Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from
his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent
judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the
office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the
mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person.
The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed
for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio
Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his
wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not
seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that
in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted
were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not
been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent
judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the
latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga
states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony
was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C.
Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter
judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit,
the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that
she is already dead.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of
Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony. We do not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous

marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear
and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in
order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively
dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration
of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Pearanda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . .
marriages not falling under Article 41."

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer
 in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at
the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to
the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of
the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of
his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the
basic principles of civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of
comprehension of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the
law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to
know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-
month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous
union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the
Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying
the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. 99-1211 January 28, 2000

(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 98-471-MTJ)

ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant,

vs.
Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and
Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso
charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of
negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the
Local Registrar alleging

a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married
and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence of
J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar; . . .

b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our
principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; . . .

c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without

any reason at all;

d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote the
City Civil Registrar to inquire my Marriage Contract;

e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that
my marriage was not registered; . . .

f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar; I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to
inquire;

g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies of
the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);

h. That not copy was retained by Judge Daguman;

i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest such
as:

1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;

2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before the
office of the Local Civil Registrar.

The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.

In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:

1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be
solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal
Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following and pressing circumstances:
 1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to
report to his station in Sta. Margita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior
appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to the
residence of respondent in said City, urgently requesting the celebration of their
marriage right then and there, first, because complainants said she must leave
that same day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that
for the parties to go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and
would entail serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of
witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former Undersecretary Pacifico
Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were already with
them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on August 28, 1997,
complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage
license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the
parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it
would complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to
date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;

1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a
valid marriage, which respondent found all in order.1wphi1.nt

1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who,

respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention under present
Government policy.

2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith
that by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not
be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.

3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also
occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control of respondent:

3.1. After handling to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate,
respondent left the three remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office
where the marriage ceremonies were held, intending later to register the
duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.

3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers
relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises
and private files, all the three last copies of the certificate were missing.
Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena . . . . Mr. Yman to shed light on the
missing documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the
marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too
late to contract complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Yman's claim.

3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of the
country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the established
facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of complainant that after
August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her without any
reason . . . but that said husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of
LITA DANGUYAN" . . . it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage
contracting parties probably absconded with the missing copies of the marriage
certificate.

3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to
protect the public interest by trying all possible means to recover custody of the
missing documents in some amicable way during the expected hearing of the
above mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina, failing to do which said
respondent would confer with the Civil Registrar General for possible registration
of reconstituted copies of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998
found that respondent Judge ". . . committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he
be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or
future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out that:

As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the

authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his
jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.

Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code,
wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place
other than his sala, to wit:

(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in
a sworn statement to that effect.

The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.

Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when failed to
register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.

Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which
provides:

It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than
fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil register of the place where the
marriage was solemnized. . . . (emphasis ours)

It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge committed
non-feasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the
basic social institution in our society whose nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate
and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he should have exerted more effort to
locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is expected
to be conscientious in handling official documents. His imputation that the missing
copies of the marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito Yman is based merely on
conjectures and does not deserve consideration for being devoid of proof.

After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation report
of the OCA well-taken.

Jimenez v. Republic1 underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus:

"[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state
has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The
security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each
and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about a condition that would shake
its foundation and untimely lead to its destruction."

With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among
others, that

Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by:

 (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; . . . (Emphasis
ours)

In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the counsel-general, consul or
vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted at the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or were both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect. (Emphasis ours)

As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge's
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote
places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fianc Yman was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the
contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers
or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was
prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant
was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official
attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in
solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was
leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated
for citizens to get married."

A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide
by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. 2 A judge is
not only bound by oath to apply the law;3 he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing
so.4 Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in
the performance of their duties.5

If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the
marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoined by marriage in the
hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent's cavalier proclivity on
its significance in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of
engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.

An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to preserve
so sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines
laid down by superior authority should have given respondent judge pause and made him more
vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing
officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or
jurisdiction of his court.6 Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by is Bishop. An
appellate court justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions
may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.7

Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-
Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in
the City of Calbayog.8
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise
extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization,
he is likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly
documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain
terms that

Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of
the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and
to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days
after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing
officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain
in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage
license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the
solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8.
(Emphasis supplied)

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was
less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra
care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact.
There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events.9 However, the records show
that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part. This Court reiterates
that judges must adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to
bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to
devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.11

In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions
will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992

ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of the
Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16,
1992, denying his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of P40,831.00.

Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for
cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.

On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for
brevity), he requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 1 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:

Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in

performance of duty. When a person in the service of the national government
of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the
performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound,
the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any period of
disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six
months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of
the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees
of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first
against vacation leave, if any there be.

xxx xxx xxx

In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of

some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize
the payment of the necessary hospital fees.

Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the
Secretary of Justice, along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief,
LED of the NBI, "recommending favorable action thereof". Finding petitioner's illness to be
service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice
favorably recommended the payment of petitioner's claim.

However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated
November 21, 1990, returned petitioner's claim to Director Lim, having considered the
statements of the Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the
effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S.
1991 2 dated April 26, 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for
brevity) stating that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or
abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of
the latter".

On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew Mecano's claim to
then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2,
1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner's claim to the COA Chairman, recommending
payment of the same. COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January
16, 1992, however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had
been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section
was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however,
that the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, considering that the
illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to

Director Lim under a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner
"elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires".

On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated
Section 699 of the RAC, this petition was brought for the consideration of this Court.

Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on the
aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the
event that a claim is filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, as suggested by
respondent, he would still not be barred from filing a claim under the subject section. Thus, the
resolution of whether or not there was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for reimbursement.

The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code
of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new
Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old
Code. Moreover, the COA questions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of
Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that employment-related sickness,
injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees' Compensation Program under P.D.
626, such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account of the
same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government.

The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a
matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein
a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and
portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. 3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its
repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is
an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. 4

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it
was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on
the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book
VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly
not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed. 5 Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in
Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition
that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. 6 This
latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals
an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect. 7 Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on
the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one.
The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; 8 otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the
later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will
continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. 9

There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts
on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the
conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal
the earlier law. 10

Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same
subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they
cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law
cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. 11

Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover
the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code
which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law,
the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699,
and still others.

Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of
the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because
the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been
restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that
the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the
same section had been repealed. It further maintained that to allow the particular provisions not
restated in the new Code to continue in force argues against the Code itself. The COA anchored
this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:

WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new

Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and

xxx xxx xxx

It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative Code of
1987. This contention is untenable.

The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier
statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute
may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. 12 What is necessary is a manifest
indication of legislative purpose to repeal. 13

We come now to the second category of repeal the enactment of a statute revising or
codifying the former laws on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if the revised statute
or code was intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It
is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the
whole subject matter of the former statute. 14 When both intent and scope clearly evidence the
idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised
act are deemed repealed. 15 Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal under this
category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the
prior act. 16

According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the
intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and
procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government
structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the
weight that this opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as the body
which had been entrusted with the implementation of this particular provision has already
rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in the case
of Sison vs.Pangramuyen 17 that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion,
the Court would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency
entrusted with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This
principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a
showing that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 It has been held that
Opinions of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of
statutes in pari materia. 19

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are
not favored. 20The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. 21

This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not
favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws
are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere
with or abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the
two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the
language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless
the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be
used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the
later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. 22

Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the
recovery of benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld.
The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees' Compensation
and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly
provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits
are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
government."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is
hereby ordered to give due course to petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.