Borja vs Comelec Case Digest

Three-Term Limit

Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a
term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by
operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter,
Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to
1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was
also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the ground that
Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30,
1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second
Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc
reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was
subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of

law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in
that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently,
it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified
to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the
office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by
operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued
the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayors
assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of
chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in
the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, 8) is not only to

prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom
of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8

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of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission
were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as
they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing
term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the
officials concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have
served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for
reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right
of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec, G.R.
No. 133495, September 3, 1998)
Borja vs COMELEC [295 SCRA 157; GR 133495, September 3, 1998]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification, Succession Exception to the 3
term limit)
Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of
Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death
of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in
1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections.
Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor,
sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and
would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of
petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running
for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration,
majority overturned the original decision.
Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?
Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that the term of
office of elective local officials shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A.
No. 71) which states that no local elective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned]
was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention

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of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve.
Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he
is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official
cannot be considered to have fully served the term not withstanding his
voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
Lonzanida vs COMELEC [311 SCRA 602]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule)
Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive
terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995
elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office
and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested
by his opponent who filed an election protest. The court rendered a
judgment declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null
and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior
proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from
running on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the
same post.
The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his
proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the
expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in
computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the
petition for disqualification
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions
maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms
and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a
term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government
officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the
May 1995 elections.
The private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of office
in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he

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discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or
barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio
Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full
term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local
government officials.
Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the term of
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same
rule, that: No local elective official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the
term.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a
term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before
the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance
with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term.
Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the
1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC
null and void on the ground of failure of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida
vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Juan
Alvez, Lonzanidas opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent,
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Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already
served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was
proclaimed winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining that he
was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in
1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit
for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in
the May 1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over
the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections
as the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court
under Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be
considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost
three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995
to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-
term limit for elective local government officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after
petitioner was proclaimed winner.

Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.

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The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and
second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office.

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by
final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his
previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as
mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office
on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive
winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did
not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because
he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which
presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that
Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because
he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents
contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-
1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it
disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under
scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The
clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term
limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice
and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner
vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full
term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a
term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding
him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be
set aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the
assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending
before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the
case and to resolve it on the merits.

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Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong.
The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of
the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after
the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said
candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the
petition until after he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the

candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not
signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a
separate investigation. (Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999)

Adormeo vs Comelec Case Digest

Recall, Term of Office, Three-Term Limit, Voluntary Renunciation

Facts:

Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and
1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao.
However, before Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was
conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was
challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga
disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration
which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.

Issue:

Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already
served two full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.
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 Held:

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently,
it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship
wasdisrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second
term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three
consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he
was defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election
is not a continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third
term thereby barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall
election is not the voluntary renunciation contemplated by the law. (Adormeo
vs Comelec, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002)
ADORMEO vs. COMELEC

February 4, 2002

FACTS:

Adormeo and Talaga, Jr. filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City for the
2001 elections.

Talaga, Jr. was then the incumbent mayor. He was elected mayor in 1992 and was again re-
elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost, however, in the recall election of May 2000,
he won and served the unexpired term.

Adormeo filed a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Talaga,

Jr., on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms.

Talaga, Jr. responded that he was not elected City Mayor for 3 consecutive terms but only for 2
consecutive terms since he was defeated in the 1998 election, interrupting the consecutiveness of
his years as mayor.

COMELEC First Division found Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the position of city mayor.

Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration.

COMELEC Ruling:

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 1) respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the 1998
elections;

2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections;
3) that his victory in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in
the 3-term disqualification rule, and
4) that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the 1998 elections is
considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City.

After canvassing, Talaga, Jr. was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City.

ISSUE: W/N Talaga, Jr was disqualified to run for mayor of in the elections on the basis of
three- term limit

RULING: No.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve in the same elective position. It is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

The two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:
1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. COMELECs ruling that private respondent was
NOT elected for three consecutive terms should be upheld. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition file by Adormeo is hereby DISMISSED.#

Constition Art X Section 8:

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be

9
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.

Adormeo vs COMELEC [76 SCRA 90; GR 147927; February 4, 2002]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Municipal Corporation: Interruption, Recall Exception to the 3 term limit)
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent incumbent mayor were the only
candidates who filed their COC for mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001
elections.
Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served the
full term. Again, he was re-elected in May 1995, where he again served the
full term. In the recall election of May 2000, he again won and served only
the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to the latter in the 1998
election.
Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the
respondent in the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city
mayor for 3 consecutive terms contending that serving the unexpired term
of office is considered as 1 term.
Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is
not consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and during
Tagaraos incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been a
mayor for 3 consecutive terms.
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office
of elective officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that no local
elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
Issue: WON private respondent had already served 3 consecutive term for
mayor of Lucena City.
Held: No. Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For
nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his term as mayor
was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a
voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. Voluntary renunciation of a term
does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time

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short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service (Lonzanida vs COMELEC).
Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3 consecutive term
limit.
Note: Recall a petition designed to remove an official from office by
reason of lack of confidence. It is initiated only in the middle of the year.
Mendoza vs. Comelec

Facts:

Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of
times:

a) 1986 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and served up to
1988
b) 1988 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
c) 1994 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office on 28
June 1994 and served up to 1995
d) 1995 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998
e) 1998 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.

In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in
the May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan.

Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent Romans
election as governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, 8 of the
Constitution.

Issue:

Should Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be
included in determining the three-consecutive term limit fixed by law?

Held:

No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely
serves the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three-year term.

The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription can apply,

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providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If
involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbents being unable to finish
his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates one term
for purposes of applying the three-term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term
assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held to be
one term in reckoning the three-term limit.

In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the
elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official
following the recall election could be considered to have served a full three-year term set by
the Constitution.

The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the
continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of
the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during
which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall
election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had
previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and
1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same position.

A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation
would in effect cut short the elected officials service to less than nine years and shortchange
his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced
against the need to uphold the voters obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman
who received 97 percent of the votes cast. (Mendoza vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154512.
November 12, 2002)

Osmea v. COMELEC (199 SCRA 750)

Posted: August 9, 2011 in Political Law
0

Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus & Injunction

Ponente: Justice Paras
Personalities: Gov. Emiliano Osmea
Gov. Roberto Pagdanganan
Rep. Pablo Garcia
Rep. Raul del Mar
Rep. Antonio Bacaltos
Rep. Wilfredo Cainglet
Rep. Romeo Guanzon
Petitioners

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COMELEC
Oscar Orbos
Guillermo Carague
Rosalina Cajucom
Respondents
Solicitor General, for respondents
Manuel Siayngco, Oliviano Regalado
Jacinto Jimenez
Pablo Garcia, Winston Garcia
For petitioners
FACTS:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates
the Constitution:
1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of
synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof,
providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over
beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the
Constitution;
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect,
shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd
Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for
Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of
Section 9, Article IX under the title Commission on Elections of the Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in
Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the
Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less,
valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of
November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all,

13
Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution,
to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible,
resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for
its amendment or revision.
On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this
petition arguing that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners
lack legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory
opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the
merits, the SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of
legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed
by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance
of the instant petition?
HELD: Yes.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary
to SolGens contention, the issue in this case is justiciable rather than political.
And even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within the
Courts power considering the expanded jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding
the challenge to the petitioners standing, the Supreme Court held that even if the
petitioners have no legal standing, the Court has the power to brush aside
technicalities considered the transcendental importance of the issue being
raised herein.
MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?
HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of
the 1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local
elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of
election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of

14
synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision was used
synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise
intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This
common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three
years.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local
officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court,
quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that it is not competent for the legislature
to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by
clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on
which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the
office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the
time.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987
Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except
barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the
second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be
serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to
June 30, 1995, not three years.
The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing
the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as
follows:
a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days
before the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective

15
provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the
elections.

Munez v Judge Arino

AM No.MTJ-94-985
February 21, 1995

In December 26, 1989, Mayor Asuero Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur summoned to his office
Apolinario S. Munez (complainant) for a conference respecting a land dispute which the latter
had with one Tirso Amado. Due to Munezs failure to appear in the said conference, Mayor
Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him on December 27, 1989. Munez was arrested
thereafter. Complainant Muniz filed two cases against Mayor Irisari. The first was with the
Office of the Ombudsman for grave misconduct and usurpation of Judicial function and the
second, an administrative complaint with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur
for violation of the Constitution, misconduct in office and abuse of authority. Based on their
preliminary findings, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a criminal case for usurpation of
judicial function against Mayor Irisari in the MCTC. The case was later assigned to
respondent Judge Ciriaco Arino after the first judge inhibited himself from the case.

Mayor Irisari moved to quash the information alleging that under 143(3) of the former Local
Government Code (BP 337), mayors were authorized to issue warrants of arrest. Judge Arino
denied the motion to quash on the ground that the 1987 Constitution had the effect of
removing the power of mayors to issue a warrant of arrest. In the administrative case, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan found him guilty and ordered him suspended for 8 months without
pay. On appeal, however, the DILG reversed the decision on the ground that what the mayor
had issued was actually just an invitation or a summons and not a Warrant of Arrest as so
worded. Mayor Irisari then moved for reconsideration of this MTQ from Judge Arino on the
ground that as the DILG exculpated him for the same acts from which the 2 cases were
based from, he should be acquitted. Judge Arino, this time, sided with the Mayor and
acquitted him. Upon receipt of the order, Munez filed a complaint charging Judge Arino with
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for dismissing the case against Mayor Irisari.

Issue:
WON Judge Arino is administratively liable for dismissing the criminal case against Mayor
Irisari.

Held: Yes.

Under the 1987 Constitution, Mayors no longer have the power to issue a Warrant of
Arrest.
The court ruled that Mayor Irisani could not have mistaken the Warrant of Arrest for a
Summon. In fact, Mayor Irisari justified his order on the basis of 143(3) of the former LGC (BP.
337) which expressly provided that "in cases where the mayor may conduct preliminary
investigation, the mayor shall, upon probable cause after examination of witnesses, have the

16
authority to order the arrest of the accused." This provision had, however, been repealed by
Art. III, s. 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge."

The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority involves the following elements: (1) that the
offender is an officer of the executive branch of the government; and (2) that he assumes
judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge
within his jurisdiction. These elements were alleged in the information. Mayor Irisari was an
officer of the executive branch. When he issued the warrant, there was before him no criminal
case, but only a land dispute. It would then appear that he assumed a Judicial function which
even a judge could not have done. All the more, therefore, respondent judge should not have
dismissed the criminal case against the mayor.

Judge Ciriaco Arino should have known that what was before him was a criminal case and he
should have considered solely the facts alleged in the information in resolving the motion to
dismiss of the accused. To justify his reliance on the opinion of the DILG, respondent judge
invoked the rule in administrative law that the findings of facts of administrative agencies,
when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on the courts in the absence of a
showing of fraud, imposition or dishonesty. The Court held that this is grossly erroneous.

Judge Arino was fined Php 5,000.

Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan (1998)

Facts:
The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 located behind the public market in
the Municipality of Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is registered in the name of Greater
Balanga Development, Corp., owned and controlled by the Camacho family. The lot was
part of Lot 261-B, formerly registered in the name of Aurora Banzon Camacho, which was
later subdivided into certain lots, some of which were sold, others donated. Five buyers of
the lot filed a civil case against Camacho for partition and delivery of titles.
Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by the Office of the Mayor of
Balanga but failed to mention the existence of the civil case for partition and delivery of
titles. The permit was granted the privilege of a real estate dealer/privately-owned market
operator. However, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed Resolution No. 12 s-88, annulling
the Mayor's permit issued to Petitioner, on the ground that the issue as to the ownership of
the lot caused anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among the stallholders and traders in
the lot, and advising the Mayor to revoke the permit to operate a public market. The
Mayor then revoked the permit through EO No. 1 s-88.
Petitioner filed this petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction or restraining order and to reinstate the Mayor's permit and to curtail the
municipality's collection of market and entrance fees from the lot occupants. He alleges that:
1) it didn't violate any law, thus, there's no reason for revocation of the permit; 2)
Respondents failed to observe due process in the revocation; 3) the collection of market
fees is illegal.

17
 On the other hand, Respondents assert that the Mayor as the local chief executive has
the power to issue, deny or revoke permits. They claim that the revocation was due to the
violation by Petitioner of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code when it: 1) made
false statement in the application form, failing to disclose that the lot was subject to adverse
claims for which a civil case was filed; 2) failed to apply for 2 separate permits for the 2 lines
of business (real estate and public market).

Issue: W/N the revocation of the Mayor's permit was valid.

Held: NO.
The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi juris and any
doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality. The authority of the Mayor
to revoke permits is premised on a violation by the grantee of any of its conditions for its
grant. For revocation to be justified under the Balanga Revenue Code, there must be: 1)
proof of willful misrepresentation, and 2) deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good
faith is always presumed.
In this case, the application for Mayor's permit requries the applicant to state the
type of business, profession, occupation, privileges applied for. Petitioner left this
entry bank in its application form. It is only in the Mayor's permit itself that petitioner's
lines of business appear. Revocation is not justified because Petitioner did not make
any false statement therein.
Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for
revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly require two
permits for their conduct of two or more businesses in one place, but only that separate
fees be paid for each business. Granting, however, that separate permits are actually
required, the application form does not contain any entry as regards the number of
businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.
The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for expansion of the
Balanga Public Market adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't actually maintain a public market
on the area. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the
landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land.
Of course, the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any
business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a
municipal license already issued may be revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]), but the
"anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders doing business on a
property not owned by the Municipality cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of
Petitioner.
Also, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's right
to due process. The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code
was not stated in the order of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of this
specific violation. Moreover, Respondent Municipality isn't the owner of Lot 261 B-6-A-3,
and thus cannot collect market fees, which only an owner can do.
LIM V CA
Facts: Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and
prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, against Mayor Alfredo Lim. Policemen under Lims
instructions inspected and investigated Bistros license as well as the work

18
 permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work
in Bistros night club and restaurant operations. Lim also refused to accept
Bistros application for a business license, as well as the work permit
applications of Bistros staff. Court granted preliminary injunction. However
Lim issued closure of Bistro operations and filed motion to dissolve the
injunction order.
Issue: Whether or not Lim violated due process on the ground of failing to
give Bistro the opportunity to be heard?
Decision: Petition denied. Lim has no authority to close down Bistros
business or any business establishment in Manila without due process of
law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws
expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private
commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is,
such provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution
requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the
allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits. The
regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be
exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of
the people to due process and equal protection of the law.

Conrado L. De Rama, petitioner, vs. The Court Of Appeals (Ninth Division, The Civil
Service Commission), Eladio Martinez, Divino De Jesus, Morell Ayala, Aristeo Catalla,
Daisy Porta, Flordeliza Oriasel, Graciela Glory, Felecidad Orinday, Ma. Petra Muffet
Luce, Elsa Marino, Bernardita Mendoza, Jane Macatangay, Adelfo Glodoviza and
Florino Ramos, respondents.

Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner
Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service
Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14)
municipal employees. Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the
appointments of the said employees were midnight appointments of the former
mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioners request for the recall of the appointments of
the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the
appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the
CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioners failure to present evidence that
would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.

Issue: whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.

Ruling: No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved,
but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of
applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the
Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically

19
 provides that an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or
revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until
disapproved by the Commission.

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the
following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the
agencys Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agencys
Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between
management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing
civil service law, rules and regulations.
OSEA vs MALAYA
G.R. No. 139821, January 30, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Eleonor Osea filed a protest case with the Civil Service
Commission alleging that she was appointed as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by the then Secretary of
DECS, upon the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines
Sur. However, despite this, President Fidel Ramos, appointed
respondent Corazon Malaya to the position of Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

Petitioner claims that the appointment of respondent was made without

prior consultation with the Provincial School Board, in violation of Section
99 of the Local Government Code as well as her vested right as the Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur. Petitioner prayed that
respondents appointmentbe recalled and set aside for being null and void.

The pertinent portion of Section 99 of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, states:

Sec. 99. Functions of Local School Boards. --- The provincial, city or
municipal school board shall:
xxx xxx xxx.

The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult the local
school boards on the appointment of division superintendents, district
supervisors, school principals, and other school officials.

The Civil Service Commission dismissed petitioners protest complaint. The

CSC found that President Ramos appointed respondent without any specific
division. Thus, respondent performed the functions of Schools Division
Superintendent in Iriga City. On November 3, 1997, Sec.
Gloria designated respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of
Camarines Sur, and petitioner Osea as Schools Division Superintendent of

20
 Iriga City. CSC held that Sec.99 of the LGC of 1991 contemplates a
situation where the DECS issues the appointments, whereas
respondents appointment was made by the President, in the exercise of his
appointing power. Moreover, the designation of respondent as Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as Schools
Division Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments,
in which case consultation with the local school board was unnecessary.

Petitioners MR was denied. Hence, she filed a petition for certiorari

ISSUE:

Whether respondents appointment require the mandatory consultation with

the Local School Board under Sec.99 of RA 7160.

HELD:

Section 99 of the LGC applies to appointments made by the DECS because

at the time of the enactment of the LGC, schools division superintendents
were appointed by the DECS to specific division or location. However, in
1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued a Memorandum Circular
placing the positions of schools division superintendent and assistant
schools division superintendent within the career executive
service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive
service positions was transferred from the DECS to the President.
The appointment may not be specific as to location. The prerogative to
designate the appointees to their particular stations was vested in
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports Secretary, pursuant to the
exigencies of the service, as provided in Department of Education, Culture
and Sports Order No. 75, Series of 1996.

In the case at bar, the appointment issued by President Ramos in favor of

respondent to the Schools Division Superintendent position on September
3, 1996 did not specify her station. It was Secretary Gloria who, in a
Memorandum dated November 3, 1997, assigned
and designated respondent to the Division of Camarines Sur, and petitioner
to the Division of Iriga City.

In addition, under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as

Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case
of appointment but rather in the nature of reassignment from Iriga City,
where she previously exercised her functions as Officer-in-Charge-Schools
Division Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Therefore, Section 99 of the
LGC, which requires prior consultation with the local school board does not
apply. It only refers to appointments made by the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports. Such is the plain meaning of the said law.

21

Appointment vs. Reassignment

Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment.

An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested
with the power, of anindividual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. When completed, usually with its confirmation,
the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless
he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.

On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee

from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency
which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not
require the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein,
a designation connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an
incumbent official

Petitioner asserts a vested right to the position of Schools Division

Superintendent of Camarines Sur, citing her endorsement by the Provincial
School Board. Her qualification to the office, however, lacks one essential
ingredient, i.e., herappointment thereto. While she was recommended by
Secretary Gloria to President Ramos for appointment to the position of
Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, the recommendation
was not acted upon by the President.

Petitioner Osea's designation as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools

Division Superintendent, was expressly made subject to further advice from
the DECS. Thus, her designation was temporary. In fact, there was a need
to recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent
capacity. Inasmuch as she occupied her position only temporarily, petitioner
can be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating her
right to security of tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the
position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

REYESV.COMELEC(1996)
RenatoU.ReyeswasthemayorofthemunicipalityofBongabong,OrientalMindoro,having
beenelectedtothatofficein1992.In1994,anadministrativecomplaintwasfiledagainsthim
withtheSangguniangPanlalawiganbyDr.ErnestoManalo.In1995,theSangguniang
Panlalawiganfoundpetitionerguiltyofthechargesandorderedhisremovalfromoffice.
proceedingsinthecaseandwasabouttorenderjudgment,petitionerfiledapetitionfor
certiorari,prohibitionandinjunctionwiththeRegionalTrialCourtallegingthatthe
proceedingshadbeenterminatedwithoutgivinghimachancetobeheard.Atemporary
restrainingorderwasissuedbythecourtonFebruary7,1995,enjoiningtheSangguniang
Panlalawiganfromproceedingwiththecase.Asaresult,thedecisionoftheSangguniang
PanlalawigancouldnotbeserveduponReyes.ButonMarch3,1995,followingtheexpiration
ofthetemporaryrestrainingorderandwithoutanyinjunctionbeingissuedbytheRegionalTrial

22
 Court,anattemptwasmadetoservethedecisionuponpetitioner'scounselinManila.However,
thelatterrefusedtoacceptthedecision.OnMarch23,1995,thePresidingOfficerofthe
SangguniangPanlalawigan,ViceGovernorPedritoA.Reyes,issuedanorderforpetitionerto
vacatethepositionofmayorandpeacefullyturnovertheofficetotheincumbentvicemayor.
Butserviceoftheorderuponpetitionerwasalsorefused.In1995,Reyesrunagain.OnMarch
24,1995,privaterespondentRogeliodeCastro,asregisteredvoterofBongabong,soughtthe
disqualificationofpetitionerascandidateformayor,citingtheLocalGovernmentCodeof
1991.In1995,theMunicipalBoardofCanvassersofBongabong,apparentlyunawareofthe
disqualificationofReyesbytheCOMELEC,proclaimedhimthedulyelectedmayor.The
COMELECenbancdeclaredhimtohavebeenvalidlydisqualifiedascandidateand,
consequently,setasidehisproclamationasmunicipalmayorofBongabong.Hencethepetition
inG.R.No.120905,whichwasfiledonJuly20,1995,alleginggraveabuseofdiscretionbythe
COMELEConthegroundthatthedecisionintheadministrativecaseagainstpetitionerReyes
wasnotyetfinalandexecutoryandthereforecouldnotbeusedasbasisforhisdisqualification.
Itiscontendedthatthechargesagainsthimwererenderedmootandacademicbytheexpiration
ofthetermduringwhichtheactscomplainedofhadallegedlybeencommitted.Invokingthe
rulinginthecaseofAguinaldov.Santos,petitionerarguesthathiselectiononMay8,1995isa
bartohisdisqualification.
Ontheotherhand,itappearsthatpetitionerJuliusM.Garcia,whoobtainedthesecondhighest
numberofvotesnexttopetitionerReyesinthesameelectionsofMay8,1995,intervened
contendingthatheshouldbedeclaredasMayor.
Issue1)WONthedecisionoftheSangguniangPanlalawigan,orderingReyesremovedfrom
office,isnotyetfinalbecausehehasnotbeenservedacopythereof
Held:No.Itappears,however,thatthefailureoftheSangguniangPanlalawigantodelivera
copyofitsdecisionwasduetotherefusalofpetitionerandhiscounseltoreceivethedecision.
Inthecaseatbar,petitionerwasgivensufficientnoticeofthedecision.Prudencerequiredthat,
ratherthanresisttheservice,heshouldhavereceivedthedecisionandtakenanappealtothe
OfficeofthePresidentinaccordancewithR.A.No.7160,67.8Butpetitionerdidnotdoso.
Accordingly,thedecisionbecamefinalonApril2,1995,30daysafterthefirstserviceupon
petitioner.
Issue2)WONtheelectionofpetitionerrenderedtheadministrativechargesagainsthimmoot
andacademic.
Held:No.PetitionerinvokestherulinginAguinaldov.COMELEC,inwhichitwasheldthata
publicofficialcouldnotberemovedformisconductcommittedduringapriortermandthathis
reelectionoperatedasacondonationoftheofficer'spreviousmisconducttotheextentofcutting
offtherighttoremovehimtherefor.Butthatwasbecauseinthatcase,beforethepetition
questioningthevalidityoftheadministrativedecisionremovingpetitionercouldbedecided,the
termofofficeduringwhichtheallegedmisconductwascommittedexpired.Removalcannot
extendbeyondthetermduringwhichtheallegedmisconductwascommitted.Ifapublicofficial
isnotremovedbeforehistermofofficeexpires,hecannolongerberemovedifheisthereafter
reelectedforanotherterm.ThisistherationalefortherulinginthetwoAguinaldocases.The
caseatbaristheveryoppositeofthosecases.Here,althoughpetitionerReyesbroughtanaction
toquestionthedecisionintheadministrativecase,thetemporaryrestrainingorderissuedinthe
actionhebroughtlapsed,withtheresultthatthedecisionwasservedonpetitionerandit
thereafterbecamefinalonApril3,1995,becausepetitionerfailedtoappealtotheOfficeofthe

23
 President.Hewasthusvalidlyremovedfromofficeand,pursuantto40(b)oftheLocal
GovernmentCode,hewasdisqualifiedfromrunningforreelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision
similar to 40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on
the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.

Joson v. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998]

08AUG
FACTS

Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for barging violently into the session hall of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. The case was endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an
answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension.
Petitioner later Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation. DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position
papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings. Later, the
Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. The
former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.

ISSUES

Whether or not:

(a) Preventive suspension is proper;

(b) Procedural due process is violated;
(c) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the President who is the
Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;

RULING

(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b)
when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent,
who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
the company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit
of two (2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of the province is in a
position to influence the witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the province dictates that extreme
precautionary measures be taken.

(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioners right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O.
No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether
they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine
whether a formal investigation would be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide
that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states
that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only after formal
investigation and hearing.

24
(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to
investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local
government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Josons
claim.

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution
or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart
of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his
powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain
matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the
time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the Presidents alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority.

JOSONvsEXECUTIVESECRETARY290SCRA279DistributionofPowersofGovernmentTraditionalBranches
FACTS:ThecaseatbarinvolvesthevalidityofthesuspensionfromofficeofpetitionerEduardoNonatoJosonasGovernor
oftheprovinceofNuevaEcija.PrivaterespondentOscarC.TinioistheViceGovernorofsaidprovincewhileprivate
respondentsLoretoP.Pangilinan,CrispuloS.Esguerra,SolitaC.Santos,VicenteC.PalilioandNapoleonInteriorare
membersoftheSangguniangPanlalawigan.OnSeptember17,1996,privaterespondentsfiledwiththeOfficeofthe
PresidentalettercomplaintdatedSeptember13,1997chargingpetitionerwithgravemisconductandabuseofauthority.
PrivaterespondentsallegedthatinthemorningofSeptember12,1996,theywereatthesessionhalloftheprovincialcapitol
forascheduledsessionoftheSangguniangPanlalawiganwhenpetitionerbelligerentlybargedintotheHall;petitioner
angrilykickedthedoorandchairsintheHallandutteredthreateningwordsatthem;closebehindpetitionerwereseveral
menwithlongandshortfirearmswhoencircledthearea.Privaterespondentsclaimthatthisincidentwasanoffshootof
theirresistancetoapendinglegislativemeasuresupportedbypetitionerthattheprovinceofNuevaEcijaobtainaloanof
P150millionfromthePhilippineNationalBank;thatpetitioner'sactswereintendedtoharassthemintoapprovingthisloan;
thatfortunately,nosessionoftheSangguniangPanlalawiganwasheldthatdayforlackofquorumandtheproposed
legislativemeasurewasnotconsidered;thatprivaterespondentsopposedtheloanbecausetheprovinceofNuevaEcijahad
anunliquidatedobligationofmorethanP70millionincurredwithoutpriorauthorizationfromtheSangguniang
Panlalawigan;thattheprovincialbudgetofficerandtreasurerhadearlierdisclosedthattheprovincecouldnotaffordto
contractanotherobligation;thatpetitioner'sactofbarginginandintimidatingprivaterespondentswasaseriousinsulttothe
integrityandindependenceoftheSangguniangPanlalawigan;andthatthepresenceofhisprivatearmyposedgravedanger
toprivaterespondents'livesandsafety.Privaterespondentsprayedforthesuspensionorremovalofpetitioner;foran
emergencyauditoftheprovincialtreasuryofNuevaEcija;andforthereviewoftheproposedloaninlightofthefinancial
conditionoftheprovince.PresidentRamosnotedthatthesituationof"12SepattheSessionHall,"i.e.,therefusalofthe
membersoftheSangguniangPanlalawigantoapprovetheproposedloan,didnotappeartojustify"theuseofforce,
intimidationorarmedfollowers."HethusinstructedthethenSecretaryoftheInteriorandLocalGovernments(SILG)
RobertBarbersto"takeappropriatepreemptiveandinvestigativeactions,"butto"breaknotthepeace."Actinguponthe
instructionsofthePresident,SecretaryBarbersnotifiedpetitionerofthecaseagainsthimandattachedtothenoticeacopy
ofthecomplaintanditsannexes.Inthesamenotice,SecretaryBarbersdirectedpetitioner"tosubmithisverified/sworn
answerthereto,notamotiontodismiss,togetherwithsuchdocumentaryevidencethathehasinsupportthereof,within
fifteen(15)daysfromreceipt.Immediatelythereafter,SecretaryBarbersproceededtoNuevaEcijaandsummoned
petitionerandprivaterespondentstoaconferencetosettlethecontroversy.Thepartiesenteredintoanagreementwhereby
petitionerpromisedtomaintainpeaceandorderintheprovincewhileprivaterespondentspromisedtorefrainfromfiling

25
casesthatwouldadverselyaffecttheirpeacefulcoexistence.Thepeaceagreementwasnotrespectedbythepartiesandthe
privaterespondentsreiteratedtheirlettercomplaint.Petitionerwasagainorderedtofilehisanswertothelettercomplaint
withinfifteendaysfromreceipt.Petitionersubmittedrequestsforextensiontosubmithisanswerandwaseachrequestwas
grantedeachtime.TheDILGhowever,informedhimthathis"failuretosubmitanswerwillbeconsideredawaiverandthat
theplaintiffshallbeallowedtopresenthisevidenceexparte."Threemonthslater,onApril22,1997,Undersecretary
ManuelSanchez,thenActingSecretaryoftheDILG,issuedanorderdeclaringpetitionerindefaultandtohavewaivedhis
righttopresentevidence.Privaterespondentswereorderedtopresenttheirevidenceexparte.Respondentwashereby
declaredindefault.OnJune24,1997,petitioner,throughcounsel,fileda"MotiontoDismiss."Petitionerallegedthatthe
lettercomplaintwasnotverifiedonthedayitwasfiledwiththeOfficeofthePresident;andthattheDILGhadno
jurisdictionoverthecaseandnoauthoritytorequirehim,toanswerthecomplaint.OnJuly4,1997,petitionerfiledan
"UrgentExParteMotionforReconsideration"oftheorderofJune23,1997reinstatingtheorderofdefault.Petitioneralso
prayedthatthehearingonthemeritsofthecasebeheldinabeyanceuntilafterthe"MotiontoDismiss"shallhavebeen
resolved.OnJuly11,1997,onrecommendationofSecretaryBarbers,ExecutiveSecretaryRubenTorresissuedanorder,by
authorityofthePresident,placingpetitionerunderpreventivesuspensionforsixty(60)dayspendinginvestigationofthe
chargesagainsthim.SecretaryBarbersdirectedthePhilippineNationalPolicetoassistintheimplementationoftheorderof
preventivesuspension.Inpetitioner'sstead,SecretaryBarbersdesignatedViceGovernorOscarTinioasActingGovernor
untilsuchtimeaspetitioner'stemporarylegalincapacityshallhaveceasedtoexist.Forthwith,petitionerfiledapetitionfor
certiorariandprohibitionwiththeCourtofAppealschallengingtheorderofpreventivesuspensionandtheorderofdefault.
Inthemeantime,onOctober24,1997,theCourtofAppealsdismissedpetitioner'spetition.Afewdaysafterfilingthe
petitionbeforethisCourt,petitionerfileda"MotionforLeavetoFileHereinIncorporatedUrgentMotionfortheIssuance
ofaTemporaryRestrainingOrderand/oraWritofPreliminaryInjunction."Petitionerallegedthatsubsequenttothe
institutionofthispetition,theSecretaryoftheInteriorandLocalGovernmentsrenderedaresolutiononthecasefinding
himguiltyoftheoffensescharged.Hisfindingwasbasedonthepositionpapersandaffidavitsofwitnessessubmittedby
theparties.TheDILGSecretaryfoundtheaffidavitsofcomplainants'witnessestobe"morenatural,reasonableand
probable"thanthoseofhereinpetitionerJoson's.OnJanuary8,1998,theExecutiveSecretary,byauthorityofthePresident,
adoptedthefindingsandrecommendationoftheDILGSecretary.Heimposedonpetitionerthepenaltyofsuspensionfrom
officeforsix(6)monthswithoutpay.ISSUE:WhetherornottheDILGSecretary,inhisresolution,wasexercisingthe
powersofthePresidentwhichareclearlyvestedbylawonlyuponthePresidentortheExecutiveSecretary,andthushis
actioniscontrarytolawRULING:Inhissecondassignederror,petitionerquestionsthejurisdictionandauthorityofthe
DILGSecretaryoverthecase.Hecontendsthatunderthelaw,itistheOfficeofthePresidentthathasjurisdictionoverthe
lettercomplaintandthattheCourtofAppealserredinapplyingthealteregoprinciplebecausethepowertodiscipline
electivelocalofficialslieswiththePresident,notwiththeDILGSecretary.Jurisdictionoveradministrativedisciplinary
actionsagainstelectivelocalofficialsislodgedintwoauthorities:theDiscipliningAuthorityandtheInvestigating
Authority.Pursuanttotheseprovisions,theDiscipliningAuthorityisthePresidentofthePhilippines,whetheractingby
himselforthroughtheExecutiveSecretary.TheSecretaryoftheInteriorandLocalGovernmentistheInvestigating
Authority,whomayactbyhimselforconstituteanInvestigatingCommittee.TheSecretaryoftheDILG,however,isnot
theexclusiveInvestigatingAuthority.InlieuoftheDILGSecretary,theDisciplinaryAuthoritymaydesignateaSpecial
InvestigatingCommittee.ThepowerofthePresidentoveradministrativedisciplinarycasesagainstelectivelocalofficialsis
derivedfromhispowerofgeneralsupervisionoverlocalgovernments.Thepowertodisciplineevidentlyincludesthe
powertoinvestigate.AstheDiscipliningAuthority,thePresidenthasthepowerderivedfromtheConstitutionitselfto
investigatecomplaintsagainstlocalgovernmentofficials.A.O.No.23,however,delegatesthepowertoinvestigatetothe
DILGoraSpecialInvestigatingCommittee,asmaybeconstitutedbytheDiscipliningAuthority.Thisisnotundue
delegation,contrarytopetitionerJoson'sclaim.ThePresidentremainstheDiscipliningAuthority.Whatisdelegatedisthe
powertoinvestigate,notthepowertodiscipline.Moreover,thepoweroftheDILGtoinvestigateadministrativecomplaints
isbasedonthealteregoprincipleorthedoctrineofqualifiedpoliticalagency.Underthisdoctrine,whichrecognizesthe
establishmentofasingleexecutive,allexecutiveandadministrativeorganizationsareadjunctsoftheExecutive
Department,theheadsofthevariousexecutivedepartmentsareassistantsandagentsoftheChiefExecutive,and,exceptin
caseswheretheChiefExecutiveisrequiredbytheConstitutionorlawtoactinpersonortheexigenciesofthesituation
demandthatheactpersonally,themultifariousexecutiveandadministrativefunctionsoftheChiefExecutiveareperformed
byandthroughtheexecutivedepartments,andtheactsoftheSecretariesofsuchdepartments,performedandpromulgated
intheregularcourseofbusiness,are,unlessdisapprovedorreprobatedbytheChiefExecutivepresumptivelytheactsofthe
ChiefExecutive.RATIO:UndertheConstitutionandasprovidedintheAdministrativeCodeof1987,thepowersofthe
NationalGovernmentaredistributedamongthree(3)branches.TheexecutivepowershallbevestedinthePresident.

Pablico v. Villapando | Kat

26
July 31, 2002
RAMIR R. PABLICO, petitioner, vs.
ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

SUMMARY: An administrative complaint was filed against Villapnado, Mayor of San Vicente Palawan. He was declared guilty
and was dismissed from service by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. This was affirmed by the Office of the President. Then,
the Vice-Mayor Pablico took his oath of office as Mayor. The CA, however, declared void the decision of the SP and OP and
ordered Pablico vacate the mayoralty seat. SC affirmed the CA
DOCTRINE: The penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of
law.

FACTS:
August 5, 1999: Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M. Fernandez, both members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan [SP] of Palawan an administrative complaint against
Alejandro A. Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the
Constitution alleging that Villapando, on behalf of the municipality, entered into a consultancy agreement with
Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections.
o They argue that the consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a government position
within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution.
Villapando: He did not appoint Tiape, rather, he merely hired him. He invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the
Department of Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one
year from the election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as
prohibited by the Constitution.
SP (February 1, 2000): found Villapando guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him the penalty of
dismissal from service.
OP (May 29, 2000) affirmed the decision of the SP
Pending Villapandos MR of the decision of the OP, or on June 16, 2000: Ramir R. Pablico, then Vice-mayor of
San Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor.
Consequently, Villapando filed with the RTC of Palawan a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction and prayer for a TRO.
o The petition, seeks to annul, inter alia, the oath administered to petitioner.
RTC: granted a Temporary Restraining Order effective for 72 hours, as a result of which Pablico ceased from
discharging the functions of mayor.
o (June 23, 2000) denied motion for extension of the 72-hour TRO
Hence, Pablico resumed his assumption of the functions of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
July 4, 2000: Villapando instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA seeking to annul:
o (1) the May 29, 2000 decision of the Office of the President;
o (2) the February 1, 2000, decision of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; and
o (3) the June 23, 2000 order of the RTC, Branch 95.
CA (March 16, 2001): declared void the assailed decisions of the Office of the President and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan, and ordered Pablico to vacate the Office of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
o April 23, 2001: MR denied
Hence, the instant petition for review
NOTE: Considering that the term of the contested office expired on June 30, 2001, the case may be dismissed for
having become moot and academic. Nonetheless, we resolved to pass upon the issue concerning the application of
certain provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. (No reason stated)
ISSUE: May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, validly impose the penalty of dismissal
from service on erring elective local officials?
RATIO
Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
o Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or
removed from office on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of
the proper court.
The penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court
of law.
Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al: "[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials,
since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the
aforequoted Section 60."
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds
that

27
 o "(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of
this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the
proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the other."
The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/ Panlungsod/ Bayan and the Office
of the President.
As held in Salalima, this grant to the "disciplining authority" of the power to remove elective local officials is
clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations.
No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government
Code.
Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to
create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity.
Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, expressed
doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the implementing rules.
Verily, the clear legislative intent to make the subject power of removal a judicial prerogative is patent from the
deliberations in the Senate quoted as follows:
o Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the issue of whether or not the
Department Secretary or the Office of the President can suspend or remove an elective official.
o Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later disposition, may I just add the following
thought: It seems to me that instead of identifying only the proper regional trial court or the Sandiganbayan,
and since we know that in the case of a regional trial court, particularly, a case may be appealed or may be
the subject of an injunction, in the framing of this later on, I would like to suggest that we consider replacing
the phrase "PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR THE SANDIGANBAYAN" simply by "COURTS". Kasi
po, maaaring sabihin nila na mali iyong regional trial court o ang Sandiganbayan.
o Senator Pimentel. "OR THE PROPER COURT."
o Senator Saguisag. "OR THE PROPER COURT."
o Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr. President.
o Senator Saguisag. It is to be incorporated in the phraseology that will craft to capture the other ideas that
have been elevated.
The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts.
Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,
insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" to remove from office erring elective local officials,
is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and
the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good
faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the
exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage.
Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority.
Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should
not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.
Lacson v. Roque: "the abridgment of the power to remove or suspend an elective mayor is not without its own
justification, and was, we think, deliberately intended by the lawmakers. The evils resulting from a restricted
authority to suspend or remove must have been weighed against the injustices and harms to the public interests
which would be likely to emerge from an unrestrained discretionary power to suspend and remove."

AGUINALDOvs. SANTOS, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992

Pertinent provision of the Local Government Code: Section 60 Grounds for Disciplinary Actions

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order,
petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19,1990
in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89 dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan.

Facts: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been elected to said position
during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. On December 7,
1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by
Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao
and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was required to
file a verified answer to the complaint. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or

28
actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel
soldiers.

Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to the complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep
and others. On the basis thereof, respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from
notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against him. During the hearing conducted
on the charges against petitioner, complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the
charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even cross-examined the complainant's witnesses, choosing
instead to move that respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which motion was denied.
Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and
ordering his removal from office.

While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor
of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution
paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.

One of the three grounds petitioner relies on for this petition is that: the alleged act of disloyalty committed by
petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it
is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be removed from office on the ground of disloyalty to the Republic.

Held: NO. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case
pending before the Court moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered
the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official
can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he
may have committed during the failed coup.

Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is
defined and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in view of removing petitioner as
the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof
required is only substantial evidence.

WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent Secretary of Local Government
dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89, dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is hereby
REVERSED.

Aguinaldo vs Santos
Date: August 21, 1992
Petitioner: Rodolfo Aguinaldo
Respondents: Hon. Luis Santos and Melvin Vargas

Ponente: Nocon

Facts: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. Shortly after the December 1989
coup d'etat was crushed, the Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, to petitioner requiring

29
him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within
forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof.
A sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by
Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and
Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup.
In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its
execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. The Secretary
suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation. During
the hearing, petitioner did not present any evidence and instead moved that the Secretary inhibit himself, which
motion was denied. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his
removal from office. The Vice Governor, Melvin Vargas was installed as Governor.
In this appeal, the power of the Secretary to suspend officials was repealed by the 1987 Constitution and
that the act of disloyalty committed by petitioner was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
While the case was pending before the SC, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been
removed from office. The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision
of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As petitioner won by a
landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of
Cagayan.

Issue: WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the
President

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case
pending before Us moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the
most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. As held by this Court in
Aguinaldo v. Comelec et al:
the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason
of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct
to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to
criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government of officials is anchored on both the
Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII
(17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments, and by the
doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly
rejected by him. 4 The statutory grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been enacted
by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2. A similar provision is
found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local government code, which provides
for the manner of removal of local government officials, is found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987
Constitution, then it can not be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution.
Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., BP 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the Constitution,
until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved.
The power of he Secretary of the DILG to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60
and 61 of BP 337. As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of the Secretary to appoint Melvin Vargas
as Governor, We need but point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 to show the fallacy of the same. Equally
without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which
is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the RPC. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the
provisions of the RPC, but administratively with the end in view of removing petitioner as the duly elected
Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only
substantial evidence.

30
Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464, 472, December 2, 1991
Petitioner: Felipe Evardone
Respondents: Comelec, Alexander Apelado, Victorino Aclana and Noel Nival
Ponente: Padilla

Facts: Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988 local elections.
He assumed office immediately after proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival
filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. The
Comelec issued a Resolution approving the recommendation of Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of
petition for recall against Evardone.

Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, the Comelec nullified the signing process for being violative of the TRO of the
court. Hence, this present petition.

Issue 1: WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by virtue of its powers under the Constitution and BP 337
(Local Government Code) was valid.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one
to be enacted by Congress. Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by
Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected
government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall
proceedings in the case at bar is premature.
The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision does not refer only to a local government code which is in
futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of
the present LGC. Pending the enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local Government Code remains operative.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the
1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the
Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as
provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January
1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to
the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the
COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall and
set the date for the signing of said petition.

Issue 2: WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held pursuant to
Resolution No. 2272.
Held: No
Ratio: In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or about 21
February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and determining the
outcome of such notice. Evardone alleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the
Resolution of the COMELEC setting the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for
the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for prohibition only on 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO
on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault
of the COMELEC and Apelado. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and
its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election
Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition
for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary there is no turning back the
clock.
The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is
based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also
predicated upon the idea that a public office is "burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the
people holding public offices are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and specific duties to
perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices. Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost
confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are
the judge. "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge his
office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall

31
 Evardone has already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14
July 1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337.
The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as
provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately
seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government
Code

REYNALDOO.MALONZO,petitioner,
vs.
THEHONORABLECOMMISSIONONELECTIONSandTHELIGANGMGABARANGAY(Caloocan
Chapter)andALEXL.DAVID,CONRADOG.CRUZ,TRINIDADREPUNO,GLORIAM.CRUZ,MIRALIM.
DURR,FERMINJIMENEZ,AURELIOBILUAN,ROGELIOSARAZA,HELENEVALBUENA,andHIGINO
RULLEPA,respondents.
G.R.No.127066March11,1997
FACTS: Malonzo was elected as Mayor of Caloocan City in the elections held on May 8, 1995.
However, barely a year after his election, on July 7, 1996, 1,057 Punong Barangays, Sangguniang
Barangay members and SK chairmen constituting a majority of the Preparatory Recall Assembly
of Caloocan passed Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96, expressing loss of
confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him.

The said resolution, along with other relevant documents, was filed by the PRA with the
COMELEC. Malonzo filed a petition with COMELEC challenging the validity of recall process. The
COMELEC, however, rejected the petition. It then declared the recall proceedings to be in order.

Malonzo then filed a Petition for Certiorari With Prayer For Temporary Restraining Order and
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction", assailing the COMELEC's resolution as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Malonzo challenged the recall proceedings, essentially
claiming that the notices for the meeting of the PRA were not properly served. Moreover, he
argued that it was the Liga ng mga Barangay and not the PRA which initiated the recall, contrary
to the requirements under the Local Government Code. He also claimed that the proceeding
followed for adopting the recall resolution was defective and therefore void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recall proceeding was valid.

HELD: Yes. The recall process was valid. The notices were propery served to the members of the
PRA. Moreover, it was the PRA which initiated the recall and not the Liga ng mga Barangay. The
resolution was properly adopted in a meeting conducted by the PRA.

RATIO

I. Service of the notices

The COMELEC adequately ruled on the issue of the service of notices to the members
of the PRA. In response to petitioner's request for a technical examination of the recall
documents, the COMELEC directed its Election Records and Statistics Department
(ERSD) to resolve the matter of notices sent to the Preparatory Recall Assembly
members. The ERSD in turn performed its task and reported its findings to the
COMELEC.

The ERSD and the COMELEC found that the notices were properly served.

32
 At the time the PRA was convened, there were 1, 699 barangay officials. 1, 927 notices
were sent. Service was done through personal delivery or by mail. Most of these were
properly received while there were some who refused to accept the notice. These were
all duly noted. The COMELEC found no irregularities in the service of the notices.

Morever, that Alex David, president of the Liga ng mga Barangay, sent the notices is of
no moment. As a member of the PRA, he could validly exercise the prerogatives
attached to his membership.

Needlesstostate,theissueofproprietyofthenoticessenttothePRAmembersisfactualinnature,andthe
determinationofthesameisthereforeafunctionoftheCOMELEC.Intheabsenceofpatenterror,orserious
inconsistenciesinthefindings,theCourtshouldnotdisturbthesame.ThefactualfindingsoftheCOMELEC,
basedonitsownassessmentsanddulysupportedbygatheredevidence,areconclusiveuponthecourt,more
so,intheabsenceofasubstantiatedattackonthevalidityofthesame.

II. Validity of the recall proceedings

Malonzos insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it
was convened by the Liga ng mga Barangays, is misplaced. The Liga ng mga Barangay is
undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so
happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very
members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom met on July 7,
1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after
deliberation reported in the record, in accordance with the existing law. Thus, the
Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as
members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and not as
members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall proceedings, therefore, cannot be
denied merit on this ground. The law on recall did not prescribe an elaborate
proceeding. Neither did it demand a specific procedure. What is fundamental is
compliance with the provision that there should be a session called for the purpose of
initiating recall proceedings, attended by a majority of all the members of the
preparatory recall assembly, in a public place and that the resolution resulting from
such assembly be adopted by a majority of all the PRA members

CLAUDIO v. COMELEC
G.R. 140560. May 4, 2000

FACTS
Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City during the 11 May 1998 elections.
He assumed office on 1 July 1998.
On 19 May 1999, an ad hoc committee was formed for the purpose of convening a
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA).
On 29 May 1999, majority of the members of the PRA adopted a Resolution to Initiate the
Recall of Mayor Jovito Claudio for Loss of Confidence.
On 2 July 1999, the petition for recall was formally submitted to the Office of the Election
Officer. Copies of the petition were posted in public places in Pasay City and the
authenticity of the signatures therein was verified by the election officer for Pasay City.

33
 The petition was opposed on several grounds. Principally, that the convening of the PRA
took place within the one-year prohibited period under Sec. 74, LGC which provides:
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once
during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one
(1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. xxxx
The COMELEC granted the petition. It ruled that the petition did not violate the one-year
ban because the petition was filed on 2 July 1999, one day after Claudios assumption
of office.

ISSUES
1. WoN the word recall in Sec. 74(b), LGC covers a process which includes the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.
2. WoN the term "regular local election" in the last clause of Sec. 74(b), LGC includes the election
period for that regular election or simply the date of such election.

HELD/RATIO
1. The word recall in Sec. 74(b), LGC refers to the to the election itself by means of which voters
decided whether they shall retain their local official or elect his replacement.

Recall is a process which involves the following steps:

(1) the convening of the preparatory assembly or gathering of the signatures of at
least 25% registered voters in the LGU;
(2) the filing of the recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC;
(3) the verification of the resolution or petition;
(4) fixing of the date of the recall election; and
(5) holding of the election.

That the word recall used in Sec. 74(b), LGC, refers to the recall election itself is due to the
following reasons:

(1) Sec. 69, LGC provides that the power of recall shall be exercised by the registered
voters of the LGU to which the local elective official belongs. It is clear that the
power of recall referred to in Sec. 69 is the power to retain/replace officials and not
the power to initiate recall proceedings. Thus, the limitations under Sec. 74
(Limitations on Recall) apply only to the recall elections.

In Garcia v. COMELEC, the delegation of the power to initiate recall proceedings

from the electorate to the PRAs was questioned. The Supreme Court held that what
the Constitution gave to the people is the power to recall and not the power to
initiate the recall proceedings. The holding of the PRA is not the recall itself.

(2) That the word recall refers to the recall election is consistent with the purposes 1 of
the limitations on recall.

1
(1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned; and (2)
that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

34
 The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the
performance of the official (Angobung v. COMELEC). This judgment is not given
during the preliminary proceedings (such as the convening of the PRA) but through
the vote during the recall election itself.

(3) That the word recall refers to the recall election is to uphold the constitutional
rights of speech and freedom of assembly of PRA members.

To hold that limitation includes the formation of opinion through public

discussions on the matter of recall of an official is to curtail these constitutional
rights.

2. The term regular elections does not include the election period.
To construe the word regular elections as including the election period would emasculate the
right of the people to exercise the power of recall.

In Paras v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that the limitations on Sec. 74 (a) and Sec. 74 (b)
would mean that a local elective official may be subject only to recall during the second year of
his/her term (in this case, from 1 July 1999 to mid-May 2000)

If the regular elections mentioned in Sec. 74(b) would include the election period, which
commences 90 days from the date of the election and extends to 30 days thereafter, the period
during which the power of recall may be exercised will be reduced even more. (in this case,
from 1 July 1999 to mid-February 2000)

HELD/RATIO
Petition DISMISSED.
Mendez v CSC (1991)

Paras, J.

Facts:

o Petitioner, Froilan Mendez, was a legal research assistant in the Quezon City Office of the City
Attorney.
o Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Vicente N. Coloyan, filed an administrative complaint
against petitioner for gross misconduct and dishonesty. He alleged that petitioner tore off a
portion of TCT No. 209287 from the registry book of Quezon City and pocketed it.
o After three months of investigation, then Quezon City Mayor Adelina Rodriguez dismissed the
said complaint against the petitioner for insufficiency of evidence.
o Coloyan appealed to the MSPB
o MPSB reversed and found petitioner guilty as charged and dismissed him from service.
o CSC affirmed.
o The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the following grounds:
o Coloyan is not an aggrieved party or "party adversely affected by the decision" allowed
by law to file an appeal.
o His exoneration by the city mayor is unappealable pursuant to Section 37, paragraph
[b] of P. D. 807 (Philippine Civil Service Law).

35
o CSC denied said motion for reconsideration, ruling that there is nothing in the said law which
precludes an appeal from the decision of the disciplining authorities to determine, among
others, whether the decision rendered is supported by the facts on record and the law.

Issues: WON petitioners exoneration by the city mayor is appealable

o Sub-issue: Who may bring the appeal?

Held:

NO. the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provision of law. [Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Office of the Presidential
Assistant for Legal Affairs]. P. D. 807 does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating
officers or employees from administrative charges. Section 37 paragraph [a] thereof provides that
the Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.... Said
provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph [a] of P. D 805 which contemplates:
Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision.

Thus, the right to appeal is qualified, such that it must be filed by the party adversely affected by
the decision. The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action
which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal
from office. In the instant case, Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved
party because he is not the respondent in the administrative case below.

Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph [b] of P. D. 807, the city mayor, as head of the city
government, is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension
from work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring
employees.

By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the
respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated
of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal.

MACALINCAG V. CHANG
FACTS:
Roberto E. Chang, acting municipal treasurer of Makati, was charged administratively by Lorinda
Carlos and Victor Macalincag, acting Finance Secretary, for illegal disbursements as well as failure to
remit collections to the Bureau of Treasury. Included in the charge was on Order of Preventive
Suspension for dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Macalincag sent a letter to the Governor of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) seeking the
implementation of the preventive suspension. The Officer-in-Charge of the MMC furnished Chang a
copy of the order through ordinary mail dated October 6, 1989. Chang, on the other hand, filed a
petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction and in the meantime, the RTC temporarily
restrained Carlos and Macalincag from implementing the said order. Upon examination of the
pleadings, the RTC denied Changs petition. Chang filed a motion for reconsideration, citing a new

36
argument by invoking Sec. 8 of EO No. 932 which created the Metro Manila Authority and thereby
transferred the power to suspend from the Secretary of Finance to the President of the Republic of the
Philippines. The RTC reconsidered and set aside the previous ruling, this time, ruled in favor of Chang.
Macalincag argues that the order took effect upon the receipt of Chang, which was on October 6, 1989,
before the effectivity of EO No.392. On the other hand, Chang argues that the preventive suspension
would only be implemented upon the happening of 2 conditions, 1) service of a copy of the order to the
respondent and 2) designation of replacement. It is the latters argument which trial court
curried favor on.
ISSUE:
Whether the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive Suspension against
Chang?
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the trial courts ruling is untenable given that the designation of a
replacement is not required in implementing preventive suspension. The Order of Preventive
Suspension took effect upon the receipt of Chang, hence, the applicability of EO No., 392 would be
immaterial. The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is under the Department of Finance, hence,
Macalincag has the power to suspend Chang.
Assuming arguendo that EO No. 932 was applicable, one only has to bring in my mind that
department secretaries are alter egos of the President, making it still within the authority of the
Macalincag as Secretary of Finance to preventively suspend Chang.
Macalincag and Carlos v Chang
Paras, 1992

FACTS:
Chang was administratively charged for dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts Prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
It was signed by Carlos, Executive Director, Bureau of Local Government and approved by Macalincag, Undersecretary of
Finance, then acting Secretary. Simultaneous with the charge, Chang was preventively suspended which caused him to
file a complaint for Prohibition with preliminary injunction in the lower court. RTC DENIED and SUSTAINED the power
of the Secretary of Finance to issue the Order of Preventive Suspension.
On MR, the RTC SET ASIDE its previous Order. GRANTED Changs application for writ of preliminary injunction.
Macalincag and Carlos contend that the Order of Preventive Suspension became effective upon receipt thereof by Chang
and not upon the designation of an officer-in-charge to replace him; that the Order of Preventive Suspension became
effective before the issuance of EO 392 and, therefore, can no longer be enjoined by reason of the alleged transfer of the
power to suspend from the Secretary of Finance to the President of the Republic of the Philippines and that the power to
suspend and remove municipal officials is not an incident of the power to appoint.

ISSUE & HELD: WON the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive Suspension against the acting
municipal treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila (YES)

RATIO:
Under Sec. 41 of PD 807 (Civil Service Law) designation of the replacement is not a requirement to give effect to the
preventive suspension. Section 156, Article 5, Chapter 3, Title II of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides for the automatic
assumption of the assistant municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal treasurer.
Accordingly, there appears to be no question that the Order of Preventive Suspension of respondent Chang became
effective upon his receipt thereof, which is presumed when he filed a complaint in the trial court preventing the
implementation of such Order of Suspension. The designation of the OFFICER-IN-CHARGE to replace respondent Chang
is immaterial to the effectivity of the latter's suspension.
Prior to EO 392, the power to appoint city and municipal treasurers, municipal assessors and their assistants was vested
in the Provincial Treasurers and Assessors of the Municipalities concerned (PD 477) and later transferred to the
Commissioner of Finance (PD 921). Under both decrees, the power of appointment was made subject to Civil Service
Laws and the approval of the Secretary of Finance.
The power to discipline is specifically vested under Sec. 37 of PD 807 in heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces and chartered cities who have original jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters
involving disciplinary action. The Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining authority to issue the preventive
suspension order. Thus, Macalincag, acted within his jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Order.
Even assuming that the power to appoint, includes the power to discipline as argued by Chang, acting Secretary
Macalincag as Secretary of Finance is an alter ego of the President and therefore, it is within his authority, as an alter ego,
to preventively suspend respondent Chang.

37
GARCIA v PAJARO

Digest by: Jessa Mary Ann Cedeo

Facts:
Garcia Pajaro

He was an employee at the City Treasurers
Office, Dagupan and has been employee thereat
as Revenue Collector appointed to that position
by then City Mayor
He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer
Pajaro from June 1, 1990 to March 15, 1992 and
directed the withholding of his salary because of
the Formal Charge filed against him.
However, he did not honor the suspension order
as the City Treasurer acted as the complainant,
investigator and judge and there was no
complaint against him from the Office of the City
Mayor.
He did not believe in the Order so he did not
submit himself for investigation.
Contrary to the charges of the City Treasurer, he
has been doing his duties and obligations; that
for the acts of charging him in the Department of
Finance and for charging him for neglect of
duties
Pajaro was the City Treasurer of Dagupan
He filed a Formal Charge against Garcia on the
ground of unsatisfactory work.
As a matter of procedure, Garcia was
preventively suspended
Then an investigation was scheduled and a
subpoena was issued to Garcia to appear and
testify but he did not answer and refused to
honor the subpoena to submit himself for
investigation.
So he proceeded with ex-parte investigation and
gathered and submitted testimonies to support
the allegations in the Formal Charge then
submitted the result of their findings to the
Department of Finance for decision.

Issues:

1. Whether the city treasurer of Dagupan can discipline petitioner

2. Whether petitioners right to due process was violated

Held:

1. YES. The Administrative Code of 1987 is the primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the
government. The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of
1987http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jul2002/141149.htm - _edn19 to heads
of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the other hand, the power to
commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted by Section 34 of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department,
the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit, the chief of an agency, the regional
director or a person with a sworn written complaint.

The city treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or
employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85 authorized the minister (now secretary) of
finance, the regional director, and head of a local treasury or an assessment office to start administrative
disciplinary action against officers or employees subordinate to them.

38
 In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in Section 47 of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The term agency refers to any of the various units of the government
including a department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the
head of the Office of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer under
him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and issue a
preventive suspension order against him.

Petitioners contention that it is only the city mayor who may discipline him is not persuasive. Section 455 (b-
1-x) of the 1991 Local Government Code states that the city mayor may cause to be instituted administrative
or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city. This rule is not incongruent with the
provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code, which authorizes the heads of agencies to discipline subordinate
employees. Likewise, the old Local Government Code does not vest in city mayors the sole power to discipline
and to institute criminal or administrative actions against any officers or employees under their jurisdiction. In
fact, there is no provision under the present Local Government Code expressly rescinding the authority of the
Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary authority over its employees. By the same token, there is
nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against petitioner.

As a corollary, the power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As held in Hagad v Dadole,
preventive suspension is not a penalty but a preliminary step in administrative investigation.

In the present case, Respondent Pajaro was authorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension Order
against petitioner, because the latter was charged with gross neglect of duty, refusal to perform official
duties and functions, and insubordination-- grounds that allowed the issuance of such Order, as provided by
Section 51 of the 1987 Administrative Code. Clearly, the city treasurer acted within the scope of his power
when he commenced the investigation and issued the assailed Order.

2. NO. In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones
side. Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also -- and perhaps even many times more
creditably and practicably -- through pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain
their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this constitutional
mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a
ruling.

In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings were conducted in accordance with the procedure set out
in the 1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws.
1) Petitioner was furnished a copy of the May 30, 1990 formal charge against him.
2) Pajaro requested the approval of the Order of Preventive Suspension in his June 1, 1990
letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finance regional director, who approved the
Order in the First Indorsement dated June 4, 1990.
3) A subpoena dated July 31, 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to testify during an
investigation on August 15, 1990. However, he admittedly refused to attend the investigation; thus, it
was conducted ex parte.
4) The Department of Finance affirmed Pajaros findings in its August 1, 1991 Decision.

39
 Parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against them cannot
complain of a denial of due process. Petitioners refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite due notice,
was at his own peril. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated.

As to petitioners claim for damages, the extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral
and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of
bad faith, malice or gross negligence. There was no such showing in the present case.

Garcia vs Pajaro
Digest by: Jessa Mary Ann Cedeo

Facts:
PAJARO was then the City Treasurer of Dagupan while Garcia was the Local Treasury
Officer III
Way back in 1990, he was Senior Revenue Collector whose immediate superior was the
late Mr. Viray, the Chief of the Local Taxes, then the Assistant City Treasurer, and the City
Treasurer himself.
Petitioner has been rating Unsatisfactory in his performance for several semesters which
is the reason a Formal Charge was filed against petitioner received by him on June 1, 1990,
10:00 a.m. and, as a matter of procedure, if the charge is a major offense, by civil service
laws, he was preventively suspended for ninety (90) days, also duly received by Mr. Garcia
on June 4, 1990 at 2:00 p.m.
Then an investigation was scheduled and a subpoena was issued to Mr. Garcia to appear
and testify on August 15, 1990 duly received by him on August 1, 1990, 8:55.
Again Mr. Garcia did not answer and refused to honor the subpoena to submit himself for
investigation.
So Pajaro proceeded with ex-parte investigation and gathered and submitted testimonies
to support the allegations in the Formal Charge then submitted the result of their findings
to the Department of Finance for decision.
A Decision was promulgated by the Department of Finance on August 1, 1991. The matter
of preventive suspension of Mr. Garcia was submitted to the Regional Director, Bureau of
Local Government Finance which was favorably approved by the Regional Director.
This case stemmed from the application of the petitioner for the position of supervising
revenue collector and he was duly appointed. The same appointment was opposed by
Mrs. Evangeline Estrada and by a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, the
appointment of Mrs. Evangeline Estrada was duly confirmed. Mrs. Estrada was
recommended first and she was issued an appointment by the City Mayor and was
submitted to the CSC. It was contested by Mr. Garcia. The first ruling of the CSC was
adverse to Mrs. Estrada and she requested for reconsideration. In the meantime, Mr.
Garcia was able to get an appointment from the same City Mayor but it was not
approved. The CSC reconsidered the request of Mrs. Estrada favorably as shown by
Resolution 91-359 dated March 14, 1991. That position was affected by the

40
 reorganization and it was changed to Local Treasury Operations Officer III now occupied
by Mrs. Estrada.
Despite the fact that Pajaro was always upheld by the CSC and the Department of Finance,
this case based on unfounded allegations was filed against him and he was the one being
harassed by the petitioner.
RTC: in favor of Pajaro
CA: affirmed RTC
o Pajaro was vested with legal power and authority to institute disciplinary action
against subordinate officers and employees
o Requisites of administrative due process had been fully observed by Pajaro while
investigating petitioner. But despite being informed of the charges against him and
being given the opportunity to be heard in a formal investigation, petitioner chose
not to answer those charges

Issues:
1. Whether the city treasurer of Dagupan can discipline petitioner
2. Whether petitioners right to due process was violated

Held:
1. YES. The Administrative Code of 1987 is the primary law governing appointive officials
and employees in the government. This Code enumerates the grounds for disciplining
them. They may be removed or dismissed summarily (1) when the charge is serious and
the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) when the respondent is a recidivist x x x; and (3) when
the respondent is notoriously undesirable. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied; due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with
that in the strict judicial sense.

The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of

1987 to heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the
other hand, the power to commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate
officer or employee is granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department, the head of office of
equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit, the chief of an agency, the regional
director or a person with a sworn written complaint.

Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary proceedings against a
subordinate officer or employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85, which
was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized the minister (now
secretary) of finance, the regional director, and head of a local treasury or an assessment
office to start administrative disciplinary action against officers or employees subordinate
to them.

In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in
Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987. The term agency refers to any of the
various units of the government including a department, a bureau, an office, an

41
 instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or
a distinct unit therein. Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the Office of the
Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer under him. Thus, the
city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and
issue a preventive suspension order against him.

Petitioners contention that it is only the city mayor who may discipline him is not
persuasive. Section 455 (b-1-x) of the 1991 Local Government Code states that the city
mayor may cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any
official or employee of the city. This rule is not incongruent with the provisions of the
1987 Administrative Code, which authorizes the heads of agencies to discipline
subordinate employees. Likewise, the old Local Government Code does not vest in city
mayors the sole power to discipline and to institute criminal or administrative actions
against any officers or employees under their jurisdiction. In fact, there is no provision
under the present Local Government Code expressly rescinding the authority of the
Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary authority over its employees. By the same
token, there is nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against
petitioner

As a corollary, the power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As held
in Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, the rationale for preventive suspension is that this is not a
penalty but just a preliminary step in administrative investigation; hence, it can be decreed
on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges
are heard. Naturally, such would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence. There is,
therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before
the charges against him are heard and be given opportunity to prove his innocence.

In the present case, Pajaro was authorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension
Order against petitioner, because the latter was charged with gross neglect of duty, refusal
to perform official duties and functions, and insubordination -- grounds that allowed the
issuance of such Order, as provided by Section 51 of the 1987 Administrative Code. Clearly,
the city treasurer acted within the scope of his power when he commenced the
investigation and issued the assailed Order.

2. NO. In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to explain ones side. Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral
argument, but also -- and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicably --
through pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side,
the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of an action or a ruling.

In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings were conducted in accordance with the
procedure set out in the 1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws.
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 5) Petitioner was furnished a copy of the May 30, 1990 formal charge against him.
6) Pajaro requested the approval of the Order of Preventive Suspension in his June 1,
1990 letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finance regional director,
who approved the Order in the First Indorsement dated June 4, 1990.
7) A subpoena dated July 31, 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to testify
during an investigation on August 15, 1990. However, he admittedly refused to
attend the investigation; thus, it was conducted ex parte.
8) The Department of Finance affirmed Pajaros findings in its August 1, 1991
Decision.

Parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against
them cannot complain of a denial of due process. Petitioners refusal to attend the
scheduled hearings, despite due notice, was at his own peril. He therefore cannot validly
claim that his right to due process was violated.

As to petitioners claim for damages, the extant rule is that a public officer shall not be
liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official
duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. There was
no such showing in the present case.

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