People v.

Bernabe Pangilinan
G.R. No. 183090 November 14, 2011
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
AAA is the victim, BBB is her aunt and the wife of accused Pangilinan, and CCC refers to one of
her relatives. Prosecution filed 2 Informations, charging him with the crimes of Rape under the
RPC and Child Sexual Abuse under Sec. 5(b) of RA No. 7610. He entered a plea of not guilty on
his arraignment, and trial proceeded thereafter.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA and the attending physician Dr. Mascarina.
The Doctor testified that AAA was raped by the accused based upon physical and internal exam-
inations, and that she issued a Medical Certificate stating that there was no hymenal laceration.
AAA testified that she lived with her Aunt BBB, first cousin of her father, and accused since she
was 2 years old until she was 13. At around 10 p.m. while her aunt was working and she was
watching TV, accused arrived and ordered her to cook chicken adobo. Suddenly, he approached
AAA and pointed a samurai at her, kissed and mashed her breast. It was not the first time that
appellant did that to her.
She further testified that she remembered 3 incidents where accused abused her: First, he kissed
her and touched her private parts; second, when he pointed a samurai at her, took her to a
room, removed her clothes, kissed and touched her private parts, and eventually tried to insert
his penis to her organ which touched, and that she felt pain but there was no blood; and lastly,
accused again kissed and mashed her breasts. AAA did not tell her aunt the sexual molestations,
because he threatened to kill her and her aunt. She also stated that her aunt and the accused
treated her like their own daughter.
The defense presented the accused, BBB and their 2 neighbors.
BBB testified that she and accused treated AAA as their real daughter by providing her with all
her needs causing other relatives to envy AAA. That she was able to talk to AAA when she was
in the custody of the DSWD, wherein AAA confessed that it was her cousin CCC who molested
her. BBB intimated that her relatives were mad at accused because he was jobless and was the
one working.
Accused denied the accusations of rape and molestation. He testified that during the alleged
incident, he was at his neighbors house dressing chickens, and that AAA told her that it was
CCC who molested her. While they were on their way to file a complaint against CCC, they met
CCCs mother who forcibly took AAA by beating her with an umbrella. AAA was forced by his
wifes relatives since they were against their relationship. This was corroborated by his 2 neigh-
bors.

RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt for both cases Rape and Sexual Abuse.
For Rape- Reclusion Perpetual; and indemnify complainant in the amount of P50,000 actual and
moral damages, and P20,000 as fine to answer for rehabilitation at the DSWD.
For Sexual Abuse- 6 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional medium to 7 years of Prision
Mayor minimum; and P30,000 as damages.

Accused filed a notice of appeal to the SC which was transferred the case to the CA. CA
affirmed the RTC decision, but modified the damages.
Accused filed a supplemental brief where he alleged that the RTC gravely erred
in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua since he should have been prosecuted
for rape under RA 7610 since AAA was already more than 12 years old on the day,
thus, the penalty should have been reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclu-
sion perpetua.

Issues/Ruling:
Whether or not accused was properly charged under the second Information for Sexual Abuse.
No, accused was not properly charged under the second information for sexual abuse. He was
charged under two separate Informations for rape under the RPC and sexual abuse under Section
5 (b) of RA No. 7610, respectively. However, the SC found the Information for sexual abuse to
be void for being violative of accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The information merely stated, The above-named ac-
cused with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally commit
acts of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a minor subjected to sexual abuse.
 Under Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it provides:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense- The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
A reading of the allegations in the above-quoted Information would show the insufficiency of the
averments of the acts alleged to have been committed by accused. It does not contain the
essential facts constituting the offense, but a statement of a conclusion of law. Thus,
accused cannot be convicted of sexual abuse under such information.
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused cannot
be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information
filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully
state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed.

Whether or not prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime of rape under the
RPC.
Yes, prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime of rape.
Art. 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed-Rape is Committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circum-
stances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b)
When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c)
By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d)
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
AAAs testimony that accused inserted his organ into her vagina which caused pain was sufficient
to constitute rape. Rape is committed even with the slightest penetration of the womans sex
organ.
A finding that the accused is guilty of rape may be based solely on the victims testimony
if such testimony meets the test of credibility. We held that no woman, much less a child of such
tender age, would willingly submit herself to the rigors, the humiliation and the stigma attendant
upon the prosecution of rape, if she were not motivated by an earnest desire to put the culprit
behind bars.
Also, proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. An intact hymen does not
negate a finding that the victim was raped. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the
vagina, even without laceration of the hymen, is enough to constitute rape, and even the briefest
of contact is deemed rape.
Lastly, that the rape was not proven to be made precisely on July 27, 2001 does not
discount the fact of rape. In rape cases, the date of the commission is not an essential element
of the offense; what is material is its occurrence.

Whether or not accused should have been prosecuted for rape under RA No. 7610 since AAA
was already more than 12 years old when the rape was committed.
No, accused can be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be convicted therefor.
The prosecutions evidence established that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through force
and intimidation by threatening her with a samurai. Thus, rape was established. Considering
that in the resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he resolved the filing of rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code for which appellant was convicted by both the RTC and
the CA, therefore, we merely affirm the conviction.
As enunciated in the case of People v. Dahilig, citing People v. Abay: Under Section 5
(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years
of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under
Article 266-A (1)(d) of the RPC and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the
victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Sec-
tion 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the RPC. However,
the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right
against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to
criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a
violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the RPC (on complex crimes),
a felony under the RPC (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized
by a special law.

Modification as to damages awarded:

While the Information for rape mentioned AAAs minority, as well as the fact that she was a
stepdaughter of appellant, it was only her minority which was proven. When either one of the
qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded
in the Information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an aggravating circum-
stance. As such, AAAs minority may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. However,
it may not serve to raise the penalty, because in simple rape by sexual intercourse, the impos-
able penalty is reclusion perpetua which is single and indivisible. Hence, the civil indemnity and
moral damages awarded by the CA must be reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00. Moreover,
when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an
award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. The CAs
award of P50,000.00 must also be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with prevailing juris-
prudence.
 Dr. Fernando P. Solidum vs. People of the Philippines (Civil Liability)
GR No. 192123 March 10, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.;

FACTS: Gerald Albert Gercayo was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days after
his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intes-
tine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached
to the side of his body.
On May 1995, Gerald (3yrs. old), was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro
Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceo, Dr. Donatella Valea and Dr. Joseph
Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Sol-
idum). During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia,7 and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two
weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutors Office of Manila against the attending physicians.
The prosecutors office, upon finding a probable case filed information solely against Dr. Solidum
for allegedly failing and neglecting to use diligence as the best of his judgment would dictate
under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia
administered to GERALD and using 100% Halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing
as a consequence for Gerald to suffer cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic
encephalopathy, meaning insufficient oxygen in the brain, thereby rendering Gerald incapable
of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing.

RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged

Penalty: Indeterminate penalty of 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum
to one year, one month and ten days of prision correctional as maximum.
Indemnify jointly and severally with Ospital ng Maynila, Dr. Anita So, and Dr. Marichu
Abella private complainant Luz:
o Moral Damages: P500K
o Exemplary Damages: P100K
Upon motion of Dr. So and Dr Abella, liability is only between Ospital ng Maynila and
Dr. Solidum

CA: Affirmed decision of RTC (discussed res ipsa loquitur as applicable to the case at bar)
*putting it here just in case
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due
care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without
need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because
there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered
by him.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases. Although it creates a presumption of negli-
gence, it need not offend due process, as long as the accused is afforded the opportunity to go forward with his own
evidence and prove that he has no criminal intent. It is in this light not inconsistent with the constitutional presumption
of innocence of an accused.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable?
2. Whether or not Dr. Solidum is liable for criminal negligence?
3. Whether Dr. Solidum has incurred civil liability with regard to the case at bar?
4. Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila is jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum?

*I think 3 and 4 yung applicable satin pero nilagay ko na lahat ng issue kasi connected sa issues ng 1 and 2 yung answers
sa 3 and 4 and baka bigla itanong

HELD:

1. NO
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be
satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any vol-
untary action or contribution of the person injured.
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate. Although it should be con-
ceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and
the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during
the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz
delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperfo-
rate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced
bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency
of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not
ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient,
but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists,
had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the
lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the patient.
2. NO.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless im-
prudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act.
Dr. Solidums conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and properly regulate the level of
anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In affirming the conviction, the CA observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed the findings and conclusions in his
report except for an observation which, to all intents and purposes, has become the storm center of this dispute. He
wanted to correct one piece of information regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent administered to the child.
He declared that he made a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the records it should have
been 100% oxygen.
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and
another dose of ATSO4 when the bradycardia persisted, but for one reason or another, he read it as 100% halothane.
He was asked to read the anesthesia record on the percentage of the dosage indicated, but he could only sheepishly
note I cant understand the number. There are no clues in the clinical abstract on the quantity of the anesthetic agent
used. It only contains the information that the anesthetic plan was to put the patient under general anesthesia using a
nonrebreathing system with halothane as the sole anesthetic agent and that 1 hour and 45 minutes after the operation
began, bradycardia occurred after which the inhalational agent was shut off and the patient administered with 100%
oxygen. It would be apparent that the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said should be read in lieu of 100% halothane was
the pure oxygen introduced after something went amiss in the operation and the halothane itself was reduced or shut
off.
The implication of Dr. Vertidos admission is that there was no overdose of the anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr.
Solidum stakes his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He made the assurance that he gave his patient the utmost
medical care, never leaving the operating room except for a few minutes to answer the call of nature but leaving behind
the other members of his team Drs. Abella and Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that he administered only
a point 1% not 100% halothane, receiving corroboration from Dr. Abella whose initial MA in the record should be enough
to show that she assisted in the operation and was therefore conversant of the things that happened. She revealed that
they were using a machine that closely monitored the concentration of the agent during the operation.
But most compelling is Dr. Solidums interpretation of the anesthesia record itself, as he takes the bull by the horns, so
to speak. In his affidavit, he says, reading from the record, that the quantity of halothane used in the operation is one
percent (1%) delivered at time intervals of 15 minutes. He studiedly mentions the concentration of halothane as re-
flected in the anesthesia record (Annex D of the complaint-affidavit) is only one percent (1%) The numbers indicated
in 15 minute increments for halothane is an indication that only 1% halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard
Gercayo for his entire operation; The amount of halothane delivered in this case which is only one percent cannot be
summated because halothane is constantly being rapidly eliminated by the body during the entire operation.
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt because the circum-
stances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of precau-
tion in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to Gerald.
An action upon medical negligence whether criminal, civil or administrative calls for the plaintiff to prove by
competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the physician to the patient,
as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards established
by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the physicians failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard
of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or
omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient.
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against unreasonable risk, commonly re-
ferred to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear
definition of the duty of a particular physician in a particular case exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are
highly technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide guidance by giving the knowledge neces-
sary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be deter-
mined from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of
care by which the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists
under similar circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the general practi-
tioner.
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice
may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any individual physicians own knowledge either. In attempting
to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty
toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The judge, as the trier
of fact, ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical experts.
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance
to the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible,
to determine whether the first three elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist himself who served as the Chairman of
the Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint
against Dr. Solidum, his testimony mainly focused on how his Committee had conducted the investigation.39 Even then,
the report of his Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum.
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered
to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications." However, the foregoing
circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly impru-
dent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did not preclude the probability
that other factors related to Geralds major operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the admin-
istration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido
revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and pre-
cautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur."
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a
reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidums guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt of guilt," according to United States v. Youthsey:
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt; not a doubt engendered
merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting
a fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to
that degree of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life,
you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not
proof beyond the possibility of mistake.
3. Cannot be determined as of the moment but he is not immediately exempt from civil
liability
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we
cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been established here do not
present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There
was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of
administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycar-
dia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the
hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
4. NO
Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not respected
from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be
prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce
the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for
subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The
term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and
capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry
conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work.
Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an
employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely
was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital.
And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen
here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
 DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D. vs.HANZ CALAPIZ
G.R. No. 163753 January 15, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:

TICKLER: Appendectomy turned circumcision

FACTS: On Jan. 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario and Herlita Calapiz brought their 8yo son, Hanz to
the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, for an emergency appendectomy.
He was attended to by Dr. Encarnacion, who suggested that Hanz also undergo circumcision at
no extra cost. With his parents consent, Dr. Encarnacion performed a coronal circumcision. The
next day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which showed blisters and swollen testicles. Also
observed were abnormal urination after the doctor removed the catheter, which she dismissed
as normal. Despite his parents protests, Hanz was discharged on Jan. 30.
A week or so later, Hanz was confined in a hospital for an abcess formation between the shaft
of his penis. Thinking that the abcess was brought about by the appencitis, the doctor referred
him to Dr. Henry Go, a urologist who diagnosed him to be having a damaged urethra. Hanz
underwent cystostomy and operated three times to repair his damaged urethra, to no avail.
Petitioner was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. Petitioner
denied the charge contending that at the time of his examination of Hanz, he had found an
accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the appendix two to three inches from the penis that had
required immediate surgical operation; that after performing the appendectomy, he had circum-
cised Hanz with his parents consent by using a congo instrument, thereby debunking the par-
ents claim that their child had been cauterized; that he had cleared Hanz once his fever sub-
sided; that he had found no complications when Hanz returned for his follow up check-up; and
that the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of the penis had been brought about
by Hanzs burst appendicitis.

Crime Charged: reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries.

RTC: Acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence but ruled that petitioner was liable for
Moral damages (P50,000.00)
CA: Affirmed
SC: Affirmed

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioners civil liability despite his acquittal of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.

HELD: Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily ex-
tinguish his civil liability. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the
civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author
of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be
held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on
the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evi-
dence only.

The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the
act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."

The acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered
against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

The failure of the Prosecution to prove petitioners criminal negligence with moral certainty did
not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence
of his negligence to hold him civilly liable.
With the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the
hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma
could have been avoided, the Court must concur with their uniform findings.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body. Although we have long advocated
the view that any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of ones body,
is not equatable to a pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil
damages should be assessed once that integrity has been violated. The assessment is but an
imperfect estimation of the true value of ones body. The usual practice is to award moral dam-
ages for the physical injuries sustained. In Hanzs case, the undesirable outcome of the circum-
cision performed by the petitioner forced the young child to endure several other procedures on
his penis in order to repair his damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and moral sufferings
properly warranted the amount ofP50,000.00 awarded as moral damages.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO y BROCA
G.R. No. 201447 January 9, 2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
1. Amistoso was charged with Statutory Rape for the rape of his daughter, AAA, alleged to
be 12 years old. The RTC found Amistoso guilty not of statutory rape, but of qualified
rape, sentencing him with Death; to pay the victim the sum of PhP75,000.00 as indemnity
and PhP50,000.00 for moral damages,

2. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed but the penalty was modified. Amistoso was sen-
tenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, civil in-
demnity of P75,000.00, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

3. Amistoso appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed with modification on a decision
dated January 9, 2013, the conviction, expressly making him liable for interest of 6% per
annum on the amounts of damages awarded.

4. However, in a letter, Roque, the Officer-in-Charge of Inmate Documents and Processing

Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died of Cardio
Respiratory Arrest on December 11, 2012 (while appeal was filed in SC) at the New Bilibid
Prison.

5. The Public Attorneys Office which represented Amistoso, unaware of its clients demise,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts Decision. The motion was deferred due
to the alleged death.

6. The Court required Roque to submit a certified true copy of Amistosos Death Certificate
which was complied with thereafter.

ISSUE:
What was the effect of Amistoso's death?

HELD:
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action
is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case. Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012
preceded the promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died,
his appeal before the Court was still pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistosos
appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his death. Amistosos death on Decem-
ber 11, 2012 renders the Courts Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming
Amistosos conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become
final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
 ANTONIO L. DALURAYA vs. MARLA OLIVA
G.R. No. 210148 December 8, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

SHORT VERSION
FACTS:
Sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a
Nissan Vanette(UPN-172) and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City,
ran her over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive medical attention, she
eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal
case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of
the vehicle.

After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer)
asserting, inter alia, that he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as
the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no clear and competent evidence
of how the incident transpired.

MeTC: Granted Dalurayas demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.
RTC: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTCs ruling, declaring that "the act from which
the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist.
CA: Granted the petition and reversed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:
Was the CA correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Olivas death despite his acquittal
in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence?

HELD:
NO, the CA is not correct.

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the ac-
cused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to
be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act
or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict com-
plained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even
if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where:
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on
the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him.

Dalurayas acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he
was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be
deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
 ANTONIO L. DALURAYA vs. MARLA OLIVA
G.R. No. 210148 December 8, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

DETAILED VERSION
FACTS:
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide in connection with the death of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that sometime in the
afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette,
bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon
City, ran her over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive medical attention,
she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a
criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported
driver of the vehicle.
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-
witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA heading
towards the island near the flyover and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing
plate number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified
as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her mothers death; (b) Dr. Paul
Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina
Oliva; and (c) Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investiga-
tion following the incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven by
Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer)
asserting, inter alia, that he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as
the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no clear and competent evidence
of how the incident transpired.

MeTC: Granted Dalurayas demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.
RTC: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTCs ruling, declaring that "the act from which
the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist.
CA: Granted the petition and reversed the RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the
amounts of 152,547.00 as actual damages, 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and 50,000.00 as
moral damages. In so ruling, the CA held that the MeTCs Order showed that Dalurayas acquittal
was based on the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As
such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability.

ISSUE:
Was the CA correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Olivas death despite his acquittal
in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence?

HELD:
NO, the CA is not correct. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The
acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil
liability.

In Manantan v. CA, the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law
and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the ac-
cused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to
be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act
or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict com-
plained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even
if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
In Dayap v. Sendiong, the Court explained further:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c)
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right
to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. This is because when the accused
files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the
trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by
way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.

In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the evidence
of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

A punctilious examination of the MeTCs Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that Dalu-
rayas acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish that he was the
author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC
declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material details and
they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed the crime charged
against him." Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTCs Order acquitting
Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not able to establish
that the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva and that
"there is no competent evidence on hand which proves that the accused was the person respon-
sible for the death of Marina Oliva.

Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC,
that Dalurayas acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a
remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Dalurayas evidence on the civil aspect.
Records disclose that Dalurayas acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution to suffi-
ciently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his
civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.