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting
and service of the notice as directed by the court."
are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render
all proceedings utterly null and void. We reiterated this rule in Tahanan
Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15 where, in respect
particularly to the required notice to an adjoining owner, We categorically
declared:
"The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or
occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having
interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less)
of Lot 2, as well as the failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of
Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality (sic) on which the land is
situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat,
are fatal to the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court."
In MWSS vs. Sison et al., supra., We further re-affirmed the foregoing
doctrine: LibLex
"The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the Official
Gazette, the service of the notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and
actual occupants of the land, as well as the posting of the notices in the main
entrance of the provincial and municipal buildings where the property lies at
least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing, as prescribed by Section 13 of
the law, are mandatory and jurisdictional requisites."
This re-affirmation is clear enough as to leave no room for any convoluted
logic to support a sophistic distinction between said case and the instant
case and an implausible interpretation of the law.
We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 "appears to have been at least impliedly amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1529." There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No.
1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to
amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or read
out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as follows:
". . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court."
Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its
proposition of implied amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of
Section 110 of the Decree. LLphil
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial hearing, publication,
etc. and provides, inter alia, that:
"The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting."
As regards publication, it specifically provides:
"Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to
be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
156
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. . . ."
This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice
by mailing and by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as
publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is
published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be
published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter alone would
not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication. LibLex
That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of
giving notice, which remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from
Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would
not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all
persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include
owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.
The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal
purposes of the Decree, which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely,
to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent anomalous
titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in
land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of
certificates of title. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very few
have access to or could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few
copies only per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of
hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court, owners of both unregistered and registered lands may someday
painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because
scheming parties had caused their registration, or secured reconstituted
certificates of title thereto and sold the property to third parties.
The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be
unfair to impose upon the private respondent the duty to comply with the
requirement of service of notice because it was not through her fault that the
original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable since
the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the
least, a ludicrous proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said
Court that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and
private respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests,
quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that mandatory
requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with
them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the principles of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which the Constitution directs
public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We should stress here
that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason
or a justification for non-observance of laws. By the very nature of their
functions, they should be the first to obey the laws. cdrep
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
GRANTING the instant petition and SETTING ASIDE the Decision of 29
August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 and the Order of Branch No. 39 of the
Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region in Petition
No. 11,456.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 85515, [June 6, 1991], 275 PHIL 243-
254)
[G.R. No. 111732. February 20, 1996.]
NEW DURAWOOD CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
FELIX S. CABALLES, as Judge, RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71,
WILSON M. GAW, ORLANDO S. BONGAT, DURAWOOD CONSTRUCTION
AND LUMBER SUPPLY CO., INC., respondents.
Edgar A. Pacis and Belo Gozon Elma Parel Asuncion & Lucila for petitioner.
Andin & Andin for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLE AND DEEDS; TORRENS TITLE OF LAND
REGISTRATION; RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES; APPLICABLE LAWS.
Section 109 of P.D. 1529 is the law applicable in petitions for issuance of
new owner's duplicatecertificates of title which are lost or stolen or destroyed.
On the other hand, R.A. 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of lost or
destroyed original certificates on file with the Register of Deeds. This is
expressly provided for under Section 110 of P.D. 1529.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RECONSTITUTED TITLE IS VOID WHERE
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS NOT LOST BUT POSSESSED BY THIRD
PERSON. If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the
possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court
rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently the
decision may be attacked any time. (Demetriou vs. Court of Appeals, et al.)
Since we already concluded earlier that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction, necessarily its judgment must fall.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, the owner's
duplicate certificates of title were in the possession of Dy Quim Pong, the
petitioner's chairman of the board and whose family controls the petitioner-
corporation. Since said certificates were not in fact "lost or destroyed," there
was no necessity for the petition filed in the trial court for the "Issuance of
New Owner's Duplicate Certificates of Title . . . ." In fact, the said court never
acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of new certificates. Hence, the
newly issued duplicates are themselves null and void.
157
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECONSTITUTION OF OWNER'S DUPLICATE TITLE; DUE
NOTICE UNDER OATH BY OWNER OR BY SOMEONE IN HIS BEHALF TO
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, REQUIRED. Section 109, P.D. 1529
(amending R.A. 496) provides that in case of loss or theft of an owner's
duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner
or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city
where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. Private
respondents and respondent judge failed to follow the procedure set forth
in P.D. No. 1529 which, as already stated, governs the issuance of new
owner's duplicate certificates of title. Section 109 of said law provides, inter
alia, that "due notice under oath" of the loss or theft of the owner's duplicate
"shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of
Deeds." In this case, while an affidavit of loss was attached to the petition in
the lower court, no such notice was sent to the Register of Deeds.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PETITION TO COMPEL SURRENDER OF
OWNER'S DUPLICATE TITLE TO REGISTER OF DEEDS, PROPER
REMEDY WHERE HOLDER REFUSES OR FAILS TO SURRENDER TITLE.
Private respondents tried to convince the Court that by their failure to
locate Francis Dytiongsee, they had no other recourse but to file a petition for
reconstitution. Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529, however, states that the remedy, in
case of the refusal or failure of the holder in this case, the petitioner to
surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, is a "petition in court to
compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds," and not a petition
for reconstitution.
6. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; ANNULMENT BASED ON FRAUD; FRAUD MUST
BE EXTRINSIC AND HAVE PREVENTED PARTY FROM EXHIBITING HIS
SIDE; NOT PRESENT WHERE PARTY WAS DULY REPRESENTED. The
respondent Court of Appeals, in its own words, "confine(d) its discussion" in
the assailed Decision only to the ground of fraud. It ruled that the RTC's
decision could be annulled only where extrinsic or collateral fraud is shown
that is, when the fraudulent acts prevented a party "from exhibiting fully his
side of the case." Hence, petitioner could not claim extrinsic fraud inasmuch
as it was duly represented by Gaw in the reconstitution proceeding.
7. ID.; ID.; ESTOPPEL; CORPORATION CANNOT CLAIM ALLEGED LACK
OF QUORUM WHEN RESOLUTION WAS PASSED WHERE IT HAD TAKEN
BENEFITS FROM SAID RESOLUTION. The appellate court explained
that while there may not have been a quorum during the board meeting of
petitioner-corporation on May 10, 1984 when a resolution authorizing Gaw to
sue on its behalf was allegedly passed, this did "not mean however, that New
Durawood Co., Inc. cannot be bound by Gaw's action" because "no howl of
protest, complaint or denial came from (said corporation)," and that said
corporation in fact had taken advantage of the benefits therefrom. Hence,
petitioner is estopped from questioning Gaw's acts.
8. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION CODE; CORPORATIONS;
DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY; DOES NOT APPLY TO A MERE
BRANCH MANAGER. The doctrine of "apparent authority" cannot apply
as to Gaw because, being a mere branch manager, he could not be looked
upon as a corporate officer clothed with the implied or "apparent" power to
file suit for and in behalf of a corporation. In petitions for issuance of new
owner's duplicate copies of Torrens titles, it is essential as provided under
Sec. 109 of P.D. 1529 as amended (supra) that the trial court take steps to
assure itself that the petitioner is the "registered owner or other person in
interest." Otherwise, new owner's duplicate certificates might be issued in
favor of impostors who could fraudulently dispose, hypothecate or otherwise
deal in and with real estate in mockery of the Torrens system of titling
properties.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The main issue here is: does a court have jurisdiction to issue a new
owner's duplicate of a Torrens certificate of title if it is shown that
the existing owner's copy has not, in fact and in truth, been lost or destroyed?
The Court resolved this issue in the negative in this petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 promulgated on May 31, 1993 and the subsequent Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration. The said Rulings dismissed the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 25434 and in effect affirmed the "order" 3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal 4 dated April 16, 1991 in
LRC Case No. 91-924, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
140486, 156454 and 140485 which were lost, null and void and of no further
force and effect and in lieu thereof.
(b) Hereby orders and directs that new copy of the said titles be issued to the
petitioner giving them the same faith and credit and carrying over the same
terms and conditions appearing on the originals thereof, upon payment of the
required fees.
"SO ORDERED."
By Resolution of the First Division dated November 15, 1995, this case along
with several others was transferred to the Third Division. After due
consultation and deliberation, the Court assigned the undersigned ponente to
write this Decision.
The Facts
On February 14, 1990, a "Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Lost
Owner's Duplicate Certificates of TCT Nos. 140486; 156454 and
140485" 5 was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal
by petitioner-corporation, "represented by its Branch Manager, Wilson M.
Gaw . . . ." Attached to said petition was an "Affidavit of Loss" dated
158
December 31, 1990 6 of respondent Orlando S. Bongat, one of the
stockholders of petitioner-corporation.
Finding the petition "to be sufficient in form and in substance," respondent
Judge set the case for hearing on March 18, 1991. On April 16, 1991,
respondent Judge issued the questioned order.
Sometime in May, 1991, petitioner discovered that the original TCT Nos. N-
140485, N-140486 and 156454 on file with the Register of Deeds of Rizal
had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and
200102 had been issued in the name of respondent Durawood Construction
and Lumber Supply, Inc. Surprised by this cancellation, petitioner after
investigation found out about the reconstitution proceeding in the
respondent trial court. So, on July 17, 1991, petitioner filed suit 7 in the Court
of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. 25434 praying for the annulment of the
assailed order in LRC Case No. 91-924 penned by respondent Judge. It also
prayed for the cancellation of the new certificates (TCT Nos. 200100, 200101
and 200102). On May 31, 1993, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered
the assailed Decision and on August 30, 1993, the Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present recourse to the Supreme
Court.
The Issues
Petitioner brought up the following ground as basis for its petition:
"The Court of Appeals gravely abused its authority in not declaring the order
of respondent Judge Caballes in LRC Case No. 91-924 null and void for want
of jurisdiction and in not declaring that the reconstitution of the owner's
duplicate transfer certificates of title Nos. N-140486, N-140485 and 156454
was obtained through fraud."
Petitioner argues that a reconstitution proceeding is one in rem and thus
jurisdiction can be acquired only through publication and notice sent pursuant
to Section 13, Republic Act No. 26. It also alleges that fraud is manifest (1)
from the insufficient allegations of the petition filed before the trial court, as it
(the petition) does not mention the names of adjoining land owners and
interested persons, as well as (2) from the affidavit of loss attached to the
petition.
In their Comment, private respondents aver that in 1990, these three lots
were sold by petitioner to Durawood Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc.
but the sale in their favor could not be registered because "the certificates of
title . . . were lost." They also allege that the applicable law is Section 109 of
R.A. No. 496, as amended by P.D. 1529, and not Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26, and
that fraud, in order to serve as basis for the annulment of a judgment "must
be extrinsic or collateral in character," which is not the case in the action
before the court a quo. They also fault "(t)he deliberate failure of Dy Quim
Pong (petitioner's board chairman) and his family, who constitute the majority
of the stockholders and directors of (herein petitioner-corporation), to
disclose the whereabouts (of) there (sic) son, the President and General
Manager Francis Dytiongsee . . ." who allegedly executed the deed of sale of
the lots and who allegedly claimed that the owner's copies of the TCTs were
lost.
In its Reply, petitioner contends that "the very procedure provided under Sec.
109, P.D. 1529, which they (private respondents) insist is the applicable
provision of law in the matter, was not strictly followed . . . ." It also argues
that the owner's duplicate copies of the TCTs were all along in the custody of
Dy Quim Pong, whom private respondents should have sued to compel him
to surrender the same in order that the alleged deed of sale in favor of private
respondent could be registered.
Finally, petitioner claims that respondent Wilson Gaw had no authority to
institute the petition for reconstitution in the trial court because "(t)he Court of
Appeals itself, in its questioned resolution stated that said board resolution
(authorizing Gaw) was passed without the required quorum."
From the foregoing, the issues may be summed up as follows:
(1) Which law governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificates of
title in lieu of lost ones?
(2) Did the respondent trial court have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the
new owner's duplicate certificates?
(3) Was the reconstitution of the said owner's duplicate certificates of title
obtained through fraud?
The First Issue:
Law Governing Issuance
Lost Owner's Duplicate Titles
To resolve this issue, it is necessary to reexamine the following provisions
referred to by the parties:
(1) Section 13, Republic Act No. 26: 8
"Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the
preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in
successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main
entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to
the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be
sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to
every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the
number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested
parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on
which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim
or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof
of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court."
(2) Section 109, P.D. 1529 (amending R.A. 496):
"Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of
loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath
shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of
Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft
is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for
the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss
or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest
and registered.
"Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the
court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new
duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is
issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be
entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be
regarded as such for all purposes of this decree."
A reading of both provisions clearly shows that Section 109 of P.D. 1529 is
the law applicable in petitions for issuance of new owner's
duplicate certificates of title which are lost or stolen or destroyed. On the
other hand, R.A. 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of lost or
destroyed original certificates on file with the Register of Deeds. This is
expressly provided for under Section 110 of P.D. 1529 as follows:
"Sec. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens title.
of Original copies of certificates of title lost or destroyed in the offices of
Registers of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting the lands
covered by such titlesshall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with
this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or
destroyed certificate prescribed in said Act may be availed of only in case of
substantial loss or destruction of land titles due to fire, flood or other force
majeure as determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority: Provided, That the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged
should be at least ten percent (10%) of the total number in the possession of
the Office of the Register of Deeds: Provided, further, That in no case shall
the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged be less than five hundred
(500).
"Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution shall be
furnished by the Register of Deeds of the place where the land is situated
and to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority. No order or
judgment ordering the reconstitution of a certificate of title shall become final
until the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and
by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority of a notice of such
order or judgment without any appeal having been filed by any such officials."
(As amended by R.A. 6732; emphasis supplied)
159
The Second Issue: Jurisdiction
In Demetriou vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 9 , this Court ruled:
"In Serra Serra v. Court Appeals (195 SCRA 482 [1991]), on facts analogous
to those involved in this case, this Court already held that if a certificate of
title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not
acquired jurisdiction. Consequently the decision may be attacked any time."
In the instant case, the owner's duplicate certificates of title were in the
possession of Dy Quim Pong, the petitioner's chairman of the board and
whose family controls the petitioner-corporation. Since said certificates were
not in fact "lost or destroyed," there was no necessity for the petition filed in
the trial court for the "Issuance of New Owner's Duplicate Certificates of
Title . . . ." In fact, the said court never acquired jurisdiction to order the
issuance of new certificates. Hence, the newly issued duplicates are
themselves null and void.
It is obvious that this lapse happened because private respondents and
respondent judge failed to follow the procedure set forth in P.D. No.
1529 which, as already stated, governs the issuance of new owner's
duplicate certificates of title.
Section 109 of said law provides, inter alia, that "due notice under oath" of
the loss or theft of the owner's duplicate "shall be sent by the owner or by
someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds . . ." (emphasis supplied). In
this case, while an affidavit of loss was attached to the petition in the lower
court, no such notice was sent to the Register of Deeds.
Private respondents tried to convince the Court that by their failure to locate
Francis Dytiongsee, they had no other recourse but to file a petition for
reconstitution. Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529, however, states that the remedy, in
case of the refusal or failure of the holder in this case, the petitioner to
surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, is a "petition in court to
compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds," and not a petition
for reconstitution.
The Third Issue: Fraud
The respondent Court of Appeals, in its own words, "confine(d) its
discussion" 10 in the assailed Decision only to the ground of fraud. It ruled
that the RTC's decision could be annulled only
where extrinsic or collateral fraud is shown that is, when the fraudulent
acts prevented a party "from exhibiting fully his side of the case . . . ." Hence,
petitioner could not claim extrinsic fraud inasmuch as it was duly represented
by Gaw in the reconstitution proceeding.
The appellate court explained that while there may not have been a quorum
during the board meeting of petitioner-corporation on May 10, 1984 when a
resolution authorizing Gaw to sue on its behalf was allegedly passed, this did
"not mean however, that New Durawood Co., Inc. cannot be bound by Gaw's
action" because "no howl of protest, complaint or denial came from (said
160
corporation)," and that said corporation in fact had taken advantage of the
benefits therefrom. Hence, petitioner is estopped from questioning Gaw's
acts. The appellate Court was of the belief that petitioner-corporation ratified
Gaw's "authority" by acquiescence to his acts. The respondent Court thus
concluded that petitioner-corporation's "claim of being a victim of extrinsic
fraud is baseless."
We are appalled by this rather novel interpretation of corporate law. It is clear
that, there having been no quorum present during the meeting in question,
the board of directors could not have validly given Gaw any express authority
to file the petition. Upon the other hand, the doctrine of "apparent authority"
cannot apply as to Gaw because, being a mere branch manager, he could
not be looked upon as a corporate officer clothed with the implied or
"apparent" power to file suit for and in behalf of a corporation. 11 Neither will
estoppel prevent the corporation from questioning Gaw's acts. Precisely,
these acts were hidden from the company and its top officers. How then can
estoppel attach? 2
Suffice it to say then, that by his surreptitious filing of the petition for
reconstitution without authority express or implied of his employer, Gaw
enabled respondent corporation to acquire the certificates of title in a manner
contrary to law.
In petitions for issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of Torrens titles, it is
essential as provided under Sec. 109 of P.D. 1529 as amended (supra)
that the trial court take steps to assure itself that the petitioner is the
"registered owner or other person in interest". Otherwise, new owner's
duplicate certificates might be issued in favor of impostors who could
fraudulently dispose, hypothecate or otherwise deal in and with real estate in
mockery of the Torrens system of titling properties.
Be that as it may, in the case before us, whether Gaw was authorized to file
the suit or not is of little significance in finally resolving this case. Jurisdiction
is and remains the main issue. Since we already concluded earlier that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction, necessarily its judgment must fall.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the assailed decision SET ASIDE
and REVERSED; the proceedings in LRC Case No. 91-924 ANNULLED; and
the order issued therein dated April 15, 1991 as well as the reconstituted
Transfer Certificates of Title issued pursuant thereto, namely, TCT Nos.
200100, 200101 and 200102 in the name of private respondent declared
NULL and VOID. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
||| (New Durawood Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111732, [February
20, 1996], 324 PHIL 109-123)