People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appelas 21st Division, accused, especially that of Oporto, Carampatana,and Alquizola.
Alquizola. It presented Committee.
Mindanao Station, Raymund Carampatana, Jeofhel Oporto, and Moises
Alquizola
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged with
the crime of rape of a 16-year old girl. The RTC convicted Carampatana and
Oporty guilty as prinicpals and Alquizola as an accomplice while the CA
acquitted them of the crime charged, hence, this present appeal.
After attending a graduation dinner party, AAA, together with her friends,
went to Alsons Palace for a drinking session to celebrate their graduation.
During such session, they shared their problems with each other. AAA
became emotional and started crying, prompting her to take her first shot
of Emperador Brandy. After consuming more or less five glasses of drinks,
she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos lap. Oporto then
started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This
angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with
the cap. The group just laughed at her and still made her drink more. She
fell asleep but was woken up so that she could drink the remaining liquor
inside the Brandy bottle. She refused but they insisted so she drank. Again,
AAA fell asleep.
When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the
Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been
there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And
during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of
her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with
her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis
into her private organ. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the
last time, she fell unconscious.
Private respondents aver that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final
and executory and that the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because
of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the
private respondents?
HELD:
YES, the Court of Appeals erred in acquitting private respondents. As a
general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from
a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. If there is
grave abuse of discretion, however, granting petitioners prayer is not
tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.
The petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting private respondents. It appears that in reaching its judgment, the
CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly
disregarded that of the prosecution. A more careful perusal will reveal that
it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the
the private respondents account and allegations as though these were the
established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support
its ruling of acquittal.
The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when
the victim is under twelve years of age. Here, the accused intentionally
made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still
forced her to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They
never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly
deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents
ravished her.
Moreover, Alquizola should not only be deemed as an accomplice but a
principal as well by virtue of conspiracy. As the caretaker of the Alquizola
Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could be accomplished with
ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching,
while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA and did not do
anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to
kissing AAAs lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there
was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually
abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them,
Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape.
CASE DIGEST: SATURNINO C. OCAMPO v. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, et al.
G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014
FACTS:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd
Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay
Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1The mass grave contained skeletal remains of
67 individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease"
(Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate
Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the
Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of
Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor
Vivero).The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-
affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National
Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including
petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,Leonardo
C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and
Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP.According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by
the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C.
Ocampo (Ocampo),Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),Rafael G. Baylosis
(Baylosis),and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)were then members of the Central
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied,
tortured and executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF pursuant to
Operation VD.
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero
issued a subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their
counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.Petitioner Ocampo
submitted his counter-affidavit.Petitioners Echanisand Baylosis did not file
counter-affidavits because they were allegedly not served the copy of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner
Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the
preliminary investigation. However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-
affidavit because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.
In a Resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an
Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo
Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as
respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital
to the success of the prosecution.
The Information was filed before the (RTC) of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18
(RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando).
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in
the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no
recommended bail for their temporary liberty.
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the
annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the Resolution
of Prosecutor Vivero.The petition prayed for the unconditional release of
petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a
temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the petition.
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44
others (including petitioners Echanis and Baylosisand Ladlad) was then
pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati).Putting forward
the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common
crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of
rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in
furtherance of rebellion.
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested by
virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando. On 1 February 2008,
petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/
Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright
and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.
Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.Petitioners Echanis and
Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration but before being able to rule
thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order transmitting the records of Criminal
Case to the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.
Petitioner Ladlad and Baylosis filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail and a
Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail respectively.The OSG interposed no
objection to the grant of aP100,000 cash bail to them. The Court granted
the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the
amount ofP100,000, subject to the condition that their temporary release
shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the peace
negotiations
ISSUE:
Were petitioners denied due process during preliminary investigation and
in the issuance of the warrant of arrest?
Should the murder charges against petitioners be dismissed under the
political offense doctrine?
HELD:
A. Preliminary Investigation
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit evidence in support of one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of
opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to
present ones own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because
they could no longer be found in their last known address, per return of the
subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim,
Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits.
However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required
Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to
resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent
could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were
made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence,
the preliminary investigation remains valid.
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve
subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is
sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no
longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served
copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure
copies of the complaint after his counsels formal entry of appearance and,
thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he
refused to participate.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was denied
the right to be heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by
not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad
would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the
Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the indictment of
petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other
witnesses attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of
Operation VD.
B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as
"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested." Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5,
1994.Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not
necessary for the determination thereof. In fact, the judges personal
examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and
supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the
indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the
basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the
prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. Delos Santos-Reyes v.
Montesa, Jr. 317 Phil. 101
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as
the trial judge.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
"common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime
of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to
justify the imposition of a graver penalty." People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime
of rebellion.Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion,
the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the
political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be
prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial
court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of
killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive
of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, 401 Phil
905 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders
were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court provides the remedy of Amendment or substitution.
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have
been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon
the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners
would not be placed in double jeopardy.
G.R. No. 179962 June 11, 2014
DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Respondents.
FACTS:
Dr. Joel Mendez was the sole proprietorof 6 different businesses
1. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa- Registered with
Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 39 South Quezon City
2. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa- Registered with RDO
No. 39 South Quezon City
3. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa- Registered with RDO
No. 40 Cubao
4. Mendez Body and Face Skin Clinic- Registered with RDO No.
47 East Makati
5. Weigh Less Center- Registered with RDO No. 21
6. Mendez Weigh Less Center- Registered with RDO No. 4
Calasia o Pangasinan
BIR alleged that petitioner failed to file an income tax return on those
businesses during the taxable years 2001 to 2013.
In defense petitioner admitted that he has been operating as a single
proprietor under these trade names in Quezon City, Makati, Dagupan and
San Fernando. But he countered that these businesses were registered only
in 2003, and thus were not yet in existence.
The state prosecutor found probable cause against him for non-filling of tax
returns for taxable years 2001 and 2002 and for failure to supply correct
and accurate information as to his true income for taxable year 2003. An
information was filed against him in the Court of Tax Appeals for violation of
Art. 255 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997. The accused was arrainged and he
plead not guilty.
After his arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the
information, however Petitioner failed to file a comment on the motion
within the required period. Thurs the motion was granted.
Petitioner now assails the validity of the amended information. He contends
that the prosecutions amendment is a substantial amendment prohibited
under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is
substantial in nature because its additional allegations alter the
prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to him and affect
the form of his defense. Thus, he was not properly informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Petitioner also adds that the
change in the date of the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002 would
also alter his defense.
ISSUE: WON the prosecutions amendments made after the petitioners
arraignment are substantial in nature and must perforce be denied?

HELD: NO SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT

The "change" in the date from 2001 to 2002 and the addition of the phrase
"for income earned"

petitioner still baselessly belaboured the point in its present petition by

citing the erroneous content of the prosecutions motion to amend instead
of the original information itself. That the actual date of the commission of
the offense pertains to the year 2002 is only consistent with the allegation
in the information on the taxable year it covers, i.e., for the taxable year
2001. Since the information alleges that petitioner failed to file his income
tax return for the taxable year 2001, then the offense could only possibly be
committed when petitioner failed to file his income tax return before the
due date of filing, which is on April of the succeeding year, 2002.
Accordingly, the addition of the phrase "for the income earned" before the
phrase "for the taxable year 2001" cannot but be a mere formal
amendment since the added phrase merely states with additional precision
something that is already contained in the original information, i.e., the
income tax return is required to be filed precisely for the income earned for
the preceding taxable year.

The addition of the phrase "doing businessunder the name and style of
MendezMedical Group and the change and/oraddition of the branches of
petitionersoperation

Under the National Internal Revenue Code, a person practicing his

profession must file an income tax return on his INCOME FROM ALL
SOURCES. Since the petitioner operates as a sole proprietor from taxable
years 2001 to 2003, the petitioner should have filed a consolidated return
IN HIS PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS, regardless of the number and
location of his other branches. Consequently, the change and/or addition
of the branches of the petitioners operation in the information does not
constitute substantial amendment because it does not change the
prosecutions theory that the petitioner failed to file his income tax
return.

The addition of doing business is merely an added description of the

business operastions of the petitioner. Because his businesses are not
separate juridical entities. A sole proprietorship is a form of business
organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the
proprietor or owner thereof, like the petitioner-accused, to secure licenses
and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national
government without acquiring juridical or legal personality of its own