PTER V.
Sections 51-77 On the advice of the Register of Deeds, DBP instituted
1. Voluntary Dealings with Registered Lands
Involuntary Dealings (c)
UDK No. 7671 June 23, 1988
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, registrant-
appellant,
vs.
THE ACTING REGISTER DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA,
respondent-appellee.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, rather cut-and-dried as far as factual background
is concerned, turns upon a determination of the true
meaning and intendment of Section 56 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, 1 which in part reads:
Sec. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees,
certified copies. Each Register of
Deeds shall keep a primary entry book
in which, upon payment of the entry fee,
he shall enter, in the order of their
reception, all instruments including
copies of writs and processes filed with
him relating to registered land. He shall,
as a preliminary process in registration,
note in such book the date, hour and
minute of reception of all instruments, in
the order in which they were received.
They shall be regarded as registered
from the time so noted, and the
memorandum of each instrument, when
made on the certificate of title to which it
refers, shall bear the same date:
Provided, that the national government
as well as the provincial and city
governments shall be exempt from the
payment of such fees in advance in
order to be entitled to entry and
registration.
xxx xxx xxx
The facts are few and undisputed. On June 13, 1980, the
Development Bank of the Philippines (hereafter, DBP)
presented for registration to the Register of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija, Cabanatuan City, a sheriff's certificate of sale in its
favor of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. NT-149033 and NT-149034, both in the names
of the spouses Andres Bautista and Marcelina Calison,
which said institution had acquired as the highest bidder at
an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The transaction was
entered as Entry No. 8191 in the Registry's Primary Entry
Book and DBP paid the requisite registration fees on the
same day. Annotation of the sale on the covering
certificates of title could not, however be effected
because the originals of those certificates were found to
be missing from the files of the Registry, where they
were supposed to be kept, and could not be located. 2
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to
reconstitute said certificates, and reconstitution was ordered
by that court in a decision rendered on June 15, 1982. 3 For
reasons not apparent on the record, the certificates of
title were reconstituted only on June 19,1984. 4
On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the
reconstituted titles of the certificate of sale subject of Entry
No. 8191 on the basis of that same four-year-old entry. The
Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action
to take on the solicitation, took the matter to the
Commissioner of Land Registration by consulta raising two
questions: (a) whether the certificate of sale could be
registered using the old Entry No. 8191 made in 1980
notwithstanding the fact that the original copies of the
reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on
June 19, 1984; and (b) if the first query was answered
affirmatively, whether he could sign the proposed
annotation, having assumed his duties only in July
1982.5
The resolution on the consulta held that Entry No. 8191 had
been rendered "... ineffective due to the impossibility of
accomplishing registration at the time the document was
entered because of the non-availability of the certificate (sic)
of title involved. For said certificate of sale to be admitted for
registration, there is a need for it to be re-entered now that
the titles have been reconstituted upon payment of new
entry fees," and by-passed the second query as having been
rendered moot and academic by the answer to the first. 6
DILI DAW PWEDE MA REGISTER KAY WALADAW ANG
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE KAY NAWAGTANG.
SINCE DILI AVAILABLE ANG OCT, DILI SAD PWEDE
MAKA ANNOTATE ANG REGISTER OF DEEDS KAY
NISTART MAN SIYA PAG 1982, DILI PAG 1980. NYA
ANG RECONSTITUTION KAY PAG 1984. DAGHAN
KAAYO DISCREPANCIES!
Unwilling to accept that result, the DBP appealed the
resolution to the Court of Appeals (then the Intermediate
Appellate Court) 7 which, after reviewing the record, certified
the appeal to this Court as involving a question purely of
law.8 INGON ANG COURT OF APPEALS, PURELY
QUESTION OF LAW RAMAN NI. IDISMISS TA NI!
GIBASEHAN ANG SECTION 56 SA PD 1529.
The appealed resolution appears to be based upon a
reading of the cited Section 56 of PD No. 1529, and
particularly of the provision therein referring to the Register's
act of making a primary entry as " ... a preliminary process in
registration ...," as depriving of any effect a primary entry
without a corresponding annotation thereof on the
certificate of title to which the instrument subject of said
entry refers. SO INGON ANG COURT OF APPEALS:
WALAY KWENTA ANG REGISTRATION IF KUWANGAN
UG ANNOTATION!
That view fails to find support from a consideration of entire
context of said Section 56 which in another part also
provides that the instrument subject of a primary entry "...
shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted ...,"
and, at the very least, gives such entry from the moment
of its making the effect of putting the whole world on
notice of the existence the instrument on entered. Such
effect (of registration) clearly attaches to the mere
making of the entry without regard to the subsequent
step of annotating a memorandum of the instrument
subject of the entry on the certificate of title to which it
refers. Indeed, said Section, in also providing that the
annotation, "... when made ... shall bear the same date ..."
as the entry, may be said to contemplate unspecified
intervals of time occurring between the making of a primary
entry and that of the corresponding annotation on the
certificate of title without robbing the entry of the effect of
being equivalent to registration. Neither, therefore, is the
implication in the appealed resolution that annotation must
annotation entry immediately or in short order justified by the
language of Section 56.
Furthermore, it is amply clear that the four-year hiatus
between primary entry and proposed annotation in this
case has not been of DBP's making. Though it was under
no necessity to present the owner's duplicates of the
certificates of title affected for purposes of primary entry,
since the transaction sought to be recorded was an
involuntary transaction, 9 and the record is silent as to
whether it presented them or not, there is nonetheless every
probability that it did so. It was the mortgagee of the lands
covered by those titles and it is usual in mortgage
transactions that the owner's duplicates of the encumbered
titles are yielded into the custody of the mortgage until the
mortgage is discharged. Moreover, the certificates of title
were reconstituted from the owner's duplicates, 10 and again
it is to be presumed that said duplicates were presented by
DBP, the petitioner in the reconstitution proceedings. SC:
DILI FAULT SA DBP NA WALA NILA ANG OCT, KAY
MORTGAGEE RAMAN SILA. USUALLY BASTA
INVOLUNTARY TRANSACTION LIKE KANANG MGA
FORECLOSURES, MAPUNTA RA ANG DUPLICATES SA
TITLES IF MA DISCHARGE NA ANG MORTGAGE.
PRESUMED NAMAN SAD NGA GIPRESENT SA DBP
ANG DUPLICATES LABI NA KATONG NAGPA
RECONSTITUTE NA SILA SA TITLE. PLUS WALA PAJUD
SILA NAGKUWANG BAYAD SA REGISTRATION FEES
NYA ANG CERTIFICATE OF SALE KAY REGISTRABLE
PAJUD ON ITS FACE!
It is, furthermore, admitted that the requisite registration
fees were fully paid and that the certificate of sale was
registrable on its face. 11 DBP, therefore, complied with all
that was required of it for purposes of both primary entry and
annotation of the certificate of sale. It cannot be blamed that
annotation could not be made contemporaneously with the
entry because the originals of the subject certificates of title
were missing and could not be found, since it had nothing to
do with their safekeeping. If anyone was responsible for
failure of annotation, it was the Register of Deeds who was
chargeable with the keeping and custody of those
documents.
It does not, therefore, make sense to require DBP to repeat
the process of primary entry, paying anew the entry fees as
the appealed resolution disposes, in order to procure
annotation which through no fault on its part, had to be
deferred until the originals of the certificates of title were
found or reconstituted. That it is hardly just or equitable to do
so also seems to have occurred to the Solicitor General, who
dilutes his argument in support of the appealed resolution
with the suggestion that "... the making of a new entry ...
would be the more orderly procedure," and that DBP should
not be made to pay filing fees anew.12
Jurisprudence on the subject, while it has not been entirely
consistent, is not wanting. In Government vs. Aballe, 13 this
Court ruled that " ... (a)lthough a notice of attachment has
not been noted on the certificate of title, its notation in the
book of entry of the register of deeds produces all the effects
which the law gives to its registration or inscription."
Seemingly, that ruling was abandoned in the wartime case of
Basa vs. De la Rama, 14 where it was held that the entry of
an instrument in the primary entry book produces no legal
effect unless a memorandum thereof is noted on the
certificate of title. Villasor vs. Camon, 15 however, clarified
that Aballe was never really abandoned or reversed insofar
as it applied to involuntary transactions. Said the Court in
that case, which involved a voluntary transactions a deed
of assignment of rights in a parcel of land and its
improvements:
The appellant cannot invoke in support
of her contention, the ruling laid down in
the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Aballe, 60 Phil.,
986, which was followed in Director of
Lands vs. Abad, 61 Phil. 479, to the
effect that an attachment entered upon
the entry book is duly registered
although the duplicate certificate is not
presented at the time of registration to
the register of deeds. Appellant cannot
invoked said ruling, not because it has
been abandoned by the Supreme Court
during the Japanese occupation in the
case of Bass VS. De la Rama, et al., ...
in which it was said that "we are
constrained to abandon the ruling in
said two cases,"- it was not abandoned
for the decision was concurred by only
two justices or less than a majority, and
said statement was not necessary or an
obiter dictum and against the law, as
correctly stated by the two associate
justices who dissented and only
concurred in the result, but because
said ruling, subsisting and in force, does
not support appellant's contention, for it
is only applicable to registration of
involuntary instruments, such as
attachment, or other liens and adverse
claims of any description. This ruling is
correct or in conformity with the
provisions of section 72 of Act No. 496,
which do not require the production by
the registrant of the duplicate certificate
of the land to be affected, ... (emphasis
supplied)
The decision in Villasor also quoted with approval the
following excerpt from an earlier case, Philippine National
Bank vs. Fernandez. 16
Coming now to the second ground on
which the appellant bases his claims,
we find that when Simona Fausa
executed the document, Exhibit 3, on
October 17, 1928, conveying her
interest in the land to the appellant, her
interest therein had already been
attached by the provincial sheriff and
also by him at public auction to the
Philippine National Bank, and the
certificate of sale filed in the office of the
 register of deeds in accordance with the
law (sections 429 and 450 of the Code
of Civil Procedure). It was not necessary
for the sheriff to present the owner's
duplicate of the certificate of title when
he filed notice of attachment with the
register of deeds, nor was it necessary
for the Philippine National Bank to
present the owner's duplicate when the
bank filed its certificate of sale for
registration (sections 71 and 72 of Act
No. 496).
Later cases appear to have applied the Aballe ruling that
entry in the day book, even without the corresponding
annotation on the certificate of title, is equivalent to, or
produces the effect of, registration to voluntary transactions,
provided the requisite fees are paid and the owner's
duplicates of the certificates of title affected are presented.
Thus, in Levin vs. Bass, et al., 17 it was held:
... Under the Torrens system the act of
registration is the operative act to
convey and affect the land. Do the entry
in the day book of a deed of sale which
was presented and filed together with
owner's duplicate certificate of title
which the office of the Registrar of
Deeds and full payment of registration
fees constitute a complete act of
registration which operates to convey
and affect the land? In voluntary
registration, such as a sale, mortgage,
lease and the like, if the owner's
duplicate certificate be not surrendered
and presented or if no payment of
registration fees be made within 15
days, entry in the day book of the deed
of sale does not operate to convey and
affect the land sold. In involuntary
registration, such as an attachment, levy
upon execution, lis pendens and the like
entry thereof in the day book is a
sufficient notice to all persons of such
adverse claim. ... The pronouncement of
the court below is to the effect that an
innocent purchaser for value has no
right to the property because he is not a
holder of a certificate of title to such
property acquired by him for value and
in good faith. It amounts to holding that
for failure of the Registrar of Deeds to
comply and perform his duty, an
innocent purchaser for value loses that
character-he is not an "innocent holder
for value of a certificate of title." ...
Neither violence to, nor stretching of the
meaning of, the law would be done, if
we should hold that an innocent
purchaser for value of registered land
becomes the registered owner and in
contemplation of law the holder of a
certificate thereof the moment he
presents the owner's duplicate
certificate of title to the property sold
and pays the full amount of registration
fees, because what remains to be done
lies not within his power to perform. The
Registrar of Deeds is in duty bound to
perform it. We believe that is a
reasonable and practical interpretation
of the law under considerations-a
construction which would lead to no
inconsistency and injustice. (emphasis
supplied)
A similar ruling was made in Potenciano vs. Dineros, et al.,
18 concerning land a deed of sale of which was entered in
the day book upon payment of the corresponding fees and
presentation of the owner's duplicate of the covering
certificate of title, on November 4, 1944. However, due to the
confusion arising from the bombing of Manila (this having
happened during the final months of the Japanese
Occupation), the papers presented by the registrant were
either lost or destroyed, no certificate of title was issued to
him and as far as the records of the Register of Deeds
showed, the property remained in the name of the vendor.
Another party later sued the vendor, obtained judgment
against him and purchased the property on execution sale.
In affirming judgment annulling the execution sale in an
action brought by the original purchaser, this Court held:
The judgment creditor contends that
entry of the deed in the day book is not
sufficient registration. Both upon law
and authority this contention must be
rejected. Section 56 of the Land
Registration Act says that deeds relating
to registered land shall, upon payment
of the filing fees, be entered in the entry
book also called day book in the
same section with notation of the
year, month, day, hour, and minute of
their reception and that "they shall be
regarded as registered from the moment
so noted." And applying this provision in
the cases of Levin vs. Bass, etc., G.R.
Nos. L-4340 to 4346, decided on May
28, 1952, this Court held that "an
innocent purchaser for value of
registered land becomes the registered
owner and in contemplation of law the
holder of a certificate thereof the
moment he presents and files a duly
notarized and lawful deed of sale and
the same is entered on the day book
and at the same time he surrenders or
presents the owner's duplicate
certificate of title to the property sold
and pays the full amount of registration
fees, because what remains to be done
lies not within his power to perform."
Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces
the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered is a
voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has
complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry
and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a
duty incumbent solely on the register of deeds.
Therefore, without necessarily holding that annotation of a
primary entry on the original of the certificate of title may be
deferred indefinitely without prejudice to the legal effect of
said entry, the Court rules that in the particular situation here
obtaining, annotation of the disputed entry on the
reconstituted originals of the certificates of title to which it
refers is entirely proper and justified. To hold said entry
"ineffective," as does the appealed resolution, amounts to
declaring that it did not, and does not, protect the registrant
(DBP) from claims arising, or transactions made, thereafter
which are adverse to or in derogation of the rights created or
conveyed by the transaction thus entered. That, surely, is a
result that is neither just nor can, by any reasonable DECISION
interpretation of Section 56 of PD 1529, be asserted as
warranted by its terms.

The qualms implicit in the query of the respondent (and

present appellee) register of deeds about making annotation
of an entry effected before he assumed that office are more
imagined than real. He would only be making a LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
memorandum of an instrument and of its entry based on or
reciting details which are already of indubitable record and,
pursuant to the express command of the law, giving
said memorandum the same date as the entry. No part
of that function is exclusive to the incumbent of the
office at the time entry was made or is forbidden to any
of his successors.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule

WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the Acting
Commissioner of Land Registration is SET ASIDE. The
respondent-appellee Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, or
his successor, is ordered to annotate on the originals of the
reconstituted Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033
and NT-149034 of his Registry a memorandum of the
certificate of sale in favor of appellant Development Bank of
the Philippines as entered under Entry No. 8191 dated June
13, 1980 of the Primary Entry (Day) Book of said Registry.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
NATIONAL HOUSING G.R. No. 149121
AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
Present:
45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 2000
and its Resolution dated July 19, 2001 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the National Housing Authority (NHA).
On April 19, 1983, spouses Augusto and Luz Basa loaned
from NHA the amount of P556,827.10 secured by a real
estate mortgage over their properties covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) Nos. 287008 and 285413, located
at No. 30 San Antonio St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City. Spouses Basa did not pay the loan despite repeated
demands. To collect its credit, the NHA, on August 9, 1990,

PUNO, C.J., filed a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of

Chairperson, mortgage before the Sheriffs Office in Quezon City, pursuant
to Act No. 3135, as amended.
CARPIO,*
- versus -
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
After notice and publication, the properties were sold at
BERSAMIN, and
public auction where NHA emerged as the highest bidder.
On April 16, 1991, the sheriffs certificate of sale was
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
registered and annotated only on the owners duplicate
copies of the titles in the hands of the respondents, since the
AUGUSTO BASA, JR.,
LUZ BASA and titles in the custody of the Register of Deeds were among
EDUARDO S. BASA, Promulgated:
those burned down when a fire gutted the City Hall of
Quezon City on June 11, 1988. ANG SALE NA ANNOTATE
Respondents.
RA SA DUPLICATES KAY ANG OCTs NASUNOG
April 20, 2010 SAONA!

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -x
On April 16, 1992, the redemption period expired, without
respondents having redeemed the properties. Shortly
thereafter, on April 24, 1992, NHA executed an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership over the foreclosed
properties, and the same was inscribed by the Register
of Deeds on the certificates of title in the hand of NHA
under Entry No. 6572/T-287008-PR-29207.
On June 18, 1992, NHA filed a petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Possession. The said petition was granted by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an Order dated August 4,
1992.
A Writ of Possession was issued on March 9, 1993 by the
RTC, ordering spouses Augusto and Luz Basa to vacate the
subject lots. The writ, however, remained unserved. This
compelled NHA to move for the issuance of an alias writ
of possession on April 28, 1993. GANAHAN NA SA NHA
NA MANGHAWA ANG SPOUSES SA PROPERTY
ASSUMING NGA THEY HAVE ALREADY BOUGHT
SUCCESSFULLY THE PROPERTIES (NHA)!
Before the RTC could resolve the motion for the issuance of
an alias writ of possession, respondents spouses Basa and
Eduardo Basa, on June 2, 1993, filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and Petition in Intervention (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction). Respondents anchored said petition for
intervention on Section 8 of Act No. 3135, as amended,
which gives the debtor/mortgagor the remedy to petition that
the sale be set aside and the writ of possession be
cancelled. In the said petition for intervention, respondents
averred that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject
properties was a nullity since notices were not posted
and published, written notices of foreclosure were not
given to them, and notices of sale were not tendered to
the occupants of the sold properties, thereby denying
them the opportunity to ventilate their rights. Respondents
likewise insisted that even assuming arguendo that the
foreclosure sale were valid, they were still entitled to
redeem the same since the one-year redemption period
from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of
foreclosure sale had not yet prescribed. Citing Bernardez
v. Reyes and Bass v. De la Rama, respondents theorized
that the instrument is deemed registered only upon actual
inscription on the certificate of title in the custody of the civil
registrar. Since the sheriffs certificate was only inscribed
on the owners duplicate certificate of title, and not on
the certificate of title in the possession of the Register
of Deeds, then there was no effective registration and
the one-year redemption period had not even begun to
run. Thus, respondents asked the RTC, among others, to
declare the foreclosure sale null and void, to allow the
respondents to redeem the mortgaged properties in the
amount of P21,160.00, and to cancel the Writ of Possession
dated March 9, 1993. INGON ANG RESPONDENTS, WALA
JUD TO NIDAGAN ANG PRESCRIPTION KAY NA
INSCRIBE RAMAN SA DUPLICATES ANG SALE, DILI SA
OCTs. ASIDE SA USA KA RASON NILA NGA WALA SILA
NANOTIFY SA FORECLOSURE EXPRESSLY. IPA
NULLIFY NILA ANG FORECLOSURE TUNGOD ANA NA
REASONS! KANI TANAN, GICOUNTER SA NHA WITH
OPPOSITE CONTENTIONS!
NHA opposed respondents petition for intervention. It
countered that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was
conducted validly and made in accordance with Act No.
3135 as evidenced by the publication of the Notice of
Sheriffs Sale in the Manila Times in its issues dated July 14,
21 and 28, 1990. NHA also said that respondents had been
furnished with a copy of the Notice of Sheriffs Sale as shown
at the bottom portion of said notice. NHA maintained that
respondents right of redemption had long expired on April
15, 1992 since the certificate of sale was inscribed on their
TCT Nos. 285413 and 287008 a year earlier, or on April 16,
1991. It pointed out that the RTC, via its Order dated August
4, 1992, had already ruled that respondents right of
redemption was already gone without them exercising said
right. Since said order had already attained finality, the ruling
therein could no longer be disturbed.
On January 2, 1995, the RTC issued the first assailed
Order with the following directives: 1) granting the
issuance of the alias writ of possession which allowed NHA
to take possession of the subject properties; 2) admitting the
Petition in Intervention and treating the same as the petition
to set aside sale mentioned in [Sec. 8] of Act No. 3155; and
3) granting the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
favor of respondents that ordered NHA to refrain from selling
or disposing of the contested properties. The pertinent
portion of the order reads:

After examining the record and following
precedents x x x this Court hereby
orders:
1. The issuance of an alias
writ of possession;
2. Admission of the Petition in
Intervention, treating the same as the
petition to set aside sale, etc.,
mentioned in [Sec. 8] of Act No. 3155;
3. The issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, after a BOND in
the amount of P20,000.00 had been
duly filed by intervenors, ordering
movant National Housing Authority, its
agents and/or any other person acting
under its command, to desist and refrain
from selling or in any manner from
disposing of the subject properties
covered by TCT Nos. 287008 and
285413 and located at No. 30, San
Antonio Street, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City, pending the
termination of this proceeding and/or
unless a contrary order is issued by this
Court;
4. Setting the hearing of the
petition in intervention (to set aside) on
March 17, 1995, at 8:30 a.m.
NHA filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the RTCs
Order insofar as it admitted respondents motion for
intervention and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. NHA
argued that respondents should have assailed the
foreclosure sale during the hearing in the petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Possession, and not during the
hearing in the petition for the issuance of an alias writ of
possession since the petition referred to in Section 8 of
Act No. 3135 pertains to the original petition for the issuance
of the Writ of Possession and not the Motion for the
Issuance of an Alias Writ of Possession. NHA stressed that
another reason why the petition for intervention should be
denied was the finality of the Order dated August 4, 1992
declaring respondents right of redemption barred by
prescription. Lastly, NHA asserted that the writ of possession
was issued as a matter of course upon filing of the proper
motion and thereby, the court was bereft of discretion.
MOTION FOR RECON. WAS DENIED AS TO THE
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INTERVENTION AND
WRIT OF PRELIM. INJUNCT. THIS WAS DENIED BY THE
RTC!
In the second assailed Order dated September 4, 1995, the
RTC denied NHAs motion for reconsideration reasoning that
the admission of the intervention was sanctioned by Section
8 of Act No. 3135. As to the grant of preliminary injunction,
the RTC made the justification that if the NHA was not
restrained, the judgment which may be favorable to
respondents would be ineffectual. The order partly provides:
The motion is without merit. The
admission of the intervention is
sanctioned by Sec. 8 of Act No. 3135.
And, because, otherwise or if no
preliminary injunction is issued, the
movant NHA may, before final
judgment, do or continue the doing of
the act with the intervenor asks the court
to restrain, and thus make ineffectual
the final judgment rendered afterwards
which may grant the relief sought by the
intervenor.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for
reconsideration is DENIED.
Undaunted, NHA filed on November 24, 1995, a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated February
24, 2000, in favor of the NHA. It declared null and void the
assailed orders of the RTC dated January 2, 1995 and
September 4, 1995, to the extent that the said orders
admitted the petition in intervention and granted the
issuance of the preliminary injunction; but it upheld the grant
of the alias writ of possession, thus: COURT OF APPEALS
IN FAVOR OF NHA!
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED, and the assailed order of
January 2, 1995 is declared NULL AND
VOID except for the portion directing the
issuance of an alias writ of possession.
Likewise declared NULL AND VOID is
the second assailed order of September
4, 1995 denying the petitioners motion
for reconsideration. Let an alias writ of
possession be issued and
executed/implemented by the public
respondent without further delay.
The Court of Appeals defended its affirmation of the RTCs
grant of the alias writ of possession in NHAs favor by saying
that it was a necessary consequence after the earlier writ
was left unserved to the party. It further explained that
NHA was entitled to the writ of possession as a matter
of course after the lapse of the redemption period.
As to the RTCs admission of respondents petition for
intervention, the appellate court opined that it was improperly
and erroneously made. The Court of Appeals believed
that the only recourse available to a mortgagor, in this
case the respondents, in a foreclosure sale is to
question the validity of the sale through a petition to set
aside the sale and to cancel the writ of possession, a
summary procedure provided for under Section 112 of
the Land Registration Act. It also observed that the grant
of the preliminary injunction by the RTC was uncalled for as
it would effectively defeat the right of NHA to possession, the
latter having been entitled by virtue of the grant of the alias
writ of possession. CA AVERRED THAT THE ONLY
REMEDY FOR RESPONDENTS WAS QUESTION THE
VALIDITY OF THE SALE THROUGH PETITION TO SET
ASIDE AND CANCEL THE WRIT OF POSSESSION, NOT
A PETITION FOR INTERVENTION! BUT GIBUTTRESS
RAJUD NI SA RESPONDENTS AND NIINGON NGA
KATONG DECISION SA RTC FINAL AND EXECUTORY
NA.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. They alleged
that since they raised the issue that their right of redemption
had not prescribed, said fact should have changed the
whole scenario such that the issuance of a writ of
possession ceased to be summary in nature and was no
longer ministerial. Respondents then concluded that their
right to redeem the properties against NHAs right to the writ
of possession must be threshed out in a hearing of the case
on its merits.
With regard to the RTC Order dated August 4, 1992
granting the writ of possession which, according to the
NHA, became final and executory, respondents argued
that said order did not constitute res judicata so as to bar
the filing of the petition for intervention since the said order
was not a judgment on the merits that could attain finality.
Also, respondents would like the Court of Appeals to treat
the petition for intervention not only as an opposition to the
issuance of the alias writ of possession, but also as a proper
remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, as amended, in
view of the various issues raised.
On November 27, 2000, the Court of Appeals, in its
Amended Decision, reconsidered its earlier stance. It
declared that the period of redemption had not expired
as the certificate of sale had not been registered or
annotated in the original copies of the titles supposedly
kept with the Register of Deeds since said titles were
earlier razed by fire. Taking its cue from Bass v. De la
Rama where the Court purportedly made a ruling that entry
of a document, such as sale of real property, in the entry
book is insufficient to treat such document as registered,
unless the same had been annotated on the certificate of
title; the Court of Appeals went on to say that the entry of the
certificate of sale in the owners duplicate of the titles could
not have been sufficient to register the same since anyone
who would wish to check with the Register of Deeds would
not see any annotation. Thus, entry made on the owners
duplicate of the titles cannot be considered notice that would
bind the whole world. Having been deprived of their right of
redemption, the Court of Appeals deemed it proper to allow
respondents to intervene. The dispositive part of the
amended decision decrees:
WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration is GRANTED. Our
decision dated February 24, 2000, is
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and
the petition DISMISSED.
Unfazed, NHA filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
Court of Appeals denied in its July 19, 2001 Resolution, to
wit:
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 24,
2000 is DENIED for lack of merit.
 NIUSAB ANG HUNA HUNA SA CA On the procedural aspect, respondents question NHAs
NYA NIAFFIRM NA BITAW, SA
alleged failure to include in its petition copies of material
DUPLICATES RAMAN NA ANNOTATE
SO DILI PWEDE. PILDI ANG NHA SA portions of the record such as pleadings filed in the RTC and
IYANG MOTION FOR RECON. HENCE
the Court of Appeals as required under Section 4, Rule 45 of
THIS PETITION!
the Rules of Court. Respondents also pointed out the
purported defective verification of NHA in view of the fact
Hence, the instant petition.
that it merely stated that the one verifying had read the
allegations of the petition and that the same were true and
correct to the best of his knowledge. According to
respondents, such declarations were not in accordance with
In its memorandum, NHA tendered the following the rules which require that a verified pleading must state
issues: that the affiant had read the pleading and that the allegations
therein were true and correct based on his personal
knowledge and not only to the best of his knowledge.
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE
ANNOTATION OF THE
SHERIFFS CERTIFICATE OF As to the merits, NHA stresses that the annotation
SALE IN THE PRIMARY
and entry in the owners duplicate certificate of titles of the
ENTRY BOOK OF THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS AND sheriffs certificate of sale are sufficient compliance with the
ON THE OWNERS
requirement of law on registration. To support this, NHA
DUPLICATE TITLE IS
SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE refers to Land Registration Administration Circular No. 3
WITH THE REQUIREMENT dated December 6, 1988, entitled Entry and Provisional
OF LAW ON
REGISTRATION. Registration of Instruments Pending Reconstitution of Title
which allegedly authorized all Registers of Deeds to accept
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF
BASS VS. DE LA RAMA HAS for entry and provisional registration instruments affecting
BEEN SUPERSEDED. lost or destroyed certificates of title pending reconstitution of
the original. The legality and validity of the disputed
registration on its duplicate copies of the sheriffs certificate
Respondents, on the other hand, offered the following as of sale, NHA insists, are backed by this Courts ruling in
issues: Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, where purportedly, this Court made a
favorable interpretation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree
I No. 1529. NHA says that the inscription of the sheriffs
certificate of sale only to the owners duplicate copies, but not
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN to those in the custody of the register of deeds is justified as
FINDING THAT THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ACT WITH the latter were burned down. Thus, it could not be blamed for
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE RESPONDENTS the non-registration of the sale in the original copies.
INTERVENTION AND GRANTING THE EQUITABLE WRIT
OF INJUNCTION THEREBY DISMISSING THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION.

NHA faults the Court of Appeals reliance on Bass v. De la

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT
PETITION COMPLIES WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 45 OF
THE RULES OF COURT.
Rama since the ruling therein stating that entry and
annotation of a sale instrument on the owners duplicate copy
only as insufficient registration, was already abandoned in
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, where it was allegedly ruled that the
primary entry alone of the transaction produces the effect of
registration so long as the registrant has complied with all
that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation.
In contrast, respondents submit that annotation of the
sheriffs certificate of sale on the owners copy is inadequate
to propel the running of the redemption period. They firmly
believe that for the sale instrument to be considered as
registered, the inscription must be made on the reconstituted
titles.
Respondents disagree with NHAs opinion that Bass v. De la
Rama was superceded by Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. They
are of the persuasion that the ruling in DBP pertains
exclusively to the unique factual milieu and the issues
attendant therein, but not to the instant case where Bass
purportedly applies. Respondents also assail NHAs citation
of Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
According to them, said case finds no application to the
instant controversy because the issue involved in the former
was whether the redemption period should be reckoned from
the date of the auction sale or the registration of the
certificate of sale, which ostensibly is not the bone of
contention in this case.
Ascribing NHAs inaction to have the burned titles
reconstituted, respondents assert that such neglect should
not be used as a justification for the non-inscription in the
original titles of the certificate of sale. Additionally,
respondents insist that the question of whether the
redemption period should be reckoned from the inscription
on the owners duplicate copies is a factual and legal issue
that is appropriately adjudicated in a hearing on the merits of
their petition in intervention, and not in the instant special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition which is limited in
scope, namely, whether the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting their
petition in intervention.
Respondents reiterate that the issuance of the writ of
possession prayed for by NHA before the RTC is no longer
ministerial since it raised the issue of whether their period of
redemption has already expired. They cite Barican v.
Intermediate Appellate Court as the authority to this
argument.
We dwell first with the procedural issues before the main
controversy. Respondents contend that the instant petition is
dismissible on the ground that NHA failed to attach
pleadings filed in the RTC and the Court of Appeals as
required under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which partly provides:
SEC. 4. Contents of petition.
The petition shall be filed in eighteen
(18) copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as
such by the petitioner, and shall x x x (d)
be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original, or a certified true copy
of the judgment or final order or
resolution certified by the clerk of court
of the court a quo and the requisite
number of plain copies thereof, and
such material portions of the record as
would support the petition; x x x.
In its petition, NHA attached the February 24,
2000 Decision, the November 27, 2000 Amended Decision,
and the July 19, 2001 Resolution all of the Court of Appeals;
copies of the transfer certificates of title of the disputed
properties; and the June 13, 1994 Order of the Quezon City
RTC ordering the reconstitution of the said titles. This Court
finds that NHA substantially complied with the requirements
under Section 4 of Rule 45. The same conclusion was
arrived at by this Court in Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Family Foods Manufacturing Co., Ltd. when it
was faced with the same procedural objection, thus:
As held by this Court in Air
Philippines Corporation v. Zamora:
[E]ven if a
document is
relevant and
pertinent to the
petition, it need not
be appended if it is
shown that the
contents thereof
can also [be] found
in another
document already
 attached to the
petition. Thus, if the
SEC. 4. Verification. Except
material allegations
when otherwise specifically required by
in a position paper
law or rule, pleadings need not be under
are summarized in
oath, verified or accompanied by
a questioned
affidavit.
judgment, it will
suffice that only a
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that
certified true copy
the affiant has read the pleading and
of the judgment is
that the allegations therein are true and
attached.
correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
Third, a
petition lacking an
A pleading required to be verified which
essential pleading
contains a verification based on
or part of the case
information and belief, or upon
record may still be
knowledge, information and belief, or
given due course or
lacks a proper verification, shall be
reinstated (if earlier
treated as an unsigned pleading.
dismissed) upon
showing that
petitioner later
submitted the
documents The reason for requiring verification in the petition
required, or that it
is to secure an assurance that the allegations of a pleading
will serve the higher
interest of justice are true and correct; are not speculative or merely imagined;
that the case be
and have been made in good faith. To achieve this purpose,
decided on the
merits. the verification of a pleading is made through an affidavit or
sworn statement confirming that the affiant has read the
pleading whose allegations are true and correct of the
Nevertheless, even if the pleadings and other
supporting documents were not attached to the petition, the affiant's personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
dismissal is unwarranted because the CA records containing
the promissory notes and the real estate and chattel
mortgages were elevated to this Court. Without a doubt, we
have sufficient basis to actually and completely dispose of
the case.
The General Manager of NHA verified the petition
as follows:
We must stress that cases
should be determined on the merits,
after all parties have been given full
opportunity to ventilate their causes and
3. I have read the allegations
defenses, rather than on technicalities
contained therein and that the same are
or procedural imperfections. In that way,
true and correct to the best of my own
the ends of justice would be served
personal knowledge.
better. Rules of procedure are mere
tools designed to expedite the decision
or resolution of cases and other matters
pending in court. A strict and rigid
application of rules, resulting in A reading of the above verification reveals nothing
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
objectionable about it. The affiant confirmed that he had read
than promote substantial justice, must
be avoided. In fact, Section 6 of Rule 1 the allegations in the petition which were true and correct
states that the Rules shall be liberally
based on his personal knowledge. The addition of the words
construed in order to promote their
objective of ensuring the just, speedy to the best before the phrase of my personal knowledge did
and inexpensive disposition of every
not violate the requirement under Section 4 of Rule 7, it
action and proceeding.
being sufficient that the affiant declared that the allegations
in the petition are true and correct based on his personal
knowledge.
Contrary to respondents assertion, NHAs verification
conforms to the rule. Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
states:
 Now, as to the merits of the case. The main
issue before us is whether the annotation of the sheriffs
certificate of sale on the owners duplicate certificate of
titles is sufficient registration considering that the
inscription on the original certificates could not be made
as the same got burned.
Jurisprudence is replete with analogous cases. Of foremost
importance is Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija where the Court listed
cases where the transaction or instrument was annotated
not on the original certificate but somewhere else. In that
case, DBP, following the extrajudicial foreclosure sale where
it emerged as the highest bidder, registered with the
Register of Deeds the sheriffs certificate of sale in its favor.
After it had paid the required fees, said transaction was
entered in the primary entry book. However, the annotation
of the said transaction to the originals of the certificates of
title could not be done because the same titles were missing
from the files of the Registry. This prompted DBP to
commence reconstitution proceedings of the lost titles. Four
years had passed before the missing certificates of title were
reconstituted. When DBP sought the inscription of the four-
year old sale transaction on the reconstituted titles, the
Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action
to take, referred the matter to the Commissioner of the Land
Registration Authority by consulta, the latter resolved against
the annotation of the sale transaction and opined that said
entry was ineffective due to the impossibility of
accomplishing registration at the time the document was
entered because of the non-availability of the certificate (sic)
of title involved. In other words, annotation on the primary
book was deemed insufficient registration. The Court
disagreed with this posture. Considering that DBP had
paid all the fees and complied with all the requirements
for purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the
certificate of sale, the Court declared that mere entry in
the primary book was considered sufficient registration
since [DBP] cannot be blamed that annotation could not
be made contemporaneously with the entry because the
originals of the subject certificates of title were missing and
could not be found, since it had nothing to do with their
safekeeping. If anyone was responsible for failure of
annotation, it was the Register of Deeds who was
chargeable with the keeping and custody of those
documents. To buttress its conclusion, the Court reviewed
the relevant jurisprudence starting from 1934. The Court
noted that before the Second World War, particularly in
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Aballe, the prevailing
doctrine was an inscription in the book of entry even without
the notation on the certificate of title was considered as
satisfactory and produced all the effects which the law gave
to its registration. During the war, however, the Court
observed that there was apparent departure from said ruling
since in Bass v. De la Rama, the holding was that entry of an
instrument in the primary entry book does not confer any
legal effect without a memorandum thereof inscribed on the
certificate of title. DBP noted that Bass v. De la Rama,
however, survived only for a little while since later cases
appear to have applied the Aballe ruling that entry in the day
book, even without the corresponding annotation on the
certificate of title, is equivalent to, or produces the effect of,
registration to voluntary transactions, provided the requisite
fees are paid and the owners duplicates of the certificates of
title affected are presented.
These later cases are Levin v. Bass and Potenciano v.
Dineros, both of which involve the issue of whether entry in
the day book of a deed of sale, payment of the fees, and
presentation of the owners duplicate certificate of title
constitute a complete act of registration.
Simply, respondents resort to Bass v. De la Rama is futile as
the same was abandoned by the later cases, i.e., Bass,
Potenciano and DBP.
In the recent case of Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals,
the respondent was awarded the foreclosed parcels of land.
A sheriffs certificate of sale was thereafter issued in its favor.
Thereafter, petitioners in that case filed a complaint before
the RTC with a prayer for the issuance of an ex parte TRO
aimed at preventing the Register of Deeds from registering
the said certificate of sale in the name of the respondent and
from taking possession of the subject properties. Before the
RTC could issue a TRO, respondent presented the sheriffs
certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds who entered the
same certificate in the primary book, even if the registration
fee was paid only the following day. Four days after, the
RTC issued a TRO directing the Register of Deeds to refrain
from registering the said sheriffs certificate of sale. A
preliminary injunction was thereafter issued as the TRO was
about to expire. The preliminary injunction was questioned
by therein respondent. One of the main issues raised there
was whether the entry of the certificate of sale in the primary
book was equivalent to registration such that the TRO and
the preliminary injunction issues would not lie anymore as
the act sought to be restrained had become an
accomplished act. The Court held that the TRO and the
preliminary injunction had already become moot and
academic by the earlier entry of the certificate of sale in the
primary entry book which was tantamount to registration,
thus:
In fine, petitioners prayer for
the issuance of a writ of injunction, to
prevent the register of deeds from
registering the subject certificate of sale,
had been rendered moot and academic
by the valid entry of the instrument in
the primary entry book. Such entry is
equivalent to registration. Injunction
would not lie anymore, as the act sought
to be enjoined had already become a
fait accompli or an accomplished act.
Indeed, the prevailing rule is that there is effective
registration once the registrant has fulfilled all that is needed
of him for purposes of entry and annotation, so that what is
left to be accomplished lies solely on the register of deeds.
The Court thus once held:
Current doctrine thus seems to be that
entry alone produces the effect of
registration, whether the transaction
entered is a voluntary or an involuntary
one, so long as the registrant has
complied with all that is required of him
for purposes of entry and annotation,
and nothing more remains to be done
but a duty incumbent solely on the
register of deeds.
In the case under consideration, NHA presented the sheriffs
certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds and the same was
entered as Entry No. 2873 and said entry was further
annotated in the owners transfer certificate of title. A year
later and after the mortgagors did not redeem the said
properties, respondents filed with the Register of Deeds an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership after which the same
instrument was presumably entered into in the day book as
the same was annotated in the owners duplicate copy. Just
like in DBP, Levin, Potenciano and Autocorp, NHA followed
the procedure in order to have its sheriffs certificate of sale
annotated in the transfer certificates of title. There would be,
therefore, no reason not to apply the ruling in said cases to
this one. It was not NHAs fault that the certificate of sale was
not annotated on the transfer certificates of title which were
supposed to be in the custody of the Registrar, since the
same were burned. Neither could NHA be blamed for the
fact that there were no reconstituted titles available during
the time of inscription as it had taken the necessary steps in
having the same reconstituted as early as July 15, 1988.
NHA did everything within its power to assert its right.
APPLICABLE ANG RULING SA PREVIOUS CASES DIRI!
While it may be true that, in DBP, the Court ruled that in the
particular situation here obtaining, annotation of the disputed
entry on the reconstituted originals of the certificates of title
to which it refers is entirely proper and justified, this does not
mean, as respondents insist, that the ruling therein applies
exclusively to the factual milieu and the issue obtaining in
said case, and not to similar cases. There is nothing in the
subject declaration that categorically states its pro hac vice
character. For in truth, what the said statement really
conveys is that the current doctrine that entry in the primary
book produces the effect of registration can be applied in the
situation obtaining in that case since the registrant therein
complied with all that was required of it, hence, it was fairly
reasonable that its acts be given the effect of registration,
just as the Court did in the past cases. In fact the Court there
continued with this pronouncement:
To hold said entry ineffective,
as does the appealed resolution,
amounts to declaring that it did not, and
does not, protect the registrant (DBP)
from claims arising, or transactions
made, thereafter which are adverse to
or in derogation of the rights created or
conveyed by the transaction thus
entered. That, surely, is a result that is
neither just nor can, by any reasonable
interpretation of Section 56 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 be
asserted as warranted by its terms.
 executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. Clearly,
respondents have lost their opportunity to redeem the
properties in question.
What is more, in Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals, the
pertinent DBP ruling was applied, thereby demonstrating that
the said ruling in DBP may be applied to other cases with
similar factual and legal issues, viz:
As regards respondents allegation on the defect in the
publication and notice requirements of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, the same is unavailing. The rule is that it is
Petitioners contend that the aforecited
case of DBP is not apropos to the case the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite who has
at bar. Allegedly, in DBP, the bank not
the burden of establishing such fact. This is so because
only paid the registration fees but also
presented the owners duplicate foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the presumption
certificate of title. We find no merit in
of regularity and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is
petitioners posture x x x.
on the party who questions it. Here, except for their bare
xxxx
allegations, respondents failed to present any evidence to
Like in DBP v. Acting Register of Deeds support them. In addition, NHA stated in its Comment to
of Nueva Ecija, the instrument involved
Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene that it had complied
in the case at bar, is a sheriffs certificate
of sale, We hold now, as we held with the publication of the Notice of Sheriffs Sale in the
therein, that the registrant is under no
Manila Times in the latters issues dated July 14, 21 and 28,
necessity to present the owners
duplicates of the certificates of title 1990. It also claimed that an Affidavit of Publication of said
affected, for purposes of primary entry,
newspaper was attached as Annex B in the said comment.
as the transaction sought to be recorded
is an involuntary transaction. NHA also said that respondents had been furnished with a
copy of the Notice of Sheriffs Sale as shown at the bottom
xxxx
portion of said notice. From all these, it would tend to show
x x x Such entry is equivalent
that respondents aspersion of non-compliance with the
to registration. Injunction would not lie
anymore, as the act sought to be requirements of foreclosure sale is a futile attempt to salvage
enjoined had already become a fait
its statutory right to redeem their foreclosed properties,
accompli or an accomplished act.
which right had long been lost by inaction.

Moreover, respondents stand on the non-applicability of the

DBP case to other cases, absent any statement thereof to
Considering that the foreclosure sale and its subsequent
such effect, contravenes the principle of stare decisis which
registration with the Register of Deeds were done validly,
urges that courts are to apply principles declared in prior
there is no reason for the non-issuance of the writ of
decisions that are substantially similar to a pending case.
possession. A writ of possession is an order directing the
sheriff to place a person in possession of a real or personal
property, such as when a property is extrajudicially
foreclosed. Section 7 of Act No. 3135 provides for the rule in
Since entry of the certificate of sale was validly registered,
the issuance of the writ of possession involving extrajudicial
the redemption period accruing to respondents commenced
foreclosure sales of real estate mortgage, to wit:
therefrom, since the one-year period of redemption is
reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of
sale. It must be noted that on April 16, 1991, the sheriffs
Sec. 7. In any sale made
certificate of sale was registered and annotated only on the
under the provisions of this Act, the
owners duplicate copies of the titles and on April 16, 1992, purchaser may petition the [Regional
Trial Court] of the province or place
the redemption period expired, without respondents having
where the property or any part thereof
redeemed the properties. In fact, on April 24, 1992, NHA is situated, to give him possession
thereof during the redemption period,
 furnishing bond in an amount having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
equivalent to the use of the property
discretion. To accentuate the writs ministerial character, the
for a period of twelve months, to
indemnify the debtor in case it be Court disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance despite a
shown that the sale was made
pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure
without violating the mortgage or
without complying with the itself.
requirements of this Act. Such petition
shall be made under oath and filed in
the form of an ex parte motion in the
registration or cadastral proceedings
if the property is registered, or in
special proceedings in the case of Believing that the instant case does not come within the
property registered under the
penumbra of the foregoing rule, respondents resort to the
Mortgage Law or under section one
hundred and ninety-four of the ruling in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court.
Administrative Code, or of any other
Unfortunately for them, the instant case does not even come
real property encumbered with a
mortgage duly registered in the office close to the cited case. There, the Court deemed it
of any register of deeds in
inequitable to issue a writ of possession in favor of the
accordance with any existing law, and
in each case the clerk of the court purchaser in the auction sale considering that the property
shall, upon the filing of such petition,
involved was already in the possession of a third person by
collect the fees specified in paragraph
eleven of section one hundred and virtue of a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage even
fourteen of Act Numbered Four
before the purchaser could register the sheriffs certificate of
Hundred and ninety-six, as amended
by Act Numbered Twenty-eight sale. Also, the auction buyer therein unreasonably deferred
hundred and sixty-six, and the court
to exercise its right to acquire possession over the property.
shall, upon approval of the bond,
order that a writ of possession issue, These circumstances are not present in the instant case.
addressed to the sheriff of the
province in which the property is
situated, who shall execute said order
immediately.

Moreover, in Fernandez v. Espinoza, the Court

refused to apply the ruling in Barican v. Intermediate
This provision of law authorizes the purchaser in a
Appellate Court and Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the
two cases which are exemptions to the stated rule,
redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for
reasoning that:
that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral
proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title. Upon
the filing of such motion and the approval of the
In Cometa, which actually involved
corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs execution of judgment for the prevailing
the court to issue the order for a writ of possession. party in a damages suit, the subject
properties were sold at the public
auction at an unusually lower price,
while in Barican, the mortgagee bank
took five years from the time of
foreclosure before filing the petition for
the issuance of writ of possession. We
The time-honored precept is that after the consolidation of
have considered these equitable and
titles in the buyers name, for failure of the mortgagor to peculiar circumstances in Cometa and
Barican to justify the relaxation of the
redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its
otherwise absolute rule. None of these
issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is exceptional circumstances, however,
attended herein so as to place the
merely a ministerial function. The writ of possession issues
instant case in the same stature as that
as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion of Cometa and Barican. Instead, the
ruling in Vaca v. Court of Appeals is on
and the approval of the corresponding bond. The judge
all fours with the present petition. In
issuing the writ following these express provisions of law Vaca, there is no dispute that the
property was not redeemed within one
neither exercises his official discretion nor judgment. As
year from the registration of the
such, the court granting the writ cannot be charged with extrajudicial foreclosure sale; thus, the
 mortgagee bank acquired an absolute
right, as purchaser, to the issuance of
Respondent.
the writ of possession. Similarly, UOB,
as the purchaser at the auction sale in
the instant case, is entitled as a matter x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
of right, to the issuance of the writ of - - - - - - - -x
possession.

Just as in Fernandez, this Court does not see any

compelling reason to veer away from the established rule.
DECISION

In fine, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals

committed reversible error in ruling that the annotation of
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
NHAs sheriffs certificate of sale on the duplicate certificates
of title was not effective registration and in holding that
respondents redemption period had not expired.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing

the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
94479 dated April 18, 2007 and its Resolution dated
petition is hereby GRANTED. The Amended Decision of the
September 18, 2007.
Court of Appeals dated November 27, 2000 is SET ASIDE.

DURAWOOD G.R. No. 179884

CONSTRUCTION AND On June 3, 2004, petitioner Durawood
LUMBER SUPPLY, INC., Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. (Durawood) filed an
action for sum of money plus damages with a prayer for the
Petitioner,
Present: issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against LBB
Construction and Development Corporation (LBB

CORONA, C.J., Construction) and its president Leticia Barber (Barber) before
Chairperson, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. In said suit, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-7240, Durawood prayed
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, for the sum of P665,385.50 as payment for construction
materials delivered to LBB Construction.
BERSAMIN,
- versus -
DEL CASTILLO, and

On June 14, 2004, the RTC issued an Order

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
granting Durawoods prayer for the issuance of a writ of
attachment. On June 16, 2004, the corresponding writ was
issued.
Promulgated:

CANDICE S. BONA,
January 25, 2012
 On June 17, 2004, Sheriff Rolando C. Leyva WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing consideration, judgment is
(Sheriff Leyva) levied on a 344-square meter parcel of land in
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
Richdale Subdivision, Antipolo City covered by Transfer against the defendants, viz:
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. R-17571 in the name of LBB
1. Ordering the defendants
Construction. A Notice of Levy on Attachment was annotated to pay plaintiff the sum of
Six Hundred Sixty[-]Five
in TCT No. R-17571s Memorandum of Encumbrances on the
Thousand Three
same day, June 17, 2004. Hundred Eighty[-]Five
Pesos and Fifty
Centavos (P665,385.50)
plus two percent (2%)
interest per month from
May 11, 2004 up to the
On July 13, 2004, respondent Candice S. Bona present;
(Candice) filed a Motion seeking leave to intervene in
Civil Case No. 04-7240. Attached to said Motion was
2. Ordering the defendants
Candices Answer in Intervention, her Third Party Claim to pay plaintiff twenty-five
percent (25%) of the
addressed to Sheriff Leyva, and a copy of TCT No. R-
amount due to the
17571. Candice claimed therein that she is a co-owner of the plaintiff by way of
attorneys fees; and
property covered by TCT No. R-17571. She alleged that LBB
Construction had sold the property to her and her siblings,
Michael Angelo S. Bona, Diane Sheila S. Bona, Glenda May 3. To pay the costs of suit.
S. Bona and Johann Louie Sebastian S. Bona, through a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 2, 2004. Candice asserted
that the sale is the subject of Entry No. 30549 dated June
16, 2004 in the books of the Registry of Deeds of Antipolo
City, while the levy on attachment is only Entry No. 30590 The Decision became final and executory. On
dated June 17, 2004. What was attached to the Motion was September 12, 2005, Durawood filed a Motion for the
a copy of TCT No. R-17571, and not a title in Candice and Issuance of a Writ of Execution. On November 15, 2005, the
her co-owners names. INGON NING SI CANDICE PAG RTC issued a Writ of Execution. It was when this Writ was
INTERVENE NIYA NGA SIYA ANG THIRD PARTY about to be enforced that Durawood discovered the
NAKADAWAT THROUGH SALE SA YUTA, NA MAS UNA cancellation of TCT No. R-17571 and the issuance of TCT
NA REGISTER IYANG PAG ACQUIRE SA YUTA KAYSA No. R-22522 in the name of Candice and her siblings.
KATONG FORECLOSURE! LOL IEXECUTE NA UNTA ANG YUTA THEN NAHIBAW
AN SA DURAWOOD NGA GICANCEL DIAY ANG
ISSUANCE SA TITLE KAY NAA SA NAME NI CANDICE
UG IYA MGA IGSUON! ANG NAGBUHAT ANI KAY ANG
On August 11, 2004, the RTC issued an Order REGISTER OF DEEDS SA ANTIPOLO!
granting Candices Motion to Intervene.

LBB Construction and Barber filed their Answer in

Civil Case No. 04-7240, but failed to attend the scheduled
hearings, including the pre-trial. Consequently, Durawood
was allowed to present its evidence ex parte.
On July 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision in
Civil Case No. 04-7240 in favor of Durawood. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
It would appear from the records that on June 16,
2004, the supposed Register of Deeds of Antipolo City, Atty.
Randy A. Rutaquio (Atty. Rutaquio), cancelled TCT No. R-
17571 and issued TCT No. R-22522 in the name of Candice
and her co-owners. The parties, however, do not dispute that
said cancellation of the old TCT and issuance of the new one
was antedated, since Atty. Rutaquio was still the Register of
Deeds of Malabon on said date. According to a certification
of the Land Registration Authority, it was a certain Atty.
Edgar D. Santos (Atty. Santos) who was the Acting Register R-17571 and issuing TCT No. R-22522
without inscribing the Notice of Levy on
of Deeds of Antipolo City on June 16, 2004.
Attachment despite the absence of a
court order dissolving the writ of
Preliminary Attachment constitute
improper conduct tending to directly or
indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade
the administration of justice.
Durawood filed a Motion to Reinstate Notice of
Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-22522 and Cite Atty.
Randy A. Rutaquio for Contempt on the following grounds:
Atty. Rutaquio filed a Manifestation alleging
that the sale was entered in the Primary Entry Book prior
to the Levy on Attachment. The two transactions were
5. The cancellation of TCT
No. R-17571 and the issuance of TCT assigned to different examiners and it just so happened that
No. R-22522 was made by Atty. Randy
the examiner to whom the levy on attachment was assigned
A. Rutaquio who, on June 2004, was not
the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City. was able to inscribe the memorandum ahead of the sale,
As evidence of such fact, plaintiff
although the inscription of the sale was entered ahead of the
corporation was issued a certification by
LRA Human Resource Management levy. The levy on attachment was not inscribed on TCT No.
Officer IV Loreto I. Orense that Atty.
R-22522 because allegedly the sale should have priority and
Edgar D. Santos was the Acting
Register of Deeds of Antipolo City from preference. The cancellation of TCT No. R-17571 and the
June 1-30, 2004.
issuance of TCT No. R-22522 was already completed when
6. While the Deed of Sale he took over the position of Atty. Santos as Acting Register of
annotated in TCT No. R-17571 appears
Deeds and was therefore already clothed with the authority to
to have been made on June 16, 2004,
the fact of its inscription was made after issue and sign TCT No. R-22522. CONTENTION SA
that of the levy on attachment as it
REGISTER OF DEEDS NA GIKASUHAN UG CONTEMPT:
obviously appears below and next to it.
NAUNA JUD ANG REGISTRATION KAYSA LEVY SA
7. The records of this case
PRIMARY ENTRY BOOK. LAHI2 ANG EXAMINERS NA
reveal that in the Third Party Claim filed
by Candice Bona sometime in July GABUHAT ANI BUT SA TINUD ANAY NAUNA JUD ANG
2004, there was never any mention of
REGISTRATION SA KATONG SALE KANG CANDICE.
any recording about a Deed of Absolute
Sale in the Memorandum of NAHUMANA TONG CANCELLATION NAHITABO NATO
Encumbrances in TCT No. R-17571. It
DAAN BEFORE PALANG SIYA NI TAKE OVER SA
is difficult to comprehend that Atty.
Hernando U. Salvador, Bonas lawyer, KARAAN NGA REGISTER OF DEEDS! BUT THIS WAS
would miss mentioning that a Deed of
NEGATED BY ATTY. SANTOS, SAYING NGA ANG
Absolute Sale was inscribed ahead of
the notice of levy on attachment if ever NAGREGISTER JUD IS SI RUTAGUIO, BUT NAUNA
such sale was made on June 16, 2004.
LANG JUD GIHAPON ANG REGISTRATION SA SALE.
8. Thus, under the KATONG SA TIME NI ATTY. SANTOS, WA SIYA KA
circumstances, plaintiff corporation
REGISTER ATO SA SALE KAY WALA MAN NABAYRI
cannot help speculate that [the] Deed of
Sale between LBB Construction and the ANG REGISTRATION FEES. PILDI SI RUTAGUIO ANI SA
Bonas was made to appear to have
RTC.
been recorded a day before the
attachment.
Atty. Rutaquio also submitted a letter dated June
9. While the Notice of Levy on
Attachment was inscribed in TCT No. R- 25, 2004 from Atty. Santos to Land Registration Authority
17571 ahead and before of the Deed of
(LRA) Administrator Benedicto B. Ulep (Administrator Ulep)
Sale between LBB Construction Co.,
Inc. and the Bonas, the said notice was consulting the latter as regards the registration of the Deed of
not carried over in TCT No. R-22522
Absolute Sale and the Notice of Levy on Attachment. In said
despite the fact that there was no order
coming from this Honorable Court letter received by the LRA on July 1, 2004, Atty. Santos
dissolving the Writ of Preliminary
stated that he had not acted on the Deed of Absolute Sale
Attachment dated June 16, 2004.
since the required registration fees were not paid therefor.
10. Randy Rutaquios
Administrator Ulep was able to reply to said letter on October
unauthorized acts of cancelling TCT No.
6, 2004, when Atty. Rutaquio was already the Acting Register
of Deeds. Administrator Ulep stated that since the Deed of
Sale was considered registered on June 16, 2004, the same
shall take precedence over the Notice of Levy on Attachment
registered on June 17, 2004.
Acting on the Motion to Reinstate Notice of
Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-22522 and Cite Atty.
Randy A. Rutaquio for Contempt, the RTC issued an
Order dated March 2, 2006, ruling in favor of Durawood.
The RTC gave great weight to the certification by LRA
Human Resource Management Officer IV Loreto I. Orense
that Atty. Santos was the Acting Register of Deeds from June
1-30, 2004, and held that this proves the fact that Atty.
Santos was the only person authorized to sign and approve
all the transactions with the Registry of Deeds of Antipolo
City at the time. Moreover, according to the RTC, the
alienation of LBB Construction in favor of the Bonas without
leaving sufficient property to pay its obligation is considered
by law in fraud of creditor under Articles 1381 and 1387 of
the Civil Code.
The RTC did not rule on Durawoods prayer to cite
Atty. Rutaquio for contempt. The dispositive portion of the
March 2, 2006 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant motion to
reinstate notice of levy on attachment in
TCT No. R-22522 now in the name of
the intervenors is hereby GRANTED its
non-inscription therein having been
made without order of this Court.
The Register of Deeds of
Antipolo City is directed to reinstate the
notice of levy on attachment in TCT No.
R-22522 in the names of intervenors
immediately upon receipt of this Order.
Candice filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
above Order. In the meantime, on March 13, 2006, Sheriff
Leyva issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale setting the sale of the
property covered by TCT No. R-22522 at public auction on
April 11, 2006 at 10:00 a.m., pursuant to the November 15,
2005 Writ of Execution. Candice filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion to Order the Branch Sheriff to Desist from the Sale of
Intervenors Property for Being Premature, which was granted
by the RTC in an Order dated March 29, 2006.
On March 8, 2006, the new Acting Register of
Deeds Jose S. Loriega, Jr. complied with the March 6, 2006
Order of the RTC by reinstating in TCT No. R-22522 the
Notice of Levy on Attachment in favor of Durawood.
On April 7, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying
Candices Motion for Reconsideration. In said Order, the RTC
highlighted its observation that in TCT No. R-17571, the
inscription of the levy on attachment by Atty. Santos
dated June 17, 2004 was in page A (the dorsal portion) of
the title, while the supposedly earlier inscription of the
Deed of Sale by Atty. Rutaquio dated June 16, 2004 was
found in page B (a separate page) of the title. The RTC
found this fact, as well as the above-mentioned
certification that Atty. Santos was the Acting Register of
Deeds of Antipolo City from June 1 to 30, 2004, sufficient
proof of the irregularity of the June 16, 2004 inscription
of the Deed of Sale. IRREGULAR JUD ANG INSCRIPTION
SA DEED OF SALE DIAY KAY NAA RA SA PAGE B,
WHICH WAS SUPPOSEDLY EARLIER KAYSA SA
FORECLOSURE. MAO TO IN FAVOR ANG RTC SA
DURAWOOD.
On April 11, 2006, Sheriff Leyva sold the subject
property at public auction for P1,259,727.90 with Durawood
being the lone bidder, and issued the corresponding
Certificate of Sale. The sale was inscribed in TCT No. R-
22522 on the same date. MAO TO GIBALIK NALANG UG
PUBLIC AUCTION ANG YUTA!
Candice filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the March 2, 2006 and
April 7, 2006 Orders of the RTC.
 The Court of Appeals accepted Atty. Rutaquios
On April 18, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered
manifestation that he signed TCT No. R-22522 subsequent
the assailed Decision in favor of Candice. According to the
to June 16, 2004, on a date when he was already the Acting
Court of Appeals, the sequence of presentation of the entries
Register of Deeds of Antipolo City. Since the entry in the
in the TCT cannot control the determination of the rights of
Primary Entry Book was made at the time of the incumbency
the claimants over a disputed property. It is the registration in
of Atty. Santos, the name of the latter still appears on the
the Primary Entry Book (also referred to in other cases as the
document. According to the Court of Appeals, Candice
day book) that establishes the order of reception of
cannot be made to suffer for the failure of Atty. Rutaquio to
instruments affecting registered land. As explained by Atty.
affix the date when he signed the document. Furthermore, a
Rutaquio, the entry in the day book is only the preliminary
certificate of title, once registered, cannot be impugned,
step in the registration. The inscription of the levy on
altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in
attachment on TCT No. R-17571 (which was made before
a direct proceeding permitted by law. Finally, an action for
the inscription of the Deed of Sale on said title) retroacts to
rescission of contracts entered into in fraud of creditors
the date of entry in the Primary Entry Book, which is June 17,
cannot be instituted except when the party suffering damage
2004. However, the inscription of the Deed of Sale on TCT
has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the same.
No. R-17571, although made after the inscription of the levy
on attachment, retroacts to the earlier date of entry in the
Primary Entry Book, which is June 16, 2004. MAO TOY
CONTENTION SA CA! SECTION 56 OF PD 1529!
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the

As regards the issuance by Atty. Rutaquio of TCT
foregoing, the assailed Orders of public
No. R-22522 on June 16, 2004 despite the fact that he was respondent judge ordering the
reinstatement of the subject notice of
not yet the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City at that time, the
levy on attachment in TCT No. R-22522
Court of Appeals held that there was substantial compliance are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. As a result thereof, the public
with the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
auction sale carried out pursuant to said
Administration (NALTDRA; now the Land Registration levy is also declared null and void.
Authority [LRA]) Circular No. 94 on Certificates of title and
documents left unsigned by former Register of Deeds, which
provides:
Durawood filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated September 18, 2007.
It has been brought to the
attention of this Registration that, in
some Registries, there are certificates of
title with the full transcriptions and
inscriptions, including the volume and
page numbers, the title number, the
date and the name of the former Durawood filed the instant Petition for Review, with
Register of Deeds, already typewritten the following Assignment of Errors:
thereon but which, for some reasons,
cannot anymore be signed by the former
official. In such cases and to resolve this
problem, the present Register of Deeds
may, without changing or altering the I.
transcriptions and inscriptions, affix his
signature below the name of the former THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED
Register of Deeds but placing the actual THE FACT THAT NON-PAYMENT OF
date and time of signing enclosed in THE REQUIRED REGISTRATION
parenthesis below his signature. FEES BY CANDICE S. BONA AND
HER SIBLINGS DID NOT COMPLETE
 THE REGISTRATION OF THE DEED The Court of Appeals, in considering the date of
OF ABSOLUTE SALE ON JUNE 16,
entry in the day book of the Registry of Deeds as controlling
2004.
over the presentation of the entries in TCT No. R-17571,
II.
relied on Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 which
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY provides that:
ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
FACT THAT NALTDRA CIRCULAR NO.
94 WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH BY
ATTY. RANDY RUTAQUIO.
SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book;
fees; certified copies. Each Register of
III.
Deeds shall keep a primary entry book
in which, upon payment of the entry fee,
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
he shall enter, in the order of their
ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
reception, all instruments including
CONSIDER THAT THE ENTRIES IN
copies of writs and processes filed with
TCT NO. R-17571 (THE
him relating to registered land. He shall,
PREDECESSOR OF TCT NO. R-
as a preliminary process in registration,
22522) ARE EVIDENCES OF THE
note in such book the date, hour and
FACTS STATED THEREIN.
minute of reception of all instruments, in
the order in which they were received.
IV.
They shall be regarded as registered
from the time so noted, and the
THE COURT OF APPEALS
memorandum of each instrument,
OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE
when made on the certificate of title
REAL PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT
to which it refers, shall bear the same
NO. R-17571 AND SUBSEQUENTLY
date: Provided, that the national
BY TCT NO. R-22522 HAS ALREADY
government as well as the provincial
BEEN ATTACHED BUT WAS
and city governments shall be exempt
UNILATERALLY RELEASED FROM
from the payment of such fees in
THE COURTS JURISDICTION BY A
advance in order to be entitled to entry
USURPER.
and registration. (Emphasis supplied.)

All these allegations are specific matters to be

The consequence of the highlighted portion of the
resolved by this Court in determining the overriding issue of
above section is two-fold: (1) in determining the date in which
the case at bar: whether the Court of Appeals correctly
an instrument is considered registered, the reckoning point is
granted Candices Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on its
the time of the reception of such instrument as noted in the
finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
Primary Entry Book; and (2) when the memorandum of the
issuing its March 2, 2006 and April 7, 2006 Orders. In other
instrument is later made on the certificate of title to which it
words, the main issue to be determined by this Court is
refers, such memorandum shall bear the same date as that
whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion in the
of the reception of the instrument as noted in the Primary
RTCs order to reinstate the notice of levy on attachment
Entry Book. Pursuant to the second consequence stated
in TCT No. R-22522. Grave abuse of discretion signifies
above, the Court of Appeals held that Atty. Rutaquio correctly
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
placed the date of entry in the Primary Entry Book as the
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
date of the memorandum of the registration of the deed of
must be grave as where the power is exercised in an
sale in TCT No. R-17571.
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of
As regards the first consequence, this Court has
law.
applied the same in several cases. Thus, in the old cases of
Levin v. Bass, Potenciano v. Dineros, and Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija, as well as in the fairly recent cases of Autocorp Group
v. Court of Appeals, Armed Forces and Police Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc. v. Santiago, and National Housing Authority
v. Basa, Jr., we upheld the entry of instruments in the
Primary Entry Book to be equivalent to registration despite
even the failure to annotate said instruments in the
corresponding certificates of title.
Based on this alone, it appears that the RTC was
in error when it considered the registration of the Absolute
Deed of Sale on June 16, 2004 inferior to the registration of
the Notice of Levy on Attachment on June 17, 2004 on the
ground that the Attachment was annotated on TCT No. R-
17571 earlier than the Deed of Sale. As discussed in the
above-mentioned cases, the annotation in the certificate of
title is not determinative of the effectivity of the registration of
the subject instrument.
However, a close reading of the above-
mentioned cases reveals that for the entry
instruments in the Primary Entry Book to be equivalent
to registration, certain requirements have to be met.
Thus, we held in Levin that:
Do the entry in the day book of a deed
of sale which was presented and filed
together with the owner's duplicate
certificate of title with the office of the
Registrar of Deeds and full payment of
registration fees constitute a complete
act of registration which operates to
convey and affect the land? In voluntary
registration, such as a sale, mortgage,
lease and the like, if the owner's
duplicate certificate be not surrendered
and presented or if no payment of
registration fees be made within 15
days, entry in the day book of the
deed of sale does not operate to
convey and affect the land sold. x x x.
Levin, which was decided in 1952, applied Section
56 of the Land Registration Act which provides:
Sec. 56. Each register of
deeds shall keep an entry book in
which, upon payment of the filing fee, he
shall enter in the order of their reception
all deeds and other voluntary
instruments, and all copies of writs or
other process filed with him relating to
registered land. He shall note in such
book the year, month, day, hour, and
minute of reception of all instruments in
the order in which they were received.
They shall be regarded as registered
from the time so noted, and the
memorandum of each instrument when
made on the certificate of title to which it
refers shall bear the same date;
Provided, however, That no
registration, annotation, or
memorandum on a certificate of title
shall be made unless the fees
prescribed therefor by this Act are
paid within fifteen days' time after the
date of the registration of the deed,
instrument, order or document in the
entry book or day book, and in case
said fee is not paid within the time
above mentioned, such entry shall be
null and void: Provided further, That
the Insular Government and the
provincial and municipal governments
need not pay such fees in advance in
order to be entitled to entry or
registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
of This provision is the precursor of the aforequoted
Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which seems to
have dispensed with the provision nullifying the registration if
the required fees are not paid:
SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book;
fees; certified copies. Each Register of
Deeds shall keep a primary entry book
in which, upon payment of the entry fee,
he shall enter, in the order of their
reception, all instruments including
copies of writs and processes filed with
him relating to registered land. He shall,
as a preliminary process in registration,
note in such book the date, hour and
minute of reception of all instruments, in
the order in which they were received.
They shall be regarded as registered
from the time so noted, and the
memorandum of each instrument, when
made on the certificate of title to which it
refers, shall bear the same date:
Provided, that the national government
as well as the provincial and city
governments shall be exempt from the
payment of such fees in advance in
order to be entitled to entry and
registration.
In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, this Court applied the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and modified the and registration fees. Given the peculiar
facts of the case, we agree with the
doctrine as follows:
Court of Appeals that the payment of
respondent bank must be deemed to be
substantial compliance with the law;
Current doctrine thus seems
and, the entry of the instrument the day
to be that entry alone produces the
before, should not be invalidated. In any
effect of registration, whether the
case, even if we consider the entry to
transaction entered is a voluntary or an
have been made on January 22, the
involuntary one, so long as the
important fact is that the entry in the
registrant has complied with all that
primary entry book was done prior to the
is required of him for purposes of
issuance of the writ of injunction [on
entry and annotation, and nothing
February 15, 1999; TRO issued on
more remains to be done but a duty
January 25, 1999] by the trial court.
incumbent solely on the register of
(Emphases supplied.)
deeds.

Records in the case at bar reveal that as of June

This pronouncement, which was reiterated in
25, 2004, the date of the letter of Atty. Santos seeking the
National Housing Authority v. Basa, Jr., shows that for the
opinion of the LRA as regards the registration of the Deed of
entry to be considered to have the effect of registration, there
Sale and the Notice of Levy on Attachment, the required
is still a need to comply with all that is required for entry and
registration fees for the Deed of Sale has not yet been paid:
registration, including the payment of the prescribed fees.
Thus, in Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals, this Court
compared the date when the required fees were paid with the
2
therein assailed writ of preliminary injunction:
5

J
u
Petitioners contend that n
payment of the entry fee is a condition e
sine qua non before any valid entry can
be made in the primary entry book. 2
Allegedly, the Court of Appeals resorted 0
to judicial legislation when it held that 0
the subsequent payment of the entry fee 4
was curative and a substantial
compliance with the law. Petitioners [
claim that the ruling in DBP vs. Acting r
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija does e
not apply to this case. As there was no c
valid registration, petitioners conclude e
that the order of the trial court issuing a i
writ of preliminary injunction was proper, v
considering the irregularities present in e
the conduct of the extrajudicial d
foreclosure x x x.
b
We find the petition bereft of y
merit.
t
First. The objection as to the h
payment of the requisite fees is e
unavailing. There is no question that the
fees were paid, albeit belatedly. L
Respondent bank presented the R
certificate of sale to the Office of the A
Register of Deeds of Cebu City for :
registration on January 21, 1999 at 4:30
p.m. As the cashier had already left, the J
Office could not receive the payment for u
entry and registration fees, but still, the l
certificate of sale was entered in the y
primary entry book. The following day,
respondent bank paid the requisite entry 0
 1 abuse of its discretion in issuing such Order, the Petition for
,
2
0
0
4
]
HON. BENEDICTO B. ULEP
Administrator
This Authority
Sir:
This has reference to the TCT
No. R-17571/T-87 registered under the
name of LBB Construction and
Development Corporation relative to the
Deed of Absolute Sale with Entry No.
30549, which was sought to be
registered on 16 June 2004 at 11:20
a.m. (a photocopy of which is hereto
attached as Annex A).
However, on 17 June 2004 at
11:45 a.m. a Notice of Levy on
Attachment (a photocopy of which is
hereto attached as Annex B) with Entry
No. 30590 was filed and annotated
against TCT No. R-17571/T-87.
In view of the foregoing, we
are now in a quandary as to what proper
steps should be taken. It should be
noted further that the required
registration fees of the
abovementioned sale was not paid
the reason for which the same was
not immediately acted upon by the
undersigned.
Since there was still no compliance of all that is
required x x x for purposes of entry and annotation of the
Deed of Sale as of June 25, 2004, we are constrained to rule
that the registration of the Notice of Levy on Attachment on
June 17, 2004 should take precedence over the former.
Considering that the Notice of Levy on Attachment was
deemed registered earlier than the Deed of Sale, the TCT
issued pursuant to the latter should contain the annotation of
the Attachment.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the RTC was,
in fact, acting properly when it ordered the reinstatement of
the Notice of Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-22522. Since
the RTC cannot be considered as to have acted in grave
Certiorari assailing the same should have been dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94479
dated April 18, 2007 and its Resolution dated September 18,
2007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 199180, July 27, 2016
THELMA RODRIGUEZ, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND,
Petitioners, v. SPOUSES JAIME SIOSON AND ARMI
SIOSON, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated May 26, 2011
and Resolution3 dated October 21, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94867, which nullified the
Joint Decision4 dated August 13, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bataan, Branch 3.
The Facts
This petition is the aftermath of a series of sales transactions
entered into by Neri delos Reyes (Neri) over a portion of a
property formerly identified as Lot 398, with an area of
22,398 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-86275 and registered in the name of "Neri
delos Reyes, married to Violeta Lacuata."5chanrobleslaw
Sometime in 1997, the Municipality of Orani, Bataan
(Municipality) purchased from Neri an area of about 1.7
hectare of Lot 398, to be used for the extension of the
Municipality's public market. Among other things, it was
agreed that upon full payment of the purchase price, Neri will
surrender the mother title to the Municipality for subdivision
of the property on the condition that Neri will equitably share
in the expense thereof.6chanrobleslaw
Lot 398 was subsequently subdivided into 5 lots: Lot 398-A,
Lot 398-B, Lot 398-C, Lot 398-D, and Lot 398-E. Lots 398-C
and 398-D pertain to the portions that were sold to the
Municipality, while Lot 398-E is a road lot. Consequently,
only Lots 398-A and 398-B were left as the remaining
portions over which Neri retained absolute title. TCT
Nos. T-209894 and T-209895 were then respectively issued
over Lots 398-A and 398-B and were both registered in the
name of "Neri delos Reyes, married to Violeta Lacuata." The
owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-209894 and T-
209895, however, were retained by the Municipality pending
Neri's payment of his share in the expenses incurred for the
subdivision of Lot 398. These were placed under the custody
of the Municipal Treasurer, where they continue to remain.
ANG NAHITABO WAS, 4 KABUOK YUTA ANG GIPALIT
SA MUNICIPALITY PERO ANNG DUHA KA YUTA NA
RETAIN SA ORIGINAL OWNERS. ANG OCT NAA NILA
PERO ANG DUPLICATES KAY NAA SA MUNICIPALITY
THEN IHATAG RA PENDING NERIS PAYMENTSA
EXPENSES. HOWEVER, INGON SI NERI NGA INGON
ANG MUNICIPAL MAYOR NGA IBALIGYA SA LATTER
ANG USA KA YUTA NGA GIRETAIN NI NERI ANG OCT
SA AUNTIE NI NERI WHO IS THE PETITIONER, SI
RODRIGUEZ! NIAGREE SI RODRIGUEZ IYAHA NING
BAYRAN DATA2 KAY NAHUROT IYA KWARTA.
Neri, however, alleged that then Municipal Mayor Mario
Zuiga suggested that he sell Lot 398-A to his aunt,
petitioner Thelma Rodriguez (Thelma). The Municipality
would then expropriate the same from Thelma. Neri agreed
to the suggestion.8chanrobleslaw
After agreeing to the amount of P1,243,000.00 as the selling
price, Thelma, on March 20, 1997, issued a check for said
amount payable to Neri. When it fell due, no sufficient funds
were available to cover the check. Consequently, it was
agreed that Thelma would pay the purchase price in
installments from March 20, 1997 to September 4, 1997.
Thelma, however, was only able to pay
P442,293.50.9chanrobleslaw
On November 12, 2001, Thelma caused the annotation of
an adverse claim on TCT No. T-209894.10 At about the
same time, Thelma saw an announcement that a new
Orani Common Terminal would be built on Lot 398-A. As
she has not yet entered into any agreement regarding
the utilization of said lot, Thelma filed a Complaint for
Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 7394 against then
incumbent mayor Efren Pascual, Jr. (Mayor Pascual),
and the Municipality under claim of ownership. To
support her claim, Thelma incorporated in her complaint
a copy of an undated and unnotarized deed of absolute
sale allegedly executed by Neri in her favor.11chanroble
NATINGA NALANG SI THELMA NA NAA NAY IBUILD NA
TERMINAL SA YUTA NA SUPPOSEDLY IYAHANG
GIPALIT. UNNOTARIZEED PA HINUON KAY PADUNG
PA UNTA JUD IANNOTATE NA SA TITULO. COMPLAINT
FOR INJUNCTION!slaw
In their joint verified answer, Mayor Pascual and the
Municipality acknowledged that Thelma became the owner
of Lot 398-A by way of purchase from Neri.12chanrobleslaw
In 2002, Neri executed an affidavit claiming that the
owner's copies of TCT No. T-209894 (covering Lot 398-
A) and TCT No. T-209895 (covering Lot 398-B) were lost,
which was annotated on the original copy of TCT No. T-
209894 on May 8, 2002.13 Two days after, or on May 10,
2002, Neri caused the cancellation of Thelma's adverse
claim.14 Neri also caused the reconstitution of new
owner's copies of TCT Nos. T-209894 and T-209895.15
Thereafter, new copies of TCT Nos. T-209894 and T-209895
were issued, and Neri then sold Lot 398-A to Spouses
Jaime and Armi Sioson, Spouses Joan and Joseph
Camacho, and Agnes Samonte (respondents) - in a deed
of sale dated November 27, 2002. A special power of
attorney was executed by Violeta delos Reyes (Violeta) in
favor of Neri for the purpose. Consequently, TCT No. T-
209894 was cancelled, and TCT No. T-226775 was thus
issued in the respondents' names.16chanrobleslaw
AMAW MANI SI NERI INGON MAN SIYA NA ANG
OWNERS OCTs SA DUHA KA YUTA KAY NAWAGTAN
WHICH WAS ANNOTATED NA UNTA. MAO TO IYANG
GIPA CANCEL ANG TITULO NI THELMA SA SALE THEN
GIRECONSTITUTE ANG MGA TITULO SA BAG O NGA
OWNERS WHO ARE THE RESPONDENTS SIOSON!
Upon the issuance of TCT No. T-226775, the respondents
declared Lot 398-A for tax purposes and paid them
accordingly. They sought to take actual possession
thereof by filling it; however, after they filled said lot
with about 40 truckloads of soil/fillings, Thelma sent two
armed blue guards who entered the premises and set up
a tent therein. The respondents brought the matter to the
attention of barangay authorities who referred them to the
municipal mayor. As the municipal mayor did not take any
action, the respondents filed a forcible entry case against
Thelma before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Orani-
Samal, Bataan, docketed as Civil Case No. 843. The said
ejectment case is still pending.17chanrobleslaw
After Thelma learned of the second sale of Lot 398-A,
she filed against the respondents a complaint for the
Declaration of Nullity of the Second Sale and TCT No. T-
226775 on February 11, 2003, docketed as Civil Case No.
7664. In support of her claim, Thelma once again presented
a deed of absolute sale executed by Neri in her favor. This
time, the deed of sale she presented was duly signed by
her and Neri, witnessed, notarized and dated April 10,
1997.18chanrobleslaw
The respondents countered that they are innocent
purchasers for value having bought Lot 398-A at the time
when Thelma's adverse claim was already cancelled. While
they admit Thelma's possession of the subject property,
they, however, qualify that possession is being contested in
a separate action for forcible entry.19chanrobleslaw
The respondents also filed a verified answer-in-intervention
in Civil Case No. 7394 (injunction case) contending that they
are the present registered owners of Lot 398-A, and as such,
Thelma is not entitled to any relief.20chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the RTC: IN FAVOR OF THELMA!!!
The RTC jointly heard Civil Case No. 7394 and Civil Case
No. 7664 and after trial, rendered judgment in favor of
Thelma. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision21 dated
August 13, 2009 reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1) [Thelma] is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction
prayed for in Civil Case No. 7394 against the respondents.
Insofar as defendants [Mayor Pascual] and the [Municipality]
are concerned, not only did they acknowledge expressly the
ownership of [Thelma] of Lot 398-A, they have disowned the
commission of any act in derogation of [Thelma's] right of
ownership of the lot and did not contest anymore the action
of [Thelma] in said case;
2) Insofar as Civil Case No. 7664 is concerned, the second
deed of sale entered into by [Neri] with the [respondents] is
hereby declared null and void, and [TCT] No. T-226775 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bataan which was issued by
defendant Register of Deeds pursuant to said second deed
of sale is likewise declared null and void, and accordingly,
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Bataan is ordered
to cancel said certificate of title and to reinstate [TCT] No. T-
209894 in the name of [Neri], married to [Violeta];
3) The new owner's copy of [TCT] No. T-209894 is hereby
declared null and void as the original owner's copy is not lost
but actually exists and is presently in the custody of the
Municipal Treasurer of Orani, Bataan. In consequence,
defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan is directed to cancel
said new owner's copy of [TCT] No. T-209894; and
cralawlawlibrary
4) [The respondents] are hereby ordered to jointly and
severally pay to [Thelma] attorney's fees in the amount of
Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
All counterclaims of [the respondents] are denied for lack of
basis in fact and in law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC concluded that by Neri's admission that he sold the
subject lot to Thelma for a consideration of P1,243,000.00,
and his acknowledgement receipt of P442,293.50 as partial
payment from the latter, the transaction between Thelma
and Neri should be regarded as an executed contract of
sale. Hence, Lot 398-A was subjected to a double sale when
Neri sold the same property to the respondents. 23 The RTC
further ruled that the contract of sale between Neri and the
respondents is null and void because it was transacted and
executed at the time when Neri was no longer the owner of
Lot 398-A. It was legally inexistent for lack of object certain.
Thereupon, the fact that the respondents were able to
register their acquisition first is of no moment. Registration
does not legitimize a void contract and thus, TCT No. T-
226775 should be cancelled.24chanrobleslaw
The respondents moved for reconsideration but it was
denied by the RTC per Order25cralawred dated January 13,
2010. Hence, they elevated their case to the CA.
Ruling of the CA: IN FAVOR OF SIOSON!!!
On May 26, 2011, the CA promulgated the assailed
Decision,26 with the following dispositive
portion:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is GRANTED. The Joint
Decision dated August 13, 2009 and the Order dated
January 13, 2010 of the [RTC] of Bataan are hereby
declared NULL and VOID insofar as it (1) granted
permanent injunction in favor of [Thelma] in Civil Case No.
7394 against [the respondents];T2) declared null and void
the deed of sale between [Neri] and [the respondents] in
Civil Case No. 7664; (3) declared null and void the [TCT] No.
T-226775; (4) ordered the cancellation of [TCT] No. T-
226775 and reinstatement of [TCT] No. T-209894 in the
name of [Neri], married to [Violeta]; and (5) ordered the
payment of attorney's fees.
Consequently, the following are hereby declared VALID: (1)
the Deed of Sale between [Neri] and [the respondents]; and
(2) the [TCT] No. T-226775 in the names of [the
respondents].
This Decision is without prejudice to any right which
[Thelma] may have against [Neri] for the refund of the
amount of Four Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Two
Hundred Ninety-Three and 50/100 Pesos (P442,293.50).
The Complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 7394 and 7664 are
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.27 (Emphasis in the original)
Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA found that the
contract between Neri and Thelma was a mere contract
to sell and not a contract of sale; hence, there was no
double sale of Lot 93 8-A. According to the CA, the question
of whether or not the respondents are buyers in good faith is
unavailing since the concept of a "buyer in good faith" finds
relevance only in cases of double sale. The CA further
stated that even if it is assumed that the contract between
Neri and Thelma was an absolute contract of sale, the same
is nonetheless void for lack of consent of Neri's wife, Violeta,
insofar as the object of the transaction is a conjugal property.
Thelma moved for reconsideration of the CA decision, which
was denied for lack of merit in Resolution28 dated October
21, 2011.
Hence this petition.
Thelma argues that there was double sale and the CA erred
in reversing the RTC decision: (1) by interpreting the sale
between Thelma and Neri as a mere contract to sell; (2) by
declaring the deed of sale in favor of Thelma as null and void
due to lack of Violeta's consent or conformity; and (3) by
declaring the respondents as buyers in good faith despite
prior registration of Thelma's notice of adverse claim in TCT
No. T-209894, and her actual possession of the subject
property.29chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case basically rests on the
determination of whether the transaction between Neri
and Thelma is a contract of sale or a contract to sell. The
rule on double sale, as provided in Article 1544 of the Civil
Code,30 does not apply to a case where there was a sale to
one party of the land itself while the other contract was a
mere promise to sell the land or at most an actual
assignment of the right to repurchase the same
land.31chanrobleslaw
SUMMARY OF THE CASE!!!
Both the RTC and the CA concur in the finding that Neri
agreed to sell Lot 398-A to Thelma for an agreed price of
P1,243,000.00. The RTC, however, concluded that by Neri's
admission that he sold the subject lot to Thelma for a
consideration of P1,243,000.00, and that he acknowledged
receipt of P442,293.50 as partial payment from the latter, the
transaction between Thelma and Neri should be regarded as
an executed contract of sale, and not a merely executory
one. The RTC likewise took into consideration Thelma's
alleged possession of the property and Neri's failure to
rescind the contract as indicative of the nature of their
agreement as one of sale.32chanrobleslawC
CONTRACT of SALE NAA NAY DOWNPAYMENT NYA
GIDAWAT NYA ANG POSSESSION SA YUTA NAA NA
SA NIPALIT!
On the other hand, the CA ruled that "the contract between
Thelma and Neri was a mere contract to sell, the transfer
of ownership over Lot 398-A being conditioned on Thelma's
full payment of the purchase price."33 As regards the
existence of the two contracts of sale, the CA concluded that
Thelma admitted on trial that the first deed of sale was only
meant to be an acknowledgment receipt for the down
payment she made on the subject lot, and the second deed
of sale was allegedly executed after Thelma pays in full the
purchase price of the lot.
CONTRACT TO SELL: ONLY UPON FULL PAYMENT MA
OWN SA NAGPALIT ANG YUTA! NYA WA PAMAN
NAHUMAN UG BAYAD DAW SO SAKTO RATONG
GICANCEL IN FAVOR OF SIOSON!
A review of this case shows that the CA ruled in accord with
existing jurisprudence.
"The real character of the contract is not the title given,
but the intention of the parties."34 In this case, there exist
two deeds of absolute sale. Though identically worded, the
first contract was undated, not notarized, signed only by
Neri, and was presented in Civil Case No. 7394 for
Injunction,35 while the second deed was dated April 10,
1997, notarized on September 5, 1997, signed by both Neri
and Thelma, and was presented in Civil Case No. 7664 for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and
Title.36chanrobleslaw
ANG KALAHIAN SA DUHA: ANG FIRST UNNOTARIZED,
ANG IKADUHA KAY NOTARIZED!
In determining the nature of the agreement between Thelma
and Neri, the CA took note of these two documents, and,
coupled with Thelma's own admissions, correctly found that
it was a mere contract to sell. According to the
CA:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
During trial, Thelma explained the apparent disparity
between the two (2) "deeds of absolute sale" by testifying
that the undated and unnotarized deed of sale served only
as a "receipt" which was signed by Neri when the latter
received the downpayment for the lot. The dated and
notarized deed of sale, on the other hand, was signed by
both Thelma and Neri upon Thelma's alleged full payment of
the purchase price:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x retained by the registered owner in spite of the partial
Second, the execution of the "deed of absolute sale" dated
August 10, 1997 and the transfer and delivery of the title to
Thelma's name covering Lot No. 398-A were conditioned
upon full payment of the purchase price.
Thelma testified that the "deed of absolute sale" dated
August 10, 1997 and which was attached to Thelma's
complaint in Civil Case No. 7664 was signed by her, Neri
and their witnesses only upon full payment of the purchase
price. Thelma further testified that she and Neri agreed to
place the amount of the purchase price on the deed of
absolute sale only at the time when Thelma had fully paid
the same: x x x37 (Italics ours and emphasis deleted)
Despite the denomination of their agreement as one of
sale, the circumstances tend to show that Neri agreed to
sell the subject property to Thelma on the condition that
title and ownership would pass or be transferred upon
the full payment of the purchase price. This is the very
nature of a contract to sell, which is a "bilateral contract
whereby the prospective seller, while expressly
reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery
thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell
the property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon
fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, i.e., the full
payment of the purchase price."38 As stated by the Court,
the agreement to execute a deed of sale upon full payment
of the purchase price "shows that the vendors reserved title
to the subject property until full payment of the purchase
price."39chanrobleslaw
ILANG SABOT: RESERVE ANG OWNERSHIP SA
PROPERTY SA ORIGINAL OWNER UNTIL MA FULLY
PAID SA BUYER ANG YUTA BISAN GIDELIVER NANI SA
BUYER! PERO WALA MAN NABAYRI JUD FULLY! SO
WALA JUD! CONTRACT TO SELL RA NYA WA
NAHITABO ANG PROMISE KAY WA NACOMPLY ANG
CONDITION!
It was likewise established that Thelma was not able to pay
the full purchase price, and that she was only able to pay
P442,293.50 of the agreed selling price of P1,243,000.00.
The RTC, in fact, made the following findings: (1) the
consideration for Lot 398-A was P1,243,000.00; (2) Thelma
issued a check on March 20, 1997 for said amount, payable
to Neri; (3) the agreement was that the check would only be
held by Neri for safekeeping as it was yet unsure if there was
ample funds to cover the check; (4) the check was not
covered by sufficient funds when presented for payment, so
Thelma subsequently paid Neri in installments starting from
March 20, 1997 to September 4, 1997; and (5) Neri
acknowledged receipt from Thelma the total amount of
P442,293.50.40chanrobleslaw
To bolster her claim, Thelma insists that she now holds title
over the subject property after Neri allegedly delivered the
subject lot to her right after the execution of the sale.41 There
is, however, nothing on record to support this claim aside
from her bare assertions. There was no testimony or any
proof on her part showing when and how she took
possession of the property. At best, what is extant from the
records is that Thelma paid taxes on the property for the
years 2000 and 2001, which was three years after the
alleged sale. "But tax declarations, by themselves, are not
conclusive evidence of ownership of real property."42 Aside
from this, the tax receipts showed that the property was still
declared in the name of Neri.43chanrobleslaw
Moreover, the alleged delivery of the property, even if true, is
irrelevant considering that in a contract to sell, ownership is
payment of the purchase price and delivery of possession of
the property. Thus, in Roque v. Aguado,44 the Court ruled
that since the petitioners have not paid the final installment
of the purchase price, the condition which would have
triggered the parties' obligation to enter into and thereby
perfect a contract of sale cannot be deemed to have been
fulfilled; consequently, they "cannot validly claim
ownership over the subject portion even if they had
made an initial payment and even took possession of
the same."45chanrobleslaw
Accordingly, the CA did not commit any reversible error in
concluding that "the contract between Thelma and Neri was
a mere contract to sell, the transfer of ownership over Lot
398-A being conditioned on Thelma's full payment of the
purchase price. Having failed to pay the purchase price in
full, Thelma cannot claim ownership over Lot 398-A and Neri
is not legally proscribed from alienating the same lot to other
buyers."46chanrobleslaw
Finally, while the CA correctly ruled that the agreement was
a contract to sell, the Court, however, does not share its
position that the subject property is a conjugal property, and
as such, the absence of Violeta's consent should be held as
among the factors which could have adversely affected the
validity of the purported contract of sale between Neri and
Thelma. This is due to the following reasons: first, the
subject property, Lot 398-A, is registered in the name of
"Neri delos Reyes, married to Violeta Lacuata," and so was
its mother lot, Lot 398. In Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company v. Tan,47 it was held that such form of registration
is determinative of the property's nature as paraphemal. That
the only import of the title is that Neri is the owner of the
subject property, it being registered in his name alone, and
that he is married to Violeta; and second, the record is
bereft of proof that said property was acquired during Neri
and Violeta's marriage - such that, the presumption under
Article 116 of the Family Code that properties acquired
during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot
apply.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Decision dated May 26, 2011 and
Resolution dated October 21, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 94867 are AFFIRMED. Reconveyance, Annulment of Title and Damages against
respondents spouses Sofronio and Aurora Santos, Luis and
SO ORDERED.cha
SIXTO ANTONIO, Petitioner, G.R. No.Angelina
149238 Liberato, and Mario and Victoria Cruz. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1261-A.

In his complaint, Antonio alleged that he is the

Present:
absolute owner of a 13,159-square meter parcel of land
denominated as Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D, Cainta-Taytay
- versus -
Cadastre, situated in Barangay San Juan, Cainta, Rizal. He
averredJ.,
QUISUMBING, that, as evidenced by certificates of payment of realty
Chairperson,
taxes for the years 1918 and 1919, the property was
CARPIO,previously owned by his father and that in 1984, he filed before
Branch 71, RTC, Antipolo, Rizal, an application for the
CARPIOregistration
MORALES,of two parcels of land, one of which was Lot No.

11703, CAD 688-D, situated in Barangay San Juan, Cainta,

SPS. SOFRONIO SANTOS & AURORA SANTOS, SPS. TINGA, and
Rizal. His application was docketed as Land Registration Case
LUIS LIBERATO & ANGELINA LIBERATO and SPS.
MARIO CRUZ & VICTORIA CRUZ, No. 142-A (LRC No. 142-A).
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Although the RTC, Branch 71, declared him the

true and absolute owner in fee simple of the two parcels of
Promulgated:
land he applied for, it set aside its decision with respect to
Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D in an Order dated August 21,
1986, to avoid duplication of issuance of titles.

November 22, 2007

Antonio said that after investigation, he
Respondents.
discovered that Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D was already
x------------------------------------------- titled in the name of respondents. He then filed the
- - - - - - - -x complaint for Reconveyance, Annulment of Title and
Damages against respondents, averring that respondents
RESOLUTION
committed fraud in their application for titling because they
made it appear in their application for registration that the
QUISUMBING, J.:
subject property was located in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Rizal,
when in fact, the property is located in Barangay San Juan,
This is an appeal from the Decision dated July 31, Cainta, Rizal. He added, respondents also made it appear in
2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58246, their application for registration that the subject property is
affirming, with modification, the Decision dated October 7, bound on the North East by the Pasig River when in fact it is
1997 of Branch 72, Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Antipolo, bound on the North East by the Tapayan River. Furthermore,
Rizal in Civil Case No. 1261-A. The RTC had dismissed the the Pasig River does not traverse any portion of the
complaint for Reconveyance, Annulment of Title and jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal. He argued that Original
Damages filed by petitioner Sixto Antonio against Certificate of Title No. 108 (OCT No. 108) in respondents
respondents. names, insofar as it included Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D, is,
therefore, null and void because it was obtained through
The antecedent facts, culled from the records, are fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations. INGON SI
as follows: ANTONIO NGA DAPAT ICANCEL ANG TITULO SA MGA
RESPONDENTS KAY GIKUHA NILA THROUGH FRAUD,
On September 19, 1988, petitioner Sixto Antonio GITITLE SA LAHI NA LUGAR, NYA GIHIMAKAK NGA
filed before Branch 72, RTC, Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint for NAA SA PASIG RIVER BISAN NAA SA TAPAYAN RIVER
DURING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION! NYA Hence, the instant petition, raising the following
GIBUTTRESS RANI SA RESPONDENTS BY SIMPLY issues:
SAYING NGA THEY HAVE BEEN IN ADVERSE
I.
POSSESSION OF THE LAND AND WALAY PANAHON
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
NGA NAA NING YUTAA KANG ANTONIO. PILDI SI APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
ANTONIO SA RTC! NYA GIAFFIRM RA SA CA! NOT HOLDING THAT THE DECISION
IN LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO.
142-A, LRC RECORD NO. 58707,
In their Answer dated July 26, 1989, respondents REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 71, IS
averred that OCT No. 108 was duly issued to them by the SUFFICIENT BASIS OF PETITIONERS
Register of Deeds for Metro Manila, District II, on May 20, CLAIM OF RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP
OVER THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF
1977. They alleged that prior to the issuance of OCT No. ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE.
108, they, as registered owners, had always been in
II.
peaceful possession of the property and at no time had
Antonio possessed the property, nor did he ever make any THE HONORABLE COURT OF
claim against the said property. APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
TREATING PETITIONERS ACTION
FOR RECONVEYANCE AS ONE FOR
The RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 72, in a TITLING OF A PARCEL OF LAND.

Decision dated October 7, 1997 dismissed the complaint and III.

ordered Antonio to pay respondents moral damages and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
attorneys fees. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE
WHEREFORE, premises FRAUDULENTLY REGISTERED AND
considered, judgment is hereby TITLED SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THEIR
rendered DISMISSING the instant NAMES.
complaint, and orders plaintiff as
follows: IV.
1. To pay defendants Sofronio THE HONORABLE COURT OF
Santos, Aurora Santos, Sps. Luis APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
Liberato and Angelina Santos, the HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS
amount of P100,000.00 each, by way of MOTHER ACQUIRED SUBJECT
moral damages; PROPERTY FROM HER FATHER,
GAVINO SANTOS, WHICH THE
2. To pay defendants the LATTER ALLEGEDLY PURCHASED
amount of P60,000.00, by way of FROM LADISLAO RIVERA.
attorneys fees, and costs of suit.
V.
SO ORDERED.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated July 31,
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
2001 affirmed with modification the abovementioned COURT A QUO DISMISSING
PETITIONERS ACTION FOR
decision by deleting the award of moral damages and
RECONVEYANCE.
attorneys fees. The dispositive portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals states:
Simply put, the issues raised are: (1) Did the Court
WHEREFORE, with of Appeals err in not holding that the decision in LRC No.
modification deleting [or] setting aside 142-A was sufficient basis of petitioners claim of ownership
the award for moral damages and
attorneys fees, the decision appealed over the subject property? (2) Did the Court of Appeals and
from is AFFIRMED with costs against RTC erroneously treat petitioners action for reconveyance as
the plaintiff-appellant.
one for titling of a parcel of land? (3) Did respondents
SO ORDERED. fraudulently title the subject property in their names? (4) Did
the Court of Appeals err in finding that respondents mother
acquired the subject property from her father, Gavino
Santos, who purchased it from Ladislao Rivera? and (5) Did
the Court of Appeals err in affirming the decision of the RTC
dismissing petitioners action for reconveyance?
SUMMARY OF THE CASE!!!
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred
in not holding that the decision in LRC No. 142-A is sufficient
basis for his claim of ownership over the property; in treating
his action for reconveyance as one for titling; in not holding
that respondents had fraudulently registered the property in
their names; and in holding that respondents mother had
acquired the subject property from her father, Gavino
Santos, who allegedly bought the property from Ladislao
Rivera.
Respondents, on the other hand, in their
Comments, contend that they have proved they have a better
title to the property. They argue that petitioners attempt to
register Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D in his name is tainted with
fraud, and that petitioner had failed to adduce any evidence of
fraud on their part. They assert that their documentary and
testimonial evidence which were unrebutted by petitioner show
original ownership of the land by Ladislao Rivera from whom
their grandfather bought the property.
After serious consideration, we find that petitioners
arguments lack merit.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that in LRC No.
142-A, the RTC of Antipolo, Branch 71, rendered a Decision
on January 7, 1986 adjudicating ownership of two lots,
including Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D, in his favor. He adds
that on February 19, 1986, after said decision has become
final and executory, the said RTC issued a certification for
issuance of decree, directing the Land Registration
Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration.
Hence, he argues, his right of ownership over the land has
already been fully established, but no certificate of title was
issued to him only because the property was already
registered in the name of respondents.
But we agree with respondents that petitioner
cannot rely on the decision in LRC No. 142-A. As pointed out
by the Court of Appeals, even if a title had been issued to
petitioner based on said decision, his title would be of a later
date than the title of respondents, hence inefficacious and
ineffective. This Court has ruled that, when two certificates
of title are issued to different persons covering the same
land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail;
and in case of successive registrations where more than
one certificate is issued over the same land, the person
holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against
a person who relies on a subsequent certificate.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that it is
very apparent the RTC and Court of Appeals had the notion
that his case a quo was not an action for reconveyance, but
rather an application for registration of land where the
applicant and oppositor had to prove their respective
registrable titles. This, he adds, could be gleaned from the
RTCs findings that the claim of plaintiff on the basis of said
documents cannot prevail over the adverse, public, open,
peaceful and continuous possession by the defendants over
the subject property, and that it was indubitably shown that
the defendants have occupied said property since time
immemorial while plaintiff has never at anytime taken
possession of said property.
We find petitioners contentions unconvincing. For
an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper,
this Court has held that the party seeking reconveyance
must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to
the property and the fact of fraud. The RTC, in making the
abovementioned findings, was not treating petitioners
action for reconveyance as one for titling of property. But
it was weighing whether petitioner has, by clear and
convincing evidence, proven his title to the property.
Moreover, the RTC, in its decision, discussed the merits of
petitioners ground for his action for reconveyance, i.e. whether
or not respondents committed fraud in titling the subject
property in their names. The RTC held that as shown by public
records in the custody of the RTC, Pasig City and the Land
Registration Authority, petitioners claim that the property was
fraudulently titled in the names of respondents is baseless.
Thus, petitioners contention that the RTC and the Court of
Appeals treated his action for reconveyance as one for titling
of property lacks any persuasive basis.
On the third and fourth issues, we find them to be
factual issues, hence beyond our jurisdiction to resolve. In a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Courts power of review is limited to
questions of law only.
 Note, however, should be taken of the established
doctrine that an action for reconveyance resulting from fraud
prescribes four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance
of the certificate of title over the property. Registration of real
property is considered a constructive notice to all persons,
thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom. It
appears that OCT No. 108 was issued to respondents by the
Register of Deeds for Metro Manila on May 20, 1977. From
the time of registration of the land in the name of
respondents on May 20, 1977 to the filing of the complaint
on September 19, 1988, more than four years had already
elapsed. Hence, it cannot be denied that petitioners action
had already prescribed.

Based on the foregoing considerations, we find

that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision
of the RTC dismissing petitioners action for reconveyance.

Finally, concerning the deletion of moral damages

and attorneys fees, we agree with the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that here an award of moral damages is not
warranted since the record is bereft of any proof that Antonio
acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the action. Neither
should attorneys fees be awarded. The accepted rule is that
the reason for the award of attorneys fees must be stated in
the text of the trial courts decision; otherwise, if it is stated
only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must
be disallowed. In this case, we find that the trial courts
decision failed to show the reason for the award of attorneys
fees, hence it was properly deleted by the appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The assailed Decision dated July 31, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58246 is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.