Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.

- Premature Campaigning

Facts:

On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELECs decision to disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera as
mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period, in
violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).

Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature
campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and
local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign
period.

Issue:

Whether or not Peneras disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning should be reconsidered.

Holding:

Granting Peneras motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held that

Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court
said

(A) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or the assailed Decision) considered a person who files a certificate of
candidacy already a candidate even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and
letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will
only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign period.

Thus, applying said law:

(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts.
Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. In
other words, election offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign period. Before the
start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no
recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court
but the Legislature.

(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does not provide that partisan political acts
done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign
period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are
temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the
Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is
lawful, as the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly
declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is
lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities before the
start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that any unlawful act or omission applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The only inescapable and logical result is that
the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

(D) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16 November 2006).
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early deadline for
filing certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and
they intended to preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of candidacy to meet the
early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.

When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the
provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate
only at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under
the early deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political
act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground
of its unconstitutionality.

The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision
considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory reversing Lanot but maintaining
the constitutionality of the said provision.

Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda:

AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action against the
respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due
course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The
petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its
prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like,
whether of domestic or foreign origin. COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer
used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC.

HELD:

The Court held that the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or
class as those specifically referred to. The COMELECs contention that a candidates jingle form part of the prohibition,
categorized under the phrase and the like, could not merit the courts approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is
quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means
of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance to the express
terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at
the cost of the candidates constitutional rights.

ABS-CBN vs Comelec

Facts:

A Petition for Certiorari raised by ABS-CBN under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections en banc
Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of
a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey
and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon
"information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct
radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during the elections for national officials
particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately." The electoral body
believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN
to undertake the exit survey. On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner.
We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the
restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media
without any difficulty or problem.

Issue: Whether the assailed resolution is valid.

Held:

The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of
communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid
and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may
be brought about by exit surveys.

A specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional survey groups may be allowed to
conduct the same. Pollsters may be kept at a reasonable distance from the voting center. They may be required to explain
to voters that the latter may refuse interviewed, and that the interview is not part of the official balloting process. The
pollsters may further be required to wear distinctive clothing that would show they are not election officials. Additionally,
they may be required to undertake an information campaign on the nature of the exercise and the results to be obtained
therefrom. These measures, together with a general prohibition of disruptive behavior, could ensure a clean, safe and
orderly election.

The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a 'preferred' right and,
therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. . . . [T]his must be so because the lessons
of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly
every other form of freedom."

Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. In the
landmark case Gonzales v. Comelec, this Court enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press consist of
the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.

The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation
by the people in social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change. It
represents a profound commitment to the principle that debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open. It means more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to
official measures, or to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any of public consequence. And paraphrasing the
eminent Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the
thought we agree with.

In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector
has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly
tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the
conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.

Statements of Contributions and Expenses

JUANITO C. PILAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION

Facts: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed
upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures notwithstanding
his having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after his filing.

Held: The petitioner is liable. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in the application
of a law where none is indicated. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the
candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to
a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.

Petition to Deny Due Course vs. Petition to Disqualify

In the event a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy is granted by final judgment as defined
in the immediately preceding section, the votes cast for the candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled
or denied due course shall be deemed as stray votes.

In the event a Petition to disqualify a candidate is granted by final judgment as defined under Section 8 of Rule 23 and the
disqualified candidate obtains the highest number of votes, the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot
be proclaimed and the rule of succession, if allowed by law, shall be observed. In the event the rule of succession is not
allowed, a vacancy shall exist for such position."

Garvida vs. Sales, G.R. No. 122872 Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy

FACTS:

Petitioner Lynette Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent COMELEC en banc
suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the SK of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui,
Ilocos Norte.
 On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay
San Lorenzo. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that she being then twenty-
one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in
Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.

On April 2, she filed a Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter with the MCTC. In a decision
dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner.

On April 23, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San
Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, Election Officer Rios, per advice
of Provincial Election Supervisor, disapproved petitioners certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner,
however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Asperin who set aside the order of respondent Rios and allowed
petitioner to run.

On May 2, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours
to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved.

Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate
for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of
Certificate of Candidacy against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of
candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections
National Office, Manila.

On May 2, 1996, the same day acting on the facsimile, respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the
COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo
to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election.

On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondents votes of 76. In accordance
with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the
winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.

On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman,
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was without prejudice to any further action by the
Commission on Elections or any other interested party.

On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon.

ISSUES:

1) WON the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy. (not
pubcor)

2) WON cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as
an elective official of the SK is valid

HELD:

1) Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under the
supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in Section
78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.

In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that
the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received
by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself and that the
jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases
before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a
decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions,
resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the
COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases.

In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It
therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the
order of May 2, 1996.

The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal
requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed,
mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed
directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the
COMELEC.[19] Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not
by registered mail.

2) The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by PD 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth
organization composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. RA 7160
changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid
down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. A member of the SK
holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies
or resigns from office.

Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen;
(b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly
registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an
elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but
not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted
of any crime involving moral turpitude.

For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991
in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective
official voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A
candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.

Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan
and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan.

Petitioners age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however,
argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of
the Local Government Code of 1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21
years of age on election day. She urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-
one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as
candidate for the SK elections.

Section 424 of the Code sets a members maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the
member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective
SK official is 21 years old on the day of his election. The addition of the phrase on the day of his election is an additional
qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The
distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than
for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts may distinguish when there are
facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.

The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very
clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood
that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the
365th day after his birth the last day of the year. In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the first
365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. The phrase not more than 21 years
of age means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or
some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. Not more than 21 years old is not
equivalent to less than 22 years old, contrary to petitioners claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less
than 22 years on election day. The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy
and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible.

Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.

To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK
member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from
among themselves. The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term,
and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the
age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her
position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang
Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.

Distinguish: Postponement of Election vs. Failure of Election

Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly
and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a
verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded
equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date
of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation
of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing
of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party
and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election
or failure to elect.

What is an Election Contest?

- a right of action conferred on every candidate to contest the certification of nomination or the certificate of vote as
made by the appropriate officials in any election. It is a post-election contest between two competing candidates.
- An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against an elective
municipal or barangay official. An election protest or a petition for quo warranto shall be filed directly with the proper
court in three legible copies plus such number of copies corresponding to the number of protestees or respondents.
An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto, nor shall a petition for quo warranto include an
election protest

Javier vs Comelec, G.R. No. L-68379-81

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in
Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering
and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the
armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of
the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered
the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the
Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed
out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the
Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by
only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during
pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and
academic by virtue of Javiers death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently
demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure
that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise
they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without
such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court
already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a
prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence
is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Gardiner vs. Romulo, G.R. No. L-8921 (full case)

Jurisdiction over Election Contest

Jurisdiction of regional trial courts. - Regional trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all election contests
involving elective municipal officials.

Jurisdiction of municipal trial courts. - Municipal trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all election
contests involving elective barangay officials.

Election Protest vs. Quo Warranto

Election protest. - A petition contesting the election or returns of an elective municipal or barangay official shall be filed
with the proper regional trial court or municipal trial court by any candidate who was voted for the same office and who
received the second or third highest number of votes or, in a multi-slot position, was among the next four candidates
following the last-ranked winner duly proclaimed, as reflected in the official results of the election contained in the
Statement of Votes By Precinct. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant; the adverse party shall
be known as the protestee. Each contest shall refer exclusively to one office; however, contests for offices of
Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Barangay may be consolidated in one case.

Quo Warranto. - A petition for quo warranto against an elective municipal or barangay official shall be filed with the
proper regional trial court or municipal trial court by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned. The
party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner; the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.

Raymond P. Espidol vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 164922

COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation illegally made. The fact that a candidate illegally
proclaimed has assumed office is not a bar to the exercise of such power. It is also true that as a general rule, the proper
remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested would be to file a regular election
protest or quo warranto. This rule, however, admits of exceptions and one of those is where the proclamation was null
and void. In such a case, the proclaimed candidates assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to
declare such proclamation a nullity.

FACTS:

Petitioner Raymond P. Espidol and private respondent Wilfredo L. Tabag were rival candidates for Mayor of the
Municipality of Ramon, Isabela, in the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Petitioner Espidol, a re-
electionist, was the official candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa (Lakas)Christian Muslim Democrats (CMD) coalition, while
private respondent Tabag was the official candidate of the Partidong Demokratiko ng Pilipinas-Laban (PDP-Laban).The
municipality had a total of 117 precincts. At about 6:00 p.m. of May 10, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC)
of Ramon, consisting of Chairman Atty. Agripino A. De Guzman, Jr., Vice-Chairman Pedro L. Gueco and MemberSecretary
Rosalinda B. Doroni, convened at the municipalitys Barangay Training Center to commence the canvassing. Actual
canvassing started at around 3:00 a.m. of the following day or May 11, 2004, and formally adjourned at about 8:30 p.m.,
with the MBC scheduling the resumption of the canvass at 9:00 a.m. of the next day.

ISSUE:

Whether there was a per-proclamation controversy

HELD:

Granting arguendo that the objections interposed by private respondent Tabag were not proper for a preproclamation
controversy, nonetheless, the MBC should have made written rulings thereon. We draw from past experience. A pattern
of conduct observed in past elections has been the pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest-slogan of
some candidates or parties. Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof
after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene. It may not be out
of place to state that in the long history of election contests in this country, as served in Lagumbay v. Climaco, successful
contestant in an election protest often wins but a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about
to expire or has expired. Protests, counter-protests, revisions of ballots, appeals, dilatory tactics, may well frustrate the
will of the electorate. And what if the protestant may not have the resources and an unwavering determination with which
to sustain a long drawn-out election contest? In this context therefore all efforts should be strained as far as is humanly
possible to take election returns out of the reach of the unscrupulous; and to prevent illegal or fraudulent proclamation
from ripening into illegal assumption of office

What is the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate?
Villamor Vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 169865 (full case)

EXCEPTION

Dumayas, Jr. vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 141952-58

Facts: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the position in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the
May 1998 synchronized elections. During the canvassing by the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of election returns
for 3 precincts of Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism, intimidation and coercion committed in said
precincts during the casting and counting of votes. The MBC denied petitioners objections and proceeded with the
canvass which showed respondent Bernal garnering more votes than the petitioner.

Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election returns from 3 precincts and directed the
MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and then, to proclaim the winning
mayoralty candidate. Private respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division with
the COMELEC en banc.

The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal filed an urgent motion to declare void
petitioners proclamation. The duly proclaimed Vice-Mayor Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed n action for quo
warranto against petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo. Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel Bernals
motion for reconsideration and motion declare void petitioners proclamation on the ground that respondent Bernal
should be deemed to have abandoned said motion when he filed quo warranto action.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, annulled the petitioner Dumayas proclamation;
and constituted a new MBC. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC as the duly-elected
Mayor of the Municipality.

Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set aside the COMELEC en banc resolution.

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC was correct in including in the canvass the election returns of the contested precincts?

Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence presented by the petitioner to prove the alleged
irregularities were the self-serving contracts of his watchers and inspectors. Returns cannot be excluded on mere
allegations that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their face appear to be regular and
without any physical signs of tampering. The election irregularities cited by the petitioner would require the
presentation of evidence which cannot be done in a pre-proclamation controversy which is summary in nature.

Election Offenses under the Omnibus Election Code

People vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-8957

Ong vs. Herrera Martinez, G.R. No. 87743

People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 115022

FACTS: Respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs, issued MICP Customs Personnel Order dated
January 10, 1992 assigning Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the Deputy Collector of
Customs for Operations as Special Assistant. The actual transfer of Ebio was made on January 14, 1992. On May 4, 1992,
Ebio filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a letter-complaint protesting his transfer. Ebio claimed that his
new assignment violated COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 and Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code,
which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120 days before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national
and local elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid transfer.

RULING: It ought to be immediately obvious that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the transfer of a
government officer or employee during the election period. To be sure, the transfer or detail of a public officer or
employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority. It is necessary to meet the exigencies of public service sometimes
too difficult to perceive and predict. Without this inherent prerogative, the appointing authority may not be able to cope
with emergencies to the detriment of public service. Clearly then, the transfer or detail of a government officer or
employee will not be penalized by Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 if done to promote efficiency in the government
service. Needless to state, respondent Maniego could not be charged with failing to secure the approval of the
COMELEC when he transferred Ebio on January 14, 1992 as on that day, the rules of the COMELEC on the subject were
yet inexistent.