94

CHAPTER-IV

THE ROLE OF THE INDUSRIAL EMPLOYMENT (STANDING

ORDERS) ACT, 1946 IN REGULATING THE INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS

4. 1. Introduction

During the era of laissez-faire the policy of hire and fire was very

common. The economic law of demand and supply in many of the cases was

determining the wage rates, conditions of service etc. The employer and the

workmen used to sttle the term cf cont r act of employment on mutual agreed

terms and conditions after individual bargain, which may be express or implied.

The State adopted the policy of laissez-faire respecting the individuals

right to contract and thus followed non-interference in the mutual bargain of the

employers and workmen. But this freedom of contract and settlement of working

conditions between the workmen and the employer proved to be disadvantageous

to the workmen for the reason that the workman could not stand up and demand

better wages and conditions from the mighty employer for various reasons

including the fear of presence of large number of unemployed youth in the field

and consequent loss of job.

 95

In many occasions the conditions of service of the industrial workmen

were either not defined at all or inadequately taken care. While entering into an

industry the workmen mostly concentrate on few issues like wages, hours of

work and payment nothing more was discussed or settled.

Where the system of laissez faire operates there is no law of industrial

relations, in the sense of law regulating collective relations between employers

and employees. However, under the system of laissez faire there is a law of

individual employment. The system of laissez faire gives little scope for

collective bargaining instead only individual bargaining is recognized.54

The most important issue of discipline and the consequent firing never

used to be or rarely settled before entering into the industry as a term of contract

of employment between the employer and the workmen. Due to this confusion

the employers often take advantage and fire the workmen at their whims and

fancies since the conditions for discharge or dismissal were not defined.

54
Riddall J.G. The Law of Industrial RelationsLondon, Butterworths & Co. (Publishers)
Ltd. (1981) at VI.
 96

The conditions of service were normally adhoc which left the workmen to

be at the mercy of the employer. In Balakrishna Pillai Vs Anant Engineering

Works (P) Ltd55 the Division Bench of Bombay High Court observed that before

the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946, was placed on statute

book; the conditions of service of the industrial workmen were undefined,

arbitrary and depended mostly upon the whims and vagaries of the employer.

However, this did not stop here. The concept of trade unionism has

developed which gave birth to the theory of collective bargaining. The workmen

started voicing their concern and put forth their demands through trade unions.

The trade unionism gave the workmen the medium to rise their voice and demand

for the basic amenities and fringe benefits in as much as the workmen as an

individual is not directly identifiable which was the basic reason for the workman

to resist from putting forth his demands against the employer. Where the

demands of trade union were not met by the employers, the situation slipped on

many a time and resulted in unavoidable strikes and strain in industrial relations.

The strikes by the workmen and the lockouts by the employers have intimately

affected the society at large.

55
(1975) 2LLJ.391
 97

The Government which was hither to practicing the policy of laissez-faire

realized the negative effects of laissez-faire and the resultant

burden/inconvenience caused to the society at large. Thus the Government finally

realized its responsibility towards the society and intervened in the matters of

employers and workmen in regulating the service conditions of the workmen.

4. 2. The Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938 - An Early

Legislation on Standing Orders

The first legislative provision towards compelling the employer to define

the conditions of employment with precision was incorporated in the Bombay

Industrial Disputes Act, 1938. Section 26 in Chapter V of the Act provides as

under:

Every employer in respect of any industry or occupation to which this

section has been applicable shall within two months, from the date of such

application, submit to the Commissioner ofLabour, for approval in such manner

as may be prescribed standing orders regulating the relations between him and

his employees with regard to industrial matters mentioned in Schedule F.

The matters mentioned in Schedule I are:

 98

(i) Classification of employees e.g. permanent, temporary,

apprentices, probationers, badlis etc.

(ii) Manner of notification to employees of periods and hours of

work, holidays, paydays and wage rates.

(iii) Shift working.

(iv) Attendance and late coming.

(v) Leave, holidays and application, procedure and authority to

grant these.

(vi) Liability to search and entry into premises by certain gates.

(vii) Temporary stoppages of work and rights and liabilities of

employers and employees arising there from.

(viii) Termination of employment and notice to be given by

employer and employee.

(ix) Suspension or dismissal for misconduct and the acts and

omissions which constitute misconduct.

(x) Means of redress for employees against unfair treatment or

wrongful exaction on the part of employer or his agent or

servant.
 99

There was no Central legislation making provision for Standing Orders.

The then Trade Disputes Act, 1929 (Central) also did not take care of. During the

Sixth Labour Conference held in October 1944, the question whether the

provision relating to Standing Orders to be incorporated in the Trade Disputes

Act, 1929 or through an independent legislation was discussed. As a result of the

discussion, a Central legislation was enacted in 1946 which came into effect from

23rd April 1946.

The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 attains greater

importance with the ultimate object to secure and maintain industrial peace and

harmony. The applicability of the Act and its effective administration are the

prime areas of concern not only to the employers, employees but also to the

society at large, in as much as any lacunae/shortfall would result in industrial

strife and thus endanger industrial peace which is sine-quo-non for the

development of the country as a whole and would be more significant in the

present situation of Globalization and booming economy of the country.

In fact this legislation is a tool in the hands of trade unions to pressurize an

employer to define with precision all the conditions of employment. The Act is

an important legislation, in resolution of industrial disputes. It is supplementary

 100

to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The

ultimate object of these three labour legislations is common one i.e. removal of

friction between the employers and workmen and maintain good and harmonious

industrial relations.

4. 3. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 - A

Note

The statement of the objects and reasons to this legislation manifest its

purpose and role. The statement of objects and reasons read as under:

Experience has shown that Standing Orders Defining the

conditions of recruitment, discharge, disciplinary action, holidays,

leave etc. go a long way towards minimizing friction between the

management and workers in industrial undertakings. Discussion on

the subject at the tripartite Indian Labour Conference revealed a

consensus of opinion in favour of legislation. The bill accordingly

seeks to provide for the framing of standing orders in all industrial

establishments employing one hundred or more workers.

 101

Thus the object of the above legislation is to require employers in

industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision, the conditions of

employment under them and to make the said conditions known to the workmen

employed by them. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946

(hereinafter referred to as the Act) is very important piece of legislation aimed at

to promote and preserve industrial peace and harmony. It also recognizes the role

of the trade unions.56

In fact the legislation is a tool in the hands of trade union to pressurize an

employer to define with precision all the conditions of employment. By

experience if a trade union finds that certain conditions in the standing order are

detrimental to the workmen, it has the right to demand for the modification of

standing orders after the expiry of six month from the date on which the

standing order or the last modifications there of came into operation57. or even

enter into an agreement with the employer modifying the standing orders even

before the stipulated period of minimum six months. Thus it is manifestly laid

down the importance of the roles of the trade union, employer and also the

56 Amended Sections 6, 10 and 13A of the Act provides that a body of workmen or trade
union also entitled to take action

57 See Sub-Section 1 of Section 10 of Industrial .Employment (Standing .Orders) Act, 1946

 102

certifying officers as a facilitator and representative of the Government in

maintaining industrial peace and harmony.

4.3.1. The Applicability of the Act

The Industrial .Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 is applicable to

every industrial establishment where one hundred or more workmen are

employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months58.

Regarding applicability to establishments not covered above, the

appropriate Government has the power to extend the applicability to such

establishments not covered, but only after giving not less than two months notice

by notification in the official Gazette. Though ex-facie the Act applies to

industrial establishments employing on any day one hundred or more workmen,

the appropriate Government has been empowered59 to extend the applicability to

the establishments employing even less than one hundred workmen .

58 See Section 1, Sub-Section (3), the Industrial .Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
59 Id, Proviso to Section 1 (3)
 103

The Rules60 made thereunder the Act contains the model standing orders.

The model Standing Orders would be applicable immediately on the date on

which the Act becomes applicable and if the Standing Orders are either not

framed or during the intervening period of the date of the applicability of the Act

and the date of certification of the standing orders.

The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Balakrishna Pitta. V

.Anant Engg. Works (P) Ltd61 held that once the Act becomes applicable to an

industrial establishment, it does not cease to apply on account of a fall in the

number of workmen in the establishment, below one hundred.

4. 3. 2 Certified Standing Orders vis-a-vis Individuals Right to

Contract

The Supreme Court in Western India Match Co. V. Workmen52 held that

the standing orders imply a contract between the employer and the workmen. The

certified Standing Orders have a statutory force. Therefore, the employer and the

workmen cannot enter into a contract overriding the statutory contract as

embodied in the certified Standing Orders framed under the Act. The Patna High

60 The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 1946

61 Supra n, 2
62 AIR 1973. SC 2650
 104

Court in Bihar Journals V. Ali Hassan62, held that where the probation period

provided by the Standing Orders was for three months only, but in the

appointment letter of the employer the period of probation was stated as six

months, held that the Standing Orders have statutory force.

The position of the right to contract in the industrial employment matters

vis-a-vis the certified Standing Orders was explained limpidly by the apex Court

in S.S. Light Railway Co,, V. S.S. Light Railway Workers Union64 as under:

The right to contract in industrial matters is no longer an absolute right

and statutes dealing with industrial matters abound with restrictions on the

absolute right to contract. The doctrine of hire and fire is completely

abrogated both by statutes and by industrial adjudication and even where

the services of the employees are terminated by an order of discharge

simpliciter the legality and propriety of such an order can be challenged in

Industrial Tribunals. These restrictions on the absolute right to contract are

imposed because security of employment is more and more regarded as

w AIR 1959 Pat 431

64 .AIR 1969 SC 513
 105

one of the necessities of industrial peace and harmony and the contentment

it brings about is a pre-requisite of social justice.

It is well settled proposition of law that where the model Standing Orders

or certified Standing Orders are in force the employer cannot enter into a contract

of employment with the workmen (even though they are willing) with the terms

and conditions which are in contradiction to those in the Standing Orders. It is

not possible in law for the parties to enter into a contract over riding the

statutory contract as embodied in Standing Orders. Hypothetically even if the

employer by exploiting the vulnerability of the workmen enters into a contract on

terms and conditions which run against the certified or modal Standing Orders

which are in force, such contract would be unenforceable. But the moot question

is who will make such a contract unenforceable? Naturally the trade union if any

functioning in the industry has to take up the issue. If there is no trade union

existing in the industry then what is the solution for the workmen. The Penalties

prescribed under the Act are that an employer who fails to submit draft standing

orders as required by Section 3, or who modifies his standing orders otherwise

than in accordance with Section 10, shall be punishable with fine which may

extend to five thousand rupees, and in the case of a continuing offence with a

further fine which may extend to two hundred rupees for every day after the first
 106

during which the offence continues.65 An employer who does any act in

contravention of the standing orders finally certified under the Act for his

industrial establishment shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one

hundred rupees, and in the case of a continuing offence with a further fine which

may extend to twenty-five rupees for every day after the first during which the

offence continues.66 Further the Act provides that no prosecution for an offence

punishable under this Section shall be instituted except with the previous sanction

of the appropriate Government.67

It is discernible from the above provisions that statutory provisions safe

guarding the interest of the workers are less punitive in preventing the employer

from entering in to confidential contracts with workmen contra to certified

standing orders. The penalty for the failure of the employer to get the standing

orders certified or modifying in contravention to section 10 is only five thousand

rupees which is not deterrent and preventive one. In the same way the penalty for

contravention of standing orders is only one hundred rupees and for continuing

offence it is only twenty five rupees for every day. The power to prosecute the

employer has been indirectly vested with the appropriate Government. In

65 See Section 13 (1) of The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
66 Id at S.13 (2)
67 A/at S.13 (3)
 107

substance it is visibly evident that the statutory provisions are not adequate to

compel the employer to follow the provisions of the Act. Such weak penalty

clauses encourage the audacious employer to violate the certified standing orders,

unless there is a strong trade union of workmen in the industry concerned. In this

scenario the role of trade union of workmen under the Trade Unions Act, 1926,

in protecting the interest of the workmen and ultimately in maintaining industrial

peace and harmony is very crucial.

4.3.3. Certification and Modification of Standing Orders

The Act lays down the procedure for submission of draft standing orders,

the conditions for certification and the issue of the certified standing orders. It

also details the procedure for the modification of the certified standing orders

duly making provision for appeals for the grievances arising out of the standing

orders as detailed below:

According to Section 3 Sub-Section (1), with in six months from the date

on which the Act becomes applicable to an industrial establishment, the employer

shall submit to the Certifying Officer five copies of the draft standing orders

proposed by him for adoption in his industrial establishment.

 108

Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 states that provision shall be made in such

draft for every matter set out in the Schedule which may be applicable to the

industrial establishment, and where model standing orders have been prescribed,

shall be, so far as practicable, in conformity with such model.

According to Sub-Section (3) of Section 4, the draft standing orders

submitted under the Section 3 shall be accompanied by a statement giving the

prescribed particulars of the workmen employed in the industrial establishment

including the name of the trade union, if any, to which they belong.

Sub-Section (4) of Section 3 provides that subject to such conditions as

may be prescribed; a group of employers in similar industrial establishments may

submit a joint draft of standing orders under this Section.

Standing Orders shall be certifiable68 under the Act if provision is made in

the draft Standing Orders for every matter set out in the Schedule and thereupon

it shall be the duty of the Certifying Officer or Appellate Authority to adjudicate

upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the draft Standing

Orders.

68
Id at Section 4
 109

The Certifying Officer on receipt of the draft standing orders for

certification, shall forward a copy there of to the trade union if any, of the

workmen or where there is no such trade union, to the workmen in such manner

as may be prescribed, together with a notice in the prescribed form requiring

objections, if any, which the workmen may desire to make, to the draft standing

orders, to be submitted to him within fifteen days from the receipt of the notice.

The Certifying Officer after giving the employer and the trade union or such

other representatives of the workmen as may be prescribed, an opportunity of

being heard, shall decide whether or not any modification of or addition to the

draft submitted by the employer is necessary to render the draft standing orders

certifiable under the Act and shall make an order in writing accordingly. Further

the Certifying Officer shall there upon certify the draft standing orders, after

making modifications if any and shall within seven days thereafter send copies of

the certified standing orders authenticated in the prescribed manner to the

employer and to the trade union or the prescribed representatives of the workmen

as the case may be.69

69
Id at Section 5
 110

Under Section 7 of the Act, the certified Standing Orders shall, unless an

appeal is preferred under Section 6, come into operation on the expiry of thirty

days from the date on which authenticated copies there of, are sent under Sub-

Section (3) of Section 5, or where an appeal as is preferred, on the expiry of

seven days from the date on which copies of the order of the Appellate Authority

are sent under Sub-Section (2) of Section 6.

Standing Orders finally certified under the Act, shall not, except on

agreement between the employer and the workmen or a trade union or other

representative body of the workmen be liable to modification until the expiry of

six months from the date on which standing orders or the last modifications there

of came into operation. An employer or workman or a trade union or other

representative body of the workmen may apply to the Certifying Officer to have

the standing orders modified and such application shall be accompanied by five

copies of the modification proposed to be made, and where such modifications

are proposed to be made by agreement between the employer and the workmen

or a trade union or other representative body of the workmen, a certified copy of

that agreement shall be filed along with the application.70 The apex Court in

70
Id at section 10
 Ill

71
Western India Match Co., V Workmen held that the terms of employment

specified in standing orders would prevail over corresponding terms in contract

of service.

Regarding the scope of the certified Standing Orders, the Supreme Court in

Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd., V. presiding officer, Labour Court Meerat72

observed that the scheme of Act would show that the certified standing orders

have more or less a statutory flavor. However, the Apex Court in Rajasthan
I'X
State Road Transport Corporation V. Krishna Kant observed that though

certified standing orders are undoubtedly binding upon both the employer and the

employees and constitute the conditions of service of the employees; it appears

difficult to say, on principle, that they have statutory force.

It shall be the duty of the Certifying Officer or the Appellate Authority to

adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of any Standing

Orders. In Engineering Workers Union .V. Appellate Authority74 it was held that

according to Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Act the draft Standing Orders

shall have provision for every matter set out in the Schedule and where model

71 (1974) 3 SCC 330

72. AIR 1984 SC 505.
73. AIR 1995 SC 1715.
74 (1965) 1 LLJ.350
 112

standing orders are prescribed, the draft standing orders must as far as is

practicable, be in conformity with such model. Hence if the draft standing orders

are not in conformity with the model standing orders where it is prescribed, the

employer shall show the reasons there of. The Act empowers the Certifying

Officer or the Appellate Authority to enquire into the impracticability to follow

the model standing orders and also adjudicate upon the fairness and

reasonableness of the draft standing orders.

The Supreme Court in U.P. Electricity supply Co., V. T.N. Chatergee15,

held that the scheme and object of the Act clearly shows that it was not intended

by the legislature that different sets of conditions should apply to employees

depending on whether a workman was employed before the standing orders were

certified or later.

The object of the legislation is to require employers in industrial

establishments to define with sufficient precision, the conditions of employment

under them and to make the said conditions known to the workmen employed by

them. Thus the ultimate aim of the Act is to maintain industrial peace and

harmony by avoiding avoidable industrial disputes arising out of the question of

75
AIR 1962 SC 1201
 113

the conditions of service agreed upon by the parties. Hence, where the parties i.e.

employer and the workmen want to include certain additional terms which may

not find place in the Schedule can do so in as much as the list of matters included

in the Schedule are not exhaustive. There may be certain matters which may not

be common to all industries/ industrial workers but akin to particular industry or

nature of the industry demands certain special matters to be defined with

precision to avoid future controversies, such matters may be definitely be defined

and reduced in writing in the Standing Orders despite the fact that such matters

not are included in the Schedule or the employer is not obliged to define such

issues/matters. It is in the interest of the industry that long lasting industrial peace

can be expected provided all mundane matters are defined in the Standing Orders

in advance.

The Supreme Court in Workmen of Lakheri Cement Works Ltd. V.

Associated Cement Companies Ltd rejected the argument that the scheme of the

Act was to show the minimum which has to be prescribed in an industrial

establishment and it did not exclude the extension otherwise.

76
AIR 1966 SC 1471
 114

The Standing Orders of every industrial establishment to which the Act

applies shall have provision for every matter set out in the Schedule which is

applicable to the individual establishment77. The Industrial Employment

(Standing Orders) Central Rules, 1946 contain three Schedules as model standing

orders. The Schedule to the Act sets out the matters to be provided in standing

orders under the Act. There are eleven items included in the Schedule. The first

ten items deals with specific matters connected to the employment and the

eleventh item is of residuary nature which authorizes for inclusion of any other

matter which may be prescribed. Accordingly Schedule IB to Industrial

Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 1946, which was inserted in 1983

through an amendment prescribes the inclusion of additional matters such as

service record, conformation, age of retirement, transfer, medical aid in case of

accidents, medical examinations, secrecy and exclusive service.

Any employer, workmen, trade union or other prescribed representatives of

the workmen aggrieved by the order of the Certifying Officer under Sub-section

(2) of Section 5 may within thirty days from the date on which copies are sent

under sub-section (3) of that section, appeal to the appellate authority, and the

appellate authority, whose decision shall be final, shall by order in writing

77 See Section 4 of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946

 115

confirm the standing Orders either in the form certified by the certifying Officer

or after amending the said Standing Orders by making such modifications thereof

or additions thereto as it thinks necessary to render the Standing Orders

certifiable under the Act.

4. 4 Classification of Workman under the Industrial Employment

(Standing Orders) Act, 1946

The Schedule of the Act under item no. 1 sets out classification of workmen

such as permanent, temporary, apprentices, probationers or badlis. The list of the

classes of the workmen given in Schedule I of the Act is not exhaustive.

However, Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 1946 in

Schedule IA and IB has classified the workmen into six categories i.e. permanent,

probationers, badlis or substitutes, temporary, apprentices and casual.

According to the Central Rules a permanent workmen is a workmen who has

been engaged on a permanent basis and includes any person who has

satisfactorily completed a probationary period of three months in the same or

another occupation in the industrial establishment including breaks due to

sickness, accidents, leave, lockout, strike (not being an illegal strike) or

involuntary closure of establishment.

 116

A Probationer is a workman who is provisionally employed to fill a

permanent vacancy in a post and has not completed three months service therein.

If a permanent employee is employed as a probationer in a new post he may at

any time during the probationary period of three months reverted to his previous

permanent post. A Badli is a workman who is appointed in the post of a

permanent workmen or probationer who is temporarily absent. A Temporary

workman is a workman who has been engaged for work which is an essentially

temporary nature likely to be finished with a limited period.

An Apprentice is a learner who is paid an allowance during the period of

his training. In the list of workmen indicated by way of illustration in item No.l

of Schedule of the Act, the casual workman has not been indicated whereas it

appears in Schedule IA and IB of Industrial Employment .(Standing Orders)

Central Rules, 1946. However, the list in the Schedule to the Act is not

exhaustive. In the list except the permanent workmen, all other classes of

workmen are not permanent in the sense that a sort of adhoc tag is attached to

these other than permanent workmen. The definition of a permanent workman

says that he is a workman who has been engaged on a permanent basis. There is a

mention of other workmen who are engaged on work of a permanent nature but

still not permanent workmen.

 117

78
The Supreme Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd V Badri Prasad

considered the definition of the permanent workmen vis-a-vis the temporary

workmen and held that a workmen engaged on a work of permanent nature which

lasts through the year and who has completed his probationary period if not being

one engaged to fill in a temporary need of extra hands on permanent jobs e.g. in

leave vacancies is a permanent workmen.

The Allahabad High Court Division Bench in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co

Ltd. V Labour Court19 observed that if on a permanent post an appointment is

made in a leave vacancy the appointment will apparently be as a substitute.

Likewise if the post itself is temporary and an appointment is made on such a

post it will on the face of it be deemed to be temporary appointment. If

appointment is made for doing work of a casual nature the workman would be

casual. If however the post is permanent one and a clear vacancy has occurred

and an appointment is made on that post without any reservation and without

expressing anything in regard to the casual nature of the appointment it will be

deemed that not withstanding the silence of the employer on the subject, the

appointment had been made on probation and on the completion of the period of

probation the incumbent would become permanent

78 AIR 1967 SC 513

79 (1979) 38 FLR 470
 118

The Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Laxman Mahadev Teli V.

Principal Shri Pancham Khewraj Mahavidyalayam, held that where the petitioner

was appointed as temporary peon, continued as peon for more than five years and

after which his services terminated by the employer, this long spell of over five

years of continuous service without break can not mean that though the petitioner

was initially employed in a temporary capacity, he continued to be in a temporary

capacity indefinitely. It is but right and fitting that he must be accorded the

dignity due to him of reinstatement.

The indefinite period of probation is another area of contest between the

employer and the workmen. The employers often retain the power to extend the

period of probation and finally terminate the services of the probationer workman

on the ground of unsuitability. It is in this context that Standing Orders must

define the concerned provisions with precision. In Dhanbad Floor Mills V.

D.M.K.Sangh8l, the employer in the draft Standing Orders defined a probationer

as a workman who provisionally worked in a permanent vacancy and had not

completed six months service therein or any extended period which had been

allowed by him. However, the Appellate Authority fixed the period of probation

80 1989 Lab IC 192

81
1975 Lab IC 268 Pat
 119

for a fixed term of six months only. The Patna High Court held after considering

the nature of the employment in the establishment that probationary period of six

months was quite sufficient and accordingly upheld the orders of the Appellate

Authority.

The confirmation of the services of the probationer after completion of the

period of probation is another area where ambiguity was allowed to creep in. In

this context the Supreme Court in Shiva Kumar Sharma .V. Haryana State

Electricity Board observed that the archaic rule of confirmation gives a scope to

the executive authorities to act arbitrarily or mala-fide giving rise to unnecessary

litigation.

4. 5. Definition of workman under the Industrial Employment (Standing

Orders) Act, 1946 vis-d-vis the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

The definition of Workman assumes importance because the object of

the Act is to require employers in industrial establishments to define with

sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the

said conditions known to workmen employed by them.

82
1988 Supp SCC 669
 120

The object of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is to make provision for

the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other

purposes. Where as an industrial dispute means any dispute or difference

between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen or

between workmen and workmen, which is connected with employment or non

employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any

person. Thus the machinery provided under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is

to investigate and settle the industrial dispute where in workmen are

concerned. These issues are commonly addressed to as threshold part issues

under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Section 2(i) of the Act adopts the definition of workman assigned to, in

clause (s) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 where in the term

workman is defined as under;

Workman means any person (including an apprentice) employed

in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical,

operational, clerical or supervisory workfor hire or reward whether the

terms of employment be express or implied and for the purpose of any

 121

proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes

any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in

connection with or as a consequence of, that dispute or whose dismissal,

discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include

any such person-

(i) Who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950) or the Army

Act, 1950 (46 of1950) or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of1957) or

(ii) Who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other

employee of a prison, or

(iii) Who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity,

or

(iv) Who being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages

exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensum or exercise,

either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason

of the powers vested in him, the functions mainly of a managerial

nature.

The definition of the term workman has the following ingredient as

discussed bellow.
 122

a) Employed and the Concept of Employment:

A workman has been defined to mean any person (including an

apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled,

skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire

or reward whether the terms of employment be express or implied.

The expression employed has at least two known connotations but as

used in the definition, the context would indicate that it is used in the

sense of relationship brought about by express or implied contract of

service in which the employee renders service for which he is

engaged by the employer and the latter agrees to pay him in cash or

kind as agreed between them or statutorily prescribed.

The Supreme Court in Workmen v. Food Corporation of

India83 held that the definition discloses a relationship of command

and obedience. The essential condition of a person being a workman

with in the purview of the definition is that he should be employed

to do the work in that industry and that there should be, in other

words, an employment of his by the employer and there should be a

(1985) 2SCC136
 123

relationship between the employer and employee or master and

servant. Unless a person is thus employed there can be no question

of his being a workman with in the definition of term as contained

in the Act.

b) Contract of service and Contract for service

In the case of contract of service a person undertakes to do the

work by himself and also subject himself to the control and

supervision of the employer where as in the case of contract for

service the person undertakes to produce the given result for which

he may engage other persons to do the work, further he would not

put himself to the control and supervision of the other with whom he

has entered in to the contract. The former is a workman and the

latter is an independent contractor.

In Shivnandan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank Ltd, the Supreme

Court observed that a master is one who not only prescribes to the

workman the end of his work, but directs or at any moment may

AIR 1955 SC 404

 124

direct the means also, or as it has been put retains the power of

controlling the work, a servant is a person subject to the command

of his master as to the manner in which he shall do his work. An

independent contractor is one who under take to produce a given

result so that in the actual execution of the work he is not under the

order or control of the person for whom he does it and may use his

own discretion in things not specified beforehand. Their Lordship

also quoted the following passage from Salmond85 that What then,

is the test of this distinction between a servant and an independent

contractor? The test is the existence of a right of control over the

agent in respect of the manner in which his work is to be done. A

servant is an agent who works under the supervision and direction of

his employer; an independent contractor is one who is his own

maser. A servant is a person engaged to obey his employers orders

from time to time; an independent contractor is a person engaged to

do certain work, but exercise his own discretion as to the mode and

time of doing it- he is bound by his contract but not by his

employers orders.

85 Salmonds Treatise on Laws of Torts', 11th edition at 98

 125

In Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh86 the apex

Court illustrated that the concept of employment involves three

ingredients (1) Employer (2) Employee and (3) the contract of

employment. The employer is one who employs i.e. one who

engages the services of the persons. The employee is one who works

for another for hire or reward. The employment is the contract of

service between the employer and the employee where under, the

employee agrees to serve the employer subject to his control and

supervision. . . . There is a well understood distinction between a

contractor and a workman and between contract of service and

contract for service. A contractor is a person who in the pursuit of an

independent business, undertakes to do specific jobs of work for

other persons, without submitting himself to their control in respect

to the details of the work. There is therefore, a clear cut distinction

between a contractor and a workman. The identifying mark of the

latter is that he should be under the control and supervision of the

employer in respect of the details of work. What determines a

person is a workman or an independent contractor is whether he has

agreed to work personally or not. If he has, he is a workman

86
AIR 1958 SC 388
 126

although he gets other persons to work along with him and these

persons are controlled and paid by him.

The work agreed by a person to do personally must be one to do

any manual, skilled or unskilled, technical, operational, clerical, or

supervisory work but in case of supervisory, he would not be

coming with in the purview of the definition if he is drawing wages

exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensum or performs

duties mainly of managerial nature.

In Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co., of India v.

Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co., of India

Management StaffAssociation , the Supreme Court observed that it

is not sufficient that he does not come with in the four exceptions in

Section 2 (s) of the Act but he must necessarily have been employed

to do either manual, skilled, unskilled or technical, operational,

clerical or supervisory work.

87
AIR 1971 SC 922
 127

In Shivnandan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank Ltd, 88 the Supreme

Court observed that if a man is employed because he possesses

special mental training or scientific or technical knowledge and they

enable him to produce something as a creation of his own, he is

employed on technical work. There is no salary limitation prescribed

under the Act for technical workman.

The Calcutta High Court in Workmen of Macfarlane & Co, Ltd. V.

Fifth Industrial Tribunal observed that clerical work implies

routine work as a writer, copyist, account-keeper or correspondent in

office without power of control or dignity of creativeness. In

Kirloskar M, Bros. Ltd V. Presiding Officer, Labour Court90 it was

held that Compiling of reconciliation statement and preparation of

budgetary statement calls for creativeness, imagination and the

application of mind which must be distinguished from skilled,

unskilled, manual, supervisory and technical or clerical work. Such

an employee is not a workman.

88 Supra note 32
89 (1964) 2 LL.J 556 (Cal)
90 1976 Lab.I.C 918
 128

The Supreme Court in Arkal Govind Raj Rao V. Ciba Geiby of

India Ltcf1 held that if a person performs purely manual, skilled,

unskilled, technical, or clerical, no difficulty arises in determining

whether the definition applies or not but where a person does more

than one nature of work such as manual as wall as supervisory work

or technical and supervisory work. In such cases, the predominant

nature test which is now well settled one shall be applied in

determining in which classification he will fall under the definition.

The dominant purpose of employment must be first taken into

consideration and the gloss of additional duties must be rejected

while determining the status and character of the person nature of

the work.

4. 6. The Categories of workmen who can raise an industrial

dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946

The use of the word workmen in its plural sense in the definition of

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 denotes that an industrial dispute in the form of a

91
(1985) 3 SCC 371
 129

collective dispute where community of interest is involved or a body of workmen

is concerned with its resolution. It follows from the definition that an industrial

dispute must necessarily be concerning to the workmen employed in the industry

except for an individual dispute defined under Section- 2A of the Industrial

.Disputes Act, 1947.

Regarding an individual dispute other than the matters mentioned in

Section- 2A, a body or majority of workmen as a community must be concerned

with, and espouse such a dispute. Precious time has been spent by the Courts in

the interpretation of the term industrial dispute and the right of the workmen in

raising the dispute as an industrial dispute. From the reading of Section 2(K) and

section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it can be concluded that the

following persons can raise an industrial dispute.

4. 6.1 Right of an individual workman to rise an Industrial Dispute

Section 2A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides that any dispute or

difference between the workman and his employer connected with or arising out

of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an

industrial dispute not withstanding that no other workmen or any union of

 130

workmen is a party to the dispute. From the reading of Section 2A the following

logical conclusions are discernible.

i) Any dispute or difference between an individual workman

and his employer if it is connected with or arising out of

discharge, dismissal retrenchment or termination would be

per se an industrial dispute as such an aggrieved

workman has a right to rise an industrial dispute

independently without espousal of other workmen or trade

union.

ii) In Samyuktha Karnataka V. M.L.Satyanarayana Rao the

Supreme Court held that any dispute or difference between

a workman and the employer which is connected with or

arising out of other conditions of service i.e. other than the

dispute connected with discharge, dismissal, retrenchment

or termination of service would not per se be an industrial

dispute; as such the aggrieved workman cannot rise an

92
(1986) 2 LL.J 72
 131

industrial dispute without the espousal of other workmen

or trade union of workmen.

iii) Item No. 10 to Fifth Schedule of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 provides that employing workmen as badlis,

casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for

years, with the object of depriving them of the status and

privileges of permanent workmen would amount to unfair

labour practices under Section 2 (ra) of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947. Section 25T of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 prohibits the practices of unfair labour practices

and Section 25U prescribes penalty for the commission of

unfair labour practice. Explanation to Section 25C defines

a BADLI workman who is employed in an Industrial

establishment in the place of another workman whose

name is borne on the muster rolls of an industrial

establishment, but shall cease to be regarded as such for

the purpose of Section 25C, if he has completed one year

of continuous service in the establishment. A Badli,

Casual, or Temporary workman who has completed 240

 132

days would be considered to be in continuous service

under an employer as per Section 25B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947. Accordingly any dispute or difference

between such workman and the employer connected with

arising out of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or other

wise termination of service would per se be an industrial

dispute. Hence such a workman has a right to raise an

industrial dispute. If connected with other service

conditions and espoused by a body of workmen it would

come with in the definition of Industrial Dispute.

The Supreme Court in H.D. Singh V. Reserve Bank

at

of India and others held that striking off the name of

the appellant (Tikka Mazdoor) under these circumstances

is clearly termination of his service and the dispute in this

case therefore squarely comes with in Section 2A of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

93
(1985) 4 SCC 201
 133

4. 6.2 Right of a body or group of workmen to raise an Industrial

Dispute

In Newspapers ltd.V State industrial Tribunal U.P and others94 the

Supreme Court held that section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

speaks of a dispute between employer and workmen i.e. plural form has been

used. Before insertion of section 2A of the Act an individual dispute could not

per se be an industrial dispute, but it could become one if taken up by the

trade union, or a number of workmen.....viz the workmen as a body or a

considerable section of them make common cause with the individual

workman. Hence it is very clear that where there is no trade union, the

workmen of a considerable section may raise an industrial dispute if they are

concerned and connected with the dispute. A collective dispute does not of

course mean that all the workmen or a majority of them of the establishment

concerned should sponsor and support. The Madras High Court in Working

Journalists of Hindu V. The Hindu,95 observed that an individual dispute in

order to become an industrial dispute should have the support of a substantial

section of the workmen, may mean will depend upon the particular facts of

each case.

AIR 1957 SC 532.

(1961) ILL.J 288 (Mad)
 134

4.6.3 Right of an unregistered Trade Union to raise an Industrial Dispute

Under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 a body of workmen or a group of

workmen who form majority representing the class of workmen concerned with

the dispute can raise an industrial dispute. The laudable object of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 is to maintain industrial peace and harmony. As such the

workers as a body of a community can raise an industrial dispute. It is a

combination may be to regulate the relations between the employer and the

workmen. However, the Bombay High Court (D.B) held that an unregistered

trade union is not a juristic person and hence incompetent to file a writ petition or

raise an industrial dispute. In the light of the definition of a trade union under the

Trade Unions Act, 1926, the decision of the Bombay High Court may appear

inappropriate. The Supreme Court in Associated Cement Co. V Their Workmen 6,

held that a minority union or minority group of workmen can raise an industrial

dispute. The only condition necessary is that the body of the workmen or the

minority union is to establish community of interest in the resolution of the

dispute. Hence, an unregistered trade union of workmen can rise an industrial

dispute if majority of the workmen express community of interest or interested in

96
AIR 1960 SC 777
 135

resolution of such a dispute and the magnitude of its non-resolution is such that

in all its probability it may jeopardize industrial peace and harmony. The Trade

Unions Act, 1926 as such puts no bar on the existence of unregistered trade

unions.

In Express News Papers (Pvt) ltd v. First Labour Court West Bengal &

others97 , it was held that if a dispute is an industrial dispute it can be raised by an

unregistered trade union, however, the trade union must be one which is

concerned with the dispute and industry.

4. 6. 4. Right of a Minority Trade Union to raise an Industrial Dispute

Ojp
The Supreme Court in, Associated Cement Co. V. Their Workmen , held

that a minority union or a minority group of workmen can raise an industrial

dispute. The only condition necessary for the body of the workmen or the

minority trade union is to establish community of interest in the resolution of the

dispute.

97 (1959-60) 17 FJR 413 Cal

98 Supra n. 45
 136

4. 6. 5. Right of a Trade Union formed after coming in to existence of

Industrial Dispute to rise an Industrial Dispute

Notwithstanding to the fact that the trade union itself was formed after the

industrial dispute came into existence and the very coming into existence of the

trade union itself may be with the sole aim to resolve such a dispute which is

disturbing industrial peace, such trade union has a right to raise an industrial

dispute. This is in tune with the broader view to give effect to the object of the

legislation.

In Workmen of Jamadoba Colliery of Tata Iron & Steel Co. VJamadoba

Colliery of Tata Iron & Steel Co.99 where the trade union which took up the

cause of the dismissed workmen itself came in to existence after the date of

dismissal and the dismissed workmen joined the union there after, it was held

that it would be a valid industrial dispute such trade union has a right to rise an

industrial dispute.

99
(1967) IILLJ 663
 137

4. 6. 6. Right of Workmen to raise an Industrial Dispute under Industrial

Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946

The object of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 is to

require employers in industrial establishments formally to define conditions of

employment with precision under them. Section 3 of the Act makes it mandatory

on the part of the employer to submit the draft standing orders to the Certifying

Officer. The employer shall make provision in the draft Standing Orders for

every matter set out in the Schedule and if modal Standing Orders are

prescribed, the draft Standing Orders shall be so far as practicable, in conformity

with such model Standing Orders. Eleven items have been included in the

Schedule to the Act. Item No. 1 deals with the classification of workmen i.e.

whether permanent, temporary, apprentice, probationers or badlis. Besides these

five categories of workmen; casual workmen also has been included in the model

standing orders100. In J.K.Coton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. V. Labour

Appellate Tribunal101 it was held that a Probationer is workmen as such can raise

an industrial dispute.

100 See Schedule I & IA to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules 1946.
101 (1963) 2L.L.J 436
 138

The Allahabad High Court in P.N. Gulati (DR) V. Labour Court102 held

that even a part time Doctor attached to an industrial establishment on a monthly

salary of Rs. 350/- is a workman. Such a workman has a right to raise an

industrial dispute in a limited sense under Section 13 A of the Act. Hence under

Section 13A of the Act, an employer, a workman (whether permanent,

temporary, apprentice, probationer, badli or casual), a trade union or other

representative body of workmen (unregistered trade union) can refer an industrial

dispute on the question of application and interpretation of the standing orders to

any one of the Labour Court designated for the purpose.

4. 7. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 vis-a-vis the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Trade Unions Act, 1926 in
maintenance of industrial peace & harmony

Majority of industrial disputes emanate from the frictions caused between

the management (employers) and the workmen which are related to the

102 (1978)2 L.L.J. ALL

103 Section 13 A of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 provides that If any
question arises as to the application or interpretation of a standing order certified under
this Act, any employer, or workman or a trade union or other representative body of
the workmen may refer the question to any one of the labour courts constituted under
the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and specified for the disposal of such proceedings by
the appropriate Government by notification in the official Gazette, and the Labour
Court to which the question is so referred shall, after giving the parties an opportunity
of being heard, decide the question and such decision shall be final and binding on the
parties.
 139

conditions of service. Chief among them are; recruitment, service benefits,

discharge, disciplinary action, holidays, leave, periods and hours of work, shift

working etc.

The Act requires the employer to define with precision the conditions of

service and such conditions of service are further required to be certified by the

Certifying Officer and notified the to workmen. Thus where all the conditions of

service are defined in writing and notified to the workmen duly authenticated by

certification would prevent the industrial disputes at least connected with these

matters. At times the difficulties can be seen in the area of interpretation and

application of the terms under the standing orders applicable, which may rise to

the situation of unending industrial conflicts. And at the same the law would not

be in a position to take care of all the matters that may arise under the contract of

employment between the employer and the workmen. Certainly there may be

number of gaps that is what the history of labour jurisprudence also speaks about.

It appears in the context that the role of the trade union was not appreciated

when the law relating to the standing orders was enacted in the year 1946.

However, the role of the trade unions, by experience appreciated in maintenance

of industrial peace and harmony. It is a fact that where trade unions are involved
 140

in the process of defining the conditions of service, many of the industrial

disputes relating to the conditions of service are resolved at the inception itself.

Accordingly the word any person appearing in Section 6 was substituted by an

Amendment Act 18 of 1982 as - any employer, workman, trade union or other

representatives of workmen, and by inserting the words or a trade union, or

other representative body of the workmen in Section 10 & 13A of the Industrial

Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. With this the role of the trade union

has been recognized. As per Section 2 (h) Trade Union means a trade union for

the time being registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Though the

definition of the trade union in Section 2 (h) refers only to registered trade union

by insertion of the words other representatives of the workmen even an

unregistered trade union has been recognized under the Industrial Employment

(Standing Orders) Act, 1946, with the intention that the main object of

maintenance of industrial peace is not lost sight of.

A settlement entered into by the employer and the workmen, to that extent

modifies the Standing Orders concerned. In Baruani Refinery Pragathisheel

Shamic parishad v. Indian Oil Corporaion ltd104 dealing with the issue where the

charter of demands by the employees contained several matters touching the

104
(AIR 1990 SC 1801)
 141

conditions of service including the one concerning the upward revision of

retirement age and one of the clauses of the settlement arrived at during the

course of the conciliation proceedings provided that the conditions of service

which had not been changed would remain unchanged, the Supreme Court held

that the employees could not seek modification of Standing Orders regarding

fixation of age of superannuation during the operation of the settlement more so

when the demand in respect of revision of age of retirement was not acceded to.

From this it is perceptible that where a settlement is arrived at then the service

conditions which form part of the settlement would operate in accordance with

the settlement and the Standing Orders shall be accordingly modified. It can also

be concluded that where a demand has been raised and discussed during the

conciliation proceeding and expressly not agreed to then it is not open to the

parties to demand for modification of Standing Orders concerning to that matter

which is rejected.

Under the Act, the Certifying Officer may be a Labour Commissioner or

Regional Labour Commissioner and includes any other Officer appointed by the

appropriate Government by notification in the official Gazette, to perform all or

any of the functions of the Certifying Officer under the Act105. The Certifying

105 See Section 2 (c) of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
 142

Officer on receipt of the Draft Standing Orders shall forward a copy there of to

the trade union if any of the workmen, or to the workmen if there is no trade

union requiring the trade union if any of the workmen to give in prescribed form,

objections if any to the Draft Standing Orders and give an opportunity of being

heard. Then the Certifying Officer shall decide whether or not any modification

of or addition to the Draft Standing Orders is necessary to render the Draft

Standing Orders certifiable under the Act and shall make an order in writing

accordingly. The trade union or the workmen may prefer an appeal if aggrieved

by the order of the Certifying Officer under Section 6 before appellate Authority.

In this context the Certifying Officer under Industrial Employment (Standing

Orders) Act, 1946 is an adjudicating authority.

There is no stringent provision in the Act to check the employer who

despite the certified Standing Orders practices the conditions contrary to the

certified Standing Orders; except levy of penalty of one hundred rupees and for

continuing offence twenty five rupees for every day of continuing offence. The

Act does not effectively check this matter. The penalty prescribed under the Act

is not adequate to act as a deterrent from committing the offence. It is the

cardinal principle that for the legal provisions to act as deterrent, the pain by legal

provision should be greater than the gain by violating the legal provisions. The
 143

Act is applicable to industrial establishments employing more than one hundred

workmen. Any violation of certified Standing Orders would affect all the

workmen. In this situation the effect is very large more prominently in the

present era of globalization.

Finally the Act does not make it mandatory to the employer to consult the

representatives of the workmen at the stage of drafting the Draft Standing Orders.

It puts the burden on the Certifying Officer to call for the comments/objections

and opportunity of being heard before the certification, with the appeal provision.

The Certified Standing Orders are the community contracts between the

workmen and the employer. As such industrial democracy demands that the

workmen must be consulted while formulating the Draft Standing Orders. If any

disagreement at this stage shall also be intimated to the Certifying Officer who

shall decide finally after hearing the parties i.e. the workmen and the employer.

Such an arrangement would not only promote industrial democracy but also gives

rise to lasting solutions to the problems. Section 3 of the Industrial Dispute Act,

1947 envisages constitution of Works Committees. The industrial establishments

which are covered by the legislation are also required to constitute the Works

Committees within the frame work of its provisions. The Works Committees are

constituted consisting of representatives of workmen and employers and charged

 144

with the duty to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good

relations between employers and workmen, to that end comment upon matters of

their regular interest or concern and endeavor to compose any material difference

of opinions in respect of such matters. The Supreme Court held in North Brook

Jute Co. Ltd v. Workmen106 that the Works Committee is not intended to

supplement or supersede the unions for the purpose of collective bargaining.

They are not authorized to consider real and substantial changes in the conditions

of service. Their task is only to smooth away frictions that may arise between the

workmen and the management in day-to-day work. They cannot decide any

alteration in the conditions of service by rationalization. If the workmens

representatives on the Works Committee agree to a scheme of rationalization,

that is not binding on workers or on the mills. The provision concerning to the

role of the Works Committees need to a fresh look in the context.

The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 further provides that during the

pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a Conciliation Officer or a

Board or any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or

National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall (a) in

regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the

106
AIR 1960 SC 879
 145

workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them

immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any

misconduct connected with the dispute discharge or punish, whether by dismissal

or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute save with express

permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending107.

The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 prescribes punishment with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which

may extend to one hundred rupees or with both to an employer for contravening

the provisions of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947108. A complaint

regarding the contravention of the provisions of Section 33 of Industrial Disputes

Act is itself given the status of an industrial dispute109. These provisions are

overlapping in both the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The law relating to the industrial disputes and

the conditions of service are in bits and pieces, which is in fact affecting the

efficacy of the provisions and their objects. An integration of both these

legislations is the need of the hour.

107 See Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 11947

108 Id Section 31
109 Id Section 33-A
 146

With the advent of new the market policies of liberalization and

globalization the characteristics of the labour have changed leading to new class

of labour called flexible labour in the form of contract labour. The

Globalization boom has resulted in mass employment of contract labour thus

threatening the permanency character of the labour and the number is alarming

that shortly the contract labour would over take the regular employees force in

number. In this context and in maintenance of industrial peace and harmony it is

pertinent to examine in detail the contract labour system and the relevant legal

frame work and its reflection on maintenance of industrial peace and harmony.

These issues are dealt in detail in the forth coming chapter in order to proceed

more meaningfully with the research.