Respondent (State of Karmasthan)

JUSTICE T.
RAMACHANDRAN MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2016
BEFORE THE HONBLE
HIGH COURT OF KARMASTHAN
ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION
[UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION]
In the matter of Article 14, 19, 20 and 21
of Constitution of India
W.P. NO. _______ OF 2016
KARMASTHAN TELEVISION ACTORS ASSOCIATION (KTAC)
......PETITIONER
versus.
STATE OF KARMASTHAN
...RESPONDENT
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION

JUSTICES OF THE HIGH COURT OF KARMASTHAN
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

JUSTICE T. RAMACHANDRAN MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION -2016
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents....i
Table of Abbreviations.....iii
Authorities Cited...vi
Statement of Facts......x
Statements of Jurisdiction..1
Questions Raised2
Summary of Pleadings...3
Pleadings5
1. Whether Karmasthan the writ petition filed against the State of Karmasthan is
maintainable...5
1.1 That the Petitioner has no Locus Standi.......5
1.2 That there is no violation of Fundamental Rights ...5
1.2 a) State has not violated Art. 14
1.2 b) State has not violated Art. 19
1.2 c) State has not violated Art. 21
1.3 Alternative Remedy a bar.....7
2. Whether Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent

Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 Violate Art.14 of the Constitution8
2.1 KDP(A)A, 2016 satisfies the Tests of Valid Classification....8
2.2 That the said Acts are not Arbitrary and Unreasonable.10
2.2 a) KDP(A)A, 2016 is not arbitrary and unreasonable
2.2 b) IRWPA, 1986 is not arbitrary and unreasonable
2.3 Discretionary Administrative Act is Constitutional11
Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

i

Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 Violate Art.19 of the Constitution.13
3.1 There is no violation of Art.19 (1) (a)..14
3.2 There is no violation of 19 (1)(g),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,..16
3.2 a) Reasonable Restrictions are in the interest of the General Public

Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 Violate Art.20 (1) & Art.21 of the
Constitution..18
4.1 That the said Acts Protect Art. 21..19
4.1 a) IRWPA, 1986 Protects Dignity of Women under Art. 21
4.1 b) KDP(A), 1986 ensures Dignity of Women under Art. 21
4.2 The Advertisement depicted Women indecently.21
4.3 States Power to seize obscene items..22
4.4 KDP(A)A, 2016 operates prospectively..23
Conclusion23
Prayer...24

ii
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
(P.) Private
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
ABCL Amitabh Bachchan Corporation Limited
AIHC All India High Court
AIR All India Reporter
ALD Administrative Law Decisions
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Co., Company
COI Constitution of India
Commr Commissioner
Del Delhi
edn., Edition
Etc., Etcetera
Govt. Government
Guj. Gujarat
HC High Court
Honble Honourable
i.e., That is
IRWPA Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act
J&K Jammu and Kashmir

iii
J. Justice
KarLJ Karnataka Law Journal
KDP(A)A Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act
KDPA Karmasthan Dramatic Performances Act
Ker Kerala
KTAC Karmasthan Television Actors Association
Ltd., Limited
Ori. Orissa
Ors. Others
p. Page
Para Paragraph
PUCL Peoples Union of Civil Liberties
Raj Rajasthan
RLW Rajasthan Law Weekly
s. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
T.N. Tamil Nadu
u/a Under article
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UOI Union of India
v. Versus

iv
Vol. Volume
W. B. West Bengal

v
AUTHORITIES CITED
1. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 ....10,23

2. Ajay Goswami v. UOI, (2007) 1 SCC 143...16
3. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid, AIR 1981 SC 487...10
4. Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Co. Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295......14
5. Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India AIR 1956 SC 479.....8
6. British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1415..14
7. Chandra Rajkumari & Anr v. Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad and Ors,1998 (1) ALT
329....7
8. Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC
687..16
9. Chiranjit Lal v UOI, AIR 1951 SC 41...............10
10. Commissioner of Income tax v. Chhabil Dass Agrawal, (2014) 1 SCC 603...........7
11. Consumer Action Group v. State of T.N, AIR 2000 SC 3060.......13
12. Cooverji B. Bharucha v. Excise Commr., AIR 1954 SC 220................17
13. Dharam Dutt v. UOI, (2004) 1 SCC 712,738....14
14. Director General, Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, (2006) 8 SCC 43316
15. Francis Coralie v. Union of Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746.19, 20,21
16. Gaurav Jain v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 1990 SC 292.....19,20
17. Gauri Shanker v. UOI, AIR 1995 SC 55..........6
18. Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi and Anr v. Union of India and Ors, AIR
1960 SC 544...21
19. Har Shankar v. Dy. Excise & Taxation Commr, AIR 1975 SC 1121....18
20. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802..........19
21. Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1989 SC 198816
22. Indo-China Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., v. Jasjit Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1140.......14
23. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (2000) 1 SCC 168...8
24. Jain Bros v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 778.....9
25. K.Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan (1999) 4 SCC 526......7
26. Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K, AIR 1980 SC 1992.....12
27. Kehar Singh v. UOI, (1989) 1 SCC 204....19
28. Krishan v. State of Madras AIR 1951 SC 301...........23

vi
29. Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of J&K, AIR 1967 SC 1368....18

30. Mahila Jagran Manch, Bangalore v State Of Karnataka & Ors,1999 (4) KarLJ
295....6
31. Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44....12
32. Meneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597..10, 11, 19
33. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohd. Usmanbhai, (1986) 3 SCC 20,
31....17
34. N.K. Bajpai v. Union of India, (2012) 4 SCC 653...6
35. Nagar Mahapalika v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 127..12
36. Pannalal Binjraj v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 397...13
37. Pratap Pharma (P.) Ltd., v. UOI, (1997) 5 SCC 87....18
38. R.C. Cooper v. UOI, AIR 1970 SC 564....10,11
39. Rahid Ahmad v. Municiapal Board, Kairana (1950) SCR 738....7
40. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. J. S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538......13
41. Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 1.....21
42. Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881..11,15,16
43. Reliance Petroleum Ltd v. Zaver Chand Popatlal Sumaria (1996) 4 SCC 579....7
44. S.M.Venkatesan v The Deputy Superintendent Of Police, AIR 1957 SC 896....6
45. S.P Gupta v. President of India & Ors, AIR 1982 SC 149...5
46. Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra, (1985) 4 SCC 289....16
47. Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P, AIR 1991 SC 537.....10
48. Som raj v. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 1176.......12
49. Sri Srinivas Theatre v. Govt. of T.N., AIR 1992 SC 999, (1992) 2 SCC 643.....8
50. St. Stephen College v. University of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 1630.....8
51. State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699.....11, 16,18
52. State of Guj. v. Arvind Mills, AIR 1974 SC 1300.....14
53. State of Kerala v. PUCL , (2009) 8 SCC 46...6
54. State of Maharashtra vs. Indian Hotel & Restaurants Assn. & Ors.......22
55. State of Rajasthan v. Nath Mal, AIR 1954 SC 307....17
56. State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75...8
57. State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92, 95......14
58. StateTrading Corpnn. of Ltd., v. CTO, AIR 1963 SC 1811.......14
59. Suo Moto v. State of Rajasthan, RLW 2005 (2) Raj 1385.....20

vii
60. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481,533..16

61. Tata Engg. Locomotion Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 40....14
62. Titahur Paper Mills Co. Ltd v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603......7
63. Udai Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 1......9
64. Union of India v. M.V. Valliappan, AIR 1999 SC 2526..9
65. Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P.AIR 1993 SC 2178,2202,2244 ....16
66. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241.....16
67. Western UP Eleectric Power and Supply Co Ltd v. State of UP AIR 1970 SC 21,24.....9
Foreign Caselaws
1. R. v. Hicklin, (1868) 3 QB 36015
2. Regina v. Bloom T. T 1702 K.B..22
Statutes Referred
1. Constitution of India, 1950

2. Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986
3. Indian Penal Code, 1860
Books Referred
1. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6TH EDITION, 2011)
2. V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (12TH EDITION, 2013)
3. DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (14TH EDITION,

2011)
4. DURGA DAS BASU , COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

(8TH EDITION, 2012) & (9TH EDITION, 2014)
5. RATANA LAL & DHIRAJLAL (34TH EDITION, 2014)

viii
Legal Database
1. Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com
2. Lexis Nexis Legal, http://www.lexisnexis.com/in/legal
3. Complete Digital Judgements, http://www.cdjlawjournal.com

ix
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Karmasthan is a State in the India Union and Punayaswar is the capital of the State.
KTAC [Karmasthan Television Actor Association] is a registered charitable society.
On 5 July 2016 KTAC published an advertisement in the leading cinema magazine
about the Beauty Pageant Miss India 17 for selecting Miss. India proposed to be held
on 7th and 8th January 2017.
According to the Advertisement the venue of the program is Mass Auditorium
Punayaswar and the rates of tickets are Rs 1,00,000, Rs 50,000,Rs 25,000 and Rs
10,000.The entry is restricted to ticket holders , judges and specially invited guests. In
the advertisement the picture of seven girls wearing only G string and seminude top
is given.
Some organisers and religious leaders submitted a memorandum to the Chief Minister
of the State requesting to ban Miss India 17 pointing out few wrong allegations
against KTAC.
On 1 Aug 2016, the Karmasthan State Legislative Assembly enacted Karmasthan
Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 amending s.2 and 3 of Karmasthan
Dramatic Performances Act, 1962.This amendment came into force on 8 Aug 2016.The
Amendment added the word beauty contests in s. 2 and 4 of the 1962 Act, which
brings beauty contests into the definition of objectionable performance.
On 15 Aug 2016, the District Collector, who is the Executive Magistrate, issued a notice
to KTAC under s.4 to show cause why Miss India 17 should not be prohibited since
its objectionable performance under s.2 (1) (vi) of Karmasthan Dramatic Performance
(Amendment) Act. On 9 Sep 2016 Miss India 17 was prohibited by Executive
Magistrate.
On 14 Sep 2016 Deputy Commissioner of Police raided the Office of KTAC and seized
the advertisements of Miss India 17 in exercise of his powers as the Authorised
Officer of the State Govt. under s. 5 of Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition)
Act, 1986. 2989 items consisting of posters and big hoardings containing the same
picture included the earlier advertisement have been seized by the Deputy
Commissioner.
On 22 Sep 2016 filed a petition before the High Court Karmasthan against the State of
Karmasthan.

x
JUSTICE T. RAMACHARAN MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner has no jurisdiction to approach the Honble High Court of Karmasthan u/a 226
of the Constitution of India, 1950.
Written Submission on behalf of Respondent

1
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED AGAINST THE STATE OF

KARMASTHAN IS MAINTAINABLE
2. WHETHER KARMASTHAN DRAMATIC PERFORMANCES (AMENDMENT)

ACT,2016 AND INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN (PROHIBITION)
ACT,1986 ARE VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA



2
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITIONFILED AGAINST THE STATE OF

KARMASTHAN IS MAINTAINABLE
It is humbly submitted before this Honble court that the writ petition filed by KTAC against
the action of the State of Karmasthan is not maintainable as there is no violation of Fundamental
Rights u/a 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution as contended by the petitioner. The
constitutionality of KDP(A)A, 2016 and IRWPA, 1986 cannot be questioned as the said Acts
are reasonable and non-arbitrary. The petitioner has not sought any alternative remedy and has
directly approached the Honble High Court. Therefore, the petition is not maintainable.

ACT, 2016 AND INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN (PROHIBITION)
ACT, 1986 IS VIOLATIVE OF ART. 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION
It is humbly submitted before this Honble Court that there is no violation of Art. 14 of the
Constitution of India. Art.14 provides for equality before law and equal protection of laws. In
order to ensure equal protection of laws the classifications made by the legislations should
satisfy both the tests of valid classification, namely, intelligible differentia and rational nexus.
In the present case both the tests are satisfied by the amendment made to the KDPA, 1962 and
hence it is reasonable to add beauty contest which indecently represent women under
objectionable performances. The action of the State taken under IRWPA, 1986 in order to
prohibit and seize obscene advertisements is non-arbitrary as the State has the authority to
protect the public morality and the said Act provides the state Government authorised officer
to take necessary actions. In the present case the above said rules are followed and hence, the
petitioner cannot claim the violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.

3

ACT, 2016 AND INDECENT REPRESENTATION WOMEN (PROHIBITION) ACT,
1986 VIOLATE ART. 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Constitution of India. Art. 19 confers certain rights to its but those rights are not absolute rights
and are restricted reasonably. In the present case the petitioner cannot claim the rights u/a
19(1)(a) because the beauty contest which is being conducted is representing women in
indecent manner, which is a ground for reasonable restriction u/a 19(2), so the said contest can
be considered as an objectionable performance under s.2(1)(vi) of KDP(A)A, 2016 as it is
grossly indecent, scurrilous and obscene. The petitioner even cannot claim the right u/a
19(1)(g) because the advertisements which are published for the purpose of beauty contest are
amounting to indecent representation of women and hence creates harm to the public morality
as it does not serve any social purpose, thus can be restricted u/a 19(6). Therefore, the obscene
advertisements can be prohibited and seized under the provisions of IRWPA, 1986.

ACT, 2016 AND INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN (PROHIBITION)
ACT, 1986 VIOLATE ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Constitution of India. The said Acts protect human dignity u/a 21. Women are indecently
represented in the advertisements that were published by the petitioner, as indecent
representation harms dignity, it is the States duty to protect the dignity of women and hence
the State through the amendment to KDPA, 1962 prohibited the beauty contest by considering
it as an objectionable performance. The advertisements were seized by the authorised official
as directed through IRWPA, 1986, because the said advertisements were obscene. This action
of the State was not violative of Art. 21 as the intention of the said Acts were to prohibit the
indecent representation of women and to protect dignity enshrined u/a 21 of the Constiution.

4
PLEADINGS
1. THE WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE
It is humbly submitted before this Honble Court that the writ petition filed by KTAC [Herein
after referred to as Petitioner] against the State of Karmasthan[Herein after referred to as
Respondent] is not maintainable as the petitioner does not have locus standi and in the
instant matter Karmasthan Legislative assembly amending Karmasthan Dramatic Performance
Act, 1962 [Herein after referred to as KDPA, 1962] does not violate Art.14, 19 and 21 and
its imposition on KTAC does not violate Art. 20(1) nor does Indecent Representation of
Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 [Herein after referred to as IRWPA, 1986]. The petitioner
has not sought any other remedies that were existing.
1.1 THAT THE PETITIONER HAS NO LOCUS STANDI
The petitioner in the present case doesnt have locus standi to approach the Honble HC as
there is no fundamental rights1 violation caused by the state for the petitioner. In S.P Gupta v.
President of India & Ors2, SC held that The traditional rule in regard to locus standi is that
judicial redress is available only to a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of
violation of his legal right or legal protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a
public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of
threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by any such action. In the
present case the Petitioner has not suffered any legal injury by the reason of violation of legal
rights. The respondents acted according to the law and such act cannot be held as violation of
Fundamental Rights.
1.2 THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
In the present case, there has been no violation of the fundamental rights since, the action 3
taken by the State was in furtherance of the principle of morality where in large section of
society is vulnerable to get affected by the Beauty Pageant that was likely to take place in the
State and State also aims to achieve and protect the dignity of women guaranteed u/a 21 right
to live a dignified life and it cannot be considered as arbitrary or unreasonable or violation
Art.14.
1
COI, 1950 Part III
2
AIR 1982 SC 149
3
KDP(A)A, 2016 and seize of obscene materials from the Petitioner

5
1.2 a) State has not violated Art. 14
The principle of equality of law thus means not law should apply to everyone, but that a law
should deal alike all in one class; that there should be an equality of treatment under equal
circumstances i.e., equals should be treated unlike and unlike should not be treated alike. Like
should be treated alike.4 Equality before law means that among equals the law should be equal
and should be equally administrated, that like should be treated alike.5 In the present case
beauty contests are defined into the ambit of objectionable performances in Karmasthan
Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 [Hereinafter referred to as
KDP(A)A,2016] as they depict women in an indecently. IRWPA, 1986 protects women s
dignity and public morality that vulnerable in the society. It is ou
r humble submission that in, N.K. Bajpai v. Union of India6 Apex Court made it clear that right
to practice can be regulated and is not an absolute right which is free from restriction or without
any limitation.
1.2 b) State has not violated Art. 19
Art.19 of the Constitution though fundamental, is not an absolute right as such, it is always
subjected to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed in the larger interest of
society.7Freedom to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business
as guaranteed u/a 19(1) (g) of the Constitution has restrictions u/a 19(6). In the present case,
there is no violation of Fundamental Rights caused by the state to the petitioner.
1.2 c) State has not violated Art. 21
The dignity of the women of the country and the cultural heritage and the social values have to
be preserved. No one can be permitted to either play with the dignity of women or the cultural
values of the nation or the cultural heritage of the country.8 One cannot brush aside an important
fact that India is a signatory to the Convention of Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women and the same is adopted by the UN General Assembly in the year 1979.
Further, Art.6 of the Convention enjoins that the state parties to take appropriate steps to
4
Gauri Shanker v. UOI, AIR 1995 SC 55: (1994) 6 SCC 349
5
Jennings, Law of Constitution, 5th Edn, p.50
6
(2012) 4 SCC 653
7
State of Kerala v. PUCL , (2009) 8 SCC 46
8
Mahila Jagran Manch, Bangalore v State Of Karnataka And Others1999 (4) KarLJ 295

6
suppress all forms of trafficking and exploitation of women9The beauty contests in any form
amounts to indecent representation of women within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the
Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 prohibited under Sections of the
said Act and all its materials prohibited under Section 4 of the Act are illegal under the Act,
they being indecent or derogatory or denigrating women or is likely to deprave, corrupt or
injure the public morality or morals and as they are punishable under Section 6 of the said Act
rigorously.10
1.3 ALTERNATIVE REMEDY IS A BAR
Art. 226 is couched in the widest possible terms and unless there is a clear bar to its jurisdiction,
its power under this Article can be exercised when there is any act which is against any
provision of law or violative of the constitutional provision and when recourse cannot be had
to the provision of the Act for the appropriate relief.11 The remedy under Art.226 being, in
general, discretionary, the HC may refuse to grant it where there exists an alternative remedy,12
equally efficient and adequate.13 When an alternative remedy was available, the petitioner
cannot approach the HC and urge that the petitioner that he has no other remedy. Where a
petitioner may get adequate relief under a tribunal or any ordinary action at law, relief u/a 226
may be refused, in the present case there is adequate and efficient alternative remedy available
at State Commission for Women as the petitioners alleging that the respondents have violated
the rights of the women to participate in the beauty contest and infringing their right that is
enshrined u/a 21 whereas this is not the true fact of the case, what the petitioner puts forward
in the court of law. Apex court in Titahur Paper Mills Co. Ltd v. State of Orissa14 held that,
where statutory remedies are available or statutory tribunal is set up, a petition u/a 226 should
not be entertained. In Comissioner of Income tax v. Chhabil Dass Agrawal,15Honble Apex
Court held that when statutory forum is created by the law for redressal of grievances, the
writ petition should not be entertained ignoring statutory dispensation. The Honble Apex
Court further opined that non entertainment of petitions under the writ jurisdiction by the High
9
S.M.Venkatesan v The Deputy Superintendent Of Police, AIR 1957 SC 896
10
Chandra Rajkumari & Anr v. Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad and Ors,1998 (1) ALT
329
11
K.Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan (1999) 4 SCC 526 (para 27) : AIR 1999 SC 1723
12
Reliance Petroleum Ltd v. Zaver Chand Popatlal Sumaria (1996) 4 SCC 579(paras 12 and
13)
13
Rahid Ahmad v. Municiapal Board, Kairana (1950) SCR 738
14
AIR 1983 SC 603
15
(2014) 1 SCC 603

7
Courts where efficacious or alternative remedy is available, is a rule of self-imposed

limitation. In the present case there is statutory tribunal available this petition cannot be
entertained by the HC.
2 KARMASTHAN DRAMATIC PERFORMANCES (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2016

AND INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN (PROHIBITION) ACT, 1986
IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION
It is humbly submitted before this Honble court that the action of the State of Karmasthan
taken against the petitioner in the present case in conducting the beauty contest is not violating
Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Art. 14 confers that the State shall not deny to any person
equality before law within the territory of India.16 Equality before law also includes equal
protection of laws. In order to ensure in equal protection of laws, the State can bring in
necessary changes in the existing laws and apply that to bring in social and economic changes
which protects every person under the umbrella of equal protection of laws.17 The expression
laws denotes specific laws in force.18 Therefore, in the present case the State in order to
ensure equal protection of law and larger public good made the amendment to KDPA,1962.
IRWPA, 1986 is also preventing the women from being indecently represented by providing
for the seizure of the advertisements which contained obscene pictures of women and hence,
these two Acts are reasonable and non-arbitrary.
2.1 KDP(A)A, 2016 SATISIFIES THE TESTS OF VALID CLASSIFICATION
Right to equality is recognised as basic feature of the Constitution.19 Equality is a dynamic

concept which goes on changing with changing times and social contexts and must be
understood in that sense.20 It is humbly submitted that in the present case, the amendment by
the Legislative Assembly was made with a view to adapt to the changing circumstances, and
the same, is beyond the purview of questioning as it serves social purpose by prohibiting
immoral influence through the beauty contests indecency and obscenity.21
16
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art.14.
17
St. Stephen College v. University of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 1630.
18
Sri Srinivas Theatre v. Govt. of T.N., AIR 1992 SC 999, (1992) 2 SCC 643
19
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (2000) 1 SCC 168
20
State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75; Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India
AIR 1956 SC 479
21
Moot proposition

8
Whenever an Act is amended, there is bound to be some difference in treatment between

transactions completed before the amendment and those which are to take place in future, but
this is not discriminatory under Art.14.22 In the present case the petitioner cannot complain that
the treatment before the amendment and after the should be the same and cannot plead the court
that the amendment is unconstitutional, as there ought to be some sort of differences in the
treatment and henceforth an amendment is made and such an amendment should satisfy the
tests of valid classification, in the present case the amendment made to the State Legislative
Assembly satisfy the for intelligible differentia as the beauty contests are regarded as form
of performance as they exhibit talents such as other dramatic performances that are included
under the ambit of objectionable performances.
In Union of India v. M.V. Valliappan23, Apex court has observed that it is settled law that
differentiation is not discriminatory. If there is a rational nexus on the basis of which
differentiation has made with the object sought to be achieved by particular provision, then
such differentiation is not discriminatory and does not violate the principles of Art.14 of the
Constitution. In the present case the Amendment made to KDPA, 1962 satisfies the object of
enactment as it is reasonable, here the object of the enactment was to prohibit the objectionable
performances which were grossly indecent, scurrilous and obscene24 as beauty contests are
a form perform which can be considered under these grounds and hence it is prohibited by the
State Legislative Assembly as it confers to these grounds.
A legislature is entitled to make reasonable classification for purposes of legislation and treat
all in one class on an equal footing. SC has underlined this principle thus: Art.14 of the
Constitution ensures equality among equals: its aims to protect persons similarly placed
against discriminatory treatment.25 In the present case the Karmasthan State Legislation
amended the KDPA, 1962 to ensure equality among equals, as beauty contests as form of
performance that exhibit talents, it is reasonable to bring it into the ambit of performance and
since beauty contests are grossly indecent, scurrilous and obscene. Our common humanity,
which is also formulated as human dignity, demands distributive justice both of which dignity
22
Udai Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 1 ; Jain Bros v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC
778: (1969) SCC 311
23
(1999) 6 SCC 259 , 269: AIR 1999 SC 2526
24
S. 2(1)(vi)
25
Western UP Eleectric Power and Supply Co Ltd v. State of UP AIR 1970 SC 21,24: (1969)
1 SCC 817

9
and distribution of justice are essential to equality.26 The State has given priority to womens
dignity and considered it to be Fundamental Duty27 to the fulfilled by the State Legislative
Assembly hence it made an amendment to the KDPA, 1962 and added beauty contests into the
ambit objectionable performance. A statute may itself indicate the person or thing to whom its
provisions are intended to apply and the basis of classification may appear on the face of the
statute. If the classification satisfy the constitutional requirement it would be valid.28 It is
humbly submitted before the Honble Court that the tests for valid classification are satisfied
by KDP(A)A,2016 and hence the said Act is constitutional as it does not violate Art.14 of
Constitution of India.
2.2 THAT THE SAID ACTS ARE NOT ARBITARY AND UNREASONABLE
Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies.29
It is humbly submitted before this Honble court that KAP(A)A,2016 and IRWPA, 1986 are
not arbitrary and unreasonable as both the Acts satisfy the grounds to be considered it as non-
arbitrary and reasonable by satisfying the tests of a valid classification and also the amendment
made to KDPA, 1962 is also reasonable as it confers to the social purpose.
2.2 a) KDP(A)A,2016 is not arbitrary and unreasonable
In Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P.30, Apex court by generally speaking about the State
actions observed that, the question whether an impugned Act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately
to be decided based upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The test of reasonableness
and non-arbitrariness should be proved by the Act which is being questioned. This test is
satisfied by examining the Act under the ambit of Art. 19 and Art. 21.31 In the present case as
to protect dignity of women and personal and public morality, the Respondent has taken
necessary reasonable actions against the petitioner and hence are not violating Art. 19 and also
Art. 21. Along with the mentioned test, in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,32 the SC held that
26
Sandra Fredman , From Deference to Democracy: The Role of Equality under Human
Rights Act 1998
27
Constitution of India, 1950 Part VI A
28
Chiranjit Lal v UOI, AIR 1951 SC 41: (1953) SCR 1129
29
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid, AIR 1981 SC 487, (1981) 1 SCC 722.
30
(1991) 1 SCC 212, AIR 1991 SC 537.
31
R.C. Cooper v. UOI, AIR 1970 SC 564, (1970) 1 SCC 248; Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR
1978 SC 597, (1978) 1 SCC 248
32
AIR 1950 SC 27, (1950) SCR 88.

10
duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard is implied from the nature of functions to be
performed by the authority which has power to take punitive actions. In the present case the
petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard before this beauty contest was prohibited under
the provisions of KDP(A)A, 201633 and hence, there is no arbitrariness in prohibiting the
beauty contest as the petitioner could not prove the authority that it is not indecently
representing the women. Therefore, in the present case the action of the State of Karmasthan
according to the facts and in accordance with the Acts which are enacted for public good which
is serving social purpose cannot be held arbitrary. It is to be humbly noted that some
organisations submitted a memorandum to the Chief Minister of the State of Karmasthan in
order to prohibit the beauty contest that is being conducted by the petitioner, clearly mentions
that the prohibition is for the public good, where the said beauty contest indecently represents
the women and immoral influence is made on the public.
2.2b) IRW(P)A is not arbitrary and unreasonable
IRWPA, 1986 provides for prohibition of the advertisements which contain obscene pictures
of women,34 as the publishing of the same will lead to indecent representation of women. This
action of the State cannot be questioned as it is exercised for the protection of dignity of women
and also to protect the public morality. Because it is contended in the said Act that the action
which goes against public morality in case of representing women will eventually leads to the
indecent representation of women.35 As it is contended above, the arbitrariness and
unreasonableness of an Act is justified only after subjecting the specific Act to the tests of
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness u/a 19 and 21 of the Constitution.36 If the Act is under the
ambit of reasonable restrictions u/a 19(2) to 19(6) and is a procedure established by law u/a 21,
then the validity and the constitutionality of such an Act cannot be questioned. In the present
case the petitioner can be restricted u/a 19(2) as the beauty contest that is being conducted does
not correlate with the principles of decency and morality37 and it can also be restricted u/ 19(6)
as the advertisements that are published by the petitioner are obscene and they cannot be used
for business activities.38The petitioner can also be restricted as their action is against the
33
s.4(b) of the KDP(A)A, 2016.
34
s.3 of the IRWPA, 1986.
35
s.2 of the IRWPA, 1986.
36
R.C. Cooper v. UOI, AIR 1970 SC 564, (1970) 1 SCC 248; Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR
1978 SC 597, (1978) 1 SCC 248
37
Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881
38
State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699

11
procedure established by law, which is the restriction on Art. 21. Therefore, it is humbly
submitted before this Honble court that IRWPA, 1986 cannot be held arbitrary and
unreasonable.
2.3 DISCRETIONARY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL
Discretion means sound discretion guided by law, governed by known principles of rules, not
by whim or fancy for caprice of the authority.39 In the present case the discretionary powers
of the State Government authorised gazetted officer to enter and seize the obscene
advertisements are guided by law, as s. 5 of IRWPA, 1986 ensures this provision and also the
prohibition of the beauty contest by considering it as an objectionable performance is provided
under s. 4 of KDP(A)A, 2016. They are also governed by known principles, as if the
advertisements contain the obscene pictures and they lead to the indecent representation of
women then only the discretionary powers are exercised by the administrative authority.
In Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K 40 the SC held that, where the State action is
bona fide and reasonable, the Court will not interfere merely on the grounds that are provided
by the petitioner. In the present case the State action is bona fide as it is prohibiting the beauty
contest which harms the dignity of women and public morality at large by indecent
representation of women. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the Honble court cannot
uphold this petition merely on the grounds provided by the petitioner.
No statutory instrument may go beyond the purposes or object of the statute under which it is
made, the test is applied being one of a fair and reasonable relation between the two. 41 In the
present case it is proved that both KDP(A)A, 2016 and IRWPA, 1986 satisfied the test of
reasonableness and hence can be declared as fair. The amendment that is made to KDPA, 1962
satisfies the test of rational nexus, which means that the amendment is having a reasonable
relation to the object of the Act, as the Acts object is to prohibit objectionable performances
which are grossly indecent, scurrilous and obscene.42
39
Som raj v. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 1176, (1990) 2 SCC 653.
40
AIR 1980 SC 1992, (1980) 4 SCC 1.
41
Nagar Mahapalika v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 127, AIR 2006 SC 2113.
42
s.2(1)(vi) of the KDP(A)A, 2016.

12
The discretionary power cannot be held as discriminatory43 as they are based on the following
principles while testing their validity and constitutionality.
1. The public officials will discharge their duties honestly in accordance with the rules of law
as the consider the principles of natural justice i.e. justice and fair play before taking any
action.44
2. If the discretionary powers are vested in the State Government or top-ranking authorities,
and not in minor officials, abuse of power cannot readily be inferred.45
3. A statute, which leaves it to the discretion of the government to select or classify the persons
or things for applying those provisions according to the policy or principle laid down in the
statute itself for guidance of the exercise of discretion by the government in the matter of such
selection or classification, is not violative of the provisions of Art. 14.46
4. Discretion must be exercised reasonably in furtherance of public policy, public good and for
public cause.47
All these above mentioned principles are followed by both KDP(A)A, 2016 and IRWPA, 1986
as, both the said Acts have proved their reasonableness as they confer to the principles of
natural justice by not violating any fundamental rights enshrined u/a 19 and 21, the authority
is given to the State govt to appoint an authorised officer in order to carry out discretionary
powers in the IRWPA, 1986, the classification made in KDP(A)A, 2016 satisfies the test of
rational nexus and hence, the provisions are in accordance with the policy and principles of the
statute and the discretion is reasonable as it is exercised in order to protect public morality by
prohibiting indecent representation of women through obscene advertisements.
Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Honble court that there is no violation of Art.21
by the action of State of Karmasthan against the petitioner, as the action of the State is valid,
reasonable, non-arbitrary and constitutional.
43
Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44, (1955) 2 SCR 925.
44
Pannalal Binjraj v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 397, 1957 SCR 233.
45
Ibid
46
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. J. S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.
47
Consumer Action Group v. State of T.N., (2000) 7 SCC 425, AIR 2000 SC 3060.

13
3. KARMASTHAN DRAMATIC PERFORMANCES (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2016

AND INDECENT REPRESENTATION WOMEN (PROHIBITION) ACT, 1986
DOES NOT VIOLATE ART. 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Constitution of India by the action of State of Karmasthan. Art. 19 of the Constitution confers
protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.,48 This Article enumerates certain
rights u/a 19(1), which are great and basic, recognised as the natural rights inherent in the status
if citizen.49 But none of these rights is absolute or uncontrolled, for each is liable to be curtailed
by laws made or to be made by the State to the extent mentioned in clauses (2) to (6) of Art.
19. This Article clearly confers the rights to the citizenship status holders. In the present case
the petitioner is a charitable society and exercise no citizenship status. In many cases it was
held by the SC that for the purpose of this Article registered companies and societies are not
treated as citizens.50 Therefore, KTAC cannot claim violation of the rights conferred u/a 19(1).
3.1 THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF ART. 19(1)(a)
Art. 19(1)(a) envisages freedom of speech and expression to all the citizens of India. In Romesh
Thappar v. State of Madras51 the SC held that, this right does not confer an absolute right to
speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose or an unrestricted or
unbridled licence that gives immunity for every possible use of language and does not prevent
punishments for those who abuse this freedom. In the present case, the petitioner has abused
this freedom by publishing the advertisements which contained the pictures of seven girls
wearing G-string and seminude tops, which represent women in an indecent manner.52
Clause (2) of Art. 19 specifies the grounds on which the freedom of speech and expression may
be restricted. It is made clear in Art. 19(2) that public order, decency and morality are amongst
48
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art.19
49
State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92, 95.
50
StateTrading Corpnn. of Ltd., v. CTO, AIR 1963 SC 1811; Indo-China Steam Navigation
Co., Ltd., v. Jasjit Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1140; British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v.
Jasjit Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1415; Tata Engg. Locomotion Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR
1965 SC 40; Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Co. Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295; State of Guj. V.
Arvind Mills, AIR 1974 SC 1300, (1974) 4 SCC 656; Dharam Dutt v. UOI, (2004) 1 SCC
712,738.
51
AIR 1950 SC 124.
52
Moot proposition.

14
the grounds for restricting this freedom. In Express Newspapers (P.) Ltd. v. UOI53 the SC held
that reasonable restrictions under the heads as provided in Art. 19(2) can be imposed only by a
duly enacted law. The same was upheld in many other cases. 54 In the present case the
restrictions are imposed by two enactments that are Karmasthan Dramatic Performances
(Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 . The
restrictions which are laid down through the legislations be subjected to the test of
reasonableness u/a 19. This test is conducted by the legislature before making any enactments
or before bringing in any amendments to the laws. This test is conducted to see the social
purpose i.e. served by the enactment and the enactments validity. As these are the two
legislations brought in to serve social purpose, in order to prohibit indecent representation of
women and for preventing immoral influence on the society by prohibiting the obscene
advertisements, the restrictions that are imposed under these two Acts cannot be held
unreasonable.
The published advertisements as mentioned above were indecently representing women and
hence under the provisions of IRWPA, 1986 those advertisements were prohibited and were
also seized by the authorised state government official. S. 3 of the said Act prohibits
advertisements containing indecent representation of women and s. 5 provides power to any
gazetted officer authorised by state government to enter and seize the advertisements which
indecently represent women. In the present case Deputy Commissioner of Police as he is an
authorised officer by the State Government seized those advertisements, which were obscene,
from KTACs office by raiding on it.
KDP(A)A, 2016 provides for prohibition of any such beauty contests under the grounds of
grossly indecent, scurrilous and obscene. In the present case this beauty contest Miss India17
was prohibited because it is a performance which is exhibited in the public and is representing
women in indecent and obscene manner. The word obscene cannot be given a wide meaning
as given in the Hicklin case.55 Because if it is given a wide meaning, there is a danger that the
obscene publications or any such obscene object which do not serve any social purpose or profit
might reach the public. Therefore, while incorporating this into Indian laws s. 292 of Indian
Penal Code has restricted the scope of the word obscenity.
53
(1986) 1 SCC 133
54
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615.
55
R. v. Hicklin, (1868) 3 QB 360.

15
In Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra56 the SC held that, Whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall. As it is defined
under s. 2(1)(vi) of KDP(A)A,201657 the beauty contests are held as objectionable
performances as they are grossly indecent, scurrilous and obscene they influence the society in
large numbers and hence are to be prohibited. It is also mentioned in the memorandum
submitted by some organisations to the Chief Minister of the State of Karmasthan that these
beauty contests serve no social purpose or profit.58 It is held by the SC that, In our country
obscenity without a preponderating social purpose or profit cannot have the constitutional
protection of free speech and expression.59
Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Honble court that instead of serving any social
purpose and profit the beauty pageant being conducted by KTAC is implying indecent
representation of women and hence, prohibition of such performances by considering them as
objectionable performances under s. 2(1)(vi) of KDP(A)A, 2016 are not violating any right as
guaranteed u/a 19 of the Constitution of India as they satisfy the reasonable test u/a 19.
Therefore, these two laws should be upheld as constitutional.
3.2 THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF ART. 19(1)(g)
Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution envisages that all citizens have right to practise any profession
or to carry on any occupation or trade or business. in the present case the petitioner is
conducting beauty pageant as a part of the organisations business activities. In Sodan Singh v.
New Delhi Municipal Committee60, Kuldeep Singh J. defined Business as a very wide term
and would include anything which occupies the time, attention and labour of a man for the
purpose of profit. It may include in its form trade, profession, industrial and commercial
56
AIR 1965 SC 881
57
Moot proposition
58
Moot proposition
59
Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881; Chandrakant Kalyandas
Kakodkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 687; Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra, (1985)
4 SCC 289; Director General, Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, (2006) 8 SCC 433; Ajay
Goswami v. UOI, (2007) 1 SCC 143.
60
(1989) 4 SCC 155, AIR 1989 SC 1988.

16
operations, purchase and sale of goods, and would include anything which is an occupation as
distinguished from pleasure.61
This freedom is also not uncontrolled, for clause (6) of the Article authorises legislation which
imposes reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of the general public. It is to be
noted that the right u/a 19(1)(g) must be exercised consistently with human dignity. 62 In the
present case the dignity of women is degraded by those obscene advertisements which
indecently represented the women is completely against human dignity. Therefore those
advertisements are considered as obscene and are seized by the Deputy Commissioner of
Police, who is an authorised officer by the State government. The discretionary power that is
conferred on the authorised official in order to regulate and control the exercise of the freedom
conferred by Art. 19(1)(g), it is necessary that the law which does so should either lay down
the circumstances or grounds on which the power may be exercised or indicate the policy to
achieve which the discretion is to be exercised.63 In the present case the grounds for considering
an advertisement as obscene is mentioned under s. 3 of IRWPA, 1986, which clearly states
that, if the advertisements are indecently representing the women then those advertisements
can be prohibited by considering them as obscene. Therefore, the powers of the authorised
official under the said Act is not violating Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as this action of the
State sustains the reasonableness of the restriction.
3.2 a) Reasonable Restrictions are in the interests of the General Public
Firstly, the restriction imposed must be required in the interests of general public and
secondly, it must be a reasonable restriction. The expression in the interests of general
pubic, the SC has held, is of wide import comprehending public order, public health, public
security, morals, economic welfare of the community and the objects mentioned in the Part IV
of the Constitution. A law providing for the basic amenities; for the dignity of human beings is
a social welfare measure in the interest of general public.64 In the present case the beauty
contest which is being conducted and the advertisements that are published for the same by the
61
State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699; Unni Krishnan, J.P. v.
State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645, AIR 1993 SC 2178,2202,2244; T.M.A. Pai Foundation v.
State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481,533.
62
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241, AIR 1981 SC 3011.
63
State of Rajasthan v. Nath Mal, AIR 1954 SC 307, 1954 SCR 982.
64
Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohd. Usmanbhai, (1986) 3 SCC 20,
31.

17
petitioner are against the morality and dignity of women as they satisfy all the grounds that are
specified in IRWPA, 1986 while defining indecent representation of women under s. 2(c) of
the same Act as indecent representation of women means the depiction in any manner of
the figure of a women, her form or body or any part thereof in such a way as to have the effect
of being indecent, or derogatory to, or denigrating, women, or is likely to deprave, corrupt or
injure the public morality or morals. Here it is important to mention that standards of morality
can afford guidance to impose restrictions.65
In the present case the beauty contest is prohibited also by considering it as scurrilous.66 The
word scurrilous is defined under s. 292 of Indian Penal Code as, the word scurrilous shall be
deemed to include any matter which is likely to be injurious to morality or is calculated to
injure any person. In the present case the beauty contest is considered as scurrilous as it injures
morality. The morality of the business activity test was put under a cloud by K.K. Narula case,67
but was revived in Har Shankar v. Dy. Excise & Taxation Commr.68 , the SC held that, the
power of control is an incidence of the societys right to self-protection and it rests upon the
right of the State to care for the health, moral and welfare of the people. Thus, the execution of
certain business activities from the purview of Art. 19(1)(g) on the basis of their adverse and
reprehensible moral and social effects adopted in the R.M.D.C. case69 applies to all such
business activities.
The word restriction, as already noted, used in clause (6) of Art. 19 is wide enough to include
cases of total prohibition also.70 In the present case as the advertisements contained indecent
pictures of women and the beauty contest also exhibits the same, it can be held as objectionable
performance as it is grossly indecent and obscene under s. 2(1)(vi) of KDP(A)A, 2016, the
beauty contest can be prohibited under s. 4 of the same Act which provides for the prohibition
of such objectionable performances as defined under s. 2(1)(vi). Here, under s. 4 the
organisation which is conducting those objectionable performances are given an opportunity
to be heard before prohibition of the same. In the present case as the petitioner could not
substantiate properly before the District Collector, who is the Executive Magistrate, who heard
65
Cooverji B. Bharucha v. Excise Commr., AIR 1954 SC 220
66
Section 2 of Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016.
67
Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of J&K, AIR 1967 SC 1368, (1967) 3 SCR 50.
68
(1975) 1 SCC 737, AIR 1975 SC 1121.
69
State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699
70
Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of J&K, AIR 1967 SC 1368, (1967) 3 SCR 50; Pratap
Pharma (P.) Ltd., v. UOI, (1997) 5 SCC 87, AIR 1997 SC 2648.

18
the case as the beauty contest was not grossly indecent, scurrilous and obscene, the beauty
contest was declared to be prohibited. As mentioned above, it is the States duty to prohibit the
circulation of obscene advertisements, which are against human dignity and the restriction on
this is imposed through IRWPA, 1986 under s. 3.
Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Honble court that the restrictions imposed u/a
19(2) and 19(6) on the business of the KTAC are reasonable and hence there is no violation of
Art.19(1) of the Constitution of India. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim for the writ as there is
no violation of fundamental rights.
4. KARMASTHAN DRAMATIC PERFORMANCES (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2016

AND INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN (PROHIBITION) ACT, 1986
DOES NOT VIOLATE ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
It is humbly submitted before this Honble court that the action of the State of Karmasthan is
not violating Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. Art. 21 enshrines protection of life and
personal liberty. This right has become an inexhaustible source of many rights. 71 These rights
have been given paramount position by our Courts.72 Art. 21 reads as, No person shall be
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.73
Therefore, if there is violation of procedure established by law, this right cannot be guaranteed
as it is the States duty to protect the social order and public morality. In the present case
Karmasthan Legislative Assembly has made amendment to KDPA in order to protect public
morality and prevent indecent representation of women by conducting the beauty contest.
Along with this the State has also taken necessary action to prohibit and seize obscene
advertisements that were published by the petitioner under IRWPA, 1986.
4.1 THAT THE SAID ACTS PROTECT ART.21
It is humbly submitted before this Honble Court that, KDP(A)A, 2016 and IRWPA, 1986 aims
to protect the womens dignity enshrined under Art.21of the Constitution of India.
4.1 a) IRWPA, 1986 Protects Dignity of Women under Art.21
71
Bhagawati, J. in Maneka Gandhi v. UOI,(1978) 1 SCC 248, AIR 1978 SC 597.
72
Kehar Singh v. UOI, (1989) 1 SCC 204, AIR 1989 SC 653.
73
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21.

19
Art. 21 of the Constitution envisages right to life and personal liberty. In Francis Coralie v.
Union of Territory of Delhi74, Bhagawati J. held that, By the term life as here used something
more is meant than mere animal existence. We think that the right to life includes the right to
live with human dignity. Relying on Francis Coralie75 case, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v.
Union of India76, the SC held that, it is the fundamental right of everyone in this country to live
with human dignity, free from exploitation. In the present case the beauty contest which is
being conducted is against the dignity of women, because the said contest depicts women in
the manner of figure, body and form and is likely to injure the public morality or morals which
satisfies the grounds to consider the above said beauty contest as it is indecently representing
the women. The Preamble, an integral part of the Constitution, pledges to secure `socio-
economic justice' to all its citizens with stated liberties, `equality of status and of opportunity',
assuring `fraternity' and `dignity' of the individual in a united and integrated Bharat.77 IRW(P)A
is a safeguard to womens dignity. The said Act prohibits indecent representation of women
through any means such as advertisements of any sort. This Act includes the prohibition of
distribution of any such and depiction in any manner of the figure of a woman, her form or
body or any other part thereof in any such way as to have effect of being indecent and the same
would deprave and injure womens dignity.
It is humbly submitted before the Honble court that the said act is constitutional and the said
Acts aims in protecting womens dignity.
4.1 b) KDP(A)A, 2016 ensures Dignity of Women under Art.21
In KDPA(A)A, 2016 is an amended act which defines beauty contests into the ambit of
objectionable performance. Art. 21 of the Constitution guarantees all the citizens of the nation
Protection of Life and Personal Liberty. Liberty in true sense includes life with human
dignity78.
Article 1 of the UDHR79 provides that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. Human rights and fundamental freedom have been reiterated by the UDHR. Democracy,
74
(1981) 1 SCC 608, AIR 1981 SC 746.
75
ibid
76
(1984) 3 SCC 161, AIR 1984 SC 802.
77
Gaurav Jain v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 1990 SC 292
78
Francis Coralie v. Union of Territory of Delhi ,(1981) 1 SCC 608, AIR 1981 SC 746.
79
Universal Declaration of Human Rights

20
development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and
have mutual reinforcement. The human rights for women, including girl child are, therefore,
inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. 80 Beauty contests were
added in the objectionable as it depicts women in grossly indecent manner.
The Apex Court in Suo Moto v. State of Rajasthan81 extending the ambit of Art.21 held that
mere existence is not the right to live, it is a right to live with dignity. It gives
the women right to health, right to profession, right to privacy, protection against sexual
harassment, right to live with human dignity as her right to life.
In Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary Union of India82, SC held that dignity of
human life has always been considered a fundamental human right of every human being like
any other key values such as freedom of association and freedom of speech. In the present
amdendment made by the state has clearly defined beauty contests under s. 2 in order to ensure
womens dignity.
S.4 of the said act prohibits that whenever the state govt, is not satisfied by any play or beauty
contests performed in public place is an objectionable performance83, it may by order stating
the grounds on which they consider the performance objectionable and prohibit the same.
Under this s. the petitioner were given an opportunity to be heard and satisfy the state
government but the petitioner failed to do so and hence under s.2 (1) (vi) of the said Act Beauty
Pageant Miss India 17 was considered to be an objectionable performance hence it was
prohibited for the same.
4.2 THE ADVERTISEMENT DIPICTIED WOMEN INDECENTLY
In the advertisement the picture of 7 girls wearing only G string and semi-nude top represented
women indecently with went against the dignity of women and public morality. Dignity of
human life has always been considered a fundamental human right of every human being like
any other key values such as freedom of association and freedom of speech. Therefore, every
act which offends or impairs human dignity tantamount to deprivation pro tanto of his right to
live and the State action must be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure
80
Gaurav Jain v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 1990 SC 292
81
RLW 2005 (2) Raj 1385
82
(2012) 5 SCC 1
83
S.2 of KDP(A)A, 2016

21
established by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights. 84 The petitioners has put
such an advertisement that is against the decency, public morality and dignity of women and
the most it is repugnant to the Indian culture, traditions and the social values.
In Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi and Anr v. Union of India and Ors85, the apex
court of Justice observed that Advertisement in its true character is reflected by the object for
the promotion which it is employed. In the present case the Advertisement depicted women
indecently which was against the dignity of the women which also is reflected back to the
object how are to participate in the beauty contests such action is intended to exploit women
and her dignity for the purpose of commercialism and such actions cannot be tolerated by the
state. Such depiction of women not only deprave women dignity alone but also divert the youth
and the spirit of the youth from real socio-economic problems survival.
The next submission of the appellants is that the objective of the Act is an expression of the
Obligation on the State to secure safety, social order, public order and dignity of women. It is
submitted that a bare perusal of the Preamble of the amending Act and the Statement of Objects
and Reasons would make it clear that the State enacted the legislation only after receipt of
complaints from various social organizations as well as from various individuals. It was also
submitted that in the present case the advertisement depicts women in obscene manner and
hence the beauty contest is also intended to do the same these beauty contests are the means to
achieve the lecherous and lustful desire of the erratic sexual maniacs and is also discriminatory
in choosing women only by vested interest in the society for the personal gain and exploitation
henceforth which is sought to be prevented by the legislation. In Regina v. Bloom86 in this case,
the appellants were proprietors of the clubs who were charged with keeping a disorderly house,
which arose out of matters that occurred in course of strip tease performances. The Court of
Criminal Appeal (England) held that as regards the cases in which indecent performances or
exhibition are alleged, a disorderly house is a house conducted contrary to law and good order
in that matters performed or exhibited are of such a character that their performance or
exhibition in a place of common resort amounts to an outrage of public decency or tends to
corrupt or deprave the dignity of women and public morality.87 Therefore in the present
84
Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi &. Ors., AIR 1981
SC 746
85
AIR 1960 SC 554
86
T. T 1702 K.B.
87
State of Maharashtra vs. Indian Hotel & Restaurants Assn. & Ors,(2013) 8 SCC 519

22
circumstances, the State, in the interest of dignity of women, maintenance of public order and
morality has banned dances in such establishments where regulation is virtually impossible.
In the present case before the Honble it is humbly submitted that the petitioners were Beauty
Pageant Miss India 17 depraves Dignity of the women and outrage public decency and
morality and womens dignity is questioned.
4.3 STATES POWER TO SEIZE OBSCENE ITEMS

S.5 of IRWPA, 1986 Gives any gazetted officer authorised by the state, may enter and
search at all reasonable times, with such assistance if any, as he considers necessary and at any
place in which he/she believes that offence under the said Act has been or being committed. In
the present case the deputy commissioner upon the order of the executive magistrate seize the
items that were against the said act and by no means this can be questioned by the petitioner as
the deputy commissioner acted upon the procedure established by law.88 Hence it is the due
responsibility of the petitioners to act upon the procedure that is laid down by the state and as
the petitioner did not act according to the procedure established by law the deputy
commissioner seized the items that were considered to be obscene which consisted of posters
and big hoarding boards containin the same picture that was included in the earlier
advertisement.89 Procedure means the manner and from of enforcing the law, Art.21 simply
means that you cannot deprive a man of his personal liberty, unless you follow and act
according to the law which provides the deprivation of such liberty.90This action of the deputy
commissioner was done in order to protect the dignity of the women enshrined under Art.21 of
the Constitution of India. These above mentioned enactments are established by law and
according to Art.21 it is procedure established by law. In A.K Gopalan91 case it was held that
the procedure established by law means the procedure enacted or laid down by a statue or
procedure prescribed by law of the state. Procedure established by law in Art.21 means the
law prescribed by Parliament at any given point of time. Parliament has the power to change
the procedure by enacting a law by amending it and when the procedure is so changed it
becomes procedure established by law92
88
A.K Goplan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27
89
Moot Proposition
90
A.K Goplan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27
91
A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 950 SC 27
92
Krishan v. State of Madras AIR 1951 SC 301

23
4.4 THAT THE KDP(A)A, 2016 OPERATES PROSPECTIVELY
It is humbly submitted before this Honble Court that the petitioner proposed the beauty
pageant which was scheduled to be held on 7th and 8th January of 2017, whereas, the State
legislative assembly enacted KDP(A)A, 2016 and the amendment came into force on 8-8-2016
which clearly signifies therer is no retrospective action that violates Art. 20(1) and therefore, it
is to be humbly noted that this amended Act operates prospectively.
The action of publishing the advertisements does not complete the offence, advertisement can
be considered as mere preparation for the commission of the offence i.e. the beauty contest that
is being scheduled on 7th and 8th January of the next year. Therefore, retrospective action can
be taken on the preparation to the commission of crime in order to bring in prospective actions
so as to prevent the commission on the crime.
CONCLUSION
In the light of aforementioned contentions it is established that KDP(A)A, 2016 and IRW(P)A,
1986 are constitutional as the said Acts do not violate Fundamental Rights u/a 14, 19, 21 of the
Constitution of India. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable and
hence, the said Acts are constitutional.
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is most
humbly and respectfully prayed before this Honble High Court that it may be pleased to
adjudge and declare that:

24
1. The present writ petition is not maintainable as there is no violation of Fundamental

Rights
2. Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent
Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 should be held constitutional.
AND/OR
Pass any other order that deems fit in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience
and for this act of kindness, counsels for the Respondent as in duty bound, shall humbly
pray.
COUNSELS FOR RESPONDENT

25

Respondent (State of Karmasthan)

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JUSTICE T.

RAMACHANDRAN MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2016

BEFORE THE HONBLE

HIGH COURT OF KARMASTHAN

ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION

[UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION]

In the matter of Article 14, 19, 20 and 21

W.P. NO. _______ OF 2016

KARMASTHAN TELEVISION ACTORS ASSOCIATION (KTAC)

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

1.1 That the Petitioner has no Locus Standi.......5

1.2 That there is no violation of Fundamental Rights ...5

1.2 a) State has not violated Art. 14

1.2 b) State has not violated Art. 19

1.2 c) State has not violated Art. 21

1.3 Alternative Remedy a bar.....7

2. Whether Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent

2.1 KDP(A)A, 2016 satisfies the Tests of Valid Classification....8

2.2 a) KDP(A)A, 2016 is not arbitrary and unreasonable

2.2 b) IRWPA, 1986 is not arbitrary and unreasonable

2.3 Discretionary Administrative Act is Constitutional11

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

3. Whether Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent

3.1 There is no violation of Art.19 (1) (a)..14

3.2 There is no violation of 19 (1)(g),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,..16

3.2 a) Reasonable Restrictions are in the interest of the General Public

4. Whether Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act, 2016 and Indecent

4.1 That the said Acts Protect Art. 21..19

4.1 a) IRWPA, 1986 Protects Dignity of Women under Art. 21

4.1 b) KDP(A), 1986 ensures Dignity of Women under Art. 21

4.2 The Advertisement depicted Women indecently.21

4.3 States Power to seize obscene items..22

4.4 KDP(A)A, 2016 operates prospectively..23

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

A.P. Andhra Pradesh

ABCL Amitabh Bachchan Corporation Limited

AIHC All India High Court

AIR All India Reporter

ALD Administrative Law Decisions

COI Constitution of India

IRWPA Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act

J&K Jammu and Kashmir

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

KarLJ Karnataka Law Journal

KDP(A)A Karmasthan Dramatic Performances (Amendment) Act

KDPA Karmasthan Dramatic Performances Act

KTAC Karmasthan Television Actors Association

PUCL Peoples Union of Civil Liberties

RLW Rajasthan Law Weekly

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

T.N. Tamil Nadu

u/a Under article

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UOI Union of India

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

1. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 ....10,23

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

29. Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of J&K, AIR 1967 SC 1368....18

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner

60. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481,533..16