Determinism and Moral Responsibility

Author(s): Maurice Mandelbaum

Source: Ethics, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Apr., 1960), pp. 204-219
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2379775
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 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

MAURICE MANDELBAUM

I. A PRELIMINARY DISTINCTION responsible for his actions, while there

is in fact a great deal of disagreement as
IN DEALING with a problem that would
to whether or not freedom in choice is
seem to have been exhausted by the
number of recent articles which have
also necessarily presupposed by our no-
tions of moral responsibility.
been concerned with it, I shall begin by
With respect to the first point, the
utilizing a distinction which was clearly
general answer which I would propose
drawn by McTaggart. Apparently this
regarding whether or not we can do what
distinction is not widely known today.
Perhaps this is because it is not reflected
we choose to do is that we have a limited
freedom in action, the degree of our
in our ordinary use of language; if it
freedom varying from case to case.
were, discussions involving the concept
Whether we can do what we choose to
of freedom would be less confused than
do depends upon what it is that we
they are.
choose, the nature of the situation which
In his essay entitled "Free Will" Mc-
we confront, and what capacities we pos-
Taggart distinguished between two
sess. If the question, "Can I do what I
meanings of freedom, referring to them
choose to do?" is a question intended to
as "the freedom of self-direction" and
refer to a specific instance, one can an-
"the freedom of indetermination."' I
swer, "You probably can do this," or
shall refer to them as "freedom in ac-
"It is unlikely that you can do this," or
tion" and "freedom in choice." The dif-
"You certainly can't do this," etc. If, on
ference between these two meanings may
the other hand, the question is intended
be briefly characterized by saying that
the question of whether or not I have
as a general question, concerning wheth-
er we, as human beings, have the power
freedom in action is a question of
to do what we choose to do, then the an-
whether or not I can do what I choose
swer is the general one which I have sug-
to do, while the question of whether or
gested: we have the capacities to do some
not I have freedom in choice turns on the
of the things that we set ourselves to do;
problem of why I choose as I choose.
but these capacities are limited, and we
Like McTaggart, I wish to direct my
cannot do whatever we may choose.
discussion primarily to the question of It will be noted that the question of
freedom in choice. I do so for two rea- freedom in action is thus an empirical
sons. First, I believe that the question of
question. The answer which I have pro-
whether or not we have freedom in ac- posed concerning it seems to me to be
tion has a perfectly obvious general an- the only empirical answer which is plau-
swer when one misunderstanding has sible. However, some philosophers have
been cleared away. Second, there seems been tempted to transform this question
to be no disagreement among writers on into a more general metaphysical ques-
ethical theory that if a man does not have tion, asking whether any one could ever
freedom in action he ought not to be held have done anything that he did not ac-

204

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 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 205
tually do. This is a different question,
which assuredly raises the problem of
whether we have freedom in choice, and
which perhaps also raises the problem
not in my opinion helped to solve the
of whether all features of the world form
one single determined system. Yet
neither of these problems is directly rele-
vant to the question of whether I can do
what I choose, or (as Moore put the
question) of whether I could have done
this if I had chosen to do it.2
With respect to the second reason for
confining my attention to the problem of
freedom in choice, it is to be noted that
our notion of moral responsibility ap-
plies only to human beings and applies
to them only with respect to what we
take to be voluntary actions, i.e., actions
which they have the power to initiate or
to prevent. But, by definition, whenever
a person lacks freedom in action, what
he does, or can do, is not what he has
chosen to do, or would have chosen to
do if he had not been cognizant of limi-
tations on his freedom of action; his
overt behavior, and (presumably) the
consequences of this behavior, are dif-
ferent from what they would have been
had he been free to do whatever he chose.
Under these circumstances we do not
hold him morally responsible for his ac-
tion, except indirectly; if we hold that
he might have chosen differently, and al-
so that he ought to have chosen differ-
ently, then the fact that he did not have
freedom in action does not exonerate
him from responsibility. This, however,
merely throws the question back to the
nature of his choice, and it is with re-
spect to whether one can be held morally
responsible for an action unless one has
freedom in choice that writers on ethics
have always disagreed. Their disagree-
ments have usually been debated in
terms of the question of whether the hinges
hu-
man will is free or determined, but this given for doing one thing rather than
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mode of phrasing the question has given
rise to further questions as to what are
to be meant by "the will" and by "free-
dom," and these further questions have
original problem which they were in-
tended to solve. That problem can, in
my opinion, be stated in comparatively
neutral language by rephrasing it as the
question of what types of factors lead
human beings to choose as they choose.
II. THE PROBLEM OF CHOICE
When we speak of a person making a
choice we have in mind a situation in
which he selects one thing rather than
another, or in which he sets himself to
do one thing rather than another, or the
like. In short, the notion of choice in-
volves the notion of "this-rather-than-
that." Thus if we are asked why a man
chose as he chose, the answer should not
be given in terms of saying "he chose X
because he liked it," or "he chose Y be-
cause he saw it was good"; rather, the
answer should be given in terms of why
he selected X rather than Y. or why he
set himself to do X rather than Y. If
such an answer is to be couched in terms
of "reasons," i.e., conscious motives, it
will be answered in terms of, say, the
fact that he preferred X to Y, and not
merely in terms of his liking X or of his
disliking Y. Similarly, if such an answer
is to be couched in terms of "causes," in
the sense of determining factors within
the organism, it will be answered in
terms of why his action followed one
path rather than another and will not
have been answered merely by indicat-
ing a causal determinant for the particu-
lar action which he performed. In other
words, the question of "freedom" or
"determinism" in the problem of choice
upon the explanation which is
 206 ETHICS

another, and this explanation will in all the person making the choice would not
cases be a causal explanation, regardless really be responsible for that choice.
of what type of cause is involved. This argument assumes that the liber-
I share the view of most analysts of tarian must equate freedom in choice
the problem of choice that the libertar- with complete lack of determination in
ian usually holds (and I believe that he choice, rather than with determination
is in fact necessarily committed to hold- by a unique factor which is not opera-
ing) that the determining causal factor tive in other cases and which controls
in a choice situation is the self, taking the effects of other determinants, rather
"the self" to mean an entity whose caus- than being merely one further determi-
al operations are not subject to descrip- nant of the same order as are they.
tion in terms of the laws which are to be
III. CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY
found exhibited among entities of any
other kind. In short, I should say that In the preceding paragraph I have re-
the libertarian position presupposes the jected the argument, often put forward
belief that in acts of choice there is a by determinists, that if we have freedom
special sort of causation (i.e., mental in choice this freedom would not be com-
causation) which is operative,8 and that patible with the ascription of moral re-
the libertarian thus presumably presup- sponsibility to a person. Similarly, liber-
poses a mind-body dualism. Perhaps the tarians often assert that the ascription
subtlest as well as the most suggestive of responsibility to a person is not com-
form of the libertarian position is thatpatible with determinism. It is with the
which was held by William James whenproblem of the "compatibility" between
he claimed that through the control offreedom, or determinism, on the one
attention we can gain freedom in choice.4 hand and moral responsibility on the
However, other forms have also been other that I shall now be concerned.
held. For example, the phenomenon of Here there are two questions to be dis-
effort has been appealed to as direct evi-cussed: first, what is meant by the term
dence for the entrance of a special type "moral responsibility," and, second,
of causation in human experience; it has what is meant when we speak of the
also been argued that the cause of our "compatibility" between freedom, or
choice of one alternative rather than an- determinism, and moral responsibility.
other is (in some cases at least) a func- a) In ordinary usage "responsible for"
tion of our apprehension of values, may sometimes merely mean "the cause
ideals, or ends, and that the manner in of," but this is not the way in which the
which these determinants operate lies term is generally used in moral discus-
not in any form of "mechanistic" causa- sions. In moral discussions, as well as
tion but through their attractiveness to in the law, "responsibility" retains more
the self. I mention these alternatives not of its original etymological significance
because I wish to defend any one of of "being answerable for." It is there-
them but because I wish to lay the ghost fore no accident that many writers
of one of the stock arguments for deter- equate the ascription of responsibility
minism. This argument states that it is to a person with the fact that it
libertarianism, not determinism, thatisisjustifiable to praise or blame, or
incompatible with our idea of moral re- to reward or punish, that person for a
sponsibility, since, if choice were free, specific action which he performed, or

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 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 207

for a trait of character which he pos- a man may be held responsible for his
sesses. In my opinion there is, in general, actions so long as they were actions
a material equivalence between the as- which he in fact chose to do. In order to
cription of moral responsibility to a per- examine whether or not this is so, it is
son in a particular instance, or in a par- necessary to examine the second prob-
ticular respect, and holding that it is lem of this section, i.e., what is meant
justifiable to praise or to blame him with by the "compatibility" or "incompati-
respect to a particular action or trait of bility" between moral responsibility and
character. As Sharp put the same point, freedom, or determinism, with respect to
a man is held to be morally responsible the question of choice.7
for a particular action "when, because b) As has been pointed out, to ascribe
of it, he is a proper object of moral ap- moral responsibility to a person can be
probation or disapprobation."5 Such ex- equated with holding that we are justi-
ceptions as one can find to this equiva- fied in praising or blaming him for a
lence are not in my opinion of any spe- specific action, or with saying that he
cial theoretical importance. However, in merited reward or punishment for that
the field of moral theory it is of some action.8 Now there can be no doubt that
importance to know whether this ascrip- people do in fact praise and blame, and
tion of responsibility to a person with they do in fact reward and punish; and
respect to a particular action is based they do both of these things whether
on any descriptive characteristics pos- they in fact believe that our choices are
sessed by that action. In spite of H. L. determined or that they are free. The
A. Hart's denial that the notions of problem is therefore not one concerning
"foresight" and "voluntariness" provide the "compatibility" of a particular the-
such descriptive characteristics, I am in- ory with a particular form of action; it
clined to believe that they are important is, rather, the theoretical question of
elements in ascribing moral responsibil- how praise and blame, or reward and
ity.6 Were they not, it is hard to see why punishment, can be justified if a person
moral theorists insist that whether or consistently holds that libertarianism is
not a man has freedom in action, that true, or consistently holds that determin-
is, whether he can do what he chooses to ism is true. This is a problem of ethical
do, does have relevance to whether he is theory, not a problem of moral practice;
responsible for his action. Whatever it is a question of justifying judgments
may be the ways in which judicial deci- which are made, not of making these
sions are reached or justified, I do not judgments, nor of acting upon them.
know of any moralist who does not in And the question with which we are here
fact believe that voluntariness and fore- concerned is how we can justify praise or
sight are relevant to moral responsibil- blame, or reward or punishment, if we
ity. hold that determinism is true, or if we
Thus, while the question of freedom hold that libertarianism is true.
in action is universally (or almost uni- Whatever moral theory we may hold,
versally) regarded as relevant to moral a justification of praise or blame, or re-
responsibility, some moralists deny that ward or punishment, must, I submit,
the question of freedom in choice is also consist in showing that the act of prais-
relevant to it: they would say that ing or blaming, rewarding or punishing,
whether or not choice was determined, is itself morally acceptable when inter-

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 208 ETHICS

preted in the
theory light
of punishment which determin- of
minism is true (or, conversely, that lib- ists characteristically rule out as being
ertarianism is true). In other words, we unjustifiable is that theory which goes
must be prepared to say that granted the by the name of "the retributive theory,"
truth of the determinist position (or of a name which has come to have a pejora-
tive aura, vaguely associated with "sav-
the libertarian position) it is morally ac-
ceptable to us that a person should be agery."
praised or blamed, rewarded or pun- Up to this point the compatibility be-
tween determinism and punishment is
ished, for his actions. And this, of course,
both libertarians and determinists at- obvious. The justification of the act of
tempt to demonstrate. punishing rests on the fact that people
Now, I shall not attempt to deal with find it morally acceptable to promote
the libertarian position with respect to the good consequences which the inflic-
this matter, but I do wish to show that tion of punishment will presumably pro-
there are difficulties which determinists duce. And the fact that the person who
face and which they do not usually no- is being punished was determined to
tice. In order to show this I shall first choose as he did does not materially af-
deal with the question of punishment fect the goodness or badness of these
since it is with respect to this question consequences. Furthermore, the deter-
that determinists have usually attempted minist characteristically argues that un-
to prove that the implications of their less determinism were true we could not
position are morally acceptable. (a) have any confidence in our belief
that the act of punishing would deter
IV. THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFYING PUN- others, nor (b) have any confidence that
ISHMENT ON A DETERMINIST THEORY punishment would reform a criminal,
The characteristic theory of deter- nor (c) would we be justified in assum-
minists with respect to the problem of ing on the basis of his past behavior that
punishment is that punishment is justi- an offender would be likely to commit
future offenses against which we should
fied because of the consequences which
take preventive action. Thus, if a teleo-
it promotes. They may hold to a preven-
logical theory of ethics is correct, the
tive, a deterrent, or a reformatory the-
justification of punishment is, up to this
ory of punishment (or all three); or
point, wholly compatible with determin-
they may substitute, or add, what I
ism.
would call a "social" theory of punish-
Now, I do not happen to believe that
ment (i.e., that the existence of laws is
a teleological theory of ethics is an ade-
essential for social life, and that laws
quate theory, and I would share the
necessarily entail socially defined sanc- views of those who argue that in addi-
tions). In any of these theories of pun- tion to an appeal to consequences some
ishment, or in any combination of them, further element must be added if we are
punishment in general is justified in to justify acts of punishing. However,
terms of its consequences, and any spe- since it is not my purpose in this paper
cific instance of punishment is justified to discuss the teleological-deontological
either in terms of its own direct conse- controversy, nor to put forward a posi-
quences or in terms of the general justi-tive theory of the justification of pun-
fication which has been given. The only ishment, I shall not press this criticism.

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 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 209
The point which I here wish to make is a
different one.
Let us recall that whatever specific
form of the various classic theories of
punishment they hold, determinists jus-
tify punishment in terms of the conse-
quences which the meting out of the
punishment will achieve. In this they as-
sume that there is a valid moral stand-
ard based on the goodness or badness of
the consequences of an act, and that our
acts are to be justified by reference to
this standard. Now, so long as they con-
fine their attention to one side of the act
of punishing-namely the consequences
which this act will have-there is, as we
have seen, no reason why they should
not hold that their justification of pun-
ishment is compatible with determinism.
However, let me now point out that if
determinism is true it is not only true
with respect to the past and future ac-
tions of the offender, it is also true with
respect to the actions of all other per-
sons at all times. And this includes the
action of the judge in punishing the of-
fender. As Schopenhauer somewhere
said, causal determination is not a cab
which we can order to stop whenever we
like. The fact that a particular judge
sentences a particular man to the work-
house for thirty days, rather than giving
him a suspended sentence, is as much
determined as is any other human action.
Furthermore, if it is true that what any
man chooses is not merely a matter of
his "reasons," but is to be explained by,
say, the subtle interplay of his particu-
lar heredity, his childhood experiences,
accidental associations, immediately pri-
or encounters, and the like, then the
judge's decision is determined not mere-
ly by the nature of the offense and by
the law, but by the judge's own peculiar
heredity, his childhood experiences, his
accidental associations, his immediately
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prior encounters (including, say, wheth-
er he was made cheerful or was de-
pressed by his children's behavior at the
breakfast table, or how he reacted to the
manner of the lawyer in the preceding
case). Whatever one may say about the
irrelevance of determinism to the justi-
fiability of punishing a person, the ac-
ceptance of the fact that he who pun-
ishes is himself determined to punish or
not to punish (and to punish in just this
way and to just this degree) involves a
radical reinterpretation of our ordinary
views of punishment. It involves such a
reinterpretation because we do not gen-
erally regard a punishment as justified
merely because it was inflicted and then
had good effects. Even on a teleological
theory we wish to say that it was in-
flicted for a good reason, that is, that it
was inflicted because it would have these
good effects. Yet it would seem to be the
case that the characteristic position of
determinists, once it is applied to the
judge as well as to the offender, under-
cuts the whole aim of justifying punish-
ment, i.e., of showing that the act of
punishing springs from a morally ac-
ceptable motive.
V. THE PROBLEM OF PRAISE AND BLAME
ON A DETERMINIST THEORY
One might object to the preceding
argument on the grounds that I have
confused causal explanation with moral
justification. It might be said that what-
ever the causes which led the judge to
punish as he did, these causes are irrele-
vant to the justification of the act of
punishing. I do not believe that this ob-
jection is well founded. Whatever may
be the case with respect to other fields
in which we seek to justify specific judg-
ments, in moral matters we cannot at all
points draw a sharp line between expla-
nation and justification. On our ordinary
 210 ETHICS

views of what makes an act a right act The seriousness of this objection is
we do look to the causes of that act, and easily overlooked because we fall into
we do not say that a particular act of the habit of assuming that the stand-
punishing is justified regardless of what ard by means of which we justify
causes led the judge to punish. However, specific moral judgments is an obviously
this is merely to repeat what I have al- correct standard. We therefore do not
ready said; the point may be made usually feel any urgency to justify the
clearer by turning our attention from standard itself. However, I submit that
punishment to praise and blame. the acceptance of a moral standard itself
The characteristic position of deter- involves a moral judgment, or must be
minists with respect to praise and blame educed from the moral judgments which
is one which regards all praise and blame we accept.'0 Therefore, what holds of
as special cases of reward and punish- specific moral judgments also holds of
ment. Now, it is true that saying kind the standard. If it is the case that every
words, or saying harsh words, can func- specific moral judgment is causally ex-
tion as rewards and punishments. How- plicable in the way that determinists
ever, it seems to be the case that, while usually say that it is, then our acceptance
we sometimes use praise and blame for or rejection of a particular moral stand-
this purpose, there are other occasions ard is explicable in precisely the same
on which we do not. In such cases we are way. And if there are any disagreements
praising an act because it appears to us between individuals concerning the
as a right act, or blaming it because it standard which is to be accepted, then
appears wrong. This is moral praise and the justification of a particular moral
blame.9 And if such praise or blame has judgment in terms of a particular stand-
side-effects on the future conduct of ard does not solve the controversy; the
those whom we praise or blame (as it acceptance of one standard rather than
often does) this is purely coincidental. another would simply be another case
Now, holding fast to praise and blame in which we were causally determined
in this sense the libertarian insists that to talk and act in one way rather than
if determinism is true then even this sort another.
of praise and blame must be "condi- If the determinist has any answer to
tioned." (We cannot stop causal deter- this type of argument, it certainly does
mination whenever it suits us to do so.) not appear in most statements which are
And if our praise and blame is to be designed to show the compatibility be-
causally explained in this way, from tween determinism and the justification
what source is a universally valid moral of punishment or the validation of praise
standard to be derived? Thus the liber- and blame. The reason why the char-
tarian would argue that, if determinism acteristic position of determinists has
were true, any person making a moral been (as I believe) so naive is that it is
judgment would be caught in preciselyeasy to slip into what may be called the
the same causal nexus as the judge, and self-excepting fallacy: my statements
any attempt to justify a moral judgment about people are true of all people ex-
would simply be another case in which cept me. The judge-excepting fallacy is
we were causally determined to talk one but a special case of this; so too is the
way rather than another. fallacy that we can justify (i.e., vali-

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 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 211

date) our moral praise and blame by VI. A CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL

pointing to the consequences of prais- PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINISM

ing and blaming, and we need not worry

The issue between the determinist and
about what caused us to praise or blame
the libertarian with respect to the prob-
as we did.
lem of choice is, as I have said, a ques-
It should now be obvious why I be-
tion of what types of factor causally en-
lieve that there is a real point in the lib-
tail the fact that a person selects one
ertarian argument that the classic posi-
thing rather than another, or that he sets
tion of determinists is "incompatible"
himself to do one thing rather than
with moral responsibility. To say that a
another, or the like. As I have pointed
man is morally responsible for an ac-
out, the libertarian position seems al-
tion is to say that we are justified in
ways to involve a belief in a mind-body
praising or blaming him for that action.
dualism, together with the belief that the
The classic position of determinism is
mind, in some cases at least, can act as
that we are justified in doing so because
a causal determinant which is not itself
our acts of praise or blame, or of reward
determined by non-mental factors; in
or punishment, can lead to beneficial re-
such cases choice is held by the libertar-
sults. Yet, if we are ourselves determined
ian to be free.
to praise and blame, reward or punish,
Now, with respect to any specific
our "justification" of these acts is re-
choice it is not possible to establish di-
duced to the acknowledgment that we
rectly that a choice was in this sense
could not help but praise or blame, re-
free, nor can we prove by direct evidence
ward or punish. This is not the kind of
that it was determined. This seems to
justification which the classic deter-
have been what James had in mind when
minist thinks he is giving when, on his
he claimed that "the question of free-
theory, he seeks to justify punishment.
will is insoluble on strictly psychologic
In short, the libertarian is correct in
grounds."' Furthermore, if we make
saying that the classic determinist view
the predictability (or unpredictability)
would lead to a radical reinterpretation
of a choice the test of whether or not
of our moral concepts if it were con-
we are determined or free, we shall still
sistently applied. And with this I agree.
be unable to settle the question.'2 How-
The libertarian, however, is very apt to
ever, this does not mean that the ques-
go on to say that determinism is there-
tion is undecidable on the basis of em-
fore untrue. This further proposition is pirical evidence; it simply is undecid-
one which has frequently been accepted.able in terms of direct evidence in spe-
However, it is one that can also be chal- cific cases. If, as I happen to believe,
lenged; it might be the case that we we can marshal evidence which makes it
should give up our traditional interpre- improbable that any current theory of
tations of moral concepts, and our tra- a mind-body dualism is true, then we
ditional means of attempting to justify have good grounds for deciding against
them, rather than giving up determinism.the libertarian position. There simply
Fortunately, as I shall now try to show,would not be any entity which could in-
we may escape between the horns of this fluence choice in the manner in which
dilemma, the libertarian claims that it is influ-

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 212 ETHICS
enced. Conversely, if it can be estab-
lished by empirical evidence that a mind-
body dualism is overwhelmingly prob-
able, then I should suppose that no de-
terminist would feel confident of the
possibility of establishing that in every
choice situation an analysis in terms of
material causes would be sufficient to
explain the choice. Thus I am claiming
that whatever empirical evidence can be
marshalled for or against a mind-body
dualism will be evidence which is rele-
vant to the controversy over freedom in
choice.13 Since, for my part, I find that
a particular form of non-dualism seems
to be demanded by empirical evidence
from such fields of psychology as per-
ception and learning, I find the liber-
tarian position unacceptable. I would
therefore wish it to be clearly under-
stood that in what follows I am speak-
ing as a determinist. However, I also
wish to separate my view from the view
of what, for want of a better name, I
shall designate as "traditional psycho-
logical determinism." The distinction I
wish to draw is based on the fact that
the latter view places what I consider
to be a mistaken emphasis upon the past
as a determining factor in choice situa-
tions. I think that there are two main
reasons why determinists have fre-
quently made this mistake: first, they
have erroneously assumed-following
Hume-that whenever we speak of the
cause of an event we must be speaking
of some temporal antecedent of that
event; second, they have often accepted
certain empirical assumptions concern-
ing the psychology of acts of choice. I
shall state and criticize what I take to
be the traditional theory with reference
to each of these points.
a) The problem of freedom in choice,
unlike the problem of freedom in ac-
tion, is a question of why I choose as I
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do; it is not a question of why I act as
I do. It may be true that whenever we
raise the latter question, an answer is
to be given in terms of some antecedent
state or event. For example, in a case
in which I act after deliberation, taking
into account various alternative pos-
sibilities, the explanation of my action
will (at least on one level of explana-
tion) be couched in terms of my choos-
ing to act in this way, and my choice in
such a case clearly preceded my action.
However, the question of what factors,
or types of factor, led me to choose as
I chose need not, in such a case, be found
in some preceding event. What demands
analysis is, as we have seen, not the fact
that I chose X, but the complex fact
that I chose X rather than Y. Now, it
may be the case that we could explain
this in terms of my past experiences with
X and with Y. taken separately. Or it
might be the case that we could analyze
what we take to be the process of de-
liberating into a series of moments in
which, say, I first incline to X, then to
Y, etc., and that finally some factor in-
tervenes to break into this sequence of
alternating states. That factor could
then be said to be responsible for my
decision, and it would have preceded (if
only instantaneously) that decision.
However, is there any contradiction in
saying that whatever factors are re-
sponsible for my deciding in one way
rather than another are not prior to my
decision, but that their conjoint effect
is my decision? Or, differently put, may
we not say that the cause of my choice
is to be found in the forces which act
on me when I choose? If this sounds
strange, it is, I suggest, only because we
too readily assume that whenever we
speak of the cause of an effect we must
be speaking of something which was
temporally prior to that effect. This,
 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 213

however, is simply not true of our or- direct influence of any form of recent
dinary usage. Far more important, how- empirical psychological theorizing. For
ever, is the fact that it has never been example, W. D. Ross also emphasizes
shown to be an accurate description of the role of the past when he says:
causal relationships in nature.
It is by the activity of thinking about the alter-
b) I wish now to show that if we are native courses of action that we come to desire
determinists we need not seek the causal one action more than the other. We are not a
determinants of our choices in the past. field on which desires as independent entities
In doing so I shall assume the position wage their battle. But the I which thinks and
desires is the I which has been moulded by its
of a determinist who rejects any form previous experiences and opinions and actions.'6
of mind-body dualism (as most deter-
minists do), and who also believes that Contrary to such views, I should like
the determinants of our behavior are to to point out that if we hold to the pos-
be found on the neuro-physiological sibility of a neuro-physiological ex-
level. What I wish to show is that on planation of the forces determining be-
such a view the determinants of our havior, the role which we assign to past
choosing one thing rather than another experience as a determinant of behavior
are not to be found in the past. This, of must be an indirect rather than a direct
course, runs counter to the assumptions role. Past experience can only affect
which are often drawn from certain em- present behavior by virtue of the neuro-
pirical theories in psychology. For ex- physiological traces which it has left,
ample, quite recently Paul Edwards, in i.e., by affecting the physiological make-
criticizing the theory of what James up of the individual. In other words, the
called "soft determinism," has the gen- past as past is not what determines our
uine or "hard" determinist say: behavior; the past can only determine
present behavior by the present traces
You arbitrarily stop at the desires and volitions.
which were left in us by that past.
We must not stop there. We must go on to
ask where they come from; and if determinism Now, consider the situation of a per-
is true there can be no doubt about the answer son who confronts a particular visual
to this question. Ultimately our desires and our stimulus. The non-dualist (and, in this
whole character are derived from our inherited
particular case, the dualist as well) will
equipment and the environmental influences
to which we were subjected at the beginning of be forced to assume that a particular
our lives.'4 brain activity will be evoked by the
presence of the stimulus. Furthermore,
Similarly, in the same symposium, John
we must assume that the nature of this
Hospers said:
activity is in part a function of the na-
The issue may be put this way: How can any-
ture of the pattern presented: what we
one be responsible for his actions, since they
grow out of his character, which is shaped and
see does depend, to some extent at least,
molded and made what it is by influences- upon the nature of the stimulus. If past
some hereditary, but most of them stemming experience also affects what we see (and
from early parental environment-that were not clearly in some cases it does), we must
of his own making or choosing?15
say (if we are giving a neuro-physiologi-
This emphasis on the role of the past cal explanation of perception) that it
is not confined to writers so obviously does so by virtue of the traces it has left.
under the influence of psychoanalytic What I wish to point out is that in ex-
theory, nor, in fact, to writers under theplaining perception in neuro-physiologi-

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 214 ETHICS

cal terms we cannot give a privileged specific natures of these alternatives, and
status to the past: the precise nature of (especially) the contrast between them,
the activity incited by the stimulus, would be the determinants of our ac-
which bears some relation to the specifiction; the answer to the question of why
nature of the stimulus itself, must also we chose X rather than Y would be
be taken into account. The degree to found in the present contrast between
which, and the ways in which, traces left the X and the Y and not in past experi-
by past experience affect perception, ences with other X's and Y's in other
and the degree to which perception can situations. While still determined, we
be explained in terms of autochthonous would, so to speak, be no less deter-
factors (including the specific nature of mined by our present vision of the
the stimulus) is an empirical problem future alternatives than we are by traces
on which different contemporary schools left by our past. In short, the alterna-
of psychology disagree. There are on tives themselves, though yet unrealized,
the one hand those who (in some cases would have every bit as good a status
at least) stress the autochthonous (i.e., as present causal determinants as would
"unlearned") factors; on the other hand anything which had happened to us in
there are those who stress the role of the past.
past experience in all cases. Similarly, I have purposely employed this seem-
in the field of learning theory there are ingly paradoxical language in order to
those who stress insight into the spe- insist that whatever determinants of
cific case, and those who stress condi- choice there may be, these determinants
tioning, i.e., the role of repeated past are to be found in the present: the past
experiences. What I wish to point out can only influence us through the mod-
is that the traditional form of psycho- ifications which it has left in the present,
logical determinism presupposes what and if we have present ideas of the fu-
must be the solution to this empirical ture the physiological correlates of these
problem: that the determinants of be- ideas must (from a non-dualist point of
havior in choice-situations are always to view) also be reckoned as possible de-
be found in the past.'7 terminants. It is only if we assume, on
Now let us suppose that it is not true the basis of the empirical hypotheses as-
that what we perceive or what we learn sumed by traditional psychological de-
is in every case a function of past ex- terminists, that our ideas of the alterna-
perience in similar situations. (I believe tives (and the contrast which exists be-
that there is ample empirical evidence tween them) are necessarily what they
in perception and learning to prove this.)are because of our past experience, that
What difference would it make to our we will ascribe greater significance as a
theory of determinism in those situa- determinant of behavior to what we have
tions in which choice is involved? It already experienced than we ascribe to
would, I submit, make a tremendous dif- the nature of the situation which we con-
ference if any of these choice-situationsfront.
were of the type in which what we see
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROBLEM
in the alternatives was not wholly con-
OF RESPONSIBILITY
ditioned by the past. For if there were
such cases then our choice, though still Let us suppose that the foregoi
determined, would be determined by the eral statement is correct. Let us
envisioned alternatives before us. The suppose that there are sound e

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 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 215

reasons for holding that in at least some dered by the nature of the crime, the
choice-situations the agent may be de- prescripts of the law, and the conse-
termined by the nature of the alterna- quences which are open to him within
tives which he contemplates and not the limits set by the law, we would say
merely by his past. What then would that, determined or not, the fact that he
be the implications of this form of de- punished the offender was morally ac-
terminism for the problem of moral re- ceptable.
sponsibility? To make this point clearer let me
First let us examine the case of pun- simply ask the reader to imagine him-
ishment. The difficulty which we found self sentenced, and then ask him to im-
in the classic form of determinism agine what he would think of the fair-
hinged on the fact that, although we ness of being punished if on the one
might show that the act of punishing hand he believed that the judge meted
was justifiable in terms of the conse- out this punishment because he was de-
quences which it would presumably pro- termined to do so by the sum total of
duce, if the judge who meted out the those past experiences which make up
punishment were himself determined to his personal history, or on the other
punish or not to punish by virtue of his hand that the judge was determined to
past experiences then our original jus- do so by the nature of the offense. For
tification was devoid of the meaning my part at least, I am free to confess
which we ascribed to it. It was devoid of that very probably I would in either case
this meaning since we were justifying complain. But my complaints would be
punishment in terms of an objective quite different in the two types of case.
standard of rightness to which moral In the one I would hold that I had been
acts should conform; but such a stand- unlucky and would attempt to give caus-
ard cannot be said to obtain if every al explanations of why this bad luck had
moral judgment is to be interpreted as befallen me when someone else had gone
due to whatever conditioning by past ex- scot-free. In the other case, however, I
perience the person judging may have would complain that I had not de-
happened to undergo. served this punishment and would try to
If, however, we turn from the tra- show that the judge had not understood
ditional version of psychological de- the facts of the case or the law, or that
terminism to the form of determinism he had not really based his judgment on
which I have suggested, this difficulty isthem. This latter appeal, as is evident,
overcome. We can then hold that a judge would be predicated upon the assump-
may be determined by the nature of the tion that punishment, if it is just, should
alternatives before him, more specifical- be determined by the case at hand, and
ly by the law, by the nature of the this, of course, is precisely the point that
offense, and by the probable conse- I wish to make.
quences of meting out a heavy or a lightThe same point may be made with
penalty. This, I submit, is the way that respect to moral praise and blame. On
we think a judge ought to judge; it is the traditional view of psychological de-
part of the ideal against which we meas- terminism he who praises or blames
ure actual judicial behavior. And no mat- must have been determined to do so on
ter how rigorously a judge may be deter- the basis of his own past experiences:
mined by whatever forces are operative his standards themselves have been de-
within him, if these forces are engen- termined by all of those conditioning

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 216 ETHICS

factors which now determine him to indirect way, as when we can only ap-
praise or to blame. On the altered form prehend the nature of a situation, the
of psychological determinism which I motivation of a person, or the conse-
have proposed, even though we may be quences of an act, because we have al-
determined when we praise or blame, ready learned something about the world
we are being determined by the prop- and the persons in it. It may also do so
erties of the action which we praise or directly, when our own past experience
blame. Again we may complain that the with actions of a certain type have so
person who finds an act praiseworthy or habituated us to them that we no longer
blameworthy has not truly understood attend to them, or when our past experi-
the nature of that act, the situation in ences with a given type of act have been
which it was done, and the alternatives so unpleasant that we always form a
which were open. In other words, we maynegative judgment concerning acts of
still wish to hold that the judgment this type. All this, and more, happens.
which was made was an erroneous judg- Howeverwedopossess standards against
ment. However, to argue that the judg- which we test the validity of those mor-
ment was erroneous is quite different al judgments which we and others make,
from arguing that the judgment was a and we do seek to correct moral judg-
product of the conditioning processes ments on the grounds that they were
which made it inevitable that this judg- predicated upon a false view of the ele-
ment, rather than its opposite, would be ments in the situation judged. As the
made. The latter undercuts the pos- traditional appeals to the impartial
sibility of justifying a judgment through spectator suggest, our standard for the
the appeal to a standard, for the accept- validity of a moral judgment involves
ance of that standard will itself be a that the personal factors which skew a
function of the past experiences of the judge's view of the situation be removed
person who employs it, whereas, the fact if the judgment is to be claimed valid.'8
that we are determined to judge as we Therefore, though any specific moral
do because of our response to the stand- judgment which is actually made may
ard itself would preserve whatever truth be both directly and indirectly influ-
the libertarian position has always enced by the personal history of the per-
wished to preserve. Yet it would not com- son who makes that judgment, we criti-
mit us to libertarianism, nor to the cize moral judgments on precisely these
mind-body dualism which is presup- grounds. We apply as a standard of the
posed by libertarianism. validity of a moral judgment the crite-
Lest it be thought that I am contend- rion that this judgment should be a re-
ing that we do in fact always respond sponse to the morally relevant qualities
to autochthonous factors in the situa- within the action itself. But if it were
tion, and that our judgments are always necessary to accept the traditional ver-
unsullied by our own conditioning, let sion of psychological determinism we
me hasten to add that I do not assume could never criticize a moral judgment
this to be true. On the contrary, I as- on these grounds; every moral judg-
sume that more often than not (though ment (all of our own included) would
not always) our own past experience in- perforce be what it is because of the
fluences what we apprehend in the alter- character of the past experiences of the
natives before us. It may do so in an person who made that judgment.

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 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 217

The preceding paragraph should show and attend sufficiently that we are moved
that I do not believe that all moral judg-by the contrast between their specific
ments are in fact free from the effects ofqualities, what we set ourselves to do
past experience, that they are pellucid will have been determined by whatever
reflections of morally relevant qualities random factors make one alternative
inherent in the actions judged. All that appear to us as more striking or entic-
I am committed to holding is that we ing than the other. And among such ran-
aim to make such judgments, and thatdom if factors would be our own past ex-
the form of determinism in which I be- periences in other vaguely similar cases,
lieve is true, then sometimes we can in the pleasantness or unpleasantness of
fact make such judgments. However, I what we have just been doing, and the
now wish to point out that conditioning, like. Thus, we can only gain the power
in a strict sense, may in some cases be to be moved by the alternatives them-
a prerequisite to making them. selves if we have literally been forced
I am willing to acknowledge that the to attend to what lies before us so that
strength of our past experience is often we respond to it rather than to some-
so great that we do not stop to attend to thing else which we take it to be. In
that which we judge. And unless we do short, our ability to respond to alterna-
stop to attend to any stimulus, what- tives in terms of their own natures must
ever power its autochthonous nature be instilled in us by our past. We must
might exert upon us will be lost. By con- be trained, and sometimes brutally
ditioning in the strict sense, e.g., through
trained, by natural causation or by the
the pain which is inflicted upon us by actions of others, to become capable of
the natural consequences of our inat- a choice based not on the past but on
tention, or is inflicted upon us by other the alternatives themselves. But when
persons for such inattention, we may we do make such a choice we are, I
learn to look before we leap. And surely should claim, morally responsible. It is
conditioning is one of the most potent morally justifiable for another to praise
forces, if not the most potent force,
or blame us for that choice, for his praise
which teaches us this lesson. If this be
or blame can itself be interpreted as a
true, it has a direct and important bear-
response to the act which we have done.
ing on the phenomenon of choice. Unless
we attend to the alternatives before us, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

NOTES

1. J. M. E. McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Re-
ligion (London, 1906), chap. v, "Free Will." Those
familiar with McTaggart's essay will note that I
am here only concerned with two of the four
meanings of freedom which he distinguishes.
Among more recent writers on the problem the
same distinction is explicitly drawn by F. C. Sharp,
Ethics (New York, 1928), pp. 245 f., and by W. D.
Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford, 1939), pp.
223 f. However, it seems fair to say that most of
the recent articles on the topic indicate either a
lack of familiarity with the distinction or a belief
that it is either false or unimportant. Mortimer J.
Adler's The Idea of Freedom (1958) does not even
cite McTaggart's article in its extensive bibliog-
raphy.
2. G. E. Moore, Ethics (London, 1912), chap.
vi. I might here remark that the use of the term
"avoidability" in current discussions of our prob-
lem seems to me unfortunate. It tends to blur the
differences between questions concerning meta-
physical determinism, questions concerning free-
dom in choice, and questions concerning freedom
in action.
3. This is also C. D. Broad's view of what the
libertarian position presupposes; cf. "Determinism,
Indeterminism, and Libertarianism" in Ethics and
the History of Philosophy (London, 1952), pp. 214

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 218 ETHICS

if. What Broad there terms "non-occurrent cau- Hart points out as defenses which can reduce moral
sation" is what Nowell-Smith terms the "contra- responsibility (cf. pp. 190 f.) we find that we can-
causal" element in the libertarian position; cf. not interpret them without appeal to what Hart
"Determinists and Libertarians" in Mind, LXIII calls "psychological" events, such as "intentions"
(1954), 318 et passim. or "choice." For example, he uses the terms "acci-
4. William James, Principles of Psychology dently" and "inadvertently" in his list of defenses.
(New York, 1890), II, 561 ff. Cf. G. F. Stout, He explains these terms by giving an illustration of
Manual of Psychology (London, 1898), IV, chap. each of them. Were he, however, to characterize
x; also Analytic Psychology (London, 1896), Vol. their meanings in such a way as to show what "in-
I, Book II, chaps. ii and iii. advertently" means in several cases, and not mere-
5. Op. cit., p. 239. Cf. R. B. Brandt in Determin-ly in the case at hand, he could not, I submit, do
ism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science, so without using at least some of the words (such
ed. Sidney Hook (New York, 1958), p. 138. [This as "intentions" or "voluntary" or "choice") which
volume will be referred to as "Determinism and he seems to wish to avoid (cf. pp. 188-91).
Freedom" in subsequent footnotes.] It is to be I am not, of course, denying that statements con-
noted that neither Sharp, Brandt, nor I wish to cerning moral responsibility might well be called
equate praise and blame with reward and punish- "ascriptive," and that they are to be distinguished
ment. from "descriptive" statements. In this limited re-
6. Cf. H. L. A. Hart, "The Ascription of Re- spect I agree wholly with Hart. What I find un-
sponsibility and Rights" in Proceedings of the convincing is Hart's insistence that ascriptive state-
Aristotelian Society, Vol. XLIX (1948-49), and ments which involve the notion of moral responsi-
"Legal Responsibility and Excuses" in Determinism
bility are not based upon assumptions involving
and Freedom. descriptive statements of the sort: "He set himself
Professor Hart's position seems to me to be un- to do this"; "He did this intentionally"; "He did
necessarily extreme. One could readily grant that not wish to do this"; etc.
"responsibility" is an ascriptive and not a descrip- 7. McTaggart also deals with this problem (loc.
tive term without denying that its use was based cit., p. 150) in a way that I have found suggestive.
on assumptions concerning the, descriptive char- However, the view which I here propose differs
acteristics of the actions to which it is applied. Fur- from his.
ther, one could readily grant that the notion of 8. It is to be noted that I use the phrase "merited
"voluntariness" is a notion less easily applicable in reward or punishment." By that phrase I wish to
a court of law than are the exceptions and defenses suggest that I am here speaking only of those cases
which the law allows; and, if this be so, it is clear in which the notion of desert is involved. I would
why judges might well decide cases in terms of readily grant that there are many cases in which
what might be called the "negative" formula of we feel justified in rewarding or punishing because
defenses and exceptions rather than in terms of the of the consequences which these actions will pro-
"positive" consideration of whether the action had mote, and that in some of these cases we are none
been voluntary. Similarly, the criteria which a the less willing to deny moral responsibility to the
judge could use to establish whether foresight had person who is being rewarded or punished (e.g.,
been present would be far less clear-cut than in the case of young children).
would be an appeal to legally recognized defenses 9. On some of the difficulties in recent attempts
and excuses, so that in this case too a "negative" to assimilate moral praise and blame to reward
formula would be used. It might nonetheless be and punishment cf. S. Moser, "Utilitarian Theories
true that there is a genuine unity, and not merely of Punishment and Moral Judgments," Philosophi-
a spurious one, among these defenses and excep- cal Studies, VIII (1957), 15-19.
tions. In fact, the table of defenses which are recog- 10. It is for this reason that I object to the cur-
nized in contract law (Proc. of Aristotelian Soc., rently fashionable tendency in ethical theorizing to
loc. cit., pp. 175 f.) and the defenses and exceptionsmake the fundamental question of justifying a
which Hart lists in his consideration of criminal moral judgment a matter of showing its relation
law (ibid., p. 179) seem to have some relations to a moral principle or rule. (Cf. my article, "On
with each other, as well as having some coherence the Use of Moral Principles," Journal of Philoso-
among their individual items. phy, LIII [1956], 662-70.)
However, even if there is an error in this objec- 11. Op. cit., II, 572.
tion to Hart's view, and even if we must accept 12. Cf. A. C. Danto and S. Morgenbesser, "Char-
the extreme view that notions of freedom in ac- acter and Free Will," Journal of Philosophy, LIV
tion and freedom in choice have nothing to do with (1957), 493-505.
legal responsibility, we would not have to accept 13. It is to be noted that both dualists and non-
a similar view with respect to moral responsibility.dualists have sometimes sought to establish their
In fact, if we examine the list of defenses which positions by appealing to evidence concerning choice

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 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 219

situations. However, this is a mistake if it is true
that neither the libertarian position nor the deter-
minist position admits of being directly established
in specific cases.
14. Determinism and Freedom, p. 108.
15. Ibid., p. 119. Cf. "Meaning and Free Will"
by the same author in Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research, X (1950), 315 ff.
16. Foundations of Ethics (Oxford, 1939), p. 225.
17. It seems to me to be the case that ethical
hedonism is, in general, connected with a psycho-
logical theory which insists on the determinative
power of the contemplated alternatives (e.g., Sharp,
op. cit., pp. 241 ff.). Nonetheless, even so careful
an analyst as Sidgwick couches the question of psy-
chological determinism in terms of that which pre-
ceded the choice (cf. The Methods of Ethics [7th
ed.], Book I, chap. v, sec. 2). Similarly, J. S. Mill
defines the position of determinism without refer-
ence to the past, and yet immediately stresses the
"antecedents" of our volitions (cf. System of Logic
[10th ed.], Book VI, chap. ii, sec. 2). If this be true
even of these psychological analyses, it is all the
more obviously true of the discussions of determin-
ism which rest on psychoanalytic theories and on
appeals to the effects of "conditioning."
It may be thought that philosophers need not
bother discussing the truth or falsity of empirical
theories in the field of psychology; however, it is
precisely the point of what follows that our in-
terpretation of moral responsibility will be affected
by the fact that we accept one psychological theory
rather than another. To focus attention upon em-
pirical problems of this sort is not presently fash-
ionable, but it has often been the case that those
whom we still claim as philosophers did deal with
such problems. Furthermore, it may be the case
that some of these problems are inescapable. (Cf.
my note, "Professor Ryle and Psychology," The
Philosophical Review, LXVII [1958], 522-30.)
18. Cf. my Phenomenology of Moral Experience
(Glencoe, 1955), chap. vi.

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