Resources Policy 37 (2012) 346357

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Resources Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/resourpol

Exploring the origins of social license to operate in the mining sector:

Perspectives from governance and sustainability theories
Jason Prno a,n, D. Scott Slocombe b
a
Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University, 75 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5
b
Dr. John McMurry Research Chair in Environmental Geography, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University,
75 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: In the mining sector, local communities have emerged as particularly important governance actors.
Received 10 December 2011 Conventional approaches to mineral development no longer suffice for these communities, which have
Received in revised form demanded a greater share of benefits and increased involvement in decision making. These trends have
21 April 2012
been spurred by the growth of the sustainable development paradigm and governance shifts that have
Accepted 23 April 2012
increasingly transferred governing authority towards non-state actors. Accordingly, there is now
Available online 28 May 2012
widespread recognition that mineral developers need to gain a social license to operate (SLO) from
JEL classification: local communities in order to avoid potentially costly conflict and exposure to social risks. A social
Q30 license can be considered to exist when a mining project is seen as having the ongoing approval and
Q56
broad acceptance of society to conduct its activities. Due to the concepts relatively recent emergence,
however, only a limited body of scholarship has developed around SLO. Drawing on examples from
Keywords:
northern Canada, this paper uses governance and sustainability theories to conceptualize the origins of
Social license to operate
Governance SLO in the mining sector and describe some of the associated implications. Further research is needed
Sustainability to determine governance arrangements which help facilitate establishment of SLO in different mineral
development contexts.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction
Mining stakeholders around the world have grown increas-
ingly wary of conventional approaches to mineral development,
which at their worst have been associated with adverse environ-
mental impacts, social and cultural disruption, and local economic
instability. Stakeholders now demand that companies align
themselves more closely with the tenets of sustainable develop-
ment, of which increased community participation in decision
making is a central goal. The industry has in many cases
responded positively to these demands, having recognized the
old ways of doing business are no longer an option if the sector is
to remain viable (Brereton, 2004; IIED and WBCSD, 2002;
MacDonald and Gibson, 2006; McAllister and Alexander, 1997).
At the same time, mining has also undergone notable shifts in
governance, largely aimed at improving the environmental and
social performance of the sector. These shifts have broadened the
range of governing actors, with civil society and market actors
now regularly sharing governing duties with the state (Ballard
n
Corresponding author. Tel.: 1 519 983 8483.
E-mail addresses: prno1900@mylaurier.ca (J. Prno),
sslocomb@wlu.ca (D. Scott Slocombe).
and Banks, 2003; Kooiman, 2003; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006;
McAllister and Fitzpatrick, 2010). As a result of both these
developments the move towards sustainable development and
broad shifts in governance the voices of mining affected
communities have become much more influential in mineral
development decision making and political processes.
Where mining projects have not satisfied the demands of civil
society and of local communities in particular, shutdowns and
slow-ups have frequently occurred. Protests and blockades, non-
issuance or retraction of government permits, media and share-
holder campaigns, and government lobbying have proven the
power of civil society action across the globe. Full legal compli-
ance with state environmental regulations has thus become an
increasingly insufficient means of satisfying societys expecta-
tions with regards to mining issues. There is now a need for
mineral developers to gain an additional social license to operate
(SLO) in order to avoid potentially costly conflict and exposure to
social risks (Bridge, 2004). A social license exists when a mining
project is seen as having the broad, ongoing approval and
acceptance of society to conduct its activities (Joyce and
Thomson, 2000; Thomson and Boutilier, 2011). Gunningham
et al. (2004: 307) add that it governs the extent to which a
corporation is constrained to meet societal expectations and
avoid activities that societies (or influential elements within

0301-4207/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2012.04.002
 J. Prno, D. Scott Slocombe / Resources Policy 37 (2012) 346357
them) deem unacceptable, whether or not those expectations are
embodied in law. Some authors have even stated securing a SLO
is one of the most significant challenges mining companies now
face (e.g., Deloitte Global Services Limited, 2010; Ernst and Young,
2011; Joyce and Thomson, 2000).
While SLO may be issued by society as a whole (e.g., govern-
ments, communities, the general public and media), local commu-
nities are often a key arbiter in the process by virtue of their
proximity to projects, sensitivity to effects, and ability to affect
project outcomes. The power to grant (or withhold) a SLO has thus
enabled some mining communities to become particularly influential
governance actors in the mineral development process. Although
there exists a relatively large body of research on community
participation in natural resource management (e.g., Agrawal and
Gibson, 1999; Berkes et al., 1991; Cleaver, 1999; Innes and Booher,
2004; Krick et al., 2005; OFaircheallaigh, 2009; Raik et al., 2008;
Rowe and Frewer, 2000; Sinclair et al., 2008; Webler and Renn, 1995)
and valuable work has been conducted on community participation
in mining projects more specifically (e.g., Baker and McLelland, 2003;
ICMM, 2010; IIED and WBCSD, 2002; Jepsen et al., 2005; Kemp,
2010; McAllister and Alexander, 1997; OFaircheallaigh, 1999; Veiga
et al., 2001; Zillman et al., 2002), there has been by comparison very
little analytic and theoretical work focussed specifically on the SLO.
What literature does exist on SLO can perhaps best be described as
emerging, although the topic is one of growing interest in mining
industry and scholarly circles.
Methods
In an effort to develop a more nuanced understanding of the
origins of SLO and its implications for mineral resource develop-
ment, this paper describes and assesses key governance and
institutional arrangements from which the SLO has evolved.
Because each mineral development context is unique, the focus
is on one region in particular northern Canada although many
of the insights provided are relevant to other jurisdictions. North-
ern Canada is a good place to examine governance due to its active
mining sector and future mineral potential, complex regulatory
and stakeholder environment, pressures for collaborative manage-
ment, and unique approaches to sustainable development. Simi-
larly, mining is a good case because of its combination of positive
contributions and potentially contentious effects.
Research for this paper was conducted using an institutional
analysis approach (e.g., Clark, 2002; Young et al., 2008), with
information derived from a comprehensive literature review. Insti-
tutions, which are defined as the rights, rules and decision-making
procedures that give rise to social practice (Young et al., 2008), are
key to understanding how sustainability outcomes are produced (or
not). Institutional analysts generally aim to identify and assess the
various institutional rules and procedures that are relevant to an
area of investigation, with the intention of developing a better
appreciation of why initiatives aimed at achieving sustainability
(e.g., a SLO) have emerged, succeeded or failed. Thus, an appreciation
of the institutional context will naturally lead to a better under-
standing of the governance context, and the challenges and oppor-
tunities associated with each. These matters are explored more
fully below.
Theory: Emergence and definition of SLO in the mining sector
SLO as an emerging concept
In the budding literature on SLO a small number of studies
have been identified that are applicable to a mining context. For
347
example, a number of authors have made recommendations for
obtaining a SLO with local communities, which include the need
for early, ongoing communication; transparent disclosure of
information; development of conflict resolution mechanisms;
and culturally appropriate decision-making (Business for Social
Responsbility, 2003; Social License Task Group, 2009; Goldstuck
and Hughes, 2010). Nelsen and Scoble (2006), however, used
mining industry surveys to identify success factors for earning a
social license. These included maintaining a positive corporate
reputation; understanding local culture, language and history;
educating local stakeholders about the project; and ensuring open
communication among all stakeholders. Nelsen and Scoble (2006)
further highlight the value of situational analysis in mine plan-
ning, which asks researchers to examine the various political,
economic, social, and technological factors that may affect SLO
outcomes.
Thomson and Boutilier (2011), on the other hand, identify
three normative components of the SLO (i.e., legitimacy, cred-
ibility, and trust) and four levels of social license (i.e., withdrawal,
acceptance, approval, identification with the project psychologi-
cally). They posit that moving from legitimacy, through credibil-
ity, to full trust, is a process of building and balancing the social
capital in the relationships between the company and local
stakeholders (the stakeholder network). The key to a commu-
nitys capacity to issue a meaningful SLO is the pattern of social
capital it has in its network structure; this capital comes from
structural (e.g., the degree to which a company is connected into a
community network), relational (e.g., the degree to which reci-
procity, shared identity, and trust exist between a company and
community), and cognitive (e.g., the degree to which mutual
understanding and agreement between the parties in a relation-
ship exists) sources. Thomson and Boutilier (2011) further note
that companies have to learn how to participate in the kind of
community partnerships that earn a SLO, and communities who
want mining have to develop the social structure that makes
them capable of issuing a legitimate, credible, trustworthy, SLO.
Nelsen and Scoble (2006) and Thomson and Boutilier (2011)
present novel, yet complementary assessments of SLO in the
mining sector. Nelsen and Scoble (2006) base their assessment on
how SLO may be obtained from the perspective of industry, while
Thomson and Boutilier (2011) consider SLO from the point of
view of the community and what their expectations are and
experiences have been. However, the role governance and institu-
tional arrangements play in shaping SLO processes and outcomes
have not yet been explicitly considered in the literature. This is an
area in need of further investigation and is the focus of this paper.
Insights can also be gleaned from other studies on SLO. For
example, Lynch-Wood and Williamson (2007) have described the
effectiveness of the SLO in the context of small and medium
enterprises. They conclude that small and medium sized firms
rarely embrace the SLO, because of the absence of societal and
market-driven pressures more commonly associated with large
firms. While their focus was not on mining per se, Lynch-Wood
and Williamsons (2007) findings are noteworthy because of their
potential relevance to junior mining and exploration firms. These
firms tend to have smaller numbers of staff and resources
available, and are rarely the focus of the same types of market,
shareholder, and media scrutiny as major mining firms. In any
case, industry organizations like the Prospectors and Developers
Association of Canada (PDAC) have increasingly promoted the
necessity of developing good relations with local communities at
all stages of development, in part to maintain the reputation of
the industry and help ensure greater saleability of junior projects
to larger, more reputation-sensitive firms. Gunningham et al.
(2004), on the other hand, examined corporate motivations in
the international pulp and paper industry for obtaining a SLO.
348 J. Prno, D. Scott Slocombe / Resources Policy 37 (2012) 346357
They found that corporations may contemplate going beyond
regulatory compliance for reasons closely connected with the
perceived terms of their social license, although the extent to
which they do so may be constrained by economic considerations.
From these previous studies and drawing on insights from our
own research, it is evident the SLO can usefully be conceptualized
as both a goal and a set of rules (i.e., an institution) that must be
followed. For mining companies, a SLO reduces social risk and
helps allow operations to continue without community conflict.
For local communities, the granting of a SLO often implies they
have been meaningfully involved in decision making and have
received sufficient benefit from the project. The securing of a SLO
is thus a goal both parties have in most cases; however, it is also
acknowledged that some projects may never receive community
support because community-mining company expectations are
beyond reconciliation.
The SLO can also be seen as an institution (i.e., sets of rights,
rules and decision-making procedures), where SLO rules (i.e., the
expectations both parties have in regards to one another) are
negotiated between mining companies and local communities
throughout the mining lifecycle. Nelsen (2006: 161) says the SLO
creates a forum for negotiation whereby the parties involved are
heard, understood and respected. Negotiated should perhaps be
used loosely here, and refer only to the general process by which
each partys expectations are made apparent and incorporated (or
not) into the SLO. Arguably, this process consists of both formal
(e.g., face-to-face negotiation of agreements) and informal (e.g.,
community expectations may be implicit and embedded in wider
cultural norms not immediately apparent to a mining company)
activities.
Nevertheless, SLO is a highly normative concept and not all
mining contexts are necessarily amenable to its issuance. For one,
it appears that broad mining sustainability principles must be met
before a community even considers granting its approval for a
project (i.e., communities must believe the social, environmental,
and economic benefits of a project outweigh its potential impacts).
Furthermore, some communities may never come to agree that
mining, in any form, is an acceptable livelihood and will only
support non-extractive forms of development. Some companies,
on the other hand, may engage in irresponsible behavior to help
advance their projects. The legitimacy of a SLO is thus called into
question when corrupt (e.g., paying of bribes to local officials,
issuance of graft), harmful (e.g., use of intimidation and abuse) or
deceitful (e.g., purposefully concealing mining impacts from local
communities) practices are used by industry to obtain it.
The SLO is also inherently complex and can be characterized
by dynamic terms, intangibility, and multi-faceted interactions
with its broader setting. The SLO is time- and context-specific and
thus reflective of local social, economic, and environmental
conditions; community priorities, capacities, and expectations
will vary depending on the setting. Furthermore, mining compa-
nies can rarely point to a physical document that indicates a
license has been issued. While companycommunity contracts
like Impact and Benefit Agreements (IBAs) are steps towards
greater certainty, this certainty is arguably never assured as
community perspectives will not only vary internally, but may
change over time (Fidler and Hitch, 2007; Prno et al., 2010;
Thomson and Boutilier, 2011). The SLO also resides within a
larger socialecological system, in which it, other stakeholders,
institutions, and contextual variables interact to produce out-
comes. Combined with inevitable surprises and uncertainties,
these factors can present significant challenges for mining com-
panies attempting to establish a SLO with local communities. This
understanding of SLO is perhaps best described using a complex
systems approach, which Prno and Slocombe (in preparation)
detail in a separate paper.
A growing focus on sustainability
The SLO has emerged in part because of societys recent
embrace of the sustainable development paradigm. While the
term sustainable development has been applied in different
ways since the inception of its use in contemporary discourse
nearly 25 years ago, the most commonly used definition comes
from the Brundtland Commissions report Our Common Future. In
this report, sustainable development is defined as development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED,
1987). The concept arose out of recognition that a new, less
harmful long-term strategy for global development was needed
and that social, economic, and environmental issues should be
solved in an integrated manner (Mitchell, 2002; Speth and Haas,
2006).
Interpretations of the concept vary depending on the view-
point of the observer. Proponents of a strong sustainability
approach (or what some might consider similar to a deep
ecology perspective) generally believe that all natural resources
should be maintained at adequate levels to provide for an
indefinite supply (Ali, 2009). More radical proponents of this
approach propose a new worldview where liberalism, capitalism,
and democracy are no longer the organizing principles of society;
rather, eco-centrism, grassroots democracy, decentralization, and
planning based on bioregions should prevail (McKenzie, 2002).
Proponents of a weak sustainability approach (or what some
might consider similar to a shallow ecology perspective), on the
other hand, focus not on resource quantities, but rather on the
aggregate stock of natural and human capital that is available (Ali,
2009). This is a more incremental and moderate approach whose
ideas can be accommodated within our existing liberal demo-
cratic and capitalistic traditions (McKenzie, 2002). In both cases,
achieving sustainability will require changes to social norms, and
the development of new institutions and organizational forms
(Brunckhorst, 2002; Clark, 2002).
The weak sustainability approach is particularly relevant to
mineral development activities. For one, it accommodates the
reality of a world where certain flows of minerals are required to
achieve development objectives and maintain adequate liveli-
hoods (IIED and WBCSD, 2002). While the approach acknowl-
edges mineral development can certainly be done better, a world
where no new mineral resources are extracted is not likely to
occur in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, it supports the
argument that extraction of non-renewable mineral resources
can transform natural capital into other needed forms of capital
(Waye et al., 2010). When considering the sustainability of
mining activities, one must also consider the various stages of
mineral development: prospecting, exploration, feasibility studies
and construction, mine operation, and closure and reclamation
(ICMM, 2010; Veiga et al., 2001). Thus, a sustainable approach to
mining is one that integrates social, environmental, and economic
considerations into the planning processes from the first stages of
exploration until post-mine closure (McAllister and Fitzpatrick,
2010).
Public participation and local empowerment in decision mak-
ing are central tenets of the sustainable development approach
(Hilson and Basu, 2004; Hilson and Murck, 2000; Pring and Noe,
2002; Veiga et al., 2001). The general rationales are that public
participation contributes not only to the improved substance of
decision-making (e.g., when community members are able to
meaningfully participate in resource management decisions that
affect them, substantively better and more equitable solutions are
often devised), but that public participation is an end in itself;
that is, the process of decision making is improved because of it
(e.g., participation provides community members an opportunity
 J. Prno, D. Scott Slocombe / Resources Policy 37 (2012) 346357
to learn about the potential impacts and benefits of a project,
voice concerns, and discuss potential challenges and opportu-
nities) (Barton, 2002; Diduck, 2010; Eden, 1996; Funtowicz and
Ravetz, 1993; Innes and Booher, 2004; Mitchell, 2002;
OFaircheallaigh, 2009; Parkins and Mitchell, 2005; Pring and
Noe, 2002). When participation activities enable social learning
opportunities in communities, the transition to sustainability is
said to be particularly enhanced (Gibson et al., 2005; Sinclair
et al., 2008). Participation is also a key concept underpinning the
principles and practice of democracy and environmental govern-
ance (Ali-Khan and Mulvihill, 2008; Sinclair and Diduck, 1995;
Webler and Renn, 1995; WRI, 2003).
Contemporary drivers of community participation are a key to
understanding the emergence of SLO in the mining sector; with-
out opportunities for active participation and empowerment,
communities are much less likely to issue their approval and
support for a mining project. Of course, certain participatory
models allow communities to be involved more directly than
others. Bowen et al. (2010) identify a continuum of community
participation approaches which include transactional, transi-
tional, and transformational forms. Generally, Bowen et al.s
(2010) framework conceptualizes participation processes in
terms of differing power, control, and decision-making authority
vested in a community. Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)
has also emerged globally as an important model for community
involvement in resource development decision-making. Broadly,
FPIC requires that affected communities agree, or grant their
consent to a project before it goes ahead. This consent must also
be free (i.e., it must be entirely voluntary), prior (i.e., it must be
obtained before permission is granted to a proponent to proceed
with a proposed project that will affect the communities), and
informed (i.e., affected people know as much about their rights
and the proposed project as do the proponents, so that both sides
can negotiate with equality of information) (Goodland, 2004).
While similarities between FPIC and SLO certainly exist (e.g., both
concepts have a goal of securing community support for a
proposed undertaking), there are important differences that
distinguish the two concepts. Many of these differences have
already been described by Thomson and Boutilier (2011), but are
worth re-iterating.
First, FPIC is primarily recognized as a duty of the state. The
key international instruments from which FPIC has derived (e.g.,
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples and International Labor Organization Convention 169)
call for states, not industry, to ensure consent is granted from
affected communities before proposed undertakings occur (Lehr
and Smith, 2010; Sosa, 2011). SLO, however, is something project
proponents can obtain without state involvement (this distinction
becomes especially relevant where weak governance may pre-
clude a states ability to effectively guarantee FPIC). In any case,
some observers (e.g., Sosa, 2011) have advocated for FPICs uptake
by industry and other non-state entities. Second, the goal of FPIC
is to ensure consent is obtained before a project goes ahead
(Goodland, 2004); it is not readily concerned with maintaining
consent after a project has already been approved. SLO takes a
longer-term view and considers the need to maintain community
support throughout a projects lifecycle. Third, FPIC, at least as
stated in the United Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples and International Labor Organization Convention 169, is
focussed on relations with indigenous peoples; SLO does not
differentiate between the types of communities it applies to. SLO
and FPIC can also be differentiated based on their degree of
formality, with FPIC being the more formal of the two. For example,
Lehr and Smith (2010: 8) note that consent is best understood as a
formalized, documented, and verifiable social license to operate
obtained in addition to the normal engagement processes that
349
companies utilize. Thus, SLO and FPIC can be distinguished from
one another based on these important differences.
Efforts to understand the emergence of SLO would be incom-
plete, however, without also exploring the role of governance and
institutions. Sound governance and institutional arrangements
are fundamental to achieving sustainability objectives (Biermann,
2008; Brunckhorst, 2002; Campbell, 2007; Imperial, 1999; Kemp
et al., 2005; Mehta et al., 1999; Young, 2008a), and thus have a
particularly important role in the evolution of SLO.
A changing governance landscape
While the term governance has been used in many different
ways, it generally implies that shifts in traditional roles of
governing have occurred, whereby governing mechanisms no
longer rest on the authority and sanctions of the government
alone (Glasbergen, 1998; Kooiman, 2003; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker,
1998; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004). These shifts have
been both vertical (e.g., political power has moved up to transna-
tional levels of government and down to local communities) and
horizontal (e.g., political power has moved from government
actors towards non-government actors) (Eckerberg and Joas,
2004). In this light, governance is different than the concept of
government which Stoker (1998: 1) says has come to mean the
formal institutions of the state and their monopoly of legitimate
coercive power; it is a broader concept than government and
covers both state and non-state actors. As a result of these shifts,
the boundaries between the public, private and voluntary sectors
have now changed and distinctions between civil society and the
state have blurred (Rhodes, 1997). These shifts are especially
relevant to the emergence of SLO, as they have helped enable the
voices of mining affected communities to become much more
influential in mineral development decision making and political
processes.
The process of governing is an important part of governance.
As Stoker (1998: 18) notes: the value of the governance per-
spective rests in its capacity to provide a framework for under-
standing changing processes of governing. Van Kersbergen and
Van Waarden (2004) note that governing processes include
negotiation, accommodation, concertation, cooperation and alli-
ance formation rather than the traditional processes of coercion,
command and control. Kooiman (2003: 13) stresses interaction
as a central component of the governance perspective, which he
defines as a mutually influencing relation between two or more
actors or entities. Outcomes are also a focus of the governance
perspective. For example, Kooiman (2003: 4) notes that governing
is aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal oppor-
tunities, while Glasbergen (1998: 2) states governance is a goal-
oriented activity. Others, like Rhodes (1997), focus on the role of
networks in governance. A network describes the several inter-
dependent actors involved in delivering services, through inter-
organizational linkages (Rhodes, 1997). In these networks,
hierarchy or monocratic leadership is less important, if not absent
(Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004).
Finally, the governance perspective recognizes the importance
of institutions (Kooiman, 2003; Paavola, 2007; Saunier and
Meganck, 2009; Stoker, 1998). Governance systems may include
several institutions operating simultaneously (Biermann, 2008;
WRI, 2003); these institutions can operate both as proximate
forces (i.e., affecting the impact of underlying forces) and as a
driver of underlying forces (e.g., population growth, consumption
patterns) (Young, 2008b). They can be enabling (e.g., incentive-
based) and constraining (e.g., regulation-based), formal (e.g., law-
based) and informal (e.g., custom-based) (Mehta et al., 1999).
They are durable social structures made up of symbolic elements,
social activities, and material resources (Scott, 2008). In this
350 J. Prno, D. Scott Slocombe / Resources Policy 37 (2012) 346357
sense, they are different from organizations, which can be defined
as a social group with a structure to achieve collective goals
(UNDP, 1997). Institutions are the rules of the game while
organizations are the players in these institutions (Young, 2008b).
The process of governance governing can thus be defined as:
y the totality of interactions, in which public as well as
private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems
or creating societal opportunities; attending to the institutions
as contexts for these governing interactions; and establishing a
normative foundation for all those activities (Kooiman, 2003: 4).
Governance, more broadly, can be defined as the totality of
theoretical conceptions on governing (Kooiman, 2003: 4).
Perspectives from the field of environmental governance build
on these conceptualizations and generally imply that solutions to
contemporary environmental issues (i.e., sustainability issues,
more broadly) can be found in many types and mixtures of
regulatory (e.g., laws, policies) and non-regulatory (e.g., voluntary
initiatives, civil oversight) tools. The World Resources Institute
(2003: 1) describes it simply as the process of how we make
environmental decisions and who makes them. Environmental
governance shifts have been particularly salient in the mining
sector in recent years and largely dedicated to improving the
industrys social and environmental performance (Brereton, 2004;
IIED and WBCSD, 2002; McAllister and Fitzpatrick, 2010). As
governance has evolved, three fundamental aspects of a positive
climate for mineral development have now been altered: access
to land, ease and speed of permitting, and the right to mine
deposits after discovery. Mining companies have had to come to
terms with these new governance requirements in order to
survive (MacDonald and Gibson, 2006).
Governance as a whole has arisen to confront the growing
diversity, dynamics, and complexity of society, recognizing that
no single governing agency is able to realize legitimate and
effective outcomes by itself (Kooiman, 2003). Modern patterns
of environmental governance are also said to be a result of
increased societal demands for sustainable development, the
spread of globalization and neoliberalism, and a belief that
alternative modes of governance can in fact lead to better out-
comes (Campbell, 2003; Dashwood, 2005; Eisner, 2004; Kemp
et al., 2005; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Reed, 2002; Schiavi and
Soloman, 2007; Sonnenfeld and Mol, 2002). More specifically,
Jordan et al. (2003) identify a general governance turn in recent
years, of which environmental governance is a part. This turn
reflects shifting public norms around the role of the state in
society and economy; in short it is increasingly held that the state
not seek to interfere in every facet of social and economic life.
Cashore and Vertinsky (2000) further note that, in the context of
environmental governance, this turn is partly attributable to the
reduction of resources available to policy makers and enforcers in
the late 1990s, which forced them to look for other means of
achieving their environmental objectives. It is also understood
that environmental governance has partly arisen because of the
limitations of conventional, state-led, command and control
environmental management (Bryant and Wilson, 1998; Fiorino,
1999; Gibson, 1999; Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002; Holling and
Meffe, 1996; Kettl, 2002; Kooiman, 2003; Lemos and Agrawal,
2006).
Governance outcomes are rarely the result of simple processes
and may be influenced by a range of contextual factors, environ-
mental variables, or the actions and behaviors of individuals. The
following section considers this broader, complex governance
context and the various institutional and governance arrange-
ments that have enabled the emergence of SLO in northern
Canadas mining sector.
Discussion: Understanding SLO in northern Canadas mining
sector through governance
Conceptualizing SLO in northern Canadas mining sector
requires a framework through which to organize major themes
and patterns. This section uses a slightly modified version of
Lemos and Agrawals (2006) governance framework,1 and inves-
tigates the emergence of SLO from state, market, civil society, and
hybrid governance perspectives (see Fig. 1), although it is
acknowledged that clear distinctions between these perspectives
do not always exist. A synthesis of this discussion is provided at
the end of the section.
State governance
The development of laws and enforcement of regulations have
traditionally been seen as the best way to ensure corporate and
environmental compliance (Eisner, 2004; Gibson, 1999), and
regulation has always been the favoured response to environ-
mental problems by the public (Winfield, 2009). In this regard,
conventional state-led environmental regulation has had many
successes and it has been consistently demonstrated that industry
responds to regulation and the real possibility of enforcement
(Gibson, 1999; CIELAP, 2000; US EPA, 2000; Winfield, 2009).
Current trends also reveal a continuing desire for the use of
government authority, as state intervention and legal regulation
of the mining sector is actually increasing around the world (Pring
and Noe, 2002; Brereton, 2004; Deloitte, 2010). While governance
shifts may have moved power away from the state in recent
years, it nevertheless remains an important governing actor
(Ballard and Banks, 2003; Kooiman, 2003; Eckerberg and Joas,
2004; Kemp et al., 2005). In any case, government regulation can
act as a significant driver of community participation in the
mining sector and motivate corporate actors to obtain a SLO.
To start, the policy process is rarely contained completely
within the state apparatus. Decision making is often the result of
input from various stakeholders, a process perhaps best described
using the policy network approach. Policy networks are a key to
understanding how power is exercised in government and who
benefits from its use. They limit participation in the policy
process, and decide which issues will be included on the policy
agenda (Rhodes, 1997). The term is often used to describe the
involvement of major societal groups in policy (e.g., state, corpo-
rate, and interest-based groups), although the degree of influence
each has over government policy will vary depending on the type
of network present (Van Waarden, 1992). Hessing et al. (2005)
note that policy networks exist where actors are bound together
by common material interests that lead to significant ongoing
interaction within a general framework of policy ideas. Civil
society actors now play an increasingly important role in the
policy process; in the northern Canadian mining context, Abori-
ginal organizations and communities are seen as some of the
most influential actors. This partly owes to the fact that mineral
exploration and development frequently occurs in remote regions
which are inhabited by Aboriginal populations; in Canada there
are approximately 1200 Aboriginal communities within 200 km
of mines and exploration properties (MAC, 2009).
Canadas constitution is one of the primary institutions guid-
ing state activities. It is the supreme law with which all other
laws must conform and creates important divisions between
national, provincial, and territorial powers. These divisions can
1
Lemos and Agrawals (2006) community mode has been replaced with the
broader notion of civil society, and their use of partnerships to describe private
social and publicprivate hybrid modes has been replaced with arrangements to
avoid presumptions of mutual aims actually being satisfied.
 J. Prno, D. Scott Slocombe / Resources Policy 37 (2012) 346357 351

STATE

Federal
Regulation
Provincial /
Territorial / Flag State
Regional Oversight
Regulation n
International
Commitments

Co-Management Public-Private
Arrangements Arrangements

Social Licence to
Operate in Northern
Canadas Mining Sector

Other
Aboriginal Market-
Rights and Driven
Governance Markets Processes
and
Civil Regulation Economies Corporate Social
By local communities (Generally) Responsibility (CSR)
and civil society Initiatives
(generally) Private-Social Firm-level initiatives
By NGOs Arrangements Sectoral initiatives
Non-sectoral initiatives

CIVIL SOCIETY MARKET

Fig. 1. Key governance and institutional arrangements enabling the emergence of SLO in northern Canadas mining sector (adapted from Lemos and Agrawal, 2006).

best be described using the federalism model, which describes a
system of government divided into two orders of governments.
Provinces and the federal government both have full control over
some specific jurisdictions, while in other matters both levels
share power (Grace and Sheldrick, 2006; Harrison, 1996;
Muldoon et al., 2009). Conversely, the three northern territories
Northwest Territories, Yukon, and Nunavut have powers
designated under federal legislation, not by the constitution.
The authority of the territories is in some cases limited by the
fact that they do not have jurisdiction over Crown lands, they
have limited taxation powers, and they are dependent on the
federal government for large portions of their budget. However,
ongoing devolution processes have transferred a range of powers
and decision making authority to the territories from the federal
government (Johns, 2006; White, 2009). As will be discussed later,
forms of Aboriginal self-government have also emerged to chal-
lenge traditional conceptions of the federalism model.
The constitution thus enabled the creation of the modern rules
that govern ownership and access to mineral resources; prospect-
ing, staking and exploration activities; approval, operating and
closure requirements; and public access to information and
participation in mineral development activities (CIELAP, 2000;
Lucas, 2002; McAllister and Fitzpatrick, 2010; Muldoon et al.,
2009; Whyte and Cumming, 2004). Depending on the type of
mining operation, the minerals extracted, and the political jur-
isdiction a mine falls in, these regulations may vary or other
regulations may apply. Environmental assessment (EA), however,
is arguably one of the most important state institutions specifi-
cally meant to address sustainability and community-related
considerations for mining projects. EA is a systematic process
designed to identify, predict, and propose management measures
concerning the possible implications that a proposed projects
actions may have for the environment, and includes various
provisions for community participation and consultation in its
use (Noble, 2010). Hanna (2009: 4) notes it is now one of the
more consistent and unquestionably powerful instruments for
environmental management in Canada, while Noble (2010: 2)
argues EA is now among the most widely practiced environ-
mental management tools in the world. White (2009: 135)
further describes northern Canadian EA as high quality with a
record of solid accomplishment y assuring that the concerns
and the approaches of the local Aboriginal people are taken into
account in decision making. Indeed, EA has been instrumental in
resource development decision-making in northern Canada since
the Berger Inquirys seminal no-go decision on the first proposed
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline (see Berger, 1977).
Most mining projects in northern Canada are subject to some
form of EA legislation, whether provincial, territorial, federal, or
land-claims based. EA is co-managed between Aboriginal and
state actors in the territories, although the federal government
retains an overriding authority over EA conducted in Nunavut and
the Northwest Territories. In Yukon, final decision making
352 J. Prno, D. Scott Slocombe / Resources Policy 37 (2012) 346357
authority may include federal, territorial, and/or First Nations
governments (White, 2009). In Canada, EA is often the primary
stage where mining-community conflicts are played out and
contentious development decisions are made. Numerous resource
development projects have been held up at this stage because of
community conflict and disapproval (e.g., Berger, 1977; Bone,
2009; Federal Review Panel, 2010; Joint Review Panel, 2007;
MVEIRB, 2004, 2007; Poelzer, 2002; White, 2009); an obvious
motivation for other companies to build ample community
support for their projects. The EA process continues to grow in
use and importance; Gibson (2002) notes that EA has evolved to
be used earlier in planning, become more open and participative,
comprehensive, mandatory, closely monitored, widely applied,
integrative, ambitious, and humble. Similarly, there has been
growing desire for and application of sustainability-based assess-
ments, which force decision makers to give serious attention to
sustainability requirements for a given undertaking (Gibson,
2002; Gibson, 2006a, b; Noble, 2002; Pope et al., 2004).
Mineral development activities are also affected by interna-
tional commitments made by the federal government. For exam-
ple, the Government of Canada is a signatory or supporter of
international conventions and agreements that pertain to com-
munity rights and participation (e.g., UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples), and sustainability more generally
(e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity; North American Agree-
ment on Environmental Cooperation). Arguably, international
agreements such as these serve to influence policy making and
decision making in Canada (Muldoon et al., 2009). There have also
been recent moves made by the federal government to regulate
and ensure Canadian mining companies operating overseas act in
a socially responsible manner (e.g., Curry, 2010; DFAITC, 2011).
While this type of flag state intervention has been minimal to
date, its use continues to be lobbied for Campbell (2003), Clapp
(2005), MiningWatch (2010).
Market governance
Market-oriented governance initiatives generally assign a key
role to the price mechanism for achieving change (Glasbergen,
1998), whereby outcomes are a result of actors making a careful
calculation of monetary costs and benefits associated with parti-
cular strategies (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). In the mining sector,
this mode of governance is often associated with forms of corporate
self-regulation such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initia-
tives (Reed, 2002). However, market-oriented tools also encompass
forms of certification, ecolabeling, ecotaxes, and subsidies (Cashore,
2002; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). These tools are generally pro-
moted because of the belief they are more flexible and can be
adopted and implemented more efficiently than regulation (Gibson,
1999). They are also seen as a means for corporations to confront
continuing public pressures to engage in sustainable forms of
development (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998; Dashwood, 2005). Simi-
larly, it is now recognized that business is an important governance
actor and has a role to play in the development of solutions to
sustainability problems (Hawken, 1993). Hart (1997: 67) has even
proposed that corporations are the only organizations with the
resources, the technology, the global reach, and ultimately, the
motivation to achieve sustainability.
Market and economic factors play a primary role in corporate
decision making, largely because of the profit motive that drives
corporate actors in a free market economy. In general terms,
mining companies seek to develop profitable ore bodies in order
to return profits to their shareholders. A mine becomes profitable
only if conditions related to ore quality and accessibility, ore
deposit size, production, pricing, and proximity to markets are
met. Regulatory, environmental, and social variables further add
to the economic equation (de la Vergne, 2003; Whyte and
Cumming, 2004; Gordon and Tilton, 2008; Russell et al., 2010).
Mining is also a highly capital intensive industry, requiring large
investment commitments in order to bring projects into devel-
opment. Because of these constraining variables, few exploration
projects ever become operating mines.2 For those projects that
enter into production, economic motivations will continue to
drive corporate decision making although it is increasingly
realized that profit seeking and social responsibility are not
necessarily divergent goals (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998; Carroll
and Shabana, 2010). Of course, mining projects are also affected
by broader economic trends as was evidenced in the global
economic downturn of 20082009. During this period the
demand for and price of many minerals fell significantly and a
number of mine closures, production cuts, and project delays
occurred as a result (MAC, 2010).
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives are arguably
the most utilized market-oriented tools for obtaining a SLO in the
mining sector. CSR encompasses the idea that businesses have
some responsibilities to society beyond that of only making
profits for their shareholders. Thus, corporations have not only
economic and legal obligations, but ethical and philanthropic
responsibilities as well (Carroll, 1991). CSR in the mining sector
includes a number of activities such as firm-level (e.g., corporate
sustainability reporting), sectoral (e.g., the Mining Association of
Canadas Towards Sustainable Mining Initiative), and non-sectoral
initiatives (e.g., the Global Reporting Initiative). The motivations
that firms may have for taking on CSR initiatives have been
described by a number of authors (e.g., Auld et al., 2008; Berry
and Rondinelli, 1998; Borck and Coglianese, 2009; Carroll and
Shabana, 2010; Clausen and McAllister, 2001; Dashwood, 2005;
Gibson, 1999; Hart, 1995; Hart, 1997; Porter and Van der Linde,
1995; Wheeler et al., 2003). Kurucz et al., (2008), however, have
summarized the business case for CSR into four categories: cost
and risk reduction (e.g., socially responsible firms will face
reduced public and regulatory scrutiny), competitive advantage
(e.g., socially responsible firms will be differentiated in the
marketplace), building reputation and legitimacy (e.g., socially
responsible firms will be viewed positively by society and sanc-
tioned to operate), and synergistic value creation (e.g., where
firms can create value for both stakeholders and the firm).
Companies are thus motivated to embrace CSR because of the
potential benefits it can deliver.
Stakeholder management is an important dimension of CSR
and especially relevant to the emergence of SLO in the mining
sector. Indeed, stakeholder approaches have been said to offer the
best hope in effecting the pursuit of global as well as organiza-
tional sustainability (Wheeler et al., 2003). This line of thinking on
stakeholder management is perhaps best captured under the
rubric of stakeholder theory, which says a firm has certain
stakeholder obligations it must fulfill. In this sense, business is
essentially about creating value for stakeholders (Freeman et al.,
2007), who can be defined as any group or individual who can
affect, or who can be affected by, a corporation or its activities
(Freeman, 1984). Freeman et al. (2007) identify two types of
stakeholders: primary stakeholders (i.e., communities, customers,
employees, suppliers, and financiers) and secondary stakeholders
(i.e., consumer advocate groups, competitors, government, media,
and special interest groups). The stakeholder view is in contrast to
the traditional shareholder view of the firm, which states a firms
only duty is to maximize the profits of its shareholders (Friedman,
1970).
2
NRCan (2006) notes the success rate for grassroots exploration is extremely
low; fewer than 1 in 10,000 mineral showings discovered actually become a mine.
 J. Prno, D. Scott Slocombe / Resources Policy 37 (2012) 346357
Justification for stakeholder management can be described from
instrumental and normative perspectives. Instrumental perspec-
tives generally stress that high-quality stakeholder relations will
equate with increased corporate financial success (through an
improved corporate reputation, less public scrutiny, proactive
identification of risks, etc.), and that long-term value maximization
should remain the focus of corporate activities (Donaldson and
Preston, 1995; Jensen, 2002). Stakeholder theory can also be
justified in normative terms, whereby the ethical and moral
obligations a firm has to its constituents are seen to be at the core
of managing for stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995;
Freeman et al., 2007). Jones and Wicks (1999), however, argue
for a convergent stakeholder theory that is justified on normative
and instrumental grounds. They state there are no reasons stake-
holder theory cannot be both morally sound and practically viable.
While the list of stakeholders a mining company may have is
potentially quite long, only certain stakeholders ever receive
concerted company attention. Stakeholders become salient to
managers when they possess attributes of power, legitimacy,
and urgency of claim. The more of these attributes a stakeholder
possesses, the more salient they become (Mitchell et al., 1997).
The strength of stakeholder relationships is also governed by the
degree to which stakeholder interests are compatible with cor-
porate objectives, and whether their relationship with the com-
pany is necessary for corporate goals to be achieved (Friedman
and Miles, 2002). Because they posses many of these attributes,
local communities are an especially significant stakeholder in the
mining sector and have garnered increasing corporate attention.
Accordingly, the mining industry has implemented a progres-
sively greater number of CSR initiatives aimed at community
engagement and building SLO for individual projects. Increasing
evidence regarding the positive relationship between corporate
social performance and corporate financial performance (Carroll
and Shabana, 2010) could further enhance these trends.
Civil society governance
Civil society actors have gained increasing prominence in
resource and environmental decision making in recent years,
and civil regulation has gained notoriety for its ability to restrict
the range of behaviors available to economic and state actors
(Trebeck, 2008). Civil society can be defined as the space of
uncoerced human association and also the set of relational net-
works formed for the sake of the family, faith, interests and
ideology that fill this space (Walzer, 2003: 7), and generally
refers to social entities that operate outside the confines of the
market and the state. In particular, civil society is composed of
private organizations that are not profit distributing, are self-
governing, and composed of voluntary membership and contribu-
tions (Salamon et al., 1999). The call for civil society involvement
in environmental governance has been particularly strong (Ali-
Khan and Mulvihill, 2008) and is being accelerated by governance
shifts and the global embrace of sustainable development. In the
mining sector, it is local communities who often emerge as the
principal civil society actors at project sites; in Canada, these
communities are often Aboriginal (Canel et al., 2010; MacDonald
and Gibson, 2006; Veiga et al., 2001). These groups have grown
increasingly disillusioned with conventional mining practices and
have demanded greater benefits and more say in development
outcomes (IIED and WBCSD, 2002).
Aboriginal communities often become important governance
actors due to their proximity to a mining project. However,
Poelzer (2002) argues Aboriginal peoples have emerged as key
actors for additional reasons such as increased international
support and pressure for Aboriginal rights (e.g., through the
United Nations and other forums), growing Aboriginal political
353
efficacy (e.g., through the development of influential Aboriginal
organizations), of society generally permitting greater dissent
over time (thus providing opportunities for Aboriginal political
activism), and of legal and constitutional changes that have
supported Aboriginal rights and title to land. Perhaps the most
important of these changes was the constitutional recognition
and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. This recognition has in turn created a
distinct relationship between the Canadian state and Aboriginal
peoples of Canada, whereby the Crown now has certain duties in
regards to protecting Aboriginal rights (Hunter, 2006; Willms
et al., 2007). Aboriginal peoples thus play a unique role in
Canadian politics and can only be considered stakeholders in
the most general sense of the term (i.e., they can affect and be
affected by a corporation and its activities). Rather, Aboriginal
peoples are increasingly distinct government entities with powers
somewhat analogous to those of provinces. They cannot be
considered equal to other, conventional stakeholders (e.g., envir-
onmental and labor organizations, recreational users) (Poelzer,
2002).
Aboriginal rights and title have been clarified and interpreted
through a series of court decisions (e.g., Calder v. British Colum-
bia; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia; R. v. Sparrow; Haida Nation
v. British Columbia; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British
Columbia and Redfern Resources), but generally derive from
historic occupation and use of land, or from rights specifically
guaranteed in historical or modern treaties (Booth and Skelton,
2010). Comprehensive land claims (i.e., modern treaties) have
been negotiated in many parts of northern Canada and commonly
provide fee simple ownership of selected parcels of land, cash
payments and other economic benefits, and a mandate to estab-
lish Aboriginal self- and co-government arrangements (Hunter,
2006; White, 2009). The constitution further establishes the
Crowns duty to consult with Aboriginal communities when
their rights are likely to be infringed by resource development
activities. This is based on the fiduciary duty of the federal Crown
in relation to Aboriginal peoples (although some procedural
aspects of this duty are often delegated to industry); the require-
ments of which will vary with the circumstances of each indivi-
dual mining project. In cases where infringement on rights is
likely to be severe, Aboriginal consent may be required (Lucas,
2002; Willms et al., 2007). Combined, these legal and constitu-
tional measures have served to empower and strengthen the
position of Aboriginal communities dealing with resource devel-
opers looking to operate in their traditional territories, and have
necessitated the establishment of a SLO.
Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have also become
increasingly influential governance actors. NGOs have played
important intermediary roles in international development con-
texts, have raised public awareness about and participated in
forums on sustainability issues, and have successfully initiated
market campaigns aimed at consumers and irresponsible cor-
porations by threatening to damage brands (Kellow, 1999; Mayo
and Craig, 1995; McAllister and Alexander, 1997; ORourke,
2005). NGOs have in recent years focused greater attention on
mining sector issues, including those pertaining to local commu-
nities (Ali, 2009; Ballard and Banks, 2003; Brereton, 2004; IIED
and WBCSD, 2002; MacDonald and Gibson, 2006; Muradian et al.,
2003; Sarin, 2006; Veiga et al., 2001). Both large, multi-issue
NGOs and smaller, mining-focussed organizations have involved
themselves in public campaigns and government lobbying;
actions which in some cases have resulted in projects being
halted or companies being taken to court (e.g., Hood, 1995;
Kirsch, 2007). NGOs have now become critical agents for stimu-
lating greater corporate accountability through their power to
influence public opinion and challenge government policies (IIED
354 J. Prno, D. Scott Slocombe / Resources Policy 37 (2012) 346357
and WBCSD, 2002: 69). Where development projects have not
satisfied the demands of civil society and of local communities in
particular, shutdowns and slow-ups have frequently occurred;
events which further highlight the value of building community
support for project activities.
Hybrid governance
A number of hybridized governance arrangements have also
emerged in the mining sector in recent years, largely out of
recognition that some sustainability problems are too complex for
any one mode of governance to manage on its own (Lemos and
Agrawal, 2006). These include co-management, privatesocial,
and publicprivate arrangements. Co-management broadly refers
to various levels of integration between local and state level
management systems. It is the sharing of power and responsi-
bility between the government and local resource users, and is
often explicitly designed to recognize and incorporate local
knowledge systems (Berkes et al., 1991; White, 2009). It is usually
agreed that co-management contributes to encouraging commu-
nity-based development, decentralizing regulatory power, and
reducing conflict through consensus building and participatory
principles (Mitchell, 2002). In northern Canada, a number of co-
management boards have been created as a result of land claims
agreements. These boards oversee matters such as EA (e.g.,
Nunavut Impact Review Board, Mackenzie Valley Environmental
Impact Review Board) and other forms of environmental regula-
tion (e.g., Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board, Mackenzie
Valley Land and Water Board). Aboriginal people are involved not
only as decision makers on these boards, but as participants in the
regulatory process by way of public hearings and consultations
(White, 2009). Co-management has thus provided Aboriginal
communities with greater control over their traditional territories
and resources. Mining companies, in response, have had to
become more open and consultative with these communities
(MacDonald and Gibson, 2006).
The use of Impact and Benefit Agreements (IBAs) is increas-
ingly common in northern Canada and represents an exemplary
case of socialprivate arrangements in the mining sector. IBAs are
essentially supra-regulatory tools meant to address impacts from
mine developments and ensure benefits are delivered to Abori-
ginal communities located near to or impacted by those devel-
opments (Galbraith et al., 2007). They are negotiated directly
between mine developers and Aboriginal communities with
limited if any state involvement. Provisions that could be nego-
tiated and included in an IBA are potentially wide-ranging, but for
Aboriginal signatories commonly include: recognition of rights;
royalty-type payments; opportunities for employment, training,
and community economic development; and additional environ-
mental and cultural protection measures (Kennett, 1999; Public
Policy Forum, 2005; Sosa and Keenan, 2001). For industry signa-
tories IBAs serve a variety of aims, the most significant of which is
the securing of a social license (Lapierre and Bradshaw, 2008).
Publicprivate arrangements also exist in northern Canadas
mining sector. These have taken the form of socio-economic
agreements meant to address territorial economic development
and ensure socio-economic reporting for mining projects, and
environmental agreements negotiated between government and
industry that focus on mining project mitigation, monitoring,
follow-up, and closure requirements (Couch, 2002; Galbraith
et al., 2007; GNWT, 2010). At the international level, agreements
between mining companies and national governments have also
been signed with the aim of ensuring greater financial and
supply-chain transparency, such as the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative and Kimberley Process. Seen together,
these hybrid mechanisms represent additional motivations
(or means, at least) for corporate actors to obtain a SLO for their
projects.
Synthesis
Fig. 1 summarizes the key governance and institutional
arrangements that have enabled the emergence of SLO in north-
ern Canadas mining sector. These include forms of state, market,
civil society and hybrid governance mechanisms operating in
various configurations. What is immediately apparent is the large
number of influences on SLO that exist. These influences may be
broad-based and applicable across jurisdictions (e.g., the growth
of the sustainable development paradigm and shifts in govern-
ance that have occurred), or unique to northern Canada and other
regions (e.g., the ongoing affirmation of Aboriginal rights and
governance, specific regulations and co-management arrange-
ments). More specifically, it is increasingly evident that each
SLO setting is unique; northern Canada was used as an example
above to help illustrate the context-specific nature of mining
companycommunity relations. SLO settings can also be charac-
terized as complex and fluid. From an industry perspective, this
complexity necessitates developing (and maintaining) a strong
understanding of relevant governance and institutional arrange-
ments, the linkages between them, and connections with other
pertinent social, economic, and environmental variables. In any
case, SLO analysts are well-advised to develop regional and/or
mine-specific assessments in order to more fully understand SLO
origins and implications in their own areas of investigation.
Conclusions
In the mining sector, local communities have emerged as
particularly important governance actors. Conventional approaches
to mineral development no longer suffice for these communities,
who have demanded a greater share of benefits and increased
involvement in decision making. These trends have been spurred
by the growth of the sustainable development paradigm and
governance shifts that have increasingly transferred governing
authority towards non-state actors. It is against this backdrop that
the need for mineral developers to obtain a social license to operate
from local communities has originated and evolved.
The mining sector governance regime from which SLO has
emerged is undoubtedly varied and complex. It involves multiple
state, market and civil society actors and institutions operating in
wide-ranging configurations. Through a governance lens, this paper
has sought to conceptualize the emergence of SLO in the mining
sector in order to better understand its complex origins and
implications for resource developers. It focused on one particular
mining region, northern Canada, to help demonstrate the unique
nature of each mineral development context and their influences on
SLO. A governance perspective is perhaps most valuable, however,
when it helps investigators and practitioners better assess, under-
stand, and craft governing outcomes. Owing to SLOs relatively recent
emergence in the mining sector, this type of work has just begun to
surface but will be increasingly required as the implications of poor
community relations become better understood. Which governance
models function best and in what combination, and how model
effectiveness varies through differing social, political, and economic
contexts are specific areas in need of further investigation.
Acknowledgements
This research has been supported by the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canadas Canada Graduate
 J. Prno, D. Scott Slocombe / Resources Policy 37 (2012) 346357
Scholarship Program, the Government of Canadas Northern
Scientific Research Training Program, WLU graduate scholarships,
and the Dr. John McMurry Research Chair in Environmental
Geography.
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