Bardillon v Barangay Masili

Facts: Two lots measuring 144 square meters was to be expropriated by Bargy Masili for the purpose of constructing
a barangay hall. However, the barangay and the lot owners could not agree with the purchase price of Php 200,000.
The first complaint was filed before the MTC. Whereas, the second complaint was filed before the RTC. The MTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of interest of the petitioner lot owners. The RTC stated that the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case. It also ruled in favor of Brgy Masili.

Issue/s:

1. WON the MTC has jurisdiction over the case of expropriation; and 3. Legality of entry into the premises
subject of expropriation.

Held:

1. The SC held that the expropriation proceedings is within the jurisdiction of the RTC because it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. As discussed: xx An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money.
Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property for public use. As
such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts.

3. The entry in the premises of the expropriated property was held to be justified by the SC. It ruled that:

xx The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and specifically
governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local government units,
expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, in expropriation
proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the
fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. In the instant case, the
issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and
deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites. The issue of the
necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation
proceedings. If petitioner objects to the necessity of the takeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer
to the Complaint. The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain
and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it. xx

Estate of JBL Reyes v City of MNL

Facts: Jose B. L. Reyes and Heirs of Edmundo Reyes are the pro-indiviso co-owners in equal proportion of11 parcels
of land with a total area of 13,940 square meters situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila and coveredby Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 24359 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila. These parcels of land are being occupied and
leased by different tenants, among whom are respondents Dr. Rosario Abiog, AngelinaMaglonso and members of
the Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). The Reyesesleased to Abiog Lot 2-E, Block 3007 of
the consolidated subdivision plan (LRC) Psd- 328345, with an area of191 square meters and to Maglonso, Lot 2-R,
Block 2996 of the same consolidation plan, with an area of 112square meters. On 9 November 1993 and 26 May
1994, respectively, Jose B.L. Reyes and the Heirs ofEdmundo Reyes filed ejectment complaints against Abiog and
Maglonso, among others. Upon his death, JoseB.L. Reyes was substituted by his heirs. The heirs obtained favorable
judgments in Civil Case 142851-CV(Metropolitan Trial Court [MTC] of Manila, Branch 10, 9 May 1994) against Abiog,
and in Civil Case144205-CV (MTC of Manila, Branch 3, 4 May 1995) against Maglonso. Abiog and Maglonso appealed
theMTC decisions but the same were denied by the RTC of Manila, Branch 28, and the RTC of Manila, Branch38,
respectively. Their appeals to the Court of Appeals were likewise denied. As no appeals were furthertaken, the
judgments of eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and executory in1998.
 During the pendency of the two ejectment cases against Abiog and Maglonso, the City of Manila filed on
25April 1995 a complaint for eminent domain (expropriation) of the properties of Reyeses at the RTC of
Manila,Branch 9. The properties sought to be acquired by the City included parcels of land occupied by
Abiog,Maglonso and members of SBMI. The complaint was based on Ordinance 7818 enacted on 29 November1993
authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land with an aggregate area of9,930 square
meters, more or less, owned by Jose B.L. Reyes and Edmundo Reyes situated along the streetsof Rizal Avenue,
Tecson, M. Natividad, Sampaguita, Oroquieta, M. Hizon, Felix Huertes, Bulacan, Sulu,Aurora Boulevard, Pedro
Guevarra and Kalimbas in the third district of Manila. The complaint alleged that,on 10 March 1995, the City thru
City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent the Reyeses a written offer topurchase the subject properties for
P10,285,293.38 but the same was rejected. On 15 May 1995, SBMI, aregistered non-stock corporation composed of
the residents of the subject properties, filed a motion forintervention and admission of their attached complaint
with prayer for injunction. The trial court denied themotion for intervention in an order dated 2 June 1995. On the
day SBMIs motion for intervention wasdenied, the Reyeses filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent
domain for lack of merit, allegingvarious grounds, among them, "that instead of expropriating the subject property
which enjoys the leastpriority in the acquisition by the City of Manila for socialized housing under Sec. 9(t) of R.A.
7279, themoney to be paid should be channeled to the development of 244 sites in Metro Manila designated as area
forpriority development." On 6 June 1995, the trial court allowed the City to take possession of the subjectproperty
upon deposit of the amount of P1,542,793, based on the P10,285,293.38 offer by the City to theReyeses which the
trial court fixed as the provisional amount of the subject properties. On 14 June 1995, theCity filed an opposition to
the Reyeses motion to dismiss. On 3 October 1995, the Citys complaint foreminent domain was dismissed. The
Citys motion for reconsideration was denied. On 12 January 1996, theCity appealed the decision of the trial court to
the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, several motions seeking theissuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction were filed by the City to preventpetitioners from ejecting the occupants of the subject
premises. On 21 March 1996, the Court of Appealsissued a resolution denying the motions for lack of merit. The
Citys motion for reconsideration was likewisedenied. Meanwhile, on 27 January 1997, in view of the finality of the
judgment in the ejectment case againstAbiog, the MTC of Manila, Branch 10, issued a writ of execution. On 31
January 1997, SBMI filed in theCourt of Appeals a motion for leave to intervene with prayer for injunctive relief
praying that the ejectmentcases be suspended or that the execution thereof be enjoined in view of the pendency of
the expropriation casefiled by the City over the same parcels of land. Abiog also filed a reiteratory motion for
issuance of TRO andto stop the execution of the order of the MTC of Manila, Branch 10. On 26 August 1997, the
Court of Appealsissued a resolution finding prima facie basis to grant SBMIs motions, and issued a TRO to Judge
Salvador,his employees and agents to maintain the status quo. On 27 January 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered
thedecision reversing the trial court judgment and upholding as valid Citys exercise of its power of eminentdomain
over the Reyeses properties. From the aforementioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the Reyesesfiled on 19
March 1998 the petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether there is violation of due process against the Reyeses in the manner their property wereexpropriated
and condemned in favor of the City of Manila.

Held: The Filstream case is substantially similar in facts and issues to the present case. In Filstream vs. Courtof
Appeals, the Court held that the Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act 7279 are limitations to the exercise ofthe power
of eminent domain, specially with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and inresorting to
expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order ofpriority for
purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted toonly after the
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions ismandatory
because these are the only safeguards of often-times helpless owners of private property againstviolation of due
process when their property is forcibly taken from them for public use. Herein, the City failedto prove strict
compliance with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. The City neither alleged inits complaint nor
proved during the proceedings before the trial court that it complied with said requirements.Even in the Court of
Appeals, the City in its pleadings failed to show its compliance with the law. The Courtof Appeals was likewise silent
on this specific jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation of the right to dueprocess of the Reyeses

Republic v Vda de Castellvi

Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement over
a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956,
the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were
erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In
1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation
should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;

2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;

3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;

4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and

5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the taking of Castellvis property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic commenced to
occupy the property as lessee thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, momentary when applied to
possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean a limited period -- not indefinite or
permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on
the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through AFP,
constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the lant was
transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By
express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially
the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the
lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements.
But this intention cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract.

The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and its
utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the
renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic
undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all
the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the
agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the taking of Castellvis property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof,
and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvis property should not be determined on the basis of the
value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the taking of the
property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the
complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.

City Govt v Judge Ericta

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer required the respondent,
Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the
owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police
power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further
argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, to make
such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and
the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of property
was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Held: No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power. Occupying the forefront in the bill
of rights is the provision which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers
of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain,
(3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would
justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified
under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial
park cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of
property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in
order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury
sustained in consequence thereof.
 Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue
of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of
the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every
holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the rights of the community. A property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights,
are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is
possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the
people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is
not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion
of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the
dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide its
own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the
law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to
set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to
home-owners.

US v Causby

Facts: Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents property
contained a house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from
Respondents property, and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63
feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a
lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six
months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The United States four motored bombers
make loud noises when flying above the property, and have very bright lights. Respondents chicken farm production
had to stop, because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found
that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property
depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00. The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was
granted.

Issue. Has the Respondents property been taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment?
Held. Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the easement and whether the easement
was permanent or temporary.

The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the sky above the land.
However, the court notes that an act of Congress had given the United States exclusive national sovereignty over the
air space. The court noted that common sense made the common law doctrine inapplicable.

However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control the present case. The United States
had conceded in oral argument that if flights over the Respondents property rendered it uninhabitable then there
would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of the property taken is the
owners loss, not the takers gain.

The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his
land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true
then landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run fences.

The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. The court does
not set the precise limits of the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like here, they
are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land. The Court of
Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of the easement and whether it is a temporary or permanent
easement.

Dissent: The dissent would reverse the decision of the Court of Claims and hold that there has been no taking within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. This is because of the modern nature of the airplane, and the desire to avoid
confusion.

Discussion: The national emergency, World War II, meant that the airport, which was not previously used by large
planes, would be the home to large bombers. The use of the airspace above Respondents home and farm was not a
problem previously, because the flights were sporadic and not nearly as loud as the bombers.

People v Fajardo

Facts: Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that prohibits the
construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to
the mayor.

After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the
town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under the rationale that he
needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.

He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view. He
appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinances constitutionality.

Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?

Held: No. The ordinance doesnt state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and
unlimited conferment.

Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be
exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a
rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
 The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the
right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation.

While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate
structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property
and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.

Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this
legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable
purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.

The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:

SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The municipal council shall have authority
to exercise the following discretionary powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or
repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined
by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each
repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school
fund.

Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire
limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within
them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated
under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)

Republic v PLDT

FACTS: The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing itsown
appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT tenable government offices tocall private
parties. Their subscription agreement prohibits the public use of the service furnished thetelephone subscriber for
his private use.

The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the same trunk linesowned by,
and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates. On 7April 1958, the defendant
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau
was violating the conditions under which their Private BranchExchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's
facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for theBureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of
government offices but even to serve privatepersons or the general public, in competition with the business of the
PLDT. Soon after, it disconnectedthe trunk lines being rented by the Bureau. Republic commenced suit against the
defendant, in theCourt of First Instance of Manila, praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT
toexecute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant'stelephone system
throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court mightconsider reasonable, and for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrainthe severance of the existing telephone
connections and/or restore those severed.

ISSUE: Whether the courts may compel PLDT to execute a contract with the Republic.
HELD: We agree with the court below that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where noagreement is
had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom tostipulate such terms and
conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by expressprovision of the statute, a contract may be
annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undueinfluence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the
Philippines). But the court a quo has apparentlyoverlooked that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the
needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the
court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use
of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much
different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6,
Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public
ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility
torender services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, thebeneficiary of
the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that thecondemnation would be for
public use.

NPC v Jocson

Facts: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued by respondent judge in
violation of deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process. The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in
the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and
transmission line for the common good with the offer of corresponding compensation to landowners affected with
the expropriation process. However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby
prompting petitioner to bring the eminent domain case. Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest
for the expropriation and thereby issued an order determining the provisional market value of the subject areas
based on tax declaration of the properties. The petitioner, in compliance to the order of respondent judge,
deposited corresponding amount of the assessed value of said lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the
Philippine National Bank. Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed
value is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as P29,970,000.00. Immediately the
following day, respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the motion for reconsideration and
ordered petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order while holding in
abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order which the petitioner immediately complied.
Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay in full amount the defendants for their expropriated
property. Petitioner assailed such order to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge hence this petition.\

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and whether or not the petitioner
was deprived of due process of law.

Held: The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent domain proceeding
and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession of the real property upon
deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to be held by the bank subject to orders and final disposition
of the court. The respondent judge failed to observe this procedure by failure to issue the writ of possession to the
petitioner despite its effort to deposit the amount in compliance to the mandate of law. Furthermore, the
respondent judge erred in increasing the provisional value of properties without holding any hearing for both
parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting aside the temporary restraining order and directing
respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders.
There are 2 stages in the action of expropriation:

1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.

2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the
property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners whose findings are deemed to be final.

Didipio Earth Savers v Secretary

Facts: This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules
and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative
Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into
on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established
under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.

Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes under
the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are
Australian nationals. On 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000
hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu,
Nueva Vizcaya.

The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full
right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented
from entry into private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting
minerals therein.

Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers and indigenous peoples
organized under Philippine laws, representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as
well as other residents of areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC.

Issue: 1. WoN Sec 76 of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 is unconstitutional; 2. WoN RA is unconstitutional for granting
courts the power to determine just compensation.

Held: 1. NO. The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-owned
contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface areas within the FTAA contract
area to be acquired for the mine infrastructure. The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas
on behalf of the contractor, through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully
implement the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called for at this stage since there are still various avenues by which
surface rights can be acquired other than expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the
implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.

There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and regulations do not
provide for just compensation in expropriating private properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107
of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just compensation.

2. NO. There is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its implementing rules and regulations that
exclude the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in expropriation proceedings involving
mining operations.

Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the authority to decide cases where surface
owners, occupants, concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus, necessitating involuntary taking, this does not
mean that the determination of the just compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board is
final and conclusive. The determination is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. There is
nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to
determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or occupants. The
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of just compensation remains intact despite
the preliminary determination made by the administrative agency.

Bennis v Michigan

Facts. Tina Bennis (Petitioner) jointly owned a car with her husband. The police arrested him after observing him
having sex with a prostitute in their car. An indecency law states that the government can seek forfeiture of property
that is a public nuisance. The government sought to declare the car a public nuisance.

Issue. If an owner of property does not know how her property is being used by another, can the owners interest
still be forfeited?

Held. Yes. A long line of cases holds that an owners interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to
which to property is put even though the owner did not know how her property was being used.

Forfeiture of property prevents further illicit use in two ways. It prevents further illicit use of the property and
renders the illegal behavior unprofitable by imposing an economic penalty.

The government is not required to compensate an owner for property, which it has already lawfully acquired under
the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain. Thus, there was no taking that
required compensation.

Petitioners automobile facilitated and was used in criminal activity. The state sought to deter illegal activity, and
they rightly do so by subjecting the car to forfeiture.

Dissent.

(Justice John Paul Stevens) Petitioner has no responsibility for her husbands act. An innocent person is being
punished. No deterrent function will be served by taking her car. She did not entrust her car to her husband; they
owned it jointly. She did not know he planned to use it wrongfully. The seizure constituted an arbitrary deprecation
of property.

(Justice Anthony Kennedy) The forfeiture does not comply with due process. Petitioner was not negligent or
complacent, so her car should not be taken away from her.

Concurrence.

(Justice Clarence Thomas) Forfeiture of property without proof of the owners wrongdoing, merely because it was
used in or was an instrument in the crime has long been permitted in this country.

(Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg) The statute is used to deter others from using cars they own or co-own to contribute
to neighborhood blight.

Discussion. When property is jointly owned, it will still be subject to forfeiture for the wrongdoing of one party, even
if the other owner had no idea that something illegal took place. While this may seem unfair, the purpose is to deter
criminal activity.

Penn Central Transportation Co. v NYC

Facts. Appellant owned the Grand Central Terminal, which was designated by application of New Yorks Landmarks
Preservation Law to be a landmark. Thereafter, the Appellant entered into a renewable 50-year lease with UGP
Properties, Ltd., a United Kingdom company, under which the UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building
on top of the terminal. The plans for the new office building were submitted to the Commission for approval, which
was denied. The plans were in conformity with existing zoning regulation, but the Commission of Landmarks
Preservation nonetheless denied the applications for certificates of no external effect and for appropriateness.
The Appellants did not pursue any administrative remedies because none were available. The Appellants did not
decide to submit other plans to the Commission, either. Instead, the Appellants filed suit in state court seeking a
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief barring the City from using the Landmarks Law to impede the construction of
any structure that might otherwise be lawfully constructed, and damaged for the temporary taking that occurred
between the designation date (August 2, 1967) and the date when the restrictions arising under the Landmarks Law
would be lifted. The trial court granted injunctive and declaratory relief, but severed the question of damages for a
temporary taking. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, and summarily rejected any claim that the Landmarks
Commission had taken any property without just compensation because the law had not transferred control of the
property to the city, but only limited the Appellants use. The Appellants appealed.

Issue. Has a taking occurred?

Held. No. Several factors must be weighed to determine whether a taking occurred: (1) the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed
expectations, and (2) the character of the government action, a taking is more readily found when the government
has physically invaded the property than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.

In deciding whether a particular government action has effected a taking, this Court focuses both on the
character of the action and the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole- here, the
city tax block designated as the landmark site.

The Appellants contended that a taking had resulted by the diminished value of the terminal as the result of
the Landmarks Law. The Court pointed out that other precedent cases held that diminished value as the result of
rezoning did not amount to a taking.

The Court concluded that the interference with Appellants property was not such that the interference
amounted to a taking requiring just compensation. The Court also held that the impact of the regulation on
Appellants parcel was insufficient to require the government to institute eminent domain proceedings.

Dissent. The dissent would not equate the Landmarks Law with a zoning regulation. The dissent points out that the
effect of the Landmarks Law is to place an affirmative duty on the owner of a designated property to maintain the
property as a landmark at his own expense.

Sumulong v Guerrero

Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of
land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government
employees, covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners
Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated were
valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor
in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited
the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing the total market value of the subject 25 ha. of
land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized
housing upon payment of just compensation.
 On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of possession pertaining to
the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived
of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition
challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended.

Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public use, just
compensation, and due process.

Issues: (1) Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people, bereft of public character, hence it is
not a valid exercise of the States power of eminent domain. (2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the
size of the property/properties to be expropriated.

Held: (1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class
members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities. The public
use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced
by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public,
then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, socialized housing falls
within the confines of public use.

(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties
to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of
fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight
to and leave undisturbed the NHAs choice and the size of the site for the project. The right to use, enjoyment and
disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good.

Province of Camsur v CA

Facts: This is an appeal for certiorari on the decision on the issue on whether the expropriation of agricultural lands
by LGU is subject to prior approval of the DAR.

December 1988, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of CamSur authorized the provincial governor to purchase or
expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-
traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.

Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto San
Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin. Upon motion for the issuance of writ or possession, San Joaquins failed to appear at
the hearing.

San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for
their property. The court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the province to take possession of the
properties.

San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but denied as well. In their petition. Asked by the CA, Solicitor
General stated that there is no need for the approval of the president for the province to expropriate properties,
however, the approval of the DAR is needed to convert the property from agricultural to non-agricultural (housing
purpose).

CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession and expropriation of the property until
th province has acquired the approval of DAR. Hence, this petition.

Held: The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A,
Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the
suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to
the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate
agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for
conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would
naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of
the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts
defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use.

Masikip v City of Pasig

FACTS: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square
meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. The then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig,
respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be
used for the sports development and recreational activities of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant
to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.

Again, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly in line with the
program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.
Petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional,
invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to provide land opportunities to
deserving poor sectors of our community.

Respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation and petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
the complaint alleging that plaintiff has no cause of action for the exercise of the power of eminent domain
considering that: (1) there is no genuine necessity for the taking of the property sought to be expropriated; and (2)
plaintiff has arbitrarily and capriciously chosen the property sought to be expropriated. The trial court issued an
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for
the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the taking of the property of petitioner.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity
to expropriate petitioners property. The records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay
Council the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, nonprofit organization, not
the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their
own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose
is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that
there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the
Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan. Therefore, the petition for review
was Granted.

Mactan Cebu International Airport v Lozada Jr.

FACTS: Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio
Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by Republic, represented by the then
Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the
pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine.
The trial court ruled for the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of the lot. However,
the projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued. The plaintiff-
respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership the subject lot. On
the other hand, the petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied that the
Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no
longer be needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was
unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding
non-use or abandonment thereof. The lower court ruled for herein plaintiff-respondents, which decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this petition, the petitioners argued that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881
was absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple to the Republic.

ISSUE: Whether or not a constructive trust was constituted in this case, and as such, the respondents herein are
entitled to the restitution of the expropriated property which was not used for a public purpose.

HELD: YES. Art. 1454 of the Civil Code provides: If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure
the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the
fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the
property to him.

Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are bound by no unyielding formula when they are used by
courts as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of legal title may not in good conscience retain the
beneficial interest.

In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustees sole duty is to
transfer the title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. Of course, the wronged party seeking
the aid of a court of equity in establishing a constructive trust must himself do equity. Accordingly, the court will
exercise its discretion in deciding what acts are required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to
obtaining such decree and has the obligation to reimburse the trustee the consideration received from the latter just
as the plaintiff-beneficiary would if he proceeded on the theory of rescission. In the good judgment of the court, the
trustee may also be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in sustaining the property, his fixed costs for
improvements thereon, and the monetary value of his services in managing the property to the extent that plaintiff-
beneficiary will secure a benefit from his acts.

The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this case, respondent
MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, When the conditions
have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said
conditions, shall return to each other what they have received x x x In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement
of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied
to the party who is bound to return x x x.