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Hegel's notion of Aufheben

a
B. C. Birchall
a
University of New England , Armidale
Published online: 29 Aug 2008.
To cite this article: B. C. Birchall (1981) Hegel's notion of Aufheben , Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 24:1,
75-103, DOI: 10.1080/00201748108601926
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201748108601926
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Inquiry, 24, 75-103
Hegel's Notion of Aufheben

B. C. Birchall
University of New England, Armidale
The paper is an attempt to make sense of Hegel's notion of aufheben. The double
Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 08:26 15 January 2015
meaning of aufheben and its alleged 'rise above the mere "either-or" of under-
standing* have been taken, by some, to constitute a criticism of the logic of
either-or. It is argued, on the contrary, that Hegel's notion of aufheben, explicated
in its primary and philosophical context, turns out to be a substantiation of that
logic. The intelligibility of the formula of either-or depends, for example, on the
categories of Being and Not-Being. But if these categories are regarded as particular
finite determinations themselves subject to the formula of either-or, then the for-
mula, far from being intelligible, 'falls apart'. Hegel is arguing, in other words, that
if we are to substantiate the logic of either-or, we must, at the same time, 'rise
above' that logic. The role of aufheben is then considered in the special sciences.
Here it is argued that we must distinguish between empirical transitions, governed
by the finite determinations of things, and logical or dialectical transitions, governed
by considerations of the intelligibility of the notions involved. Applying the notion
of aufheben to the former transitions suggests wrongly that empirical transitions
have an objective or philosophic necessity. Finally, the place of 'immanent trans-
formation' in the context of aufheben is examined. It is concluded that if there is to
be a transformation, then a distinction must be drawn between thought and its con-
tent, but then the transformation cannot be regarded as immanent.
Hegel may have thought that Hegelian philosophy climaxed the history of
philosophy and that further philosophizing could do little more than sub-
stantiate his opinion. It would be quite un-Hegelian, however, to adopt
this opinion merely on the strength of what Hegel said. A lot of contem-
porary Hegelian 'scholarship', with its finely tuned exposition and trans-
lation, contributes little of importance to this question. Instead of sub-
jecting Hegel's philosophy to the same radical historical and philosophical
critique that Hegel had turned upon other philosophical positions in the
history of philosophy, many Hegelian 'scholars' are obsessed with the
details of what Hegel said or might have meant in some passage, as if the
settling of these sorts of issues constitutes philosophical scholarship. Not
so with some commentators, notably Croce, who, in his What is Living
and What is Dead of the Philosophy; of Hegel,* at least made a serious
attempt to disentangle critically the strains in Hegel's philosophy that are
dead from the strains that are well and truly alive and capable of further
76 B.C.Birchall
philosophical development. This is not to say, of course, that exposition is
of no importance, only that it is of secondary importance to the
philosophical task of critical disentangling. It is only if we undertake this
philosophical critique that we will be in a position to move beyond a
preoccupation with Hegel's philosophy to a consideration of the place of
Hegel's philosophy in the history of philosophy. By distinguishing be-
tween the different lines of inquiry opened up by Hegel in his philosophical
works, we will be able to see that some lines of inquiry are productive of
further philosophical insights while others turn out to be obstructions to

further philosophical development. Often, conflicting lines of inquiry,
some of which are fruitful, others of which are unfruitful, are represented
by the one notion and, for this reason, make the task of disentangling more
arduous. This was so, Croce argued, in the case of Hegel's dialectic. From
a similar perspective, I will be arguing that it is also the case with Hegel's
notion of aufheben. Hegel may have thought that the notion of aufheben
had an unequivocal use throughout his philosophical works. I will be
arguing, however, that this is not so; that the notion of aufheben is
radically equivocal. The primary philosophical sense of the notion of
aufheben must be distinguished (as is done by Croce with Hegel's dialec-
tic) from a number of secondary senses, for it is this primary sense only, so
I will be arguing, that contains important philosophic insights and is
capable of further philosophical development.
I. The Primary and Philosophical Context of Aufheben

In the Smaller Logic, Hegel says of the double meaning of the German
word aufheben (to annul, to preserve) that it 'is not an accident, and gives
no ground for reproaching language as a cause of confusion. We should
rather recognize in it the speculative spirit of our language rising above the
mere "either-or" of understanding'.2 To appreciate why Hegel would see
in the double meaning of a word like aufheben 'the speculative spirit of our
language rising above the mere "either-or" of understanding', it is im-
portant to place aufheben in the primary and philosophical context in
which it appears in Hegel's philosophy. 'To transcend (aufheben) and that
which is transcended (the ideal)' are said by Hegel in the Greater Logic to
be 'among the most important concepts of philosophy, - a fundamental
determination which reappears everywhere without exception ' 3 Now
the study of what reappears everywhere without exception is, for Hegel,
the study of Logic. For it is Logic that is the ground of all things. Seen in
Hegel's Notion o/Aufheben 77
the context of the study of Logic -an inquiry into the intelligibility of the
finite - the double meaning of aufheben and its alleged rise above the mere
'either-or' of understanding make, with some qualifications, perfectly
good sense.
Commenting on Hegel's Logic, Herbert Marcuse says that it begins
as the whole of Western philosophy began, with the concept of being. The question,
What is Being? sought that which holds all things in existence and makes them what they
are. The concept of being presupposes a distinction between determinate being (some-
thing; Seiendes) and being-as-such (Sein), without determinations. Daily language dis-
tinguishes being from determinate being in all the forms of judgment. We say a rose is a
plant; he is jealous; a judgment is true; God is. The copula 'is' denotes being, but being
that is quite different from a determinate being. 4
Philosophy began with a vague recognition of the distinction between

determinate Being and Being. Thales and Anaximenes, for example, post-
ulated water and air, respectively, as the Being which is common to and
makes sense of all that is determinate. According to Diogenes, Anaximan-
der, on the other hand, 'adduced the Infinite [the undetermined] as princi-
ple and element; he neither determined it as air or water or any such
thing'.5 Indeed, 'Anaximander appears to have asked how the primary
substance could be one of these particular things'.6 Plato and Aristotle
also rejected the notion that a determinate Being, like water or air, could
itself be the primary substance or Being while realizing, at the same time,
that the primary substance or Being is not an 'undetermined something',
as Anaximander's 'infinite' appears to be, that is opposed to or abstracted
from determinate Being. In overcoming these problems, Plato and Aris-
totle present an account of the primary substance or Being in the context
of determinate Being - as the multiple forms of determinate Being.7
The characteristic ways in which thought attempts to come to terms
with the relationship between determinate Being and Being - with the
relationship between the finite and the infinite - are brought to conscious-
ness or made explicit in Hegel's Logic of the Notion. In his History of
Philosophy, one example of the Logical Notion 'injected into time', Hegel
notes that Thales's simple proposition that everything is water is
philosophy, 'because in it water, though sensuous, is not looked at in its
particularity as opposed to other natural things, but as Thought in which
everything is resolved and comprehended'.8 But he also notes that for
such a principle to be truly philosophical 'would necessitate its being
Notion and having what is sensuous removed'.9
While Thales and Anaximenes exhibited primitive philosophic con-
78 B. C. Birchall
sciousness in recognizing, however vaguely, the distinction between de-
terminate Being and Being, they had not emancipated themselves suffi-
ciently from the thinking characteristic of determinate Being, and had
tried to provide a solution to the problem of the intelligibility of the finite in
terms of one particular example of the finite. Anaximander removed 'the
individuality of the element of water; his objective principle does not
appear to be material, and it may be understood as Thought. But it is clear
that he did not mean anything else than matter generally, universal mat-
ter'. 10 Even though Anaximander's 'infinite' is 'undetermined' in the
sense that it is not, like Thales's water and Anaximenes's air, a particular
example of determinate Being or the finite, it has not overcome the logic of
determinate Being or the finite. As the not-determinate or not-finite,
Anaximander's 'infinite' is abstracted from determinate Being or the
finite, but in being abstracted, it functions as another finite, an 'undeter-
mined finite' beyond that of the determined finite with which we are
familiar.
'Thus the first great defect here', Hegel says, 'rests in the fact that the
universal is expressed in a particular form.'11 It matters not whether that
particular form is explicitly of the finite, as in Thales's water or
Anaximenes's air, or only implicitly of the finite, as in Anaximander's
'infinite'. The fact remains that Anaximander, whatever advance he made
on the thinking of Thales, made nological advance. Plato and Aristotle, on
the other hand, argued that the intelligibility of the finite is not to be
explained in terms of either the material or logic of the finite, but must,
nevertheless, be explained in the context of the finite - as multiple forms of
determinate Being. That is to say, for Plato and Aristotle, the intelligibility
of the finite is the form of the finite, and its form is neither some particular
determinate Being like water or air nor a 'non-determined determinate
Being' like Anaximander's 'infinite', abstracted from the finite.
Hegel's Logical Notion has what might be termed an objective and a
subjective side. On the objective side, Hegel saw the problem on the part
of Thales, Anaximenes, and Anaximander, for example, as that of thought
attempting to explain the intelligibility of the finite in terms of the material,
or more importantly, the logic, of the finite. On the subjective side, Hegel
saw this attempt on the part of thought as the work of what he called the
Abstract Understanding. Immersed in the finite, the Abstract Under-
standing, when it came to consider the intelligibility of the finite as such,
had no option but to treat this problem in the same way, and according to
the same logic, as it had treated the problems arising from a consideration
Hegel's Notion of Aufheben 79
of determinate Being. Undoubtedly, in this respect, Aristotle was a sig-
nificant influence on Hegel. Aristotle offers an explanation for the prob-
lems encountered on the objective side not very different from that of
Hegel's notion of the Abstract Understanding. "The reason they believe
this is that they are unable to say what these primary beings are which are
imperishable and independent of individual, sensible things. So they rep-
resent them as being of the same kind as the perishable (for with these we
are familiar).'12 None of this should be taken to imply that Hegel rejects or
belittles the understanding. What he rejects or belittles is the abstract
employment of the understanding. Of finite things, for example, Hegel

says:
[I]t is no doubt the case that they have to be characterized through finite predicates: and
with these things the understanding finds proper scope for its special action. Itself finite,
it knows only the nature of the finite. Thus, when I call some action a theft, I have
characterized the action in its essential facts; and such a knowledge is sufficient for the
judge. Similarly, finite things stand to each other as cause and effect, force and exercise,
and when they are apprehended in these categories, they are known in their finitude. But
the objects of reason cannot be defined by these finite predicates. To try to do so was the
defect of the old metaphysic."
With the abstract employment of the understanding, the intelligibility of

the finite (Hegel's 'objects of reason') is subjected to the logic of the finite
on the assumption that the intelligibility of the finite is itself a finite
consideration. In this way the intelligibility of the finite is broken up into
oppositions, like the finite, but ones that come into conflict with the very
nature of intelligibility itself. Hegel saw the 'battle of reason' as 'the
struggle to break up the rigidity to which the understanding has reduced
everything'.14
By treating the infinite as if it were no more than a special case of the
finite, by subjecting the intelligibility of the finite to the logic of the finite,
thought discovers that the intelligibility of the finite becomes opposed to
what it is assumed to render intelligible, namely, the finite. The infinite
becomes the non-finite and the finite becomes the non-infinite. But if the
intelligibility of the finite is its infinitude, then, given that the infinite is the
non-finite, it follows that the finite is truly itself only when it is not itself.
Lucio Colletti puts it in this way:
In practical terms, the innovation means this: one no longer says only that the finite does
not have true reality, does not have independent being; but one adds that the finite has as
'its' essence and foundation that which is 'other' than itself, i.e., the infinite, the
immaterial, thought. The consequence that derives from this is crucial. If, in fact, the
80 B. C. Birchall
. finite has as its essence the 'other' than itself, it is clear that, in order to be itself as. it
truly, or 'essentially', is, it can no longer be itself- i.e. the self that it is 'in appearance':
finite - but must be the 'other'. The finite 'is not' when it is really finite; vice versa, it 'is'
when it 'is not*. . . . "
Colletti's interpretation of the alleged 'collapse of the finite into the in-
finite' may not be mine, but he does highlight the problems generated by
treating the intelligibility of the finite, i.e. the infinite, in terms of the logic
of the finite, i.e. as the non-finite. The finite can only be itself as it truly or
'essentially' is when it is intelligible. But if the intelligibility of the finite is
itself subjected to the logic of the finite, then 'it' becomes excluded from
and opposed to the finite. As exclusion from or opposition to are part of
what it is for the finite to be intelligible, thought is involved in an apparent
contradiction. Whilst one finite thing can exclude or be opposed to another
finite thing, the finite cannot exclude or be opposed to exclusion or
opposition, which is to say no more than that the finite cannot exclude or
be opposed to its own intelligibility. Aristotle makes much the same point
when he observes that 'it is impossible for the process of change itself to
have come into being or cease to be; for it has always been. And so with
time; for there could be no before or after, if time were not'.16
There is no consistent way, then, in which the finite can exclude or be
opposed to the infinite, for it is the infinite that is the 'essence' or intelligi-
bility of the finite. Clearly a 'reconciliation' of the finite and the infinite is
required, but a 'reconciliation', so I will argue, on the part of thought.
Colletti sees the problem and the 'reconciliation' in this way:
Thus there are two errors at one and the same time: the infinite as finite, i.e. God as
object; and, in addition, God separated from the world, confined to the 'beyond',
segregated apart at an unattainable distance. The terms of the problem to be solved by
idealism are all here. Its actualization implies the elimination of these errors. In order to
comprehend the infinite in a coherent fashion, the finite must be destroyed, the world
annihilated: the infinite, in fact, cannot have alongside itself another reality which limits
it. On the other hand, once the finite is expunged and that which thrust the infinite into
the beyond - making it an 'empty ideal', devoid of real existence - is suppressed, the
infinite can pass overfromthe beyond to the here and now,that is, become flesh and take
on earthly attire."
Hegel's approach to the general problem of the 'separation' of the finite

and the infinite and their ultimate 'reconciliation' is exemplified in the
Logic in the context of the specific determinations or categories of intel-
ligibility. He begins both the Greater and Smaller Logics with a discussion
ofBeing. To treat the category of Being according to the logic of the finite
is to treat 'it' as if it were a particular finite determination or thing. The
intelligibility of a particular finite determination or thing, however, in-
volves limitation and opposition. The term cat, for example, involves as
part of its intelligibility, contrast with and limitation by its opposite, the
term, not-cat. And it is this opposition between a term and its logical
opposite that is presupposed in the application of 'the formula of
either-or'. Now to treat the category of Being as if it were a particular
finite determination or thing is to require of 'it' that 'it' has a determinate
logical opposite Not-Being. We now have a particular example of the
apparent contradiction involved in asserting that the finite excludes or is

opposed to the infinite. In taking the categories of Being and Not-Being to
be logical opposites, we are assuming that Being, for example, caaexclude
the very category of exclusion, i.e. Not-Being. But this is the apparent
contradiction of assuming, on the one hand, that Being does not exclude
exclusion, while asserting, on the other hand, that Being does exclude
exclusion. I have referred to this 'contradiction' as only apparent simply
because it does not appear to admit of resolution, as one would expect, by
a cancellation of one or other of the opposed 'propositions'.18 If we cancel
the first 'proposition' and affirm the second 'proposition', then we are
asserting that Being does exclude exclusion. It is this 'proposition', how-
ever, that gave rise to the apparent contradiction in the first place. It might
be thought that the resolution is to be found by cancelling the second
'proposition' and affirming the first 'proposition'. What we have to re-
member in considering this option is that the apparent contradiction only
arose on the assumption that the category of Being is a particular finite
determination or thing. The problem, in this case, is that of reconciling this
initial assumption - that the category of Being is a particular finite deter-
mination or thing - with its not having a logical opposite, Not-Being.
'Contradiction' in the very application of the notion of logical opposition
means that something has gone wrong. It cannot be the case, in other
words, that Being and Not-Being are genuine opposites, since if this were
so, one could be cancelled at the expense of the other without generating
an apparent contradiction. What emerges, then, is the realization that the
categories of Being and Not-Being are not genuine logical opposites. But if
they were particular finite determinations or things then they would be
genuine logical opposites. The way of resolving the apparent contradiction
is to reject the initial assumption, on the part of the Abstract Understand-
ing, that the categories of intelligibility are to be considered according to
the material or logic of the finite.
82 B. C. Birchall
The treatment of the categories of Being and Not-Being as particular
finite determinations or things leads not only to an apparent contradiction,
one that cannot be resolved in terms of the formula of either-or, but also to
an obliteration of the distinction between the two categories. Part of what
it is to distinguish one finite thing from another finite thing is that of
contrast - of opposition - of being able to say of one particular finite thing
that it is not of some character. In the case of the category of Being,
however, when it is taken to be a particular finite determination or thing,
its logical opposite, i.e. its principle of contrast, is the category of Not-
Being. But the category of Not-Being is involved in the very notion of

there being a logical opposite, that is to say, is involved in the very notion
of there being a principle of contrast. So Being, in excluding Not-Being, is
excluding one of the categories necessary to there being a principle of
contrast. In losing a principle of contrast, however, there is no ground on
which we can distinguish between the particular finite determination or
thing said to be Being and the particular finite determination or thing said
to be Not-Being. On the assumption of the Abstract Understanding, Being
is indistinguishable from its alleged opposite Not-Being.19
Hegel's solution to the apparent contradiction of Being and Not-Being,
said to be the work of Speculative Reason, takes place on two sides. On
the negative side, the false opposition between Being and Not-Being is
rejected, whilst on the positive side, the true distinction between Being
and Not-Being is retained. And this two-sided solution is possible because
of development on the part of Thought. Thought, in moving from the level
of Abstract Understanding to that of Speculative Reason, rejects the
assumption of the Abstract Understanding that the categories of intelligi-
bility are finite determinations or things 'existing in and for themselves'
and replaces it with the view that the categories of intelligibility can be
comprehended only in the context of the finite, but not as the finite. In the
case of Being and Not-Being, we have a realization on the part of Thought
that the categories of Being and Not-Being can be comprehended only as
'moments' of determinate Being, and, conversely, that determinate Being
can be comprehended only as having the 'moments' of Being and Not-
Being.
The more precise meaning and expression which Being and Nothing receive, now that
they are moments, must result from the consideration of Determinate Being as the unity
in which they are preserved. Being is Being and Nothing Nothing, only in the distinct-
ness of one from the other; but, truly considered and in their unity, they have disap-
peared as these determinations, and are now something different. Being and Nothing are
the same: but just because they are the same they no longer are Being and Nothing, and
have a different determination. In Becoming they were Arising and Passing Away: in
Determinate Being, as in a differently determined unity, they are moments differently
determined. This unity now remains their basis, from which they no more issue to the
abstract meaning of Being and Nothing. 20
In the Smaller Logic, Hegel explicates Being Determinate, with its 'mo-
ments' of Being and Not-Being, as 'Being there and so', 21 apropositional
treatment which is not at all different from those offered by Plato and
Aristotle. We can comprehend the categories of Being and Not-Being

only as 'moments' or forms of determinate Being - X being Y and X not
being Z. Similarly, we can comprehend determinate Being only in the
'moments' or forms oisomething being some character andsomething not
being some character. This is literally how, for Hegel, in the context of the
categories of Being and Not-Being, Colletti's 'infinite' passes over 'from
the beyond to the here and now\ becomes 'flesh' and takes on 'earthly
attire'.
II. The Notion of Aufheben Explicated in its Primary and

Philosophical Context
Hegel takes thedouble meaning of the word aufheben to be indicative, net
of confusion, but of the speculative spirit of our language rising above the
mere 'either-or' of understanding. Nevertheless, on the face of it, the
double meaning of aufheben is confusing. It is confusing, on the face of it,
simply because we take for granted that what is cancelled and what is
preserved is one and the same thing. To claim to cancel^ and, at the same
time, to preserve X is neither to cancel X nor to preserve X. This under-
standable confusion is removed once aufheben is placed in the philosophi-
cal context of the intelligibility of the finite. In general terms, what is
cancelled is the opposition between the finite and the infinite whilst what is
preserved is the distinction between the finite and the infinite. In the
specific case of Being and Not-Being, what is cancelled is the opposition
between Being and Not-Being while what is preserved is the distinction
between Being and Not-Being. In the development of Speculative
Reason, on the negative and positive sides, we have a rejection of the
assumption on the part of the Abstract Understanding that the categories
of Being and Not-Being are particular finite determinations or things, and
its replacement by the assumption on the part of Positive Reason that the
categories of Being and Not-Being are 'moments' of determinate Being.
84 B. C. Birchall
Because we talk of Being and Not-Being at the level of the Abstract
Understanding and at the level of Speculative Reason, it might be thought
that we have cancelled and preserved one and the same content. But this
would be to ignore the radical transformation or interpretation of content
that has taken place in the development from Abstract Understanding to
Speculative Reason.
Hegel says that in the double meaning oiaufheben we should recognize
'the speculative spirit of our languagerisingabove the mere "either-or" of
understanding' (my emphasis). Abstracted from its philosophical context,
this claim has the air, not only of mystery, but of mystification. How can
thought 'rise above' the mere 'either-or' of understanding? The formula of
either-or states that if genuine opposites are predicated of the one subject
term, then only one can be true of that subject term, the other must be
false. Despite some uninformed interpretations, Hegel is unequivocal in
his praise for the legitimate use of the formula of either-or.22 He is not
claiming to have discovered a case of genuine opposites that can be
predicated of the one subject term - a case of genuine opposites that is not
subject to the formula of either-or. That is to say, Hegel does not reject the
Law of Non-Contradiction. For this reason, 'rising above the mere
"either-or" of understanding' is not to be understood as rejecting the
either-or of understanding. What it does mean is that the formula of
either-or is inapplicable in principle to the categories of intelligibility - the
infinite.
We might have a claim that the terms black and furry are genuine
opposites. The formula of either-or is not applicable in this particular case
simply because the terms black and furry are not, as it turns out, genuine
opposites. Nevertheless, the formula is applicable in principle, for in being
particular finite determinations, the term black will have the opposite
non-black, whilst the termfurry will have the opposite non-furry. To be a
particular finite determination, then, is to admit, in principle, of genuine
opposition and exclusion. But the categories of intelligibility cannot be
regarded as finite determinations or things and, for this reason, do not
admit, in principle, of genuine opposition or exclusion. In not admitting, in
principle, of genuine opposition or exclusion, the categories of intelligi-
bility do not satisfy the first condition for the legitimate application of the
formula of either-or. This is all that Hegel means, so I would argue, by
'rising above the mere "either-or" of understanding'.
It does not mean a rejection of the formula of either-or, nor does it mean
that the categories of intelligibility are separated or abstracted from the
formula of either-or. To separate or abstract the categories of intelligi-
bility from the formula of either-or is to separate or abstract the categories
of intelligibility from that to which the formula of either-or has legitimate
application. According to this interpretation of 'rising above the mere
"either-or" of understanding', the categories of intelligibility or the infi-
nite appear as the non-finite - that which is opposed to or excludes the
finite. But in treating the finite and the infinite as opposites, we have not
risen above the formula of either-or, but have, on the contrary, subjected
the infinite to the logic of the finite, i.e. to the formula of either-or.
Hegel's rise above the formula of either-or is, at the same time, a
substantiation of that formula. If we are to substantiate the formula of
either-or, then we must do so in terms of the categories of Being and
Not-Being. But if the categories of Being and Not-Being are regarded as
particular finite determinations or things, themselves subject to the for-
mula of either-or, then the formula, rather than being substantiated, 'falls
apart'. Hegel is arguing, in other words, that if we are to substantiate the
formula of either-or, we must, at the same time, 'rise above it'. And this is
precisely what he does with the intelligibility of the finite. If we are to
substantiate the finite, i.e. find its intelligibility, then we must, at the same
time, 'rise above the finite'. To 'rise above the finite' is not, as we have
seen before, to reject the finite or to abstract the infinite from the finite, but
to recognize that the intelligibility of the finite is not subject to the logic of
the finite, i.e. is not to be regarded as a particular finite determination or
thing.
Now that we have some idea of what Hegel means by 'rising above the
mere "either-or" of understanding', the next step is to consider the
grounds on which Hegel connects this 'rise' with the speculative spirit.
The understanding, preoccupied with the particular problems of the finite,
adopts, according to Hegel, a similar attitude in considering the intelligi-
bility of the finite. In doing so, in its abstract employment, the under-
standing generates false oppositions and contradictions that can be re-
solved only by a rejection of its assumption that the categories of intelligi-
bility are on the same logical footing as particular finite determinations or
things, subject to the same logic of either-or. For the Abstract Under-
standing to be the attitude of mind that generates the false oppositions and
'contradictions* in the first place, means that it cannot be the attitude of
mind that is able either to recognize the false oppositions and 'contradic-
tions' or to resolve them in a positive manner. With the recognition of the
apparently insoluble problems with which the Abstract Understanding is
86 B. C. Birchall
confronted, we have the appearance of what Hegel calls Negative Reason
- the negative side of Speculative Reason. It is Negative Reason that is
able to comprehend that the finite is unintelligible if its intelligibility is
thought, as it is by the Abstract Understanding, to consist in finite deter-
minations. But this is the negative side only of Speculative Reason. The
positive side of Speculative Reason 'recovers' the intelligibility of the
finite, thereby avoiding the more extravagant claims of Negative Reason
qua Scepticism, by revealing the positive way in which the intelligibility of
the finite is to be thought.23
That Speculative Reason is said to develop from or 'overcome' the

Abstract Understanding and Negative Reason should not be taken to
imply that Hegel rejects or dispenses with either the understanding or
Negative Reason. What he rejects of understanding, as mentioned previ-
ously, is its abstract employment. What he retains of understanding is its
indispensable capacity to understand the finite in its finite determinations.
What he rejects of Negative Reason is its conclusion that the finite is
unintelligible. What he retains of Negative Reason is its recognition that
the finite is unintelligible on the assumptions of the Abstract Understand-
ing. All in all, what we find in Speculative Reason is not an attitude of
thought divorced from the Abstract Understanding and Negative Reason,
but one which incorporates specific phases of both understanding and
Negative Reason. In so far as we regard Speculative Reason as
philosophic consciousness, we find that philosophic consciousness is not
atomistic, but is, in fact, complex and three-sided. Colletti is aware of this
complex interpenetration of phases or sides of thought where, in the
context of a discussion of scepticism (Negative Reason), he says:
Since in scepticism this repudiation, this negation of the v,orld never becomes the
epiphany of God, scepticism reveals itself to be only a part or the 'first rung' of
philosophy, but not the true philosophy in its entirety. For if, as we have seen, it can be
said that philosophy, in so far as it has a negative side turned against all that is finite,
contains scepticism within itself, it is also true that it contains scepticism only in the
sense that the convex contains the concave - since scepticism itself represents in
philosophy 'the negative side of knowledge of the absolute', i.e. that side which 'presup-
poses in a direct way reason as the positive side'.24
So it is in the development of Speculative Reason or philosophic con-

sciousness, according to its three phases or sides, that we have a reso-
lution, on the objective side, of the problem of the intelligibility of the
finite. And this, as I see it, is the connection between His speculative spirit
and the notion of aufheben.
Hegel's notion of aufheben can be explicated and understood only in the
primary and philosophical context of the intelligibility of the finite. It is an
abbreviated description of the characteristic postures thought adopts25 in
its attempts to explain the intelligibility of the finite. In the context of
particular finite determinations or things - the province of the under-
standing - the claims made by Hegel on behalf oiaufheben would make no
sense.26 Because particular finite determinations or things do admit of
genuine opposition, they do not raise the same problems requiring a
resolution in terms of'rising above the mere "either-or" of understanding'
that we found in the philosophical context of the intelligibility of the finite.

That is to say, alleged opposition among particular finite determinations or
things is resolved, not by 'rising above', but by applying, legitimately, the
formula of either-or.
Hegel views the notion of aufheben as one of 'the most important
concepts of philosophy' simply because it arises in the context of distin-
guishing philosophy from the special sciences. And to distinguish
philosophy from the special sciences, we have to distinguish, but not
separate, the infinite from the finite. This is not an abstract undertaking,
since the very point of distinguishing philosophy from the special sciences
- the infinite from the finite - is that of providing some account of the
intelligibility of the finite or special sciences.
III. The Notion of Aufheben and the Special Sciences

That I explicated the notion of aufheben in what I termed the primary and
philosophical context of the intelligibility of the finite, might suggest that I
am arguing that the notion of aufheben is confined to Hegel's Logic. This
is not so. It would be so only if the logical notion were confined to Hegel's
Logic. But the logical notion, in its various phases of development, con-
stitutes the intelligibility of the empirical or finite sciences. For science to
ignore the logical notion is for science to ignore its own intelligibility.
Often the alleged 'facts of science have the aspect of a vast conglomerate,
one thing coming side by side with another, as if they were merely given
and presented - as in short devoid of all essential or necessary connec-
tion'. 27 Now Hegel's philosophy of science is not intended to be some
rationalist substitute for the empirical method and findings of science, 'this
development only means that thought incorporates the contents of sci-
ence, in all their speciality of detail as submitted' (my emphasis).28 Its
main concern is to present the empirical findings of science in the form of
88 B. C. Birchall
science, which, for Hegel, is the form of the philosophic or logical notion.
In such a case the contrasts between the varied and numerous phenomena brought
together serve to eliminate the external and accidental circumstances of their condi-
tions, and the universal thus comes clearly into view. Guided by such an intuition,
experimental physics will present the rational science of Nature -as history will present
the science of human affairs and actions - in an external picture, which mirrors the
philosophic notion. (My emphasis)29
Any science, to be intelligible, will have, independently of its empirical or

finite determinations, an intelligible structure. And it is this structure

which provides science with its objective or philosophic necessity. In the
Philosophy of Fine Art, Hegel expounds the function of philosophy in
respect of the special sciences in this way:
The function of philosophy is to examine subject-matter in the light of the principle of

necessity, not, it is true, merely in accordance with its subjective necessity or external
co-ordination, classification, and so forth; it has rather to unfold and demonstrate the
object under review out of the necessity of its own intimate nature. Until this essential
process is made explicit the scientific quality of such an inquiry is absent. In so far,
however, as the objective necessity of an object subsists essentially in its logical and
metaphysical nature the isolated examination of art may in such a case, at any rate or
rather inevitably, must be carried forward with a certain relaxation of scientific
stringency. For art is based upon many assumptions, part of which relate to its content,
part to its material or conceptive medium, in virtue of which art is never far from the
borders of contingency and caprice. Consequently, it is only relatively to the essential
and ideal progression of its content and its means of expression that we are able to recall
with advantage the formative principle of its necessity. (My emphasis)30
As the logical or metaphysical nature of an object, the intelligibility of the

finite (considered abstractly in the Logic), unravels dialectically according
to the notion of aufheben, any examination of science in respect of
objective or philosophic necessity will naturally and legitimately employ
the notions of dialectical transition and aufheben. In so far as we are
examining, not the objective or philosophic necessity of science, but the
accidental, external laws and classifications which govern its empirical or
finite determinateness, the notions of dialectical transition and aufheben
will be out of place. That is to say, whether or not X is a species of Y is a
matter for empirical observation and classification, but whether or not
anything can be a species o/any thing else is a matter for dialectical logic or
aufheben. Even though the first issue presupposes the intelligibility of the
second issue, the two must be carefully distinguished. Of course, if it
transpires that the notion of 'being a species of is unintelligible, then the
empirical or finite notion which presupposes it must collapse. With the
collapse of the empirical or finite issue, that Z is or is not a species of Y, a
new empirical or finite issue arises, on the basis of the immanent
emergence, through dialectical transition and aufheben, of a more
adequate form of intelligibility. As a result, the empirical 'findings' of
science will be rearranged accordingly.
There are various ways in which the notions of science may be incon-
sistent with the intelligibility of the logical notion in which they are,
unavoidably, articulated and presented. One such example is to be found
in the transition from sense-certainty, through perception, to under-
standing in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind.31 Here Hegel is not claiming

that we have a transition from one empirical actuality, through the media-
tion of another empirical actuality, to some resolution in a further empiri-
cal actuality. He is not claiming this simply because the point of the
transition from sense-certainty to understanding is to demonstrate that the
notions of sense-certainty and perception, despite their finite determina-
tions as 'stages of consciousness', are inconsistent with their own intel-
ligibility as notions, and for this reason, cannot be true, i.e. actual. His
intentions for the Phenomenology were to demonstrate how notions of
consciousness (what views people have held of consciousness) lead,
through dialectical transitions, to the truth of the notion of consciousness
(to the notion of truth itself). To take Hegel to be engaged systematically in
a temporal ordering of actual sequences of stages of consciousness would
be to miss Hegel's method entirely. Stace is aware, in part, of the logical
point of Hegel's method in the Phenomenology: 'Hegel is deducing the
logical order of the phenomena of mind. The historical order may possibly
be different.'321 say 'in part' because Stace refers to Hegel deducing the
logical order of the phenomena of mind, when, in fact, I would argue that
the only interpretation of Hegel's method consistent with his conception
of science and dialectical transition is that where the notions of conscious-
ness are revealed as having a logical order or structure in and for them-
selves.
It does not require a close examination of the transition from the notions
of sense-certainty and perception to that of understanding to disclose that
it is a dialectical, i.e. logical, transition, and, as such, one characterized by
the notion of aufheben in its primary and philosophical sense. Hegel
argues, in effect, that the notion of sense-certainty cannot be actualized as
such because it is infected with a fundamental misconception of what it is
to be actual, i.e. what it is for a notion to be intelligible. The truth of the
notion of sense-certainty is allegedly that of the 'pure particular' as rep-
90 B. C. Birchall
resented by'This' or'Now'. But the'truth' of the notion of sense-certainty
- the 'pure particular' - cannot be stated as such, for as soon as we give
utterance to the abstract 'This' or 'Now' we discover that we have
grasped, not the abstract or 'pure particular', but the abstract or 'pure
universal'.
It is as a universal, too, that we give utterance to sensuous fact. What we say is: 'This',
i.e., the universal this; or we say: 'it is', being in general. Of course we do not present
before our mind in saying so the universal this, or being in general, but we utter what is
universal; in other words, we do not actually and absolutely say what in this sense-cer-
tainty we really mean. Language, however, as we see, is the more truthful; in it we

ourselves refute directly and at once our own 'meaning'; and since universality is the real
truth of sense-certainty, and language merely expresses this truth, it is not possible at all
for us even to express in words any sensuous existence which we 'mean'.33
Because the notion of sense-certainty is found to be inconsistent with its

intelligibility as notion, with the emergence of its 'real truth', the abstract
or 'pure universal', the notion of sense-certainty collapses into that of
perception. But the notion of perception, because it cannot dispense, for
its intelligibility, with the 'particular', is also found to 'suffer this violence
at its own hands' . 34 The only way that this opposition between the notions
of sense-certainty and perception can be overcome is by eradicating the
misconceptions of intelligibility on which these empirical or finite deter-
minations of consciousness depend, i.e. by eradicating the 'abstract or
pure particular' and 'abstract or pure universal'. The eradication is not,
however, total dissolution. That is to say, the notions of sense-certainty
and perception are a mixture of intelligibility and unintelligibility. What is
eradicated is the conception of the abstract or pure particular and univer-
sal, whilst what is preserved is the form of particularity and universality.
Emerging from this logical transition is the notion of Law of Force in which
both particularity and universality are preserved as distinguishable forms
or moments and which Hegel takes to be the ground of the notion of
consciousness he calls Understanding.35
Logical transitions of this type I take to be clear exemplifications of the
primary and philosophical sense of the notion of aufheben in the special
sciences. The opposition between the empirical or finite notions of sense-
certainty and perception is seen to be based on an alleged opposition
between forms or categories of intelligibility; between the conception of
particularity as 'abstract or pure particularity' and the conception of
universality as 'abstract or pure universality'. Such conceptions, or mis-
conceptions, are the result of attempting to conceive of forms or
categories of intelligibility as if they were empirical or finite determina-
tions, i.e. things, and as such, can be seen to be the work of the abstract
understanding. Because the misconceptions and the false opposition to
which they give rise are the work of the abstract understanding, a solution
of the problem cannot be found at that level. So a solution to the problem
of sense-certainty and perception requires a rise above the mere either-or
of the understanding; the realization that the forms or categories of par-
ticularity and universality are not to be conceived of as empirical or finite
determinations, as things, themselves subject to the formula of either-or.
The solution Hegel takes to be present, if only implicitly, in the notion of

Understanding. To bring the truth or intelligibility of the finite to con-
sciousness, to render what is only implicit explicit, we require a series of
further logical transitions. But it is in the working out of these further
'logical transitions' that the logical or scientific structure of the
Phenomenology is seen, so I will argue, to break down.36 Transitions that
are in fact governed by the empirical or finite determinations of notions of
consciousness are presented as if they were logical transitions, of the same
order as that of sense-certainty, perception and understanding, explica-
ble, in principle, by the notion oiaufheben. It is here that we find Hegel
diverging from the primary sense of the notion of aufheben; the sense
which I have argued alone makes logical or philosophical sense.
The section on Lordship and Bondage, the famous 'dialectic of master
and slave', is one example, I will argue, of a breakdown in the logical
structure of the Phenomenology. Hegel does not demonstrate, as he did in
the case of sense-certainty, that the notion of being a master contains
assumptions that are inconsistent with its presentation as an intelligible
notion. Hegel says:
[T]here is posited a pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is not purely for
itself, but for another, i.e. as an existent consciousness, consciousness in the form and
shape of thinghood. Both moments are essential, since, in the first instance, they are
unlike and opposed, and their reflexion into unity has not yet come to light, they stand as
two opposed forms or modes of consciousness. The one is independent, and its essential
nature is to be for itself; the other is dependent, and its essence is life or existence for
another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsman.37
I argued previously that the alleged opposition between the notions of

sense-certainty and perception was based upon a presumed opposition
between the 'abstract or pure particular' and the 'abstract or pure univer-
sal'. With the collapse of this presumed opposition on the level of the
notion, the very notions of sense-certainty and perception are called into
92 B. C. Birchall
logical question, i.e. they cannot as such be actualized as empirical or
finite determinations of consciousness. In the case of Lordship and Bond-
age, Hegel contends that we also have 'two opposed forms of conscious-
ness'. The important issue here is whether or not this alleged opposition
between the notions of being a master and being a slave is based upon a
presumed opposition within the intelligibility of the notions themselves. If
it is, then the transition from one to the other, and ultimately to stoicism,
will be, as it is in the case of sense-certainty, perception, and understand-
ing, a logical transition governed by the intelligibility of the philosophic or

logical notion, and one characterized by the notion of aufheben in its
primary and philosophical sense. If it is not, then the transition from one to
the other,- and ultimately to stoicism, will be a presumed empirical transi-
tion governed by the laws pertaining to the empirical or finite determinate-
ness of being a master, being a slave, and stoicism respectively, and not
one, for this reason, characterized by the notion of aufheben in its primary
and philosophical sense.
What does Hegel take to be the ground of the alleged opposition be-
tween the notions of being a master and being a slave? He says of the
Master that it is 'independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself,
and of the Slave that it is 'dependent, and its essence is life or existence for
another'. There is an apparent opposition here between the notions of
being independent and for itself and being dependent and for another. But
is it an opposition that breaks up the intelligibility of the notion itself such
that we can say, on logical grounds, that there cannot be such an opposi-
tion, or is it no more than an opposition between the respective empirical
or finite determinations of the notion such that we can say, on empirical
grounds, that there is no such opposition? If the notion of being a master
were based upon the logical assumption of 'pure existence for itself
('independence') and that of being a slave upon the logical assumption of
'pure existence for another' ('dependence') then the alleged opposition
between the two notions would be found to be inconsistent with the logic
or intelligibility of the notion itself. The 'opposition' would dissolve and
we would be in a position to discover a notion of consciousness, possibly
stoicism, in which the notions of existence for itself and existence for
another were preserved as distinguishable moments. This is not how
Hegel proceeds. Instead, he purports to demonstrate that the notion of
being a master is inconsistent with that of independence and that the
notion of being a slave is inconsistent with that of dependence, by refer-
ence to what he takes to be the empirical facts of the master-slave
relation. That is to say, in place of immanent critique we have the empiri-
cal claim that the master cannot achieve what he may want to achieve, viz.
independence, precisely because of his use of the slave a$ a mediator.
Similarly, we have the empirical claim that the slave cannot remain de-
pendent precisely because of his use by the master as a mediator, i.e. his
direct confrontation with reality. But Hegel is talking aboutpsychological
or social independence/dependence, not logical independence/depen-
dence. The master is not attempting to achieve logical independence by
utilizing a slave, nor is the slave in a state of logical dependence. If Hegel is
not talking about logical independence/dependence, but psychological or

social independence/dependence in relation to the empirical or finite
determinations of being a master and being a slave, i.e. in the context of
the empirical relation of dominance-submission, then the outcome will be
determined by the laws governing such empirical or finite determinations,
laws which Hegel has said must be incorporated 'as submitted',38 and not
by the nature of the philosophic or logical notion. What he says in this
section may be true, the empirical or finite determination of being a master
may be inconsistent with psychological or social independence, just as the
empirical or finite determination of being a slave may be inconsistent with
psychological or social dependence, but if this is so, it must be de-
monstrated by means of empirical, not logical, methods. I agree with the
general thrust of the following comment by Stace:
It will be observed that, in order to reach this result, there is necessary the condition that
one ego is more powerful than the other, thereby attaining the mastery and reducing the
other to slavery. Hegel makes, so far as I can see, no attempt to deduce this inequality,
but merely empirically foists it in. Moreover it was impossible that, on his own princi-
ples, he ever could deduce this inequality. For such inequality is the result of the
individual peculiarities of the antagonists, and forms no part of the universal essence of
mind as mind, upon which alone the philosophy of spirit can dwell. 39
If what I have said above is correct, that the transition from the notions of
being a master, being a slave, to that of stoicism, is an empirical, not a
logical, transition, then it lacks thephilosophic necessity that can be found
in the transition from the notions of sense-certainty, perception, to that of
understanding, and, as such, represents a breakdown in the logical struc-
ture of the Phenomenology.40 Moreover, in lacking philosophic necessity,
the transition is not one characterized by the notion of aufheben in its
primary and philosophical sense. To suggest otherwise would be to
suggest that the notion of aufheben has no primary and philosophical
sense, that it is not 'among the most important concepts of philosophy',
94 B. C. Birchall
but that it is one which does not differentiate between logical and empirical
transitions, between transitions governed by the internal necessity of the
notion and transitions governed by the laws pertaining to the empirical or
finite determinations of the notion.
There are, of course, some empirical transitions that exhibit what some
commentators take to be the mark of the notion oiaufheben, viz. 'opposi-
tion overcome and distinction preserved'.41 That this is not a sufficient
indicator of the work ofaufheben in its primary and philosophical sense is
clear from the fact that such 'opposition overcome and distinction pre-
served' is governed, not by the intelligibility of the notion, but by the laws
pertaining to the empirical or finite determinations of the notions involved.
In other words, while the notion oiaufheben in its primary and philosophi-
cal sense involves 'opposition overcome and distinction preserved', it is
not the case that all 'opposition overcome and distinction preserved' is the
work of the notion of aufheben in its primary and philosophical sense. In
the case of empirical transitions, while there might be a rise above the
either-or of particular empirical or finite determinations, there is no rise
above the 'mere either-or of understanding'. To use a notion which Hegel,
in his Logic, articulates in ^philosophical context (the intelligibility of the
finite) to explain empirical transitions is to suggest that empirical trans-
itions are 'really' logical transitions, that they 'really' have an underlying
logical necessity which somehow guarantees the empirical outcome. But
this would be to confuse considerations pertinent to the intelligibility of
the notion with considerations pertinent to its empirical or finite determi-
nation. Indeed, empirical transitions whether they involve 'opposition
overcome and distinction preserved' or not, can be explained in terms of
empirical methods and nomenclature and do not give rise to the need for a
special philosophical notion, such as that of Hegel's notion oiaufheben,
for their articulation or exposition.
It may well be true that Hegel did not always use the notion oiaufheben
in its primary and philosophical sense. But in so far as the primary and
philosophical sense is confused with its more literal and non-philosophical
sense, there is the danger that empirical transitions, such as that of
master-slave-stoicism, can be presented as if they were more than this, as
if they had, as well, a logical or philosophical legitimacy and thus neces-
sity. The only consistent philosophical sense that I can find for the notion
of aufheben is the one already adumbrated. It does not imply that the
notion oiaufheben has no application to the special sciences, only that its
application is confined to considerations of the intelligibility of the notions
of the special sciences. As I said earlier, abstracted from this primary and
philosophical context, Hegel's notion of aufheben has no meaningful
application.
IV. 'Immanent Transformation'

The notion of aufheben, explicated in the primary and philosophical
context of the intelligibility of the finite, was seen to involve a logical
transition from notions of understanding to notions of positive or specula-

tive reason (the 'rise above the mere either-or of understanding').42
How is this logical transition, what I will henceforth call transformation,
to be understood? Is it a transformation on the part of thought indepen-
dently of content, or is it what might be termed an immanent transforma-
tion on the part of the content itself? In the Smaller Logic, Hegel says that
by Dialectic
is meant the indwelling tendency outwards by which the one-sidedness and limitation of
the predicates of understanding is seen in its true light, and shown to be the negation of
them. For anything to be finite is just to suppress itself and put itself aside. Thus
understood the Dialectical principle constitutes the life and soul of scientific progress,
the dynamic which alone gives immanent connection and necessity to the body of
science. . . . (My emphasis)*3
In the Greater Logic, Hegel says of method that it is 'the consciousness of

the form taken by the inner spontaneous movement of the content of
Logic11 (my emphasis).44 For Hegel, then, the transformation that is in-
volved in the notion of aufheben is an immanent transformation - a
transformation immanent in the content of Logic itself.
I have separated this alleged feature of aufheben from the others previ-
ously discussed, not only because I think it is separable in fact, but
because it will prove, so I will argue, to be inconsistent with the other
features of aufheben. In so far as Hegel takes the transformation involved
in the notion of aufheben to be immanent in the content of Logic, then we
have very good grounds for reproaching language and Hegel's philosophy
as a cause of confusion.
The transformation that we have observed in the context of the intelligi-
bility of the finite depends, importantly, upon an initial misconception, on
the part of thought, of the nature of the content of Logic. The Abstract
Understanding takes the content of Logic - the categories of intelligibility
- to be particular finite determinations or things subject, like the finite, to
96 B. C. Birchall
the formula of either-or. But this assumption, on the part of the Abstract
Understanding, leads to a 'contradiction* that can be resolved only by a
recognition that the initial opposition is & false opposition and that the
categories of intelligibility, unlike particular finite determinations or
things, are not subject to opposition. What this means, however, is that the
content of Logic that is said to be above the formula of either-or must
already be present at the level of understanding.45 It cannot, contrary to
what Hegel might suggest with his notion of immanent transformation,
develop, by means of contradiction, out o/that level. It must be already
there if there is to be false opposition in the first place. If it is not already

there, then there is no measure of truth present on the grounds of which it
can be true to say of the Abstract Understanding that it generates false
oppositions and 'contradictions'. But if this cannot be said, then there is no
reason for there being a transformation, immanent or otherwise, to a
'higher level'.
It might be thought that a distinction between what is only implicit and
what is explicit can avoid this criticism and thereby save the notion of
immanent transformation. Hegel might argue that the truth of Being and
Not-Being, for example, is only implicit at the level of Abstract Under-
standing, but becomes, through immanent transformation, explicit at the
level of Speculative Reason. But if truth is defined in terms of being
explicit, then it follows that the truth of Being and Not-Being is not present
at the level of Abstract Understanding. On the other hand, if truth is not
defined in terms of being explicit, then the truth of Being and Not-Being is
present at the level of Abstract Understanding, and what is transformed is
not truth as such, but the thought of truth, until at the level of Speculative
Reason, truth becomes explicit to thought.
Being 'above the formula of either-or' from the outset, the content of
Logic does not, itself, undergo any transformation. What transformation
does take place is precisely that which we have seen take place, namely,
transformation on the part of thought in the context of Logic. In other
words, it is not the categories of Being and Not-Being, for example, that
are transformed, for, as Croce asks, at the level of the Abstract Under-
standing 'what are those two abstractions, being and nothing, taken sepa-
rately, each in itself, but two falsities, or two errors?'. 46
For the notion of aufheben to be intelligible in the context in which I
have previously explicated it, a clear distinction must be drawn between
thought and its transformations and the content of Logic which does not,
itself, undergo any such transformations. To make sense, then, of the
Hegel's Notion 0/Aufheben 97
notion otaufheben, the extraneous notion of immanent transformation
must be excised. Where Hegel talks, for example, of the finite 'being
radically self-contradictory' and as undergoing its 'own self-suppres-
sion', 47 he is forcing the notion of aufheben into a context, that of imma-
nent transformation, in which it loses its primary and philosophical signifi-
cance. It is not 'the finite' that is 'radically self-contradictory' nor is it 'the
finite' that is responsible for its 'own self-suppression', rather it is the
thought of the finite as constituting its own truth that is 'radically self-
contradictory' and undergoes its 'own self-suppression'.
V. The Content of Logic

I have argued that if Hegel is to make sense of his notion ofaufheben in the
primary and philosophical context in which it appears, a clear distinction
must be drawn between thought and the content of thought. In so far as
Hegel wants the content of Logic to undergo a transformation, Hegel has
to both preserve the distinction and conflate it. He has to preserve the
distinction if there is to be any transformation while he has to conflate the
distinction if there is to be a transformation on the part of the content of
Logic. Hegel extracts the transformation that we have seen take place in
the primary and philosophical context of aufheben by observing the dis-
tinction between thought and the content of Logic. By conflating the very
distinction he observes, however, Hegel presents a transformation on the
part of thought as a transformation on the part of the content of Logic. Itis
interesting to observe how Hegel's 'wanting it both ways' breaks down.
Unless the content of Logic is distinguished in a thoroughgoing way from
the thought of that content, there can be no transformation, immanent or
otherwise, of the kind we have seen to be characteristic of the notion of
aufheben.
To get the appearance of an immanent transformation of the content of
Logic according to the notion of aufheben, Hegel has to treat the content
of Logic as the categories of intelligibility independently of thought and as
the thinking of the categories of intelligibility, at one and the same time.
This inconsistent treatment of the content of Logic is evident, for exam-
ple, where he comments: 'Consequently, if the object in question be the
True, the Infinite, the Unconditioned, we change it by our notions into a
finite and conditioned; whereby, instead of apprehending the truth by
thought, we have perverted it into untruth.' 48 Hegel requires, on the one
hand, an independent measure of Truth whereby he can say of the
98 B. C. Birchall
Abstract Understanding that, in conceiving of the True, the Infinite, the
Unconditioned, as the finite and conditioned, it is involved in untruth, i.e.
error, but in saying that in thinking the object as finite we change it into the
finite and conditioned, Hegel is conflating, on the other hand, the distinc-
tion between thought and content that is involved in there being an
independent measure of Truth, and thus, untruth, i.e. error. Clearly,
Hegel has to make a choice. And this choice will be governed by the
formula of either-or.
If the content of Logic is'dependent upon its being thought, then, apart
from the fact that Hegel's philosophy, at this stage, would be indistin-
guishable from the subjective idealism of which he is extremely critical, he
would lack the independent measure whereby he could say of the Abstract
Understanding that it is involved in untruth or error. But if the truth of
Being and Not-Being, for example, consists in its being thought, then we
have lost any reason for requiring, on the part of thought or content, a
transformation above that of either-or.
The only alternative remaining is to take the content of Logic to be
distinguishable from the thinking of that content. In distinguishing con-
sistently between the content of Logic and the thinking of that content
Hegel can rescue the notion of aufheben, but only at the expense of
immanent transformation. The rejection of the notion of immanent trans-
formation, however, is of no consequence to the significance of aufheben
in its primary and philosophical context. The solution that Hegel offers to
the problem of Being and Not-Being, for example, does not consist in its
being thought - except in the sense of its being thinkable. That is to say,
determinate Being, with its 'moments' of Being and Not-Being, is a so-
lution to the problem of Being and Not-Being, to the thinkability of Being
and Not-Being, independently of its being thought as such by Speculative
Reason. But this means that the content of Logic - the categories of
intelligibility - is, independently of its being thought as such, 'above the
formula of either-or'. In being 'above the formula of either-or', indepen-
dently of its being thought as such, the content of Logic is not-even if the
thinking of that content is - transformed.
VI. Implications of 'Immanent Transformation'

For the notion of aufheben to have any meaningful use in Hegel's
philosophy, there has to be a distinction drawn between what is trans-
formed and what is not transformed - between thinking and content. In
Hegel's Notion 0/Aufheben 99
wanting a transformation of content, i.e. an immanent transformation,
Hegel conflates the distinction he requires for the meaningful use of the
notion of aufheben. It is not, as Croce claims, a confusion between the
theory of distincts and the theory of opposites, but Hegel's conflating
(while at the same time attempting to maintain) the distinction between
thought and content, that is the source of 'all that is philosophically
erroneous in the system of Hegel'.49
The transformation we have seen took place on the part of thought
independently of content. In so far as Hegel takes this transformation to be
a transformation on the part of the content of Logic, the content of Logic is

said to develop in accordance with the thinking of that content. Croce,
correctly, takes Hegel's Logic to be 'a congeries of criticisms directed
against the affirmations of abstract terms. . .'. 50 As the content of Logic is
supposed to be transformed immanently, a 'congeries of criticisms' on the
part of thought is presented as a transformation of the content of Logic
itself. Because Hegel requires the distinction between thinking and con-
tent if he is to know what sort of transformation is possible, he cannot put
his notion of immanent transformation consistently into practice.
The main source of confusion in Hegel's philosophy, then, brought to light
in his use of the notion ofaufheben, is his inconsistent view of the content
of Logic. On the one hand he regards it as independent of thought, while on
the other hand he regards it as dependent upon thought. In so far as the
content of Logic is taken, by Hegel, to be the ground of all that is scientific,
we have an extension of this fundamental confusion into the special
sciences. In Hegel's Philosophy of History, for example, we have at the
same time, many illuminating insights into the nature of history itself
(independently of its being thought as content) and the fundamental falsifi-
cation of these many insights by Hegel's conflation of the thinking of the
content of history with the actual course of history itself. Because thought,
when it studies history as content, struggles to realize the truth of history,
Hegel presents history as struggling to realize its own truth.
With the recognition of Hegel's inconsistent treatment of the distinction
between thought and content, we find an apparent explanation of the
ambivalence that many commentators have demonstrated towards
Hegel's content studies. In drawing a distinction between thought and
content, Hegel discovers much that is of value in a particular content. But
in proceeding to conflate that very distinction in the notion of immanent
transformation, Hegel falsifies the content that he has previously illumi-
nated.
100 B. C. Birchall
In thinking about a particular content, whether that content be Logic or
History, the object of thought will be the truth of that content. But truth is
not, as Hegel recognizes, easy to come by. The discovery of truth will be
preceded and stimulated by untruth, i.e. error. Having recognized a dis-
tinction between thinking and content, to then proceed to deny that
distinction in the notion of immanent transformation is to claim, falsely,
that the transformation observed on the part of thought in its efforts to
discover the truth of a particular content is really a transformation on the
part of that content itself in Its efforts to realize its own truth. Untruth or
error, then, 'becomes a partial expression of the Ultimate Truth'. But, as

Croce observes,
when these errors have been baptized truths of a certain kind, there is nothing to hinder
every error, error in general, being considered particular truths. The phenomenology of
error thus assumes the appearance of an ideal history of truth.51
Hegel's mistake here is not that of confusing distincts and opposites, as

Croce thought, but of conflating the distinction he requires if there is to be
error, and thus transformation, namely, the distinction between thought
and content.
VII. Conclusion
Explicating Hegel's notion of aufheben is not an easy task, but it is a
rewarding one. It is all too easy, however, to ignore Hegel's claim in the
Greater Logic that the notion oiaufheb.en is 'among the most important
concepts of philosophy'52 and to proceed as if it were no more than its
dictionary meaning (to annul, to preserve). Understood in this very broad
and, I would argue, non-philosophical, sense, the notion of aufheben can
be applied indiscriminately to logical and empirical transitions. That is to
say, wherever there is 'opposition overcome and distinction preserved',
we have the legitimate use of aufheben. But this is to lose sight altogether
of its philosophical significance. Hegel did not borrow the word aufheben
from the language for expressly philosophical purposes without having
seen in such a word an underlying philosophical significance. What I have
attempted to do in this paper is to bring to light what this philosophical
significance might be. In doing so, it was necessary that uses of the notion
of aufheben that do not have as their ground what I have termed the
primary and philosophical context of the intelligibility of the finite, be
distinguished from those that do. This does not mean, as I said earlier, that
the primary sense of aufheben has application only in Hegel's Logic.
Wherever we have the logical notion, we have considerations of intelligi-
bility arising which may contribute to or detract from the development of
the special sciences. For the notion of aufheben to be employed in the
context of the special sciences in its primary and philosophical sense, the
emphasis has to be on the intelligibility of the notions of the science in
question and not on the empirical or finite determinations of those notions.
The philosophical significance of the notion ofaufheben is to be found in
the context of the intelligibility of the finite. It cannot involve, as Hegel
might have thought, an immanent transformation on the part of the content

of logic itself, but is, rather, an abbreviated description of the characteris-
tic postures thought adopts in its efforts to think the intelligibility of the
finite. The understanding, immersed in and preoccupied by specific prob-
lems of the finite, is employed abstractly when it attempts to think the
very intelligibility of the finite in terms of the material or logic of the finite.
In its abstract employment, understanding generates false oppositions and
'insoluble contradictions', recognized at the stage of Negative Reason and
resolved at the stage of Positive Reason. By recognizing that the intelligi-
bility of the finite is not to be regarded as a particular finite determination
or thing, Positive Reason discovers the truth or intelligibility of the finite
that is, independently of its being thought as such, 'above the mere
"either-or" of understanding'.
Explicating the notion of aufheben in this way - in the primary and
philosophical context of the intelligibility of the finite - does not involve a
rejection of the logic of the finite. Indeed, the main thrust of Hegel's Logic,
as exemplified by his use of the notion of aufheben in its primary sense, is
to substantiate the finite, which involves, needless to say, a substantiation
of the formula of either-or - the logic of the finite. But if we are to develop
Hegel's positive contributions to an understanding of the intelligibility of
the finite, i.e. to an understanding of philosophy, we need to disentangle
his contributions from his errors. Even if what I have said is true, that
Hegel's notion of aufheben has an important philosophical sense, it does
not follow, of course, that Hegel employed it, in thh sense, consistently.
Indeed, his dialectic, as Croce acutely observed,53 and his notion of
aufheben were abused, not only by his contemporaries and followers, but
by Hegel himself.
102 B. C. Birchall
NOTES
1 B. Croce, What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, trans. by D.
Ainslie, Russell & Russell, New York, reissued 1969.
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Logic: Pan One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences,
trans, by W. Wallace, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 3rd ed., 1975, p. 142 (Zusatz).
3 G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, Vol. I, trans. by W. H. Johnston & L. G. Struthers,
George Allen & Unwin, London, 4th imp., 1966, p. 119.
4 H.Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 2nd ed., 1973,
p. 129.
5 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. I, trans. by E. S. Haldane
and F. H. Simson, Routledge & Kegan Paul, reprinted London 1974, pp. 185-6.
6 J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, Meridian Books, New York, 3rd imp., 1959, p. 53.
7 See Plato's The Sophist and Aristotle's Metaphysics (passim).
8 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 179.
9 Ibid., p. 177.
10 Ibid., p. 187.
11 Ibid., p. 192.
12 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. by R. Hope, The University of Michigan Press, Michigan,
3rd imp., 1966, p. 165.
13 Hegel, Logic, p. 50 (gusatz).
14 Ibid., p. 53 (Zusatz).
15 L. Colletti, Marxism and Hegel, trans, by L. Garner, New Left Books, London 1973,
p. 14.
16 Aristotle, op. cit., p. 256.
17 Colletti, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
18 Cf. J. Findlay's 'Comment on Weil's "The Hegelian Dialectic"', in J. J. O'Malley, K. W.
Algozin, H. P. Kainz, and L. C. Rice (Eds.), The Legacy of Hegel, Martinus Nghofif, The
Hague 1973, pp. 67-68.
19 Hegel, Logic, 'The Doctrine of Being', op.cit., pp. 123-35; and Science of Logic, op. cit.,
Vol. I,'Being', pp. 94-118.
20 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 120.
21 Hegel, Logic, op. cit., p. 133.
22 E.g. Hegel, Science of Logic, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 67-68.
23 Hegel, Logic, 'Logic further Defined and Divided', op. cit.
24 Colletti, op. cit., p. 76.
25 Cf. J. McTaggart's view of Hegel's dialectic as reported by A. Sarlemyn, Hegel's
Dialectic, D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland 1975, p. 79.
26 It makes no sense, then, in the primary and philosophical context of aufheben, to equate
dialectic with some reciprocity between the finite determinations of things.
28 Ibid., p. 16.
29 Ibid., p. 22.
30 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Fine Art, Vol. I, trans. by F. P. B. Osmaston, Hacker
Art Books, New York, reissued 1975, pp. 14-15.
31 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. by J. B. Baillie, George Allen &
Unwin, London, 8th imp., 1971, pp. 150-213 (pp. 58-103). Page references to the A. V.
Miller trans. (Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1977) are given
in parentheses.
32 W. T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel, Dover Publications, New York 1955, p. 358.
33 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, op. cit., p. 152 (p. 60).
34 Ibid., p. 138 (p. 51).
35 Ibid., p. 195 (p. 90).
36 In his letters from the time of publishing the Phenomenology, Hegel acknowledges its
lack of logical order and structure: 'Hegel says that the book has no structure, composi-
tion, or form; that it is loaded with accidental stuff; that the same themes are treated under
different titles; that there is no order, but themes crisscross without warning; that there is
no necessity to the sequence . . . ' (G. E. Mueller, 'The Interdependence of the
Phenomenology, Logic and Encyclopaedia', in W. E. Steinkraus [Ed.], New Studies in
Hegel's Philosophy, Rinehart & Winston, New York 1971, p. 20).
37 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, op. cit., p. 234 (p. 115).
39 Stace, op. cit., pp. 357-8. See also J. Shklar's Freedom and Independence, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 1976, pp. 58-64. Shklar's analysis, for example, of the
transition from the master-slave relation to stoicism is based not upon the unavoidable
assumptions of the intelligibility of the notion itself, but upon various assumptions
pertinent to the empirical or finite determinations of the specific notions involved in the
transition.
40 By recognizing that some transitions are not logical, but empirical, we come to see that
there is no need for the postulation of another type of dialectic, an historical dialectic, in
addition to the ontological dialectic that is said to cover the transition from sense-cer-
tainty to understanding. Indeed, I would argue that the notion of an ontological dialectic
is pleonastic. Cf. C. Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1975, pp.
130-2.
41 E.g. ibid., p. 119.
42 Walter Kaufmann's 'uplift'; see his Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 4th ed., 1974, p. 236.
44 Hegel, Science of Logic, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 64.
45 Even if not present to thought, i.e. to the Abstract Understanding.
46 Croce, op. cit., p. 101.
47 Hegel, Logic, p. 117 (Zusatz).
48 Ibid., p. 95. It is also, evident, importantly, in Hegel's treatment of Logic as Logic of the
Notion. His confusion between Logic and the thinking of Logic is crystallized in the
Smaller Logic where he talks of the Abstract Understanding, Negative Reason, and
Positive Reason as 'stages or "moments" in every logical entity, that is, of every notion
and truth whatever' (p. 113, my emphasis). Glockner exemplifies the same confusion
when, in representing Hegel's dialectic, he says: 'But because this world is itself never
anywhere else but in our consciousness . . . ' (reported by Sarlenujn, op. cit., p. 79, my
emphasis). To discover the origin of Hegel's confusion between Logic and the thinking of
Logic would be an undertaking outside the scope of this paper, but I would suggest that
the answer lies in his analysis of the stages of consciousness in the Phenomenology of
Mind.
49 Croce, op. cit., pp. 98-99.
50 Ibid., p. 114.
51 Ibid., p. 103.
52 Hegel, Science of Logic, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 119.
53 Croce, op. cit., see esp. Ch. IX, 'The Construction of the False Sciences and the
Application of the Dialectic to the Individual and to the Empirical', op. cit., pp. 174-91.

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On: 15 January 2015, At: 08:26

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy

Hegel's notion of Aufheben

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Hegel's Notion of Aufheben

further philosophical insights while others turn out to be obstructions to

I. The Primary and Philosophical Context of Aufheben

Philosophy began with a vague recognition of the distinction between

employment of the understanding. Of finite things, for example, Hegel

With the abstract employment of the understanding, the intelligibility of

Hegel's approach to the general problem of the 'separation' of the finite

apparent contradiction involved in asserting that the finite excludes or is

Being. But the category of Not-Being is involved in the very notion of

Aristotle. We can comprehend the categories of Being and Not-Being

II. The Notion of Aufheben Explicated in its Primary and

That Speculative Reason is said to develop from or 'overcome' the

So it is in the development of Speculative Reason or philosophic con-

that we found in the philosophical context of the intelligibility of the finite.

III. The Notion of Aufheben and the Special Sciences

Any science, to be intelligible, will have, independently of its empirical or

finite determinations, an intelligible structure. And it is this structure

The function of philosophy is to examine subject-matter in the light of the principle of

As the logical or metaphysical nature of an object, the intelligibility of the

standing in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind.31 Here Hegel is not claiming

tainty we really mean. Language, however, as we see, is the more truthful; in it we

Because the notion of sense-certainty is found to be inconsistent with its

The solution Hegel takes to be present, if only implicitly, in the notion of

I argued previously that the alleged opposition between the notions of

ing, a logical transition governed by the intelligibility of the philosophic or

not talking about logical independence/dependence, but psychological or

IV. 'Immanent Transformation'

transition from notions of understanding to notions of positive or specula-

In the Greater Logic, Hegel says of method that it is 'the consciousness of

there if there is to be false opposition in the first place. If it is not already

V. The Content of Logic

VI. Implications of 'Immanent Transformation'

a transformation on the part of the content of Logic, the content of Logic is

error, then, 'becomes a partial expression of the Ultimate Truth'. But, as

Hegel's mistake here is not that of confusing distincts and opposites, as

might have thought, an immanent transformation on the part of the content

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