ESTRADA vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:
On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No.
26558, finding probable cause that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the
President of the Philippines has committed the offense of plunder, and that he be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The
petitioner contended that RA 7080 was unconstitutional, on the grounds that 1.) it was
vague; 2.) it dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal prosecutions;
and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, thus violating the fundamental rights of the accused. The said law
allegedly suffers from vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly: combination,
series, and unwarranted. Based on this, the petitioner used the facial challenge to
question the validity of RA 7080.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
2. WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder leads to its violation of the right of the
accused to due process.
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and
if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to classify it as such.
RULE:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law. The over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. A facial challenge is allowed to be made
to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of a possible chilling effect
upon protected speech. This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.

1. NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because

of the employment of general terms or the failure to define the terms used
therein. The validity of a law is sustained, so long as that law provides some
comprehensible guide as to what would render those subject to the said law
liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the void-for-vagueness
 doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely consist of
imprecise language.
2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in
criminal prosecutions to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Thus he is
entitled to an acquittal unless the State succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the
accused with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The contention that Sec. 4 of RA
7080 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime is a
misconception. Rather than proving each and every criminal act done, it is
enough that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or criminal acts indicative of the crime as a whole.
3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 (which has been declared as
constitutionally valid in a previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se.

Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte,
petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S.
MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and CIRILO M. ZANORIA, respondents.
The Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M.
Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of
Hindang, Leyte for violation of Republic Act No. 4670. The respondents orally moved to
quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and alleged that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense considering that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and
void for being unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and
unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion
perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as
if the latter were the legislative department of the Government.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over violations of Republic
Act No. 4670; and
(2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.
RULING:
1. The Supreme Court held that the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since
the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is
endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. It is not for
the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an
exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must
be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of
which designated limits well constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an
outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.
2. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of
imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the
legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the
term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the
duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the
life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a
power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case,
does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the nondelegability of
legislative powers. This time, the preumption of constitutionality has to yield.
On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof
should be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR

SCALZO, respondents.
G.R. No. 142396, 2003 February 11

FACTS:
Sometime in May 1986, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher with the RTC. The criminal charge
followed a "buy-bust operation" concluded by the Philippine police narcotic agent in the
house if Minucher where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been
seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo
who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On
January 1988, Presiding Judge Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the accused.
Minucher filed Civil Case before the RTC for damages on account of what he claimed to
have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULING:
YES. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity
from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed
facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies
of the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the buy-bust operation conducted at the residence of
Minucher at the behest of Scalzo.
These may be inadequate to support the diplomatic status of the latter but they
give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not
consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on
suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law
enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal
case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or
duties.