Search and seizure

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas

FACTS:

On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas issued a search
warrant on the basis of affidavit of Agent Mariano Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal
knowledge but through information from a reliable source. In other words, the applicant's knowledge of facts is
based on a mere hearsay.
In the affidavit presented to the judge, the description is as follows:

"That there are being kept is said premises books documents, receipts, lists chits, and other papers used by him
in connection with his activities as money lender, charging a usurious rate of interests, in violation of the law."
At 7 pm on June 4, by virtue of the warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board enterd the store and
residence of Narciso Alvarez seized some articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, journals. cash bonds,
check stubs, memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence,
receipt books, promissory notes and checks.
On July 8, Alvarez filed a petition alleging that the search was illegal based on the lack of personal knowledge,
that it was made at night and for non compliance in the particularity description rule in issuing warrant.
On September 10, the Court of First Instance ruled against the Alvarez and upheld the validity of the search
warrant.

ISSUES:

(1) W/N the search warrant is legal when the affidavit is based on hearsay.
(2) W/N a search warrant can be made at night.
(3) W/N the search warrant satisfies the particularity of description as required by the law.

RULING:

(1) No. The search warrant is ILLEGAL because the affidavit is based on mere hearsay.

RATIO: The general rule is that when the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts
within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause.
But when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having
personal knowledge of facts is necessary. The Court held that the warrant is illegal because it is based on the
affidavit of an agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has
been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages
caused.
(2) Yes, the search can be made at night.

RATIO: Section 101 of General Orders number 58 authorizs a search made at night when it is positively asserted
that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. However, since the search warrant is
declared illegal (RULING 1), such search could not be legally made at night.

(3) Yes, it satisfied the requirement of particularity of description.

RATIO: Article III of the Constitution and section 97 of General Orders Number 58 requires that the affidavit must
contain a particular description of the placed to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
But, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required
that technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue.
Based on the description of the affidavit, and taking into consideration the nature of the articles as described it is
clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is
difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof.
The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who
executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabiling him to identify the articles in question, which he
did.

PP vs Sy Juco

Narciso of BIR applied for SW as he got reliable info that the fraudulent books letters and papers and records
were kept in BLDG 482 occupied by respondent Sy Juco
Among the seized item was the filing cabinet owned by atty. Remo, this cabinet was refused to be returned by
the CIR so he filed a case to prohibit them from opening on the ground that the SW is null and void being llegal

ISSUE: W/N the SW is illegal taking into account the provision of the law and the consti relative thereto

HELD: SW illegal because it does not meetteh necessary condition in support of its va2lidity

1. Appli upon which it is issued be supported by oath

2. Part described not only the place to be searched but also the things and person to be searched
3. There must be probable cause

Oath requires that it constitutes guaranty that the person taking such oath has personal kow2ledge of
such facts and circumstances and it convinces the magistrates of the existence of the requisite of probable
cause.
True test of sufficiency of affidavit to warrant issuance of SW is whether it has been drawn in such a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon In case allegations charged thereon proved false.

Affidavit which gave rise to the issuance of the SW does not fulfill the necessary condition in support of its
validity. First, not stated in the said affidavits that the BOOKS docus or records therein are being used or
intended to used for the commission of fraud against the government ,lacking such allegation, the
warrant purports that they are actually being used for such purpose.

Second, it assumes that the entire building no. 482 is owned by Sy Juco against whom the warrant was
exclusively issued when only ground for such assumption is the statement of Narciso which is just a mere hearsay

Third, it was not asked that the things belonging to appellant atty. Remo and to others must also be searched

For these reasons, the warrant in question has gone beyond what had been applied and that it being evident the
purpose thereof was solely to fish for evidence or search for it by exploration.

SW is not designed for such purpose.

3. Prudente vs Hon Judge Dayrit

has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives
handgrenades and ammunition which are illegally possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense which
the said NEMESIO PRUDENTE is keeping and concealing at the following premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,
to wit:

a. Offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor;
b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor;
2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be
issued to enable the undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following
described properties:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and handgrenades; and,
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the premises of Polytechnic University
of the Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms
at the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor,
and forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal properties, to wit:

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;

b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and hand grenades; and
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
and bring the above described properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col.
Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander. In his affidavit, 4 dated 2
November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside
the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately
wrapped with old newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.M33 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b)
one (11) pc.M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.PRB423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt.
Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the
examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general
warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense;
and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege
under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent

On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt.
Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the
examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general
warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense;
and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege
under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent

The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division, WPD, opposed the
motion. 6 After petitioner had filed his reply 7 to the opposition, he filed a supplemental motion to quash. Thereafter, on 9 March
1988, respondent Judge issued an order, 9denying the petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration 10 was likewise denied in the order 11 dated 20 April 1988

Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge has decided a question of substance in a manner not in
accord with law or applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, or that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the disputed orders.

ISSUE: W/ SW WAS VALID?

FOR VSW TO ISSUE, there must be probable cause which is

For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause,

1. which is to be determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

2. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and

3. the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet arid prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched." 15 This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant
or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. 16

IN THIS CASE, NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO WARRANT ISSUANCE OF SW BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING:

1. NO PERONAL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS because The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the
affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom
one considers to be reliable. the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his deposition, do not come up to the level of
facts of his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the
issuance of the questioned search warrant.

2. MERE AFFIDAVITS OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES ARE NOT SUFFICIENT. The examining judge has
to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and ATTACH THEM TO THE
RECORD. Depositions in this case were too brief and short

3. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers." On the contrary, the questions
asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI," 21 the questions
propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable
cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in
a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."

2nd issue: PARTICULARITY

rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and Identify the place intended . 22 In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the
place to be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc,
Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the
President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be
searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.

3RD ISSUE

Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questionned warrant, on the ground that it was issued in violation of the rule that a search
warrant can be issued only in connection with one specific offense. The search warrant issued by respondent judge, according to
petitioner, was issued without any reference to any particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated when allegedly P.D. No.
1866 punishes several offenses.

Held: Not a general warrant.

In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 23 Where the warrants involved were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons
therein named had committed a

"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," ( general warrant)

the Court held that no specific offense had been alleged in the applications for a search warrant, and that it would be a legal hearsay
of the highest order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and
Revised Penal Code" without reference to any determinate provision of said laws and codes.

In the case herein, the issued warrant is not a general warrant becausealthough the appli for SW was captioned for violation of PD
1866( IPF, etc), the alleged violation in this case was quakified by the phrase illegal possession of firearms,etc.

The term etc. referred to ammunitions and explosives. Hence the failure of the SW to mention that particular provision of PD 1-866
is not of such a gravity to call of its invalidation on this case.
4TH ISSUE: Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the applicant to state, under oath, the urgent
need for the issuance of the search warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned warrant
invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular No. 19, dated 14 August 1987, which reads:

Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon
by any judge of the court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the
facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is urgent.

HELD:

it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely provides for a guideline, departure from which would not
necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise valid search warrant.

4. STONEHILL VS DIOKNO

In violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code, 42
warrants were issued against petitioners or the corporation where they are officers to search the persons above-named
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of their books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) which are the subject of the offense.

Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and
prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued alleging the search
warrants to be void since (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2)
cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against
the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an
illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law

TWO POINTS TO REMEMBER:

SW TO THE CORPORATION

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and
of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them
in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it
affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one
were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a
seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the
privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F.
501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search
and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . .
(A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

SW FOR THE RESIDENCE OF Robert

2) important questions need be settled, namely:

(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and
(2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence
against petitioners herein.
1wph1.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the
seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.

Herein, warrants involved were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed
a m"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," ( general warrant)

the Court held that no specific offense had been alleged in the applications for a search warrant, and that it would be a legal hearsay
of the highest order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and
Revised Penal Code" without reference to any determinate provision of said laws and codes.

No particular description of the things to be seized. the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in
our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy
of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision
above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political
strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIED

Things and objects seized in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures are fruits of the poisonous
tree and are inadmissible as evidence

ASIAN SURETY V HERRERA