AARMS LOGISTICS

Vol. 7, No. 3 (2008) 485504

Logistics planning and the

Operations Logistics Chain Management
LSZL STICZ

Ministry of Defence, Budapest, Hungary

In order to meet war fighter sustainment needs and the operational requirements of
today, the structure and specifically the method and the practice of supply chain
management is constantly being forced to react. Inside the alliance, fundamental
changes and collaborative initiatives are being placed in order to maximise quality
processes and to eliminate waste.
This publication will address the current situation and the relative successes in supply
chain management advancement, examining NATO concepts and discussing how they
are working inside the alliance nations. Specifically the UK model is reviewed, and
analyzed since they are really advanced in this field and the author had the opportunity
to discuss it with British logisticians during the Fourlog exercise.
As consequences of this analytical work we can state, that the OLCM capability will
produce timely, relevant and accurate logistics information and enables the NATO
Commander to influence on operations support.

Logistics is a major part of defence capability. It is big business in its own

right. We must not, however, allow cost and efficiency alone to be the sole
drivers behind our thinking. We must never forget that the purpose of
logistics is to maximise the freedom of action of the operational commander.
The Right Honorable Adam Ingram JP, MP
UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces

Introduction and actuality of the topic

The Alliances Strategic Concept, approved by NATO Heads of State and Government
in Washington on 23 April 99, articulates NATOs approach to the security challenges
in the new century. It requires that the Alliance be able to undertake the full spectrum of
its military missions through a common set of Alliance structures and procedures,
which reflect its commitment to both collective defence and crisis response.
The Alliance has taken steps to adapt its command and force structures to meet the
needs of the evolving security environment. Necessary changes in NATO Command

Received: September 3, 2008

Address for correspondence:

LSZL STICZ
E-mail: sticz.laszlo@hm.gov.hu; laslosticz@hotmail.com
L. STICZ: Logistics planning

and Force Structure to better fit them for the conduct of expeditionary operations are set
out in relevant NATO documents. Defence Ministers concluded in their June 2002
Session, that NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they
are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.
There will be a continuing need to adapt to new challenges and to ensure that the
Alliance and NATO Nations have the structures, and deployable and sustainable forces
capable of responding to emerging threats in the future.
The shift to more expeditionary operations has significant implications for NATO
logistics policy and posture. The deployment of forces to locations with little or no Host
Nation Support (HNS), at much greater distances than previously necessary, operating
along extended and perhaps very limited lines of communication, places an emphasis on
deployable logistic capabilities that were less important for territorially-based defence.
The uncertain location of operations and composition of forces to be deployed poses
challenges for logistic readiness. Operations of any significant duration also raise
sustainability issues, including those relating to the logistics force elements required to
keep the combat forces supplied and maintained.
In addition to the above political and military strategic influences on NATO
logistics policy and principles, a number of wider developments have occurred during
the last decade. These include: promulgation of the NATO Policy on Cooperation in
Logistics, which defines the principles and policies for cooperation in logistics and
establishes a common vision across the full spectrum of logistics executed through the
NATO Logistic Vision and Objectives process; and developments in logistic support to
civil authorities, including the possible use of NATO logistics assets for international
disaster relief operations. Logistic support management, including OLCM concept
developments within Alliance nations that are relevant to NATO and strategic level
logistic policy implications of experience gained from recent NATO operations are also
taken into account.
Based on the above mentioned activities and taking advantages of the excellent
opportunity to interview NATO logisticians (from Great Britain) during the Logistical
Training Program, conducted between 13 and 26 April 2008, I would like to identify
some elements and analyse the current status of the above mentioned process and
activities and try to summarize the situation and make some useful recommendation
regarding the development of this capability.

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 L. STICZ: Logistics planning

Logistics planning in defense and operational planning, logistics command and

control, logistics readiness and sustainability and funding possibilities

Now turning into the category called Logistics planning, which is one of the
disciplines of defence planning. It must identify the different logistic capabilities that
need to be acquired by nations and NATO to support the NATO Level of Ambition
(LOA) included in the Defence Planning Ministerial Guidance. These logistic
capabilities can be called upon by NATO Commanders as part of the operational
planning process to be used in a specific NATO-led operation.

Logistics Planning in Defence Planning

Logistics planning is an integral part of defence planning through the force planning
process and Partnership Planning and Review Process (PARP). It is at this level that
identification of the civil and military logistic capabilities required to deploy, sustain
and redeploy Alliance forces is carried out by the Strategic Commanders (SCs) in
consultation with nations. The required specific capabilities can be addressed to the
nations by Force Proposals (FPs) or by Capability Packages (CPs). The resulting
logistic support concepts, structure and procedures must be tailored to the respective
forces and their related employment options.
The SCs must ensure timely and proper inclusion of requirements for logistic forces
and capabilities in the force planning process so that nations, including PARP nations,
can agree to acquire and to provide them to NATO for its use during NATO-led
operations. The authority, responsibility and funding for multinational logistic
arrangements are to be established during the operational planning process.

Logistics Planning in Operational Planning

Logistics operational planning is written in MC 133/3, NATOs Operational Planning
System. The level of detail is related to the planning category and the level of
responsibility. Logistic support concepts and structures must be tailored to the
respective forces and their missions.
To achieve the desired level of multinationality, national and NATO logistics
planning must be harmonised from the beginning of the operational planning process.
The Force generation process must take into consideration the different levels of
standardisation. Logistic operational planning should consider the contributions of non-
NATO nations and other organisations.

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Logistic Command and Control (C2)

Logistic support to NATO forces must be as effective and efficient as possible.
Therefore, nations must provide NATO Commanders with the logistic C2 authority and
capabilities they require to execute their responsibilities throughout all phases of an
operation. It includes coordination, prioritisation and deconfliction of logistics and
includes Operational Control (OPCON) over logistic units that are allocated in the JOA,
such as specific logistic support units identified and provided by nations through the
force generation process. This will ensure that effective logistics to support the
operation can be planned for and executed. The assets belonging to the national support
chain, which includes the units performing Logistic Lead Nation (LLN) and Logistic
Role Specialist Nation (LRSN) missions, normally remain under national command
unless there is a specific disposition in the TOA message or special arrangement related
to funding.

Logistic Readiness and Sustainability

Logistic sustainability must support NATOs Level of Ambition as defined in the
Defence Planning Ministerial Guidance. National and NATO logistic plans must ensure
that sufficient quantity and quality of logistic resources are available at or above the
readiness and the deployability level of the forces they support. These logistic resources
must cover the entire mission spectrum.

Funding possibilities
Nations are responsible for the deployment, sustainment and redeployment of their
forces. National logistic resources are procured and maintained for that purpose at
national expense, although cooperative multinational arrangements should be taken into
consideration by nations and the NATO Commander.
Strategic infrastructure may be funded via the NATO Security Investment Program
(NSIP) dependent upon the context of individual projects, while funding of the
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs via the Military Budget (MB) should be
taken into consideration through categorical budget allocations.

The current status of the OLCM process within the alliance

NATO operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans confirm the need for modern,
deployable, sustainable, and interoperable, highly capable forces, able to operate across
the full spectrum of conflicts and crisis for extended periods of time beyond Alliance
territory, both on its periphery, and at strategic distances. To respond to these challenges

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Logistics should be recognized as an effective force multiplier to achieve joint

deployment and sustainment without geographical limits.
In this context, a NATO Operations Logistics Chain Management (OLCM)
capability has the potential to reduce the degree of redundancy within national
processes, to streamline NATOs logistics footprint and to provide the NATO
Commander with the required logistics visibility, authority and flexibility to meet his
operational requirements.
OLCM is NATOs forward looking logistics concept that links the main actors
(NATO Commander, CJ4 or equivalent, and National Interface), policy and doctrine as
well as technology in order to improve logistics effectiveness and efficiency.1
A logistics chain management capability for NATO Operations, driven by the
NATO Commanders intent, is absolutely needed to improve the logistics effectiveness
of NATO Forces in rapidly changing, complex expeditionary environments and
maximize efficiency for supporting Nations, NATO Agencies and civil actors.
Why do we need this capability? What and where are the problematic areas?
Significant equipment, financial and manpower inefficiencies,
Independent and often un-coordinated, unnecessarily redundant national support
systems,
Incomplete visibility of available logistic resources, resulting in wasted
opportunities and the needless provision of additional supplies,
Insufficient logistics decision support.
An Operations Logistics Chain (OLC) is a network of logistics facilities and distribution
capabilities operating together along lines of communication to receive, transport, store,
distribute and re-distribute equipment, material and personnel to an end user.
The purpose of an OLCM capability is to optimize the operational planning and
execution of the flow of logistic resources and services into, within and out of the
NATO Joint Operational Area (NATO JOA). The flow will be synchronized to meet the
NATO Commanders requirements and will also assist nations to achieve the level of
support necessary to meet the NATO Commanders operational intent.
An OLCM capability functions in all phases of NATO operations and across a
network of interacting NATO, National and civilian OLCs.

1
NATO Operations Logistics Chain Management (NATO OLCM) Final Concept LSM version, dated 07
January 2008.

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The benefits of having an OLCM capability

It will provide the NATO Commander with more effective logistics support to
operations and has the potential to maximize efficiency to supporting Nations and
civilian actors.
It will help determine the optimal means to meet the NATO Commanders
operational capability requirements.
It will assess shortfalls of logistic resources and help map the best approach for
meeting those shortfalls.
It will facilitate consideration of logistic resources made available by Nations,
NATO and civil actors, including those logistic resources in the Joint Operational
Area (JOA), those inbound to the JOA and those allocated, but not yet delivered, to
the operation.
It will assist in optimizing movement and distribution into, within and out the JOA
in all phases of NATO operations.

The Logistics Planning Process

The logistics operational planning for specific NATO operations is an integral part of
the overall NATO Operational Planning Process (OPP). During the OPP the CJ4 (or
equivalent) is responsible for developing, evaluating and updating the Logistics
Concept of Operations through the following process (Figure 1):
Logistics translation of the NATO Commanders guidance
Logistics Mission Analysis. Assessment of logistics resources and requirements
identifying critical areas.
Logistics Estimate of the Situation. Logistics assessment of location, operational
status, availability/usability of committed resources.
Logistics Concept of Operations.
Review of the Logistics Concept of Operations
Evaluation of the Logistics Plan
Revision of the Logistics Plan.

Key components of the OLCM capability

In this context an OLCM capability is designed to optimize the operational planning
and flow of logistic resources and services into, within and out of the NATO Joint
Operational Area.
An OLCM capability is designed to assist the operational planning and execution
process. In order to manage the flow of logistics resources and services into, within and
out of the NATO JOA an OLCM capability is built on Visibility, Authority and
Flexibility (Figure 2).

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Figure 1. Logistic Concept of Operation

Figure 2. OLCM capability

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Responsibility and Authority are interdependent. The responsibilities assigned to a

NATO commander by the member countries and by NATO bodies must be
complemented by delegation of the authority he needs to discharge his responsibilities.
This means that NATO and the Nations must provide the NATO Commander with the
required logistics C2 authority, visibility and capabilities to execute his responsibilities
throughout all phases of a specific NATO operation. It includes coordination,
prioritization and de-confliction of logistics.
Concerning Visibility, the NATO Commander requires timely, accurate and
relevant information to make effective decisions. OLCM enables the CJ4 or equivalent
to execute the NATO Commanders authority over multinational and national logistics
capabilities in a credible way. The key to this information is visibility on logistics
requirements, resources and processes. This visibility must extend across the multiple
levels of management and command for NATO, Nations and other actors and must
provide the information required at each level. An OLCM capability requires relevant
visibility over logistics requirements, regardless of the originator or level, to best
optimise overall logistics chain management functions through all phases of the
operation. Nations and other actors perform the same OLCM functions within their own
logistics chains in support of the NATO Commanders intent. In order for them to
provide the required logistic resources, a bi-directional flow of information between the
NATO Commander, Nations and other actors is essential. In order to meet the identified
operational requirements, the NATO Commander requires relevant visibility of logistics
resources in the NATO JOA and committed by Nations and other actors. This visibility
provides the NATO Commander, Nations and other actors with the logistics segment of
location (in place, in use, in transit, in repair and in reserve), operational status, and
availability/usability of committed resources. For an OLCM capability to link
requirements to available resources, visibility of the operational underlying logistics
chain processes is necessary. This entails visibility of the inter- and intra-theatre lines of
communication, and includes capacity and status information on Point of Embarkation
and Point of Disembarkation, transportation assets and logistics chain infrastructure. In
addition, visibility of the business processes in use, such as prioritisation and
distribution reallocation, is also required.
Regarding Flexibility, the planning, implementation and execution of OLCM
follows an adaptive and flexible approach. An OLCM capability must be sufficiently
flexible to be able to coordinate and manage effectively when subjected to a wide range
of design parameters.

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The development of the OLCM capability:

An OLCM capability will be designed on the basis of a single operation; however it has
to meet NATOs level of ambition.
The capability development (Figure 3) will follow an incremental, step-by-step
approach that involves close coordination and effective interaction between the
Strategic Headquarters, NATO nations and other relevant NATO bodies.
ACO will act as Operational Sponsor in order to ensure the accurate reflection of the
operational requirement.
Work performed to improve the current, in-place Operational NATO Logistics
System will be used to aid the development of a new OLCM capability.

Figure 3. Capability development

Milestones for the development

An Initial Operating Capability (IOC) scheduled for 2012 for an OLCM capability
will be the minimum capability that would add value to the NATO logistics chain.
Additional capability, to provide the optimized levels of efficiency and effectiveness of
an OLCM capability, will be delivered once Full Operating Capability (FOC) is
declared. The specific functionalities that will make up an OLCM IOC will be
determined following the OLCM experimentation and the concept implementation.

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The development of the Operations Logistics Chain Management (OLCM)

capability inside nations (GB example)

Based on the British House of Commons Public Accounts Committees review

regarding the operational logistics activities, the following shortfall areas were
identified (The failures in Iraq (2003):
Insufficient supply chain planning for an operation, leading to reach behaviour
Static demand forecasts with insufficient granularity
No planning of deployed inventory
No infrastructure or capacity planning beyond the Coupling Bridge
No end-to-end balancing of capacity or synchronising of activity
No performance measurement to enable the identification of performance inhibitors.
One major outcome of the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee findings
was to direct the MoD to do better, this led to a major piece of work taken forward by
the then DLO to Improve Supply Chain Performance for Operations ISPO. The ISPO
diagnostic identified 4 strands where improvements needed to be made Organization,
Process, People and Tools identifying in detail where the major failings arose. This
has resulted 3 recommendations were made:
a JSC estimate process should be developed to inform a JSC plan
JSC planning support tools should be developed to underpin planning activity, and
a skills audit should be conducted.
These recommendations were endorsed by the DLB in 2005 and since then work has
continued apace, led by DE&S, PJHQ and DEC CCII to take the recommendations forward.
Thats more or less enough of the background, and now we can turn into the details
regarding the British example.
First of all lets review the procedure and the process where basically we should
focus on the flow of logistic inputs to the strategic and operational level:

The British Strategic Planning Process

This process should consider certain fundamental logistic issues to ensure that logical
and clear planning parameters are set. Logistic input to this activities is led by Assistant
Chief of Defence Staff (ACDS) (Log Ops) staff based on the Strategic Defence
Guidances (SPG) assessment of the likely duration and expected intensity of the
operation. Based on a strategic logistic estimate process carried out by ACDS (Log
Ops) staff, logistic input will include limitations on, and requirements for, critical
assets, the requirement for any in-theatre training, concurrency with other operations,
movement constraints and guidance on the use of existing arrangements such as
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs).

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The British Operational Planning Process:

The capability Planning team (CPT) led by PJHQ J5 produce an MSE, in consultation
with the CCT, which will identify the capabilities required from DSF and FLCs and
warns DE&S of the likely resources required to conduct the operation. All PJHQ staff
branches, including J4, are represented on the CPT. Logistic input to the MSE is
provided via the J4 member(s) of the CPT through the production of a Logistic Estimate
conducted by a Logistics Planning Team (LPT). The LPT is chaired by Deputy
Assistant Chief of Staff (DACOS) J4 and has representatives from ACDS(Log Ops),
Defence Supply Chain and Operational Movement Group (DSCOM), FLCs and the
Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC). The composition, role and outputs of the
LPT are shown at Figure 4.

Figure 4. Logistics Planning Team

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What are the main products (outputs) of the LPT

The Logistic Estimate enables coherent and coordinated planning activity to be driven
from an early stage using well defined and endorsed common assumptions. The
principal output of the Logistic Estimate is the development of an operation specific
JSC Plan. The complexity, and evolutionary nature, of the logistics planning process
means that the JSC Plan must be kept under continuous review. It is, in effect, a living
document that develops both iteratively, as higher level planning matures, and
responsively, as assumptions and circumstances evolve or performance diverges from
that which is required.
Two main products are the following:
a. Logistic Estimate
b. Joint Supply Chain Plan
Logistic Estimate
The Joint Logistic Estimate coordinates all logistics planning activity and develops an
operation specific JSC. It enables:
Coherent and coordinated planning activity to be driven from an early stage using
well defined and endorsed common assumptions.
Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for JSC planning, configuration and execution.
Improved ability to identify risk within the chosen JSC configuration design through
the use of Decision Support Tools (DSTs).
Improved execution through closer integration at all levels of planning, including
use of an information-sharing capability, the JSC Estimate Team Site (JSCETS) and
defined performance targets.
Joint Supply Chain Plan
The Logistic Estimate will influence, and be influenced by, the outputs from the
medical, personnel, infrastructure and Log IS staff. The output of the Logistic Estimate
will be an operation specific JSC Plan and logistic freedoms and constraints that will be
used to inform subsequent operational and tactical level logistic estimate planning.
The JSC Plan is issued by PJHQ to DE&S, FLCs and the JFLogC together with any
other organisations tasked with providing FE or capabilities to form the JSC. The JSC
Plan will be included in the Coupling Bridge Directive and be a reference document to
the JTFCs Campaign Plan.

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The operation specific JSC Plan should be supported by the following annexes including:
Minimum Information Set. In order to carry out the quantitative analysis required for
JSC planning, a Minimum Information Set (MIS) is required, at the earliest
opportunity, prior to starting a Logistic Estimate.
Synchronization Matrix. The Synchronization Matrix is a detailed JSC timeline that
shows critical milestones and dependencies.
Assumptions Table. J3/J5 planners will not always be able or ready to provide
detailed planning parameters. The LPT will produce an Assumptions Table in order
to derive the plan. These assumptions need to be owned, documented and reviewed
during each iteration of the plan. The use of a set of common assumptions by all
JSC planners will ensure that all planning is coherent.
Risk Table. The JSC must be established with the resilience to cope with operational
uncertainty. Risks may be defined by the Joint Commander or identified during the
JSC planning process.
Capability Gaps. Once the JSC configuration is designed, it will be assessed for
capability gaps based on information contained in the Assumptions and Risk tables.
These capability gaps should be expressed to the Joint Commander as a resource bill
to meet the requirement in full, along with the gap in operational capability that
would result from failing to mitigate the gap.

Conduct of the Log Estimate:

The Logistic Estimate process should start in the early stages of operational planning.
CJO as the operations Supported Commander is tasked to produce an Operation
specific JSC Plan.
The Logistic Estimate is common in format, process and outputs to the Operational
Estimate.
The Logistic Estimate is shown in detail at Figure 52,3 and will be described in
detail later. Although the Estimate follows a sequential process, the changing nature of
the planning environment makes it naturally iterative. The process should enable the
Joint Commander to understand the requirement, identify the art of the possible, select
the optimal Course of Action (CoA) and translate it into a robust plan.

2 The Logistic Estimate uses a similar process to the operational estimate described in JWP 5-00 Joint
Operations Planning but according to operational planners, there are significant differences.
3
Based on the clarification given by British logistician, there are no real differences. During the Fourlog
exercise, I had the opportunity to clarify this with British experts.

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Figure 5. Logistic Estimate

It is very simple. Form a Logistics Planning Team to conduct a Logistic Estimate

and develop a Joint Supply Chain Plan.
The Logistics Planning Team (LPT) will form under the direction of Chief of Joint
Operations (CJO), who will delegate leadership of the LPT to either Assistant Chief of
Staff (ACOS) J1/J4 or Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff (DACOS) J4. ACOS J1/J4 will
advise on the requirement to form an LPT in conjunction with Assistant Chief of
Defence Staff (Logistic Operations) (ACDS (Log Ops)), the Defence Supply Chain
Operations and Movements (DSCOM) and the Front Line Commands (FLCs).

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The requirement will be based on strategic direction and an assessment against the
available Minimum Information Set (MIS).
The LPT Leader will task ACDS (Log Ops), DSCOM and FLCs to provide logistic
planners to form the LPT. The LPT Chief of Staff (COS) will normally be SO1 J4
Plans, who will determine the LPT battle rhythm and identify the requirement for LPT
members to meet together and to share information on the Joint Supply Chain Estimate
Team Site (JSCETS).
A supporting Estimate staff, comprising an SO1/SO2 from DSCOM and an SO2
from J4 Operations Support (Ops Sp) will provide Information Management (IM),
meeting space and other support functions as required.
Specifically J4 Ops Sp will manage the JSCETS ensuring that the site is available at
all times and the correct user permissions are set.

Figure 6. The scheme of the process

Step 1 Review of the Situation

The Review of the Situation establishes the strategic context for the operation gives an
understanding of the background to the problem and provides analysis of the current
situation. Simplistically put, it is a mind clearing exercise.
Step 2 Identify and Analyse the Problem
Step 2 consists of 2 separate parts, which are conducted concurrently by the
Commander and the staff. The Commander analyses the mission in Step 2A using the 4
Questions (relating to: Superior Cdrs intent - Specified and implied tasks Constraints

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And situational change) will be mentioned later) and the staff the object of the
mission in Step 2B. The mission analysis is led by the Commander, who will consider
what has to be done and why, with JIPB informing the Commanders thinking on the
enemy. What has to be done is to achieve the Mission and therefore Military
Operational Endstate, and why comes from the strategic context. The last step is to
create the mission statement.
Step 3 Consider Factors and Calculate Demand
The key questions to be addressed in step 3 are:
What are the factors that need to be considered and how do they impact on the JSC?
What is the quantified demand that the JSC should meet?
What are the dependencies between JSC tasks?
What are the key decision points for the JSC?
What are the JSC performance requirements?
What are the initial potential JSC COAs to consider?
These questions can be addressed by a consideration of factors process based on the
4Ds (Destination, Demand, Distance and Duration).
Step 4 Commanders Guidance
In Step 4 the LPT needs to consider the concept of operations, the associated risks and
issues and the cost of potential capability gaps.
Step 5 Development of Logistic COAs
Activities will need to be synchronised in time and space and these can be
superimposed as DPs on the JSC timeline and the JSC Effects schematic.
Together the timeline and effects schematic will inform the JSC Synchronisation
Matrix, outputs of which are shown here. It is also during Step 4 that resource
requirements can be translated into cost.
Step 6 COA Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of potential JSC COAs they need to be tested using
a combination of operational analysis, war gaming, textual analysis and Decision
Support Tools.
Step 7 The Commanders Decision and the Completion of the Plan
Finally in Step 7, the Cdrs decision and completion of the plan, the recommended COA
will be selected, the key DPs articulated and thought given to the next stage of the
planning process.

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Conclusions, recommendations

Why do we need to deal with the OLCM capability? The answer is very easy. There are
several implications of the decision making process including operational and logistics
planning procedures and processes, which we should always improve based on lessons
learned and approved concepts.
Finally, lets have a look at the following decision making principles and take them
into consideration, because they are really important for operational and logistics
planners during their activities:
Quality and timeliness of decision are critical to operational effectiveness
Commanders should make decisions personally and express these decisions clearly
and succinctly
Commanders make better and quicker decisions through training
Staffs assist commanders to make decisions through the provision of information
and its subsequent assessment, analysis and arrangement
Commonly understood decision-making methods enable commanders and staffs to
work together effectively
More specifically, experiences from current and previous NATO Operations call for
the improvement of logistic effectiveness in a rapidly changing, complex expeditionary
environment and the maximization of efficiency benefiting all actors. A chain
management capability for NATO operations will be designed to reduce the degree of
redundancy within national processes, to streamline NATOs logistics footprint and to
provide the NATO Commander with the required logistics visibility, authority and
flexibility to meet his operational requirements.
An OLCM capability will produce timely, relevant and accurate logistics
information and enables the NATO Commander to exert greater influence on operations
support by translating operational requirements into direct support action.
In this context, the OLCM concept provides the intellectual foundation that will
ensure long term coherence to numerous ongoing, interrelated logistics initiatives, and
aims to create an OLCM capability for the Alliance that will be evolutionary in
character and design.
This is a challenging journey and very complex one, but we are well on track in this
field. The British example can provide considerable support for the development this
capability and based lessons learned will come from current and future operations I am
sure that we are going to achieve our goal the Full Operational Capability very soon.

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One of the most difficult things we have to do in war is to recognize the moment for
making a decision. Information comes in degrees. Shall we make a decision now or shall we
wait a little longer? It is usually more difficult to determine the moment for making a
decision than it is to formulate the decision itself.
Adolph Von Schell

List of abbreviations

OLCM Operations Logistics Chain Management

HNS Host Nation Support
LOA Level of Ambition
PARP Partnership Planning and Review Process
SCs Strategic Commanders
FPs Force Proposals
CPs Capability Packages
C2 Command and Control
OPCON Operational Control
JOA Joint Operation Area
LLN Logistic Lead Nation
LRSN Logistic Role Specialist Nation
TOA Transfer of Authority
NSIP NATO Security Investment Program
O&M Operation Maintenance
MB Military Budget
OLC Operation Logistics Chain
OPP Operational Planning Process
CJ4 Chief J4
ACO Allied Command Operation
IOC Initial Operating Capability
FOC Full Operating Capability
DLO Defense Logistic Organization
ISPO Improve Supply Chain Performance for Operations
JSC Joint Supply Chain
DLB Defense Logistics Board
De&S Defense equipment and Support
PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters
DEC Defense Equipment Capabilities
ACDS Assistant Chief of Defense Staff
SPG Strategic Planning Guidance
MOUs Memorandum of Understanding
CPT Capability Planning Team
MSE Major Subordinate Element
CCT Combat Control Team
DSF Defense Supply Fund
FLCs Force Level Controllers
LPT Logistics Planning Team

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DACOS Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff

DSCOM Defense Supply chain and Operational Movement Group
JFLogC Joint Force Logistic Component
DSTs Decision Support Tools
JSCETS Joint Supply Chain Estimate Team Site
JTFCs Joint Task Force Commanders
MIS Minimum Information Set
CJO Chief of Joint Operations
CoA Course of Action
ACOS Assistant Chief of Staff
ACDS (Log Ops) Assistant Chief of Defense Stall (Logistic Operations)
DSCOM Defense Supply Chain Operations and Movements
FLCs Front Line Commands
COS Chief of Staff
JSCETS Joint Supply Chain Estimate Team Site

References

BARANYAI, Virgil: A NATO m veleti tmogatsi lnc menedzsment koncepci megvalsulsa napjainkban.
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