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Legal Medicine
Digest Cases
MARITIME FACTORS INC., Petitioner, vs. BIENVENIDO R.
HINDANG, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
The LA found that Danilo did not commit suicide, thus, the claim for
his death benefit must prosper. The NLRC rendered a Resolution which
affirmed in toto the LA decision. The CA denied the petition and affirmed
the NLRC resolutions.
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the LA, NLRC, and CA.
CARPIO, J.:
The second level court found the appellant guilty of illegal possession
and sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drugs. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC Decision.
Whether the guilt of Climaco for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of shabu, a dangerous drug, was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
Since what was seized (TR-B and TR-R) from Climaco at the time of
the buy-bust operation was different from the dangerous drugs submitted
(GSC1 and GSC2) to the forensic chemist for review and evaluation, the
chain of custody over the dangerous drugs was broken and the integrity of
the evidence submitted to the trial court was not preserved, casting doubt on
the guilt of Climaco.
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SOLOMON ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The petitioner was charged with Homicide for the shooting of Aurelio
Manalo, Jr. which resulted to his death. Petitioner assailed the prosecution
for its failure to conduct ballistics and paraffin tests. He presumed that no
such tests were made by the prosecution in order to "deliberately suppress"
the results thereof, which might exculpate him from the offense.
Whether the failure to conduct ballistic and paraffin test is fatal to the
prosecution of the crime.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals held that
petitioner had failed to prove by the requisite evidence her allegation of
forgery in the subject Deed of Absolute Sale.The Ca had further held that
the trial court had observed the correct process of identification first, by not
completely relying on the findings or statements by the handwriting expert
presented by appellant as to the existence of forgery in the questioned
document, and more important, in considering both similarities and
dissimilarities between the questioned signatures and the standard signatures
as to extract by such comparison between the two (2) sets of signatures the
habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in the
genuine writing. The apparent dissimilarities are overshadowed by the
striking similarities and therefore, fail to overcome the presumption of
validity in favor of the duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
On the first issue, the courts a quo had sufficient factual basis in
holding that the questioned signatures were not forgeries. Although there
were dissimilarities between the questioned and the standard signatures, the
CA also found between them "striking similarities as to indicate the habitual
and characteristic writing of the appellant. The apparent dissimilarities are
overshadowed by the striking similarities and, therefore, fail to overcome the
presumption of validity in favor of the duly notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale.
Anent the second issue, well-settled is the rule that expert opinion is
never conclusive. Courts may exercise discretion in accepting or overruling
the opinions of handwriting experts. Clear and convincing evidence is
required to overturn the presumption of validity of a notarized deed of
absolute sale. Absent such species of evidence, the presumption stands. The
Supreme Court cited from the book of Justice Francisco, a learned authority
in Remedial Law that: Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the
sense that they must be accepted as true on the subject of their testimony, but
are generally regarded as purely advisory in character; the courts may place
whatever weight they choose upon such testimony and may reject it, if they
find it is inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable.
NORA T. JIMENEZ, JOSEFINA T. GAVINO, LIBRADA T. DINO
and SUSAN T. JOVEN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ECUMENICAL MISSION AND RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES
and POLICARPIO CARUNGIN, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The petitioners asked for signature verification of the said deed of sale
by the NBI and the PC. In its Questioned Document Report No. 241-780 the
NBI made the finding that the sample and questioned signatures of Francisca
were not written by the same person, while no definite opinion was given as
to Nicanors signatures because of the insufficiency in numbers of his sample
signatures. The PC Crime Laboratory examination came to the conclusion
that the signatures of both Francisca and Nicanor were written by persons
other than the said spouses.
The RTC rendered its first decision of the case dismissing the
complaint of petitioners on the grounds of prescription and laches. The case
was appealed to the Supreme Court. It ruled that there was the case did not
prescribe and that there was no laches and remanded the case back to the
RTC. Upon remand, the court a quo rendered the herein assailed judgment in
favor of petitioners declaring the nullity of the deed of sale and the TCT No.
90689 due to forgery. The CA reversed the RTC holding that the signatures
were not forged. The appellate court doubted the findings of the NBI and the
PC handwriting experts, because the documents from which the sample
signatures were taken were either mere photocopies, or dated years away
from the questioned Deed of Sale of 1936.
In the case of Gamido vs. Court of Appeals (citing the case of Alcon
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 833), the Court held that the
authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense
that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular
biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion
of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is
certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a
specialist on a highly technical issue. A judge must therefore conduct an
independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
September 7, 2010
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, who
testified that as a security guard he was then assigned at 211
KatipunanAvenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, and that he was at a vantage
point wherein he couldrecognize the relative positions and participations of
the ambushers. In his KaragdagangSalaysay dated June 21, 1996 Alejo
positively identified Joel and a Lorenzo de los Santos during a police line-
up. Alejo confirmed these two as the persons who served as look outs and
had pointed a gun at him.
Whether the out of court identification by the lone witness for the
prosecution is valid.
The Supreme Court cited the case of People v. Teehankee, Jr. wherein
the SC explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to
determine the admissibility of such identification, thus:
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly gave probative
value to the testimony of the NBI Senior Document Examiner Caroline
MoldezPitoy, who categorically testified that the signatures of Julian and
Guillerma in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Whether the CA erred when it remanded the case to the RTC for DNA
analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of
Rogelio Ong.
NACHURA, J.:
CORONA, J.:
The medico-legal officer who conducted the tests determined that the
bloodstains found in appellants house were human blood. He testified that
the bloodstains were only two days old when she received the specimen four
days after the death of Evelyn. The prosecution had likewise failed to show
that Evelyn had blood type B meant that the bloodstains found were not the
deceaseds.
The Supreme Court found the accused guilty of parricide. It held that
the testimony of the medico legal officer as to the age of the bloodstains and
the failure of the prosecution to show that Evelyns blood type was B were
not fatal to the prosecutions case since the guilt of appellant was
sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOJO MUSA y
SANTOS,ROBERT CARIO yFERRERAS, AUGUST DAYRIT y
HERNANDEZ, CESAR DOMONDON, JR.y SACRIZ, and MICHAEL
GARCIA y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellants.
BRION, J.:
The victim was with his girlfriend Nancy G. Bonifacio when the
robbery happened and she identified the assailants. Nancy testified that both
she and Harold had identified the assailants. Aside from the in-court
identification she was also shown photographs and made a previous out-of-
court photographic identification in the hospital.Nancy significantly testified
that other pictures, aside from the pictures of the assailants, were shown to
her and to Harold at the hospital. From these pictures, they were able to
identify the perpetrators of the crime.
Another witness, Ryan Del Rosario, had also identified the accused as
the perpetrators. Ryan admitted executing a sworn statement before the
police five days after the robbery. He admitted having been told by the
police that the persons detained were the suspects in the robbery before he
identified them.
BRION, J.:
Appellant was charged before the RTC with the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and imposed the death penalty. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the accused.
TINGA, J.:
The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted
in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as
"BBB."In view of that fact, as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito,
the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not Umanito is the father of
BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of the appeal. Thus, the SC
directed the appellant, AAA and her child to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.
PERALTA, J.:
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his
mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the
assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics
and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer. While admittedly the Court was unable to fully comprehend all the
differences noted by Sorra given that her testimony was fairly technical in
nature and description, it would, however, not be amiss to state that it Court
has observed a good number of the differences noted by her.
DIGESTED FOREIGN CASES
SHEILA YVONNE BERMAN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. LABORATORY
CORPORATION OF AMERICA d/b/a LAB CORP, INC.,
Defendant/Appellee.
Oklahoma Supreme Court
Case Number: 107999
Decided: 12/20/2011
WATT, Justice:
While the Grady County case was still pending, Berman filed this
lawsuit on April 9, 2008, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, seeking
money damages from LabCorp for the negligent testing of White's DNA
sample in the DHS administrative proceeding. Berman alleged LabCorp had
the duty of care of a "reasonably prudent professional in the paternity testing
field" and that its actions constitute a breach of that duty.
Whether LabCorp owe Berman, as the parent seeking to prove the paternity
of her child, a duty of care to conduct accurate DNA testing?
DUFFLY, J.
IRELAND, C.J.
CORDY, J.
Crothers, Justice.
It was held that the blood test was administered in accordance with the
proper procedure.
Form 104 has three sections that correspond to the conduct of the
three people who normally participate in administering the blood test. The
top half of the form includes the name of the person whose blood is drawn,
and a list of directions for both the specimen collector and the recipient of
the sample at the laboratory. The bottom half of the form contains a similar
list for the specimen submitter. The submitter, who will usually be a police
officer, is directed to retain this half of Form 104 in police records,
undoubtedly for later evidentiary use. These lists on the form enable the
actors to complete, sign, and certify that the director of the state crime
laboratory or the director's designee's directions have been followed. Fair
administration of a blood test can be established by proof that the directions
in Form 104 have been scrupulously followed. Testimony from the
participants, including the specimen submitter, can be used to show they
scrupulously complied with the methods approved by the state crime
laboratory director.
In this case, the Department did not offer the bottom half of Form 104
as evidence at the hearing. Schatz testified she removed the bottom half of
the form at the time of the blood draw and kept it in the case files. A blank
Form 104 was entered into evidence. Schatz testified she used an intact
testing kit she received from the hospital, she was present during the blood
draw, the nurse handed her the vial of blood and she put the seal on the tube,
starting at the top and putting it down the side. She testified she put the tube
in the blood tube protector with the absorbing sheet, placed the protector into
the plastic bag provided in the kit, placed the whole unit with the top portion
of Form 104 in the kit box and sealed the box with the kit seal. She testified
she mailed the kit to the state crime laboratory in Bismarck. Schatz's
testimony established she performed each of the required steps from the
specimen submitter's checklist and complied with the approved method.
HINES, Justice.
After the shooting, Garey did not call the police or for an ambulance
even though he had a cell phone with him. Nor did he contact Jones's family.
Garey admitted that, instead, he pulled Jones out of the car and pushed her
down an embankment. He then fled the scene. Garey drove to a friend's
house and tried to wash the blood off the car; he lied to the friend about how
the blood got there. Garey threw the pistol in a nearby wooded area. He then
drove home and went to sleep.Jones died as the result of a contact gunshot
wound behind the left ear.
The Court considered the testimony the doctor who performed the
autopsy on Jones testified that he had never had a case of suicide by any
person of either sex shooting himself or herself in the back of the head.
Investigator Haynie with the medical examiner's office indicated that the
blood found on Jones's left palm could not have been there if Jones had been
holding the pistol in her left hand when the fatal shot occurred.
Marcus, J.
Here, the defendant opposes the People's request for a second lineup.
He argues that permitting the complainant to view him again, after seeing his
photograph in the computer, and after viewing him in the lineup, would in
and of itself be impermissibly suggestive and would undermine the
reliability of any resulting identification.The defendant contends that
displaying him yet again to the complainant would not only be unduly
suggestive, but would also increase his confidence in his identification of the
defendant without increasing its reliability, further introduce "mug shot"
bias, and risk effecting the accuracy of the identification with post-event
information and by unconscious transference.
LaBuda, J.
Defendant is charged with Rape in the First Degree and Sexual Abuse
in the First Degree. One of the arresting officers testified before the grand
jury that Defendant was administered a polygraph examination at the request
of the police as part of the investigation, and viewed a video of Defendant's
interrogation from which they were further informed that the police
administered a polygraph to Defendant. Defendant argues that introduction
of evidence that a polygraph was used during the investigation was in error
and unduly prejudiced the grand jury proceedings. The prosecution however
furthers that the mention of the polygraph was made only in the context of
providing the chronology for the period during which Defendant was being
questioned.
Whether the mention of the fact that the defendant had undergone a
polygraph test is prejudicial to the defense.
Barry Kron, J.
The criminalist who lifted the print and who was unavailable, or
any other criminalist who could have lifted the print, would have no way of
knowing that it would later implicate defendant as having his prints on the
note. Notably, even though the defendant was arrested, the arrest was done
before any fingerprint linked him to the note because a comparison was not
done until a day after the arrest. Thus, the person who lifted the print from
the note did not have defendant in mind as a suspect and was merely
attempting to lift a print, if at all possible, from a note recovered at the scene
of the crime. The criminalist did not know who the print that was lifted
belonged to. The person merely lifted a print that she thought was usable to
try and match someone as having touched the note. The fact that defendant
in this case was in custody and under suspicion is not the key factor for
Crawford analysis. The important factor is that the person lifting the
fingerprint is doing it in a vacuum unconnected to any specified individual,
and is simply taking a blind, mechanical step in generating the potential for
scientific evidence. The scientific evidence can ultimately turn out to be
exculpatory, inculpatory or neutral. Defendant here was arrested based on
identification evidence, totally unrelated to fingerprints analysis.
Additionally defendant has the opportunity to confront the expert who
testified as to the match.
Rick MORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Appellee.
No. S-12279, 186 P.3d 575 (2008)
Supreme Court of Alaska
Decided on July 3, 2008
CARPENETI, Justice.
Morris argued that the results of his blood test, performed thirty-seven
minutes after his breath test, varied so greatly from the breath test result that
it fell "outside the generally acceptable range" of natural alcohol elimination
from the body and therefore failed to corroborate his breath test result. He
asserted that the blood test result proved that the chemical breath test, which
the department had relied upon to revoke his driver's license, was therefore
inaccurate and that his license could not be suspended.
In this case, the hearing officer's decision was supported by the results
of the breath test, by unchallenged evidence that the breath test machine was
properly certified for use and was functioning properly, by evidence that the
machine's internal self-tests were performed both before and after Morris's
test, and by the fact that the blood test result supports the conclusion that
Morris exceeded the legal limit at the time of his breath test. In addition,
Morris's admission that he had been consuming alcohol, the evidence of his
poor driving, and Officer Stoneking's testimony as to his personal condition
and his performance of field sobriety tests all supported the hearing officer's
decision. Finally, AS 28.35.033(d) creates a presumption that where a
chemical breath test "was performed according to approved methods by a
person trained according to techniques, methods, and standards of training
approved by the Department of Public Safety," the test is valid. In these
circumstances, there was substantial evidence that supported the hearing
officer's decision of revoking the appellants license.
Morris first assumes that only one chemical test the state's breath test
showing .089 percent at 4:36 a.m., or Morris's blood test showing .070
percent at 5:13 a.m. can be right. But the tests are not necessarily
inconsistent. Both tests could have been accurate if Morris had in fact
eliminated alcohol at a high rate. While the average person eliminates
alcohol at a rate of .012 to .024 percent per hour, the hearing officer had
before her the department's "Breath Alcohol Supervisor Manual," which
noted that "higher rates of metabolism have been reported and are usually
associated with chronic consumption of large quantities." Indeed, even
Morris's clinical chemist was unwilling to say that it was impossible for both
tests to be accurate, only that he would have had to *580 have eliminated
alcohol at an "unexpectedly" high rate.
The defendant questioned the validity of the photo array as it was not
in accordance with theAttorney General Guidelines in conducting the photo
array.
Although the officer conducting the array allowed the victim to view
all six photos simultaneously instead of sequentially as specified in the
Guidelines, the court was satisfied "that it was a fair and excellent process."
He found the officer who conducted the array credible and that his failure to
have the victim view the photos one-at-a-time did not inject any
suggestiveness or improper influence into the process.
RABNER, C.J.
In 2005, Angel Chalco left his home in Newark and headed toward
the subway station to catch a train to work. As he walked down the stairs,
the men grabbed Chalco, pulled him backward, and demanded money. The
men took Chalcos wallet and his cell phone. They then hit him on the head
and kicked his stomach, causing him to lose consciousness. After he
returned home, he called the police. Soon after, he met with a New Jersey
Transit Police Detective and described one of his assailants. That description
was broadcast to patrol units. At police headquarters, Chalco viewed about
thirty photographs but did not identify anyone as his assailant. A police
sketch artist worked with Chalco and prepared a sketch of the assailant
based on Chalcos description. The composite drawing was then
disseminated. Days later, the detective came across an arrest photo of
Defendant Danny Lazo taken after he had jumped a turnstile. The detective
thought Defendants photo closely resembled the composite sketch and
included a picture of Defendant in an array he compiled. To comply with
guidelines from the Attorney General, the detective used a two-year-old
photo of Defendant instead of the more recent arrest photo. The detective
showed Chalco the photo array, and Chalco identified the picture of
Defendant as his assailant. Defendant was arrested the following day.
Defendant vigorously objected to both the introduction of the arrest photo
and the testimony.
Whether it was proper for a police officer to testify at trial about how
and why he assembled a photo array.
LaVecchia, J.
Williams and Banaag testified for the State, but Schiffner did not
testify. Defendant objected to any testimony by Banaag about Schiffner s
analysis, arguing that it was hearsay and violated his right to confront the
analyst who had performed the tests being used against him. The court
overruled defendant s objection. Banaag testified that she had made an
independent data analysis for the buccal swab that she received, went back
and reviewed Miss Schiffners case and made her own independent
conclusions. Banaag went on to state her conclusion that within a
reasonablescientific certainty. Reginald Roach is identified as the source of
the DNA profile obtained from the samples taken from H.H.
Although the trial court should have granted defendant's request for a
midtrial adjournment to obtain the testimony of a police sketch artist, any
error was plainly harmless. However, even assuming that the artist's
testimony would have been completely favorable to defendant, there is no
reasonable possibility that it would have affected the verdict. In addition to
the victim's identification, the overwhelming evidence included defendant's
confession, the recovery of the victim's identifiable property from defendant,
and various forms of persuasive circumstantial evidence. Moreover, any
prejudice from the absence of the sketch artist was minimized by the parties'
stipulation. Defendant did not preserve his claim that he was constitutionally
entitled to the adjournment.
The State, Respondent, v. Richard P. Anderson, Petitioner.
78 S.C. 243, 662 S.E.2d 461 (Ct. App. 2008).
JUSTICE BEATTY
Priscilla Ward went home one day to find her home burglarized.
During the investigation, Stephen Hardee, the police who investigated the
crime scene lifted two fingerprints from the broken window. At trial,
Hardee identified two lift cards on which he transferred the latent
fingerprints from the crime scene.
Whether the fingerprint card was inadmissible given the person who
actually took the fingerprints did not testify and, thus, the card was not
authenticated.