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The Social Construction of Emotions in the "Bhagavad Gt": Locating Ethics in a Redacted
Text
Author(s): Kathryn Ann Johnson
Source: The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec., 2007), pp. 655-679
Published by: Blackwell Publishing Ltd on behalf of Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40018024
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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS
IN THE BHAGAVAD GIT A
ABSTRACT
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656 Journal of Religious Ethics
is not to answer the question of how we should manage our passions, for
that answer shifts with the sands of time and varies among philosophers.
Instead, I want to demonstrate how such answers may be constructed
historically through redacted texts - texts that are composed in one era
and then edited or supplemented in one or more later period(s) - by au-
thors with different or new concerns. After such texts are modified, over
time, we are often left with a powerful statement of ethics, which, nev-
ertheless, may represent a range of moral philosophies recognizable in
their abstracted parts.
One redacted text that presents a moral dilemma and philosophizes
about the role that emotions should play in choosing the appropriate
action is the Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gitd.1 Philosopher Bina Gupta
(2006) has convincingly defended the coexistence of virtue ethics and
duty ethics in the Gitd.2 The sacred text is less concerned with what
Arjuna ought to do as he readies for war, and more concerned about what
sort of man Arjuna ought to be. Gupta concludes that the Gitd supports
the cultivation of emotions in much the same way that Aristotle had.
The virtuous Hindu warrior will do his duty as a disciplined activity, but
with self-control and emotional detachment from the consequences of
his action and the all-embracing virtue of indifference. Conquering one's
passions and desires precedes right action.
Bilimoria (1995, 2004) has also recently evaluated the text of the Gitd,
and he identifies three components of, or commentaries on, emotions
in the epic. He finds that the presumed author of the Gitd approves
of not only bhaktibava (devotional love) and "the more commonplace
affects" (feelings of confusion, fear, or joy) for making moral decisions, but
that the author also endorses the dismissal of emotions in the pursuit
of one's duty (Bilimoria 1995, 66). Bilimoria argues that each of these
perspectives has been incorrectly championed as the true teaching of the
Gitd at one time or another. He wants to reconcile the three perspectives
and find, in the text, a more "philosophically circumspect" understanding
of emotions and their impact on Indian moral reasoning (66). I will argue
that Bilimoria is correct in identifying these three perspectives and that
it is actually the redacted, textual layers of the Bhagavad Gitd that
evidence the three very different ways of relating emotions and moral
judgment.
Since the early 1800s, scholars have debated the dating and author-
ship of the Gitd (Jezic 1986, 628) and, admittedly, there is not unanimous
agreement that the epic story is a redaction at all (Brockington 1998,
1A11 quotations of the Bhagavad Gita are taken from Barbara Stoler Miller's
(1986/2004) English translation of the Sanskrit text.
z I will usually substitute the shortened form Gitd for the full name, Bhagavad Gitd,
in this paper.
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The Social Construction of Emotions in the Bhagavad Gita 657
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658 Journal of Religious Ethics
given while the warrior, Arjuna, and his charioteer, Krishna, oversee the
battlefield just prior to the destruction of the kingdom.
The Mahdbhdrata, itself, is traditionally thought to have been com-
posed in two stages, an original 7,000-verse epic ascribed to Vyasa, and
a subsequent elaboration attributed to Vaisampayana (Flood 1996, 105).
Scholars consider the Mahdbhdrata to have been compiled by a number
of authors over the centuries between 500 BCE and 100 CE, although the
epic was probably not fully formed until 400 CE (105). The greater epic,
as well as the Gitd which is set within it, was finally rewritten by the
Brahman family of Bhargava, descended from Bhrgu, an ancient sage,
who added the final verses to the text(s).
At the opening of the Bhagavad Gitd, the two families of the descen-
dents of Kuru, the Kauravas and the Pandavas, stand poised on opposite
sides of the battlefield. The leader of the Pandavas, Arjuna, faces both
an emotional and a moral dilemma. His desire, and the purpose of the
battle, is to obtain the kingdom. The impending battle is fully endorsed
by the members of both his immediate community and by his opposing
kinsmen, as evidenced by the amassing troops. On the other hand, as Bil-
imoria sums up so eloquently, Arjuna suddenly foresees "the destruction
of the kingdom, the carnage of the elders, the collapse of the family and
tradition, the ruin of his Gandiva missile, the demise of his invincible
golden chariot, and so on - [consequences that] did actually come to pass
according to his prediction during the tragic course and un-triumphant
conclusion of the war" (Bilimoria 2004, 222).
Arjuna is overcome with a complex emotion of grief, fear, guilt, and
dread at the thought of committing and experiencing such atrocities.
He wants to know how he can kill his kinsmen when such physical and
emotional pain will result. His moral judgment, if based on his emo-
tions, is that the killing is not worth the kingdom. A dialogue between
Arjuna and his charioteer, Krishna, ensues in which Krishna explains
the relationships of emotions, knowledge, and right action (in West-
ern terms) or, in Hindu terms, kdma (desire - one aspect of emotions),
karma-yoga (disciplined, detached action - without deference to emo-
tions), bhakti (devotion - emotions directed toward deity), jndna (knowl-
edge), and dharma (right action).
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The Social Construction of Emotions in the Bhagavad Gita 659
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660 Journal of Religious Ethics
There has been some debate about whether the values or sentiments
that give rise to emotions are themselves derived from reason, some com
bination of reason and emotions, or from emotions "struggling against
the dictates of reason" (Altieri 2003, 153-80). The strong view of social
constructionist theories of emotions claims that there are no natural,
basic emotions and that there would be no emotional state at all with-
out culturally constructed views of what constitutes a sentiment or an
appropriate circumstance for emotions (see Claire Armon-Jones 1986;
Levenson et al. 1992; and Shweder 1994). However, as cross-cultural
studies of facial expression, research on basic emotions such as fear, and
linguistic analyses show, there are some universal, unlearned, emotional
states. These basic emotions are rooted in pre-conscious intuitions or an-
imalistic instincts that are only slightly modified by cultural influences
(see Ekman 1992; Scherer and Wallbott 1994; and Frijda 2000).
Arj una's emotional state at the opening of the Gitd certainly reflects
not only the cultural tension between sentiments of non-injury and duty,
but it also evidences a presumably universal and instinctual state of
arousal prior to mortal combat. One need not be trained in either emo-
tional psychology or moral philosophy to surmise that in the moments
before killing one's own relatives, in hand-to-hand combat, there most
assuredly will be a sweeping emotional experience of some kind.
Thus, socially constructed, culturally specific, reasoned values or basic
universal intuitions are both able to induce the physiological arousal of
the warrior in the moments before the battle begins. However, Arjuna's
dilemma, the concern of the authors of the Gitd, and the subject of this
paper is not how emotions occur but, rather, how a person should respond
once these mental and bodily agitations have set in.
Western psychologists and Hindu philosophers agree that emotions
have both a social and ethical function (Armon-Jones 1986; Frijda and
Mesquita 1994; Bilimoria 1995; Keltner and Haidt 1999; Shweder and
Haidt 2000; and Haidt 2001). The felt sensations of emotions alert the
person that they must take action, change or continue the present course
of action, or in cases of inappropriate action, emotions may cause them
to stop and reconsider the consequences of their actions.
Thus, immediately felt sensations cue moral reasoning in two ways.
First, the felt sensations may prompt reasoning about whether or not
to act in accordance with the emotions. Second, felt sensations may in-
duce cognitive appraisals about the sensation itself. The affected person
may ask, "What is the significance, or source, of my fear? Is this emo-
tion acceptable in my community? How should I regulate this emotion?"
The monitoring, regulation, and expression of emotions vary both cross-
culturally and historically within cultures, and emotional regulation is
subject to the same kinds of moralizing and social construction as are
rules for right action (Armon-Jones 1986; Frijda and Mesquita 1994). In
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The Social Construction of Emotions in the Bhagavad Gita 661
terms of both Western and South Asian emotional theory, then, Arjuna
must make a twofold cognitive evaluation: are his emotions appropriate
and should emotions determine his actions?
Not surprisingly, the status of these physical and mental agitations,
their ideal relationship to reason, and their presumed ability (or in-
ability) to produce right action have varied both within and between
the Hindu and Western philosophical traditions (see Bilimoria 1995;
Solomon 2000; Calhoun and Solomon 1984; and Sherman 1997). I will
argue that the final edited text of the Bhagavad Gita, too, promotes three
distinct theories of emotions and moral reason that have recently been
elucidated in cross-cultural psychological research.
In summary, psychologists and philosophers have shown emotions to
be multi-faceted and contextually dependent, the cognitive response to
which is socially constructed. An emotion is a somatic "feeling," induced
by the perception of some internal or external condition, which is im-
portant to the self, and is susceptible to a cognitive evaluation (whether
accurate or inaccurate, conscious or pre-conscious). The physiology of
emotions necessitates a twofold judgment, grounded in notions of right
and wrong: determining whether the emotional state is appropriate and
deciding what action should be taken (remembering that standards for
the self-management and regulation of the complex of emotions vary
cross-culturally).
It should be noted, however, that in "real life" one rarely has eigh-
teen chapters of thoughtful deliberation to evaluate an emotional event.
When the heart races, hands tremble, and the face is flushed with over-
coming waves of emotions, psychological research confirms that we often
respond according to who we feel we "ought to be," rather than what we
think we "ought to do" (Haidt 2003). Moral judgment often involves quick
gut feelings or intuitive responses that have been developed throughout
one's life (Haidt 2001; Pizzaro and Bloom 2003). Cultural narratives and
scriptural texts, such as the Gita, often provide competing codes of ethics
that influence those intuitive responses, direct the monitoring and regu-
lation of the emotion, and promote the different kinds of post hoc moral
reasoning that are the subject of the Bhagavad Gita.
S.K. Belvalkar has aptly likened the redactive process to the reshaping
of a small coat that is enlarged piece by piece to fit a larger frame, then
re-cut and substantially altered, with nothing being discarded along the
way. Although the work was crafted into a finely tailored finished piece,
"it was inevitable that, once in a while, the seams, holes, creases and
other vestiges of the earlier stages of the coat obtruded themselves here
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662 Journal of Religious Ethics
and there" (1944, 117).3 This is the case regarding the construction of
emotions and moral reasoning in the Bhagavad Gitd.
As many scholars and readers have observed, there are puzzling in-
consistencies in the Gitd. Barbara Stoler Miller comments, "the dialogue
moves through a series of questions and answers that elucidate key
words, concepts, and seeming contradictions7' (Miller 1986, 8; my empha-
sis). How did Arjuna manage to put down his bow just as the battle was
commencing for the lengthy time it took to consult with Krishna (Embree
1988, 280)? In one instance, Arjuna is instructed that one should rely on
the emotions and act so as not to bring public disgrace and shame upon
oneself (Bhagavad Gitd 2.35); while another verse (16.24) asserts that
scripture is the authority for moral reason (Embree 1988, 280). Bilimoria
(2004, 222) asks why Krishna should scoff at Arjuna's feelings about the
consequences of the war, when Arjuna's premonition was correct and,
therefore, warranted. Additionally, Jezic (1986, 631-32) has noted that
the poem proclaims that no god or demon can see Krishna's manifest na-
ture (Bhagavad Gitd 10.14), yet all the demons and gods gaze at Krishna
amazed (11.22).
More importantly, why does Krishna urge Arjuna to go to the battle
by appealing to his sense of shame and then, later, argue for dispas-
sion? Why, after Krishna argues for dispassion and detachment, does he
encourage powerful emotions of devotion and desire for Krishna?
Various commentators have attempted to reconcile these variances in
the reasoning about emotions and right action in the Gitd. A classic in-
terpretation begins with Krishna's response to Arjuna's emotional cry, "I
see nothing that could drive away the grief that withers my senses" (Bha-
gavad Gitd 2.7a). Read as a unified whole, Krishna takes Arjuna through
a systematic argument, stressing that "learned men do not grieve" (2.10),
ostensibly showing Arjuna the folly of personal passion. Krishna leads
Arjuna through arguments for personal concern, concern for one's so-
cial responsibilities, and ultimately toward a vision of divine purpose
and right order. Miller identifies the magnificent theophanic Hymn as a
necessary "mystical experience" allowing Arjuna to finally comprehend
Krishna's argument (2004, 9).
In this synthesized reading, Krishna teaches Arjuna how to ac-
complish renunciation (forsaking the world and its illusory claims) by
combining emotional detachment and dedication of worldly action to
Krishna, while duty is explained as part of Krishna's cosmic order (Miller
2004, 12). In this way, Arjuna can continue to act in the world without
grief or fear of eternal suffering (Bhagavad Gitd 18.66). This synthesis
of Krishna's teachings may provide a fine philosophical or theological
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The Social Construction of Emotions in the Bhagavad Gita 663
argument for attaining moksha (the release from the cycle of worldly ac-
tion), but it does not adequately account for the inconsistencies regarding
appropriate emotions in the text.
As Bilimoria (1995, 2004) forcefully argues, the classic reading priv-
ileges emotional detachment but ignores the charioteer's acceptance of
the common affects of pity, fear, sadness, and shame in the beginning
of the Gitd. In the larger philosophical argument, these emotions are
portrayed as the problem and not as an appropriate response to Arjuna's
dilemma. This dismissal is more easily accomplished perhaps due to
the fewer number of verses relative to the Samkhya/Yoga layer. Addi-
tionally, the synthesized interpretation marginalizes the very powerful
bhakti emotions of love, awe, and fear of the deified Krishna, championed
as the true teaching of the Gitd by other commentators. Furthermore, a
careful reading of the text as a redaction shows that the important con-
cern with grief, and the mandate not to grieve, is actually limited to the
Samkhya/Yoga layers of the text, which espouse detachment. Finally,
it seems logically inconsistent to endorse (and, arguably, biologically
impossible to experience simultaneously) emotional detachment, self-
focused pity and shame, and intense devotion directed toward an "other,"
Krishna. Only as we unpack the layers of the Gitd are we able to analyze
and reflect upon the three statements of emotional theory and moral
reasoning that were constructed in the course of creating the Gitd.
Jezic (1986, 628-30) reviews a list of scholars who suggest there are
layers in the Gitd beginning with W. von Humboldt (1826) and including,
among others, A. Holtzmann (1895), R. Garbe (1905), H. Jacobi (1918), H.
Oldenberg (1922), R. Otto (1934), and L. Renou (1947-1949). However,
coming to a consensus on the likelihood and composition of redacted lay-
ers in the Gitd has been an ongoing process, with a measure of agreement
finally having been reached through the work of G. Sh. Khair4 and Jezic
(Szczurek 2002, 57). The scholarship regarding the layers in the Gitd has
focused mainly on attempts to reconcile inconsistencies in tenor, syntax,
poetic meter, ultimate goals, virtue ethics, and complementary or op-
posing duplications in the poem. Other concerns have been the varying
cosmologies, nuances of action (as it relates to karma and dharma), and
the identity of Krishna between the layers in the epic. A summary of the
approximate philosophical location of the verses of the Gitd is given in
Table 1.
Scholars now theorize that the "original Gitd" was a part of the greater
epic, the Mahdbhdrata, and includes verses (slokas) 1.1 to 2.10 and
2.31 to 2.37. With the exception of these original verses, chapters two
4 1 do not cite Khair in this paper as a primary source. His work, Quest for the Orig-
inal "Gita" (Bombay, 1969) is recapped and cited by my three primary sources, Jezic, J.
Brockington, and Szczurek.
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664 Journal of Religious Ethics
Philosophical Source:
Chapter Content Layer Verses Pagea
1 Arjuna's Dilemma Original Mahdbhdrata 1.1-2.4 J: 630
2 Philosophy and Spiritual Samkhya 2.5-2.8 J: 636
Discipline: Control of Original Mahdbhdrata 2.9-2.10 S: 58
Desires by Knowledge Yoga 2.11-2.30 J: 636
Original Mahdbhdrata 2.31-2.37 J: 632
Samkhya/Yoga 2.38 J: 632
Yoga 2.39-2.72 J: 632
3 Cosmic Significance of Samkhya/Yoga All J: 633
Action - karma
4 The Way of Samkhya/Yoga Original 4:1-4.41 J: 633
Knowledge- jfiana Mahdbhdrata 4.42 J: 633
5 Renunciation of Yoga All B: 268
Action- tydga (B: 274)
6 The Man of Discipline: Yoga All B: 268
Renunciation of Desire
and Intention - vairdgya
(B: 274)
7 Knowing Krishna Samkhya/Bhakti All B: 268, 274
S:57
8 Cycle of Death Bhakti 8:1-8
Yoga 8:9-11 J: 633
Bhakti 8:12-27
Yoga 8:28 J: 633
9 Life of Krishna Bhakti 9.1-9.19
Hymn 9.20-21 J: 633
Bhakti 9.22-9.34
10 Nature of Krishna Bhakti All S: 57
Hymn possibly begins B: 275
at 10.10
11 Krishna's Totality- The Bhakti 11.1-11.14 S: 57
Theophany Vedantic Hymn to 11.15-11.50 J: 632, 633
Krishna
Bhakti 11.51-11.55 J: 632
12 The Ideal Man Bhakti All S: 57
13 The Field of Conflict Samkhya All B: 276
14 Triadic Nature of Reality, Samkhya All B: 276
Lucidity, Passion,
Darkness
15 Spirit of Man Samkhya/Yoga 15:1-15:14
Hymn 15:15 J: 633
Samkhya/Yoga 15:16-15.20
16 The Divine vs. the Demonic Bhakti All B: 268
17 "Three's" of Faith Samkhya All B: 276
18 The Relationship of Yoga 18.1-18.71 J: 636
Emotions, Knowledge, Original Mahdbhdrata 18.72-18.73 J: 634
and Right Action: Reconnects to Epic 18.74-18.78
Concluding Dialogue
aI have used "J" to indicate Jezic (1986), "B" for Brockington (1998), and "S" for Szczure
(1999).
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The Social Construction of Emotions in the Bhagavad Gita 665
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666 Journal of Religious Ethics
My limbs sink,
my mouth is parched,
my body trembles,
the hair bristles on my flesh.
The magic bow slips
from my hand, my skin burns,
I cannot stand still,
my mind reels.
I see omens of chaos,
Krishna; / see no good . . . [Bhagavad Gita 1.29-31b; my emphasis].
Arjuna has consulted his emotions and found the answer to his moral
dilemma; his trembling body and sinking heart cannot lie: there is no
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The Social Construction of Emotions in the Bhagavad Gita 667
good in this battle. Arjuna asks how he can ever be happy if he kills his
own cousins, for "honor forbids" it {Bhagavad Gita 1.37). The emotions
of Arjuna portrayed in the original verses are so powerful that he begins
to weep (Bhagavad Gita 2.1). The warrior has evaluated his situation
according to his physiological affects and made his moral decision: he
refuses to fight (Bhagavad Gita 2.9).
Krishna's counsel in the original Gita passages is quite different from
his advice in the later layers, however. Krishna actually appeals to Ar-
juna's emotions, deliberately stirring a different set of fears. Krishna
warns of the greater terror of dejection and shame:
In these passages we learn that the ideal man is a man of honor who
has the emotional courage and fortitude for battle. War is the glory of the
warrior. Shame is worse than pity or death. Even Krishna has appealed
to Arjuna's deepest affects to justify the war that Arjuna must fight,
thus implicitly endorsing emotions as a proper locus of moral evalua-
tions. Clearly, as Bilimoria also notes, "It appears that the Mahdbhdrata's
'Great Song' is open to alternative perspectives to the stark ascetic or sto-
ical tendencies of the ancients" (Bilimoria 2004, 221).
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668 Journal of Religious Ethics
In the Samkhya/Yoga layer of the Gita, Arjuna now states that emo-
tions of pity, grief, and conflict cloud his reason (Bhagavad Gita 2.7).
Without regard for emotional theory or the social construction of emo-
tions across time and culture, we can appreciate the universality of
Arjuna's emotional state as he stands, bow in hand, on the battle-
field, about to slaughter his uncles and cousins. Krishna agrees but
further counsels Arjuna that matter is temporary; therefore, emotional
assessments are based on transitory conditions and must be forsaken
(Bhagavad Gita 2.14-15).
According to Krishna's counsel (and Yogic discipline), passion, desire,
anger, and all dark emotions are forceful, overcoming evils that obscure
knowledge and create a cloud of confusion. It is these deceptions that
overtake men, causing them to do evil. The real enemies are desire and
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The Social Construction of Emotions in the Bhagavad Gita 669
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670 Journal of Religious Ethics
the horses. As a charioteer controls the horses of the chariot, so the self
should control the senses through keeping them restrained" (Flood 1996,
95).
What, then, is the ethical judgment and reply to Arjuna's dilemma
in this Samkhya/Yogic system of emotional control? Duty (dharma) has
social significance and therefore must be performed, and performed with-
out either attachment to the world or regard for the fruit of action.
Now the warrior is free to reason correctly. Knowing the relationship
between what is real (purusha), and therefore right (dharma), "reduces
action (karma) to ashes" (Bhagavad Gitd 4.37). In other words, no nega-
tive karma accrues for action without desire. Moreover, Krishna advises
Arjuna that the real self (purusha) neither acts nor dies, for purusha is
indestructible. Therefore, killing does not eradicate purusha, killing on
the battlefield merely changes the form (of prakriti) and is not wrong
(Bhagavad Gitd 2.16-30).
While Samkhya is an atheistic philosophical system, the yoga sys-
tem permits the idea of God (Flood 1996, 235). This admission of de-
ity is an important concept for the author(s) of the Gitd inasmuch as
the teacher and charioteer, Krishna, will later be identified as the great
Lord Krishna. Therefore, the teachings of the Samkhya/Yoga layer do not
preclude the bhakti perspective that will be added in the next redacted
layer.
4.3 Bhakti layer and the Great Hymn - ethics and devotion to deity
The bhakti devotional movement views the body as the locus of the
divine in the world in contrast to the Samkhya philosophy of the body
as the prison of the real self. Thus, in this third and final layer, certain
bodily sensations, which are emotions, are re-introduced as having value
for moral decisions. Moreover, the bhakti movement also emphasizes the
proper object of affect, that is, the embodied Krishna.6 In the bhakti layer
of the Gitd, the ideal man is the one devoted to Krishna. We learn that it
is possible to come to Krishna through discipline and control, but faster
and easier through devotion (Bhagavad Gitd 12.2-8). Moral decisions
are to be grounded in devotion to the will and purposes of Lord Krishna:
6 Bhakti (devotion) is also extended to other Hindu deities, for example, Vishnu, Siva,
or Devi.
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The Social Construction of Emotions in the Bhagavad Gita 671
Finally, Jezic has argued that the theophanic Hymn of the eleventh
chapter was composed separately from either the original Gitd or the
later additions. In this Great Hymn, the charioteer is fully revealed as
the great God, Krishna, in a vision that transcends time, space, and the
imagination. Arjuna is overwhelmed with awe, an emotional response to
the perception of the vastness and power of God, stretching his joy into
ecstasy and placing his emotions at the outer boundaries of fear.
If we now consider the emotional response endorsed in the verses of the
Great Hymn, we can observe that the author has very few, if any, refer-
ences to the controlled, detached emotions of Samkhya/Yoga philosophy.
Furthermore, the author's emotional expressions toward Krishna are not
merely those of the longing or adoration of the bhakta that are exempli-
fied in the recitation of names and attributes in chapter ten. Instead,
although the author of the Hymn has relocated the locus of emotions in
the body (as in the bhakti layer), the author promotes not only the love
of God, but also the fear of God. With the deity Krishna as the object of
his emotional state, he writes:
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672 Journal of Religious Ethics
... I am thrilled
and yet my mind
trembles in fear [Bhagavad Gitd 11.45].
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674 Journal of Religious Ethics
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The Social Construction of Emotions in the Bhagavad Gita 675
Thus, in one redacted text, compiled across the centuries, the Hindu au-
thors are able to offer meaningful moral reasoning for soma, psyche, and
spirit in any era.
6. Conclusion
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676 Journal of Religious Ethics
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