Ang-Angco v.

Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 (1963)

Facts:
The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not covered by
any Central Bank release certificate. Its counsels approached Collector of Customs Ang- Angco to secure
the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel to secure the release certificate from
the No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-Angco which stated that
his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates but could not take action on the request as it
was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned the Secretary of Finance who expressed his approval
of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco finally released the concentrates.
When Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an administrative complaint against
Collector of Customs Ang-Angco. For three years Ang-Angco had been discharging the duties of his
office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered his judgment against
the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees in the classified civil
service.

Previous History:
Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct action and dispose of the administrative case in
subordinate officers of the executive branch of the government.

Holding:
The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the classified civil
service.

Reasoning:
It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been
deprived of the procedure laid down in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it
may be said that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law. The Power of control
of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees but
not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that
inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that
"the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the
courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers
whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure
for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of
1959.

Significance:
It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on the administrative case of
an employee under classified service even with the authority of the President without submitting the case
to the Commissioner of Civil Service

Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710 (1965)

FACTS: Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In 1960,
Congressman Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the
government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. The Exec Sec suspended Villaluz and ordered a
committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that she be removed. The
president then issued an AO removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no

1
jurisdiction to remove him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering that
he is an appointee of the president.

HELD: The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a
presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of RA
2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the
government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the
President of the Philippines under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint . There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to
the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be
justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not with
regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent
power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that `the
Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or
in heads of department.

Manalang-Demigilio v. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines

(TIDCORP), G.R. No. 168613, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 359

Facts: Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) is a wholly owned
government corporation whose primary purpose is to guarantee foreign loans, in whole or in part, granted
to any domestic entity, enterprise or corporation organized or licensed to engage in business in the
Philippines. On May 13, 2003, the Board of Directors of TIDCORP formally charged Maria Rosario
Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo), then a Senior Vice-President in TIDCORP, with grave misconduct,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, .insubordination, and gross discourtesy in the
course of official duties. Finally, and after considering Section 19 of the same Rules, which gives authority
to the disciplining body to issue an order of preventive suspension, you are hereby preventively
suspended for a period of ninety (90) days from receipt hereof.
Issue: Whether or not preventive suspension of Demigilio is valid pending the administrative
investigation.
Held: Yes. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (RAC) embodies the major structural, functional and
procedural principles and rules of governance of government agencies and constitutional bodies like the
CSC. Section 1, Chapter 1, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, of the RAC states that the CSC is the central
personnel agency of the government. Section 51 and Section 52, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
the RAC respectively contain the rule on preventive suspension of a civil service officer or employee
pending investigation, and the duration of the preventive suspension.
Section 51. Preventive Suspension. The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such
officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance
of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his
removal from the service.
Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the CSC promulgated the Uniform Rules on August 31, 1999.
Section 19 and Section 20 of Rule II of the Uniform Rules defined the guidelines in the issuance of an
order of preventive suspension and the duration of the suspension.
It is clear from Section 19, supra, that before an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation
may validly issue, only two prerequisites need be shown, namely: (1) that the proper disciplining authority
has served a formal charge to the affected officer or employee; and (2) that the charge involves either
dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant her removal from the service.
Proof showing that the subordinate officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses against her or
may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office is not among the prerequisites.
CSC Resolution No. 030502 apparently reiterates the rule stated in Section 19 of the Uniform Rules,

2
supra, that for a preventive suspension to issue, there must be a formal charge and the charge involves
the offenses enumerated therein. The resolution considers an order of preventive suspension as null and
void if the order was not premised on any of the mentioned grounds, or if the order was issued without a
formal charge. As in the case of Section 19, the resolution does not include as a condition for issuing an
order of preventive suspension that there must be proof adduced showing that the subordinate officer or
employee may unduly influence the witnesses against her or tamper the documentary evidence in her
custody.
Preventing the subordinate officer or employee from influencing the witnesses and tampering the
documentary evidence under her custody are mere purposes for which an order of preventive suspension
may issue as reflected under paragraph 2 of Section 19, supra. This is apparent in the phrase for the
same purpose found in paragraph 3 of Section 19. A purpose cannot be considered and understood as
a condition. A purpose means reason for which something is done or exists, while a condition refers to
a necessary requirement for something else to happen; or is a restriction, qualification. The two terms
have different meanings and implications, and one cannot substitute for the other.

League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENR, G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013, 696 SCRA 190

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENR and Secretary

GR. No. 175368
April 11, 2013

Topic: General Supervision of Local Governments & Autonomous Regions - Art. X, Sec. 4 & 16

NATURE OF THE CASE

Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that the Court order the following:
(1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code) and Section
24 of R.A. 7076 (People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991);
(2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and
(3) declare as illegal the DENR Secretarys nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale
Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.

THE PARTIES
Petitioner: League of Provinces - a duly organized league of local governments incorporated under the
Local Government Code; it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including the Province of Bulacan;
it states that its petition is a collective action of all provinces through the Leauge, as a favorable ruling will
benefit all provinces and all local governments
Respondent: DENR and DENR Secretary Angelo Reyes
Other parties:
Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) applicant for a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA); filed before Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Regional
Office No. III (MGB-RO); application was denied twice
Mercado, Cruz, Cruz and Sembrano (MCCS) applicants for Quarry Permit; filed before the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) applicant for Exploration Permit; filed before the
PENRO of Bulacan

THE FACTS
Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO
April 29, 1998 - MGB-RO denied Golden Falcons application for FTAA on for failure to secure the
required area clearances from the Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the
DENR-RO.
Golden Falcon appealed the denial with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central Office (MGB-
CO)

3
 February 10, 2004 - pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO, MCCS filed with the PENRO of
Bulacan their applications for quarry permit covering the same area subject of Golden Falcon's
FTAA application.
July 16, 2004 MGB-CO finally denied Golden Falcons appeal
September 13, 2004 - AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration
permit covering the same subject area.
Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC and the persons applying for
quarry permits the contention was the date the area of Golden Falcons application became open to
other permit applications from other parties
October 19, 2004 - upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog, DENR-MGB Director Ramos stated
that the denial of Golden Falcons application became final on August 11, 2004, or fifteen days after
Golden Falcon received the order of denial of its application. Hence, the area of Golden Falcons
application became open to permit applications only on that date.
Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion on the issue, stating that
the subject area became open for new applications on the date of the first denial on April 29,
1998 (MGB-ROs order of denial), as MGB-COs order of denial on July 16, 2004 was a mere
reaffirmation of the MGB-ROs April 29 order; hence, the reckoning period should be April 29.
Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsed the applications for quarry
permit, now apparently converted to applications for small-scale mining permit, to the
Governor of Bulacan.
PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Governor the approval of said applications.
Eventually, the Governor issued the small-scale mining permits.
AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary
The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and cancelled the governors
issuance of small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos that the area was
open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO denial). Hence, the
applications for quarry permit filed on February 10, 2004 were null as these were filed when the area
was still closed to mining location. On the other hand, AMTC filed its application when the area was
already open to other mining applicants, hence, its application was valid. The small-scale mining
permits were also issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the
Governor pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never proclaimed to be under the
small-scale mining program.

THE ISSUES
1. Whether DENRs act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not
merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces, as the DENR Secretary substituted
the judgment of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
2. Whether or not Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of the Small-Scale
Mining Act, which confer upon DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional,
as the Constitution states that the President (and Exec Depts) has the power of supervision only, not
control over acts of LGUs

THE RULING:
DENR Secs act was valid and authorized pursuant to its power of review under the RA 7076 and
its IRR; Assailed statutes did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality, hence, are not
unconstitutional.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three
statutes: (1) R.A. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. 7076 or the People's Small
Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Control - the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter

4
 Supervision - the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function in
accordance with law.
The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X, Sec. 2 of the Constitution refers to
the administrative autonomy of the LGUs or the decentralization of government authority. It does
not make local governments within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of
powers, but it is still subject to limitations, like following national policies or standards and those
provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of LGUs and the allocation of
powers/responsibilities/resources among the LGUs and local officials are placed by the Constitution
to Congress under Article X Section 3.
It is the DENR which is incharge of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development and autilization of the countrrys natural resources, pursuant
to the provisions of Section 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement of the small-scale
mining law by the provincial government is subject to the supervision, control and review of
the DENR. The LGC did not fully devolve to the provincial government the enforcement of the
small-scale mining law.
RA 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining program was established to be implemented by the
DENR Secretary in coordination with other government agencies (Section 4, RA 7076). Section 24 of
the law makes the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct supervision and
control of the Secretary, its powers and functions subject to review by the same.
Under Section 123 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining applications should be filed with the
PMRB and the permits shall be issued by the provincial governor, for applications outside the mineral
reservations.
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the IRR of RA 7076 likewise provides that
the DENR Secretary shall exercise direct supervision and control over the Peoples Small-Scale
Mining Program, and that the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Boards (PMRB) powers and
functions shall be subject to review by the DENR Secretary. DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 or
the Revised IRR of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides that applications for Small-Scale
Mining Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through their respective Mining
Regulatory Boards for areas outside the Mineral Reservations, and further, that the LGUs in
coordination with the Bureau/Regional Offices shall approve applications for small-scale mining, sand
and gravel, quarry xxx and gravel permits not exceeding 5 hectares.

Petitioners contention that the aforementioned laws and rules did not confer upon DENR and DENR
Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial
Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board are without merit because the
DENR Secretary was granted the power of review in the PMRBs resolution of disputes under
Sec. 24 of RA 7076 and Section 22 of its IRR. The decision of the DENR Secretary to nullify
and cancel the Governors issuance of permits emanated from its power of review under RA
7076 ad its IRR. Its power to review and decide on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale
Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves the
determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect
to the matter in controversy and on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their
respective rights.
The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076 and its IRR to the extent
necessary in settling disputes, conflicts, or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-
judicial power of the DENR can neither be equated with substitution of judgment of the
Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor control over the said act of
the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of the AMTC over conflicting
claims based on the law.
In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. In this
case, the grounds raised by the petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 17 b(3)(iii) of the
LGC and Section 24 of RA 7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of
the law.

5
 Hence, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971)

Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general
elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said
candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889
was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a
conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of
habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant. It was stated that
one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in flagrante
delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word actually staging.
Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26
cities.
Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc.
889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and
2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare
the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became
moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require
the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the
suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no
untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21,
1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified;
and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to
such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A resolution was
issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to
satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after
conclusive decision reached by majority.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive
upon the courts and upon all other persons.
(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.

Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for
the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b)
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other
alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh. Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has
no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains
and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila
Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations; has
exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively
advancing the CPP.

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006)

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan

6
Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO
5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the
government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their
rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they
seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency
(Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest
was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos.
His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual
basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also
such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth.
Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected
rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP
1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents
calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is
still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP.
Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part
and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A
reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of
the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day,
the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the
President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must
not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech
cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-
related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate
state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum
of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this

7
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that
GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The
only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And
such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated
Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in
Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is
similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority
to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1,
Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in
the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a
distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency
powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The
authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid
exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000)

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN.
PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
Facts:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine
National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense,
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In
compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B.
Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint
visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed

8
under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a
Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. In
the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro
Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The
President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is
necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the
situation shall have improved.
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City),
Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and
the NAIA and Domestic Airport.
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to
annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and
unconstitutional, arguing that:
I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN
ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE,
SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A
CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI,
SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO
PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS
UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold
the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
Issue: WON Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the AFP is subject to judicial
review?
WON The calling of the armed forces to assist PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of PNP?
Held:
In case at bar, the bone contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity of
calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the
petitioner agreed that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief
Powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically the power to
call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Thus there is a

9
clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call
out the armed forces and to determine the necessity of the exercise of such power. But while this court
has no power to substitute its judgment for that of the President, it may look into the question of whether
such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted
either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise
or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution: (provides in part)

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under Martial Law.
As stated in the foregoing provisions, the full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual
basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied. The only criterion to the power to call out
the armed forces is that whenever it becomes necessary in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. Hence in the Memorandum issued by the President he categorically asserted that violent
crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro
Manila. The court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in
shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places which are among the areas described in LOI 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts, the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law
enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.
The Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such there is no
insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy
clause in the Constitution. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of the civilian
institution, the PNP, and not with the military. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of
the joint visibility patrols. As stated in the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on
police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms
persists in Philippine jurisdiction, it is not averse to requesting the assistance of military in the in the
implementation and execution of certain traditionally civil functions (like relief and rescue operations
during calamities and disasters, anti-drug enforcements, etc).
It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the
military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions,
however, are unfounded. Not a single citizen has complained that his political or civil rights have been
violated as the result of the deployment of the marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility
and civil liberties of the people that joint visibility was conceived.

WHEREFORE the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Gudani v. Senga, 498 SCRA 671 (2008)

FACTS:

Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine Marines
assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several senior
officers of the military to appear at a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of

10
massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation
between the President and then Commission on Elections Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of the
2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of Joint
Task Force Ranao by the AFP Southern Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff
Lt . Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to
attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon.

Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing.
It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the
two officers to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective
requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent.

However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the President that
NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING
WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. `

While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a
statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee in spite of the fact that a
guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance; that
such directive was in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command; and that the
two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior
Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x x Both Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.

On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. The Office of the
Solicitor General notes that the E.O. enjoined officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.

Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President enjoining them and other military
officers from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent. Petitioners also pray for
injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-
martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners violation of
the aforementioned directive.

The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their
defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR
BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is
unconstitutional?

HELD:

The Petition is dismissed.

Is EO 464 constitutional or not, or may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry?

Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before
appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. The
impression is wrong. The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before
appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and independent specie of presidential authoritythe
commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief

11
powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach
to executive privilege or executive control.

We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-
chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a
military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so
by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying
before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-
in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives
as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The
commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins
with the simple declaration that [t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article
XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority
over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of
the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may
otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.

Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined
under house arrest by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also
ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press
conference during his period of detention. The Court unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:

to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in
fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its
ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with,
irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions
imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.

As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldiers speech be with the consent and
approval of the military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes
even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely on political matters. For there is no
constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldiers ability to form a personal political
opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one, political belief is a potential
source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its
constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military
discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they
may dislike or distrust. Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain
permission from their superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing.

Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and
the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the
exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control
the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is
torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that
the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and
not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

12
Judicial relief as remedy:

The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is not absolute.
Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it
is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the
presidential prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts.

Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and
limitations on the constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry, with process
to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information
possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that
subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.

It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. To avoid conflict, Congress must indicate in its invitations to the public
officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the
legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate
or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry
conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere
to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive
officials from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent notwithstanding the invocation of
executive privilege to justify such prohibition. Should neither branch yield to the other branchs assertion,
the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can
compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries.

Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between
the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power.
By this and, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief,
to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier
disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is
nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court-martial,
considering his retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408,
which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, all officers and soldiers in the active
service of the [AFP], and points out that he is no longer in the active service. However, an officer whose
name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military
authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his
service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.

Ampatuan, v. Puno, 651 SCRA 228 (2011)

FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to
undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the

13
supervision of the ARMM.
The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances encroached the ARMMs autonomy, that it
constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for
declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,
where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared
unconstitutional.
The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to
restore peace and order in subject places. It is pursuant to her calling out power as Commander-in-
Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.
The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was
her alter ego any way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings

ISSUE:
WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP
to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
City
HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three
places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.

ISSUE (2): WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces.
HELD: Yes. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs
from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the
Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, unless it is
shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect
to the Presidents judgment.

Kulayan v. Tan. G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA 482

JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu, et
al. G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.)

The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by
another of cial, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justi ed by the
invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity
of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were
purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by
three armed men who were later con rmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis
Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to
investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent
Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.

Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province

14
of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it
as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the
Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints
and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to
ensure public safety.

Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null
and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole
authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President

HELD:

It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President
of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive
power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive,
who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the
Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority
is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nations supreme military
leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian
President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not
require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief,
he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be
expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power
is his.

Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his
own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he
declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian

15
Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another of cial, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not
be justi ed by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

Lagman, et. al v. Medaldea, et. al, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of
actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical
dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination
of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The
Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and
flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain
peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other
areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the
escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their
supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension
to the place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it
will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.

FACTS:

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress
on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out
that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated
and worsened with the passing of time. The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City
and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the
Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the
lawless groups.

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolution expressing full
support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional
and in accordance with the law. In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found no compelling

16
reason to revoke the same. The House of Representatives likewise issued a resolution expressing its full
support to the President, as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216.

Invoking the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, various citizens filed several
petitions, essentially invoking the Courts specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216; and seeking to nullify Proclamation No. 216 for being
unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis.

ISSUES:

1. Are the instant petitions the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution?

2. Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,: a.
required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts; b. required to
obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense; or

2017-2018

c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if subsequent
events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported?

3. IsthepoweroftheCourttoreviewthesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartial law or the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus independent of the actual actions that
have been taken by Congress jointly or separately?

4. Weretheresufficientfactualbasisfortheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionofthe privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus? a. What are the parameters for review? b. Who has the burden of proof? c.
What is the threshold of evidence?

5. IstheexerciseofthepowerofjudicialreviewbytheCourtinvolvesthecalibrationofgraduated powers granted

the President as Commander-in-Chief?

6. May Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and void:

a. with its inclusion of other rebel groups; or b.

sinceithasnoguidelinesspecifyingitsactualoperationalparameterswithintheentireMindanao

17
region?

7. ArethearmedhostilitiesmentionedinProclamationNo.216andintheReportofthePresidentto Congress
sufficient bases; a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or b.
foradeclarationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusin

the entire Mindanao region?

8. Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of
public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus?

9. Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:

a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or b.

alsonullifytheactsofthePresidentincallingoutthearmedforcestoquelllawlessviolencein

Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region?

RULING:

1. YES.TheuniquefeaturesofthethirdparagraphofSection18,ArticleVIIclearlyindicatethatitshould be treated
as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII.

Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a
different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue
to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The
usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is
likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period
within which the Court has to promulgate its decision.

In fine, the phrase in an appropriate proceeding: appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be
denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

2.

a. NO. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the

18
 Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the
accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require
precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede
the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President
to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that
only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.

b. NO.Eventherecommendationof,orconsultationwith,theSecretaryofNationalDefense,or other high-ranking

military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain reading of
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare martial law
is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that
public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the
President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only
on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.

c. YES. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of the
Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of the power to declare martial
law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, must be based only on facts or
information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or
suspension which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report
submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the
declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the present
depends on the President. Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the
proclamation, which are included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already
issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or reference in the
Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component of the
portfolio of the factual basis itself.

3. YES.TheCourtmaystrikedownthepresidentialproclamationinanappropriateproceedingfiledby any citizen

on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation
or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers

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only the information and data available to the President prior to, or at the time of the declaration; it is not
allowed to undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. On the other hand, Congress
may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will
be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts
presented before it.

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In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the
sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was
made.

Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different
but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is,
the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be
exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.

4. YES.ThePresidentdeducedfromthefactsavailabletohimthattherewasanarmedpublicuprising, the culpable

purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its
territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogative, leading the
President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being
committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

a. Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the
exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the
President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must be struck down. A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the
Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient
factual ' bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion,
that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal
from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the

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 deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached
after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged
his burden of proof.

b. Afterall,whatthePresidentneedstosatisfyisonlythestandardofprobablecauseforavalid declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

c. What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

5. NO.ThepowerofjudicialreviewdoesnotextendtocalibratingthePresident'sdecisionpertaining to which
extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to
an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative
that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

6.

a. NO. The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the
context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other
rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas
clauses.

b. NO. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or
operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the

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proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation
of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a
separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed
a trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to
revoke.

7. YES.AreviewofthefactsavailabletothePresidentthattherewasanarmedpublicuprising,the culpable
purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its
territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives leading to
President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being
committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the

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 privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The Presidents conclusion
was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily
discharged his burden of proof. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard
of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

8. YES.Foradeclarationofmartiallaworsuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusto be valid, there

must be concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his
report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group
were directed not only against government forces or establishment but likewise against civilians
and their properties. In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued,
road blockades and checkpoints were set up, schools and churches were burned, civilian
hostages were taken and killed, non-Muslim or Christians were targeted, young male Muslims
were forced to join their group, medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered,
reinforcement of government troops and civilian movement were hindered, and the security of the
entire Mindanao Islands was compromised. Based on the foregoing, Proclamation No. 216 has
sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public
safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

9.

a. NO. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Courts declaration of a state of
national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55
dated September 4, 2016 where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence from
spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines. The Presidents calling out power is in a
different category from the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare
martial law. In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces
independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare
martial law, although, of course, it may also be precluded to a possible future exercise of the
latter powers, as in this case.

b. NO. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an operative fact
before it is declared unconstitutional. The actual existence of a statute prior to such a
determination of constitutionality is an operative fact that may have consequence which cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the

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 invalidy may have to be considered in various aspects- with respect to particular regulations,
individual and corporate and particular conduct, private and official.

Court Ruling on Martial law on Whole of Mindanao

We revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with
the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in
the particular place where the armed public uprising actually transpired. This is not only practical but also
logical. Martial law is an urgent measure since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival.
As such, the President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not
wait for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If that
is the case, then the President would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is infested with
rebels before he could declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario
envisioned by the Constitution.

Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose martial law only
within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually transpired, he may do
so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the coverage of martial
law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within predetermined bounds.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of
actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical
dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination
of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The
Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and
flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain
peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other
areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the
escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their
supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension
to the place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it
will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.

x x x Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in
Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in Mindanao. Thus, there is
reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and

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strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report,
"[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply
lines, and backdoor passages;" there is also the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the
siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of
his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing
operations, carnapping, and the murder of military and police personnel, must also be considered.
Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao
the end.

x x x Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.

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