#41

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.

On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court of Iloilo City,
followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents

Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when
and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work despite Leouel's pleas
to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or

on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the
auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no
avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code" respondent Julia, in her answer opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled
out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Leouel argument of not communicating for 5 years is a sign of
Psychologically Incapacitated

RULLING:

NO! Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1),
who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;

#42 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

PETITIONER challenge the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3

The Facts

Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina.

Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's
refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to
run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of
St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was
born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
 5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on
personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a

broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative
of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with
the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment
of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered
as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason
to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

ISSUE:

WON Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and
that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

From the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our
law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

# 43

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
 JOCELYN M. SUAZO, G.R. No. 164493
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF March 10, 2010

THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

THE FACTS

Jocelyn and Angelito marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a
ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos parents
after their marriage. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household
help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn left
Angelito sometime in July 1987.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage, she alleged in her complaint:

That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their
relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable
physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because defendant
inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a troublesome encounter;

That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their
marriage and became very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous,
permanent and incurable;

THE RTC RULING

 The RTC annulled the marriage
THE CA RULING

The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling
that:

THE COURTS RULING

On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took
effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented,
including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these
pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the
advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.

As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological

incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own
examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the
differences in the trial court and the appellate courts appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns
presented evidence.

we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelitos

habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she
received from him all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her
testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior,assuming this to be indicative of a
personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with
him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of
the celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the
absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While
we may concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality
patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological
incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The
evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion
of the psychologist cannot be relied upon.

#44 VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, VS REY C. ALCAZAR,

Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent After their wedding,
petitioner and respondent lived for five days in hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter,
the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latters
abode. 12 days after the wedding respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for
work. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or
by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About
a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that
respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was
not advised by respondent of his arrival.

when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner
respondent proceeded to his parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez who claimed that he was not aware of
respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was
informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There
was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent. (Physically
incapable)

On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion[5] to direct the public
prosecutor to conduct an investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.
 During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan),
and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.

Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her
Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated petitioners testimony.

Petitioners third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner
and respondent:

After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data,

petitioner is found to be free from any underlying personality aberration neither
(sic) of any serious psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede her
normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned arrived
to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner
and respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the
respondent is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to properly
assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.

The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the

diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically classified as Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and
incurable by any treatment.

People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to

have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for
admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a
variety of contexts

The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical

antecedence as it already existed long before he entered into marriage. Since it
already started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his system and becomes
a[n] integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such to be
permanent and incurable.[7]

Petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix interposed no objection
to the admission of petitioners evidence and manifested that she would no longer present
evidence for the State.

RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioners Complaint for annulment of her marriage
to respondent
 WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.[15]

At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the
RTC was for annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which
reads:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the

marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable; x x x.

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.[16] Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete
act of sexual intercourse.[17] Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband
or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the
parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from
psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or
disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage
act.

One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As can be gleaned from the
evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it
appears that petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent based on the latters psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of
nullity based on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of
merit, consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
 obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[24] to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or

clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts
and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the

celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
 not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68

up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of

Appeals, we scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same
was not enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

Tayags psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioners
cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent.

In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into
petitioners marital life and, as a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart
too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing
or detaching himself as much as possible from his wife.

To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse are not necessarily signs
of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled.

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads
abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent.

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondents
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.[31]

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in
its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[32] Presumption
is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio

#47

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL,
INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died
in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong
premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted
that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.

Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and
such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or
the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

48

EINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 13, 2008

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married,
thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a
marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date,
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.[3] In her complaint, respondent alleged that she
is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to
financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.[4]

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit
=======
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.[23] In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five
years.[24] However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was
asked during cross-examination, thus

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name
for a marriage license.[26] In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in
fact, there was no cohabitation at all.The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed
so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

#49

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
CARLOS II,
Respondents. December 16, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

FACTS
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to
their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De
Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name
of Teofilo. Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were
registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.
petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent
Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive
 father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the
contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real
properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the
name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Evidence used by respondents for existence marriage:
Affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. late Teofilo Carlos and
respondent Felicidad were designated as parents
Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit,
Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not a party outside of marriage can file for nullity of marriage
2. Whether or not Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages is applicable in this case

HELD (including the Ratio Decedent)

(1) it depends:

General rule: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or wife.

Exceptions:
(1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of Rule on Declaration
of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, (March 15,
2003)
(2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.

Reason:
They do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts .
States concern is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
Husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage.
They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of
marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are
simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence,
they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the
grounds allowed by law.
Beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of
marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights
They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules
on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.

(2) No.
 Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995.
The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
But the civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void.
Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of
marriage?
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were
married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate
proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any
other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and
must be based on a cause of action . Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights