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Volume 11(6): 793824

ISSN 13505084
Copyright 2004 SAGE
(London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi)

Speech Timing and Spacing: The


Phenomenon of Organizational
Closure
articles

Franois Cooren and Gail T. Fairhurst


Universite de Montreal, Canada and University of Cincinnati, USA

Abstract. This article examines how communication contributes to the


achievement of spatio-temporal closures through the interactional enact-
ment of sequences called schemata. Human and nonhuman inter-
actants not only bring into being but also contribute to the opening,
development and closing of organizational sequences, which constitute
and circumscribe what gets done collectively. Timing and spacing thus
consist of creating and sometimes interrupting what could be called
organizational closures, that is, spatio-temporal limits that indicate when
and where specific organizational episodes are initiated, fulfilled and
sanctioned. Organizational spaces and times are thus achieved and
delineated through interactions, a phenomenon that will be illustrated
through the in-depth analysis of a radio transmission that involved police
officers trying to locate and rescue one of their colleagues. Key words.
conversation analysis; organizing; schema; spacing; timing; Karl Weick

Since Weicks (1979) seminal book on organizing, scholars have gradually


started to think about organizations in terms of processes achieved by
individuals to coordinate their activities. According to this approach, an
organization should be understood as being constantly enacted by its
members, a process that Weick identifies as sensemaking, that is, a set of
recipes for connecting episodes of social interaction in an orderly man-
ner (1979: 45). Although this model has contributed to our better
understanding of the nature of organizing, it still remains to be shown
how the process of organizing can be identified through the details of

DOI: 10.1177/1350508404047252 www.sagepublications.com


Organization 11(6)
Articles

naturally occurring interactions. For example, Boden (1994) demon-


strated how organizations can be said to be interactionally achieved and
locally organized, but she never presents a formal model that would
analytically account for the link that supposedly exists between inter-
acting and organizing (Taylor and Van Every, 2000).
If people manage to get organized by interacting with each other, there
should be a way to show that these interactions have organizing proper-
ties, that is, that they contribute to the delineation and embedment of
episodes through which the coordination of activities takes place. In this
regard, Weick (1979) proposed the double interact to account for such a
structuring process, but has never, to our knowledge, tested its analytical
power through the detailed analysis of organizational interactions. Con-
versely, conversation analysts (Sacks and Schegloff, 1979; Woodilla,
1998) identified a structuring framework, called adjacency pair, that was
illustrated through numerous in-depth analyses of talk in interaction, but
they never explored to what extent this framework could account for the
coordination and embedment of organizational activities.
One possible explanation for such shortcomings could be that Weicks
double interact is too general to capture the complexity of talk in
interaction, whereas the conversation analysts framework appears too
focused on what interactants say and tends to neglect what is collectively
accomplished through interaction. As an alternative, we propose another
framework, called schema (Cooren, 1999, 2000, 2001a,b; Cooren and
Fairhurst, 2002; Cooren and Taylor, 2000; Groleau and Cooren, 1998;
Taylor, 1993; Taylor and Lerner, 1996; Taylor and Van Every, 1993, 2000),
which integrates the general character of the double interact while being
detailed enough to account for the details of organizational interaction. In
keeping with the discursive turn in organizational studies (Alvesson and
Karreman, 2000a,b; Cooren, 2000; Cooren and Taylor, 1997; Fairhurst and
Putnam, 2004; Grant et al., 1998; Hawes, 1974; Keenoy et al., 1997;
Putnam and Fairhurst, 2001; Reed, 2000; Smith, 1993; Taylor and Van
Every, 2000), as well as the bottom-up approach advocated by ethnome-
thodologists (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984) and actor network theorists
(Latour, 1987, 1993, 1994, 2002), we would like to show how the
structure of interactional sequences contributes to the enactment of
organizational forms, that is, how interactants (whether they are humans,
nonhumans, or even textual) collectively initiate, fulfill, and close orga-
nizational schema to coordinate with each other.
Since organizing implies the production and re-production of these
coordinated and embedded activities, one crucial dimension to be stud-
ied appears to be the management and enactment of organizational times
and spaces. What could be called spacing and timing, i.e. the achieve-
ment of organizational spaces and times, will be the main empirical focus
of this article. Through the schematic framework we propose, we will
show how interactions contributeand sometimes fail to contributeto
the fabrication of spatio-temporal closures, which define the structures of

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organizing processes. Since our focus will be on the achievement of


organizational times and spaces through interactions, we will first show
how these effects of closure are enacted and delineated through different
turn-takings, whose development will be presented and analyzed
through the schematic approach. Instead of taking times and spaces for
granted, we will then illustrate how both can be not only achieved but
also negotiated through these sequences. Moreover, we will show how
these openings and closings can be performed not only by human
participants but also by nonhumans (especially texts and documents). To
illustrate these phenomena, we will analyze an excerpt from a radio
transmission involving police officers who were trying to rescue one of
their injured colleagues.

Communication and Organizational Schemata


In what follows we compare the phenomenon of double interacts identi-
fied by Karl Weick with the phenomenon of adjacency pairs analyzed by
the conversation analysts. This comparison then allows us to introduce
the concept of organizational schema, which we present as the building
block of spacing and timing. Having analyzed the structure of the
organizational schemata, we analyze the role humans and nonhumans
play in their opening, enactment, interruption and/or closing.

Double Interacts and Adjacency Pairs


To what extent can we identify the process of organizing in interactions?
According to Weick (1979), the response has to be found in what he calls,
following Buckley (1967), interlocked behaviors. These interlocked
behaviors, which constitute for Weick the substance of organizing, are
enacted through specific sequences he calls double interacts. Defining
organizing as being accomplished by processes, Weick (1979: 89) speci-
fies,
Processes contain individual behaviors that are interlocked among two or
more people. The behaviors of one person are contingent on the behaviors
of another person(s), and these contingencies are called interacts. The unit
of analysis in organizing is contingent response patterns, patterns in which
an action by actor A evokes a specific response in actor B (so far this is an
interact), which is then responded to by an actor A (this complete
sequence is a double interact).

For Weick, the stability of organizations is mostly assured through these


sequences of interlocked behavior cycles. In other words, the source of
organizational order has to be found in double interacts, which can be
identified and circumscribed according to the action, reaction, and
counter-reaction of at least two members.
Although Weick has never analyzed the micro-details of naturally
occurring interactions, a similar phenomenon has been identified by

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ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts in their studies of inter-


actional organization. As Schegloff and Sacks (1974) note, it is through
turn-taking machinery, which is presented as a fundamental generating
feature of conversation (pp. 2367), that interactions exhibit orderliness,
for analysts and participants alike. This machinery, coined adjacency
pair by Sacks in the mid-1960s (Heritage, 1984), mostly revolves around
sequences such as requestgrant/rejection, invitationacceptance/refusal,
question/answer, or even greetings (Woodilla, 1998).
What is crucial for this type of analysis is that the adjacency pair
structure functions like a normative framework, that is, what Heritage
also calls an accountable template for action (1984: 254, emphasis
added) that humans orient to as constraining but not determining their
actions. In other words, when the first part of an adjacency pair is
produced (for example, when A asks B to do something), it is, of course,
not taken for granted that the second part of the pair is going to be
produced (i.e. that B is going to accept what was requested by A).
Conversation analysts and ethnomethodologists empirically illustrate
that participants orient to this framework normatively, that is, the second
pair part, which is projected by the first, is considered to be due by the
participants. In keeping with Garfinkels (1967) social ontology, they
show that, even if this framework never determines behaviors, inter-
actants are held accountable for completing the pair when it has been
initiated. In this regard, Heritage (1984: 247) notes,
[T]he first speakers production of a first pair proposes that a second
speaker should relevantly produce a second pair part which is accountably
due immediately on completion of the first.

According to this approach to interaction, human participants thus


reflexively orient to this fundamental ordering principle. They are not,
following Garfinkels (1967: 68) famous expression, judgmental dopes,
that is, social robots who would obediently enact adjacency pairs. On the
contrary, they orient to this structure as a resource and/or constraint to
accountably make sense of the situation (Giddens, 1984).
Although the adjacency pair phenomenon was initially presented as an
organizational principle of the structure of talk in interaction, it was not
identified as an organizing principle per se. That is, it was not a
framework that would explain how people manage to organize them-
selves (Weick, 1979, 1995). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that whereas
Weick analyzes the building blocks of interlocked behaviors in terms of
double interacts, which consist in a sequence of three actions (action/
reaction/counter-reaction), conversation analysts prefer to speak in terms
of adjacency pairs, which (normatively) consist in sequences of two
actions (question/answer, request/grant, etc.).1 Although initially these
differences might appear irreconcilable, these models become compatible
when we mobilize the sanctionable or accountable character of these
frameworks.

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Even if the building blocks of talk in interaction seem organized into


adjacency pairs, the fact that the recipients second turn is, by definition,
sanctionable in the third turn makes the pair a double interact. This
phenomenon is indirectly accounted for by Schegloff et al. (1977)
through what they call the organization of repair, that is, a set of methods
by which interactants address questions related to the display of under-
standing enacted during the talk. To illustrate this phenomenon, let us
analyze the following example borrowed from Heritage (1984: 257):
(1)
A: Which one::s are closed, an which ones are open.
Z: Most of em. This, this, [this, this ((pointing))
A: [I ont mean on the shelters, I mean on the road.

As we see in this excerpt, when Z displays his understanding of As


request by pointing to the shelters, A corrects his analysis of her question
by specifying what she really meant (on the road, not on the shelters).
This third-position repair (Schegloff, 1991) thus illustrates that every
adjacency pair potentially is a double interact. Had Z correctly identified
what was requested by A, a specific sequence of actions would have been
considered completed by both interlocutors and the following sequence
could have obtained:
(2)
A: Which one::s are closed, an which ones are open.
Z: Most of em. This, this, this, this ((pointing))
A: Okay.

In this invented sequence, we see how the accountable character of every


turn makes any adjacency pair a double interact, that is a sequence
involving a (positive or negative) reaction to the second turn. By saying,
Okay in the third turn, A completes a sequence that was initiated by her
question. The fact that this counter-reaction can sometimes be passed
over in silence does not invalidate the double interact framework if we
consider that the second turn can be considered non-accountable if
identified as non-problematical. For example, instead of (2), we could
easily imagine that the following sequence could have occurred:
(3)
A: Which one::s are closed, an which ones are open.
Z: Most of em. This, this, this, this ((pointing))
A: And on the shelters?

As we see in the third turn of this sequence, A can also directly switch to
another question instead of acknowledging what Z did in the previous
turn. In other words, asking Z another question implicitly amounts to
recognizing that what Z did was correct (it did not justify any repair).
We can therefore infer that any adjacency pair is a double interact to
the extent that a positive sanction is taken for granted when no repair is
produced in the third turn. In excerpt (3), As third turn (And on the

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shelters?) can be analyzed not only as the opening of a new sequence but
also as the closing of the sequence initiated by her initial question
(Which one::s are closed, an which ones are open). Instead of a
juxtaposition of adjacency pairs, we analytically end up with a series of
double interacts that structure the organization of mundane organiza-
tional interactions.

The Building Blocks of Organizing


This comparison paves the way for the identification of what could
constitute the building blocks of organizing, that is, borrowing Heritages
(1984) term, the sequential template through which spacing and timing
occurs. As we will show, the organizational world is spatially and
temporally ordered not by a macro-entity called the organization but by
the interactants (humans and nonhumans) that contribute to its orderly
emergence through the enactment of these templates. Referred to as a
schema2 or program, this generic form through which any coordination
of activities potentially occurs has been identified by Greimas and others
(Cooren, 1997, 1999, 2000; Greimas, 1988; Greimas and Courtes, 1982) as
follows:
Manipulation phase: X has to or is requested/ invited by Y to perform
an action A (having to do)
Commitment phase: X decides or agrees to perform A (wanting to do)
Competence phase: X needs to know how to perform A (knowing how
to do), and X needs to be able to perform A (being
able to do)
Performance phase: X performs A (to do)
Sanction phase: X is assessed by Y regarding her performing A
Although the concept of schema is often cast strictly as a knowledge
structure (Abelson, 1981; Schank and Abelson, 1977) with concrete ties
to specific content and actions as in the notion of scripts (Mandler,
1984), Greimass schema differs in its cognitive and performative orienta-
tion. Based upon co-orientation, there is a logical, problem-solving
sequencing of events in a schema that provides actors with a basis for
sensemaking (see Greimas, 1988; Greimas and Courtes, 1982). This
generic form highlights the conditions of action (i.e. necessity, will-
ingness, know-how, and means), the performance and its consequences.
Schemas can be lived or told, constructed or co-constructed, rich or
impoverished in storyline and circumstance, and explicitly detailed or
left to the imagination. As noted by Taylor and Van Every (2000: 47), It is
this very property of abstraction from the concrete circumstances of any
particular context that gives [this] form its applicability to an infinite
variety of situations.
Moreover, although initially this form might appear quite different
from adjacency pairs and double interacts, it actually encompasses them
quite economically. To illustrate the generative character of this model,

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let us first look at an invented sequence involving a manager (lets call her
Karen) and her secretary (John):
1. Karen: Could you please email a message for me?
2. John: Yes, of course. What do you want me to write?
3. Karen: Just remind everybody that we need to have a meeting tomor-
row
4. John: Okay, no problem.
5. ((John goes to his desk, writes the message, emails it and comes back
to Karens office))
6. John: Done!
7. Karen: Thanks
As we see in this example, the adjacency pairs template proposed by of
the conversation analysts appears relatively ill equipped to account for
this type of organizational interaction. Although lines 1 and 2 do corre-
spond to an adjacency pair (request/grant), we see that the real closure of
the sequence initiated by Karen occurs not on line 2 but on line 7. The
concept of adjacency pairs might be useful to account for conversational
interactions, but it seems inadequate to account, more generally, for how
things get done collectively and collaboratively, that is, organizationally.
In contrast, Weicks double interact template does account for the overall
sequenceKarens request (line 1) / Johns execution (line 5) / Karens
recognition (line 7)but does not seem to capture the relative complexity
of the interaction. If we analyze this interaction from a schematic
perspective, we obtain Figure 1.
The advantage of this template is that it accounts for the embedding of
activities while anticipating different sources of trouble (or repairs) that
might occur during the achievement of each sequence. Although the
interaction between Karen and John seems linear, we see that it actually
consists of two schemata that literally punctuate their interactional
duree. The first schema opens up with Karens initial request on line 1 to
end up on line 7 when Karen finally thanks John for what he did.
Similarly, a second schema opens up on the second part of line 2 (when
John asks a question to Karen) and ends on line 4 when he displays his
understanding of what needs to be done. As we see, schema 2 is literally
embedded within schema 1, since this latter cannot be completed as long
as schema 2 is not fulfilled. In the embeddedness of these schemas lie the
clues to how spacing and timing are achieved. Spacing and timing can
thus be said to be accomplished to the extent that the turn-taking
machinery contributes to the spatial and temporal punctuation of organi-
zational interactions (for a similar model, see also Filliettaz and Roulet,
2002).

Nonhuman Agency
Moreover, if we pay attention to the circumstances of this invented case,
we can note that some specific schemata of actions are supposed to be

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Figure 1. Schematic Analysis of Karen/John Interaction.

already predetermined and accepted by the human agents. For instance,


by becoming Karens secretary, John implicitly commits (commitment)
himself to accede to Karens requests (performance), as long as they are
related to secretarial tasks. In exchange, John knows that he will be paid
for this series of activities (sanction). In other words, these forms of moral
or legal contract normally anticipate the enactment of organizational
schemata. Whether under the form of documents or verbal agreement,
these contracts (or mutual commitments) function as warranties that can
be used at any time to remind contracting parties of their obligations.
In keeping with the principles of Actor Network Theory (Latour,
1996a,b, 1999a), our schematic analysis is not reduced to what humans
do in interaction situations, but can also be extended to the role that can
be played by nonhumans (here, a contract) in the development of specific
spacings and timings. In this fictitious case, we see how a contract signed
in the past can continue to make a difference in a given organizational
situation. Ultimately, John and Karen know that this contract can be
invoked at any time to confirm what they can and cannot do. As we see,
nonhuman forms (in this case, a contract) have this fundamental capacity
to last or endure. As we will argue, it is a capacity that stabilizes
organizational interactions and confirms the enactment of specific organi-
zational schemata. This dimension will be developed further in our
empirical analysis.

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Schematic Interruptions
It is also essential to note that schematic forms are literally brought into
being by both human and nonhuman participants, who punctuate the
duree of interaction. For example, schema 1 is initiated by Karens initial
question on line 1, which is made possible in the first place by virtue of
the text that is the employment contract. Furthermore, these schemata
constitute a normative framework that may guide yet not determine the
interactants behavior. For instance, Johns cooperation expressed on line
2 is, of course, not determined by Karens question on line 1; however, it
is projected by this question and can be considered accountably owed by
the participants. Thus, each initiation of a schema opens a specific space
and time whose closure can be anticipated and projected. Latour (1986:
267) notes in this regard,
[T]he spread in time and space of anythingclaims, orders, artefacts,
goodsis in the hands of people; each of these people may act in many
different ways, letting the token drop, or modifying it, or deflecting it, or
betraying it, or adding to it, or appropriating it.
We could then imagine cases in which John might drop, modify, deflect,
betray, amend or appropriate Karens request, a series of actions that
could weaken, challenge or even interrupt the schema initiated by
Karens request.3 At any phase of the schema (manipulation, commit-
ment, competence, performance, sanction), a specific interruption can
take place. Human interactants might not: (1) understand what needs to
be done (manipulation), (2) be willing to cooperate (commitment), (3) be
capable of cooperating (competence), (4) perform the action correctly
(performance), or (5) be recognized or rewarded appropriately (sanction).
The different phases identified do not determine behaviors, but indicate
potential sources of trouble in the completion of a sequence. Fur-
thermore, the normative character of this template is revealed when we
observe that, to complete what is requested in the manipulation phase
(1), the recipient must (2) be willing to cooperate (commitment), (3) know
how and be able to cooperate (competence), (4) perform the action
correctly (performance) and (5) be acknowledged explicitly or implicitly
by the person who initiated the request. In other words, spacing and
timing are always at the mercy of a miss: a missed or missing commit-
ment, competence, performance, or sanction.
Moreover, another asset of this framework is revealed when we realize
that different categories of speech acts appear to correspond with the
phases identified in the schemata (Cooren, 1999, 2000). As shown in
Table 1, the schematic forms proposed appear to be justified by the fact
that they encompass, a la Austin (1975), all the different types of things
we can do with words. In other words, major categories of speech acts,
including directives, commissives, assertives, accreditives or expressives
(Cooren, 2000; Searle, 1979), contribute to the opening, developing and
closing of the schemata.

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Table 1. Correspondence between Schematic Phases, Speech Act Categories and


Modalities

Schematic phases
Manipulation Commitment Competence Performance Sanction

Speech act Directives Commissives Assertives X does A Expressives


categories
X is X commits X is told X is thanked or
requested or herself to do how to do A recognized for
invited to do A (agreement, doing A
Accreditives
A acceptance)
X is
authorized to
do A
Modalities Having to do Wanting to Knowing To do Evaluation /
do how to do acknowledgment
of what was
Being able to
done
do

Though this schematic form should not be understood as determining


potential behaviors, it functions as a normative framework. In other
words, it is a sequential form that people use as a resource/constraint to
initiate, drop, interrupt, delay or enact sequences of actions when coor-
dinating their activities. The analysis of the following excerpt taken from
Schegloff (1972b; quoted in Heritage, 1984: 251) is a good illustration:
(4)
1. A: Are you coming tonight?
2. B: Can I bring a guest?
3. A: Sure
4. B: Ill be there.

As we see in this excerpt, the schema initiated by As request for


information (Are you coming tonight?), which functions as a manipula-
tion, does not immediately lead to Bs commitment (Ill be there), which
just appears on line 4. On the contrary, B responds to As question by
initiating an insertion sequence (Schegloff, 1972a), in which he asks
another question (line 2) whose answer (line 3) determines if she will or
will not attend the event. Furthermore, we can note that the schema does
not end with Bs commitment on line 4. Strictly speaking, the schema can
be said to be completed when B finally comes to the event the same
night,4 an action that can then be sanctioned by A (see Figure 2).
Again, we can note that the adjacency pair template appears insuffi-
cient to analyze closure effects in this episode.5 When B responds to As
question with another question, a sub-schema (schema 2) opens up,
which closes when B finally commits herself to come to the event. In

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Figure 2. Schematic Analysis of Schegloffs (1972b) invitation excerpt.

other words, in saying Ill be there (sanction 2), B not only closes
schema 2 but also participates in the development of schema 1, initiated
by A on line 1. Having now committed herself to come (commitment 1),
she is expected to show up later at the event (performance 1), an action
that is, of course, at the mercy of potential mishaps (competence 1) and
that will ultimately be sanctioned (positively) by A (sanction 1). Instead
of determining the interactants actions, the schematic form actually
anticipates all the possible types of events that can take place between its
opening and its closure. For instance, had B not known where the event
was taking place that night (lack of competence 1), she could have then
asked A to give her its location, a question that would have opened up
another sub-schema (that would then be called schema 3), whose closure
would have then corresponded with her acknowledging As informa-
tion.
As we see illustrated in these examples, the organizational world is
spatially and temporally ordered not by a macro-entity called the organi-
zation but by human and, as we will demonstrate, nonhuman inter-
actants that contribute to its orderly emergence. Furthermore, any
organizing form can be subverted or diverted at any time by the non-
alignment of a specific participant. Through the interactants contribu-
tions, these schemata are thus punctuated: initiated, developed and

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sanctioned in a process that defines the opening and closure of organiza-


tional spaces and times. These discontinuities can admittedly be chal-
lenged, questioned or even deconstructed, but they constitute what could
be called the organizing order.
Finally, it is crucial to highlight that not all schemata are organizational
per se. As illustrated throughout the examples introduced in this section,
schemata constitute normative templates that are abstract and general
enough to account for the organization of any kind of activity (simple
conversations, for instance). However, the idea for us is not to define a
template that would be strictly organizational (we do not think that such
a thing exists), but to show conversely that organizing requires the
enactment of the templates we just presented and that specific features
can indeed help us define what constitutes organizational schemata. As
we will show, these features are, but are not limited to, (1) membership
categorization devices (Boden, 1994; Sacks, 1972, 1992), (2) objects that
are organizationally inscribed, (3) context-sensitive actions (Sacks et al.,
1974), and (4) procedures/protocols, which are typical of organizational
settings. In what follows, we will illustrate to what extent the schematic
forms are relevant to understanding the organizing properties of commu-
nication, while highlighting, toward the end of the analyses, what
appears to characterize organizational schemata.

Illustration of the Template


The Data
To illustrate its analytical power and to further develop the role of
nonhuman agents, the schematic template must demonstrate some rele-
vancy for naturally occurring organizational interactions. To do that, we
propose to analyze a transcript that was made from radio transmissions
between Katie Conway, an injured police officer struggling with an
assailant for control of her police car, a 911 dispatcher and several police
officers on Tuesday, February 2, 1998, in Cincinnati, Ohio (see Appendix
A). The transcription was produced according to the convention system
(see Appendix B) developed over the years by Gail Jefferson (1984). This
excerpt was selected because we think it nicely illustrates how the
achievement of space and time emerges from interacting, that is, how the
coordination of activities results from the co-construction of schematic
forms by the interactants.
Although some of the examples analyzed in the first part of this paper
were not taken from organizational settings, our analysis of the police
radio transcript will demonstrate the utility of the schematic template for
the study of organizing, that is, situations in which people have to
coordinate their activities to get things done collectively (Follett, 1941;
Grant et al., 1998). Certainly, not just any instance of interaction counts as
organizing (McPhee and Zaug, 2000); however, our hypothesis is that
the double interact framework that Weick (1979) proposed to account for

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the process of organizing can be operationalized through the identifica-


tion of schematic forms. Given the high level of organization that con-
versation analysts find in the most banal and mundane interactions
(Pomerantz and Fehr, 1997), we contend that the template we propose
should be especially relevant to study high-reliability organizing (HRO)
processes (Weick et al., 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) such as the
rescue operation we now propose to analyze.
Even if these processes are highly routinized and proceduraland that
is what partly makes these processes organizationalthey have to be
performed by the human and nonhuman participants involved. As we
will show, it is precisely through the detailed analysis of these perfor-
mances, which always are at the mercy of contingencies, variations,
interruptions and interferences, that the resilient character of this type of
HRO intervention will be revealed (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). Spacing
and timing, the empirical foci of this article, will thus be especially
illustrated through the resilience that human participants display in
initiating and striving to close schemata that ultimately contribute to the
rescue of the officer injured. However, we will also show the resilience of
some nonhumans, while others are discarded because of their rigidity.

Data Analysis
In this analytical section, we propose to illustrate what we claim to be
five important dimensions of spacing and timing. First, we focus on how
interactants contribute to the enactment of spatio-temporal units that
imbricate with each other, creating effects of submission and subordina-
tion so typical of organizational processes. Second, we show how these
sequences can be typically interrupted by effects of subversion, a phe-
nomenon that demonstrates how spacings and timings always are at the
mercy of the constraints/enablements imposed by any human and non-
human interactant involved in the process. Third, we explore in more
depth the role nonhumans play in the enactment or interruptions of these
organizational sequences, a phenomenon that allows us to illustrate how
what happened there and then can have some bearing on what happens
here and now. Fourth, we analyze how punctuation takes place, that is,
how openings and closings are literally enacted by the interactants in
presence (and in absence). Fifth, we show how organizational schemata
can function in parallel or in articulation with each other, two phenomena
that illustrate the diversity of organizational spacings and timings. Finally,
we close this analytical section by highlighting four characteristics that, for
us, define what constitutes organizational schemata per se.

Submission and Subordination The excerpt begins with Conways call


for help on line 1. This distress calls creates a tension (analyzable as a
schema) whose potential resolution corresponds with Conway being
finally rescued. Everything that follows this distress call then appears to
be related in one way or another to this resolution. What we then have to

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analyze is how these effects of embedment are actually achieved. We first


notice that Conways call for help is subsequently answered by a question
from the dispatcher (Where do you need it?), which constitutes the
opening of a sub-schema. Following the distress call, the dispatcher is
supposed to identify and confirm her location according to procedure.
Given the situation, the police officers clearly need to know where
Conway is, since their job now is to rescue her. The procedural sub-
schema initiated by the dispatcher can thus be understood as inserted or
embedded within the initial schema opened by Conways distress call.
As we see in this analysis, something interesting occurs during this
very short period of time. Although the interaction appears to have a
linear flow, we can observe that a structuring effect is already operating.
As we saw, Conways distress call can be understood as an attempt to
enlist other police officers in her program of action. From her per-
spective, the course of action of her colleagues can thus be understood as
subordinated to her own program. Similarly, since the dispatcher does
not have the information necessary to send the officers, she also has to
enlist Conway in her own program. Similar to excerpt (4) borrowed from
Schegloff (1972b), the situation can be analyzed according to the sche-
mata that appear in Figure 3.
As we see in this analysis, each contribution makes sense because it
can be inserted into schemata that appear to be embedded within each
other. The dispatchers question makes sense because it is meant as
contributing to the fulfillment of the program of action initiated by
Conway. Following the distress call on line 1, the dispatcher knows that
procedurally she must launch an assistance call to confirm Conways

Figure 3. Schematic Analysis of the First Three Lines of the Radio Transmission

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location for the other officers, an operation that normally leads the
officers who are the closest to the located incident to self-select in order
to intervene. In order to provide the officers with this vital information,
she then asks Conway where she is (Where do you need it, line 3). As
we see in this analysis, two sub-schemata (2 and 3) have thus been
opened following Conways initial distress call. Through Schema 3, the
dispatcher seeks to know where Conway is located, a piece of informa-
tion that will then enable her to launch her assistance call to the police
network (Schema 2).
Imagine that Conway had responded to the dispatcher by directly
indicating where she was, this information would have enabled the
dispatcher to complete Schema 3, which would have then enabled her to
launch her assistance call (Schema 2). This completion would have then
allowed her to communicate the information to the relevant officers, an
action that would have also contributed to the completion of the general
sequence of intervention (called Schema 1). Were this to have happened,
the identification of temporal and spatial sequences would seem to pose
few problems, since the imbrication of schemata would have been
performed seamlessly (as we will see later, what really happened is, of
course, much more messy). Again, what is essential to note at this level of
our analysis is that these schemata that may or may not follow procedure
do not function as top-down structures determining or governing what is
about to happen. Similar to the adjacency pairs analyzed by conversation
analysts, they constitute normative frameworks, i.e. resources.

Interruptions and Subversion Even if police officers and dispatchers are


supposed to submit to specific procedures that determine how the
interactions should be enacted, these procedures can be bypassed, drop-
ped or interrupted at any point in space and time. For example, a general
procedure for all radio communication is that police officers should give
their car number and then wait for the dispatcher to recognize them prior
to communicating. As we see in the excerpt, this form of submission is
bypassed at the beginning of the transmission (from line 6 to line 66), and
it progressively emerges once Conway is finally located (from line 67). At
any moment, a procedural or nonprocedural schema initiated by a
participant can thus be dropped, interrupted or delayed by the other
participants.
As we see on line 4, Conway does not really answer the dispatchers
question and just reiterates twice that she needs help. After a 1.5 second
silence, Officer 1030 intervenes to propose a possible location (line 6).
One of the main issues confronted by the police is that Conway seems
unable to answer the dispatchers request, creating an interruption of the
schema of intervention. In other words, her response does not insert into
the polices program of action. In keeping with the resilient character of
high-reliability processes, it is to compensate this interruption that
Officer 1030 decides to propose a location that could allow the police

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schema to proceed with its course of action. However, the dispatcher


does not seem to acknowledge this intervention and twice reiterates her
question to Officer Conway (whose official identification number is 1212)
(lines 8 and 10). After 6.5 long seconds, Officer 1080 asks the dispatcher
if she has a location (line 12), to which she responds in the negative (line
14). Officially, the schema is still open and the police network seems
blocked at the level of the competence phase. As specified by Latour
(1986), the spread in time and space is in the hands of the actors who
punctuate the process. Far from being a functionalist perspective, the
schematic approach thus shows that the organizing forms are constituted
by different phases that can be subverted, diverted or interrupted at any
time and any place.
The Role of Nonhumans As in the case of contracts, procedures tell or remind
people what they have to do, but this form of submission/subordination
can always be dropped if their enactment appears to be too constraining
or their non-enactment not appropriately sanctioned. In other words,
organizational texts such as policies, contracts or procedures appear to
operate as sources of enablements and constraints during the enactment
of schemata.6 They are constraints because they function as speech
agents that can tell or remind people what they have to do in specific
circumstances. They are sources of enablement because submitting to
these speech agents normally enables human interactants to fulfill their
objectives, either by allowing them not to be negatively sanctioned, or by
providing the means through which they can actually perform their tasks.
To illustrate this source of enablement, consider the following excerpt:
75 Dispatcher: Fire company is responding. (.) Other units
76 Officer 1240: No other units to transmit at this point. Im also gonna need the uh recall
list
77 Dispatcher: OK. I need, if you can give us a call to know the condition right now also.

As we see on lines 7677, Officer 1240 asks for what is usually called the
Situational Notification List, which is a protocol for the identification of
all the relevant police departments and units that must be notified (e.g.
night chief, homicide division, etc.). If we now analyze the role this list
plays in the organizing process, it seems reasonable to say that it
indicates specific organizational pathways to be followed by the officers.
At this specific point of the process, a list that was designed in the past
can intervene to tell the officer what kind of units should be notified,
given the present situation. As we see, spacing and timing are not
phenomena that can be reduced to what happens here and now during
the police intervention. On the contrary, we see how textual agents such
as the Situational Notification List or the procedures literally dislocate
the interactions: what happens in the past and in other locations does
have some bearing on the police intervention.
This analysis also illustrates an important point about speech act
theory. Although scholars such as Austin (1975), Searle (1969, 1977,

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1979a,b, 1989, 1995) and Vanderveken (19901) tend to reduce the


phenomenon of speech acts to what human actors do, what should
prevent us from ascribing to documents and texts in general the very
capacity to do things with words? In other words, the Situational
Notification List plays a consequential role in the progression of the
organizing process. More precisely, it will actually remind officer 1240
what needs to be done in the given circumstances. As a list of instruc-
tions, it thus functions as a source of directives that the officers are
supposed to follow in specific situations (see also Cooren, 2004).
To be sure, this list emanates from the police authorities and is
recognized as such. We could then say that it is the police authorities
who will, in fact, remind officer 1240 what needs to be done in these
circumstances. This analysis is also correct and the phenomena of
spacings and timings precisely correspond to this action from a distance
and at some previous time by the authorities. This general phenomenon
of delegation has been very well analyzed by Callon (1986), Callon and
Latour (1981) and Latour (1994), who speak in terms of mediation. What
this analysis shows is that the same logic should apply to speech acts;
that is, speaking in terms of organizing presupposes that we take into
account all the different agents (human and nonhuman) contributing to
organizational spacings and timings. This means that we have to account
for the physical mediations that were so nicely studied by Actor Network
theoreticians (had we had enough space, we could have dwelled, for
example, on the role played by the radio system and the cars), but also for
the discursive mediations that are analyzed here. As Derrida (1988) notes,
texts function like machines and the actionality of speech acts identified
by the orthodox model should be extended to the texts themselves. Texts
and documents can remind, assert, say, authorize, inform, instruct or
indicate, and these activities must be taken into account if we really want
to understand the spread in time and space of organizing process,
especially through the phenomena of action from a distance (spacing)
and action across time (timing).

Schemata and Punctuation Having recognized the bottom-up character of the


schematic forms, we must also demonstrate the extent to which the
different turn-takings enacted by the participants contribute to the
numerous effects of closure that can be identified in this excerpt. If we
pay attention to the details of the interaction as analyzed in Figure 4, we
can then identify several discontinuities. The first could be identified as
being the dispatchers repeated attemptsManipulation 3a (line 3),
Manipulation 3b (line 8) and Manipulation 3c (line 23)to get the
location from Conway. Initiated on line 3, these attempts finally succeed
on lines 2425 (when Conway finally says where she is), a performance
that then enables the dispatcher to launch her second assistance call
(lines 36 to 39). Again following procedure, this call apparently corre-
sponds to the completion of Schema 2. This episode can thus be

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circumscribed and delineated by the dispatchers first question (line 3),


which initiates the process, and Officer 1080s confirmation of Conways
location (Sanction 2b), which actually consists of correcting the location
provided in the assistance call (line 41). As mentioned previously, this
schema then appears to be embedded within a larger schema (schema 1),
which is initiated by Conways distress call and corresponds to the police
intervention. Strictly speaking, Schema 1 starts to close when the police
officers finally arrive at Conways location around line 43 and begin to
rescue her (Performance 1), and it can be considered closed when
Conway is finally brought to the hospital (Sanction 1).
However, if we pay more attention to Schema 2, we then realize that it
actually looks a little more complicated than what we initially proposed.
The official assistance call that the dispatcher is supposed to launch
normally contains, according to procedure, an attention marker, a
description of the situation, the location, possible enjoinders to the
police officers, and a repetition of the message. As we noted before,
Schema 3 is initiated by the dispatcher to get Conways location. Once
this specific sub-schema is completed (on line 27), the dispatcher can
proceed with another question related to the description of the situation,
a piece of information that she also needs to reference in her assistance
call. On lines 28 and 30, she thus initiates Schema 5 by asking for
additional information about Conways condition (Are you hurt?), to
which Conway finally responds (Thats affirmative) on line 32. Given
that the two sub-schemata (3 and 5) are now completed and closed, the
dispatcher can launch her assistance call from lines 36 to 39 (Perform-
ance 2b).
If we now look at the details of Schema 3, we have already observed
that Officer 1030 intervenes on line 6 when he proposes a possible
location for Conway (Performance 3a). By proposing this location, Officer
1030 thus attempts to contribute to the closure of this schema, given that
Conway seems unable to provide the information. Though the dispatcher
does not immediately acknowledge Officer 1030s contribution (she
reiterates her question to Conway on line 8), it is this location that she
decides to take up when she launches her first assistance call from lines
16 to 17 (Performance 2a), an assistance call that is invalidated by Officer
1080 on line 19 (Sanction 2a).
Meanwhile, another embedding that bypassed the dispatchers con-
tribution has already occurred. Given the present circumstances, there is
no time to defer the intervention; some officers have already started to
look for Conway since the initial distress call on line 1. By asking the
dispatcher if she got the location (Manipulation 4a, line 12), Officer 1080
can thus be said to be initiating another schema (called Schema 4), which
literally bypasses the procedural course (Schema 2) actively followed by
the dispatcher. Note that the dispatcher contributes to this schema by
answering in the negative on line 14 (Performance 4a). Following the

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invalidation of the first assistance call, another attempt is made by Officer


1240 when he asks the dispatcher to play the tape of the transmission
back to check if Conway did not say anything during her initial distress
call (Manipulation 4b, line 21). The dispatcher does not seem to comply
(an absence of performance that we label Performance 4b) and just
reiterates her question to Conway (Manipulation 3c, line 23), who finally
gives her location (lines 2425).

Figure 4. Schematic Analysis of the Radio Transmission.

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Interestingly enough, this response from Conway can count as contrib-


uting both to the police officers schema of intervention (Schema 4) and
to the dispatchers procedural course (Schema 3), which explains why it
is labeled Performance 3c/4b. This analysis is confirmed by the fact that
it is Officer 1080, not the dispatcher, who acknowledges reception of
Conways response on line 27. This acknowledgment, labeled Sanction
3c/4b, can thus be said to contribute to the closure of Schemata 3 and 4.
Schema 3 can be considered closed to the extent that the dispatcher now
knows where Conway is located, a piece of information that can later
enable her to launch her second assistance call on lines 3639 (Schema
2). Concomitantly, Schema 4 can also be considered closed to the extent
that the police officers can now directly intervene without waiting for the
official assistance call.

Articulation and Parallelism Following this detailed analysis, we can note


that the officers and the dispatchers contributions function sometimes
in parallel and sometimes in articulation. In terms of parallelism, we saw
that at least two schemata (2 and 4) are overlapping throughout the
intervention. While the dispatcher attempts to get Conways location in
order to launch her assistance call (Schema 2), some police officers
(Officers 1080, 1030 and 1240) try to get the information directly from the
dispatcher or from Conway (Schema 4) without waiting for the assistance
call. For example, as soon as Conway gives her location, Officer 1080
bypasses the dispatcher to acknowledge reception (line 27). The police
officers finally know where Conway is (closure of Schema 4) and can
proceed without apparently relying on the dispatchers role of inter-
mediary (no articulation occurs).
In terms of articulation, we also noted that some of the officers
contributions are designed to be inserted in the dispatchers schema,
whereas others are designed to insert the dispatchers contribution within
their own schema of action. For example, we saw that Officer 1030s
initial intervention on line 6 can be understood as a response to the
dispatchers question initially addressed to Conway (but note that it
could also be a way to inform the police network, more generally). This
response can thus be considered a possible contribution to the dis-
patchers schema of intervention. Alternatively, Officer 1080s question
on line 12 (1080, we got a location?) and Officer 1240s request on line
21 (1240. Play the tape back) constitute attempts to insert the dispatcher
in their own schema of action.
As we see, the coordination of activities creates spacings and timings
rather than one homogeneous space and one linear time.7 Although the
officers sometimes contribute to the dispatchers schemata of action, they
also expect that the dispatcher will contribute to their own. The embed-
ding of organizational schemata then appears to be quite complex, since
each agent seems to be following his or her own course of action, yet
expects other agents to cooperate, and vice versa. The coordination of

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activities thus appears as the enactment of a series of schemata com-


pleted or left opened by the different agents in presence. From line 3, the
dispatcher has opened a sequence that ultimately ends on line 41.
Throughout this sequence, she addressed five questions to Conway, two
of which were responded to by Conway (on lines 2425 and 32) and one
of which was responded to by Officer 1030 on line 6. Meanwhile, we also
saw how she subordinated one of her contributions to Officer 1080s
schemata (on line 14, following a question on his part on line 12), while
apparently refusing to comply with a request launched on line 21 by
Officer 1240 (whose schema was thus interrupted). Though this sequence
takes place very quickly, we see how each intervention can be under-
stood as contributing or not contributing to a series of schemata initiated
by the participants. We then see how timings and spacings are achieved
with potentially endless variety in the turn-taking machinery of inter-
action.

Organizational Schemata We will conclude this analytical section by high-


lighting four features that for us define in many respects what character-
izes organizational schemata per se.
First, we can point out the various membership categorization devices
that are used throughout the police interaction (Sacks, 1972, 1992). For
instance, we saw that the police officers use their police call sign
numbers to identify themselves. This usage illustrates an unspoken
orientation to hierarchy by all officers since only police supervisors,
designated by a 0 in the last digit of their call sign, handle the rescue.
Similarly, Distress (line 24) is a membership categorization device used
by police to signal an extreme emergency (see also Fairhurst and Cooren,
2004; Fairhurst, forthcoming). The membership categorization work of
the police makes the police organization present throughout the inter-
vention.
Second, we can note that, throughout the interaction, the dispatcher
and police officers mobilize documents (e.g. the Situational Notification
List), machines (e.g. the police radio) and vehicles that re-present (make
present) and belong to the police organization. In that sense, the sche-
mata we analyzed are organizational to the extent that they mobilize
various objects that not only contribute to the process but also can be
clearly identified with the organization they actualize (they are inscribed
with organizational protocols and procedures). Note that this way of
thinking does not amount to reifying the organization, but consists of
saying that the organization, whatever its mode of being, can be actu-
alized through the entities (humans and nonhumans) that officially act in
its name.
Third, we can highlight a series of context-sensitive actions that
correspond with typical police tasks. For example, the turn-taking in this
transcript demonstrates an emerging speaking order based upon who has

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information that can further the task of the police rescue. It also explains
the dispatchers emotion minimization to further location formulation.
Finally, these schemata appear to be organizational through the numer-
ous procedures and protocols that are implicitly mobilized during the
intervention. In other words, schemata are organizational to the extent
that, in many respects, they are constrained in advance by these texts that
also re-present (make present) the police organization.
As we see through these four characteristics, schemata can be said to be
organizational in that they involve entities (words, texts, devices, humans)
that act and speak in the name of the organization they are enacting.
Schemata are indeed general and abstract enough to be enacted in any type
of activity (mundane conversation included), but it is mostly through the
entities (humans and nonhumans) that actualize and participate in these
schemata that these latter can be considered organizational.
It is therefore crucial to distinguish two relatively distinct phenomena
in our analysis: (1) organization as a process grounded in action (i.e.
organizing) and (2) organization as an entity made present through these
activities (i.e. organizations) (Fairhurst and Putnam, 2004). Our schema-
tic analysis does explain how organizing takes place, but the model is
general enough to explain the organization of any type of activity.
Conversely, any organization is rendered present through the entities
(humans and nonhumans) that act on its behalf. It is in this dynamic of
actions and re-presentation that organizations are enacted and that orga-
nizing occurs.

Conclusion
As we have tried to illustrate, the identification of an organizational
template, called schema, allows us to show how organizational spaces and
times are achieved (at least partially) through different turn-takings whose
articulation into episodes has been highlighted. Turn-takings can thus be
analyzed as various contributions to the enactment of procedural or non-
procedural schemata whose circumscription and delineation are defined
by the participants speech contributions (whether these participants are
human or nonhuman, as we saw in our analysis). According to this
perspective, organizations in their spatial and temporal dimensions can
thus be considered to be literally generated and punctuated by the different
human and nonhuman agents who contribute to these discursive processes.
In keeping with the turn-making machinery already identified by conversa-
tion analysts, each initiation of a schema opens a specific space and a
specific time whose closure can be anticipated and projected (but never
determined). It is through this effect of closure that we can speak in terms
of spacing and timing. Moreover, each (human, nonhuman, textual) agent
contributing to the organizing process can initiate, participate or close these
episodes. As they punctuate organizational life, these closures sometimes
need to be negotiated and/or may never truly close.

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As we also showed, the organizational world appears to be spatially


and temporally ordered not because of a sui generis entity called the
organization, which would structure its own activities a priori, but by
the human and nonhuman (including textual) interactants who not only
contribute to its orderly emergence but also re-present it. This emergence
is always at the mercy of specific agents who can subvert or divert a
schema initiated by another agent. Any organizing form is thus a circum-
scribed structure of submission that can be interrupted at any time by a
participants non-cooperation (a machine, an employee, a manager, a
document, etc.). Initiated, punctuated, developed and sanctioned
through interactants contributions, these schemata thus define the open-
ing and closure of organizational spaces and times. Whether procedural
or nonprocedural, they offer discontinuities that can admittedly be
challenged, questioned or even deconstructed. As such they constitute
the organizing order, a bottom-up order that can be very messy, as in the
case we analyzed. Of necessity, the untidy nature of social interaction
stems from the mutual insertions through which agents achieve, i.e.
close, their respective programs of action.
Since spaces and times are now considered opened and achieved
through a turn-taking machinery and under the form of schemata, the
(old) question of what constitutes the inside versus the outside of an
organization takes on a new dimension. To be sure, buildings and other
architectural elements still play an important role in the delineation of
organizational spaces, since they are the places where offices are and in
which organizational members might do most of their work (for more
details, see Cooren and Fairhurst, forthcoming). However, another way to
approach what constitutes organizational spaces and times is to see them
as delineated by the schemata we described. According to this approach,
no limits can be arbitrarily imposed to delineate what constitutes these
spatio-temporal dimensions, except the ones that are constituted within
the very schemata brought into being by the organizational agents.
Finally, beyond this reflection on spacing and timing, it is our hope
that our analysis will have contributed to our better understanding of
organizing processes, especially the one displayed in high-reliability
organizations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick et al., 1999). Through the
detailed study of this radio transmission, we were able, for example, to
illustrate the resilient and improvisational character of the police inter-
vention. Despite the complexity of the operations undertaken by the
dispatcher and police officers, our analysis reveals how they were able to
keep focused on the main objectiveformulating Conways location in
order to rescue herby attending and sometimes disattending to the
procedural schemata that characterize organizational processes. Our
approach thus shows how organization emerges from interaction through
a sort of ruled improvisation, that is, a process by which participants
procedurally orient to the closure of programs of action while sometimes
improvising about the means to obtain such closure.

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Appendix A: Transcript of the Radio Transmission


Abbreviations: Conway = Cy (police car ID # = 1212)
911 Dispatcher = Disp
Police car ID # = 1030 (example)

1 Cy: Help! I need assistance! Im shot in the (car)!


2 (2.0)
3 Disp: Where do you need it?
4 Cy: Help. I need help
5 (1.5)
6 1030: 1238 Elm. I believe, 1030, I believe I heard shots fired there.
7 Cy: [((Unintelligible screaming)) please
8 Disp: [ -Location?
9 (1.0)
10 Disp: 1212, whats your location?
11 (6.5)
12 1080: 1080, we got a location?
13 (1.0)
14 Disp: Negative
15 ((line sounds))
16 Disp: Officer needs assistance, District One, unknown location. 12th 12th and Elm. Officer
17 needs assistance, 12th and Elm. Possibly shots fired.
18 (3.0)
19 1080: 1080 35, 12th and Elm, do not see them.
20 (2.5)
21 1240: 1240. Play the tape back
22 (2.5)
23 Disp: 1212, whats your location?
24 Cy: Distress. Ive been involved in a shooting (0.3) on Central Parkway (0.5) north (.) of
25 Liberty. I need some help hhh
26 (0.5)
27 1080: 1080, I [copy that. Check on her safety.
28 Disp: [are you hurt?
29 (0.5)
30 Disp: 1212, are you hurt?
31 (0.3)
32 Cy: Thats affirmative.
33 (0.5)
34 1080: 1080, Ill be there in five seconds. Blockin it off with four cars.
35 ((line sounds))
36 Disp: Attention all cars, all departments. An officer has been injured. Possible shooting
37 offense hh at 12th and Central Parkway. = Repeating, Cincinnati officer needs
38 assistance hhh at 12th and Central Parkway, a possible shooting offense. = The officer
39 reporting she is injured, approach with caution.
40 (0.3)
41 1080: Shes at. Correct- correction, shes at Liberty (.) and, uh, Elm.
42 1240: 1240
43 Disp: [12. . .
44 1240: [1240, no more cars.

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45 ((unintelligible sounds))
46 Disp: 1240, are you on the scene?
47 1080: Come on you guys =
48 1240: = Assist assist! All emergency traffic. Let me talk.
49 Disp: Go ahead
50 1240: OK. Were about, uh, were about just about north of uh (.) uh Central Parkway.
51 Were going to need a couple rescue units. Weve got an officer in the car shot.
52 ((sirens in the background))
53 Disp: OK, I you need to go slower.
54 1080: Where are you?
55 Disp: Where are you?
56 1240: 1240. We are at the corner of Central Parkway, just north of ((sounds)) No more
57 cars.
58 Disp: OK. Parkway, north of what.
59 1240: North of Liberty. West Liberty street
60 Disp: OK. You got any other cars with [you?
61 1240: [I - ] need (.) a rescue unit. I need a rescue
62 unit!
63 (2.5)
64 ((line sounds))
65 Disp: Attention, all cars all departments. No additional officers are to respond hh reference
66 the officer shot (0.5) on Central Parkway, just North of Liberty. Repeating
67 1240: 1240 =
68 Disp: = No other units are to respond on the assistance.
69 (1.5)
70 Disp: 1240
71 1240: Hey!
72 Disp: 1240, go ahead.
73 1240: Hey. I will take care of it on the scene here. We have the perimeter secure. We need
74 a fire company to expedite.
75 Disp: Fire company is responding. (.) Other units
76 1240: No other units to transmit at this point. Im also gonna need the uh recall list
77 Disp: OK. I need, if you can give us a call to know the condition right now also.
78 1240: Ill give you one in two minutes
79 (1.0)
80 ((unintelligible sounds))
81 1240: Weve got the address right. 1627 Central Parkway.
82 Disp: Copy 1627 Central

Appendix B: Transcribing Conventions (based on Gail Jeffersons


transcript techniques)
Brackets indicate that the encased portions of the utterances are
produced simultaneously. Left-hand brackets designate the beginning of
simultaneity and right-hand brackets mark its end.

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Bob: I wish [he was in time]


Kathy: [He is always] always late
Bob and Kathy respectively say He was in time and He is
always late at the same time
Underscoring indicates that the speaker is emphasizing this specific
portion of the utterance
Bob: I cannot stand him
Bob emphasizes the word stand
Equal signs indicate that there is no time elapsed between two
utterances.
Bob: Hes a very nice guy =
Kathy: = and so considerate toward them
When Bob finishes to say guy, Kathy starts right away her
turn by saying and. There is no interval between the two
turns.
Period in parentheses indicates a very short pause (less than one-tenth
of a second)
Kathy: So we could, (.) you know
The pause between could and you know is almost
imperceptible.
Number in parentheses indicates intervals in the stream of talk. These
intervals (indicated in seconds and tenths of seconds) can be identified
within an utterance or between utterances.
Bob: How do you change that?
(2.5)
Eric: How do you change what.
2.5 seconds elapse between the completion of Bobs turn
and the beginning of Erics turn.
Double parentheses indicate that what is encased is a description of
what is happening during the interaction. What is enclosed is not a
transcription.
Mark: Honestly
((Harrys cellphone rings))
Hyphens indicate the prior syllable was cut off short.
Bob: He is so biz- he is so strange.
Bob is about to say bizarre but stops and rephrases his
assessment.
For more details on these transcribing conventions, see Van Dijk (1997:
31214), as well as Atkinson and Heritage (1984: ixxvi).

Notes
1 These sequences of adjacency pairs can be embedded in each other, a
phenomenon that conversation analysts identify by the term insertion

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Franois Cooren and Gail T. Fairhurst

sequence (Schegloff, 1972a; see also Levinson, 1983). Despite the acknowl-
edgement of this embedding effect, conversation analysts tend to reduce the
logic of interaction to this adjacency pair template.
2 There are some interesting parallels between Greimass (1983, 1987) concept
of schema and North American conceptualizations beginning with the work
Schank and Abelson (1977). Although they come from radically different
traditions (Greimass structural analysis of folk tales versus Schank and
Abelsons psychological research on artificial intelligence), both focus on
schemata as knowledge structures used in human understanding and behav-
ior. Greimass concept of narrative schema and as used in this paper may seem
akin to Schank and Abelsons (1977; Abelson, 1981) concept of event sche-
mata or script because both deal with ordered sequences of events. However,
scripts are more concretely tied to specific content and specified actions than
is the schema concept (Mandler, 1984). For example, the restaurant script is
always about restaurants and specific behaviors such as obtaining a seat,
ordering, eating, paying the check, etc. Moreover, Greimass (1987) concern is
with the presentation of narrativity as a basic mechanism of sensemaking and
meaning production. His analytical model establishes a causal link between
organizing and sensemaking since it shows that it is the general organiza-
tion of events within a given initiative that produces signification or meaning.
Research on the psychological validity of story schemata and processing offers
some support for this claim, although only for story grammars based on folk
tales (for a review, see Mandler, 1984). These stories describe a particular kind
of text dealing with problem-solving; there appears to be a problem/solution/
moral-of-the-story structure that recurs over and over again in the folk tales of
the world (Mandler, 1984). In fact, all of the organizational analyses using
Greimas (1983, 1987) qualify as belonging to a problem-solving genre (e.g. see
also Cooren, 2001a; Cooren and Fairhurst, 2002; Groleau and Cooren, 1998;
Robichaud, 1998). Ironically, what little language-related organizational
research there is dealing with the concept of schema focuses heavily on stories
and scripts (e.g. Martin, 1982) or speech acts and scripts (e.g. Gioia et al.,
1989; Gioia and Poole, 1984); for a review, see Putnam and Fairhurst (2001).
3 Similarly, we can imagine situations in which the question of closure becomes
controversial. For example, one of our reviewers rightly mentions the case of
a Japanese scholar who says Yes to a request for collaboration from a
European colleague, just because Japanese tend not to say No. In this case,
the European colleague considers her counterparts collaboration to be
assured (this sub-schema looks closed to her), whereas it is not the case for the
Japanese colleague. As we will see in our case study, effects of closure thus are
always negotiable and open to disruption and misunderstanding.
4 Using speech act theory, we can note that, when B keeps her promise by
coming to the event, she can be said to be satisfying her promise. For more
details on the concept of satisfaction, see Vanderveken (19901).
5 In this regard, the conversation analyst Margaret Wetherell (1998: 402) notes,
If the problem with post-structural analysts is that they rarely focus on actual
social interaction, then the problem with conversational analysts is that they
rarely raise their eyes from the next turn in the conversation. The organiza-
tional template we propose could precisely be understood as an attempt to
make us raise our eyes from the next turn in the conversation. By focusing
essentially on what is said in interaction, conversation analysts run the risk of

819
Organization 11(6)
Articles

neglecting the organizational sequences that often exceed adjacency pair


phenomena.
6 Though the vocabulary we are using might appear similar to Structuration
Theory, we think that our schematic perspective cannot be reduced to
Giddenss (1984) model. For example, following Callon and Latour (1981), our
conception of agency (extended to nonhumans) is certainly different from the
one proposed by Giddens. For more details on what makes the schematic
approach both close and apart from Giddenss theory, see Cooren (2001a).
7 We thank one of the reviewers for pointing out that the phenomena of spacing
and timing should be considered plural not singular. Following Latour
(1999b), we agree that we live and work not in a universe but in a pluriverse,
that is, a world characterized by the heterogeneity and diversity of its spacing
and timing effects. In such a pluriworld, some schemata remain opened
(sometimes for ever), others get closed, some are executed in parallel, others
in articulation.

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Franois Cooren is an Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at the


Universite de Montreal. His research centers on the organizing properties of
communication as displayed in high-reliability organizations, coalitions and
board meetings. Recent publications include three articles, Translation and
Articulation in the Organization of Coalitions: The Great Whale River Case
(2001, Communication Theory), The Communicative Achievement of Collective
Minding: Analysis of Board Meeting Excerpts (2004, Management Communica-
tion Quarterly) and Textual Agency: How Texts Do Things in Organizational
Settings (2004, Organization). He has also published The Organizing Property of
Communication (2000, John Benjamins). He is the recipient of the 2002 Inter-
national Communication Association Young Scholar Award. Address: Universite
de Montreal, Departement de communication, CP 6127, Succursale Centre-ville,
Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3C 3J7. [email: f.cooren@umontreal.ca]
Gail Fairhurst is a Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of
Cincinnati. Her research interests include organizational leadership and language
analysis. Her articles have appeared in Academy of Management Journal, Acad-
emy of Management Review, Organization Science, Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, Human Communication Research, Communication
Monographs, Management Communication Quarterly, and Journal of Applied
Communication Research, among others. She is the co-author of The Art of
Framing: Managing the Language of Leadership (Jossey-Bass, 1996), which
received the 1997 National Communication Association Organizational Commu-
nication Division Book of the Year Award. Address: Department of Communica-
tion, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0184, USA. [email:
gfairhurst@cinci.rr.com]

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