3. Ocampo vs.

Enriquez
G.R. 225973 November 8, 2016
Peralta J.:

Facts:

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte (Duterte)
publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB). He won the May 9, 2016 election and formally assumed his office at the Rizal
Hall in the Malacaang Palace.

In compliance to the verbal order of the President to implement his election campaign promise, public
respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment
of Marcos at the LNMB.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, petitioners, filed their respective petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators,
members of the Bar and taxpayers.

Issue: WON the case should be dismissed.

Held: YES. Our courts are a court of law and a court of equity. Thus, judges are mandated to entertain
only legal controversies. The case at bar involve questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure. Hence, petitioners failure to show that they have suffered or will suffer
direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB warrants the dismissal of the
case.
 29. Taganas vs. Emuslan
G.R. No. 146980, Sept. 2, 2003
Corona, J.
Facts:

On July 11, 1997, a road accident occurred along the national highway of La Union involving four vehicles to
wit: 1.) a minibus; 2.) an Isuzu Elf owned by the Juntos; 3.) a petron truck owned and operated by the
petitioner Taganas and; 4.) a Shell tanker truck.

The Juntos filed a case for damages (Civil Case No. 97-02055-D) against petitioner which was decided by the
trial court holding the Juntos liable for the damage sustained by petitioner Taganas Petron tanker truck.

On the other hand, private respondent, Standard Insurance Co. Inc., insurer of the Shell tanker truck, filed a
separate complaint for damages (Civil Case No. 6754) against both the Juntos and petitioner. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the case invoking the the doctrine of res judicata and contending that since Civil Case No.
97-02055-D was already decided, private respondent no longer had any cause of action against them but the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals
but the same was denied.
Hence, an instant petition was filed in Supreme Court.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of res judicata.

Held:
No. The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the
judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of
parties, of subject matter and cause of action. For res judicata to apply, all the above essential requisites must
exist.

Supreme Court agrees with both the trial court (in Civil Case No. 6754) and the appellate court that there
was neither identity of parties nor identity of subject matter, much less identity of cause of action between
Civil Case No. 97-02055-D and Civil Case No. 6754.

Clearly, there was, in the two cases, no identity of parties. The owner of the Shell tanker truck was never
a party in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D. Neither was the private respondent insurance company a party therein.
Since private respondent insurance company, whose cause of action was legal subrogation to the rights of the
owner of the Shell tanker, was not a party in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D, it was not barred from filing Civil Case
No. 6754. Res judicata clearly did not apply to it.

On the issue of identity of subject matter, in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D, the subject matter was the
collision between the Isuzu Elf van owned by the Juntos and the Petron tanker truck owned and operated by
petitioner Luz Taganas. However, in Civil Case No. 6754, the subject matter was the collision between the
Shell tanker truck insured by private respondent insurance company and the Isuzu Elf van of the Juntos which
was rear-ended by the Petron tanker truck of petitioner.

Thus, petition was denied.

30. Degayo vs. Dinglasan

G.R. No. 173148, April 6, 2015
Brion, J.:
Facts:
 The present case involves a property dispute, which gave rise to two civil cases for ownership and
damages between conflicting claimants over a parcel of land located on the northeastern bank of Jalaud River.
The Jalaud River, which separates these parcels of land, thus flows along the northeast side of Lot No. 861
owned by Degayo and southwest side of Lot No. 7328 owned by respondents.

Sometime in the 1970s, the Jalaud River steadily changed its course and moved southwards. As a result,
Lot. No. 7328 progressively decreased in size while the banks adjacent to Lot No. 861 gradually increase in
land area.

October 2, 1984, Dinglasan filed a complaint for ownership and damages against the tenants docketed as
Civil Case No. 16047. Degayo and the tenants believed that the area was an accretion to Lot 861. As a result,
her tenants, commenced cultivating and tilling the disputed area with corn and tobacco. Dinglasan, on the
other hand, argued that the disputed property was an abandoned riverbed, which should rightfully belong to
them.

Degayo sought to intervene but her motion was denied. Instead, Degayo filed suit a suit against
respondents for declaration of ownership with damages docketed as Civil Case No. 18328 also with the same
RTC and likewise stressed that the area in dispute was an accretion to Lot No. 861.

The decision in Civil Case No. 16047 favored Dinglasan. The tenants filed an appeal but was denied by the
Court of Appeals. The decision became final and executory.

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 18328, the decision found in favor of Degayo. Dinglasan filed a motion for
reconsideration but their motion was denied. Hence, Dinglasan filed an appeal with the CA.

CA granted Dinglasans appeal and set aside the decision of the Civil Case No. 18328 that favored Degayo.
CA noted that the disputed properties are abandoned riverbeds. Being abandoned riverbeds, the property in
question rightfully belongs to the respondents Dinglasan as the owners of the land now occupied by the
Jalaud River. The CA likewise noted that the previous RTC Branch decision in Civil Case No. 16047 is conclusive
to the title of the thing. Degayo sought a reconsideration of the CA but the motion was denied. Aggrieved,
Degayo filed a petition for certiorari. Respondents argued that the decision in Civil Case No. 16047 constitutes
res judicata.

Issue:
WON the decision in Civil Case No. 16047 constitutes res judicata.
Held:
Yes. In the present case, it is beyond dispute that the judgment in Civil Case No. 16047 has attained
finality in view of the tenant's abandonment of their appeal to the CA.
Supreme Court likewise find that there is an identity of parties in Civil Case No. 16047 and the present
case. The interests of Degayo and the tenants in relation to the two cases are inextricably intertwined in that
both their claims emanate from a singular
fundamental allegation of accretion.

Moreover, Degayo and the respondents are litigating the same properties subject of the antecedent
cases inasmuch as they claim better right of ownership. Degayo even admitted this in her petition wherein
she stated that "the land subject of Civil Case No. 16047 is the same property subject of the case at bench."

Notably, the ownership of the disputed parcel of land has been unequivocally settled in Civil Case No.
16047.

Hence, petition is denied.

 36. Mejia-Espinoza vs. Carino
G.R. No. 193397, Jan. 25, 2017
Jardeleza, J.:
Facts:

On, August 25, 1998, Petitioner Espinoza filed an action for ejectment against respondent Carino before
the MTC of Pangasinan City. It rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner ordering Carino to vacate the
respective properties and to pay rents from time of default, litigation expenses, and attorneys fees.

Petitioner filed a motion for a writ of execution which the MTC granted on March 10, 2005. Sheriff
Hortaleza was able to turn over the property to petitioners attorney-in-fact when he found out that
respondent voluntarily vacated the place and levied the commercial lot owned by respondent to cover the
monetary awards for rent, litigation expenses and attorneys fees.

On September 19, 2005 or six months after, Carino filed a complaint as Annulment of Court Processes
with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and/or Prohibition, and
Damages" before the RTC of Dagupan City. She argued that she was deprived of the opportunity to ask for
reconsideration of the order granting Espinoza's motion for issuance of writ of execution because she was not
furnished a copy of the order. Espinoza emphasized that the writ of execution was properly served and
received by Nena on March 16, 2005, and that Carino had already removed all her personal belongings from
the premises weeks before the service of the writ.

The RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and held that the issuance of writ of execution was
rendered moot because Carino had already relinquished her possession of property. But on appeal, the CA
reversed the RTC.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:
WON the principle of res judicata applies in this case.

Held:

Yes. Supreme Court was convinced that respondents complaint for annulment of court processes, filed six
months after she voluntarily complied with the writ of execution, was a mere afterthought designed to evade
the execution of a decision that has long attained finality. Public policy dictates that once a judgment
becomes final, executory, and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory
by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.

The fact that she received a copy of the writ without any protest and voluntarily vacated the premises
and turned over possession to Espinoza's representative are actions of respondents recognition to the writ of
execution and is therefore, estopped from questioning its validity. Thus the principle of res judicata applies in
this case.
 41. Ejercito vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 212398, Nov. 25, 2014
Peralta, J.:
Facts:
A petition for disqualification was filed by San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila
against Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the
Province of Laguna.

He alleged in his petition that Ejercito has violated the Omnibus Election Code by giving money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters when he distributed to the electorates of the
province of Laguna the so-called "Orange Card" with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in
voting for his favor and when he spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed on the
Code.

However, these were not acted upon by the COMELEC and Ejercito was proclaimed as the duly-elected
Governor.

Thereafter, Ejercito filed his anwer praying for the dismissal of the petition due to procedural and
substantive irregularities and taking into account his proclamation as Provincial Governor. As to the acts he
allegedly committed, Ejercito claimed that the same are baseless, unfounded, and totally speculative. He
stated that the Health Access Program or the E.R. "Orange Card" was a priority project of his administration as
incumbent Governor of Laguna and was never intended to influence the electorate during the May 2013
elections. Ejercito also claims that the advertising contracts were executed by an identified supporter without
his knowledge and consent as, in fact, his signature thereon was obviously forged. He cited Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission decided by the US Supreme Court, he argues that every voter has the right to
support a particular candidate in accordance with the free exercise of his or her rights of speech and of
expression, which is guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

COMELEC rejected all of Ejercitos arguments and disqualified and prevented him from further holding
office as Governor of Laguna.

Hence, petitioner a filed a petition for certiorari contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Issue:
WON the cited foreign jurisprudence apply.
Held:
 No. Supreme refuse to believe that the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito's knowledge
and consent. After Having determined that the subject TV advertisements were done and broadcasted with
Ejercito's consent, it follows that Citizens United does not apply. The rulings in Citizens United find bearing
only on matters related to "independent expenditures, which are not authorized or requested by the
candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, or an agent of the candidate; they are expenditures
that are not placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized
committee of the candidate.

Since in Ejercitos case, there was knowledge and consent of the advertising contracts made by a third
party, the citing of the said foreign jurisprudence does not apply.

42. Republic of the Philippines vs. Manila Electric Company

G.R. No. 141314, April 9, 2003
Puno, J.:

Facts:
On December 23, 1993, MERALCO filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for an
average increase in its distribution charge. ERB granted the increase. However, COA conducted an
examination of the books of accounts and records of MERALCO and thereafter recommended to reduce its
rate adjustment in the amount of P0.017 for its billing cycles beginning 1994 and to credit the excess average
amount of P0.167 per kwh to its customers starting with Meralco billing cycles beginning February, 1994. ERB
adopted COAs recommendations and instructed MERALCO to adopt the said instructions.

Hence, a motion for reconsideration was filed in the SC. MERALCO contends that that deduction of all
kinds of taxes, including income tax from the gross revenues of a public utility is firmly entrenched in
American jurisprudence. It contends that the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) was patterned
after Act 2306 of the Philippine Commission, which, in turn, was borrowed from American state public utility
laws such as the New Jersey Public Utility Act. Hence, it maintains that American jurisprudence on the
inclusion of income taxes as a lawful charge to operating expenses should be controlling. It cites the rule on
statutory construction that a statute adopted from a foreign country will be presumed to be adopted with the
construction placed upon it by the courts of that country before its adoption

The Republic through the ERB, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, contends that the
foreign jurisprudence cited by MERALCO in support of its position is not applicable in this jurisdiction.

Issue:
 WON the cited foreign jurisprudence by respondents is applicable in this case.

Held:

No. American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. Our laws must be
construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the
language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must
be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need
not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.
 43. Central Bank Employees Association vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004
Puno, J.:

Facts:

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. Petitioner filed a petition to
restrain respondent from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on
the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

Respondent BSP contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the
constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law.

Issue: Whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional
mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws."

Held: No R.A. 7653 is valid under the present standards of equal protection clause. The constitutionality of a
statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable
provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and
invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of
altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its
validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of
changed conditions.

Supreme Court cited the U.S. case of Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 27 where the Court of
Appeals of New York ruled:

While the common council has the right to enact zoning laws designed to promote public health, safety and
general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation. By the same token, an ordinance valid
when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under
changed conditions proves confiscatory.