Province of North Cotabato

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize,
however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of
the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The
MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements
between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997,
the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year,
they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. On July 23, 2008, the Province
of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the
MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD
be declared unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the exercise of judicial
review. The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline on
issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions. Related to the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is the requirement of RIPENESS. The contention of the SolGen is that there is no
issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically create legally
demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave abuse
of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed their authority, by
violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a
prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for
adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside
from the fact that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy
ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

With regards to the LOCUS STANDI, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato,
Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of
Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs which
will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in
alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an
illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal
standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents
Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the
attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-
government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of
the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.

On the contention of MOOTNESS of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already
been suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court reiterates
that the moot and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a voluntary cessation
of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it does not divest the court the power to hear and try the
case especially when the plaintiff is seeking for damages or injunctive relief. Clearly, the suspension of the
signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not render the petitions moot and academic. The
MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever
provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in
this case, the government and its negotiating entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a reasonable
expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are
capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the
MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic considering that parties have already complied thereat.

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. As enshrined in the
Constitution, the RIGHT TO INFORMATION guarantees the right of the people to demand information, and
integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a
genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression
and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.
 Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is SELF-EXECUTORY with reasonable
safeguards the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open
a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest
of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people's will. The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it
is corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the
plebiscite as per the contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to
be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.

3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot be all
accommodated under the present Constitution and laws.

The court vehemently objects because the principle of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution. In international law, association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily establish
durable The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent with the international definition of
association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of an associated state, or at
any rate, a status closely approximating it.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the Constitution
can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such concept
implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that contemplate any state
within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims
to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that
these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of the Constitution.
Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the
law since those included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The Constitution is clear that only the President has the
sole organ and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nation. Should the BJE be granted with the
authority to negotiate with other states, the former provision must be amended consequently. Section 22 must
also be amendedthe provision of the law that promotes national unity and development. Because clearly,
associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of unity.
The associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine
territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.

The SUSPENSIVE CLAUSE runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions from the President stating that
negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial integrity of the countrysuch was negated by
the provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this, the suspensive clause was also held
invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will require
new legislation or even constitutional amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the
query whether the President can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well
settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. The power of the
President to conduct peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather implied from
her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general
responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent
and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may
require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the president may not, of course,
unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be prevented from submitting
them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal
procedures for constitutional amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress,
a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for
constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may
validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not
unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body
were assumed as a certainty. The Presidents power is limited only to the preservation and defense of the
Constitution but not changing the same but simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.

o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term because it is not a
question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will take effect; but, when. Hence, the
stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework which changes would
include constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with the limits of the
President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points"
found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
PHILCONSA

Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
(FAB)

On 15 September 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO No. 125 6 creating the Office of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process and calling for a "comprehensive, integrated and holistic peace process with Muslim rebels" in
Mindanao. On 28 February 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued. EO .No. 37 which amended EO No. 125 to
reaffirm the government's commitment to achieve just and lasting peace in the Philippines through a comprehensive
peace process. However, on 14 October 2008, in the case of Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of
the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain,8 the Court declared the MOA-AD unconstitutional.

During the administration of President Benigno S. Aquino III, the government resumed peace negotiations with the MILF.
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen9 headed the GPNP and became the government's chief peace negotiator with the MILF in July 2010.
On 15 October 2012, a preliminary peace agreement called the FAB 10 was signed between the government and the MILF.
The F AB called for the creation of an autonomous political entity named Bangsamoro, replacing the ARMM. Annexes
were also signed in Malaysia.

On 17 December 2012, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued EO No. 120,16 constituting the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission. On 27 March 2014, the Philippine Government signed the CAB which was an integration of the FAB, the
Annexes and the other agreements previously executed by the government and the MILF.

On 10 September 2014, a draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, referred to as House Bill (HB) No. 4994. The Ad Hoc
Committee passed another version known as House Bill No. 5811.21 In the Senate, a revised was passed known as the
Basic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region or Senate Bill No. 2894. However, on 6 June 2016, the 16th Congress
adjourned23 without passing the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law.

On 7 November 2016, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued EO No. 08 27 expanding the membership and functions of the
Bangsamoro Transition Commission. EO No. 08 expands the number of members of the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission from 15 to 21. Section 3 of EO No. 120, as amended by EO No. 08, provides for the functions of the
Bangsamoro Transition Commission, which include drafting proposals for a Bangsamoro Basic Law, to be submitted to the
Office of the President for submission to Congress, and recommending to Congress or the people proposed amendments
to the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the CAB, including the FAB, is constitutional.

RULING: Not ripe for adjudication due to non-enactment of

the Bangsamoro Basic Law

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 29 There must be a contrast of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 30 The Court can decide
the constitutionality of an act, either by the Executive or Legislative, only when an actual case between opposing parties
is submitted for judicial determination.

Closely linked to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it. 32 For
a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch of government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate
or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. 33 Petitioner must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.

In the present case, however, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that there is no actual case or controversy
requiring a full-blown resolution of the principal issue presented by petitioners. Unlike the unconstitutional MOA-AD, the
CAB, including the FAB, mandates the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in order for such peace agreements to be
implemented. In the MOA-AD case, there was nothing in the MOA-AD which required the passage of any statute to
implement the provisions of the MOA-AD, which in essence would have resulted in dramatically dismembering the
Philippines by placing the provinces and areas covered by the MOA-AD under the control and jurisdiction of a Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity.

In the present case, there is no such guarantee when the CAB and the FAB were signed. The government gives no
commitment, express or implied, that the Constitution will be amended or that a law will be passed comprising all the
provisions indicated in the CAB and the FAB. Thus, contrary to the imagined fear of petitioners, the CAB and the FAB are
not mere reincarnations or disguises of the infirm MOA-AD.

The CAB and the FAB require the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law for their implementation. The CAB and the
FAB cannot be implemented without the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. The CAB and the FAB remain peace
agreements whose provisions cannot be enforced and given any legal effect unless the Bangsamoro Basic Law is duly
passed by Congress and subsequently ratified in accordance with the Constitution. The CAB and the FAB are preparatory
documents that can "trigger a series of acts"40 that may lead to the exercise by Congress of its power to enact an organic
act for an autonomous region under Section 18, Article X41 of the Constitution. The CAB and the FAB do not purport to
preempt this Congressional power.

It is not the CAB or the FAB that will establish the Bangsamoro but the Bangsamoro Basic Law enacted by Congress and
ratified in a plebiscite in accordance with the Constitution. Congress must still enact a Bangsamoro Basic Law. The
requirement of a Bangsamoro Basic Law under the CAB and the FAB ensures that the pitfalls under the invalid MOA-AD
will be avoided.

Clearly, any question on the constitutionality of the CAB and the FAB, without the implementing Bangsamoro Basic Law, is
premature and not ripe for adjudication. Until a Bangsamoro Basic Law is passed by Congress, it is clear that there is no
actual case or controversy that requires the Court to exercise its power of judicial review over a co-equal branch of
government.