1. People v. Santiago, 51 Phil.

68

Facts:
On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked Felicita, who was then about 18
years of age, to accompany him across the river on some errand. The girl
agreed and they went over the river together into the municipality of San
Leonardo. After crossing the river, the appellant conducted the girl to a place
about twenty paces from the highway where tall grass and other growth hid
them from public view. In this spot the appellant manifested a desire to have
sexual intercourse with the girl, but she refused to give her consent, and he
finally, notwithstanding her resistance, accomplished his purpose by force
and against her will.

After the deed had been done the appellant conducted the girl to the house of
his uncle, Agaton Santiago, who lived not far away. They arrived here about
11 a. m., and remained for several hours. In the course of the afternoon
Agaton Santiago brought in a protestant minister who went through the
ceremony of marrying the couple. After this was over the appellant gave the
girl a few pesos and sent her home. Her father happened to be away that
night, but upon his return the next day, she told him what had happened,
and this prosecution for rape was started.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the marriage of Agaton Santiago and Felicita Masilang
is valid?

Ruling:
1. NO. The manner in which the appellant dealt with the girl after the
marriage, as well as before, shows that he had no bona fide intention
of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered
binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for
lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the
prosecution of the wrongdoer.
 2. Jimenez v. Caizares, L-12790, Aug. 31, 1960

Facts:
The plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the
defendant Remedios Caizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of
the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of
her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ
or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above
existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that
reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been
married.

Issue
1. Whether or not the complaint is a valid ground for annulment?

Ruling:

Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The

presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that
his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear
asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings.
3. Contreras v. Macaraig, 33 SCRA 222

Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic
Church of Quiapo, Manila. Out of their Marriage, three children were born:
Eusebio C. Macaraig, on January 11, 1953; Victoria C. Macaraig, on March
26, 1956; and Alexander C. Macaraig, on August 4, 1958. All the children
are in the care of plaintiff wife.

After the elections of 1961, defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a

special agent at Malacaang. He began to be away so often and to come home
very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was out on a
series of confidential missions.

In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff
that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala.

All this while, defendant, if and whenever he returned to the family fold,
would only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about
a month.

After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a
baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the
reports. Mrs. Antioquia then went to the parish priest of Singalong where she
inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala and she
was given a copy of the baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien Mageline
Macaraig (Exh. G) which she gave to plaintiff sometime in October, 1963.

In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two

children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk
to defendant at his place of work. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby
restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann
Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing
to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave
Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal
separation.

Issue:
1. Whether or not there is a valid ground for legal separation?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The court rendered holding that appellant is entitled to legal
separation as prayed for in her complaint. In the absence of a clear-cut
decision of the Supreme Court as to the exact import of the term
"cognizant," the practical application of said Article can be attended
with difficulty.

After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes
of the law, the only time when appellant really became cognizant of
the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963.

The court conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the
preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was
living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his
legitimate family, and it was only then that the legal period of one
year must be deemed to have commenced.
4. Alperal v. Republic, 6 SCRA 357

Facts:
That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24,
1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; That during her marriage to
Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name,
that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from
Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years
now. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr.
Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many
years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be
permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the petition is valid?

Ruling:
1. No. The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of
Article 372 of the New Civil Code which reads:

ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation. (Emphasis supplied)

The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the
legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married
status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of
the vinculum.
5. Buccat v. Buccat, 72 Phil. 19

Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938,
became engaged in September, and got married in Nov 26. On Feb 23, 1939
(89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth
to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to
married life with her. On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of
their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida,
she assured him that she was a virgin.

Issue:
1. Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be granted on
the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Ruling:
1. No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage,
a sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society
rests.

In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student,
did not suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she
was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed
physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.
6. Alcazar v. Alcazar 603 SCRA 604

Facts:
The Complaint was filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August
2002. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to
respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at
the latters residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for
five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents
parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did
not live with petitioner at the latters abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left
for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. While working in Riyadh, respondent
did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to
call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year
and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner
that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was
surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in

the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad
Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents
house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Petitioner traveled to San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living
with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in

the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her,
providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner
and respondent.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Article 45 paragraph 5 of the family code, a ground
for marriage to be nullified is present in the case?
Ruling:
1. None. No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that
respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his
marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-
examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their
wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being
no physical incapacity on respondents part, then, there is no ground
for annulling petitioners marriage to respondent. Petitioners Complaint
was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
7. Republic v. Dayot, 550 SCRA 435

Facts:
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were
married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas
V. Atienza. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit, also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a
sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the marriage of Jose to Felisa is valid considering that
they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage licence
requirement?
2. Whether or not an action for nullity of marriage prescribes?

Ruling:
1. No. It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit
and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before
the celebration of their marriage.

Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating

to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
 attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

2. No. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and

Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other
conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case,
the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be
raised any time.
8. Bolos v. Bolos, 634 SCRA 429

Facts:
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo
Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a
Decision, dated August 2, 2006

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He

timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the
appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or
new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal

was likewise denied.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006
decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment
filed by Cynthia.

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC

The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for

reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did
not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.

Issues:
1. Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
Ruling:
1. NO. Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her
stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15,
2003, is explicit in its scope.

In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest

opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal considering that what
is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.

No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an

inviolable social institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our
Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and
inviolability.
9. Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio and Trinidad, 534 SCRA 418

Facts:
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli
(Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita
D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.[3] They
begot seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma,
Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.[4] On 1 May
2004, Trinidad died.[5] On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner
before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.[6] Six months later, or on 10
February 2005, Eulogio passed away.[7]

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as
husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence,
they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their
union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli,
on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall
of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an
affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that
it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

Issues:
1. Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity
of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita.

Ruling:
1. No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March
14, 2003, covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines
does not allow it. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated
on August 26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of the order. The
order declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But it does
not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without
any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional
right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
10. Castro v. Castro, 542 Scra 379

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They
planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their
first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar,
the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through
with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated
13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with
Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil
rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to
their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna

Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one
supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her
private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner

before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City trial court. In her complaint,
respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has
reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife
and Reinna Tricia as his child.

Issues:
1. Whether or not a valid marriage is present in the case?
2. Whether or not the petitioner is liable for support of illegitimate child?

Ruling:
1. No. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so
they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it
is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
 license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.
2. Yes, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and
therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
11. Carlos v. Sandoval, 574 SCRA 116

Facts:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos. During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his
estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of
inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the
share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. On May 13,
1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II).
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No.
95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes
of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c)
recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late
brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence
of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased
brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the brother of Teofilo can file nullity of marriage
between Teofilo and Felicidad.
2. Whether Juan Carlos brother of Teofilo entitled to intestate proceeding?

Ruling:
1. No. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of
marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment
of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate
 heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that
they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
2. If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted
son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the
nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent
Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right
to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the
marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning,
still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of
descendant, illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes the
collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
12. Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, 556 SCRA 711

Facts:
Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on August 12, 1997. Less
than three years later or on October 12, 2000, Lynnette filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of Martinis psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital duties and obligations under Articles 68-
70 of the Family Code.
Lynnette noticed that every time she conversed with Martini, he always
mentioned his mother and his family, and she soon realized that he was a
mamas boy. And she noticed too that when she would call up Martini at his
parents house and his mother was the one who answered the call, she would
deny that he was around.
The last time the couple talked was on October 14, 1999 when Martini
was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) about to depart for
abroad. Since then, Martini never communicated with Lynnette. On
investigation, Lynnette learned that Martini declared in his employment
records that he was single and named his mother as principal allottee.
Hence, Lynnettes filing of the complaint for declaration of nullification
of marriage.

Issues:
1. Whether Martini is Psychologically incapacitated him being a mamas
boy?

Ruling:
1. No. Lynnettes marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it
cannot be declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity in light of the insufficient evidence presented.

While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare

him/her psychological incapacitated is not required, the root cause
thereof must be medically or clinically identified. There must thus be
evidence to adequately establish the same. There is none such in the
case at bar.
13. Salmingo v. Rubica, 527 SCRA 379

Facts:
Ignacio J. Salmingo (Salmingo), City Administrator of Silay, filed a
disbarment complaint against Atty. Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica) and a
petition for setting aside of the decision holding Liza Janes (Jane) marriage
as annulled. Salmingo alleged that in prosecuting an annulment case, Atty.
Rubica deliberately concealed Liza Janes address so that she could not be
served with summons, thus enabling him to present evidence ex parte, and
that Atty. Rubica also caused the publication of summons only in a
newspaper of local circulation. Salmingo also contends that Atty Rubica did
not serve a copy of his petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor; and that he did not cause the
registration of the decree of nullity in the Civil Registry. Salmingo contends
that the conduct of Atty. Rubica did not comply with the Rule on
Declaration of AbsoluteNullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Atty Rubicas alleged non-compliance with the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages is tantamount to gross misconduct which warrants
his disbarment

Ruling:
1. The requirement that the trial court order the prosecutor to investigate
whether collusion exists in case the defendant in the declaration of
nullity case files no answer is addressed to the said court, not to the
parties to the case nor to their counsel, absent any showing of
respondents involvement in the lapse in the prescribed procedure, he
cannot be faulted therefor.

As for complainants prayer for the setting aside of the decision in Civil
Case No. 2243-40 and the reopening of the case, the same may not be
considered, not in the present case anyway. He is, parenthetically, not
even a real party in interest to the said case. His invocation of the States
interest in protecting the sanctity of marriage[29] does not give him the
standing to question the decision. By law, it is the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal or the Solicitor General who represents the interest of the State
in proceedings for the annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage.
14. Tongol v. Tongol, 537 SCRA 135

Facts:
Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were
married on August 27, 1967. Out of their union, they begot four children,
namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born in
1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.

On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of
their conjugal partnership of gains, which was granted in a Judgment issued
by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the
ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations.

In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at

reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure.
However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando who is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married man.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister,
Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza Guevara, an employee in the
pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando also
presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological
examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing their
marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision granting the
petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written
evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the spouses' psychological examination.
On the other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas only consisted of
her own testimony.

Issues:
1. Whether there is psychological incapacity in either of the spouses in
the case?
Ruling:
1. None. It is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a
psychological disorder. However, the totality of the evidence presented
in the present case does not show that her personality disorder is of the
kind contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as
jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or
incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
15. Republic v. CA and Roridel Oliviano Molina, GR 108763 Feb. 13, 1997

Facts:
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent
Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel
and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers
and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard
to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime
in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since
then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October
1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few
weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as
a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the court erred in judging the marriage void due to
psychological incapacity?

Ruling:
1. Yes. In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing
at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such
failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the
faults and blemishes of the beloved.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
remains valid.
16. Jocson v. Robles, 22 SCRA 521

Facts:
On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court an action for the annulment of her marriage to
Ricardo R. Robles (Civ. Case No. E-00013), on the ground that it was
bigamous.
Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that during their cohabitation,
she was subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the
premature birth of their first child, who died three days later.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But
he charged plaintiffs' parents with having compelled him by force, threat
and intimidation, to contract that marriage with her, notwithstanding their
knowledge that he is a married man; and that said threat and intimidation
allegedly persisted until January, 1963 when he was finally able to get away
and live apart from the plaintiff.

Issue:
1. Whether or not mere a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment
be a valid ground for nullity of marriage?

Ruling:
1. No. The court finding indications of collusion between the parties in
their attempt to secure the nullification of said marriage. On the
merits, the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for
summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and
1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the
rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of
facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition
for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not
countenanced by the Civil Code.
17. Ocampo v. Florenciano, 107Phil. 35

Facts:
Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina,
on the ground of adultery. The court of first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed
it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was confession of judgment,
plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.
According to the Court of Appeals, the evidence thus presented shows
that "plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious
ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and
wife. They begot several children who are now living with plaintiff. In
March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas.
Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man
plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she
stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city
defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas.
Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her
course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
"On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having
illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff
signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a
petition for legal separation."

Issues:
1. Whether there is presence of collusion, confession of judgment, plus
condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription in the case
prohibiting the promulgation of legal separation?

Ruling:
1. None, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the
mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables
the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. And proof that
the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself
collusion.

We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and

take her home (after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted
condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will
be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas
and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it
was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the
obligation to return.
18. Dela Cruz v. Ejercito, 68 SCRA 1

Facts:
On May 20, 1974 Milagros de la Cruz was charged with bigamy in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Angeles City Branch IV for having
married Sergeant Dominick L. Gaccino on September 15, 1973 while her
prior marriage to Teodoro G. David was undissolved. The information was
filed at the instance of her first husband
On August 1, 1974 Milagros de la Cruz filed in the same court at its
San Fernando Branch III a complaint for the annulment of her marriage to
Sergeant Gaccino on the ground of duress
On December 16, 1974 Judge Castaeda rendered a decision annulling
the marriage of Milagros de la Cruz to Gaccino. No appeal was taken from
that decision. It became final. In view of the annulment of her second
marriage, Milagros de la Cruz filed on January 27, 1975 a motion to dismiss
the bigamy charge. The private prosecutor and the prosecuting fiscal opposed
the motion.

Issues:
1. Whether or not annulment of Dela Cruz to Gaccino excuses the previous
from the crime of bigamy filed by her first husband?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The SC hold that the finding in the annulment case that the
second marriage contracted by Milagros de la Cruz with Sergeant
Gaccino was a nullity is determinative of her innocence and precludes
the rendition of a verdict that she committed bigamy. To try the
criminal case in the face of such a finding would be unwarranted.
19. Pacete v. Cariaga, Jr., 231 SCRA 321

FACTS:

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one
Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and
Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint
that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named
Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita
de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August
1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension
within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to
unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants
failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff
filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings
held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980
which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null
and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case
of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is
no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys
in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of
marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a
mere contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before
six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in
order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court
should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or

underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for
legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order
to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
20. Menzoza v. Court of Appeals, 19 SCRA 756

Facts:
In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
is owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied for a title. During pendency of the
application before the land registration court, Mendoza sold the land to
Daniel Cruz. The contract of sale was admitted in court in lieu of the
pending application for land title. The registration court rendered a decision
in July 1965, ordering the registration of the two parcels of land in the
name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of Mendoza.

The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon failure of
Cruz to pay Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name of
Cruz be cancelled. The land registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza on
the ground that the court erred in its earlier decision in issuing the land title
to Cruz who was not a party to the application of title initiated by
Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the title can be dealt with in the name of a third
party.

Ruling:
1. A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration
proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the
instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together
with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the
application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case.
And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show
that these requirements have been complied with in this case.
21. De Asis v. CA, 303 SCRA 176

FACTS:

Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action
in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De
Asis who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated
demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason
that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it
seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the
dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue
his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against
the alleged father, this time as the minors legal guardian/mother. Manuel
interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He maintained
that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity
between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim
support.

ISSUE:
1. WON the minor is barred from action for support.

HELD:

1. No. The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be

transmitted to a third person. The original agreement between the
parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a
compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With
respect to Manuels contention for the lack of filial relationship
between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing
the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any
filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties
must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true
that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first
shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be
judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot
be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal
cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no
force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by
Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any
compromise or waiver.
22. Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104

Facts:

The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said
complaint the spouses Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially
that, October 1, 1952 said spouses executed a deed. They sold to Pedro
Galera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein
described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal,
provice of Iloilo including the improvements thereon. That said right of
redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or
any of their heirs or successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor;
that said Pedro Galera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of deed of
sale Dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro
Gayon for the sum of P614.00 that plaintiff had since 1961.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the case at bar would fall under the provision of Art.
217 of family code

Ruling:

1. YES Reason No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of

the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in article 2035. It is noteworthy that the impediment
arising from this provision applies to suits filed or maintained
between members of the same family. This phrase members of the same
family should, however be constructed in the light of Art. 217 of the
same code.
25. Esquivas v. CA. 303 SCRA 176