G.R. No.

201043 June 16, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), Petitioner,
vs.
DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated November 29,
2011 and Resolution2 dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN. The CA affirmed
the orders and decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22 granting temporary and permanent protection
orders, and denying the motion to lift the said temporary protection order (TPO).

Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,3
otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon
(S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were married
on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in partner.

On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows:

Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of Protection Order to be sufficient in form and substance and to prevent great and irreparable
injury to the petitioner, a TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER is forthwith issued to respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON directing
him to do the following acts:

1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to commit or committing further acts of physical abuse and violence against the petitioner;
2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500 meters from petitioner, her residence or her place of work;
3. To refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating, contacting or communicating with petitioner;
4. Respondent is prohibited from using or possessing any firearm or deadly weapon on occasions not related to his job;
5. To provide reasonable financial spousal support to the petitioner.

The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials through the Chairman in the area where the petitioner and respondent live at
Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental and Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to any request for assistance
from the petitioner for the implementation of this order. They are also directed to accompany the petitioner to their conjugal abode at
Purok 2, Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her personal belongings in order to insure the safety of the petitioner.

The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately serve the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) upon the respondent personally
and to seek and obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents, if needed, for purposes of effecting the smooth implementation of this
order.

In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be served upon the respondent for him to file an OPPOSITION within a period of five
(5) days from receipt hereof and let a Preliminary Conference and hearing on the merits be set on October 17, 2006 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.

To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondents retirement and other benefits, the following agencies thru their heads are
directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension and other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from the court:

1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City.

VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.

IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE AND HEARING
ON THE MERITS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE OR
POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A LAWYER FOR THE RESPONDENT
AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE SAID HEARING.
IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MER-
ITS DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT SHALL ALLOW EX-PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER
AND RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION OF THE
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE ALLOWED.

SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)

S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of the TPO, appeared during the scheduled pre-trial but informed the court that
he did not yet have a counsel and requested for time to hire his own counsel. However, he did not hire a counsel nor file an opposition or
answer to the petition. Because of his failure to appear in the subsequent hearings of the case, the RTC allowed the ex-parte presentation
of evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO).

Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately refused to give her spousal support as directed
in the TPO (she claimed that she had no source of livelihood since he had told her to resign from her job and concentrate on keeping their
house), the RTC issued another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal support in the amount of 4,000.00 per month
and fifty percent (50%) of his retirement benefits which shall be automatically deducted and given directly to respondent.5
In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon never complied with the TPO as he continued making threats and inflicting
physical abuse on her person, and failed to give her spousal support as ordered by the court.

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,6 as follows:

After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in this case, this court finds that there is a need to permanently protect
the applicant, Daisy R. Yahon from further acts of violence that might be committed by respondent against her. Evidences showed
that respondent who was a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at the Headquarters 4ID Camp Evangelista,
Cagayan de Oro City had been repeatedly inflicting physical, verbal, emotional and economic abuse and violence upon the petitioner.
Respondent in several instances had slapped, mauled and punched petitioner causing her physical harm. Exhibits G and D are
medical certificates showing physical injuries suffered by petitioner inflicted by the respondent at instances of their marital altercations.
Respondent at the height of his anger often poked a gun on petitioner and threatened to massacre her and her child causing them to
flee for their lives and sought refuge from other people. He had demanded sex from petitioner at an unreasonable time when she was
sick and chilling and when refused poked a gun at her. Several police blotters were offered as evidence by petitioner documenting
the incidents when she was subjected to respondents ill temper and ill treatment. Verbally, petitioner was not spared from respond-
ents abuses by shouting at her that he was wishing she would die and he would celebrate if it happens and by calling and sending
her threatening text messages. These incidents had caused petitioner great psychological trauma causing her [to] fear for her life and
these forced her to seek refuge from the court for protection. Economically, petitioner was also deprived by respondent of her spousal
support despite order of the court directing him to give a monthly support of Php4,000.00. In view of the foregoing, this court finds a
need to protect the life of the petitioner not only physically but also emotionally and psychologically.

Based on the evidence presented, both oral and documentary, and there being no controverting evidence presented by respondent,
this Court finds that the applicant has established her case by preponderance of evidence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition, thus, pursuant to Sec. 30 of A.M. No. 04-
10-1-SC, let a PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER be issued immediately and respondent, S/Sgt. CHARLES A.YAHON is ordered
to give to petitioner, DAISY R. YAHON the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per month by way of spousal support.

Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to petitioner 50%
of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that may be due or released to him from the government and the said share of
petitioner shall be automatically deducted from respondents benefits and claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R.
Yahon.

Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp
Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-
IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City for their guidance and strict compliance.

SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)

Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), assisted by the Office of the Judge Advocate General (OT-
JAG), AFP, filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion (To Lift Temporary Protection Order Against the AFP)8 dated November 10,
2008. Stating that it was making a limited and special appearance, petitioner manifested that on August 29, 2008, it furnished the AFP
Pension and Gratuity Management Center (PGMC) copy of the TPO for appropriate action. The PGMC, on September 2, 2008, requested
the Chief, AFPFC the temporary withholding of the thirty-six (36) Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October
29, 2008, PGMC forwarded a letter to the Chief of Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action on the TPO, and requesting for legal
opinion as to the propriety of releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon. Petitioner informed the RTC that S/Sgt. Yahons check representing
his 36 MLS had been processed and is ready for payment by the AFPFC, but to date said check has not been claimed by respondent.

Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its obligation under the TPO, the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the
military institution due to lack of summons, and hence the AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order. Additionally, petitioner con-
tended that the AFPFC is not a party-in-interest and is a complete stranger to the proceedings before the RTC on the issuance of
TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner lamented that it was not afforded due process and it was thus improper to issue
execution against the AFPFC. Consequently, petitioner emphasized its position that the AFPFC cannot be directed to comply with the
TPO without violating its right to procedural due process.

In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the aforesaid motion for having been filed out of time. It noted that the September
28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007 Decision granting Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had long become final and executory.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the RTCs Order10 dated March 6, 2009.

On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying for the nullification of the aforesaid orders and decision
insofar as it directs the AFPFC to automatically deduct from S/Sgt. Yahons retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same to
respondent as spousal support, allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Respondent filed her
Comment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, manifesting that there is no information as to whether S/Sgt. Yahon already
received his retirement benefit and that the latter has repeatedly violated the TPO, particularly on the provision of spousal support.

After due hearing, the CAs Twenty-Second Division issued a Resolution11 granting respondents application, viz:

Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the parties, the Court finds meritorious private respondents application for the
issuance of an injunctive relief. While the 36-month lump sum retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already been given
to him, yet as admitted by petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been released to
him. It appears that the release of such pension could render ineffectual the eventual ruling of the Court in this Petition.
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issue enjoining the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Finance Center, its employees, agents, representatives, and any all persons acting on its behalf, from releasing the remaining pension
that may be due to S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon.

SO ORDERED.12

By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the assailed orders and decision of the RTC.
The CA likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage
from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latters lawful wife as spousal support in compli-
ance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.

A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any
disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.13 The protection orders issued by the court
may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order that may be issued by the
barangay shall be known as a Barangay Protection Order (BPO).14

Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to wit:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned
in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner,
directly or indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent
must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to
the residence, remain there until respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and any designated family or household member at a distance specified by
the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner
and any designated family or household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership,
and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that
the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the
petitioners or respondents removal of personal belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws
to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly
by the respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or
any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his
employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same
to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to
use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm
and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses,
child care expenses and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner temporary shelter and other social services that the petitioner
may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any
designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated family or household member consents to such
relief. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTCs directive for the automatic deduction of 50% from S/Sgt. Yahons retirement benefits
and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separa-
tion of military personnel.

The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638,15 which states: Section 31. The benefits authorized under this
Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall
they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled
to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than
fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be
withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)

A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads:

SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x

xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this
Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies
 or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, in-
cluding his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or
duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is
in favor of the GSIS.

In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 we held that a court order directing the Philippine National Bank to refrain from releas-
ing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latters conjugal share is
illegal and improper, as it violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from execution.

The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which governs execution of
judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39 enumerates those properties which are exempt from execution:

SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall
be exempt from execution:
xxxx
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the Govern-
ment;(Emphasis supplied.)

It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the
more recent expression of legislative will.17 Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system
of jurisprudence.18 However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law is
the latest expression of the legislative will.19

We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule
above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a
percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]ot-
withstanding other laws to the contrary.

Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahons retirement benefits was illegal
because said moneys remain as public funds, citing the case of Pacific Products v. Ong.20 In that case, this Court sustained the CA when
it held that the garnishment of the amount of 10,500 payable to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in the possession of the Bureau
of Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void. The CA therein relied on the previous rulings in Director of Commerce
and Industry v. Concepcion21 and Avendano v. Alikpala, et al.22 wherein this Court declared null and void the garnishment of the salaries
of government employees.

Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in Pacific Products:

A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its
sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment
would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in
the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a
specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.23

We disagree.

Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahons
employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private
or government.

It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement legislation. In the United States,
provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act24 allow garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to
satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As these provisions were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity problems" and provide that
"moneys payable by the Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings," the law is clearly intended
to "create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders directed against Government agencies
attaching funds in their possession.25

This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon26 the
issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of
a protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the
classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to
be victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against women.

We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, viz:

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women
and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children,
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights
instruments of which the Philippines is a party.27

Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one form of violence committed against women
economic abuse.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the
following:

1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity,
except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or
property owned in common;
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.28

The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who are victims of domestic violence and
provide them continued protection against threats to their personal safety and security.

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary
to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and
any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that
jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the
children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.29

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution dated March 9, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.No costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated April 28, 1994 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040.

I
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of the Province of Isabela.

On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.

In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner
the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.

In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R.
Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14).

Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp.
10-13).

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

We dismiss the petition.

II
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Author-
izing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:

Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party
shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized
statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.

No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and
expenditures herein required.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein
within the period prescribed by this Act.

Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with electoral contributions and
expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administra-
tive fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of
execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.

It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five
(5) days from the date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their statements of
contributions and expenditures.

For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to
perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).

To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures, the COMELEC promulgated on January 13, 1992
Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and
Local Elections on

May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:

Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within five (5) days from the day
of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election director of the National Capital Region, the provincial
election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed
their certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures in
connection with the elections. Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said
obligation (Emphasis supplied).

Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he
has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
 The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidates fails to file the statement required within
the period prescribed by law.

(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports in connection with the electoral contributions
and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an admin-
istrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of
execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.

For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-
candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that
candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost

Petitioner's argument is without merit.

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.

Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos
(Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103
SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636
[1946]).

In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the
same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who
withdrew his candidacy.

The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution
No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section
13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy.

Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute
is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest
is involved. We apply the general rule
(Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).

The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way
of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication
of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections
(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited (B.P. Blg.
881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881,
Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).

Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of several states in the United States, as well as in
federal statutes, expenditures of candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements of expenses and by limiting the amount of
money that may be spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections
287). These laws are designed to compel publicity with respect to matters contained in the statements and to prevent, by such publicity,
the improper use of moneys devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections 289). These statutes
also enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors, and to furnish evidence of corrupt
practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).

State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing
(State ex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109
S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)

It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short
span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.

It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or
made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect.
Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made
no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact.
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is
provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which
a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 110898 February 20, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANTONIO C. EVANGELISTA, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXI, 10th Judicial Region, RTC of Misamis Oriental,
Cagayan de Oro City, and GRILDO S. TUGONON, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide in the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental (Branch 21),
the information against him alleging

That on or about the 26th day of May, 1988, at more or less 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay Publican+.3, Municipality of
Villanueva, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with intent to kill and with the use of a knife, which he was then conveniently provided of, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab Roque T. Bade thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:

Stab wound, right iliac area,

0.5 cm. penetrating non
perforating lacerating posterior
peritoneum, 0,5 cm.

thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is by timely medical attendance which prevented his
death.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

After trial he was found guilty and sentenced to one year of prision correccional in its minimum period and ordered to pay to the offended
party P5,000.00 for medical expense, without subsidiary imprisonment, and the costs. The RTC appreciated in his favor the privileged
mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed private respondent's conviction but modified his sentence by imposing on him an indeterminate
penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum.1

On December 21, 1992, respondent Judge Antonio C. Evangelista of the RTC set the case for repromulgation on January 4, 1993.

On December 28, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probation,2 alleging that (1) he possessed all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications for probation under P.D. No. 968, as amended; (2) the Court of Appeals has in fact reduced the penalty imposed on
him by the trial court; (3) in its resolution, the Court of Appeals took no action on a petition for probation which he had earlier filed with it
so that the petition could be filed with the trial court; (4) in the trial court's decision, two mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense
and voluntarily surrender were appreciated in his favor; and (5) in Santos To v. Pao,3 the Supreme Court upheld the right of the accused
to probation notwithstanding the fact that he had appealed from his conviction by the trial court.

On February 2, 1993, the RTC ordered private respondent to report for interview to the Provincial Probation Officer. The Provincial Pro-
bation Officer on the other hand was required to submit his report with recommendation to the court within 60 days.4

On February 18, 1993, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isias B. Valdehueza recommended denial of private respondent's application
for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he could have then applied for probation, private
respondent waived the right to make his application. The Probation Officer thought the present case to be distinguishable from Santos To
v. Pao in the sense that in this case the original sentence imposed on private respondent by the trial court (1 year of imprisonment) was
probationable and there was no reason for private respondent not to have filed his application for probation then, whereas in Santos To
v. Pao the penalty only became probationable after it had been reduced as a result of the appeal.

On April 16, 1993 Valdehueza reiterated5 his "respectful recommendation that private respondent's application for probation be denied
and that a warrant of arrest be issued for him to serve his sentence in jail.

The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's recommendation and granted private respondent's application for probation in its order of April
23, 1993,6 Hence this petition by the prosecution.

The issue in this case is whether the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent's application for
probation despite the fact that he had appealed from the judgment of his conviction of the trial court.

The Court holds that it did.

Until its amendment by P.D. No. 1990 in 1986, it was possible under P.D. No. 986, otherwise known as the Probation Law, for the accused
to take his chances on appeal by allowing probation to be granted even after an accused had appealed his sentence and failed to obtain
an acquittal, just so long as he had not yet started to serve the sentence.7 Accordingly, in Santos To v. Pao, it was held that the fact that
the accused had appealed did not bar him from applying for probation especially because it was as a result of the appeal that his sentence
was reduced and made the probationable limit.
The law was, however, amended by P.D. No. 1990 which took effect on January 15, 19868 precisely to put a stop to the practice of
appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence is probationable for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for
probation only if the accused fails in his bid. Thus, as amended by P.D. No, 1990, 4 of the Probation Law now reads:

4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be
filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis added).

Since private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after P.D. No. 1990 had taken effect,9 it is covered by
the prohibition that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal," Having appealed from the judgment
of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was
clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.

Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction should be drawn between meritorious appeals (like his appeal notwithstanding the
appellate court's affirmance of his conviction) and unmeritorious appeals. But the law does not make any distinction and so neither should
the Court. In fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set free and not only given probation. Private respondent's original
sentence (1 year of prision correccional in its minimum period) and the modified sentence imposed by the Court of Appeals (2 months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum) are probationable. Thus the fact that he
appealed meant that private respondent was taking his chances which the law precisely frowns upon. This is precisely the evil that the
amendment in P.D. No. 1990 sought to correct, since in the words of the preamble to the amendatory law, "probation was not intended
as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first
opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated.

The ruling of the RTC that "[h]aving not perfected an appeal against the Court of Appeals decision, [private respondent] is, therefore, not
covered by [the amendment in] P.D. 1990" is an obvious misreading of the law. The perfection of the appeal referred in the law refers to
the .appeal taken from a judgment of conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under the law an application for
probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant the same "after it shall have convicted and sentenced [the] defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal. "Accordingly, in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 10 it was held that
the petitioner who had appealed his sentence could not subsequently apply for probation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the order of April 23, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental (Branch 21)
granting probation to private respondent Grildo S. Tugonon is SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991
CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z.
LORAYES, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision* of the Court of Appeals promulgated on February 1, 1989
in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled "Cecilio S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and Roberto Z. Lorayes," dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed therein.

The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
(Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to ROB-
ERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987,
payable to herein complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the
time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment which
check when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored for the reason
"INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ the
amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving
said notice.

After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination, petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the
following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the
check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure
Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).

On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned orders stating:

Accused's motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack of merit.

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though
payable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the
coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign currency.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequently denied by respondent court in its order dated September 6, 1988,
and which reads:

Accused's motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, which was opposed by the prosecution, is denied for lack of merit.

The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign currency (Proceedings of the Batasang
Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in Makati RTC Judge (now Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero's The Ramifications of
the Law on Bouncing Checks, p. 5). (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, pp. 20-22).

A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the aforequoted orders dated July 19, 1988 and September 6, 1988 was filed by
the petitioner in the Court of Appeals wherein he contended:

(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the same or with accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
could have not contemplated extending its coverage over dollar accounts;
(b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a private transaction between petitioner and private respondent,
the payment could not be legally paid in dollars as it would violate Republic Act No. 529; and
(c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is null and void and is not enforceable with the Philippines either
in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the questioned check cannot be said to have
violated the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 22).

On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5)

A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner on February 7, 1989 (Rollo, Petition, p. 6) but the same was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 26).
Hence, this petition.

In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second Division of this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81).
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in question.
The petition is without merit.

Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases (Velunta vs.
Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 [1988]).

Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendant, or over the issues
framed in the pleadings (Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of commencement of the action (De la Cruz vs. Moya,
160 SCRA 538 [1988]).

The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned.

Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:

Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the
offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof occured at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless
the particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense
charged.

Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took
place.

In the case of People vs. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487 [1988]), the Supreme
Court ruled "that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information.

The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same
is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and
over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga,
162 SCRA 191 [1988]).

Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of People vs. Grospe,
157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check.

On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People vs. Yabut (76 SCRA
624 [1977], laid down the following guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which
reads:

(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered; (2) the place where the check was written, signed
or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is
the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October
28, 1980)." (See The Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12,
October-December, 1983, p. 14).

It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the petitioner to herein private respondent at Makati, Metro
Manila.

However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is
therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).

But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated
July 5, 1988:

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though
payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of said law.

It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the
rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it
(Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]).

More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in
determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts
as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may
be adopted (Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).

The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may
be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.
 MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the Gentlemen who interpellated that any check may be involved, like
U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking about checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks, in our currency, and many
others.
THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.
MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and this check may be a check in whatever currency. This would not even
be limited to U.S. dollar checks. The check may be in French francs or Japanese yen or deutschunorhs. (sic.) If drawn, then this bill
will apply.
MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.
MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis supplied).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. L-14787 January 28, 1961
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIP-
PINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the
manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. On several occasions, it imported from abroad various materials such as irish
moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and
flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of
the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges
incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.

On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in the
aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that "foreign exchange
used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and
flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and
regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." After the applications were processed by the officer-in-charge of the
Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that official advised, the petitioner that of the total sum of P113,343.99 claimed by it for
refund, the amount of P23,958.13 representing the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract,
sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate had been approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in
audit its claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory
that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, December 4, 1958 affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank,
maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the prepa-
ration or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for
review.

The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers
and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to
refund under section 2 thereof, which reads as follows:

SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or
other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat,
chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks, reference books, and
supplementary readers approved by the Board of Textbooks and/or established public or private educational institutions; newsprint
imported by or for publishers for use in the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers; book paper, book cloth, chip
board imported for the printing of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government
under contracts perfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by the Director of Printing; anesthetics,
anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films, laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical drugs necessary
for compounding medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this Act, in quantities to be certified by the Director
of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals applying therefor; drugs and medicines listed in the said appendix; and such other
drugs and medicines as may be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time to promote and protect the health of the people
of the Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under
the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)

The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the
preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that "general terms
may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the
statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction by Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable
only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at
bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but
it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.

Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or food products because they are used in the farming and poultry
industries, respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears to be more of a medicine than food or food product, for, as matter of fact, vitamins
are among those enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs appearing in the appendix to the law. It should also here be stated that
"cattle", which is among those listed preceding the term in question, includes not only those intended for slaughter but also those for
breeding purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that under, Republic Act No. 814 amending the above-quoted section of Republic Act No. 601,
"industrial starch", which does not always refer to food for human consumption, was added among the items grouped with "stabilizer and
flavors".

Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the
above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is
supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we
distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law does
not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental
cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense. The rule of construction that
general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the
rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in
connection with other rules of construction. (See Handbook of the Construction and Interpretation of Laws by Black, p. 215.216, 2nd ed.)

Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now idle to pass upon the other questions raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the respondents are hereby ordered to audit petitioners applications for refund
which were approved by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in the total amount of P23,958.13.
G.R. No. 180235
ALTA VISTA GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, Petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY OF CEBU, HON. MAYOR TOMAS R. OSMEA, in his capacity as Mayor of Cebu, and TERESITA C. CAMARILLO, in her
capacity as the City Treasurer, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Resolution1 dated March 14, 2007 and the Order2 dated October 3, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, Branch 9 in Civil Case No. CEB-31988, dismissing the Petition for Injunction, Prohibition,
Mandamus, Declaration of Nullity of Closure Order, Declaration of Nullity of Assessment, and Declaration of Nullity of Section 42 of Cebu
City Tax: Ordinance, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction3 filed by petitioner Alta Vista Golf and
Country Club against respondents City of Cebu (Cebu City), then Cebu City Mayor Tomas R. Osmea (Osmea), and then Cebu City
Treasurer Teresita Camarillo (Camarillo).

Petitioner is a non-stock and non-profit corporation operating a golf course in Cebu City.

On June 21, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City enacted City Tax: Ordinance No. LXIX, otherwise known as the "Revised
Omnibus Tax: Ordinance of the City of Cebu" (Revised Omnibus Tax: Ordinance). Section 42 of the said tax ordinance on amusement
tax was amended by City Tax Ordinance Nos. LXXXII4 and LXXXIV5 (which were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City
on December 2, 1996 and April 20, 1998, respectively6) to read as follows:

Section 42. Rate of Tax. - There shall be paid to the Office of the City Treasurer by the proprietors, lessees or operators of theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other similar places of entertainment, an amusement tax at the rate of thirty percent (30%), golf
courses and polo grounds at the rate of twenty percent (20% ), of their gross receipts on entrance, playing green, and/or admission
fees; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That in case of movie premieres or gala shows for the benefit of a charitable institution/foundation or
any government institution where higher admission fees are charged, the aforementioned rate of thirty percent (30%) shall be levied
against the gross receipts based on the regular admission fees, subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod; PROVIDED
FURTHER, That in case payment of the amusement tax is made promptly on or before the date hereinbelow prescribed, a rebate of
five percent (5%) on the aforementioned gross receipts shall be given to the proprietors, lessees or operators of theaters; PROVIDED
FURTHERMORE, that as an incentive to theater operators who own the real property and/or building where the theater is located, an
additional one percent (1 %) rebate shall be given to said operator/real property owner concerned for as long as their theater/movie
houses are then (10) years old or older or the theater or movie house is located at the city's redevelopment area bounded on the north
by Gen. Maxilom Street up to the port area; on the south by V. Rama Avenue up to San Nicolas area; and on the west by B. Rodriguez
St. and General Maxilom Avenue; PROVIDED FINALLY, that the proceeds of this additional one percent (1 %) rebate shall be used
by the building/property owner-theater operator to modernize their theater facilities. (Emphases supplied.)

In an Assessment Sheet7 dated August 6, 1998, prepared by Cebu City Assessor Sandra I. Po, petitioner was originally assessed defi-
ciency business taxes, fees, and other charges for the year 1998, in the total amount of P3,820,095.68, which included amusement tax
on its golf course amounting to P2,612,961.24 based on gross receipts of P13,064,806.20.8

Through the succeeding years, respondent Cebu City repeatedly attempted to collect from petitioner its deficiency business taxes, fees,
and charges for 1998, a substantial portion of which consisted of the amusement tax on the golf course. Petitioner steadfastly refused to
pay the amusement tax arguing that the imposition of said tax by Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, was
irregular, improper, and illegal. Petitioner reasoned that under the Local Government Code, amusement tax can only be imposed on
operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, or places where one seeks to entertain himself by seeing or viewing a show or performance.
Petitioner further cited the ruling in Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) v. Court of Appeals9 that under Presidential Decree No. 231,
otherwise known as the Lo.cal Tax Code of 1973, the province could only impose amusement tax on admission from the proprietors,
lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses, and other places of amusement, but not professional basketball
games. Professional basketball games did not fall under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, and circuses as
the latter basically belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the former catered to sports and gaming.

Through a letter dated October 11, 2005, respondent Camarillo sought to collect once more from petitioner deficiency business taxes,
fees, and charges for the year 1998, totaling P2,981,441.52, computed as follows:

Restaurant - P4,021,830.65 P 40,950.00

Permit Fee 2,000.00
Liquor-Pl,940,283.80 20,160.00
Permit Fee 2,000.00
Commission/Other Income 14,950.00

P 1,262,764.28

Permit Fee 1,874.00

Retail Cigarettes - P42,076. 11 - Permit 84.15
Non-Securing of Permit 979.33
Sub-Total P 82,997.98
Less: Payment based on computer assessment 74,858.61
Short payment P 12,723.18
25% surcharge 3,180.80
72% interest 11,450.00
Penalty for understatement 500.00
Amount Due P 27 ,854.85
Add: Amusement Tax on golf course P 1,373,761.24
25% surcharge (P6,868,806.20 x 20%) 343,440.31

72% Interest 1,236,385.12 2,953,586.67

GRAND TOTAL P 2,981,441.5210

Petitioner, through counsel, wrote respondent Camarillo a letter11 dated October 17, 2005 still disputing the amusement tax assessment
on its golf course for 1998 for being illegal. Petitioner, in a subsequent letter dated November 30, 2005, proposed that:

While the question of the legality of the amusement tax on golf courses is still unresolved, may we propose that Alta Vista Golf and Country
Club settle first the other assessments contained in your Assessment Sheet issued on October 11, 2005.

At this early stage, we also request that pending resolution of the legality of the amusement tax imposition on golf courses in [the Revised
Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended], Alta Vista Golf and Country Club be issued the required Mayor's and/or Business Permit.12

Respondent Camarillo treated the letter dated October 17, 2005 of petitioner as a Protest of Assessment and rendered on December 5,
2005 her ruling denying said Protest on the following grounds: (a) a more thorough and comprehensive reading of the PBA case would
reveal that the Court actually ruled therein that PBA was liable to pay amusement tax, but to the national government, not the local
government; (b) section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality and peti-
tioner failed to avail itself of the remedy under Section 187 of the Local Government Code to challenge the legality or validity of Section
42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, by filing an appeal with the Secretary of Justice within 30 days from effectivity
of said ordinance; and ( c) the Office of the City Attorney issued a letter dated July 9, 2004 affirming respondent Camarillo's position that
petitioner was liable to pay amusement tax on its golf course.13 Ultimately, respondent Camarillo held:

WHEREFORE, upon consideration of the legal grounds as above-mentioned, we reiterate our previous stand on the validity of the
ASSESSMENT SHEET pertaining to the Tax Deficiencies for CY 1998 and this ruling serve as the FINAL DEMAND for immediate
settlement and payment of your amusement tax liabilities and/or delinquencies otherwise we will constrained (sic) the non-issuance
of a Mayor's Business Permit for nonpayment of the said deficiency on amusement tax and/or other tax liabilities as well as to file the
appropriate filing of administrative and judicial remedies for the collection of the said tax liability and the letter treated as a Protest of
Assessment that was duly submitted before this office is hereby DENIED.14

Shortly after, on January 12, 2006, petitioner was served with a Closure Order15 dated December 28, 2005 issued by respondent City
Mayor Osmea. According to the Closure Order, petitioner committed blatant violations of the laws and Cebu City Ordinances, to wit:

1. Operating a business without a business permit for five (5) years, from year 2001-2005, in relation to Chapters I and II and
the penalty clauses under Sections 4, 6, 8, 66 (f) and 114 of the City Tax Ordinance No. 69, otherwise known as the REVISED
CITY TAX ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF CEBU, as amended By C.O. 75;
2. Nonpayment of deficiency on Business Taxes and Fees amounting to Seventeen Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Nine
Pesos and Sixty-Four Centavos (Php17,499.64), as adjusted, despite repeated demands in violation [of] Sections 4 and 8 of
City Tax Ordinance No. 69, as amended;
3. Nonpayment of deficiency on Amusement Tax and the penalties relative therewith totaling Two Million Nine Hundred Fifty-
Three Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Six Pesos and Eighty-Six Centavos (Php2,953,586.86) in violation of Sections 4 and
8 in relation to Section 42 of City Tax Ordinance No. 69, as amended, business permit-violation of the Article 172, Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied.)

The Closure Order established respondent Mayor Osmea's authority for issuance of the same and contained the following directive:

As the chief executive of the City, the Mayor has the power and duty to: Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city x x x and, in addition to the foregoing, shall x x x Issue such executive orders for the faithful and appropriate enforcement and execution
of laws and ordinances x x x. These are undeniable in the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Section 455, par. (2) and par. (2)(iii).

Not only that, these powers can be exercised under the general welfare clause of the Code, particularly Section 16 thereof, where it is
irrefutable that "every government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental of its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare.

This CLOSURE ORDER precisely satisfies these legal precedents. Hence now, in view whereof, your business establishment is hereby
declared closed in direct contravention of the above-specified laws and city ordinances. Please cease and desist from further operating
your business immediately upon receipt of this order.

This closure order is without prejudice to the constitutional/statutory right of the City to file criminal cases against corporate officers, who
act for and its behalf, for violations of Section 114 of the REVISED CITY TAX ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF CEBU and Section 516 of
the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, with penalties of imprisonment and/or fine.
FOR STRICT AND IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE.16

The foregoing developments prompted petitioner to file with the RTC on January 13, 2006 a Petition for Injunction, Prohibition, Mandamus,
Declaration of Nullity of Closure Order, Declaration of Nullity of Assessment, and Declaration of Nullity of Section 42 of Cebu City Tax
Ordinance, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against respondents, which was docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-31988.17 Petitioner eventually filed an Amended Petition on January 19, 2006.18 Petitioner argued that the Closure
Order is unconstitutional as it had been summarily issued in violation of its right to due process; a city mayor has no power under the
Local Government Code to deny the issuance of a business permit and order the closure of a business for nonpayment of taxes; Section
42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, is null and void for being ultra vires or beyond the taxing authority of respondent
Cebu City, and consequently, the assessment against petitioner for amusement tax for 1998 based on said Section 42 is illegal and
unconstitutional; and assuming arguendo that respondent Cebu City has the power to impose amusement tax on petitioner, such tax for
1998 already prescribed and could no longer be enforced.

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter; (b) non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies; (c) noncompliance with Section 187 of the Local Government Code, which provides the procedure
and prescriptive periods for challenging the validity of a local tax ordinance; (d) noncompliance with Section 252 of the Local Government
Code and Section 75 of Republic Act No. 3857, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu, requiring payment under
protest of the tax assessed; and (e) failure to establish the authority of Ma. Theresa Ozoa (Ozoa) to institute the case on behalf of
petitioner.19

In its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner countered that the RTC, a court of general jurisdiction, could take cognizance of its
Petition in Civil Case No. CEB-31988, which not only involved the issue of legality or illegality of a tax ordinance, but also sought the
declaration of nullity of the Closure Order and the issuance of writs of injunction and prohibition. Petitioner likewise asserted that Section
195 of the Local Government Code on the protest of assessment does not require payment under protest. Section 252 of the same Code
invoked by respondents applies only to real property taxes. In addition, petitioner maintained that its Petition in Civil Case No. CEB-31988
could not be barred by prescription. There is nothing in the Local Government Code that could deprive the courts of the power to determine
the constitutionality or validity of a tax ordinance due to prescription. It is the constitutional duty of the courts to pass upon the validity of
a tax ordinance and such duty cannot be limited or restricted. Petitioner further contended that there is no need for exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies given that the issues involved are purely legal; the notice of closure is patently illegal for having been issued without
due process; and there is an urgent need for judicial intervention. Lastly, petitioner pointed out that there were sufficient allegations in the
Petition that its filing was duly authorized by petitioner. At any rate, petitioner already attached to its Opposition its Board Resolution No.
104 authorizing Ozoa to file a case to nullify the Closure Order. Thus, petitioner prayed for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss.20

Respondents, in their Rejoinder to Petitioner's Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,21 asserted that the Closure Order was just a necessary
consequence of the nonpayment by petitioner of the amusement tax assessed against it. The Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of re-
spondent Cebu City directs that no permit shall be issued to a business enterprise which made no proper payment of tax and, correspond-
ingly, no business enterprise may be allowed to operate or continue to operate without a business permit. The fundamental issue in the
case was still the nonpayment by petitioner of amusement tax. Respondents relied on Reyes v. Court of Appeals,22 in which the Court
categorically ruled that the prescriptive periods fixed in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are mandatory and prerequisites
before seeking redress from a competent court. Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, was passed on April
20, 1998, so the institution by petitioner of Civil Case No. CEB-31988 before the RTC on January 13, 2006 - without payment under
protest of the assessed amusement tax and filing of an appeal before the Secretary of Justice within 30 days from the effectivity of the
Ordinance - was long barred by prescription.

After filing by the parties of their respective Memorandum, the RTC issued an Order23 dated March 16, 2006 denying the prayer of
petitioner for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The RTC found that when the business permit of petitioner expired and
it was operating without a business permit, it ceased to have a legal right to do business. The RTC affirmed respondent Mayor Osmea's
authority to issue or grant business licenses and permits pursuant to the police power inherent in his office; and such authority to issue or
grant business licenses and permits necessarily included the authority to suspend or revoke or even refuse the issuance of the said
business licenses and permits in case of violation of the conditions for the issuance of the same. The RTC went on to hold that:

[Petitioner] was given opportunities to be heard when it filed a protest [of] the assessment which was subsequently denied. To the mind
of this court, this already constitutes the observance of due process and that [petitioner] had already been given the opportunity to be
heard. Due process and opportunity to be heard does not necessarily mean winning the argument in one's favor but to be given the fair
chance to explain one's side or views with regards [to] the matter in issue, which in this case is the legality of the tax assessment.

It is therefore clear that when this case was filed, [petitioner] had no more legal right in its favor for the courts to protect. It would have
been a different story altogether had [petitioner] paid the tax assessment for the green fees even under protest and despite payment and
[respondent] Mayor refused the issuance of the business permit because all the requisites for the issuance of the said permit are all
complied with.24

On March 20, 2006, petitioner paid under protest to respondent Cebu City, through respondent Camarillo, the assessed amusement tax,
plus penalties, interest, and surcharges, in the total amount of P2,750,249.17.25

Since the parties agreed that the issues raised in Civil Case No. CEB-31988 were all legal in nature, the RTC already considered the
case submitted for resolution after the parties filed their respective Memorandum.26

On March 14, 2007, the R TC issued a Resolution granting the Motion to Dismiss of respondents. Quoting from Reyes and Hagonoy
Market Vendor Association v. Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan,27 the RTC sustained the position of respondents that Section 187 of the
Local Government Code is mandatory. Thus, the RTC adjudged:

From the above cited cases, it can be gleaned that the period in the filing of the protests is important. In other words, it is the considered
opinion of this court [that] when a taxpayer questions the validity of a tax ordinance passed by a local government legislative body, a
different procedure directed in Section 187 is to be followed. The reason for this could be because the tax ordinance is clearly different
from a law passed by Congress. The local government code has set several limitations on the taxing power of the local government
legislative bodies including the issue of what should be taxed.

In this case, since the Petitioner failed to comply with the procedure outlined in Section 187 of the Local Government Code and the
fact that this case was filed way beyond the period to file a case in court, then this court believes that the action must fail.
 Because of the procedural infirmity in bringing about this case to the court, then the substantial issue of the propriety of imposing
amusement taxes on the green fees could no longer be determined.

WHEREFORE, in view of the aforegoing, this case is hereby DISMISSED.28

The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner in an Order dated October 3, 2007.

Petitioner is presently before the Court on pure questions of law, viz.:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER THE VALIDITY OF A LOCAL TAX ORDINANCE HAS BEEN RE-
STRICTED BY SECTION 187 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE CITY OF CEBU OR ANY LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN VALIDLY IMPOSE AMUSEMENT TAX TO THE
ACT OF PLAYING GOLF.29

There is merit in the instant Petition.

The RTC judgment on pure questions of law may be directly appealed to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.

Even before the RTC, the parties already acknowledged that the case between them involved only questions of law; hence, they no longer
presented evidence and agreed to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memorandum.

It is incontestable that petitioner may directly appeal to this Court from the judgment of the RTC on pure questions of law via its Petition
for Review on Certiorari. Rule 41, Section 2(c) of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]n all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45." As the Court declared
in Bonifacio v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 14930:

The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to
the lowerranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that peti-
tions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be
filed in the Court of Appeals. The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.

Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but purely
legal questions. (Citations omitted.)

"A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts;
or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted[;]" and it may be brought directly before this Court, the undisputed final arbiter of all questions of law.31

The present case is an exception to Section 187 of the Local Government Code and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

Section 187 of the Local Government Code reads:

Sec. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The
procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Pro-
vided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on
the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effec-
tivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal:
Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and
payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse
of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings
with a court of competent jurisdiction.

Indeed, the Court established in Reyes that the aforequoted provision is a significant procedural requisite and, therefore, mandatory:

Clearly, the law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to
the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof. In case the Secretary decides the appeal, a period also of 30 days is
allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court. But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already
proceed to seek relief in court. These three separate periods are clearly given for compliance as a prerequisite before seeking redress
in a competent court. Such statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well as enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
functions. For this reason the courts construe these provisions of statutes as mandatory.

A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is the most effective instrument to
raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential
to the promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any delay
in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests over tax ordinances are required
to be done within certain time frames. In the instant case, it is our view that the failure of petitioners to appeal to the Secretary of
Justice within 30 days as required by Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160 is fatal to their cause.32 (Citations omitted.)
The Court further affirmed in Hagonoy that:

At this point, it is apropos to state that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts
is not a "mere technicality" that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory. Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall
rentals. Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its
agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential
that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a time limit for an
aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances.33 (Citations omitted.)

Nevertheless, in later cases, the Court recognized exceptional circumstances that justify noncompliance by a taxpayer with Section 187
of the Local Government Code.

The Court ratiocinated in Ongsuco v. Malones,34 thus:

It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed
himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one's cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned
every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However, there are several exceptions to this rule.

The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve
a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where
the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the admin-
istrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and
application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court
and such lower courts the Legislature may establish.

In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present evidence. The sole issue
petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable
despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction
of the RTC to resolve.

Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly
recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In J.M Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos,
the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local
ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)

In Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. (CEPALCO) v. City of Cagayan De Oro,35 the Court initially conceded that as in Reyes, the
failure of taxpayer CEPALCO to appeal to the Secretary of Justice within the statutory period of 30 days from the effectivity of the ordinance
should have been fatal to its cause. However, the Court purposefully relaxed the application of the rules in view of the more substantive
matters.

Similar to Ongsuco and CEPALCO, the case at bar constitutes an exception to the general rule. Not only does the instant Petition raise
pure questions of law, but it also involves substantive matters imperative for the Court to resolve.

Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, imposing amusement tax on golf courses is null and void as it
is beyond the authority of respondent Cebu City to enact under the Local Government Code.

The Local Government Code authorizes the imposition by local government units of amusement tax under Section 140, which provides:

Sec. 140. Amusement Tax. -

(a) The province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts
from admission fees.
(b) In the case of theaters or cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to
the provincial treasurer before the gross receipts are divided between said proprietors, lessees, or operators and the distributors of
the cinematographic films.
(c) The holding of operas, concerts, dramas, recitals, painting, and art exhibitions, flower shows, musical programs, literary and oratorical
presentations, except pop, rock, or similar concerts shall be exempt from the payment of the tax hereon imposed.
(d) The sangguniang panlalawigan may prescribe the time, manner, terms and conditions for the payment of tax. In case of fraud or failure
to pay the tax, the sangguniang panlalawigan may impose such surcharges, interests and penalties as it may deem appropriate.
(e) The proceeds from the amusement tax shall be shared equally by the province and "the municipality where such amusement places
are located. (Emphasis supplied.)

"Amusement places," as defined in Section 13l(c) of the Local Government Code, "include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and
other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performance.

The pronouncements of the Court in Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. The Province of Benguet36 are of particular significance to this case.
The Court, in Pelizloy Realty, declared null and void the second paragraph of Article X, Section 59 of the Benguet Provincial Code, in so
far as it imposes amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots. Applying
the principle of ejusdem generis, as well as the ruling in the PBA case, the Court expounded on the authority of local government units to
impose amusement tax under Section 140, in relation to Section 131(c), of the Local Government Code, as follows:

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of
the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to
persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

The purpose and rationale of the principle was explained by the Court in National Power Corporation v. Angas as follows:
The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as
indicating the class and the general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular
words. This is justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would
have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms. [2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd
ed., pp. 395-400].

In Philippine Basketball Association v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to interpret a starkly similar provision or
the counterpart provision of Section 140 of the LGC in the Local Tax Code then in effect. Petitioner Philippine Basketball Association
(PBA) contended that it was subject to the imposition by LGUs of amusement taxes (as opposed to amusement taxes imposed by the
national government). In support of its contentions, it cited Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax
Code of 1973, (which is analogous to Section 140 of the LGC) providing the following:

Section 13. Amusement tax on admission. The province shall impose a tax on admission to be collected from the proprietors,
lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement xx x.

Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the Supreme Court rejected PBA's assertions and rioted that:

[I]n determining the meaning of the phrase 'other places of amusement', one must refer to the prior enumeration of theaters, cinemat-
ographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic expression as their common characteristic. Professional basketball games do not fall
under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter basically belong to artistic forms of
entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming.

However, even as the phrase 'other places of amusement' was already clarified in Philippine Basketball Association, Section 140 of the
LGC adds to the enumeration of 'places of amusement' which may properly be subject to amusement tax. Section 140 specifically men-
tions 'boxing stadia' in addition to "theaters, cinematographs, concert halls [and] circuses" which were already mentioned in PD No. 231.
Also, 'artistic expression' as a characteristic does not pertain to 'boxing stadia.

In the present case, the Court need not embark on a laborious effort at statutory construction. Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides
a clear definition of' amusement places':
xxxx
Indeed, theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia are bound by a common typifying characteristic in that
they are all venues primarily for the staging of spectacles or the holding of public shows, exhibitions, performances, and
other events meant to be viewed by an audience. Accordingly, 'other places of amusement' must be interpreted in light of
the typifying characteristic of being venues "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show
or performances" or being venues primarily used to stage spectacles or hold public shows, exhibitions, performances, and
other events meant to be viewed by an audience.

As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, 'show' means "a spectacle or display of something, typically an impressive one";
while 'performance' means "an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other form of entertainment." As such, the ordinary
definitions of the words 'show' and 'performance' denote not only visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things)
but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions are manifested to, and (correspondingly)
perceived by an audience.

Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be considered venues
primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances". While it is true that they
may be venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display,
stage or present shows and/or performances.
 Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or class as theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they cannot be considered as among the 'other places of amuse-
ment' contemplated by Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject to amusement taxes.37 (Emphases supplied,
citations omitted.)

In light of Pelizloy Realty, a golf course cannot be considered a place of amusement. As petitioner asserted, people do not enter a golf
course to see or view a show or performance. Petitioner also, as proprietor or operator of the golf course, does not actively display, stage,
or present a show or performance. People go to a golf course to engage themselves in a physical sport activity, i.e., to play golf; the same
reason why people go to a gym or court to play badminton or tennis or to a shooting range for target practice, yet there is no showing
herein that such gym, court, or shooting range is similarly considered an amusement place subject to amusement tax. There is no basis
for singling out golf courses for amusement tax purposes from other places where people go to play sports. This is in contravention of one
of the fundamental principles of local taxation: that the "[t]axation shall be uniform in each local government unit."38 Uniformity of taxation,
like the kindred concept of equal protection, requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both
in privileges and liabilities.39

Not lost on the Court is its declaration in Manila Electric Co. v. Province of Laguna40 that under the 1987 Constitution, "where there is
neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power [of local government units] must be deemed to exist although Congress may
provide statutory limitations and guidelines." Section 186 of the Local Government Code also expressly grants local government units the
following residual power to tax:

Sec. 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes; Fees, or Charges. Local government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees, or
charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, that the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes,
fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.

Respondents, however, cannot claim that Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, imposing amusement tax on
golf courses, was enacted pursuant to the residual power to tax of respondent Cebu City. A local government unit may exercise its residual
power to tax when there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute; or when such taxes, fees, or charges are not otherwise specifically
enumerated in the Local Government Code, National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws. In the present case,
Section 140, in relation to Section 131 (c), of the Local Government Code already explicitly and clearly cover amusement tax and re-
spondent Cebu City must exercise its authority to impose amusement tax within the limitations and guidelines as set forth in said statutory
provisions.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the instant Petition, and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolution
dated March 14, 2007 and the Order dated October 3, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 9 in Civil Case No. CEB-
31988. The Court DECLARES NULL and VOID the following: (a) Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu,
as amended by City Tax Ordinance Nos. LXXXII and LXXXIV, insofar as it imposes amusement tax of 20% on the gross receipts on
entrance, playing green, and/or admission fees of golf courses; (b) the tax assessment against petitioner for amusement tax on its golf
course for the year 1998 in the amount of Pl,373,761.24, plus surcharges and interest pertaining to said amount, issued by the Office of
the City Treasurer, City of Cebu; and (c) the Closure Order dated December 28, 2005 issued against Alta Vista Golf and Country Club by
the Office of the Mayor, City of Cebu. The Court also ORDERS the City of Cebu to refund to Alta Vista Golf and Country Club the
amusement tax, penalties, surcharge, and interest paid under protest by the latter in the total amount of P2, 750,249 .17 or to apply the
same amount as tax credit against existing or future tax liability of said Club.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THRU: THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), AFP ANTI-GRAFT
BOARD, COL. ERNESTO A. PUNSALANG and PETER T. TABANG, Petitioners, v. HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch 151, Pasig, Metro Manila and TROADIO TECSON, Respondents.

DECISION
CORTES, J.:

This case puts in issue the authority of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines Anti-Graft Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), to investigate and cause the prosecution of petitioner, a retired
military officer, for violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379.

Assailed by the Republic in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order are the orders of respondent judge in Civil Case No. 57092 Branch 151 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila: (1) dated June 23, 1989, denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss and Opposition, and (2) dated June 26,
1989, granting private respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the petition seeks the annulment
of the two orders, the issuance of an injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092 and, finally, the
dismissal of the case before the trial court.

The controversy traces its roots to the order of then PCGG Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, dated May 13, 1986, which created the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board. The Board was created to "investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel, both retired and in active service." The order further stated that" [t]he Board shall be primarily charged with the task of
investigating cases of alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended) and shall make
the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies and instrumentalities with respect to the action to be taken thereon
based on its findings."

Acting on information received by the Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, private respondent Lt.
Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) was required by the Board to submit his explanation/comment together with his supporting evidence by October
31, 1987 [Annex "B", Petition]. Private respondent requested, and was granted, several postponements, but was unable to produce his
supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad.

Just the same, the Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution, dated June 30, 1988, recommending that private
respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.

The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds: (1)
that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action against him under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3)
that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his case; and
(4) that having retired from the AFP on May 9, 1984, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Board opposed the motion
to dismiss.

In a resolution dated February 8, 1989, the PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Private respondent moved for reconsid-
eration but this was denied by the PCGG in a resolution dated March 8, 1989. Private respondent was directed to submit his counter-
affidavit and other controverting evidence on March 20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m.

On March 13, 1989, private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig,
Metro Manila. The case was docketed as Case No. 57092 and raffled to Branch 151, respondent judges court. Petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss and opposed the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the Regional Trial
Court had no jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 556. Private
respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the opposition.

On June 23, 1989, respondent judge denied petitioners motion to dismiss. On June 26, 1989, respondent judge granted the application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from investigating or prosecuting private respondent under Rep.
Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

Hence, the instant petition.

On August 29, 1989, the Court issued a restraining order enjoining respondent judge from enforcing his orders dated June 23, 1989 and
June 26, 1989 and from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.

Private respondent filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply. A rejoinder to the reply was filed by private Respondent. The Court
gave due course to the petition and the parties filed their memoranda. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted.

The issues raised in the petition are as follows:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JU-
RISDICTION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER AND INTERFERING WITH THE ORDERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDEN-
TIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT.

II.
WHETHER, OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JU-
RISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED JUNE 26, 1989 ENJOINING PETITIONERS FROM INVESTIGATING AND
PROSECUTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ANTI-GRAFT
AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1379, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT FOR THE FORFEITURE OF
UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY [Rollo, p. 19].

As to the first issue, petitioner contends that following the ruling of the Court in PCGG v. Pea the Board, being a creation and/or extension
of the PCGG, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. On the second issue, petitioner strongly argues that the private
respondents case falls within the jurisdiction of the PCGG.

The pivotal issue is the second one. On this point, private respondents position is as follows:

1. . . . he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1 , 2 , 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to
him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own
alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the
PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.

If indeed private respondent amassed wealth beyond his legal means, the procedure laid down by Rep. Act 1379 as already pointed out
before be applied. And since, he has been separated from the government more than four years ago, the action against him under
Republic Act 1379 has already prescribed.

2. . . . no action can be filed anymore against him now under Republic Act 1379 for recovery of unexplained wealth for the reason that he
has retired more than four years ago.

3. . . . The order creating the AFP Anti-Graft Board (Annex "A", Petition) is null and void. Nowhere in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
is there any authority given to the commission, its chairman and members, to create Boards or bodies to be invested with powers
similar to the powers invested with the commission .. [Comment, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 117-118].

1. The most important question to be resolved in this case is whether or not private respondent may be investigated and caused to be
prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379. According to petitioners, the PCGG
has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent because he is a "subordinate" of former President
Marcos. They cite the PCGGs jurisdiction over

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordi-
nates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enter-
prises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of
their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship. [E.O. No. 1, sec. 2.].

Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth was done during the administration of Pres. Marcos. However, what has to be
inquired into is whether or not private respondent acted as a "subordinate" of Pres. Marcos within the contemplation of E.O. No. 1, the
law creating the PCGG, when he allegedly unlawfully acquired the properties.

A close reading of E. O. No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the term "subordinate."

The Whereas Clauses of E. O. No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.

E.O. No. 2 freezes "all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation."

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are
not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58 (1954), citing Black on Interpretation of Laws,
2nd Ed., 203].

the term "subordinate" as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos
and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business
associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.

Thus, as stated by the Court in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. PCGG, G.R. No. 75885, May 27, 1987, 150 SCRA 181, 205-
206.

The situations envisaged and sought to be governed [by Proclamation No. 3 and E.O. Nos. 1, 2 and 14] are self-evident, these being:

1) that" (i)ll gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime" ;

a) more particularly, that" (i)ll-gotten wealth (was) accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, rela-
tives, subordinates, and close associates, . . . located in the Philippines or abroad, xx (and) business enterprises and entities (came
to be) owned or controlled by them, during . . . (the Marcos) administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage
of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship;"
 b) otherwise stated, that "there are assets and properties pertaining to former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had
been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties
owned by the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions,
or by taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust enrichment
and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines" ;
c) that "said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks, buildings, shopping
centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal properties in the Philippines and in
various countries of the world;" and.

2) that certain "business enterprises and properties (were) taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or
persons close to former President Marcos."

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the administration of former
Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association
or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This is so because otherwise the respondents case will fall under existing general
laws and procedures on the matter. Rep. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes the corrupt practices of any
public officer. Under Rep. Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor), whenever any public officer or employee has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee
and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have
been unlawfully acquired [Sec. 2]. The Solicitor General shall file the petition and prosecute the case in behalf of the Republic, after
preliminary investigation by the provincial or city prosecutor [Ibid].

Moreover, the record shows that private respondent was being investigated for unlawfully acquired wealth under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019
and 1379, and not under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

Since private respondent was being investigated by the PCGG through the AFP Anti-Graft Board it would have been presumed that this
was under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. But the record itself belies this presumption:

(a) The letter of the chairman of the AFP Anti-Graft Board to private respondent, dated October 16, 1987, states: "This letter is in
connection with the alleged information received by the AFP Anti-Graft Board indicating your acquisition of wealth beyond legal
means of income in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." [Rollo, p. 39].

(b) The Resolution dated June 30, 1988 of the Board categorically states:

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:

This refers to the case against Col Troadio B. Tecson PC (Ret) for alleged unexplained wealth pursuant to R.A. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the "Act for Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property." [Rollo, p. 43].

The resolution alleges that private respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by taking advantage of his office as Finance Officer of the
Philippine Constabulary. No attempt is made in the Boards resolution to link him or his accumulation of wealth to former Pres. Marcos
and/or his wife.

(c) The letter of the Board chairman to the chairman of the PCGG, dated July 28, 1988, is clear:

Respectfully transmitted herewith for the prosecution before the Sandiganbayan is the case folder of COLONEL TROADIO TECSON
(Ret) who after preliminary investigation of the case by the Board, found a prima facie evidence against subject officer for violating
Section 8, R.A. 3019, as amended by BP 195, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise
known as an Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." [Rollo, p. 46].

Moreover, from the allegations of petitioner in its memorandum, it would appear that private respondent accumulated his wealth for his
own account. Petitioner quoted the letter of Ignacio Datahan, a retired PC sergeant, to General Fidel Ramos, the material portion of which
reads:

. . . After an official in the military unit received an Allotment Advice the same signed a cash advance voucher, let us say in the amount
of P5,000.00. Without much ado, outright, Col. Tecson paid the amount. The official concerned was also made to sign the receipt
portion on the voucher the amount of which was left blank. Before the voucher is passed for routine processing by Mrs. Leonor Cagas,
clerk of Col. Tecson and its facilitator, the maneuver began. The amount on the face of the cash advance voucher is altered or
superimposed. The original amount of P5,000.00 was now made say, P95,000.00. So it was actually the amount of P95,000.00 that
appeared on the records. The difference of P90,000.00 went to the syndicate.

. . . Boy Tanyag, bookkeeper in Col. Tecsons office took care of the work.

. . . In the liquidation of the altered cash advance amount, names of persons found in the Metropolitan Manila Telephone Directory with
fictitious addresses appeared as recipients or payees. Leonor and Boy got their shares on commission basis of the looted amount while
the greater part went to Col. Tecson. [Rollo, pp. 184-185.].

Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
2. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, dated May 13, 1986, creating the Board and authorizing it to investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service, to support the contention that PCGG
has jurisdiction over the case of private Respondent. The PCGG cannot do more than what it was empowered to do. Its powers are
limited. Its task is limited to the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. The PCGG cannot,
through an order of its chairman, grant itself additional powers powers not contemplated in its enabling law.

3. Petitioner assails the trial courts cognizance of the petition filed by private Respondent. Particularly, petitioner argues that the trial court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over the PCGG. This matter has already been settled in Pea, supra, where the Court ruled that those who
wish to question or challenge the PCGGs acts or orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive
and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayans decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this
Court. [Ibid, at pp. 564-565].

The ruling in Pea was applied in PCGG v. Aquino, G.R. No. 77816, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 363, Soriano III v. Yuson, G.R. No. 74910
(and five other cases), August 10, 1988, 164 SCRA 226 and Olaguer v. RTC, NCJR, Br. 48, G.R. No. 81385, February 21, 1989, 170
SCRA 478, among others, to enjoin the regional trial courts from interfering with the actions of the PCGG.

Respondent judge clearly acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when he took cognizance of Civil Case No. 57092 and issued the
writ of preliminary injunction against the PCGG.

4. Thus, we are confronted with a situation wherein the PCGG acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, hence, may be enjoined from doing
so, but the court that issued the injunction against the PCGG has not been vested by law with jurisdiction over it and, thus, the
injunction issued was null and void.

The nullification of the assailed order of respondent judge issuing the writ of preliminary injunction is therefore in order. Likewise, respond-
ent judge must be enjoined from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.

But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep.
Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be
taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers
granted it.

5. The pronouncements made above should not be taken to mean that the PCGGs creation of the AFP Anti-Graft Board is a nullity and
that the PCGG has no authority to investigate and cause the prosecution of members and former members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379. The PCGG may investigate and cause the prosecution of active and
retired members of the AFP for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 only in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, i.e., insofar
as they involve the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos and his family and "cronies." But the PCGG would not
have jurisdiction over an ordinary case falling under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, as in the case at bar. E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A did not envision the PCGG as the investigator and prosecutor of all unlawful accumulations of wealth. The PCGG was created for
a specific and limited purpose, as we have explained earlier, and necessarily its powers must be construed with this in mind.

6. n his pleadings, private respondent contends that he may no longer be prosecuted because of prescription. He relies on section 2 of
Rep. Act No. 1379 which provides that" [t]he right to file such petition [for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth] shall prescribe within
four years from the date of resignation, dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the officer or employee concerned." He
retired on May 9, 1984, or more than six (6) years ago. However, it must be pointed out that section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 should
be deemed amended or repealed by Article XI, section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that" [t]he right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be
barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel." Considering that sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 was deemed amended or repealed before
the prescriptive period provided therein had lapsed insofar as private respondent is concerned, we cannot say that he had already
acquired a vested right that may not be prejudiced by a subsequent enactment.

Moreover, to bar the Government from recovering ill-gotten wealth would result in the validation or legitimization of the unlawful acquisition,
a consequence at variance with the clear intent of Rep. Act No. 1379, which provides:

SEC. 11. Laws on prescription. The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actions cannot be invoked by, nor
shall they benefit the respondent, in respect to any property unlawfully acquired by him.

Thus, we hold that the appropriate prosecutory agencies, i.e., the city or provincial prosecutor and the Solicitor General under sec. 2 of
Rep. Act No. 1379, may still investigate the case and file the petition for the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth against private re-
spondent, now a private citizen. (On the other hand, as regards respondents for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 who are still
in the government service, the agency granted the power to investigate and prosecute them is the Office of the Ombudsman [Rep. Act
No. 6770]). Under Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379
shall be tried by the Sandiganbayan.

7. The Court hastens to add that this decision is without prejudice to the prosecution of private respondent under the pertinent provisions
of the Revised Penal Code and other related penal laws.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated June 26, 1989 in Civil Case No. 57092 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
judge is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No. 57092. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on August 29, 1989 is MADE
PERMANENT. The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent in I.S. No. 37,
without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecutory agency.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as
complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO
OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:p

The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural
lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other
purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more
than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is omitted.)

The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons
charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the
other fifteen informations, reads:

That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy
and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor
to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area has been and
is still against the win of the offended party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the
said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for
which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing
damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)

Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused,
were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the
five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under
the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of
the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with threat, and taking
advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be
reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted.

The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include agricultural purposes
because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.

From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was
intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the
Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC
General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City
and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along
railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities
all over the country;

WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice.

It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is complemented by
Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace and order.
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished
by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural
lands. That law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under the provision of
the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the
 corresponding applications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or for any person,
natural or judicial to investigate induce or force another to commit such acts.

Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both such fine
and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil.
40.)

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the
decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions.

The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato
Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169435 February 27, 2008
MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor, CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, peti-
tioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor, SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:

AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between municipalities is facilitated by carrying
into effect the law that created them.

Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its
amendment, which only the Congress can do.1

For Our review on certiorari is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing to a certain extent that3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that originated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the
boundary dispute between the Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.

The CA declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary extended up "to the boundary line between the province of Ilocos
Norte and Kalinga-Apayao."4 By this extension of Marcos' eastern boundary, the CA allocated to Marcos a portion of Nueva Era's territory.

The Facts

The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc,
Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Gov-
ernor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias
and created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated September 30, 1916.

The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of
Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as
the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot
path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the
East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between
the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and
Dingras.

The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of Biding.

Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall be derived from the listed barangays of
Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays
was not mentioned. Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a source of territory of
Marcos.

There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem,
however, lies in the description of Marcos' boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the
Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary.

It must be noted that the term "Mt. Province" stated in the above phrase refers to the present adjoining provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were then a single province.

Mt. Province was divided into the four provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao by virtue of R.A. No. 4695
which was enacted on June 18, 1966. On February 14, 1995, the province of Kalinga-Apayao, which comprises the sub-provinces of
Kalinga and Apayao, was further converted into the regular provinces of Kalinga and Apayao pursuant to R.A. No. 7878.

The part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is now the province of Apayao. Hence, the eastern boundary referred to
by the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 is the present Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary.

On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary, Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which
adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning was founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the
Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary, part of Nueva
Era would consequently be obtained by it.6

Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,7 or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang
Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era,
But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte.
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. The SP, on the other hand, required Marcos to
submit its position paper.9

In its position paper, Marcos alleged that since its northeastern and eastern boundaries under R.A. No. 3753 were the Burnay River and
the Ilocos Norte-Mountain Province boundary, respectively, its eastern boundary should not be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era
boundary, which was coterminous and aligned with the eastern boundary of Dingras. According to Marcos, its eastern boundary should
extend further to the east or up to the Ilocos-Norte-Mt. Province boundary pursuant to the description of its eastern boundary under R.A.
No. 3753.10

In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era was cut into two parts. And since the law required
that the land area of a municipality must be compact and contiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no longer be considered
as its territory but that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the middle portion11 of Nueva Era but also to Nueva
Era's isolated northern portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were within Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era.

Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993. It alleged that since time immemorial, its entire
land area was an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the land being
claimed by Marcos must be protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era.12

According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras only. And since R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven
(7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of said barrios.13

From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been considered to be aligned and coterminous with the eastern
boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras. However, based on a re-survey in 1992, supposedly done to conform to the second
paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era was alleged to form part of Marcos.14 This was the
area of Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era that Marcos claimed in its position paper.

On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its decision15 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Body has no alternative but to dismiss, as it hereby DISMISSES said petition for lack
of merit. The disputed area consisting of 15,400 hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part and portion of the territorial juris-
diction of respondent Nueva Era.16

R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos, but none of Nueva Era's barangays were mentioned. The
SP thus construed, applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in
creating Marcos.17

The SP ratiocinated that if Marcos was to be bounded by Mt. Province, it would encroach upon a portion, not only of Nueva Era but also
of Abra. Thus:

x x x Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the eastern boundary of Marcos is indeed Mountain Province, Marcos will then be
claiming a portion of Abra because the province, specifically Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era, is actually bounded on the East by the
Province of Abra. Abra is situated between and separates the Provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province.

This is precisely what this body would like to avoid. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil
or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and
secure the benefits intended.18 (Citations omitted)

The SP further explained:

Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important. When the interpretation of the
statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to the spirit and
reason, disregarding if necessary the letters of the law. It is believed that congress did not intend to have this absurd situation to be
created when it created the Municipality of Marcos. This body, by the mandate given to it by the RA 7160 otherwise known Local
Government Code, so believes that respondent Nueva Era or any portion thereof has been excluded from the ambit of RA 3753.
Under the principle of "espressio (sic) unios (sic) est exclusio alterius," by expressly naming the barangays that will comprise the town
of Marcos, those not mentioned are deemed excluded. In Republic Act 4354, where Section 2 thereof enumerated the barrios com-
prising the City of Davao excluding the petitioner Barrio Central as part of the said City, the court held that there arose a prima facie
conclusion that the said law abolished Barrio Central as part of Davao City.

Historically, the hinterlands of Nueva Era have been known to be the home of our brothers and sisters belonging to peculiar groups
of non-(C)hristian inhabitants with their own rich customs and traditions and this body takes judicial notice that the inhabitants of
Nueva Era have proudly claimed to be a part of this rich culture. With this common ancestral heritage which unfortunately is absent
with Marcos, let it not be disturbed.19 (Emphasis ours and citations omitted)

RTC Decision

On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decision20 of March 19, 2001. The dispositive part of the RTC decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte
is hereby AFFIRMED.
 No costs.
SO ORDERED.21

The RTC reasoned out in this wise:

The position of the Municipality of Marcos is that the provision of R.A. 3753 as regards its boundary on the East which is the "Ilocos
Norte-Mt. Province" should prevail.

On the other hand, the Municipality of Nueva Era posits the theory that only the barrios of the Municipality of Dingras as stated in R.A.
3753 should be included in the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Marcos. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan agreed with the
position of Nueva Era.

xxxx
An examination of the Congressional Records during the deliberations of the R.A. 3753 (House Bill No. 3721) shows the Explanatory
Note of Congressman Simeon M. Valdez, 2nd District, Ilocos Norte, to wit:

EXPLANATORY NOTE
This bill seeks to create in the Province of Ilocos Norte a new municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, to be comprised
by the present barrios of Capariaan, Biding Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit, all in the Municipality of Dingras of the same
province. The seat of government will be in the sitio of San Magro in the present barrio of Ragas.
xxxx
On the other hand, the Municipality of Dingras will not be adversely affected too much because its finances will still be sound and
stable. Its capacity to comply with its obligations, especially to its employees and personnel, will not be diminished nor its operations
paralyzed. On the contrary, economic development in both the mother and the proposed municipalities will be accelerated.

In view of the foregoing, approval of this bill is earnestly requested.

(Sgd.) SIMEON M. VALDEZ
Congressman, 2nd District
Ilocos Norte22

Parenthetically, the legislative intent was for the creation of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte from the barrios (barangays) of
the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte only. Hence, the Municipality of Marcos cannot add any area beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. This conclusion might have been different only if the area being claimed by the Municipality
of Marcos is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras and not the Municipality of Nueva Era. In such case, the two
conflicting provisions may be harmonized by including such area within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras as
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Marcos.23 (Emphasis ours)

CA Disposition

Still determined to have a more extensive eastern boundary, Marcos filed a petition for review24 of the RTC decision before the CA. The
issues raised by Marcos before the CA were:

1. Whether or not the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. which is within a Government Forest Reservation in Barangay Sto. Nio,
formerly of Nueva Era, is a part of the newly created Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
2. Whether or not the portion of Barangay Sto. Nio on the East which is separated from Nueva Era as a result of the full implementation
of the boundaries of the new Municipality of Marcos belongs also to Marcos or to Nueva Era.25

The twin issues involved two portions of Nueva Era, viz.: (1) middle portion, where Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. is located; and (2)
northern portion of Nueva Era, which, according to Marcos, was isolated from Nueva Era in view of the integration to Marcos of said
middle portion.

Marcos prayed before the CA that the above two portions of Nueva Era be declared as part of its own territory. It alleged that it was entitled
to the middle portion of Nueva Era in view of the description of Marcos' eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753. Marcos likewise contended
that it was entitled to the northern portion of Nueva Era which was allegedly isolated from Nueva Era when Marcos was created. It posited
that such isolation of territory was contrary to law because the law required that a municipality must have a compact and contiguous
territory.26

In a Decision27 dated June 6, 2005, the CA partly reversed the RTC decision with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition treated as one for certiorari. The Decisions of both the Sangguniang Panlala-
wigan and Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they made the eastern boundary of
the municipality of Marcos co-terminous with the eastern boundary of Dingras town, and another is rendered extending the said
boundary of Marcos to the boundary line between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, but the same Decisions are
AFFIRMED with respect to the denial of the claim of Marcos to the detached northern portion of barangay Sto. Nio which should, as
it is hereby ordered to, remain with the municipality of Nueva Era. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28

In concluding that the eastern boundary of Marcos was the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, the CA gave the
following explanation:
Clearly then, both the SP and the RTC erred when they ruled that the eastern boundary of Marcos is only coterminous with the eastern
boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras and refused to extend it up to the boundary line between the provinces of Ilocos Norte
and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao). R.A. No. 3753, the law creating Marcos, is very explicit and leaves no room for equivocation
that the boundaries of Marcos town are:

"On the Northwest by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of
foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan;
on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South by the Padsan River, which is at the same time the
boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest by the boundary between the municipal-
ities of Batac and Dingras.

To stop short at the eastern boundary of Dingras as the eastern boundary also of Marcos and refusing to go farther to the boundary
line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao) is tantamount to amending the law which Congress alone can do.
Both the SP and RTC have no competence to undo a valid act of Congress.

It is not correct to say that Congress did not intend to take away any part of Nueva Era and merge it with Marcos for it is chargeable
with conclusive knowledge that when it provided that the eastern boundary of Marcos is the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and
Mountain Province, (by the time of both the SB and RTC Decision was already Kalinga-Apayao), it would be cutting through a portion
of Nueva Era. As the law is written so must it be applied. Dura lex sed lex!

The CA likewise held that the province Abra was not located between Marcos and Kalinga-Apayao; and that Marcos would not encroach
upon a portion of Abra for it to be bounded by Kalinga-Apayao, to wit:

Nueva Era's contention that to lay out the eastern jurisdiction of Marcos to the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain
Province (Kalinga-Apayao) would mean annexing part of the municipality of Itnig, province of Abra to Marcos as Abra is between
Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province is geographically erroneous. From Nueva Era's own map of Region 1, which also depicts the
locations of Kalinga-Apayao, Abra, Mountain Province, Benguet and Nueva Vizcaya after the partition of the old Mountain Province
into the provinces of Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Mountain Province and Benguet, the province of Abra is situated far to the south of
Kalinga Apayao and is between the latter and the present Mountain Province, which is farther south of Abra. Abra is part of the eastern
boundary of Ilocos Sur while Kalinga-Apayao is the eastern boundary of Ilocos Norte. Hence, in no way will the eastern boundary of
the municipality of Marcos encroach upon a portion of Abra.30

However, Marcos' claim over the alleged isolated northern portion of Nueva Era was denied. The CA ruled:

Going now to the other area involved, i.e., the portion of Sto. Nio that is separated from its mother town Nueva Era and now lies east
of the municipalities of Solsona and Dingras and north of Marcos, it bears stressing that it is not included within the area of Marcos
as defined by law. But since it is already detached from Sto. Nio, Marcos is laying claim to it to be integrated into its territory by the
SP because it is contiguous to a portion of said municipality.

We hold that the SP has no jurisdiction or authority to act on the claim, for it will necessarily substantially alter the north eastern and
southern boundaries of Marcos from that defined by law and unduly enlarge its area. Only Congress can do that. True, the SP may
substantially alter the boundary of a barangay within its jurisdiction. But this means the alteration of the boundary of a barangay in
relation to another barangay within the same municipality for as long as that will not result in any change in the boundary of that
municipality. The area in dispute therefore remains to be a part of Sto. Nio, a barangay of Nueva Era although separated by the
newly created Marcos town pursuant to Section 7(c) of the 1991 Local Government Code which states:

SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to
another shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
xxxx
(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a local government unit
independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such
basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.31

The CA also expressed the view that Marcos adopted the wrong mode of appeal in bringing the case to it. The case, according to the CA,
was appealable only to the RTC. Nonetheless, despite its pronouncement that the case was dismissible, the CA took cognizance of the
same by treating it as one for certiorari, to wit:

A final word. At the outset, we agonized over the dilemma of choosing between dismissing outright the petition at bar or entertaining
it. This is for the simple reason that a petition for review is a mode of appeal and is not appropriate as the Local Government Code
provides for the remedy of appeal in boundary disputes only to the Regional Trial Court but not any further appeal to this Court. Appeal
is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of
supporting authority.
xxxx
By the same token, since the Local Government Code does not explicitly grant the right of further appeal from decisions of the RTCs
in boundary disputes between or among local government units, Marcos town cannot exercise that right from the adverse decision of
the RTC of Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, because of the transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our inceptive
dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special civil action for certiorari.32

Nueva Era was not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issues
Nueva Era now raises the following issues:

a) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on the Petition for Review on Appeal, since Sec. 119 of the Local Government
Code, which provides that "An appeal to the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is exclusively vested to the Regional Trial
Court, without further Appeal to the Court of Appeals";
b) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, in treating the Petition for Review On Appeal, filed under Rule 45,
Revised Rules of Court, as a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;
c) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring that MARCOS East is not coterminous with the
Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras. That it has no factual and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory beyond Brgys. Agunit
(Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East, by traversing and disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Nio, and drawing
parallel lines from Sto. Nio, there lies Abra, not Mt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.33

Basically, there are two (2) issues to resolve here: (1) whether or not the mode of appeal adopted by Marcos in bringing the case to the
CA is proper; and (2) whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.

Our Ruling
Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review under Rule 42.

Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned." The dispute shall be formally tried by the said
sanggunian in case the disputing municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement.34

The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties. The appeal of the SP judgment to the RTC was likewise
properly filed by Marcos before the RTC. The problem, however, lies in whether the RTC judgment may still be further appealed to the
CA.

The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute was not appealable to it. It ruled that no further appeal of the RTC
decision may be made pursuant to Section 119 of the Local Government Code35 which provides:

SECTION 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the
sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall
decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be
maintained and continued for all legal purposes.

The CA concluded that since only the RTC was mentioned as appellate court, the case may no longer be further appealed to it. The CA
stated that "(a)ppeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the
citation of supporting authority.36

The CA, however, justified its taking cognizance of the case by declaring that: "because of the transcendental legal and jurisdictional
issues involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special civil action for certiorari.37

The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the SP.

True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass
upon the petition for review precisely because the law allows it.

Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A. No. 7902,38 vests in the CA the
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, among others.39 B.P. Blg. 129 has been further supplemented by the 1997 Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, as amended, which provides for the remedy of appeal via petition for review under Rule 42 to the CA in cases decided by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same.
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain
appeals of such judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

At the time of creation of Marcos, approval in a plebiscite of the creation of a local government unit is not required.

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.40

The purpose of the above constitutional provision was acknowledged by the Court through Justice Reynato S. Puno in Miranda v. Agui-
rre,41 where it was held that:

The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne
out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby
local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of
 the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mech-
anism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units.
It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - direct democracy of the people
as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the
Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.42

Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and statutory43 plebiscite requirement for the creation of a local government unit is applicable
to this case. It posits that the claim of Marcos to its territory should be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite.

We agree with Nueva Era's contention that Marcos' claim over parts of its territory is not tenable. However, the reason is not the lack of
the required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 constitutions and the Local Government Code of 1991 but other reasons as will be
discussed below.

At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created
without conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was derived.

Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.44 It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be
given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.45

In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on Elections46 involving the City of Mandaue, the Court has this to say:

Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having been ratified by the residents of the city in a
plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of
the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective
in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on June 21, 1969.47 (Citations
omitted and underlining supplied).

Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos but merely interpreting the law that created it. Its creation was already a fait
accompli. Therefore, there is no reason for Us to further require a plebiscite.

As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:

Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be given only a prospective application unless the contrary
is clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn even in the
absence of an unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the Constitution.48

No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753.

Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. To wit:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of
Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as
the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded.

Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a
statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its
operation and effect.49 This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the
human mind.50

Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise
language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other
matters.51 The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.52

Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos
shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro
omisso habendus est, which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted inten-
tionally.53

Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for the
creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.

Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the
purpose and intent of the statute.54

Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter still contends that said law included Nueva
Era. It alleges that based on the description of its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.
The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot
path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the
East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between
the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and
Dingras.

Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary," a portion of Nueva Era formed part of
its territory because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in
order for its eastern side to reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the middle portion of Nueva Era.

Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to its northern portion which, as a consequence,
was isolated from the major part of Nueva Era.

We cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.

Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive
only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory.

Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in
light of the legislative intent.

The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application.55 We thus uphold the legislative intent to create
Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.

Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and
in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered.56 Every section,
provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law, and every part of the act is to be taken into
view.57

It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very purpose for which they were passed.
This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat
the purpose of the legislature and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable
result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.58

Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus, in construing a statute,
the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose.
The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.59

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms.
ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by RA-
OULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the preventive suspension of
petitioners,

Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant
to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health.
The petition also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of
the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes
to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).

The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by
the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-
Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify
Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).

On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on the petition.

On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130); Annexes to Supplemental
Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an "Urgent Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo, pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifes-
tation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively, averring developments that transpired after the filing of the petition and stressing the urgency for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.

On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in the meantime, the STATUS QUO pending
filing of comments by said respondents on the original supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).

On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution dated September
22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of
Health to comment on the said motion.

On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its Comment to
the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the
lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus Submission" as annexes were the
orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).

The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:

(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy, ignore, disregard,
disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2)
"unlawfully interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260);
and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting
blatant lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in
their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).

On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply
with 22 September 1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation attached to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).

On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that: (a) "despite the issuance
of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing respondents to maintain the status quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance
the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to
hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant
petition; (c) respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension and in
tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution
dated September 22, 1992; and

(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 immediately, by restoring
the status quo ante contemplated by the aforesaid resolution" (Comment attached to Rollo without paginations between pp. 613-614
thereof).
In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order,
stating inter alia, that:

It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last peaceable uncontested status which preceded the present controversy
was the situation obtaining at the time of the filing of the petition at bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners were then actually
occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their respective
positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may be lawfully entitled to, and that respondents and/or any and all persons
acting under their authority desist and refrain from performing any act in violation of the aforementioned Resolution of September 22,
1992 until further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615 thereof).

On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Supplemental Manifestation, stated
that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming
the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise
of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case" (Attached to Rollo without pagination).

In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman can only suspend
government officials or employees connected with his office. Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners'
counsel and to cite them for contempt (Attached to Rollo without pagination).

The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices
other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and em-
ployees.

In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to Lift Status Quo, etc, dated
January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of Ombudsman but not more than six months,
without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.

Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated
by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform
such functions or duties as may be provided by law.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend
to the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investiga-
tion conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension himself.

They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power,
function, and duty to:

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct powers, namely: (1) direct
the officer concerned to take appropriate action against public officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension,
demotion fine, censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 9-
10).

The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can easily mislead, unless one bears in mind that what the Ombudsman
imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only a preventive suspension.

When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13
[3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should
be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co
Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing
administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the
requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of
erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman
has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need
to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence
in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the
persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended.

Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Interpretation of
Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed
for the punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory
Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally
(People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).

The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him
by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation
that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should
be avoided.

A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes
and objectives for which it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d)
213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]).

In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is not a penalty, said:

Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the
person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases who are employed in his
office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the phrase "suspend any officer or employee under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770.

The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with preventive suspension and
which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an
investigation . . . .

Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code also
authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority.

However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to the Civil Service Commission by the Civil
Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the President, the Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices,
the phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his bureau" was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his authority." Therefore,
Section 41 of said law only mentions that the proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).

The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to "preventively suspend any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation" (Sec. 51).

The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to read "suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the word "subordi-
nate" before and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to
preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed "in his office"
or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent
therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive
suspension.

In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
he issued the suspension order without affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges against them during the preliminary
conference and even after petitioners had asked for the disqualification of Director Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining
petitioners, the Solicitor General contends that assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend erring
public officials and employees who are working in other departments and offices, the questioned order remains null and void for his failure
to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).

Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued even without a full-blown
hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health
could not preventively suspend him before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The contention of petitioners herein
can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the suspension meted out was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was
"nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before tho charges against him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia.,
supra).

There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive suspension of a respondent
unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the charts against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave mis-
conduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondent's continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively suspend officials or employees under investigation were found in Section
34 of R.A. No. 2260.

The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This
fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on
the basis of the administrative complaint. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order of preventive suspension only after: (a)
petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which
incorporated the charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex 4, Rollo, pp.
290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases of harassment by petitioners of the
members of the private respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the
complainant and the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and documentary evidence.

Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 336-337) while private
respondents submitted their list of exhibits (Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-348).

Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality
and bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation.

The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to openly
defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-
261). The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the acts alleged to
constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive sus-
pension of their clients.

On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for private respondents hurled against petitioners
and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.; (2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3)
Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5).

A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful
and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession
(Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes at the
same time a disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not,
creates more heat than light.

The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action, which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or
abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of
procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is
LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988
MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing
Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference
in the Trial Court. The facts stipulated upon read:

a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of this case;
b) That the accused was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation on or before January 21, 1981;
c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued and made out check No. 26741, dated January 24, 1981 in the sum of P2,541.05;
d) That the said check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness, Roy Nadera;
e) That the check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in remittance of collection;
f) That the said check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but the same was dishonored for the reason that the said checking
account was already closed;
g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been properly Identified as the accused party in this case.

At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence consisting of Exhibits "A," "B" and "C." At the subsequent
hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum
confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.

On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction. 1

Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that:

The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the offense
charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on
August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.

Finding the petition meritorious, we resolved to give due course.

The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to this case since the pre-trial was held
on August 8, 1985, provides:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall
be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]

By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as
mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term "shall" further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs.
Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or proce-
dural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado No.
L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).

The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the
Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed
the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of
Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by
Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the
accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed
established beyond reasonable doubt.

Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that evidence be presented to determine the
culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be
set aside or reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 [1928]).

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and RE-
MANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35910 July 21, 1978
PURITA BERSABAL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, Branch XIV, TAN THAT
and ONG PIN TEE, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

On March 23, 1972, petitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge of August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971 and
March 15, 1972 and to compel said respondent Judge to decide petitioner's perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of
the case submitted by the City Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and respondents.

Since only questions of law were raised therein, the Court of Appeals, on October 13, 1972, issued a resolution certifying said case to this
Court pursuant to Section 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of this case are as follows:

It appears that private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee filed an ejectment suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 6926 in the City
Court of Caloocan City, against the petitioner. A decision was rendered by said Court on November 25, 1970, which decision was
appealed by the petitioner to the respondent Court and docketed therein as Civil Case No. C-2036.

During the pendency of the appeal the respondent court issued on March 23, 1971 an order which reads:

Pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6031, the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City, is hereby directed to transmit to this Court
within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof the transcripts of stenographic notes taken down during the hearing of this case before
the City Court of Caloocan City, and likewise, counsels for both parties are given thirty (30) days from receipt of this order within
which to file their respective memoranda, and thereafter, this case shall be deemed submitted for decision by this Court.

which order was apparently received by petitioner on April 17, 1971.

The transcript of stenographic notes not having yet been forwarded to the respondent court, petitioner filed on May 5, 1971 a 'MOTION
EX-PARTE TO SUBMIT MEMORANDUM WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT
OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES TAKEN DURING THE HEARING OF THE CASE BEFORE THE CITY COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY'
which was granted by respondent court on May 7, 1971. However, before the petitioner could receive any such notice from the
respondent court, the respondent Judge issued an order on August 4, 1971 which says:

For failure of the defendant-appellant to prosecute her appeal the same is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against her.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on September 28, 1971, citing as a ground the granting of his ex-parte motion
to submit memorandum within 30 days from notice of the submission of the stenographic notes taken before the City Court. Private
respondents filed their opposition to the motion on September 30,1971. In the meantime, on October 20,1971, petitioner filed her
memorandum dated October 18, 1971. On October 30, 1971 the respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Then on
January 25, 1972, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by the re-
spondent court on March 15, 1972. Hence this petition.

The sole inquiry in the case at bar can be stated thus: Whether, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of
Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on nine the memorandum mentioned in
the same paragraph would empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to Prosecute; or, whether
it is mandatory upon said Court to proceed to decide the appealed case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, the
failure of the appellant to submit a memorandum on time notwithstanding.

The second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No.
6031 provides, in part, as follows:

Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or
municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested ... . (Emphasis
supplied).

The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda
is optional on the part of the parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so choose to waive submission of the
memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the
submission of said memorandum the appellant so chooses not to submit the memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no
alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts. In other words,
the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is
the Court's mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and records transmitted to it.

As a general rule, the word "may" when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word "shall" is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717).
The implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records
transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on request.
Moreover, memoranda, briefs and oral arguments are not essential requirements. They may be submitted and/or made only if so re-
quested.

Finally, a contrary interpretation would be unjust and dangerous as it may defeat the litigant's right to appeal granted to him by law. In the
case of Republic vs. Rodriguez

(L-26056, May 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 378) this Court underscored "the need of proceeding with caution so that a party may not be deprived
of its right to appeal except for weighty reasons." Courts should heed the rule in Municipality of Tiwi, Albay vs. Cirujales

(L-37520, Dec. 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 390, 395), thus:

The appellate court's summary dismissal of the appeal even before receipt of the records of the appealed case as ordered by it in a
prior mandamus case must be set aside as having been issued precipitously and without an opportunity to consider and appreciate
unavoidable circumstances of record not attributable to petitioners that caused the delay in the elevation of the records of the case
on appeal.

In the instant case, no notice was received by petitioner about the submission of the transcript of the stenographic notes, so that his 30-
day period to submit his memorandum would commence to run. Only after the expiration of such period can the respondent Judge act on
the case by deciding it on the merits, not by dismissing the appeal of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, THE CHALLENGED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED AUGUST 4, 1971, OCTOBER 30, 1971 AND MARCH
15, 1971 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO DECIDE CIVIL
CASE NO. C-2036 ON THE MERITS. NO COSTS.
G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997
LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION, EMDEN ENCARNACION and HORATIO
AYCARDO, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
May the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation, as mandated by Section 46 of the
Corporation Code, result in its automatic dissolution?

This is the issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). This quasi-judicial body recognized Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (LGVHA)
as the sole homeowners' association in Loyola Grand Villas, a duly registered subdivision in Quezon City and Marikina City that was
owned and developed by Solid Homes, Inc. It revoked the certificates of registration issued to Loyola Grand Villas homeowners (North)
Association Incorporated (the North Association for brevity) and Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association Incorporated (the
South Association).

LGVHAI was organized on February 8, 1983 as the association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. It was registered
with the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor of herein respondent HIGC, as the sole homeowners' organization in the said
subdivision under Certificate of Registration No. 04-197. It was organized by the developer of the subdivision and its first president was
Victorio V. Soliven, himself the owner of the developer. For unknown reasons, however, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws.

Sometime in 1988, the officers of the LGVHAI tried to register its by-laws. They failed to do so. 2 To the officers' consternation, they
discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision the North Association and the South Association. According
to private respondents, a non-resident and Soliven himself, respectively headed these associations. They also discovered that these
associations had five (5) registered homeowners each who were also the incorporators, directors and officers thereof. None of the mem-
bers of the LGVHAI was listed as member of the North Association while three (3) members of LGVHAI were listed as members of the
South Association.3 The North Association was registered with the HIGC on February 13, 1989 under Certificate of Registration No. 04-
1160 covering Phases West II, East III, West III and East IV. It submitted its by-laws on December 20, 1988.

In July, 1989, when Soliven inquired about the status of LGVHAI, Atty. Joaquin A. Bautista, the head of the legal department of the HIGC,
informed him that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved for two reasons. First, it did not submit its by-laws within the period required
by the Corporation Code and, second, there was non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the asso-
ciation's activities. Apparently, this information resulted in the registration of the South Association with the HIGC on July 27, 1989 covering
Phases West I, East I and East II. It filed its by-laws on July 26, 1989.

These developments prompted the officers of the LGVHAI to lodge a complaint with the HIGC. They questioned the revocation of
LGVHAI's certificate of registration without due notice and hearing and concomitantly prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of
registration of the North and South Associations by reason of the earlier issuance of a certificate of registration in favor of LGVHAI.

On January 26, 1993, after due notice and hearing, private respondents obtained a favorable ruling from HIGC Hearing Officer Danilo C.
Javier who disposed of HIGC Case No. RRM-5-89 as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc., under Certificate of
Registration No. 04-197 as the duly registered and existing homeowners association for Loyola Grand Villas homeowners, and de-
claring the Certificates of Registration of Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (North) Association, Inc. and Loyola Grand Villas Home-
owners (South) Association, Inc. as hereby revoked or cancelled; that the receivership be terminated and the Receiver is hereby
ordered to render an accounting and turn-over to Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc., all assets and records of the
Association now under his custody and possession.

The South Association appealed to the Appeals Board of the HIGC. In its Resolution of September 8, 1993, the Board 4 dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit.

Rebuffed, the South Association in turn appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising two issues. First, whether or not LGVHAI's failure to file
its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code resulted in the automatic dissolution of LGVHAI. Second,
whether or not two homeowners' associations may be authorized by the HIGC in one "sprawling subdivision." However, in the Decision
of August 23, 1994 being assailed here, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of the HIGC Appeals Board.

In resolving the first issue, the Court of Appeals held that under the Corporation Code, a private corporation commences to have corporate
existence and juridical personality from the date the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issues a certificate of incorporation
under its official seal. The requirement for the filing of by-laws under Section 46 of the Corporation Code within one month from official
notice of the issuance of the certificate of incorporation presupposes that it is already incorporated, although it may file its by-laws with its
articles of incorporation. Elucidating on the effect of a delayed filing of by-laws, the Court of Appeals said:

We also find nothing in the provisions cited by the petitioner, i.e., Section 46 and 22, Corporation Code, or in any other provision of
the Code and other laws which provide or at least imply that failure to file the by-laws results in an automatic dissolution of the
corporation. While Section 46, in prescribing that by-laws must be adopted within the period prescribed therein, may be interpreted
as a mandatory provision, particularly because of the use of the word "must," its meaning cannot be stretched to support the argument
that automatic dissolution results from non-compliance.

We realize that Section 46 or other provisions of the Corporation Code are silent on the result of the failure to adopt and file the by-
laws within the required period. Thus, Section 46 and other related provisions of the Corporation Code are to be construed with
 Section 6 (1) of P.D. 902-A. This section empowers the SEC to suspend or revoke certificates of registration on the grounds listed
therein. Among the grounds stated is the failure to file by-laws (see also II Campos: The Corporation Code, 1990 ed., pp. 124-125).
Such suspension or revocation, the same section provides, should be made upon proper notice and hearing. Although P.D. 902-A
refers to the SEC, the same principles and procedures apply to the public respondent HIGC as it exercises its power to revoke or
suspend the certificates of registration or homeowners association. (Section 2 [a], E.O. 535, series 1979, transferred the powers and
authorities of the SEC over homeowners associations to the HIGC.)

We also do not agree with the petitioner's interpretation that Section 46, Corporation Code prevails over Section 6, P.D. 902-A and
that the latter is invalid because it contravenes the former. There is no basis for such interpretation considering that these two provi-
sions are not inconsistent with each other. They are, in fact, complementary to each other so that one cannot be considered as
invalidating the other.

The Court of Appeals added that, as there was no showing that the registration of LGVHAI had been validly revoked, it continued to be
the duly registered homeowners' association in the Loyola Grand Villas. More importantly, the South Association did not dispute the fact
that LGVHAI had been organized and that, thereafter, it transacted business within the period prescribed by law.

On the second issue, the Court of Appeals reiterated its previous ruling 5 that the HIGC has the authority to order the holding of a refer-
endum to determine which of two contending associations should represent the entire community, village or subdivision.

Undaunted, the South Association filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. It elevates as sole issue for resolution the first issue it
had raised before the Court of Appeals, i.e., whether or not the LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section
46 of the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation.

Petitioner contends that, since Section 46 uses the word "must" with respect to the filing of by-laws, noncompliance therewith would result
in "self-extinction" either due to non-occurrence of a suspensive condition or the occurrence of a resolutory condition "under the hypothesis
that (by) the issuance of the certificate of registration alone the corporate personality is deemed already formed." It asserts that the
Corporation Code provides for a "gradation of violations of requirements." Hence, Section 22 mandates that the corporation must be
formally organized and should commence transaction within two years from date of incorporation. Otherwise, the corporation would be
deemed dissolved. On the other hand, if the corporation commences operations but becomes continuously inoperative for five years, then
it may be suspended or its corporate franchise revoked.

Petitioner concedes that Section 46 and the other provisions of the Corporation Code do not provide for sanctions for non-filing of the by-
laws. However, it insists that no sanction need be provided "because the mandatory nature of the provision is so clear that there can be
no doubt about its being an essential attribute of corporate birth." To petitioner, its submission is buttressed by the facts that the period
for compliance is "spelled out distinctly;" that the certification of the SEC/HIGC must show that the by-laws are not inconsistent with the
Code, and that a copy of the by-laws "has to be attached to the articles of incorporation." Moreover, no sanction is provided for because
"in the first place, no corporate identity has been completed." Petitioner asserts that "non-provision for remedy or sanction is itself the tacit
proclamation that non-compliance is fatal and no corporate existence had yet evolved," and therefore, there was "no need to proclaim its
demise." 6 In a bid to convince the Court of its arguments, petitioner stresses that:

. . . the word MUST is used in Sec. 46 in its universal literal meaning and corollary human implication its compulsion is integrated
in its very essence MUST is always enforceable by the inevitable consequence that is, "OR ELSE". The use of the word MUST
in Sec. 46 is no exception it means file the by-laws within one month after notice of issuance of certificate of registration OR ELSE.
The OR ELSE, though not specified, is inextricably a part of MUST . Do this or if you do not you are "Kaput". The importance of the
by-laws to corporate existence compels such meaning for as decreed the by-laws is "the government" of the corporation. Indeed, how
can the corporation do any lawful act as such without by-laws. Surely, no law is indeed to create chaos. 7

Petitioner asserts that P.D. No. 902-A cannot exceed the scope and power of the Corporation Code which itself does not provide sanctions
for non-filing of by-laws. For the petitioner, it is "not proper to assess the true meaning of Sec. 46 . . . on an unauthorized provision on
such matter contained in the said decree.

In their comment on the petition, private respondents counter that the requirement of adoption of by-laws is not mandatory. They point to
P.D. No. 902-A as having resolved the issue of whether said requirement is mandatory or merely directory. Citing Chung Ka Bio v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 8 private respondents contend that Section 6(I) of that decree provides that non-filing of by-laws is only a
ground for suspension or revocation of the certificate of registration of corporations and, therefore, it may not result in automatic dissolution
of the corporation. Moreover, the adoption and filing of by-laws is a condition subsequent which does not affect the corporate personality
of a corporation like the LGVHAI. This is so because Section 9 of the Corporation Code provides that the corporate existence and juridical
personality of a corporation begins from the date the SEC issues a certificate of incorporation under its official seal. Consequently, even
if the by-laws have not yet been filed, a corporation may be considered a de facto corporation. To emphasize the fact the LGVHAI was
registered as the sole homeowners' association in the Loyola Grand Villas, private respondents point out that membership in the LGVHAI
was an "unconditional restriction in the deeds of sale signed by lot buyers.

In its reply to private respondents' comment on the petition, petitioner reiterates its argument that the word " must" in Section 46 of the
Corporation Code is mandatory. It adds that, before the ruling in Chung Ka Bio v. Intermediate Appellate Court could be applied to this
case, this Court must first resolve the issue of whether or not the provisions of P.D. No. 902-A prescribing the rules and regulations to
implement the Corporation Code can "rise above and change" the substantive provisions of the Code.

The pertinent provision of the Corporation Code that is the focal point of controversy in this case states:

Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws. Every corporation formed under this Code, must within one (1) month after receipt of official notice
of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws for its govern-
 ment not inconsistent with this Code. For the adoption of by-laws by the corporation, the affirmative vote of the stockholders repre-
senting at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or of at least a majority of the members, in the case of non-stock corpora-
tions, shall be necessary. The by-laws shall be signed by the stockholders or members voting for them and shall be kept in the
principal office of the corporation, subject to the stockholders or members voting for them and shall be kept in the principal office of
the corporation, subject to inspection of the stockholders or members during office hours; and a copy thereof, shall be filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission which shall be attached to the original articles of incorporation.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, by-laws may be adopted and filed prior to incorporation; in such case,
such by-laws shall be approved and signed by all the incorporators and submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
together with the articles of incorporation.

In all cases, by-laws shall be effective only upon the issuance by the Securities and Exchange Commission of a certification that the
by-laws are not inconsistent with this Code.

The Securities and Exchange Commission shall not accept for filing the by-laws or any amendment thereto of any bank, banking
institution, building and loan association, trust company, insurance company, public utility, educational institution or other special
corporations governed by special laws, unless accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate government agency to the effect that
such by-laws or amendments are in accordance with law.

As correctly postulated by the petitioner, interpretation of this provision of law begins with the determination of the meaning and import of
the word "must" in this section Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imperative act or operates to impose a duty which may be enforced.
9
It is synonymous with "ought" which connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. 10 However, the word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not
always imperative. It may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. In this jurisdiction, the tendency has been to interpret "shall" as the
context or a reasonable construction of the statute in which it is used demands or requires. 11 This is equally true as regards the word
"must." Thus, if the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object reveals that the legislature
intended to use the words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning.12

In this respect, the following portions of the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa No. 68 are illuminating:
MR. FUENTEBELLA. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
On page 34, referring to the adoption of by-laws, are we made to understand here, Mr. Speaker, that by-laws must immediately be filed
within one month after the issuance? In other words, would this be mandatory or directory in character?
MR. MENDOZA. This is mandatory.
MR. FUENTEBELLA. It being mandatory, Mr. Speaker, what would be the effect of the failure of the corporation to file these by-laws within
one month?
MR. MENDOZA. There is a provision in the latter part of the Code which identifies and describes the consequences of violations of any
provision of this Code. One such consequences is the dissolution of the corporation for its inability, or perhaps, incurring certain
penalties.
MR. FUENTEBELLA. But it will not automatically amount to a dissolution of the corporation by merely failing to file the by-laws within one
month. Supposing the corporation was late, say, five days, what would be the mandatory penalty?
MR. MENDOZA. I do not think it will necessarily result in the automatic or ipso facto dissolution of the corporation. Perhaps, as in the
case, as you suggested, in the case of El Hogar Filipino where a quo warranto action is brought, one takes into account the gravity of
the violation committed. If the by-laws were late the filing of the by-laws were late by, perhaps, a day or two, I would suppose that
might be a tolerable delay, but if they are delayed over a period of months as is happening now because of the absence of a
clear requirement that by-laws must be completed within a specified period of time, the corporation must suffer certain consequences.
13

This exchange of views demonstrates clearly that automatic corporate dissolution for failure to file the by-laws on time was never the
intention of the legislature. Moreover, even without resorting to the records of deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa, the law itself
provides the answer to the issue propounded by petitioner.

Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum
statutum), 14 Section 46 aforequoted reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word "must"
in the first sentence thereof. Note should be taken of the second paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to
incorporation. This provision in the same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement of filing the by-laws
"within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission." It necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within that period does not imply the "demise" of the corporation. By-
laws may be necessary for the "government" of the corporation but these are subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the
Corporation Code and related statutes.15 There are in fact cases where by-laws are unnecessary to corporate existence or to the valid
exercise of corporate powers, thus:

In the absence of charter or statutory provisions to the contrary, by-laws are not necessary either to the existence of a corporation or
to the valid exercise of the powers conferred upon it, certainly in all cases where the charter sufficiently provides for the government
of the body; and even where the governing statute in express terms confers upon the corporation the power to adopt by-laws, the
failure to exercise the power will be ascribed to mere nonaction which will not render void any acts of the corporation which would
otherwise be valid. 16 (Emphasis supplied.)

As Fletcher aptly puts it:

It has been said that the by-laws of a corporation are the rule of its life, and that until by-laws have been adopted the corporation may
not be able to act for the purposes of its creation, and that the first and most important duty of the members is to adopt them. This
would seem to follow as a matter of principle from the office and functions of by-laws. Viewed in this light, the adoption of by-laws is
a matter of practical, if not one of legal, necessity. Moreover, the peculiar circumstances attending the formation of a corporation may
 impose the obligation to adopt certain by-laws, as in the case of a close corporation organized for specific purposes. And the statute
or general laws from which the corporation derives its corporate existence may expressly require it to make and adopt by-laws and
specify to some extent what they shall contain and the manner of their adoption. The mere fact, however, of the existence of power
in the corporation to adopt by-laws does not ordinarily and of necessity make the exercise of such power essential to its corporate
life, or to the validity of any of its acts. 17

Although the Corporation Code requires the filing of by-laws, it does not expressly provide for the consequences of the non-filing of the
same within the period provided for in Section 46. However, such omission has been rectified by Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the
pertinent provisions on the jurisdiction of the SEC of which state:

Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) To suspend, or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of corporations, partnerships or
associations, upon any of the grounds provided by law, including the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Failure to file by-laws within the required period;
xxx xxx xxx
In the exercise of the foregoing authority and jurisdiction of the Commission or by a Commissioner or by such other bodies, boards,
committees and/or any officer as may be created or designated by the Commission for the purpose. The decision, ruling or order of
any such Commissioner, bodies, boards, committees and/or officer may be appealed to the Commission sitting en banc within thirty
(30) days after receipt by the appellant of notice of such decision, ruling or order. The Commission shall promulgate rules of proce-
dures to govern the proceedings, hearings and appeals of cases falling with its jurisdiction.

The aggrieved party may appeal the order, decision or ruling of the Commission sitting en banc to the Supreme Court by petition for
review in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

Even under the foregoing express grant of power and authority, there can be no automatic corporate dissolution simply because the
incorporators failed to abide by the required filing of by-laws embodied in Section 46 of the Corporation Code. There is no outright "demise"
of corporate existence. Proper notice and hearing are cardinal components of due process in any democratic institution, agency or society.
In other words, the incorporators must be given the chance to explain their neglect or omission and remedy the same.

That the failure to file by-laws is not provided for by the Corporation Code but in another law is of no moment. P.D. No. 902-A, which took
effect immediately after its promulgation on March 11, 1976, is very much apposite to the Code. Accordingly, the provisions abovequoted
supply the law governing the situation in the case at bar, inasmuch as the Corporation Code and P.D. No. 902-A are statutes in pari
materia. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi. Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 18

As the "rules and regulations or private laws enacted by the corporation to regulate, govern and control its own actions, affairs and
concerns and its stockholders or members and directors and officers with relation thereto and among themselves in their relation to it," 19
by-laws are indispensable to corporations in this jurisdiction. These may not be essential to corporate birth but certainly, these are required
by law for an orderly governance and management of corporations. Nonetheless, failure to file them within the period required by law by
no means tolls the automatic dissolution of a corporation.

In this regard, private respondents are correct in relying on the pronouncements of this Court in Chung Ka Bio v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 20 as follows:

. . . . Moreover, failure to file the by-laws does not automatically operate to dissolve a corporation but is now considered only a ground
for such dissolution.

Section 19 of the Corporation Law, part of which is now Section 22 of the Corporation Code, provided that the powers of the corporation
would cease if it did not formally organize and commence the transaction of its business or the continuation of its works within two
years from date of its incorporation. Section 20, which has been reproduced with some modifications in Section 46 of the Corporation
Code, expressly declared that "every corporation formed under this Act, must within one month after the filing of the articles of incor-
poration with the Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws." Whether this provision should be given mandatory
or only directory effect remained a controversial question until it became academic with the adoption of PD 902-A. Under this decree,
it is now clear that the failure to file by-laws within the required period is only a ground for suspension or revocation of the certificate
of registration of corporations.

Non-filing of the by-laws will not result in automatic dissolution of the corporation. Under Section 6(I) of PD 902-A, the SEC is empow-
ered to "suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of a corporation" on the ground
inter alia of "failure to file by-laws within the required period." It is clear from this provision that there must first of all be a hearing to
determine the existence of the ground, and secondly, assuming such finding, the penalty is not necessarily revocation but may be
only suspension of the charter. In fact, under the rules and regulations of the SEC, failure to file the by-laws on time may be penalized
merely with the imposition of an administrative fine without affecting the corporate existence of the erring firm.

It should be stressed in this connection that substantial compliance with conditions subsequent will suffice to perfect corporate per-
sonality. Organization and commencement of transaction of corporate business are but conditions subsequent and not prerequisites
for acquisition of corporate personality. The adoption and filing of by-laws is also a condition subsequent. Under Section 19 of the
Corporation Code, a Corporation commences its corporate existence and juridical personality and is deemed incorporated from the
date the Securities and Exchange Commission issues certificate of incorporation under its official seal. This may be done even before
the filing of the by-laws, which under Section 46 of the Corporation Code, must be adopted "within one month after receipt of official
notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation." 21
That the corporation involved herein is under the supervision of the HIGC does not alter the result of this case. The HIGC has taken over
the specialized functions of the former Home Financing Corporation by virtue of Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1989. 22
With respect to homeowners associations, the HIGC shall "exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the
Securities and Exchange Commission . . . , the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding."23

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AF-
FIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172409 February 4, 2008
ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE MARTILLOS, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners Roos Industrial Construction, Inc.
and Oscar Tocmo assail the Court of Appeals2 Decision dated 12 January 2006 in C.A. G.R. SP No. 87572 and its Resolution3 dated 10
April 2006 denying their Motion for Reconsideration.4

The following are the antecedents.

On 9 April 2002, private respondent Jose Martillos (respondent) filed a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal and money claims
such as the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement plus full backwages, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, litigation
expenses, underpayment of holiday pay and other equitable reliefs before the National Capital Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR South Sector Case No. 30-04-01856-02.

Respondent alleged that he had been hired as a driver-mechanic sometime in 1988 but was not made to sign any employment contract
by petitioners. As driver mechanic, respondent was assigned to work at Carmona, Cavite and he worked daily from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00
p.m. at the rate of P200.00 a day. He was also required to work during legal holidays but was only paid an additional 30% holiday pay.
He likewise claimed that he had not been paid service incentive leave and 13th month pay during the entire course of his employment. On
16 March 2002, his employment was allegedly terminated without due process.5

Petitioners denied respondents allegations. They contended that respondent had been hired on several occasions as a project employee
and that his employment was coterminous with the duration of the projects. They also maintained that respondent was fully aware of this
arrangement. Considering that respondents employment had been validly terminated after the completion of the projects, petitioners
concluded that he is not entitled to separation pay and other monetary claims, even attorneys fees.6

The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent had been illegally dismissed after finding that he had acquired the status of a regular employee
as he was hired as a driver with little interruption from one project to another, a task which is necessary to the usual trade of his employer.7
The Labor Arbiter pertinently stated as follows:

x x x If it were true that complainant was hired as project employee, then there should have been project employment contracts
specifying the project for which complainants services were hired, as well as the duration of the project as required in Art. 280 of the
Labor Code. As there were four (4) projects where complainant was allegedly assigned, there should have been the equal number of
project employment contracts executed by the complainant. Further, for every project termination, there should have been the equal
number of termination report submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the record shows that there is only
one termination [report] submitted to DOLE pertaining to the last project assignment of complainant in Carmona, Cavite.

In the absence of said project employment contracts and the corresponding Termination Report to DOLE at every project termination,
the inevitable conclusion is that the complainant was a regular employee of the respondents.

In the case of Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 539, 556 [1998], citing capital Industrial Construction Group v. NLRC, 221 SCRA
469, 473-474 [1993], it was ruled therein that a project employee may acquire the status of a regular employee when the following
concurs: (1) there is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after the cessation of a project; and (2) the tasks performed by
the alleged "project employee" are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. Both factors are
present in the instant case. Thus, even granting that complainant was hired as a project employee, he eventually became a regular
employee as there was a continuous rehiring of this services.

xxx
In the instant case, apart from the fact that complainant was not made to sign any project employment contract x x x he was succes-
sively transferred from one project after another, and he was made to perform the same kind of work as driver.8

The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to pay respondent the aggregate sum of P224,647.17 representing backwages, separation pay,
salary differential, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.9

Petitioners received a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision on 17 December 2003. On 29 December 2003, the last day of the reglementary
period for perfecting an appeal, petitioners filed a Memorandum of Appeal10 before the NLRC and paid the appeal fee. However, instead
of posting the required cash or surety bond within the reglementary period, petitioners filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Submit/Post
Surety Bond.11 Petitioners stated that they could not post and submit the required surety bond as the signatories to the bond were on
leave during the holiday season, and made a commitment to post and submit the surety bond on or before 6 January 2004. The NLRC
did not act on the motion. Thereafter, on 6 January 2004, petitioners filed a surety bond equivalent to the award of the Labor Arbiter.12

In a Resolution13 dated July 29, 2004, the Second Division of the NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The NLRC
stressed that the bond is an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer and that the perfection of an appeal
within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. In addition, the NLRC restated that
its Rules of Procedure proscribes the filing of any motion for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal. The NLRC summed
up that considering that petitioners appeal had not been perfected, it had no jurisdiction to act on said appeal and the assailed decision,
as a consequence, has become final and executory.14 The NLRC likewise denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration15 for lack of merit
in another Resolution.16 On 11 November 2004, the NLRC issued an entry of judgment declaring its resolution final and executory as of
9 October 2004. On respondents motion, the Labor Arbiter ordered that the writ of execution be issued to enforce the award. On 26
January 2005, a writ of execution was issued.17

Petitioners elevated the dismissal of their appeal to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action of certiorari. They argued that the
filing of the appeal bond evinced their willingness to comply and was in fact substantial compliance with the Rules. They likewise main-
tained that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in failing to consider the meritorious grounds for their motion for extension of time to
file the appeal bond. Lastly, petitioners contended that the NLRC gravely erred in issuing an entry of judgment as the assailed resolution
is still open for review.18 On 12 January 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the challenged resolution of the NLRC. Hence, the instant
petition.

Before this Court, petitioners reiterate their previous assertions. They insist on the application of Star Angel Handicraft v. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al.19where it was held that a motion for reduction of bond may be filed in lieu of the bond during the period for
appeal. They aver that Borja Estate v. Ballad,20which underscored the importance of the filing of a cash or surety bond in the perfection
of appeals in labor cases, had not been promulgated yet in 2003 when they filed their appeal. As such, the doctrine in Borja could not be
given retroactive effect for to do so would prejudice and impair petitioners right to appeal. Moreover, they point out that judicial decisions
have no retroactive effect.21

The Court denies the petition.

The Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter involving a monetary award is only deemed
perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety bond within ten (10) days from such decision.22 Article 223 of the Labor Code states:

ART. 223. Appeal.Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by
any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
xxx

Contrary to petitioners assertion, the appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional. Without said bond, the NLRC does not
acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.23 Indeed, non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory.24 It must be stressed that there is no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from the
grant of statute.25

Evidently, the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners appeal within the ten (10)-day reglementary period to perfect the appeal
as the appeal bond was filed eight (8) days after the last day thereof. Thus, the Court cannot ascribe grave abuse of discretion to the
NLRC or error to the Court of Appeals in refusing to take cognizance of petitioners belated appeal.

While indeed the Court has relaxed the application of this requirement in cases where the failure to comply with the requirement was
justified or where there was substantial compliance with the rules,26 the overpowering legislative intent of Article 223 remains to be for a
strict application of the appeal bond requirement as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal and as a burden imposed on the employer.27
As the Court held in the case of Borja Estate v. Ballad:28

The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is under-
scored by the provision that an appeal may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The word "only" makes it
perfectly clear that the LAWMAKERS intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be

the exclusive means by which an employers appeal may be considered completed. The law however does not require its outright
payment, but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail. What petitioners have
to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium of such bond.29

Moreover, no exceptional circumstances obtain in the case at bar which would warrant a relaxation of the bond requirement as a condition
for perfecting the appeal. It is only in highly meritorious cases that this Court opts not to strictly apply the rules and thus prevent a grave
injustice from being done30 and this is not one of those cases.

In addition, petitioners cannot take refuge behind the Courts ruling in Star Angel. Pertinently, the Court stated in Computer Innovations
Center v. National Labor Relations Commission:31

Moreover, the reference in Star Angel to the distinction between the period to file the appeal and to perfect the appeal has been
pointedly made only once by this Court in Gensoli v. NLRC thus, it has not acquired the sheen of venerability reserved for repeatedly-
cited cases. The distinction, if any, is not particularly evident or material in the Labor Code; hence, the reluctance of the Court to adopt
such doctrine. Moreover, the present provision in the NLRC Rules of Procedure, that "the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not
 stop the running of the period to perfect appeal" flatly contradicts the notion expressed in Star Angel that there is a distinction between
filing an appeal and perfecting an appeal.

Ultimately, the disposition of Star Angel was premised on the ruling that a motion for reduction of the appeal bond necessarily stays
the period for perfecting the appeal, and that the employer cannot be expected to perfect the appeal by posting the proper bond until
such time the said motion for reduction is resolved. The unduly stretched-out distinction between the period to file an appeal and to
perfect an appeal was not material to the resolution of Star Angel, and thus could properly be considered as obiter dictum.32

Lastly, the Court does not agree that the Borja doctrine should only be applied prospectively. In the first place, Borja is not a ground-
breaking precedent as it is a reiteration, emphatic though, of long standing jurisprudence.33 It is well to recall too our pronouncement in
Senarillos v. Hermosisima, et al.34 that the judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally
passed, since the Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into
effect. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-
existing one, as is the situation in this case.35

At all events, the decision of the Labor Arbiter appears to be well-founded and petitioners ill-starred appeal untenable.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 98382 May 17, 1993
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ, respondents.

MELO, J.:
The notices of sale under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, on extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage
are required to be posted for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is
situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notices shall also be published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.

Respondent court, through Justice Filemon Mendoza with whom Justices Campos, Jr. and Aldecoa, Jr. concurred, construed the publi-
cation of the notices on March 28, April 11 and l2, 1969 as a fatal announcement and reversed the judgment appealed from by declaring
void, inter alia, the auction sale of the foreclosed pieces of realty, the final deed of sale, and the consolidation of ownership (p. 27, Rollo).

Hence, the petition at bar, premised on the following backdrop lifted from the text of the challenged decision:

The facts of the case as related by the trial court are, as follows:

This is a verified complaint brought by the plaintiff for the reconveyance to him (and resultant damages) of two (2) parcels of land
mortgaged by him to the defendant Philippine National Bank (Manila), which the defendant allegedly unlawfully foreclosed. The de-
fendant then consolidated ownership unto itself, and subsequently sold the parcels to third parties. The amended Answer of the
defendant states on the other hand that the extrajudicial foreclosure, consolidation of ownership, and subsequent sale to the third
parties were all valid, the bank therefore counterclaims for damages and other equitable remedies.
xxx xxx xxx
From the evidence and exhibits presented by both parties, the Court is of the opinion that the following facts have been proved: Two
lots, located at Bunlo, Bocaue, Bulacan (the first covered by Torrens Certificate No. 16743 and possessed of an area of approximately
3,109 square meters: the second covered by Torrens Certificate No. 5787, possessed of an area of around 610 square meters, and
upon which stood a residential-commercial building were mortgaged to the defendant Philippine National Bank. The lots were under
the common names of the plaintiff (Epifanio dela Cruz), his brother (Delfin) and his sister (Maria). The mortgage was made possible
because of the grant by the latter two to the former of a special power of attorney to mortgage the lots to the defendant. The lots were
mortgaged to guarantee the following promissory notes:
(1) a promissory note for Pl2,000.00, dated September 2, 1958, and payable within 69 days (date of maturity Nov. l0, 1958);
(2) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated September 22, 1958, and payable within 49 days (date of maturity Nov. 10, 1958);
(3) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated June 30, 1.9581 and payable within 120 days (date of maturity Nov. 10, 1958) See
also Annex C of the complaint itself).

[1 This date of June 30, 1958 is disputed by the plaintiff who claims that the correct date is June 30, 1961, which is the date actually
mentioned in the promissory note. It is however difficult to believe the plaintiff's contention since if it were true and correct, this would
mean that nearly three (3) years elapsed between the second and the third promissory note; that at the time the third note was executed,
the first two had not yet been paid by the plaintiff despite the fact that the first two were supposed to be payable within 69 and 49 days
respectively. This state of affairs would have necessitated the renewal of said two promissory notes. No such renewal was proved, nor
was the renewal ever alleged. Finally, and this is very significant: the third mentioned promissory note states that the maturity date is Nov.
10, 1958. Now then, how could the loan have been contracted on June 30, 1961? It will be observed that in the bank records, the third
mentioned promissory note was really executed on June 30, 1958 (See Exhs. 9 and 9-A). The Court is therefore inclined to believe that
the date "June 30, 1961" was a mere clerical error and hat the true and correct date is June 1958. However, even assuming that the true
and correct date is June 30, 1961, the fact still remains that the first two promissory notes had been guaranteed by the mortgage of the
two lots, and therefore, it was legal and proper to foreclose on the lots for failure to pay said two promissory notes.

On September 6, 1961, Atty. Ramon de los Reyes of the bank (PNB) presented under Act No. 3135 a foreclosure petition of the two
mortgaged lots before the Sheriff's Office at Malolos, Bulacan; accordingly, the two lots were sold or auctioned off on October 20, 1961
with the defendant PNB as the highest bidder for P28,908.46. On March 7, 1963, Sheriff Leopoldo Palad executed a Final Deed of Sale,
in response to a letter-request by the Manager of the PNB (Malolos Branch). On January 15, 1963 a Certificate of Sale in favor of the
defendant was executed by Sheriff Palad. The final Deed of Sale was registered in the Bulacan Registry of Property on March 19, 1963.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff did not volunteer to buy back from the PNB the two lots, the PNB sold on June 4, 1970 the same to spouses
Conrado de Vera and Marina de Vera in a "Deed of Conditional Sale". (Decision, pp.3-5; Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 96-98).

After due consideration of the evidence, the CFI on January 22, 1978 rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant complaint against the defendant Philippine National Bank is hereby ordered
DISMISSED, with costs against the plaintiff. The Counterclaim against the plaintiff is likewise DISMISSED, for the Court does not
believe that the complaint had been made in bad faith.
SO ORDERED. (Decision, p. B.; Amended Record on Appeal, p. 100)

Not satisfied with the judgment, plaintiff interposed the present appeal assigning as errors the following:

I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING IN FOOTNOTE I OF ITS DECISION THAT IT IS THEREFORE INCLINED TO BELIEVE
THAT THE DATE "JUNE 30, 1962" WAS A MERE CLERICAL ERROR AND THAT THE TRUE AND CORRECT DATE IS JUNE 30, 1958.
IT ALSO ERRED IN HOLDING IN THE SAME FOOTNOTE I THAT "HOWEVER, EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE TRUE AND CORRECT
DATE IS JUNE 30, 1961, THE FACT STILL REMAINS THAT THE FIRST TWO PROMISSORY NOTES HAD BEEN GUARANTEED BY
THE MORTGAGE OF THE TWO LOTS, AND THEREFORE, IT WAS LEGAL AND PROPER TO FORECLOSE ON THE LOTS FOR
FAILURE TO PAY SAID TWO PROMISSORY NOTES". (page 115, Amended Record on Appeal)
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WAS PREMATURELY
FILED AND IS A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER BECAUSE IT MERELY FORECLOSED THE ORIGINAL AND NOT THE AMENDED MORT-
GAGE.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AUCTION SALE WAS NOT PREMATURE". (page 117,
Amended Record on Appeal)
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "SUFFICE IT TO STATE THAT ACTUALLY THE POWER OF ATTORNEY GIVEN
TO THE PNB WAS EMBODIED IN THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE (EXB. 10) WHICH WAS REGISTERED IN THE REGISTRY OF
PROPERTY OF BULACAN AND WAS ANNOTATED ON THE TWO TORRENS CERTIFICATES INVOLVED" (page 118, Amended Rec-
ord on Appeal).
V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE NOTICES REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 3 OF ACT NO. 3135 WERE ALL COM-
PLIED WITH" AND "THAT THE DAILY RECORD . . . IS A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION (pages 117-118, Amended
Record on Appeal).
VI.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE, FINAL DEED OF SALE AND AFFIDAVIT OF CON-
SOLIDATION, NULL AND VOID.
VII.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING DEFENDANT TO RECONVEY TO PLAINTIFF THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED
BY T.C.T. NOS. 40712 AND 40713 OF BULACAN (page 8, Amended Record on Appeal)
VIII.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY TO PLAINTIFF REASONABLE AMOUNTS OF MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES (page 8. Amended Record on Appeal).
IX.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK WITH
COSTS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. (page 118, Amended Record on Appeal)." (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 1-4) (pp. 17-21, Rollo)

With reference to the pertinent issue at hand, respondent court opined:

The Notices of Sale of appellant's foreclosed properties were published on March 228, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the
newspaper "Daily Record" (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 108). The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday while the dates April 11
and 12, 1969 are on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be
"published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks". Evidently, defendant-appellee bank failed to comly with this legal
requirement. The Supreme Court has held that:

The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with,
and that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable (Jalandoni vs. Ledesma,
64 Phil. l058. G.R. No. 42589, August 1937 and October 29, 1937). Interpreting Sec. 457 of the Code of Civil Procedure (repro-
duced in Sec. 18(c) of Rule 39, Rules of Court and in Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135) in Campomanes vs. Bartolome and German & Co.
(38 Phil. 808, G.R. No. 1309, October 18, 1918), this Court held that if a sheriff sells without notice prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure induced thereto by the judgment creditor, and the purchaser at the sale is the judgment creditor, the sale is absolutely
void and no title passes. This is regarded as the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction whatever the rule may be elsewhere (Boria vs.
Addison, 14 Phil. 895, G.R. No. 18010, June 21, 1922).

. . . It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a
jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the notice insufticient
and vitiate the sale (59 C.J.S. 1314). (Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals, L-48278, November 8, 1988; 167 SCRA 16, 23-24).

In view of the admission of defendant-appellee in its pleading showing that there was no compliance of the notice prescribed in Section
3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act 4118, with respect to the notice of sale of the foreclosed real properties in this case, we have
no choice but to declare the auction sale as absolutely void in view of the fact that the highest bidder and purchaser in said auction
sale was defendant-appellee bank. Consequently, the Certificate of Sale, the Final Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation are
likewise of no legal efffect. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)

Before we focus our attention on the subject of whether or not there was valid compliance in regard to the required publication, we shall
briefly discuss the other observations of respondent court vis-a-vis herein private respondent's ascriptions raised with the appellate court
when his suit for reconveyance was dismissed by the court of origin even as private respondent does not impugn the remarks of respond-
ent court along this line.
Although respondent court acknowledged that there was an ambiguity on the date of execution of the third promissory note (June 30,
1961) and the date of maturity thereof (October 28, 1958), it was nonetheless established that the bank introduced sufficient proof to show
that the discrepancy was a mere clerical error pursuant to Section 7, Rule l30 of the Rules of Court. Anent the second disputation aired
by private respondent, the appellate court observed that inasmuch as the original as well as the subsequent mortgage were foreclosed
only after private respondent's default, the procedure pursued by herein petitioner in foreclosing the collaterals was thus appropriate albeit
the petition therefor contained only a copy of the original mortgage.

It was only on the aspect of publication of the notices of sale under Act No. 3135, as amended, and attorney's fees where herein private
respondent scored points which eliminated in the reversal of the trial court's decision. Respondent court was of the impression that herein
petitioner failed to comply with the legal requirement and the sale effected thereafter must be adjudged invalid following the ruling of this
Court in Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 16 [1988]); p. 8, Decision, p. 24, Rollo). In view of petitioner's so-called indifference
to the rules set forth under Act No. 3135, as amended, respondent court expressly authorized private respondent to recover attorney's
fees because he was compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.

Immediately upon the submission of a supplemental petition, the spouses Conrado and Marina De Vera filed a petition in intervention
claiming that the two parcels of land involved herein were sold to them on June 4, 1970 by petitioner for which transfer certificates of title
were issued in their favor (p. 40, Rollo). On the other hand, private respondent pressed the idea that the alleged intervenors have no more
interest in the disputed lots in view of the sale effected by them to Teresa Castillo, Aquilino and Antonio dela Cruz in 1990 (pp. 105-106,
Rollo).

On March 9, 1992, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda
(p. 110, Rollo).

Now, in support of the theory on adherence to the conditions spelled in the preliminary portion of this discourse, the pronouncement of
this Court in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals (125 SCRA [1983]; p. 135, Rollo) is sought to be utilized to press the point that the notice
need not be published for three full weeks. According to petitioner, there is no breach of the proviso since after the first publication on
March 28, 1969, the second notice was published on April 11, 1969 (the last day of the second week), while the third publication on April
12, 1969 was announced on the first day of the third week. Petitioner thus concludes that there was no violation from the mere happen-
stance that the third publication was made only a day after the second publication since it is enough that the second publication be made
on any day within the second week and the third publication, on any day within the third week. Moreover, in its bid to rectify its admission
in judicio, petitioner asseverates that said admission alluded to refers only to the dates of publications, not that there was non-compliance
with the publication requirement.

Private respondent, on the other hand, views the legal question from a different perspective. He believes that the period between each
publication must never be less than seven consecutive days (p. 4, Memorandum; p. 124, Rollo).

We are not convinced by petitioner's submissions because the disquisition in support thereof rests on the erroneous impression that the
day on which the first publication was made, or on March 28, 1969, should be excluded pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 17 of
the New Civil Code.

It must be conceded that Article 17 is completely silent as to the definition of what is a "week". In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G. 3139
[1938]; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Ed., 1972, p. 660), this term was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of
seven consecutive days a definition which dovetails with the ruling in E.M. Derby and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al. (38 Pac. Rep. 900
[1984]; 1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Twelfth Ed., 1989, p. 88; 1 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on th
Civil Code, 1990, p. 46). Following the interpretation in Derby as to the publication of an ordinance for "at least two weeks" in some
newspaper that:

. . . here there is no date or event suggesting the exclusion of the first day's publication from the computation, and the cases
above cited take this case out of the rule stated in Section 12, Code Civ. Proc. which excludes the first day and includes the last;

the publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as sufficient advertisement for the second week because the period
for the first week should be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the second week should be counted from April 4,
1969 until April 10, 1969. It is clear that the announcement on April 11, 1969 was both theoretically and physically accomplished
during the first day of the third week and cannot thus be equated with compliance in law. Indeed, where the word is used simply as a
measure of duration of time and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the
day of the week on which it begins (1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467 citing Derby).

Certainly, it would have been absurd to exclude March 28, 1969 as reckoning point in line with the third paragraph of Article 13 of the New
Civil Code, for the purpose of counting the first week of publication as to the last day thereof fall on April 4, 1969 because this will have
the effect of extending the first week by another day. This incongruous repercussion could not have been the unwritten intention of the
lawmakers when Act No. 3135 was enacted. Verily, inclusion of the first day of publication is in keeping with the computation in Bonnevie
vs. Court of Appeals (125 SCRA 122 [1983]) where this Court had occasion to pronounce, through Justice Guerrero, that the publication
of notice on June 30, July 7 and July 14, 1968 satisfied the publication requirement under Act No. 3135. Respondent court cannot,
therefore, be faulted for holding that there was no compliance with the strict requirements of publication independently of the so- called
admission in judicio.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and intervention are hereby dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 17,
1991 is hereby affirmed in toto. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109902 August 2, 1994
ALU-TUCP, Representing Members: ALAN BARINQUE, with 13 others, namely: ENGR. ALAN G. BARINQUE, ENGR. DARRELL
LEE ELTAGONDE, EDUARD H. FOOKSON, JR., ROMEO R. SARONA, RUSSELL GACUS, JERRY BONTILAO, EUSEBIO MARIN,
JR., LEONIDO ECHAVEZ, BONIFACIO MEJOS, EDGAR S. BONTUYAN, JOSE G. GARGUENA, JR., OSIAS B. DANDASAN, and
GERRY I. FETALVERO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION (NSC), respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioners assail the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") dated 8 January 1993
which declared petitioners to be project employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation ("NSC"), and the NLRC's subsequent
Resolution of 15 February 1993, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners plead that they had been employed by respondent NSC in connection with its Five Year Expansion Program (FAYEP I & II) 1
for varying lengths of time when they were separated from NSC's service:

Employee Date Nature of Separated

Employed Employment

1. Alan Barinque 5-14-82 Engineer 1 8-31-91

2. Jerry Bontilao 8-05-85 Engineer 2 6-30-92
3. Edgar Bontuyan 11-03-82 Chairman to present
4. Osias Dandasan 9-21-82 Utilityman 1991
5. Leonido Echavez 6-16-82 Eng. Assistant 6-30-92
6. Darrell Eltagonde 5-20-85 Engineer 1 8-31-91
7. Gerry Fetalvero 4-08-85 Mat. Expediter regularized
8. Eduard Fookson 9-20-84 Eng. Assistant 8-31-91
9. Russell Gacus 1-30-85 Engineer 1 6-30-92
10. Jose Garguena 3-02-81 Warehouseman to present
11. Eusebio Mejos 11-17-82 Survey Aide 8-31-91
12. Bonifacio Mejos 11-17-82 Surv. Party Head 1992
13. Romeo Sarona 2-26-83 Machine Operator 8-31-912

On 5 July 1990, petitioners filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC, Sub-
Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City.

The complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a Decision dated 7 June 1991, declared petitioners "regular
project employees who shall continue their employment as such for as long as such [project] activity exists," but entitled to the salary of a
regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials. 3

Both parties appealed to the NLRC from that decision. Petitioners argued that they were regular, not project, employees. Private respond-
ent, on the other hand, claimed that petitioners are project employees as they were employed to undertake a specific project NSC's
Five Year Expansion Program (FAYEP I & II).

The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter's decision. It affirmed the Labor Arbiter's holding that petitioners were
project employees since they were hired to perform work in a specific undertaking the Five Years Expansion Program, the completion
of which had been determined at the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the business of steel
manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of
legal and factual basis.

Deliberating on the present Petition for Certiorari, the Court considers that petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse of discretion
or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in rendering its questioned resolutions of 8 January 1993 and 15
February 1993.

The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code which reads in full:

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment The provisions of the written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless
of the oral agreement of the parties, and employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engage-
ment of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of
the season.
 An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has
rendered at least one year service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect
to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners argue that they are "regular" employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are "necessary, desirable and work-related to private
respondent's main business, steel-making"; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6) or more years to private respondent NSC. 4

The basic issue is thus whether or not petitioners are properly characterized as "project employees" rather than "regular employees" of
NSC. This issue relates, of course, to an important consequence: the services of project employees are co-terminous with the project and
may be terminated upon the end or completion of the project for which they were hired. 5 Regular employees, in contract, are legally
entitled to remain in the service of their employer until that service is terminated by one or another of the recognized modes of termination
of service under the Labor Code. 6

It is evidently important to become clear about the meaning and scope of the term "project" in the present context. The "project" for the
carrying out of which "project employees" are hired would ordinarily have some relationship to the usual business of the employer. Ex-
ceptionally, the "project" undertaking might not have an ordinary or normal relationship to the usual business of the employer. In this latter
case, the determination of the scope and parameeters of the "project" becomes fairly easy. It is unusual (but still conceivable) for a
company to undertake a project which has absolutely no relationship to the usual business of the company; thus, for instance, it would be
an unusual steel-making company which would undertake the breeding and production of fish or the cultivation of vegetables. From the
viewpoint, however, of the legal characterization problem here presented to the Court, there should be no difficulty in designating the
employees who are retained or hired for the purpose of undertaking fish culture or the production of vegetables as "project employees,"
as distinguished from ordinary or "regular employees," so long as the duration and scope of the project were determined or specified at
the time of engagement of the "project employees." 7 For, as is evident from the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted earlier,
the principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as "project employees" as distinguished from
"regular employees," is whether or not the "project employees" were assigned to carry out a "specific project or undertaking," the duration
(and scope) of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project.

In the realm of business and industry, we note that "project" could refer to one or the other of at least two (2) distinguishable types of
activities. Firstly, a project could refer to a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer company,
but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the company. Such job or undertaking begins
and ends at determined or determinable times. The typical example of this first type of project is a particular construction job or project of
a construction company. A construction company ordinarily carries out two or more discrete identifiable construction projects: e.g., a
twenty-five- storey hotel in Makati; a residential condominium building in Baguio City; and a domestic air terminal in Iloilo City. Employees
who are hired for the carrying out of one of these separate projects, the scope and duration of which has been determined and made
known to the employees at the time of employment, are properly treated as "project employees," and their services may be lawfully
terminated at completion of the project.

The term "project" could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation.
Such a job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the ordinary or regular business operations of the employer.
The job or undertaking also begins and ends at determined or determinable times. The case at bar presents what appears to our mind as
a typical example of this kind of project."

NSC undertook the ambitious Five Year Expansion Program I and II with the ultimate end in view of expanding the volume and increasing
the kinds of products that it may offer for sale to the public. The Five Year Expansion Program had a number of component projects: e.g.,
(a) the setting up of a "Cold Rolling Mill Expansion Project"; (b) the establishment of a "Billet Steel-Making Plant" (BSP); (c) the acquisition
and installation of a "Five Stand TDM"; and (d) the "Cold Mill Peripherals Project." 8 Instead of contracting out to an outside or independent
contractor the tasks of constructing the buildings with related civil and electrical works that would house the new machinery and equipment,
the installation of the newly acquired mill or plant machinery and equipment and the commissioning of such machinery and equipment,
NSC opted to execute and carry out its Five Yeear Expansion Projects "in house," as it were, by administration. The carrying out of the
Five Year Expansion Program (or more precisely, each of its component projects) constitutes a distinct undertaking identifiable from the
ordinary business and activity of NSC. Each component project, of course, begins and ends at specified times, which had already been
determined by the time petitioners were engaged. We also note that NSC did the work here involved the construction of buildings and
civil and electrical works, installation of machinery and equipment and the commissioning of such machinery only for itself. Private
respondent NSC was not in the business of constructing buildings and installing plant machinery for the general business community, i.e.,
for unrelated, third party, corporations. NSC did not hold itself out to the public as a construction company or as an engineering corporation.

Which ever type of project employment is found in a particular case, a common basic requisite is that the designation of named employees
as "project employees" and their assignment to a specific project, are effected and implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means
of evading otherwise applicable requirements of labor laws.

Thus, the particular component projects embraced in the Five Year Expansion Program, to which petitioners were assigned, were distin-
guishable from the regular or ordinary business of NSC which, of course, is the production or making and marketing of steel products.
During the time petitioners rendered services to NSC, their work was limited to one or another of the specific component projects which
made up the FAYEP I and II. There is nothing in the record to show that petitioners were hired for, or in fact assigned to, other purposes,
e.g., for operating or maintaining the old, or previously installed and commissioned, steel-making machinery and equipment, or for selling
the finished steel products.
We, therefore, agree with the basic finding of the NLRC (and the Labor Arbiter) that the petitioners were indeed "project employees:

It is well established by the facts and evidence on record that herein 13 complainants were hired and engaged for specific activities
or undertaking the period of which has been determined at time of hiring or engagement. It is of public knowledge and which this
Commission can safely take judicial notice that the expansion program (FAYEP) of respondent NSC consist of various phases [of]
project components which are being executed or implemented independently or simultaneously from each other . . .

In other words, the employment of each "project worker" is dependent and co-terminous with the completion or termination of the
specific activity or undertaking [for which] he was hired which has been pre-determined at the time of engagement. Since, there is no
showing that they (13 complainants) were engaged to perform work-related activities to the business of respondent which is steel-
making, there is no logical and legal sense of applying to them the proviso under the second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor
Code, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
The present case therefore strictly falls under the definition of "project employees" on paragraph one of Article 280 of the Labor Code,
as amended. Moreover, it has been held that the length of service of a project employee is not the controlling test of employment
tenure but whether or not "the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee". (See Hilario Rada v. NLRC, G.R. No. 96078, January 9, 1992;
and Sandoval Shipping, Inc. v. NLRC, 136 SCRA 674 (1985). 9

Petitioners next claim that their service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as regular employees. We believe this claim
is without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not
detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as project employees. 10 The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted
above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual
employees, not to project employees.

In the case of Mercado, Sr. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 11 this Court ruled that the proviso in the second paragraph of Article
280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who fall within the definition of said Article's first paragraph, i.e., project
employees. The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the
provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof, unless the clear legislative intent is to restrict or qualify not only the
phrase immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole. No such intent is
observable in Article 280 of the Labor Code, which has been quoted earlier.

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolutions of the NLRC
dated 8 January 1993 and 15 February 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.