Nagel,

T., 2005. The Problem of Global Justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33 (2), pp. 113-147.
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Tags: Theory of Politics - Global Justice
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Theory of Politics - Global Justice

Nagel, T., 2005. The Problem of Global Justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33 (2), pp. 113-147.

pg. 114, In broad sense, the international requirements of justice include standards governing the justification and
conduct of war and standards that define the most basic human rights.
But concerned with socio-economic justice
Focus on two central issues:
1. Justice and sovereignty
As Hobbes argued, actual justice requires sovereign state
So possible issue with international justice
2. Limits of equality as a demand of justice
Rawls argues equality applies to basic structure of state, not to personal choices, nor between societies
Egalitarian structure for nation-states
pg. 115, Question whether consistency requires global application

II

Sovereignty linked to justice by coordinated conduct, backed by monopoly of force

Cannot be realised with free riders
Need sovereign as enabler

III

pg. 118, Moral view that there is some condition of fairness or equality in the way the institutions of a just society treat its
citizens.
Creates unease over absence of comparable standards governing relations with other societies
Clearly disaster from humanitarian point of view, let alone justice
some form of humane assistance from the well-off to those in extremis is clearly called for quite apart from any
demand of justice.
pg. 119, These duties exist in virtue of absolute, not relative, need
Justice concerned with conditions of between classes of people
Question of inequality
Two principal conceptions:
1. Cosmopolitanism
the existence of separate sovereign states is an unfortunate obstacle to the establishment or even the
pursuit of global justice.
2. pg. 120, Political
Derives name from Rawls view that justice strictly political value
States existence is precisely what gives the value of justice its application
pg. 121, Dworkin: Equal concern is the special and indispensable virtue of sovereigns.
Citizens have duties of justice due to 'legal, social, and economic institutions that sovereign power makes
possible.
On this view, absence of global justice not cause for distress in itself

IV

pg. 122, On either view, 'global justice would require global sovereignty.
But for political view, not a matter of regret, where it is for cosmopolitan
Rawls argues for dualism of justice, that the two practical problems of institutional design and personal conduct require,
at the fundamental level, two different kinds of practical principle. (Murphy)
 pg. 123, Rawls justice only apply to separate nation-states
Does not apply to individual morality nor to individual outcomes
Does not apply to relations between states
pg. 124, Internationally, moral constraints a limited requirement of mutual respect and equality of status
among peoples.
Limitation rejected by critics
The issue is the choice of moral units.
Monist idea that basic constituency for moral units must be individuals
N.B. Universal moral features
See Caney
Natural from this view to count individual lives equally
Thus to avoid moral inconsistency on should favour a global difference prince-[pg. 125]ple.
Rawls would argue as no inconsistency in covering interpersonal relations differently, so no need to be inconsistent at
global level
But we are looking for moral not just logical consistency
Way to fundamentally resist cosmopolitanism is to deny pressure for equal concern
Admit humanitarian minimal concern
But any more requires associative responsibility which does not exist at global level
pg. 126, Still universal principle, but would imply a strongly differentiated system of moral obligations.

Cosmopolitan approach has moral appeal, as birth place does seem arbitrary
points us toward the utopian goal of trying to extent legitimate democratic governance to ever-larger domains in
pursuit of more global justice.
Not look further at cosmopolitanism, try to develop fuller account of political conception
Follow partly because accepted by most people
Follow partly because probably correct
Note that even on political conception, some justice not dependent on associations
pg. 127, Some rights pre-political
e.g. Self-ownership, freedom of expression, religion
Socioeconomic justice is different.
Depends on positive rights, which arise only through joining together
Only from that we can claim a right to democracy, equal citizenship, nondiscrimination equality of
opportunity
Rawls appeals to elimination of morally arbitrary sources of inequality
To extent these factors create differences, system needs justification
Important that moral presumption against arbitrary inequalities is not a principle of universal
application.
pg. 128, Rawls theory gets a foothold only because of the societal context.
But co-membership is arbitrary, so an arbitrary distinction is responsible for the scope of the presumption
against arbitrariness.
Thus, ground for distinction cannot be merely arbitrariness
Special involvement of agency or the will that is inseparable from membership in a political society.
The engagement of the will essential to life in a society, and is crucial
Sovereign state not just cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage
Not a voluntary association
It is that we are both putative joint authors of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms
[pg. 129] that creates the special presumption against arbitrary inequalities in our treatment by the
system.
Assigned role in society
Makes us responsible for acts of society
Also responsible to uphold institutions and conforming to norms
pg. 130, Thus we owe not justification for discriminatory policies to other people
Does not mean we can do whatever we want to other people
States can be left to own devices, as long as they dont harm others
N.B. Whats the definition of harm?
e.g. IRP and IBP
See Pogge
 Most basic rights and duties are universal
Only the heightened requirements of equal treatment embodied in principles of justice are contingent.
the state makes unique demands on the will of its members and those exceptional demands bring with them
exceptional obligations, the positive obligations of justice.

VI

pg. 131, Though political conception does not take content from universal moral relation, does not deny it
there are also non contingent, universal relations and political justice is surrounded by this larger moral
context.
Normative force of basic rights evident by putting ourselves in others shoes
N.B. But why does this not work for global justice?
This minimal humanitarian morality governs our relation to all other persons.
Does not depend on institutions
But may be impossible to fulfil basic duties without help of institutions
pg. 132, indispensable to enable us to fulfill the duty of rescue.
Some role filled by institutions like World Bank, Amnesty International, ICC etc.
But we do not have an obligation to live in a just society with everyone.
The right to justice is the right that the society one lives in be justly governed.
Is this 'too radical an exclusion of humanity at large from full moral concern?
Political answer that no single level of full moral concern
pg. 133, Difference thus between cosmopolitan and political conceptions:
Cosmopolitan sees the formation of the state as answering also a universal demand for equality
On political, only universal requirement of equality is conditional
We are required to accord equal status to anyone with whom we are joined in a strong and coercively
imposed political community.

VII

pg. 134, Rawls poses the question differently, not as general about international obligation, but about what principles should
govern foreign policy of liberal society
Elaboration of account of just society, rather than independent account of just world
moral units of this international morality separate societies, or peoples, and is equality among these
collective units that is the basis of Rawlss conception.
Equal respect for peoples out their moral nature
Provided at least decent
Equal respect enough for liberal societies to tolerate nonliberal societies that meet condition of decency.
Analogous to restrained liberalism at state level, which is against imposing particular comprehensive view
It is surprising that internationally, equal respect should result precisely in toleration for the absence of
such restraint in nonliberal societies.
pg. 135, But Rawls argues consequence of according moral nature and right of equality to all peoples
The claims of individuals take over only at a much lower threshold, that of basic human rights.
Society that does not respect these forfeits moral status and demand for respect
But The political conception of justice need not be based on the strong personification of peoples and need not imply
the principled toleration of nonliberal societies.
Practical reasons for liberal societies to show restraint, but there are no moral reasons for restraint of the kind Rawls
offers.
More plausible that liberal states not obliged either to tolerate or to try to transform nonliberal peoples
Moreover, respect for the autonomy of other societies can be thought of as respect for the equality of
peoples, taken as moral units in their own right.
We owe it to the people to allow them, and to some degree enable them, to collectively help
themselves.
pg. 136, universal human rights rather than the equality of peoples or societies as the source of the constraints
on the external exercise of sovereign power.

VIII

Implications of political conception tend to be conservative

 But under pressure from existing global institutions and felt need for strengthening them
Three purposes:
1. Protection human rights
2. Provision of humanitarian aid
3. Provision of global public goods
e.g. Free trade, environmental protection etc.
Not designed to extend democracy or justice, but they naturally give rise to claims for both
Put pressure on national sovereignty, by need for power to be effective
Dilemma: Prosperous nations have reasons to want more governance on a world scale, but they do no want increased
obligations and demands for legitimacy that may follow in its wake.
pg. 137, Global economy needs stable international system of property rights and contractual obligations
Includes IRP and IBP and much else
We are clearly in some kind of institutional relationlegal and economic with people the world over.
Some argue level of world economic interdependence already brings into force a version of the political conception of
justice.
Argue not the case, as institutions do not rise to level of statehood.
Absence of sovereign authority not only makes it practically infeasible but also makes them, under the
political conception, an [pg. 138] inappropriate site for claims of justice.
Claims do not come about just because of mutual advantage activity
Interaction does not trigger justice
N.B. What do we say about something like the EU?
Some sovereignty taken from nations
Can this enforce justice?
Current rules and institutions may lead to dislodging of sovereignty of separate nation-states
Currently not sovereign, so thus not basis for justice
International institutions act in name of state, thus responsibility of those institutions toward individuals is
filtered through the states that represent and bear primary responsibility for those individuals.
Some institutions are delegated responsibility by states
e.g. ECJ
Some are financed by states, and empowered to pursue agreed-upon goals
Generally no coercive force
Exception of Security Council
pg. 139, Less formal networks
e.g. Antitrust regulators, FSB, Basel Committee
Changing nature of institutions, but share a markedly indirect relation to individual citizens and this is
morally significant.
N.B. Is it..?
pg. 140, Individuals are not the constituents of such institutions.
Justice applies only to a form of organization that claims political legitimacy and the right to impose decisions by
force, and not to a voluntary association or contract among independent parties concerned to advance their common
interests.

IX

Another objection that limitation of justice assumes an unrealistically sharp dichotomy between sovereign states and
existing global institutions with respect to agency, authorization, and authority.
GEO thus entails some modified social justice at least
there is a sliding scale of degrees of co-membership
pg. 141, A natural suggestion in light of morality as multilayered
But doubt rules of international trade at level of collective action needed to trigger claims of justice
relation remains essentially one of bargaining.
pg. 142, With cross-national contracts, the requirements of background justice are filtered out and
commercial relations become instead something much thinner: instruments for the common pursuit of
self-interest.
Continuous scale would have to work on degrees of collective engagement
Does this make moral sense?
Less plausible than either cosmopolitan or political standard
Institutions do not act in name of all individuals concerned
Thus how are obligations of justice created?
 pg. 143, Two qualifications:
1. Good reasons to be concerned about consequences of economic relations that are internally unjust
the complicity of other states in the active support or perpetuation of an unjust regime is a secondary
offense against justice.
2. Even self-interested bargaining should be tempered by considerations of humanity
Best way is to allow poor societies to benefit from comparative labour costs

Fortunate nations face problem of how to create a global order that will have its own legitimacy, but not the kind of
legitimacy that undermines the strict limits on their responsibilities.
pg. 144, Globally, number of reasons greater international authority desirable:
More effective use of relief aid
Protection of global public goods
Protection of human rights and provision of aid
Easier if oppressive states seen as forfeiting right against outside interference
pg. 145, Would bring about increased responsibilities
Subject to claims of legitimacy, democracy, and applying standards of justice
The alternative to global sovereignty may not be global anarchy, but a clear and limited form of such governance
remains elusive.

XI

Demands for legitimacy rarely create political power

sovereignty usually precedes legitimacy.
pg. 146, Unjust and illegitimate regimes are necessary precursors of the progress toward legitimacy and
democracy.
most likely path toward some version of global justice is through the creation of patently unjust and illegitimate global
structures of power
N.B. e.g. The selection criteria for head of IMF/World Bank
e.g. IRP and IBP
Only way institutions worth taking over in the service of more democratic purposes
pg. 147, the path from anarchy to justice must go through injustice.
the global scope of justice will expand only through developments that first increase the injustice of the world by
introducing effective but illegitimate institutions.