Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15939 January 31, 1966
ANGELES UBALDE PUIG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ESTELLA MAGBANUA PEAFLORIDA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Salonga and Ordonez for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Fulgencio Vega for the defendants-appellants.
RESOLUTION
(Main opinion was promulgated on November 29, 1965).
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, et al., insist that the reservation by the donor
of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed of December 28, 1949
indicates that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime, otherwise, it is argued, the reservation
would be superfluous, and they cite American authorities in support.
This thesis would be plausible if the reservation of the power to dispose were the only indication to
be considered in deciding whether the donation of December 28, 1949 was mortis causa or inter
vivos. But such is not the case. The Court in its decision took to account not only the foregoing
circumstance but also the fact that the deceased expressly and consistently declared her conveyance
to be one of donation mortis causa, and further forbade the registration of the deed until after her
death. All these features concordantly indicated that the conveyance was not intended to produce
any definitive effects, nor to finally pass any interest to the grantee, except from and after the death
of the grantor.
We see nothing in the deed itself to indicate that any right, title or interest in the properties
described was meant to be transferred to Doa Estela Magbanua prior to the death of the grantor,
Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon. Not ownership, certainly, for the stipulation:
Que esta escritura de donacion mortis causa no se registrara en la oficina del Registrador de
Titulos de Iloilo sino despues del fallecimiento de la Donante
necessarily meant, according to section 50 of the Land Registration Act, that the deed in question
should not take effect as a conveyance nor bind the land until after the death of the "donor".
Neither did the document operate to vest possession upon Doa Estela Magbanua, in view of the
express condition that (paragraph 3) if at the date of her death the donor had not transferred, sold, or
conveyed one-half of lot 58 of the Pototan Cadastre to other persons or entities, the donee would be
bound to pay to Caridad Ubalde, married to Tomas Pedrola, the amount of P600.00, and such
payment was to be made on the date the donee took possession of Lot No. 58. As the obligation to
pay the legacy to Caridad Ubalde would not definitely arise until after the death of the donor,
because only by then would it become certain that the "donor" could not transfer the property to
someone else, and such payment must precede the taking possession of the property "donated", it
necessarily follows that the "donee's" taking of possession could not occur before the death of the
donor.
It being thus clear that the disposition contained in the deed is one that produces no effect until the
death of the grantor, we are clearly faced by an act mortis causa of the Roman and Spanish law. We
thus see no need of resorting to American authorities as to the import of the reservation of the
donor's right to dispose of the donated property, for the Spanish authorities are very clear on this
point:
Desde el momento en que la muerte del donante es la que determina la adquisicion o el
derecho a los bienes; desde el montento en que la disposicion puede ser revocada
voluntariamente, se salva la linea divisoria entre unos y otros actos: la donacion equivale a
un legado; mas aun que esto: es un legado en realidad. (5 Manresa, 5th Ed., p. 107)
Ahora bien: si el mal llamado donante no solo dilata la fecha de la ejecucion para el
momento de su muerte, sino que ademas se reserva la facultad de revocar a su arbitrio la
disposicion, entonces el acto no es valido bajo la forma de contrato; hay en realidad una
disposicion mortis causa que exige las solemnidades del testamento. (V Manresa, 5th Ed., p.
109) (Emphasis supplied)
The presence of an acceptance is but a consequence of the erroneous concept of the true nature of
the juridical act, and does not indicate that in the same is a true donation inter vivos.
Appellant Magbanua further argues that the reserved power of the donor to convey the donated
property to other parties during her lifetime is but a resolutory condition (albeit a potestative one)
that confirms the passing of the title to the donee. In reality, this argument is a veritable petitio
principii; it takes for granted what has to be proved, i.e., that some proprietary right has passed
under the terms of the deed, which, as we have shown, is not true until the donor has died.
It is highly illuminating to compare the condition imposed in the deed of donation of December 28,
1949 with that established in the contract dealt with in Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao & Tau Liuan, 43
Phil. 874, invoked by appellants.
In the alleged deed of donation of December 28, 1949, the late Doa Carmen Ubalde imposed
expressly that:
Que antes de su muerte, la Donante podra enajenar, vender, traspasar e hipotecar a
cualesquiera personas o entidades los bienes aqui donados a favor de la Donataria en
concepto de Donacion mortis causa.
In the Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao case, on the other hand, the condition read:
It is understood and agreed that should the machinery to be installed in said factory fail, for
any reason, to arrive, in the City of Manila within the period of six (6) months from date
hereof, this contract may be cancelled by the party of the second part at its option, such
cancellation, however, not to occur before the expiration of such six (6) months. (pp. 874-
875, cas. cit.).
In the Uy Tieng Piao case the contract could only be cancelled after six months, so that there could
be no doubt that it was in force at least for that long, and the optional cancellation can be viewed as
a resolutory condition (or more properly, a non-retroactive revocatory one); but no such restriction
limited the power of the donor, Doa Carmen Ubalde, to set at naught the alleged conveyance in
favor of Doa Estela Magbanua by conveying the property to other parties at any time, even at the
very next instant after executing the donation, if she so chose. It requires no argument to
demonstrate that the power, as reserved in the deed, was a power to destroy the donation at any
time, and that it meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her death made it
impossible to channel the property elsewhere. Which, in the last analysis, as held in our main
decision, signifies that the liberality is testamentary in nature, and must appear with the solemnities
required of last wills and testaments in order to be legally valid.
Wherefore, the motion to reconsider is denied.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.