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RAJAN MENON
Lehigh University
City College/City University of New York
S. ENDERS WIMBUSH
Hudson Institute
© 2010 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved.
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May 2010
Rajan Menon*
Lehigh University
City College/City University of New York
S. Enders Wimbush*
Hudson Institute
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Other Emerging Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
*
Rajan Menon is currently the Monroe J. Rathbone professor of international relations at Lehigh University, but will soon
be the Anne and Bernard Spitzer professor of political science at the City College of New York in New York City. S. Enders
Wimbush is senior vice president for international programs and policy at the Hudson Institute. The authors are grateful to
Dr. Aparna Pande of the Hudson Institute for her generous research support.
Executive Summary
The number of new states seeking some the region as part of a grand strategy that extends
combination of economic, energy, and security Beijing’s footprint globally.
gains in the Mediterranean is increasing. Some
have historical ties with the Mediterranean India’s historical ties to the Mediterranean date
region and the Maghreb and are trying to build back more than 1,000 years. Its interests in the
or rebuild economic and security ties. Others Maghreb are linked to its interests in the broader
probably see the Mediterranean region through Arab world; its economic ties to both Italy and
both short- and longer-term filters that reveal more Cyprus are particularly deep. Like China, India
immediate economic interests but that eventually is pursuing a multifaceted energy strategy in
converge with a larger strategic plan. Still others which the Mediterranean figures with increasing
see purely economic benefits, and a few see purely prominence, Libya being a particular target. India’s
security benefits. Mediterranean strategy is also notable for the
close India-Israel security condominium, which
The emerging strategic landscape in the is important.
Mediterranean is being constantly shaped by the
entry of new players—China, India, Brazil—with A range of other actors, Japan and Brazil
strategies that reflect their special economic and for example, add increasing fluidity to the
security concerns and the re-entry of some old Mediterranean’s strategic dynamics and make for
ones—e.g., Russia—with strategies that remind the possibility of political-economic alignments and
us of pre-Cold War objectives. The landscape is realignments that may be unprecedented.
changing rapidly, the dynamics of the individual Six conclusions emerge from this analysis:
actors and of their possible combinations are fluid,
and the trajectories of their strategies are far from First, all of the key new players in the
clear. It is of course impossible to know everyone’s Mediterranean view the acquisition of additional
motivation, but it is possible to identify a number supplies of energy from Mediterranean states as
of emerging issues and patterns of behavior with both necessary and possible, and they are designing
some confidence. strategies to this end. While supplies are abundant,
transport is unimpaired, and comity reigns amongst
Russia is reasserting its global role, and its activities them, the Mediterranean’s energy market will
in the Mediterranean are part of a larger strategy likely work efficiently enough as part of a global
shaped by a fluid interplay of internal and external market that determines who gets how much and
influences. In this it draws on a deep historical at what price. But any hiccup in the larger global
involvement in the region, impaired at least energy supply system—or worse, if one can imagine
temporarily by the breakdown of Soviet power. destabilizing political turmoil in Saudi Arabia or
Russia has many cards to play, and it is playing the collapse of the Iranian theocracy—will bring a
some of them expertly. heightened level of competition, probably including
China once enjoyed ties with the countries of military competition, among non-Mediterranean
the Mediterranean and the Maghreb mainly as states and actors in the Mediterranean region itself
an extension of the Silk Road. It has returned to to adjudicate how energy is produced, sold, and
the Mediterranean theater through aggressive transported. In this sense, the Mediterranean basin
investment in strategic infrastructure and energy, has become an important section of the energy
although its investment in Europe proper has been security umbilical cord linking Asia’s dynamic
minimal. It also is possible to see China’s interest in economies to the global energy marketplace.
The number of new states seeking some region more strategically fluid, more complex to
combination of economic, energy, and security understand, more difficult to track, and ultimately
gains in the Mediterranean is increasing. Some have more prone to disruption and possibly instability,
historical ties with the Mediterranean region and as the strategies of these new actors converge or
the Maghreb (e.g., Russia, India, Turkey) and are collide on such vital interests as energy access
trying to build or rebuild economic and security and security.
ties. Others probably see the Mediterranean region
through both short- and longer-term filters that The Mediterranean is no stranger to outsiders,
reveal more immediate economic interests but but it is probably the case that, relative to earlier
that eventually converge with a larger strategic periods, the new outsiders are capable of exercising
plan; China would fall into this latter category. Still more political, economic, and military power
others (e.g., Brazil, Azerbaijan, Romania, Bulgaria) than their predecessors, that is they are capable of
see purely economic benefits and a few (e.g., fundamentally altering political relationships and
Venezuela) see purely security benefits. economic and security realities. Moreover, as we
discuss, the traditional balancing and moderating
It is of course impossible to know everyone’s role of the Mediterranean’s other big outsider, the
motivation, but it is possible to identify a number United States, may become less robust and visible in
of emerging issues and patterns of behavior that the future. The strategies pursued by the new actors
suggest where the “new outsiders” might be headed, will be informed in no small way by the truth or
that is if they are not so bold as to tell us directly. perception of this reality.
We conclude that the interplay of outsiders with
Mediterranean states and with each other is certain The following is a survey of those new players, their
to make the dynamics of the Mediterranean motivations, and their goals.
The larger strategic context states, which Russian strategists were wont to call
the “near abroad.” This is the context in which
Critics and the detractors of Vladimir Putin agree
Russia’s strong-armed conduct toward Ukraine,
on two points. The first is that although Putin
its support of secessionism in Georgia, its military
stepped aside as president in 2008, in favor of his
deployments in Moldova’s Transnistria region,
long-time protégé Dmitry Medvedev, to comply
its opposition to NATO’s expansion, and its
with the constitutional ban on serving more than
determination to counter efforts to build pipelines
two consecutive terms, Putin remains the real
that skirt Russian territory should be seen. But
source of political power in Russia. Medvedev is not
Putin does not believe that the multipolar world
a mere puppet, but no major initiative on domestic
he seeks will come about if Russia is reduced to a
or foreign policy would get off the ground without
regional power (no matter how preeminent it is in
Putin’s approval and probably also his involvement
its immediate neighborhood), so he has expanded
at the outset. And if a position adumbrated by the
the “strategic partnership” with China that was
Russian president—for example that Russia may
launched under Boris Yeltsin, pursued a policy
be prepared to join multilateral efforts to increase
toward Europe that deals bilaterally with the major
the economic pressure on Iran in order to induce
centers of power on that continent so as to prevent
it to end its quest for nuclear weapons—is out of
the rise of a cohesive EU policy toward Russia,
sync with the Russian prime minister, the latter
focused on expanding Russian ties with Iran and
statement is the one most likely to reflect what
India, and used the Security Council to ensure
Russia will in fact do.
that Russia has a say in peacekeeping operations
The second point of consensus is that Putin, no and sanctions.
matter Russia’s myriad problems, believes that his
It is in this context—the reassertion of Russia’s
country is destined to be a great power and that
global role—that Moscow’s activities in the
the erosion of its standing during the presidency of
Mediterranean should be seen; they are part of a
Boris Yeltsin is being reversed and will be viewed
larger strategy and should not be abstracted from
in hindsight as an aberration. When Putin harps
it. This strategy itself is shaped by an interplay
on the dangers inherent in a U.S.-dominated
among: i) the Russian leadership’s conception
unipolar world, the remedy he proposes is to
of what Russia should be as a society and polity
fashion a multipolar world, with Russia playing a
(best articulated in “sovereign democracy,” which
leading role in bringing it into being and serving
sets forth the principles and perceptions shaping
as one of its independent centers of power. As
Russia’s foreign and domestic policies)2; ii) the
shown in his February 2007 address to the Munich
domestic influences on Russian foreign policy (in
Conference on Security Policy, he believes that only
particular the role of the siloviki, the armed forces,
in such a world can American unilateralism be
plus the institutions involved in internal security
counterbalanced and restrained.1
and intelligence and arms exports, and the energy
An essential part of Putin’s plan to resurrect sector, which is either state-controlled or conducts
Russia’s influence in world politics has been to
secure its dominance in the so-called post-Soviet 2
The concept’s originator is Vladislav Surkov, First Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and the man
considered to the Kremlin’s chief ideologist. For his exposition
1
For the text of Putin’s Munich address, see http://www. on “sovereign democracy, see Surkov, “Russian Political Culture:
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/ The View from Utopia,” Russian Social Science Review, Vol. 49,
AR2007021200555.html. No. 6 (November/December 2008), 81–97.
Even older Russian weapons systems planned While Russia has been willing to take account of
for sale to Syria, such as the man-portable Israel’s worries about its arms sales to Syria (and
(MANPADS) Igla (SA-18), and the MiG-31 Iran), the fact that Moscow is the principal arms
(Foxhound) interceptor, have evoked Israeli supplier to Israel’s adversaries has also forced
objections. Israel has been able to use Russia’s Israel to take account of Russia’s interests when it
quest for a substantive relationship to raise its sells arms or offers military training to countries
concerns during high-level meetings, and its efforts that are at odds with Russia. The best example
have been helped by Russia’s interest in acquiring is Georgia, where an Israeli firm has provided
Israeli UAVs.19 Israel’s efforts apparently led to the expertise for modernizing the Soviet-made SU-
25s in the Georgian air force, Israeli specialists
17
These details are drawn from Martin Sieff, “Russia Eyes have trained Georgian soldiers, and Israel has
New Customers for Iskander E Missile,” UPI, October 3, sold arms to the Georgian military. The budding
2008, reprinted at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Russia_
Eyes_New_Customers_For_Iskander_E_Missile_999.html;
and “Russia’s Iskander-E Missile Systems See Strong Foreign
Demand,” at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081001/117366006.html. 20
Details from Melikishvili, “Russia Scraps MiG-31 Sale,”;
Pravda.ru, April 29, 2005, “Russia is Not Selling Short-
18 “Russia Freezes Work on MiG-31s for Syria: Report,” Agence
Range Missiles to Syria,” at http://english.pravda.ru/russia/ France-Presse, May 20, 2009, reprinted at http://www.
politics/8160-syria-0. defensenews.com/story.php?i=4098764; and “Syria Denies Deal
with Russia over advanced Aircraft Fell Through,” Reuters,
19
Crisis in Israel-Russia Relations over Missile Sales to Syria,” May 24, 2009, at http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/
Associated Press, January 12, 2005, reprinted at: http:// idUSTRE54N0XM20090524.
israelinsider.com/Articles/Diplomacy/4797.htm; Alexander
Melikishvili, “Russia Scraps MiG-31 Sale to Syria in Exchange
21
Pravda.ru, “Russia is Not Selling Short-Range Missiles to Syria.”
for Israeli UAVs,” Jamestown Foundation Blog, at http:// 22
The figure of $700 is mentioned in Peter Crail, “Syria Shirks
jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2009/06/russia-scraps-mig- Follow-Up IAEA Probe,” Arms Control Today (September 2008),
31-sale-to-syria-in.html. reprinted at http://armscontrol.org/act/2008_09/Syria.
47
Andrés, ”Political Economic Relations,” p. 4; Rosneft Press
Release, “Plan for Development 245 South Block in Algeria are
Approved,” March 11, 2009, at http://www.rosneft.com/news/
pressrelease/11032009.html.
50
Hurghada Information Net “Egypt Becomes a Popular
Destination for Russian Tourists,” March 17, 2009, at http://
48
Economist Intelligence Unit, “Energy Report: Oil and Gas,” www.hurghada-information.com/index.php?option=com_
(Updated on September 29, 2009), at http://www.zawya.com/ content&task=view&id=383&Itemid=87.
marketing.cfm?zp&p=/story.cfm/sidEIU20091001221527097.
51
“Russia, Egypt Seal Nuclear Power Plant Deal in Mubarak
49
“Egypt Hopes to Double Trade with Russia to $8 billion,” Visit,” Agence France-Presse, March 25, 2008, at http://
ArabFinance, November 12, 2008, at https://www.arabfinance. afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iAoUxFoEP0MKC5GGbn
com/News/newsdetails.aspx?Id=123640. SJWqBuM4Gg.
56
This did not prevent some analysts from speculating that
Chinese foreign policy maybe a reflection of Chinese-style chess, 57
See Juli MacDonald and Amy Donahue, “Asian Energy
called Wei chi, a 4000-year old game the aim of which is to Futures,” sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment, Office
acquire territory, not to checkmate the opponent. of the Secretary of Defense, 2004. (Published by Booz Allen
Hamilton).
61
BBC News, “China issues alert in Algeria,” July 15, 2009. 62
CNN “Turks criticize Chinese treatment of Uyghurs,” July 11, 2009.
India’s historical and commercial ties with the India’s connections to the Mediterranean are closely
Mediterranean date back more than 1000 years, linked with India’s broader ties to the European
when Arab traders carried Indian muslin and spices Union. Historically speaking, India has ties with
to Mediterranean consumers. In later centuries, the United Kingdom, its former colonial master, as well
Portuguese, Dutch, French, and English trading as to France and Portugal, thanks to French and
companies took over this trade. In contemporary Portuguese colonies in India. The European Union
times, India has built close economic ties with is India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral
countries in the region, especially Italy, Greece, trade standing at €55 billion in 2007.64 Faced with
Cyprus, and Turkey. an aging population and lack of skilled workers,
the European Union has looked to countries like
India’s ties with the Maghreb have historical, India to fill that gap. The large Indian diaspora in
diplomatic, security, and economic dimensions, the EU has been a traditional source of remittance,
reinforced during the 20th century when India with around $2 billion annually being sent to India.
championed the cause of de-colonization in Ties with countries in Europe are also important
countries like Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. for India diplomatically as India seeks a seat on
For diplomatic reasons, close ties with Muslim the UN Security Council and needs the support
countries in the Maghreb are important for India to not only of the five permanent members but also
help counter anti-Indian propaganda by Pakistan. other European countries that would champion
India has relied on its close ties with countries India’s cause.
like Egypt for support in organizations like the
Organization of Islamic Conference (O.I.C.) India’s ties to Italy are particularly salient. During
especially on the issue of Kashmir. Cooperation on the Indian nationalist movement, many Indians
fighting terrorism is another area of mutual interest studied and learned from Mazzini and Garibaldi.
for India and countries in the Maghreb. Today, Italy is India’s fourth-largest trading partner
in the European Union, and Italy is the 12th-largest
India’s interest in the Maghreb is also linked investor in India. Bilateral trade between India
with India’s interests in the broader Arab world. and Italy stood at €4 billion in 2007 with the two
As a country with the world’s second- or third- countries working toward taking it to €10 billion
largest population of Muslims, India has always by 2010.65
sought good ties with leading Muslim countries
in the Arab world. Of India’s total international India has old trading ties with countries in the
trade, $414.5 billion in 2007-08, Arab countries Mediterranean region and an important stake in
accounted for 21 percent. Within the Arab world, the free passage of trade in the Suez Canal. Greece
India’s trade with the GCC (Gulf Cooperation is another key Mediterranean player for India. Ties
Countries) nations alone rose to $66.75 billion were established as early as 1950, and today there
in 2007–08, or 16.1 percent of the country’s total are deep educational and cultural ties between
global trade. Most of the five million expatriate the two countries. Though India and Greece had
Indians in the Middle East are concentrated in the
Gulf countries.63
64
“India–EU Trade,” European Commission. Bilateral Trade
Relations, at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/
india/index_en.htm.
70
Pranay Sharma, “Arabic Lessons: N-Deal Done, India Re- 71
“India-Egypt Economic and Commercial Relations,” FICCI.
Engages Arab World for Fuels, Funds, and Friendships,” Outlook,
November 24, 2008, at http://www.outlookindia.com/article. 72
“India, Libya to boost bilateral trade, Silicon India,” October
aspx?238997. 9, 2002.
Japan Brazil
Most of Japan’s investment in Europe is in the As one of the countries comprising BRIC (Brazil,
rich and northern regions rather than in southern Russia, India and China), Brazil is an emerging
Europe and the Mediterranean area. In 2006, power that aims to build ties with countries outside
Western Europe was Japan’s largest recipient of the Americas. Brazil’s economic and diplomatic
of FDI, however, that money was concentrated engagement with countries in the Mediterranean
in developed, non-Mediterranean economies, and Maghreb is part of this larger strategy of
specifically the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, building alliances around the world. Like India,
and Germany. In recent years, Japanese companies Brazil, too, is a contender for a seat on the United
have begun investing in the North African states Nations Security Council and would like the
of the Maghreb. Several companies have shifted support of countries in different parts of the world.
factories from Eastern Europe to Tunisia, Algeria, Though a net oil exporter, Brazil is among the top
and Morocco. In terms of Japan’s larger European oil consumers, and thus ties with countries in the
investments, this is pretty small change. Maghreb and Arab world are crucial. We should
not be surprised to see Brazil build its energy and
The one area in which Japan has shown an abiding security ties with Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco,
and consistent interest in the Mediterranean Algeria, and Libya in the future. On the other hand,
is its supply of bluefin tuna. The Japanese had Brazil’s emergence as an energy producer could also
traditionally imported southern bluefin tuna threaten some Mediterranean exporters like Algeria
from the waters off the coast of Australia. When and Libya.
that market collapsed from overfishing, the
Japanese switched to Atlantic bluefin from the Acknowledging their similar status as regional
Mediterranean. Japan is now importing 80 percent powers and emerging economies, Brazil and Turkey
of the world’s bluefin tuna catch, mainly from the are seeking to increase cooperation in the areas
Mediterranean. of trade, investment, and energy. In May 2009,
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva paid
As the third-largest oil consumer in the world, a visit to Ankara to discuss bilateral relations with
Japan depends on the Gulf Arab countries for Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
most of its oil. But, like China and India, in recent The most tangible result of the meeting was the
years Japan has also invested in the Maghreb announcement of a joint venture between Brazil’s
region as a way of diversifying its energy sources. Petrobras and Turkey’s TPAO for oil exploration in
Joint ventures between Japanese companies and the Black Sea reportedly worth $800 million.77 In
those states with significant energy reserves are order to diversify their sources of energy, Turkey
prominent. For example, the Japanese engineering is also looking to gain from Brazilian expertise in
firm JGC has signed a $1.42 billion contract for biodiesel and ethanol-based fuels. Brazil in turn
the construction, procurement, and engineering is hoping to collaborate with Turkish companies
of facilities in the Gassi Touil gas fields in in the manufacture and sale of jet airplanes.
southern Algeria.76
77
Saban Kardas, “Turkey and Brazil to Explore Oil in the
76
“Japanese, European firms ink gas deal with Algeria,” Black Sea,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 100 (May 26
ChannelNewsAsia.com, June 8, 2009, at http://www. 2009); “Turkey and Brazil to Jointly Explore for Petroleum
channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world_business/ in Black Sea,” Today’s Zaman, January 2, 2010, at http://www.
view/434459/1/.html. todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=176099.
The emerging strategic landscape in the the collapse of the Iranian theocracy—will bring a
Mediterranean is being constantly reshaped by the heightened level of competition, probably including
entry of new players—China, India, Brazil—with military competition, among non-Mediterranean
strategies that reflect their special economic and states and actors in the Mediterranean region itself
security concerns and the re-entry of some old to adjudicate how energy is produced, sold, and
ones—e.g., Russia—with historic objectives and transported. In this sense, the Mediterranean basin
vintage strategies. We have tried to capture the has become an important section of the energy
key forces animating these actors in this analysis, security umbilical cord linking Asia’s dynamic
but it must be said that this is just a snapshot economies to the global energy marketplace.
in time. In reality, the landscape is changing
rapidly, the dynamics of the individual actors Second, energy competition will certainly lead the
and of their possible combinations are fluid, and Mediterranean’s new players to pursue competitive
the trajectories of their strategies are far from and cost-imposing strategies directed at their
clear to us, and perhaps to them. The number of rivals. Energy delivered from long distance offers
scenarios one might assess as plausible, possible, adversaries a rich menu of mischievous options
or probable that could emerge from the interaction for raising competitors’ costs in ways that might
of the forces, strategies, and dynamics we have alter their behavior, either in the Mediterranean
discussed in this analysis is substantial. Much is in or elsewhere. In this sense, the Mediterranean’s
motion. Nonetheless, some of the new features and seeming isolation from larger competitions taking
patterns of the Mediterranean strategic landscape place in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean,
can be identified with confidence. We believe East Asia, Eurasia, and even Latin America
that our analysis warrants at least the following will diminish.
six conclusions. Third, while Russia benefits from close proximity
First, competition for energy that has defined to the Mediterranean competition because of its
the strategies of Asia’s largest consumers— physical connections to both Europe and the Black
especially China and India, but also Japan—for Sea, the new actor with the greatest potential to
the last decade, particularly with respect to alter the strategic landscape may well be India. Its
their competitive positions in the Middle East potent and growing strategic alliance with Israel
and Persian Gulf, is being transported to the and its longer-term security cooperation with
Mediterranean. All of the new key players in the Turkey—both buttressed more or less by the United
Mediterranean view the acquisition of additional States—are likely to cast India as an increasingly
supplies of energy from Mediterranean states as powerful Mediterranean actor. Add to this India’s
both necessary and possible, and they are designing strong economic, commercial, and energy interests
strategies to this end. While supplies are abundant, in the Maghreb and in Europe’s Mediterranean
transport is unimpaired, and comity reigns among states, as well as the well-lubricated movement of
them, the Mediterranean’s energy market will Indian workers and professionals into labor-short
likely work efficiently enough as part of a global markets like Europe, suggest that India’s presence
market that determines who gets how much and on the new Mediterranean landscape is better
at what price. But any hiccup in the larger global rooted and more organic than either China’s or
energy supply system—or worse, if one can imagine Russia’s. That said, in comparison to its rival, China,
destabilizing political turmoil in Saudi Arabia or India’s policy is currently one more of aspirations
than of achievements.