Endencia vs.

David
GR Nos. L-6355-56; August 31, 1953

FACTS:

Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice
Fernando Jugos (and other judges) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which provides that

No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered
as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from taxation this is also
in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports, is
separate from the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries of judges may not
be diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their
benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was rendered
ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD:

No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the power to interpret laws.
Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the functions
of the courts when it inserted the phrase: payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their salary. This is a
clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office, found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial
officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined
and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what
the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as
used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a
judicial function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it
be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in
their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs
counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

Tanada v. Yulo
GR No. 43575; May 31, 1935

FACTS:

Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the consent by the Philippine Commission,
assigned to Alabat, Tayabas. Later in his service, he was transferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65 birthday on
October 5, 1934, subsequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of all justices who
have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect on January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting
upon the directive of the Secretary of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act No.
3899.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office.

2. W/N his transfer is considered a new transfer and requires confirmation by the Philippine Commission.

HELD:

1. No, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office
are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect, not thereafter. Therefore, Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace
for life as long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated.
2. No, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence, no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the
jurisdiction grounded on original appointment.
The natural and reasonable meaning of the language used in Act No. 3899, leaves room for no other deducting
than that a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act and who completed sixty-five years of age on
September 13, 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act, which was on November 16, 1931, and to the date fixed for
cessation from office which was on January 1, 1933, is not affected by the said Act.
A justice of the peace like the petitioner who became sixty-five years of age on October 5, 1934, was not
included in a law which required justice of the peace sixty-five years of age to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933.
It is to be deduced that according to the United States Supreme Court, the transfer simply amounted to an
enlargement or change of jurisdiction grounded on the original appointment and thus did not require a new
appointment. Whatever our view is might have been to the contrary, it now becomes our duty to follow the decision of
the higher court. It also seems evident that a transfer as applied to officers amounts merely to a change of position or to
another grade of service.

Araneta v. Dinglasan
GR No. L-2044; August 26, 1949

FACTS:

The five cases are consolidated for all of them present the same fundamental question. Antonio Araneta is being
charged for violating EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Another case is of Leon
Ma. Guerrero seeking to have a permit issued for the exportation of his manufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio
Rodriguez seeking to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds pursuant to EO 225, while another is of Antonio
Barredo attacking EO 226 which appropriated funds to hold the national elections. They all content that CA 671 or the
emergency Powers Act is already inoperative and that all EOs issued under said Act also ceased.
The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency
Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules
and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.
EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under
prosecution in the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.
EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel
the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both
officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is
forbidden by this EO.
EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to
June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and
president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from
disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.
 Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in
1949. was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the
respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect

HELD:

CA 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the act has to be sought for in its nature,
object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the
Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be for a limited period. It is presumed that CA 671
was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is
contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the Constitutional scope of its power.
CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session of May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and
226 were issued without authority of law. In a regular session, the power if Congress to legislate is not circumscribed
except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.

Daoang v Municipal Judge

G.R. No. L-34568; 28 March 1988

Facts:
Petitioners are grandchildren of private respondents Agonoy. Private respondents filed a petition before the MTC of
San Nicolas seeking adoption of two minors. Petitioners filed an opposition to the adoption invoking the provisions of
the Civil Code. That the respondents have a legitimate child, the mother of the petitioners, now deceased, as such they
are not qualified to adopt as per Article 335 of the aforesaid Code. The petition for adoption was granted. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Art. 335.

Held:
No. The provision invoked by the petitioners is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, no construction or interpretation
should be made. To add grandchildren in this article where no such word is included would be in violation to the legal
maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included.

Cebu Portland Cement Company, vs. Mun. of Naga, Cebu

GR Nos. 24116-17; August 22, 1968

Facts:

1. The Treasurer of the Mun. of Naga, Cebu collected from Cebu Portland Cement Company (CPCC) municipal
license tax imposed by the Amended Ordinance No. 21 on cement factories located in the same municipality.
2. The demands made by the Treasurer were not entirely successful and resulted to the remedies provided under
Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Treasurer gave CPCC 10 days to settle the account.
3. The Treasurer also notified the Plant Manager of CPCC that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo cement in
satisfaction of their municipal license tax in the total amount of Php 204,300.00. At first the Plant Manager did not agree
with the letter but acknowledged the distraint in the afternoon of the same day he was notified.
4. The Treasurer signed the receipt of the goods under the authority of 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code &
shall sell the same at a public auction to the highest bidder. The proceeds thereof shall be utilized in part of the
satisfaction of the municipal license tax & penalties CPCC owes to the municipality of Naga, Cebu.
5. The Notice of Sale was posted by the Treasurer & stated that the public sale shall be on July 27, 1962. However,
no sale was held on the date specified & in the appealed decision, that there was a stipulation by the parties where the
auction took place on January 30, 1962.
WHO WHAT WHERE DECISION
Cebu Portland Cement Petition (2 separate RTC Denied
Company actions: Validity of the
distraint & the sale at a
public auction of the bags
of cement)
Cebu Portland Cement Motion for Reconsideration Supreme Court Denied
Company

Issue
1. Whether the distraint was valid.
2. Whether the auction sale was valid

Held:
Decision of the lower court was affirmed in toto. With costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
1. CPCC alleged that the 10-day grace period in the letter of the Municipal Treasurer did not lapse and therefore,
the distrain is invalid. This is not true. According to the Revised Administrative Code, the municipal treasurer may seize
& distrain any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity
to satisfy the tax or charge in question xxx. With this, the law gives an authority to the municipal treasurer to seize &
distrain properties regardless of the provisions or conditions stated in the letter. There is only room for application and
not for interpretation and what is stated in the letter cannot amend the law.
2. The auction sale is also valid. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the sale cannot take place less than 20
days after notice to the owner or possessor of the property xxx. Since the first notification for distrait was in July 6, 1961
& the sale was on January 30, 1962, the requisite for the notification was more than complied with. The sale was only
delayed due to the deferment made by the CPCC. Even if the sale was made only in January 1962, the Treasurer
informed the CPCCs acting officer that he would again advertise for the public sale of the said bags of cement. With this,
the validity of the date of the said auction sale cannot be contested.

RESINS V AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. L-17888; October 29, 1968

Facts:
Petitioner Resins Inc, as in Casco v. Gimenez, seeks a refund from respondent Central Bank on the claim that it
was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, used
for the production of synthetic glue, of which it was a manufacturer.

Since the specific language of the Act speak of urea formaldehyde and petitioner admittedly did import urea and
formaldehyde separately, it can be exempted if the law was construed to read urea and formaldehyde.

Issue:
W/N Resins contention is with merit

Held:
No. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct from urea and
formaldehyde as separate articles. Resins contend that the approved Congress bill contained the conjunction and
and that Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately, citing statements made on the floor of the
Senate. Said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate, much less of the House of
Representatives. It is also well settled that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts. If there has been any mistake
in the printing of the bill, the remedy is by amendment or curative language not by judicial decree.
 Additionally, refund partakes of a nature of an exemption, it cannot be allowed unless granted in the most
explicit and categorical language. The Court has held that exemption from taxation is not favored and never presumed,
so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer (strictissimi juris). Petition denied.

Albino Co vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100776; October 28, 1993
FACTS:

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against petitioner with
the Regional Trial Court. The case eventuated in petitioners conviction of the crime charged on the basis that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Pending litigation,
Ministry of Justice Circular No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22) was subsequently
reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought
exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court but the Court of Appeals affirmed
his conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check will no longer be
considered as a valid defense be retroactively applied.

HELD:

NO. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set aside. Criminal prosecution against accused-petitioner was
dismissed.

RATIO:
It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Courts decision of
September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given retrospective effect to
the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of
Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved
in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and
discussed, negating criminal liability.