Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 131909 February 18, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and
RODERICK ODIAMAR, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR.
No. 42318 which affirmed the March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders 2 of the lower court
granting accused-respondent's Motion for Bail and denying petitioner People's Motions "to
Recall and Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995" and "to Recall and/or Reconsider the Order of
May 5, 1995" confirming the hospitalization of accused-respondent.

Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of
Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused- respondent filed a motion
praying that he be released on bail which petitioner by presenting real, documentary and
testimonial evidence. The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail in an order,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the trial, this court is
constrained to grant bail for the provisional liberty of the accused Roderick Odiamar in the
amount of P30,000.00. (Emphasis supplied)

Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him
was strong, the prosecution filed the two abovementioned motions which the lower court
disposed of, thus:

WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995 both filed by Atty.
Romulo Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are hereby denied, for lack of merit.

The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before the Court of Appeals
with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition reasoning thus:

We have examined in close and painstaking detail the records of this case, and find that
the claim of the People that the respondent judge had over-stepped the exercise of his
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders, is unimpressed with merit. We are not
inclined to declare that there was grave abuse in respondent court's exercise of its
discretion in allowing accused to obtain bail. There is grave abuse of discretion where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We do not find this to be so in this
case. Our ruling is based not only on the respect to be accorded the findings of facts of the
trial court, which had the advantage (not available to Us) of having observed first-hand the
quality of the autoptic preference and the documentary exhibits of the parties, as well as
the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, but is grounded on the liberal slant given by
the law in favor of the accused. Differently stated, in the absence of clear, potent and
compelling reasons, We are not prepared to supplant the exercise of the respondent
court's discretion with that of Our own.

Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the instant petition submitting the
following sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION DESPITE A SHOWING BY THE
PROSECUTION THAT THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE PROVING RESPONDENT'S
GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower court granting
used-respondent's application for bail which it justified through its summary of the
evidence presented during the hearing. Said order states, thus:

Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the petition for bail filed by the
accused through counsel, the court believes that the evidence so far presented by the
prosecution is not strong. This is so because the crime of rape is not to be presumed;
consent and not physical force is the common origin of acts between man and woman.
Strong evidence and indication of great weight alone support such presumption. It is the
teaching of applicable doctrines that form the defense in rape prosecution. In the final
analysis, it is entitled to prevail, not necessarily because the untarnished truth is on its
side but merely because it can raise reasonable, not fanciful doubts. It has the right to
require the complainant (sic) strong evidence and an indication of great weight (People v.
Godoy, G.R. No. L-31177, July 15, 1976), and in the instant case, the reasonable doubt is
on the evidence of the prosecution, more so, because the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
conviction or the acquittal of the accused depends almost entirely on the credibility of the
complainant (People v. Oliquino, G.R. No. 94703, May 31, 1993). Rightly so, because in
the commission of the offense of rape the facts and circumstances occuring either prior,
during and subsequent thereto may provide conclusion whether they may negate the
commission thereof by the accused (People v. Flores, L-6065, October 26, 1986). If they
negate, they do presuppose that the evidence for the prosecution is not strong. More so,
because in the instant case, the facts and circumstances showing that they do seem to
negate the commission thereof were mostly brought out during the cross-examination. As
such, they deserve full faith and credence because the purpose thereof is to test accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom from interest and bias or the reverse (Rule 132, Sec. 6,
Revised Rules of Evidence). The facts and circumstances brought up are as follow, to wit:

a) That, when the offended party Cecille Buenafe rode in the jeepney then driven by the
accused Roderick Odiamar in that evening of July 20, 1994 at about 8:00 o'clock from the
Poblacion, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur the former knew that it was for a joy ride. In fact, she
did not even offer any protest when the said jeepney proceeded to the Pilapil Beach resort
at Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines Sur instead of Sabang, same municipality, where she
and Stephen Florece intended to go. And when the said jeepney was already inside that
resort, Cecille even followed the accused in going down from the jeepney also without
protest on her part, a fact which shows voluntariness on the part of the offended party and,
therefore, to the mind of the court her claim of rape should not be received with precipitate
credulity. On the contrary, an insight into the human nature is necessary (People v. Barbo,
56 SCRA 495). And it is only when the testimony is impeccable and rings true throughout
where it shall be believed (People v. Tapao, G.R. No. L-41704, October 23, 1981). Rightly
so, because the aphorism that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity with the common
experience and observation of mankind is nowhere of moral relevance than in cases
involving prosecution of rape (People v. Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188);

b) That, in that resort, when the accused Roderick Odiamar and companions allegedly
forced the offended party Cecille Buenafe to drink gin, the latter, at first, refused and even
did not swallow it but later on voluntarily took four (4) shots there shows that there (was)
no force. And as regards the claim that the accused Roderick Odiamar and companions
allegedly forced the said offended party to inhale smoke, out of a small cigarette,
presumably a marijuana, it becomes doubtful because the prosecution, however, failed to
present any portion of that so-called small cigarette much less did it present an expert
witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would cause dizziness.
Rightly so, because administration of narcotics is covered by Art. 335, par. 2 Revised
Penal Code (People v. Giduces C.A. 38 O.C. 1434 cited in the Revised Penal Code,
Aquino, Vol.III, pp. 392). As such, the burden of proof rests with the prosecution but it
failed to do so;

c) That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick Odiamar allegedly brought the
offended party, Cecille Buenafe, the former was able to consummate the alleged offense
of rape by removing the two (2) hands of the offended party, placed them on her knee,
separating them thereby freeing the said hand and consequently pushed the head of the
accused but the latter was able to insert his penis when the said offended party was no
longer moving and the latter became tired. Neither evidence has been presented to show
that the offended party suffered an injury much less any part of her pants or blouse was
torn nor evidence to show that there was an overpowering and overbearing moral
influence of the accused towards the offended party (People v. Mabunga, G.R. No.
96441d, March 13, 1992) more so, because force and violence in the offense of rape are
relative terms, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to
each other (People v. Erogo, 102077 January 4, 1994);

d) That, after the alleged commission of rape at about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of
July 21, 1994, the offended party, Cecille, Stephen Florece and the latter's companions all
boarded the same jeepney going back to the Poblacion of Lagonoy, without the said
offended party, protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of grief regarding the alleged
commission of the offense of rape until the jeepney reached the house of Roderick
Odiamar where the latter parked it. As in other cases, the testimony of the offended party
shall not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion, because
the nature of the offense of rape is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved but
harder to be defended by the party accused though innocent (People v. Francisco G.R.
No. L-43789, July 15, 1981). It becomes necessary, therefore, for the courts to exercise
the most painstaking care in scrutinizing the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution (People v. Dayag, L-30619, March 29, 1974);

e) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself physically examined by Dr.
Josephine Decena for medical certificate dated July 27, 1994 and it states, among others,
that there was a healed laceration on the hymen, her laceration might have been
sustained by the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and even a year, prior to
the said examination and that the said laceration might have been caused by repeated
penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that the offended party might have
experienced sexual intercourse. This piece of testimony coming from an expert, such
finding is binding to court (Rules of Court, Moran, op.cit,vol 5, 1963, ed. pp. 413).

f) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe accompanied by the Station Commander of
Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, proceeded to Naga City and upon the suggestion of Gov.
Bulaong, the said offended party submitted for medical treatment before the same
physician per medical certificate dated August 1, 1994 but according to the said physician
the lesions near the umbilicus were due to skin diseases but the said offended party claim
they were made by the accused after the sexual acts. As such, there were contradictions
on material points, it becomes of doubtful veracity (People v. Palicte 83 Phil.) and it also
destroys the testimony (People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 13086, March 27, 1961). As to the fact
that the said lesion was made by the accused subsequent to the commission of the act, it
is immaterial. As such, it has no probative value.

The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not strong.

The office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It opined that aside from
failing to include some pieces of evidence in the summary, the trial also misapplied some
well-established doctrines of criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out
the following circumstances duly presented in the hearing for bail:

First. There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the heinous crime of rape
against respondent (People v. Paragsa, 83 SCRA 105 [1978]; People v. Delovino, 247
SCRA 637 [1995]).

Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille testified that based on her
psychiatric examination of the latter, Cecille manifested psychotic signs and symptoms
such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty
of thought content as well as depressive signs and symptoms. These abnormal
psychological manifestations, according to Dr. Belmonte, are traceable to the rape
incident (Pages 5-7, TSN, November 22, 1994.)

Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an implied admission of guilt

(People v. Flore, 239 SCRA 83 [1994]).

Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered unconscious by

intoxication and inhalation of marijuana smoke.
Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, "no bail was
recommended in the information" constitutes "clear and strong evidence of the guilt of (all)
the accused" (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 284 [1995].

Sixth. Cecille categorically testified on re-cross examination (pages 5-7, Order) that
respondent succeeded in forcibly deflowering her because she was already weak and
dizzy due to the effect of the smoke and the gin. Her declarations remain unrebutted.

Seventh. Cecille categorically testified that she performed acts manifesting her lament,
torment and suffering due to the rape. She went to Stephen Florece, cried and
complained about the incident. Instead of helping her, Florece threatened to harm her and
her family. (Pages 9-13, November 17, 1994). The statements of Cecille are positive
statements which, under existing jurisprudence, are stronger than the denials put forth by
respondent (Batiquin v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 [1996]).

Eight. The reliance by trial court on the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the
lacerations suffered by Cecille "might have been sustained by the latter a month, six (6)
months or even a year prior to the examination" (Page 12 (e), Order, March 24, 1995) thus
implying that respondent could not have committed the crime is highly misplaced.

Dr. Decena herself testified that she cannot tell "how old is an old hymenal laceration"
because she cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted and that from the size of
the vagina she "could not point the exact cause" (Pages 7-10, TSN, December 9, 1994).
Nevertheless, proof of hymenal laceration is not indispensable in indictments for rape as a
broken hymen is not an essential element of the crime (People v. Echegaray, 257 SCRA
561 [1996]). Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the victim's
genitalia is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime. The
examination is merely corroborative in nature. (People v. Arce, 227 SCRA 406 [1993]).

Ninth. With respect to the cigarette wounds, Dr, Decena positively testified that the
wounds could have been '"aused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim" (Page 6, TSN,
December 9, 1994) which confirms Cecile's testimony (quoted in the Order at page 9) that
respondent burned her "right side of the stomach" thrice.

The above points are well taken and have impressed upon this Court the merits of the
instant petition.

The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee on bail and in accordance
with its rule-making powers, 3 the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Rules of Court,
adopted the following provision:
Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. 4 (Emphasis suppplied)

In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a
deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. 5 As such, bail is discreationary
and not a matter of right. The grant or denial of an application for is, therefore, dependent on
whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower should determine in a hearing called for
the purpose. The determination of the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of
judicial discretion. While the lower court would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative
to exercise judicial discretion, this Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial court's findings if
found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.

By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or
the presumption of guilt is strong. 6 "Proof evident" or "Evident proof" in this connection has
been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded disspositionate
judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is
the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered. 7 "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified to are such that
the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convinsing to an
unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conlusion. 8 Even
though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire
record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be
refused. 9 (Emphasis and supplied)

In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable
doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such,
the court is ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present
which would show evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above. 10

This Court has observed that the lower court's order failed to mention and include some
significant factors and circumstances which, to the mind of this Court are strong, clear and
convincing. First, it excluded the testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric
examination of the victim as well as her findings that the latter manifested "psychotic signs
and symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor
retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and symptom." 11 This
particular testimony should have been considered and included in the summary as it was given
by an expert witness. Second, the unrebutted offer of compromise by accused-respondent is
an implied admission of guilt which should have been noted as an offer of a compromise is
generally considered as admissible evidence against the party making it. 12

Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of evidence and testimonies, this
Court has likewise observed that the lower court misappplied some doctrines in criminal
law. First, the lower court, in its order, intoned the following doctrine that "evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be
credible in itself in conformity with common experience and observation of mankind."

According to the lower court, the credibility of the complainant is suspect because she
willingly went with accused-respondent to the resort where she was allegedly raped. In the
scene of the crime, complainant allegedly voluntarily drank four shots of gin. The
complainant, likewise, never protested nor cried while they on their way to
accused-respondent's house. Because of those findings, the court doubted the credibility
of complainant and stated that the crime of rape is not to be presumed and that sexual
acts between a man and a woman are presumed to be consensual. In overcoming such
presumption, much depends on the credibility of the complainant.

This Court cannot agree. First, there was no finding of any ill-motive on the part of
complainant in filing the rape charge against accused-respondent. This should have been
taken into consideration. The following rebuttal of petitioner to the findings of the lower
court is more credible:

It must also be stressed that Cecille testified that she was forced by respondent to drink
gin with the help of his friends by holding her hair and putting the glass on her mouth
(Pages 5-7, TSN, November 17, 1994). More, respondent and his friends blew smoke into
her face forcing her to inhale the intoxicating smoke. Whenever she attempted to leave
the place, she was forced to sit down by Odiamar and his friends (Pages 6-7, TSN,
November 17, 1994).

Similarly, Cecille categorically declared that she was threatened by Florece with a gun
(Page 17, TSN, November 17, 1994).

The requirement of force and intimidation in the crime of rape are relative and must be
viewed in light of the victim's perspective and the offender's physical condition (People v.
Plaza, 242 SCRA 724 [1995]). Further, physical resistance need not be established in
rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against
her will because of fear for life and personal safety. (People v. Ramos, 245 SCRA 405
[19951)

In this case, Cecille was only fifteen (l5) years old at the time of the incident in question. At
her age, it is reasonable to assume that a shot of gin rendered her tipsy. Thus, four (4)
shots of gin must have rendered her dizzy, intoxicated and deprived of will or reason. The
resulting weakness and dizziness which deprived Cecille of reason, will and freedom must
be viewed in light of her perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime, and not by any hard and fast rule because in "rape cases, submission does not
necessarily imply volition." (Querido, 229 SCRA 745 [1994])

It must likewise be taken into consideration that when Cecille went with the group of
accused-respondent, she was of the impression that it was just for a joy ride. The
conclusion made by the trial court that Cecille must have consented to the sexual act
because she acquiesced to go with them in the first place is, therefore, bereft of any legal
or factual support, if not non sequitur. That she agreed to accompany them for a joy ride
does not mean that she also agreed to the bestial acts later committed against her person.

Second, the lower court stated that "force and violence in the offense of rape relative
terms, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each
other." The lower court enunciated this doctrine in finding that the alleged rape was
actually a consensual act since the prosecution was unable to show the complainant
suffered any injury nor show any evidence that her pants or blouse was torn. Neither was
there any evidence that accused-respondent exerted overpowering and overbearing
moral influence over the offended party.
This Court is of the impression that when the lower court invoked the above doctrine, it
readily concluded that complainant agreed to the sexual act disregarding testimonies
lending credence to complainant's allegation that she was threatened and intimidated as
well as rendered weak and dizzy, not only by the smoke of the marijuana cigarette but
also by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. It was not imperative
for the prosecution, in order to prove the elements of force or intimidation to show that
Cecille had broken limbs or that her blouse or pants were torn. Her testimony to that effect
would have sufficed. Nevertheless, the prosecution still exerted efforts to corroborate
Cecille's claim by presenting the physician who testified that Cecille suffered hymenal
lacerations and lesions near the umbilicus area. Unfortunately, however, the lower court
chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence.

In addition, the lower court doubted complainant's allegation that she was to smoke a
small cigarette, presumably marijuana, due to the fact that "the prosecution failed to
present any portion of that so-called small cigarette much less did it present an expert
witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would cause the said
offended party to suffer weakness and dizziness." Said ratiocination is trifling and
unpersuasive. In fact, it is even misleading as complainant categorically asserted that
what made her weak and dizzy were the smoke of the cigarette and the intoxicating effect
of four shots of gin, not the inhalation of the smoke alone. In any case, complainant could
not be expected to produce that "portion of that so-called small cigarette." Moreover, one
does not need an expert witness to testify on what is common knowledge - that four shots
of gin have a "weakening and dizzying" effect on the drinker, especially one as young as
the fifteen-year old complainant.

More disturbing than the above misapplication of criminal law doctrines is the lower court's
misinterpretation of the medical findings and deliberate withholding of some testimonies
which would have shown a very strong likelihood that complainant could indeed have
been raped. The following pieces of evidence cited in the summary of the assailed order
are indications of misleading findings:

First, the lower court did not lend any credence to the medical certificate issued after
complainant's physical examination. On the contrary, it interpreted it to mean that the
offended party is already experienced in sexual intercourse, after the examining physician
had testified that the hymenal lacerations might have been sustained a month, six months
or even a year prior to the examination. Interestingly, the lower court failed to mention that
Dr. Decena also testified that she cannot tell "how old is an hymenal laceration" because
she cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted and that from the size of the
vagina she "could not point the exact cause."

This Court views this apparent lapse on the part of the lower court with and agrees with
petitioner, in accordance with well established jurisprudence, that proof of hymenal
laceration is not indispensable in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not an
essential element of the crime. Further, in against chastity, the medical examination of the
victim's genitalia is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the
crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature. 13 And contrary to the theory
espoused by the lower court, a hymenal laceration is not conclusive proof that one is
experienced in sexual intercourse.
Second, the lower court highlighted the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect the cigarette
burns indicated that the lesions near complainant's umbilicus were due to skin diseases.
Notably, however, the lower court again failed to mention that Dr. Decena likewise
positively testified that the wounds could have been "caused by cigarette butts as alleged
by the victim" which corroborates Cecille's testimony that respondent burned her "right
side of the stomach" thrice.

It is thus indicative from the above observations that the lower court abuse its discretion
and showed manifest bias in favor of accused-respondent in determining which
circumstances are to be considered in supporting its decision as to the guilt of
accused-respondent. In this regard, it must be remembered that the discretion to be
exercised in granting or denying bail, according to Basco v. Rapatalo 14 "is not absolute nor
beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its
very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion. It is because of its very
nature that the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-know rules which,
while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent
them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a
judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, of the discretion to be exercised in granting
or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion
guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and;
but legal and regular."

The fact that vital prosecution evidence and testimonies have been irregularly disregarded
indicate that they have not been considered at all in arriving at the decision to grant bail.
This irregularity is even more pronounced with the misapplication of the two criminal law
doctrines cited to support the grant of the bail application. This Court cannot help but
observe that the lower court exerted painstaking efforts to show that the evidence of guilt
of accused-respondent is not strong by its non sequitur justifications, misleading or
unsupported conclusions, irregular disregard of vital prosecution evidence and strained
interpretation, if not misinterpretation, of criminal law doctrines.

It is the view of this Court that: (1) the testimony of Dr. Decena confirming complainant's
allegation that accused-respondent burned the right side of her stomach with cigarette
butts, (2) the testimony of Dr. Belmonte stating that complainant exhibited psychological
manifestations which are "traceable to the rape incident'', and (3) the unrebutted offer of
compromise, are indications of the strength of the evidence of guilt of
accused-respondent.

Lending credence to petitioner's case is the fact that after the conduct of two (2)
preliminary investigations, "no bail" was recommended in the information. According to
Baylon v. Sison, 15 such recommendation constitutes clear and strong evidence of guilt of the
accused.

Aside from the apparent abuse of discretion in determining which circumstances and
pieces of evidence are to be considered, the lower court also did not strictly comply with
jurisprudential guidelines in the exercise of discretion. As reiterated in Carpio v.
Maglalng, 16 discretion is guided by: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the
statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles
of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land.
The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in crimes punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not matter of right. This
Court has reiterated this mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently,
this Court laid down the following rules in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo 17which outlined the
duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for
the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution; (Emphasis supplied)

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.

Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the court's order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for prosecutions. 18 A
summary is defined as "a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or
statement." 19

There are two corollary reasons for the summary: First, the summary of the evidence in
the order is an extension of the hearing proper, thus, a part of procedural due process
wherein the evidence presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having
been presented and most importantly, considered. The failure to include every piece of
evidence in the summary presented by the prosecution in their favor during the prior
hearing would be tantamount to not giving them the opportunity to be heard in said
hearing, for the inference would be that they were not considered at all in weighing the
evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due process, for due process means not only
giving every contending party the opportunity to be heard but also for the Court to
consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor. 20 Second, the summary of the
evidence in the order is the for the basis for the judge's exercising his judicial discretion. Only
after weighing the pieces of evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his
own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong based on his
discretion. 21 (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should necessarily be a complete

compilation or restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing
proper. The lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence
should be included in the summary. While conceding that some prosecution evidence
were enumerated, said enumeration was incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or
selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be
considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence
presented by the prosecution. A "summary" that is incomplete is not a summary at all.
According to Borinaga v. Tamin, 22 the absence of a summary in the order would make said
order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order containing an incomplete
"summary" would likewise be defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained or be
a semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang, 23 said order was considered defective and
voidable. As such, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated. 24

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated August 1, 1997 and the
resolution dated December 22, 1997 in CA G.R. No. 42318 are REVERSED and the order
dated March 24, 1995 in Criminal Case No. T-1417 is declared void for having been
issued in grave abuse of discretion. The court a quo shall immediately issue a warrant for
the rearrest of Roderick Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved and thereafter,
proceed with dispatch in the disposition of said case. This resolution is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 133066-67 October 1, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ROMEO H. LAMBID, appellant.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

On automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
18, in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45672 and CBU-45673 finding Romeo H. Lambid guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death for each count.1

In her two separate Complaints dated November 4, 1997 and November 5, 1997,
complainant Lyzel S. Lambid, accuses Romeo H. Lambid of raping her, as follows:

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45672:

The undersigned complainant, LYZEL S. LAMBID, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law, hereby accuses ROMEO H. LAMBID of the crime of Rape,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of October, 1997, at about 5:00 A.M., and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation upon undersigned
complainant to wit, by forcibly placing himself on top of the victim, and at the same time
threat her with death if she would shout, then removed her panty, did then and there have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673:

The undersigned complainant, LYZEL S. LAMBID, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law, hereby accuses ROMEO H. LAMBID of the crime of Rape,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of November, 1997, at about 5:00 A.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by
means of force and intimidation upon undersigned complainant to wit, by forcibly placing
himself on top of the victim, and at the same time threat her with death if she would shout,
then removed her panty, did then and there have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Upon his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The cases were
consolidated and tried jointly.

The prosecution presented three witnesses: Lyzel Lambid, the complainant; Mary Ann
Lambid, a sister of Lyzel; and Dr. Aster Khosravibabadi, the physician who conducted a
physical examination on the complainant.

The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:

On October 31, 1997, 14-year old Lyzel was sleeping in their house located at Inayawan,
Cebu City together with her father, herein appellant, and two sisters. Around 5:00 in the
morning, she woke up and noticed her father lying beside her. Then, her father started
removing her panty at the same time warning her not to tell her mother what he was doing.
After her father succeeded in removing her panty, he went on top of her and started
inserting his penis into her vagina. She initially tried to resist the sexual advances of her
father by kicking him and by moving her body from left to right and vice versa. She
stopped resisting when her father stared hard at her and threatened to kill her (Lyzel). Her
father succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. The following day, November 1,
1997, she was again roused from her sleep and noticed her father lying beside her.
Repeating what he did the previous day, her father removed her panty. Thereafter, he
successfully inserted his penis into her vagina. Lyzel did nothing out of fear. She did not
tell anybody about these two incidents.4

However, her sister, Mary Ann, aged 13, witnessed both incidents. She was awakened
around 5:00 in the morning of October 31, 1997 when she heard their father say to her
sister Lyzel: "Dont tell this to your mother or else I will kill you." Their father was then lying
beside Lyzel. Afterwards, she saw him stand up and go to urinate. About 5:00 in the
morning of the succeeding day, November 1, 1997, she was sleeping beside her sister
Lyzel. She was awakened while their father was pulling her blanket. Suspicious of their
fathers actuation, she kicked him. After kicking him, she laid near the foot of her sister
Lyzel. Their father then covered her with a blanket but she peeped through the blanket.
She saw their father who was only wearing an underwear place himself on top of Lyzel.
Her father covered himself and Lyzel with a blanket, after which Mary Ann saw their
fathers whole body shake and heard him breathing hard. She again heard their father
warn Lyzel not to relate the incident to their mother, otherwise he will kill her (Lyzel).

On November 2, 1997, Mary Ann informed three of their neighbors about the incidents
she witnessed. Their neighbors brought her to the president of their local association for
assistance and on that same day their father was arrested.5

Dr. Aster Khosravibabadi conducted a physical examination of Lyzel on November 3,

1997 and found that Lyzels vagina had "new hymenal lacerations with raw edges at 5
oclock position." The doctor asserted that Lyzel might have sustained the lacerations
within six days prior to her examination. The test for the presence of spermatozoa yielded
negative results.6
The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. On the witness stand, when asked
about the truth of her daughters complaint, appellant simply stated that if he had
committed the crimes of rape against his daughter, he asks for forgiveness because
during that time he was drunk. He asked the court to impose upon him a lesser penalty
considering that his children are still under his care.7

The trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Romeo H. Lambid
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, defined and penalized by Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 7659 known as the Death Penalty Law
and sentences him to suffer two supreme penalties of Death for the two (2) crimes of rape
committed against her own daughter Lyzel Lambid, with inherent accessory penalties
provided by law; to indemnify the victim the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and to
pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.8

Hence, the present automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

Appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING

ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED
ON REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME

PENALTY OF DEATH NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ALLEGE THE AGE AND RELATIONSHIP OF THE
VICTIM AND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.9

At the outset, it is noted that since the crimes were committed on October 31, 1997 and
November 1, 1997, the applicable law is R.A. 8353, otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape
Law of 1997"10 which took effect on October 22, 1997.11 Under this law, rape has been
reclassified from a private crime or crime against chastity into a crime against persons.
Consequently, the prosecution for the crime of rape was removed from the ambit of
Chapter Five, Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure which required that in crimes against chastity, the complaint
must be filed by the offended party, or her parents, godparents or guardian, as the case
may be under the law. Thus, effective October 22, 1997, R.A. No. 8353, it is required that
prosecution for the crime of rape, as in any other public crimes, is commenced in court by
the filing of an information by the public prosecutor and no longer by a mere complaint
filed by the offended party, parents, godparents or guardian.
In the present cases, the indictments charging appellant with the crimes of rape were
each captioned as a "Complaint" signed by Lyzel herself; but, there is a Certification on
the second page of each of the complaints by the investigating prosecutor treating the
complaint as an information, to wit:

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45672:

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the foregoing information is filed pursuant to Sec. 7,

Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the
accused not having opted to avail of his right to a preliminary investigation
and not having executed a waiver pursuant to Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. I further certify that this information is being filed with the prior
authority of the City Prosecutor.

Cebu City, Philippines, November 4, 1997.

(signed)
JOSE R. PEDROSA
Prosecutor II, Cebu City12
(Emphasis supplied)

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673:

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the foregoing information is filed pursuant to Sec. 7,

Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the
accused having opted to avail of his right to a preliminary investigation and
having executed a waiver pursuant to Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
I further certify that this information is being filed with the prior authority of
the City Prosecutor.

Cebu City, Philippines, November 5, 1997.

(signed)
JOSE R. PEDROSA
Prosecutor II, Cebu City13

The apparent defect in the form of indictment, that is by way of a complaint by the
offended party, is merely one of form which does not invalidate the proceedings had in the
trial court. The certification converted the complaints into informations filed by the
prosecutor.

Moreover, under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 14 the
governing law at the time of the filing of the indictments, for his failure to move to quash
the same prior to his arraignment, appellant was deemed to have waived his right to
question the complaints filed by Lyzel on the ground that it is defective in form per Section
3(d), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.15
Coming to the merits of the case, appellant, in support of the first assigned error, attacks
the credibility of the complainant. He harps upon the fact that although Lyzel was sure of
the dates when appellant raped her, she failed to recall the days of the week upon which
these dates fell. Appellant also points out the apparent inconsistency as to the date
Lyzels mother arrived from Leyte and the date she accompanied Lyzel to report the
incident to the police authorities.

We agree with the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the failure of
complainant to correctly pinpoint the day of the week when she was raped and to recall
the exact date of her mothers arrival from Leyte are inconsequential matters. It is a settled
rule that discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime, such as
the exact time of the commission of the crime, are not grounds for acquittal.16 To be
material, discrepancies in the testimony of the victim should refer to significant facts which
are determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.17 In the present case, the
mental lapse on the part of Lyzel in failing to accurately recall the exact days of the week
when she was raped and the date of her mothers arrival from Leyte does not detract from
her credibility. It only indicates that her account is spontaneous, neither rehearsed nor
contrived.18 What is important is that she was able to clearly recall how she was raped and
testify on this matter in a categorical and straightforward manner.

Moreover, Lyzels testimony is strongly corroborated by her sister Mary Ann19 and
buttressed by physical evidence. The physicians findings on her physical examination
conducted on November 3, 1997 indicated the presence of fresh lacerations on her
hymen. Laceration of the hymen, whether fresh or healed, is the best physical evidence of
defloration.20 In the present case, the doctor estimated that the lacerations could have
been sustained by Lyzel within six days prior to the date of her examination.21 This
estimate is consistent with Lyzels claim that she was raped on October 31, 1997 and
November 1, 1997.

Under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
8353, rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through
fear, threat or intimidation.

Appellant would have us to believe that if he had carnal knowledge with her daughter
Lyzel, it was done without force and intimidation, citing her testimony that she did nothing
while she was supposedly being sexually abused by him.

We are not convinced in the light of Lyzels testimony, pertinent portions of which we
quote verbatim, as follows:

Q At about 5:00 oclock in the morning of October 31, 1997 can you recall of any unusual
incident that transpired inside the house where you were residing?

A Yes there was sir.

Q Please tell the Court Lyzel what was the unusual indicent?

A While I was still asleep I was awaken when my father sleep beside me.

Q If your father was laying beside you did he do anything?

A There was sir.

Q What did your father do to you?

A He remove my panty.

Q And after your father remove your panty what did he do?

A He lift out his penis and let it enter into my vagina.

Q And did your father succeeded in inserting his penis into your vagina?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you do when your father was still removing your panty and before he placed
himself on top of you and inserted his penis into your vagina?

A He told me not to reveal to my mother what he did

...

COURT:

Q What did you do when your father was doing all these things that you have told to us?

A Nothing.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q Why?

A I was entertaining fear considering that he stared his eyes towards me.

Q Aside from staring at you what else if any did your father do to in staring on you?

A He said as follows: "Dont tell anybody, if you still somebody I would kill you".

COURT:

Q Did you not move your body away from him so that he would not succeed in doing such
thing to you?

A I moved my body but he kept on holding me.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q On the following day Lyzel November 1, 1997 where did you sleep?

A At our house sir.

Q The same house where you sleep the day before?

A Yes, sir.

COURT:

Q Why did you still sleep in that house after that experienced you had with your father the
preceding night. Why did you not run away from that house.

A Because he will be looking for me, Your Honor.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q And again Lyzel who were your companions if any on November 1, 1997 at your house
when you were sleeping?

A My two younger sister sir.

Q Who else if any?

A My father.

Q At about the same time on November 1, 1997 at about 5:00 oclock in the morning was
there anything unusual that happened inside your house?

A There was.

Q Now. Please tell this Honorable Court what unusual incident happened on that
particular date and time.

A While I was still asleep there was somebody lying beside me I thought it was my sister
but when I was awaken it was my father.

Q And while your father was lying beside you did he do anything?

A Yes.

Q Please tell the Court Lyzel what did your father do to you?

A He removed my panty sir.

Q And after your father removed your panty what did he do next?

A He lift out his penis and inserted into my vagina.

...

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q Did your father succeed in inserting his penis into your vagina?
A Yes.

Q Now what did you do when your father inserted his penis into your vagina?

A Nothing.

Q Why?

A Because I was entertaining fear.

COURT:

Q Why were you afraid of your father?

A Because his eyes were starring at me.

Q Was his bolo was still there?

A Yes, Your Honor.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q Did you tell somebody Lyzel on what your father did to you on October 31, 1997 as well
as on November 1, 1997?

A No, sir.

Q Why did you not tell anybody about what your father did to you?

A Because I was entertaining fear all the time.22 (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, Lyzel further testified:

ATTY. GUBALANE:

Q How long did it take by your father in removing your panty on October 31, 1997?

A About one minute sir.

Q Do your remember what were your wearing on October 31, 1997?

A Yes I remember sir.

Q What were you wearing then?

A Short pants sir.

Q When you noticed your father on October 31, 1997 sleep beside you and before he
remove your panty why did you not shour for help?
A Because I was entertaining fear sir.

COURT:

Q Fear of what?

A Entertaining fear to my father, Your Honor.

ATTY. GUBALANE:

Q Is it not true then that Mary Ann is sleeping beside you at your foot?

A Thats correct sir.

Q Did you not kick you father?

A I kicked him sir.

Q How many times did you kick your father?

A Two times.

Q But you did not shout?

A No, sir.

Q Because of fear?

A Thats right sir.

Q Inspite your fear you managed to kick your father two times?

A Thats right sir.

COURT:

Q You kick for two times, did you do this on the first rape or on the second rape?

A The first rape, Your Honor.

Q Why did you not kick him any more in the second time?

A Because he stared his eyes towards me (gisigahan ko sa iyang mata).23 (Emphasis

supplied)

Lyzel very clearly testified that in the first incident, she tried to resist the sexual advances
of appellant by kicking him and by trying to move her body but when appellant threatened
to kill her, she, who was only fourteen years old, was easily cowed into submitting herself
to appellants carnal desire. When appellant raped her the following day, her fear of her
father and of the previous threat that he would kill her still pervaded causing her to do
nothing the second time. Her harrowing experience the day before in the hands of her
father coupled with a threat on her life was sufficient to envelop her with fear and paralyze
her into submission even if appellant merely stared at her when he raped her again the
following morning. Lyzels failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance during the second
incident does not demolish her claim that she was raped. As we have held in People vs.
Rodriguez:

The defense argument that the accused has not employed force upon his daughter in
order to have sex with him does not at all persuade. The force or violence necessary in
rape is a relative term that depends not only on the age, size, and strength of the persons
involved but also on their relationship to each other. In a rape committed by a father
against his own daughter, the formers parental authority and moral ascendancy over the
latter substitutes for violence or intimidation who, expectedly, would just cower in fear and
resign to the fathers wicked deeds. It would be plain fallacy to say that the failure to shout
or to offer tenacious resistance makes voluntary the victims submission to the criminal act
of the offender.24

and in People vs. Flores, to wit:

Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it
produced fear fear that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her revisher, some
evil could happen to her at that moment or even thereafter.

The fact that complainant bore no physical evidence of any force used against her person
is of no moment. The absence of any external sign of injury does not necessarily negate
the occurrence of rape, proof of injury not being an essential element of the crime. What is
important is that because of force and intimidation, the victim was made to submit to the
will of appellant. As stated in People vs. Maglente, the test is whether the treat or
intimidation produces fear in the mind of a reasonable person that if one resists or does
not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out.25

Besides, no less than Lyzels younger sister Mary Ann positively testified that she heard
her father threaten Lyzels life on both occasions. Appellants threat on the life of his
14-year old child and the fear it instilled in her clearly repudiate his claim that there was no
force or intimidation employed against her in both occasions.

Appellant further questions the credibility of Lyzel in enabling him to rape her in two
successive days. He contends that after Lyzel was raped for the first time on October 31,
1997, her logical reaction should have been to immediately seek the help of other people;
that despite her opportunity to do so, she did not. We are not persuaded. It is a settled rule
that the workings of the human mind under emotional stress are unpredictable and there
is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.26 Verily,
under emotional stress, the human mind is not expected to follow a predictable
path.27 Indeed, Lyzel must have been shocked and utterly confused by the fact that her
own father, committed such an act of bestiality against her. More importantly, it is
established by competent evidence that appellant threatened to kill Lyzel if she told
anybody about the rape. That alone is sufficient explanation why she did not make known
to other people the first time that she was raped by her father.
Appellant raised no defense whatsoever. He virtually admitted his guilt. A review of the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during his direct and cross examinations shows that
he never disowned the acts imputed against him.28 Appellant merely claimed that he was
drunk and he asked for forgiveness from Lyzel, if he had really raped her and for
compassion from the trial court. In People vs. Alvero, we held that a plea for forgiveness
may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise and an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.29 Thus, by asking for forgiveness, appellant has admitted his guilt.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG agrees with appellant. We sustain the
arguments of both appellant and the OSG. The trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty.

Articles 266-A and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353,
provide:

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.- Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above are present.

...

Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

...

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim;

...

3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity; (Emphasis supplied)

...
In both cases, the prosecution has established by competent evidence that Lyzel was
fourteen years old and appellant is her father. In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673, it is
likewise established that appellant raped his daughter Lyzel in full view of his other minor
daughter Mary Ann, thus:

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q The following day November 1, 1997 at about the same time 5:00 a.m., can you recall
where were you?

A Yes, I can.

Q Where were you on that particular date and time?

A At our house.

Q Again, can you tell the Court if there was any unusual incident that transpired?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that unusual incident?

A While I was sleeping beside my sister my father pulled that blanket and then I kicked
him. That is why I transferred lying at the foot sir of my sister.

Q You said that when your father pulled the blanket you kicked him why did you kick you
father?

A Because I was suspicious on his actuations sir considering that because I noticed what
he said to my sister by saying dont tell to your mother. If you tell your mother I would kill
you.

Q What was that something which your father dont want to let your sister do, if you know?

A When he abused my sister.

Q Now, after you kicked your father and transferred sleeping at the foot of your sister what
happened next?

A While I was lying at that time and when he covered me with a blanket I saw my father
rose placed himself on top of my sister.

Q While your father was already on top of your sister what did you do?

A He made a sexual intercourse with my sister.

COURT:

Q Were you not dreaming?

A No, Your Honor.

Q Are your sure you were wide awake at that time?

A Yes, I am sure.

COURT:

Proceed.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q According to you Mary Ann you covered yourself you covered yourself with a blanket
how were you able to witness, to see what all your father did to your sister when you were
inside the blanket?

A Because I peeped sir.

Q Why did you peep when there was no partition or room inside that house?

A The breathing of my father. As a matter of fact, he kicked me.

Q You said you saw what your father did to your sister because you peeped from where
did your peep?

A I peeped through the blanket.

Q Whose blanket?

A My blanket.

COURT:

Q Are you made to understand you have covered yourself with a blanket and removed a
part so you can peeped?

A That is right Your Honor.

COURT:

Proceed.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q Now, after your father, according to you, sexually abused your sister Lyzel did your
father say anything to your sister?

A Yes, there was. He threatened my sister.

Q What was this threat?

A He told my sister as follows: dont tell your mother and if you tell your mother I will kill
you.

Q And after that what happened?

A He keep on sexually abusing my sister.

Q For how long?

A For quite a time.

Q Did you notice, if your sister, ever resisted to the sexual intercourse done by your father
to her?

A My sister moaned.

Q How about you Mary Ann considering that you actually saw your father abusing your
sister what did you do?

A I cried.

Q Did you not try to stop your father from abusing your sister?

A No, sir because he placed a bolo beside him when he sleep.

Q On October 31, 1997 did your father place a bolo beside him when he sleep?

A Yes, sir.

Q How about on November 1, 1997 did he also place the bolo beside him when your
father sleep?

A Yes, he place the bolo beside him every night.30

However, the complaints/informations in those two cases fail to allege Lyzels minority or
appellants relationship to her. Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, requires that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
the complaint or information. Existing jurisprudence instructs that the death penalty may
be imposed only if the complaint or information has alleged and the evidence has proven
both the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender by the quantum of proof
required for conviction.31 In the present case, not only were the minority of the
complainant and her relationship with appellant not alleged in the two
complaints/informations filed against appellant, but, also, the aggravating/qualifying
circumstance that the second rape was committed in full view of appellants daughter.
Consequently, appellant may be convicted only of simple rape; hence, the trial court erred
in imposing death penalty in both cases. The appropriate penalty which could be imposed
on the appellant is reclusion perpetua in each count.

Let us now consider the civil aspect of the criminal cases.

It is a settled rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct an error as may be found
in the appealed judgment, whether or not it is made the subject of assignment of errors.32

While the trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, it
failed to award civil indemnity.

Civil indemnity is distinct from moral damages as it is based on different jural foundations
and assessed by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion.33 The award of civil
indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of fact of rape.34 Based on existing jurisprudence,
the civil indemnity for the victim in simple rape shall not be less than P50,000.00.35

It is settled that the presence of an aggravating circumstance justifies an award for

exemplary damages under Article 223036 of the Civil Code even in the absence of an
allegation of the aggravating circumstance in the Information.37 The award of exemplary
damages should serve to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies and aberrant
sexual behavior from preying upon and sexually abusing their daughters.38 Thus,
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 for each count of rape should be
awarded to the victim in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
relationship and dwelling.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, dated
December 22, 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45672 and CBU-45673 finding appellant
Romeo H. Lambid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS to the effect that in each case, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay complainant Lyzel S. Lambid the amounts of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages in addition to the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) awarded by the trial court as moral damages or a total of Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 141782 December 14, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
RENATO FLORES a.k.a. "ATONG," and PATERNO PARENO a.k.a.
"PATTER," accused,
RENATO FLORES a.k.a. "ATONG," appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In a rape case, the force or intimidation employed need not necessarily be shown to be
objectively irresistible. Rather, it must be viewed from the victim's perception that unless
she yielded to the ravisher's demand, some injury or evil would befall on her during the
commission of the offense or even thereafter.

The Case

On appeal before this Court is the Decision,1 dated November 16, 1999, issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City (Branch 171)2 in Criminal Case No.
6367-V-97, in which Renato Flores, also known as "Atong," was convicted of rape.

The Information3 filed against appellant and his co-accused, Paterno Pareno, also known
as "Patter,"4 reads as follows:

"That on or about February 2, 1997 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another and by means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of
REMEDIOS RENORIA y BANDOJO, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with her, against her will and without her consent."5

During the arraignment, Appellant Renato Flores pleaded not guilty.6 His co-accused;
Paterno Pareno, was at large.7 After trial in due course, the lower court rendered its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, accused RENATO FLORES alias Atong, [having been found g]uilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, x x x is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to pay the costs.

"He is ordered to indemnify the minor complainant [in] the amount of P50,000.00."8
 The Facts
Prosecution's Version

In its Brief,9 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the prosecution's version of the
facts as follows:

"On February 2, 1997, around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Paterno (Pater) Pareno arrived
at the house of Remedios Renoria in Ulingan St., Lawang-Bato, Valenzuela. Immediately
upon his arrival, Paterno Pareno asked Remedios Renoria to accompany him to the nipa
hut located about fifty (50) meters away from their (Remedios Renoria's) house.
Remedios Renoria acceded because she [knew] Paterno.

"When Paterno Pareno and Remedios Renoria reached the place, appellant was already
inside the nipa hut obviously waiting for them. Paterno Pareno suddenly dragged
Remedios Renoria inside the nipa hut. Then, appellant and Paterno Pareno immediately
covered her mouth and removed her clothing. However, it was appellant who removed her
underwear. This was quickly followed by appellant discarding his own underwear.

"Remedios Renora was then made to lie down on a wooden bed. Thereafter, appellant
positioned himself on top of her and immediately inserted his penis inside her vagina. She
felt pain. Afterwards, appellant grasped her breasts. She could not cry for help because
appellant and Paterno Pareno were covering her mouth.

"Having satisfied his lust, appellant left immediately. Remedios Renoria, thereafter, stood
up, got dressed and went home.

"On April 24, 1997, Remedios Renoria went to see her uncle, Larry Frias, to report the
ordeal she suffered in the hands of appellant. In turn, Larry Frias told Remedios Renoria's
mother [about] the incident. Thereafter, Remedios Renoria's mother asked Larry Frias to
do what [was] best for her daughter.

"Out of genuine concern for his niece who was only thirteen (13) years old at the time she
was ravished, and because Remedios Renoria and her [were] both unlettered Larry Frias
took the initiative to go to the Office of the Bantay Bata in Quezon City to ask for help.

"At the Office of the Bantay-Bata, Larry Frias narrated what happened to Remedios
Renoria. He was then given referral letters to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

"Larry Frias and Remedios Renoria went to the Valenzuela Police Station on April 28,
1997. PO2 Virginia Viacrusis took the statement of Remedios Renoria.

"The following day, or on April 29, 1997, they went to the NBI for medico-legal
examination. Dr. Armie Soreta-Umil, an NBI Medico-Legal Officer, conducted a physical
examination on the victim and submitted a medical report which reads:

Living Case No. MG-97-626

Findings
Conclusions:

1. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injuries noted on the body at the time of
examination. Hymen, intact but distensible and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to
allow complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing any genital injury."10 (Citations omitted)

Defense's Version

Appellant, on the other hand, argues that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. His statement of facts is as follows:11

"Evidence for the defense shows that on February 2, 1997, at about 7:00 in the evening,
accused-appellant Renato Flores was ordered by his father to get the latter's salary in
Ulingan, Valenzuela City. His father worked for Rudy Frias, private complainant's
grandfather. He testified that private complainant [was] his girlfriend and that their
marriage was being arranged by her mother and her uncle. On the night the crime
charged allegedly occurred, accused-appellant recalled that it was private complainant's
mother, Rowena Frias, who invited him to sleep in their house. He slept in the sofa
together with private complainant. The following morning, accused-appellant's parents
were summoned by Rowena Frias and Larry Frias. Private complainant's mother asked
accused-appellant if he love[d] her daughter to which he an[s]wered in the affirmative.
Thereafter, they talked about their plan of getting married and Rowena even allowed her
daughter to go with accused-appellant the following day, bringing with her a bag of clothes.
Since then, the couple lived together as husband and wife for more or less three months
until May 28, 1997 when private complainant was fetched by her mother. She never
returned since then. The next time they saw each other was when private complainant
visited him in jail. She informed him that she was in fact merely forced by Larry Frias to file
a complaint."

Ruling of the Trial Court

After a careful study and a judicious assessment of the evidence submitted by both
parties, the RTC ruled that the guilt of appellant was proven with moral certainty. It added
that his denial could not prevail over the victim's positive assertions, which were
convincing and credible.12 It brushed aside his defense that he and the victim were
sweethearts, and that they lived together as husband and wife.

Hence, this appeal.13

The Issue

Appellant assigns a sole alleged error for our consideration:

"The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the
crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the insufficiency of the
evidence presented by the prosecution."14

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is devoid of merit.

Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence

In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a
man of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be
innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Corollary to the
foregoing legal yardsticks is the dictum that when a victim of rape says that she has been
defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed
against her. So long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof.15

Based on the foregoing principles, we have carefully scrutinized the testimony of

Remedios Renoria, who was 13 years old at the time the rape was committed, as follows:

"Q: Now, Madam Witness, when Renato Flores removed his brief and after he
removed your panty, what did he do?

A: He inserted, sir.

Q: What did he insert?

A: His penis, sir.

Q: Where did he insert that?

A: [Into] my vagina.

Q: Now, madam witness, what was your position when the accused Flores
inserted his penis into your vagina?

A: I was lying, sir.

Q: On what part [were] you lying?

A: [O]n a wooden bed.

Q: What about the accused Flores, what was his position when he inserted his
penis into your vagina while you were lying?

A: He was standing.

Q: While you were lying?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What do you mean standing, was he on top of you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was he able to have his penis penetrated into your vagina?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was the movement of the accused when he was inserting his penis into
your vagina, particularly his buttocks, was he pumping it?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was your feeling when he inserted his penis into your vagina, did you feel
pain?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened to your vagina, did it bleed?

A: No, sir.

Q: Now, how long did he do that to you?

A: It was quite a long time, sir.

Q: Now will you kindly tell this court the reason why you were able to go to that
nipa hut?

A: I was dragged by Pater.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now when Pater dragged you inside the nipa hut, was Renato Flores already
inside?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what was he doing, was he waiting for you?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx"16

A careful review of the evidence adduced by both parties leads us to the conclusion that
the RTC did not err in finding appellant guilty of rape. The lone testimony of the victim, if
credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. This is so because, from the nature of the
offense, her sole testimony is oftentimes the only evidence that can be offered to establish
the guilt of the accused.17 As correctly observed by the lower court:
". . . . Minor complainant was forthright. She narrated how she was sexually abused by
accused Renato Flores. She was straight forward in pin pointing to the accused as her
abuser. There [are] no facts and/or circumstances from which it could be reasonably
inferred that the minor complainant falsely testified or she was actuated by improper
motive. The absence of clear and convincing evidence of the existence of improper motive
sustain[s] the conclusion that no improper motive exist[s] and her testimony should be
given full faith and credit. The Court is persuaded by the sincerity and c[a]ndor of minor
Remedios Renoria. She showed no sign of hostility but interest to bring the malefactor to
justice."18

Well-settled is the rule that the trial court's assessment of credibility of witnesses is
accorded great respect, owing to its direct opportunity to observe their demeanor during
trial.19

Force and Intimidation

We disagree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove the force and
intimidation inflicted upon the offended party.

Well-established is the rule that for the crime of rape to exist, it is not necessary that the
force employed be so great or be of such character that it could not be resisted; it is only
necessary that the force employed by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the
purpose for which it was inflicted. In other words, force as an element of rape need not be
irresistible; as long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it
was more or less irresistible are beside the point.20

Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it
produced fear fear that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her ravisher, some
evil would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter.

The fact that complainant bore no physical evidence of any force used against her person
is of no moment. The absence of any external sign of injury does not necessarily negate
the occurrence of rape, proof of injury not being an essential element of the crime.21 What
is important is that because of force and intimidation, the victim was made to submit to the
will of appellant.22 As stated in People v. Maglente,23 the test is whether the threat or
intimidation produces fear in the mind of a reasonable person that if one resists or does
not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out.

In the present case, the victim narrated how, with the use of threat, she had been coerced
by appellant into submitting to his carnal desires. Pertinent portions of her affidavit are
reproduced as follows:

"08.T. Paano ang [nangyaring] pang-aabuso sa iyo o pang re Rape?

S. Ganito po iyon noong Feb. 2, 1997, sa ganap na ika 9:00 ng gabi ay pinatawag
ako ni Atong alias Renato Flores at may sasabihin daw po siya sa akin, noon pong
pumunta ako ay nasa loob daw po siya ng kubo, sabi ni Patter punta daw sa kubo at doon
daw ko usap ni Atong, punta ako kubo hila ako sa kamay ni Atong tulak ako Patter, at
takip bibig ko ng kamay ni Atong at sama panyo kamay at tali panyo sa bibig, higa ako sa
papag ni Atong (referring to Renato Flores) at tanggal lahat ng damit ko, pagkatapos ay
kiss niya ako sa labi at dede ko at pagkatapos ay pasok niya ang titi niya sa pek-pek ko
taas baba siya at pagkatapos ay parang pagod na pagod siya at dagan siya sa dibdib
ko at tanggal niya ang tali sa bibig ko at sabi niya ay [sinabihang] "H]uwag kang
magsusumbong at papatayin kita naiintindihan mo ba[?"]

"09.T. Ano po ang mga sumunod na pangyayari?

S. Kinabukasan ay pinatawag ako uli kay Patter at punta daw ako sa kubo
February 3, Lunes sa ganap na ika 9:00 ng gabi at punta daw ako [kay] Atong (Renato
Flores) at iwan ako uli ni Patter at sabi ni Atong pag hindi ako payag patay ako, kaya . . .
higa na lang ako papag at hubad ni Atong ang damit ko at pasok uli niya ang titi niya sa
pekpek ko, at pagkatapos sabi ni Atong (Renato Flores) o baka magsusumbong ka kahit
kanino, at sabi niya ay kung magsusumbong daw ako ay papatayin daw niya ako kaya
hindi ako [nagsusumbong] kahit kanino, pinauwi niya ako."24

Undisputably, the sexual act was committed with force and intimidation as shown by
prosecution evidence. Moreover, the victim could not have shouted for help, as her mouth
was covered by the accused. She testified thus:

"Q: Now after the accused inserted his penis into your vagina, what happened
next?

A: He h[e]ld my breast, sir.

Q: Did you shout or [ask] for help?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why?

A: They were covering my mouth, sir."25

Indeed, it is inconceivable how a 13-year-old girl could muster enough strength to resist
two men in their prime. It would be incongruous to assume that she could overcome the
superior strength of appellant and his cohort, Paterno Pareno.

Lack of Resistance

Appellant likewise contends that complainant's lack of physical struggle shows that she
consented to the sexual assault. We are not persuaded.

In a long line of cases, we have held that different people react differently to different
situations. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a frightful experience. While the reaction of some women who are faced
with the possibility of rape is struggling or shouting for help, still others become virtually
catatonic because of the mental shock they experienced.26
To the depraved mind of appellant, complainant's failure to resist or to shout may have
been a sign of consent. But in the crime of rape, what is given paramount consideration is
the state of mind of the victim, not of the perpetrator.27

"Sweethearts Theory"

While appellant interposed the defense of denial, he additionally alleged that he and
Remedios were sweethearts, and that they had lived as husband and wife from February
3, 1997 until May 28, 1997. To support this contention, he presented several witnesses
who testified that they had seen the victim in his house. These are unavailing, however,
because they did not have personal knowledge of the fact. Moreover, there is no sufficient
evidence on record that would support this defense. A "sweethearts defense" should be
substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of the relationship like
mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like.28Appellant presented only a bag of
clothes allegedly belonging to complainant.

We believe that the bag of clothes and the presence of complainant in the house of
appellant do not establish their alleged amorous relationship. As correctly observed by the
trial court:

"Defense['s] claim that the minor complainant is his sweetheart and they lived together as
husband and wife cannot be given serious consideration. There was not even a letter or
photograph of the minor-victim to show that the accused and she (Remedios Renoria)
[were] sweethearts. The bag of clothes is not concrete proof that the clothes [belong] to
minor complainant.

"x x x [I]f it is really true that Remedios Renoria and the accused lived as husband and
wife in the house of the accused and left only on May 28, 1997 when fetched by the sister,
why was she able to give her written statement to the police on April 28, 1997 charging the
accused [with] rape and [to submit] herself [to] physical and genital examination before the
NBI on April 29, 1997."29

Appellant's claim of love relationship is belied by the concurrence of the following

actuations of complainant: (1) disclosing the rape incident to her uncle, (2) seeking help
from police authorities, (3) subjecting herself to medical examination, (4) filing a Complaint
for rape and recounting in court the details of her horrible experience.

Further, the sweethearts defense does not necessarily preclude rape. Even if it were true,
such relationship would not, by itself, establish consent, for love is not a license for
lust.30 A love affair could not have justified what appellant did subjecting complainant to
his carnal desires against her will.31

Inconsistencies

In his vain attempt to discredit the testimony of complainant, appellant cites two
inconsistencies. First, he concedes that she was forcibly brought by Pareno to the nipa
hut. Prosecution Witness Larry Frias' testimony, however, allegedly showed that Pareno
merely instructed her to go to the nipa hut with him. This circumstance allegedly raises the
possibility that she consented to the sexual intercourse. Second, appellant submits that,
while the victim avers that her mother went to the police station with her, Larry Frias
testified that only he had accompanied private complainant to the NBI, the DSWD and the
Municipal Hall to file a Complaint.32

The solicitor general correctly debunks appellant's contentions in this wise:

"A careful review of Remedios Renoria's testimony reveals that on February 2, 1997,
Paterno Pareno arrived at their (Remedios Renoria['s]) house and asked her to
accompany him to the nipa hut located at Ulingan, Lawang-Bato, Valenzuela; that when
they reached the place, Paterno Pareno dragged her inside the nipa hut where appellant
was obviously waiting; and that appellant and Paterno Pareno covered her mouth and
undressed her.

"In other words, Paterno Pareno used force on Remedios Renoria only when they finally
reached the nipa hut, the place where the crime was committed.

"Anent the issue of who really was with Remedios Renoria at the time she went to the
police station to report the incident, Remedios Renoria clarified during her cross
examination that it was Larry Frias who accompanied her to the police station.

"Demonstrably, the alleged inconsistencies pointed out by appellant do not actually exist.
Assuming that they do exist, the same are very trivial in nature [and] cannot impair the
essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole."33 (Citation omitted)

Further, the aforecited inconsistencies, even if true, are minor in character and do not
impugn the credibility of complainant. Indicative of an unrehearsed testimony, slight
contradictions even serve to strengthen credibility. Indeed, the Court cannot expect a rape
victim to remember every ugly detail of the sexual assault.34 A witness who is telling the
truth is not always expected to give a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory.35

The Delay in Reporting the Incident

Complainant's failure to report the incident immediately, according to appellant, belies her
claim of rape. This contention is untenable.

There is no standard form of behavior when a person is confronted by a shocking,

harrowing and unexpected incident. The workings of the human mind, when placed under
emotional stress, are unpredictable. Rape is a traumatic experience, and the shock
concomitant with it may linger for a while. Oftentimes, the victim would rather bear the
ignominy and the pain in private, rather than reveal her shame to the world or risk the
rapist's carrying out his threat to harm her.36

In sum, the credibility of the complainant's testimony is not diminished by the delay in
reporting the incident or by the lack of strong resistance. One cannot expect a 13-year old
girl to act like an adult or a mature and experienced woman who would have the courage
and intelligence to disregard a threat to her life and complain immediately that she had
been sexually assaulted.37

Indemnity and Moral Damages

It has been the policy of the Court to award outrightly to a victim of rape an amount not
exceeding P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, upon an indubitable showing of the
commission of the crime.38 When the rape is committed in its qualified form and the death
penalty is imposed, the indemnity given is P75,000.

Moreover, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, appellant should be ordered to pay

the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. It may be awarded without need of
independently showing that the victim suffered mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and
the like.39 In the crime of rape, these are assumed by the law.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that an

additional award of P50,000 as moral damages be given to the victim. Costs against
appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-69564 January 29, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, RICHARD
DOE, PETER DOE AND JUAN DOE, accused. JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE and
MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, accused-appellants.

G.R. No. L-69658 January 29, 1988

JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
XCVII, QUEZON CITY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

These consolidated cases originated from the decision rendered by Judge Oscar Leviste
in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVII,
finding the accused-appellants Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y
Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and severally
the heirs of the victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 for each of the victims and
moral damages of P200,000.00 G.R. No. 69564 is the automatic review of the death
sentence while G.R. No. 69658 is a petition for review on certiorari of said decision, the
recourse taken by accused-appellant Juan Escober 'to cut short that long period of wait for
a final resolution of his fate." 1

Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as John Doe, Peter Doe,
Richard Doe and Juan Doe, were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in an Information dated December 9, 1982. He
entered a plea of "Not Guilty" with the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon
arraignment on March 2, 1983.

On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-appellant Macario
Punzalan, Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too, pleaded "Not Guilty" during the
arraignment on April 22, 1983, assisted by court-appointed counsel, Atty. Benigno
Mariano, who at that time had replaced Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel de parte for
Juan Escober.

A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution presented its evidence, summarized
by the Solicitor General in his Consolidated Brief, as follows:
One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic), Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto Alorte, * was formerly a
co-security guard of appellant Juan Escober at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, Inc., a family corporation owned by the couple
Vicente Chua and Lina Chua. It is located inside a walled compound about 50 meters away from the residence of its owner, at
24 Joy Street, Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City. About 4 months prior to the incident, Abuyen was relieved by Domingo
Rocero for being always absent and found sleeping while on duty. [pp. 5-8, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 2-10, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983;
pp. 6-8, tsn, April 22, 1983).

At the time of the incident on December 3, 1982, Rocero's tour of duty was from 7:00 in
the morning to 7:00 in the evening. He left his post at about 7:30 P.M. that evening after
he was relieved by appellant Juan Escober. On his way home, he passed by Barangay
Balingasa in Balintawak, where he saw Amadeo Abuyen in the store of Colonel Samson
drinking beer with three companions, one of whom he later Identified as the appellant
Macario Punzalan, Jr. [pp. 4-11, tsn, April 22, 19831.

After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente Chua went to his office at the Bee Seng
Electrical Supply as he usually does after office hours, accompanied by his 13-year old
son Irvin and 6-year old daughter Tiffany On their way, he saw appellant Escober at his
post. At the office, the two children watched a television program, as their father
proceeded to the bathroom to take a bath [pp. 10-17, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle and proceeded to the Bee
Seng Electrical Supply. Upon alighting thereat, Abuyen knocked at the little door of the
gate. Appellant Escober, peeped thru the hole and opened the door. Then after Abuyen
had talked with Escober, the former asked Punzalan to wait outside, while he (Abuyen)
and his two other companions went inside [pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov. 9, 1983].

At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left their residence to join her
husband and two children. On her way, she noticed that the pedestrian gate was wide
open with the appellant Punzalan standing there. She shouted why the gate was opened,
but nobody answered. Suddenly, she heard of shot coming from the direction of the
garage; and when she looked thereat, she saw Abuyen and the appellant Escober
walking towards the gate. So, she rushed back inside the house to contact her husband
through the intercom. But since the intercom was out of order, she hurriedly went outside
and met appellant Escober who volunteered the information "that he was not hit." [pp.
9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983].

Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom, when he heard the gunshot.
He hurriedly went out and saw her (sic) son Irvin lying on the sofa while her (sic) daughter
Tiffany was lying on the floor, both mortally wounded. Beside her (sic) daughter, he saw a
scissor blade [Exhibit 'E' fun of blood. He also observed that everything was scattered in
his office, with all Ms drawers opened. Later, he found out that the P5,000.00 cash he kept
in one of the drawers was lost [pp. 1314, 31-36, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

Immediately, he went out and shouted for help from his wife to bring out the car as their
children was (sic) stabbed and bleeding. Forthwith, she got one car, while her eldest son
drove a second one. After Vicente Chua had brought the two wounded children inside the
two cars, they were brought to the Chinese General Hospital where they were pronounced
dead upon arrival. [pp. 22-26, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 13-14, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

It was about 8:45 in the evening of December 3, 1982 when Police Investigator Oscar
Francisco was dispatched to investigate the incident. And, since the victims were already
brought to the Chinese General Hospital, he was instructed to proceed thereto. When he
arrived at the hospital at past 9.00 o'clock P.M., he found the victims already dead.
Whereupon, he conducted a cursory examination of the victim and indicated on two
separate sketches (Exhibits "C" and "D"), the 12 and 11 stab wounds sustained by Irvin
Chua and Tiffany Chua, respectively. From there, he proceeded to the scene of the crime,
where he met Corporal Ibuan Pat. Robanera and a police photographer, who arrived to
assist him in the investigation [pp. 3-9, tsn, July 5, 1983].

Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a scissor (Exhibit "E") which
the former said was found beside the pool of blood inside the room where the incident
happened. In the course of his investigation, Francisco noticed that the drawers inside the
office of Vicente Chua were forcibly opened with its (sic) contents scattered. Upon
subsequent interview with Vicente, he likewise learned that cash amounting to P5,000.00
was taken by the culprits in one of said drawers [pp. 9-13, Ibid].

Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning at the Police Headquarters appellant

Escober, the security guard on duty then at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, who
voluntarily gave his version of the incident (Exhibit "F"). Aside from that of Escober, the
written statements of the victims' parents, Vicente Chua and Lina B. Chua, were also
taken (Exhibits "G" & "H", respectively). Thereafter, Francisco referred on December 8,
1983 [sic] (Exhibit "I") the result of his investigation to the City Fiscal who wrote at the left
hand margin thereon the following notations: "Detained the accused all prima facie case
exist(s) and that accused is probably guilty thereof. No bail recommended. [pp.
13-23, Ibid].

Subsequently, on the morning of December 10, 1982, the police apprehended the
appellant Punzalan, who in a police line-up was readily Identified by the victims' mother,
Una Chua, as one of those she saw standing at the open gate of their compound during
the night of the incident on December 2 (sic), 1982. Another statement (Exhibit "F") was,
therefore, taken on December 10, 1982 from the victims' mother to supplement the
previous statement she gave on December 8, 1982. Also taken on even date were the
statements of Security Guard Jesus Zaragosa (Exhibit "K") and that of Virginia Alorte
Abuyen, the mother of one of the suspects who claimed that her son, Amadeo Abuyen,
mentioned to her his four [4] companions, including the herein two appellants, in the
commission of the crime. Even appellant Punzalan waived his constitutional rights under
custodial investigation and voluntarily and willingly gave his statement (Exhibit "M")
wherein he did not only admit his participation in the commission of the crime, but also
implicated appellant Juan Escober [pp. 25-26, Ibid; pp. 2-12, tsn, July 6, 1983].

Thus, in his second referral dated December 13, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "J") to the Fiscal,
Police Investigator Francisco named the five [5] accused as: Juan Escober y Geralde,
Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra, Amadeo Abuyen y Alorte, alias Florante Bato, alias
Dodong and a certain Peter Doe, albeit, only the herein two appellants were apprehended.
[pp. 7-8, tsn, July 6, 1983]. 2

Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to testify in his
defense. His testimony is deed in his Brief, thus:

Escober was then a Security guard and belonged to the Western Private Detective
Security since January 1, 1982 and was assigned at Vising Electrical Supply at Joyce St.
Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City,owned by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw Chua. On
December 3, 1982, at 7 p.m. he reported for work. When his companion left and he
arrived (to take over) he cleaned the guardhouse, a routinary work because Mr. and Mrs.
Chua did not like to see the guardhouse dirty and also because after the security guard
leaves, the security guard on duty must clean it. There was a janitor but the security
guards used to clean the guardhouse. As security guard, he had a gun but on this
occasion he left it in the locker because he was cleaning the guardhouse. Then when he
was to throw the garbage, Alorte arrived and talked to him because he, Alorte alias
Abuyen, wanted to, and two men [also accused named Does as they are also still at large]
entered and one man [co-accused Punzalan] was left at the gate. Escober was not able to
talk to Alorte alias Abuyen because when Alorte came, one of his companions aimed a
gun at Escober and also a knife and they said they would kill him. He does not know the
man who aimed a gun at him. He only knows Alorte because he Alorte used to be his
co-guard at Vising Electrical Supply. They then asked Escober to get into (climbed) the
pick- up car inside the garage and the other man was pointing a gun at Escober. Alorte
and his companion went up the Vising Electrical Supply. Escober does not know the real
name of Alorte; all the (sic) knows is Roberto Alorte. Escober does not know the man who
was left near the gate but he knows him by face and he was then in the courtroom and he
pointed to the person who answered by the name of Macario Punzalan, Jr., his co-
accused. Escober did not see what Punzalan was doing because he, Escober, was made
to climb the vehicle (pick-up). At this point, his gun was in the locker. He was not able to
get that gun when these four men entered because a gun was already pointed at him.
Alorte took Escober's gun from the locker because he was formerly a security guard at
Vising Electrical Supply for 3 or 4 months. He does not know why Alorte did not continue
his work there. After 5 minutes, after the two men went up the office, they came down and
talked to the man guarding Escober and Alorte fired at him. He was not hit for he was able
to avoid it and after that, the four men suddenly left. Escober went down from the pickup
and he heard Vicente Chua calling him and he responded. Chua asked him to call Mrs.
Chua at the house because, according to Chua, their children were stabbed. So Escober
went to the house and called Mrs. Chua. When Mr. Chua called him, Alorte and his
companions were no longer at the place for, after firing, they hurriedly left. Escober was
able to call Mrs. Chua and she and he, together, returned to Vising Electrical Supply and
upon reaching the place, Mr. Chua was shouting and he could not understand him
because he was speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua went back and got the car, parked it and
returned to the office. When Mr. Chua went out of the office, he was bringing his son and
placed him at the parked car of the office. When Chua returned to the office (after he
called Escober) and came back out, Escober saw him with his son and placed him at the
balcony. The two children who were stabbed were carried in two cars because there were
only two cars at the driveway. Escober opened the gate. He does not know to what
hospital they went. After that, he called Jeffrey one of the sons of the Chuas, so he could
help him (Escober) call the police. Jeffrey was not able to call the police because when
Jeffrey gave him a directory and asked him (Escober) to look for the telephone number of
the police but he told Jeffrey to look it up himself because his eyes were blurred. After 15
minutes, the police came and after that, the owner of the security agency arrived. Other
policemen not in uniform also arrived. They interviewed Escober and forced him to go with
them to the police precinct. He refused because the owner of the agency had not then
arrived. When owner arrived, he called another security guard to guard the Vising
Electrical Supply. The police and the owner of the security brought Escober to the precinct
to get his statement and there the police was forcing him to adroit he was the one who
robbed and killed the children of the Chuas and he told them do not know everything. The
testimony of Mrs. Chua that she saw him together with Abuyen Alorte inside the garage is
not true because he was the one who told Mrs. Chua that their children were being
stabbed. When Alorte and his companions left, Mrs. Chua was finding (sic) to call him
(Escober). When he was brought to the precinct, the investigator was typing something.
Escober could recall/remember only his signature. He Identified his statement, Exhibit I for
the defense, Exh. F for the prosecution. He narrated it there exactly. The signature there
are his. He knows the police who investigated him but he does not know the person.
Escober was at the precinct when he signed his statement. He was there up (sic) October
3, 1983, the date he testified in court (tsn, 2-13). 3

Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testified in his defense. The gist of his
testimony is found in his Brief as follows:

PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his direct testimony is found in TSN, pp. 2-35, Nov.
9, 1983). PUNZALAN is a fruit vendor at "the market of Monumento." In the afternoon of 3
December 1982, according to PUNZALAN, he accepted the invitation of fugitive
ABUYEN/ALORTE for a drink, in a place near Abonce Beer House; ABUYEN/ALORTE
was with two companions whom he introduced all his relatives; after several drinks, he
was requested to join the group to proceed to another place for which reason they
boarded a tricycle; and the group stopped 'at a place with a high gate' because ABUYEN/
ALORTE wanted 'to drop by someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11, November 9, 1983).
ABUYEN/ALORTE knocked at the little door and the security guard (PUNZALAN
Identified accused Escober as the security guard) opened the door and they greeted each
other; ABUYEN/ALORTE then instructed PUNZALAN "to wait for him outside;" and
thereafter ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions entered the compound (TSN, pp.
11-14, Nov. 9, 1983).

PUNZALAN further testified that he waited for half an hour for the group; that while waiting
he heard the mourn (sic) of a child that he was then about to enter the premises but he
met ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions and saw them with blood stains in their
arms;' that ABUYEN/ALORTE and his companions started running and he followed them;
that in response to his query AB ABUYEN/ALORTE stated that he stabbed the two [2]
children'; and that they boarded a taxi and he was brought back to our place where we are
selling apples' (TSN pp. 14- 18, Nov. 9, 1983)

PUNZALAN was apprehended early dawn of 10 December 1982 at the Monuments

market. No lawyer assisted him during his custodial investigation despite the fact that he
informed the police officers that he has a lawyer by the name of Atty. Valdez nor was he
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. Nevertheless, the
police investigator proceeded to interrogate him. He disclosed that he was invited by
Amadeo Abuyen for a drink; and that they drank beer 'in a place near Abonce Beer House.
"PUNZALAN asserted that, when Exh. M was presented for his signature he refused to
sign (Exh. "M") because 'many statements thereon are not correct that he nevertheless
signed Exh. "M" because he was already tired and was forced to sign it after they hurt me
by boxing me, subjected me to water therapy and he could not endure the pain, when they
gave (him) the electric shock treatment;" and that the portions of Exh. "M" which are
incorrect are those Identified as Exhs.'11-A and 11-B (TSN, pp. 19-32, Nov. 9, 1983 ). 4

On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On February 8, 1984,
despite his manifestation in open court immediately after the promulgation of the decision
that he was appealing the same to this Court, Atty. Mariano filed a motion for
reconsideration. This was opposed by the prosecution.

Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance on August 7,
1984 as counsel for accused Escober, and on August 20, 1984, he filed another motion
for reconsideration for the said accused, which was likewise opposed by the prosecution.
After an exchange of pleadings between Atty. Dacanay and the prosecution, the trial court
issued an Order dated November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence. the petition in
G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic review.

In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober contends that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING HIS TWO-PAGE DECISION

IMPOSING DEATH SENTENCE IN CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST BE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, ACQUITTING
PETITIONER ...;

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER,

TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED PUNZALAN AND THREE OTHERS ACTED "AS
PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION" CONSIDERING THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST: (THE) UNLIKELY GARBAGE THROWING REASON OF
ACCUSED ESCOBER (PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE GATE OF THE COMPOUND
IN QUESTION, AGAINST THE TESTIMONY OF HIS CO-ACCUSED MACARIO
PUNZALAN, JR. OF KNOCKING ON THEIR PART; SECOND THE RITUAL IN
AVOIDANCE OF SUSPICION OF FIRING A GUN JUST BEFORE THE EXIT OF THE
CONSPIRATORS AND VOLUNTEERING THAT HE WAS NOT HIT': AND THIRD: '(T)HE
VERSION OF JUAN ESCOBER 'PETITIONER) REGARDING HIS ACTUATION DURING
THE HALF-HOUR ROBBERY-HOMICIDE WAS REPLETE WITH CONTRADICTIONS.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE IN CONVICTING PETITIONER TO

DEATH AS SUCH PRINCIPAL UNDER THE DECISIONAL LAW ON CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION ... OF SAID DECISION OF JANUARY 10, 1984. 5

These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused-Appellant Juan Escober
filed in G.R. No. 69564.

On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his conviction on the following
grounds:

PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT THE VERY LEAST, HIS CONVICTION

SHOULD BE NULLIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT PUNZALAN WAS DENIED HIS
RIGHTS TO RE MAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL IN ALL OF THE THREE OF THIS
CASE: CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION PRELIMINARY IN- INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL
ON THE MERITS;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MAT TER OF LAW, PUNZALAN
IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBERY;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRINCI PAL MOTIVE FOR THE
CRIME WAS ROBBERY;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY WAS IN FACT

COMMITTED;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON THE GROUND OF

REASONABLE DOUBT;

THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE CRIME WAS

COMMITTED, THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING
THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS ATTENDED WITH THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRUELTY, NIGHTTIME, TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, TREACHERY AND IN BAND. 6

We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the objection interposed to
the form and substance of the decision under review. Accused-appellant Escober asserts
that said decision is null and void for it does not conform with the requirement of Section 9,
Article X of the 1973 Constitution and that it was rendered even before all the
stenographic notes of the proceedings had been transcribed.

We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists of 1-1/2 pages,
typed single-space, with a number of handwritten notations and insertions. It reads:

The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the above-named accused of Robbery with

Homicide defined in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. It alleged, among others, that
on or about December 3, 1982, in Quezon City, said accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of violence and
intimidation again persons robbed Vicente Chua y Ching by entering the premises of No.
24 Joy St. Grace Village, Quezon City and taking therein P5,000.00 and (sic) by reason or
on the occasion of said robbery employed personal violence upon minors Irvin Chua y
Saw and Tiffany Chua y Saw, stabbing them and inflicting thereby multiple serious mortal
wounds directly causing their immediate deaths, to the damage of their heirs.

Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente Chua, Mrs. Lina Chua,
Domingo Rocero, Oscar Francisco, Amado V. Ramos, Teodoro Ibuan Abelardo V. Lucero
and Dr. Josefina Qua, and Exhibits "A" to "Z" with sub-exhibits; while Defense evidence
consisted of the testimonies of the two named accused above and some exhibits,
contained in Pages 1 to 454 of the Records, Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3.

In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the memoranda of both parties, the
arguments and authorities cited therein, this Court finds that the material allegations of the
above information are facts, and that accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario
Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra are guilty of the charges of Robbery with Double Homicide, as
principals by indispensable cooperation as defined in article 17, par. 3, with no mitigating
circumstances, and attended by aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime to insure
the commission of the crime, taking advantage of number and superior strength, treachery,
in band, among others, and that the defenses and excuses of the accused are unnatural,
incredible, contradictory and uncorroborated. The circumstances pointing to the (sic) this
fact, among others, are the following: The unlikely garbage throwing reason of accused
Juan Escober in opening the gate of the compound in question, against the testimony of
his co-accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. of knocking on their part; the ritual in avoidance of
suspicion of firing a gun just before the exit of the co-conspirators of Juan Escober, and
volunteering the information that he was not hit. The version of Juan Escober regarding
his actuation during the half-hour robbery homicide was replete with contradictions.
Macario Punzalan admitted being fetched by, going with and talking to, immediately prior
to taking a tricycle to the said compound, and later acting as lookout for, his
co-conspirators. The Court finds further that the group took some drinks, not to get drunk
admittedly, and therefore to strengthen their resolve better to commit the crime planned.

WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the amended information, this
Court holding firmly that when a hired security guard opens the compound under his
protection to four men who turn out to be robbers and murderers or when a former
security guard accompanies and meets with said malefactors immediately before the
commission of the offense and stands guard at the gate and flees with said malefactors
then the burden of proof is shifted to him to exculpate and excuse himself by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence, which the named accused failed to do, but
succeeded only in insulting this Forum of Truth with their rediculous (sic) justifications for
the brutal and merciless killing of innocent and helpless children on the occasion of that
robbery in question, of being held-up at gunpoint, of coincidentally being in the act of
throwing garbage and being fired at but not getting hit but not knowing so many vital
details a truthful witness would certainly not forget, among others, thus that this court after
a total appreciation of all the evidence on record is convinced that there being apple (sic)
circumstances present that could only possibly point to the guilt of said accused for the
most heinous (sic) crime that deserves the highest penalty, Hereby sentences the said
accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. to the legal punishment
provided by Article 294, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which
is DEATH and orders the said accused further to pay the heirs of their victims
compensatory damages of P12,000.00 each, jointly and severally, and moral damages of
P200,000.00 to the said heirs, jointly and severally.

SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984. 7

Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based ...

The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily
from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without
detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the
material allegations of the Amended Information were the facts without specifying which of
the testimonies or exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of
accused-appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions without
pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what "vital details" Escober should
have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to have been attended by the
aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band,
"among others," but did not particularly state the factual bases for such findings.

As enunciated by this Court in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco, 64 SCRA 480,

reiterating Montelibano v. Director of Lands, 21 Phil. 449; Alindogan v. Insular
Government 15 Phil. 168; City of Manila v. Insular Government, 9 Phil. 71; Enriquez v.
Enriquez, 3 Phil. 746; Braga v. Millora, 3 Phil. 458:

Without the concrete relation or statement in the judgment of the facts alleged and proved
at the trial, it is not possible to pass upon and determine the issue raised in litigation,
inasmuch as when the facts held to be proved are not set forth in a judicial controversy, it
is impossible to administer justice, to apply the law to the points argued, or to uphold the
rights of the litigant who has the law on his side.

It is not sufficient that the court or trial judge take into account the facts brought out in an
action suit, the circumstances of each question raised, and the nature and condition of the
proofs furnished by the parties. He must also set out in his decision the facts alleged by
the contending parties which he finds to have been proven. The conclusions deduced
therefrom and the opinion he has formed on the issues raised; then only can be
intelligently set forth the legal grounds and considerations proper in his opinion for the due
determination of the case.

As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely difficult. Without a

particularization of the evidence, testimonial or documentary, upon which the findings of
facts are based, it is practically impossible for the appellate court to determine whether or
not such findings were sufficiently and logically supported by the evidence relied upon by
the trial court.

Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the efforts shown by
respondent-judge to administer justice in this case in the most speedy and expeditious
manner. He obviously took to heart our admonition that judges do not have to wait for the
transcription of stenographic notes before rendering judgments but can rely on the notes
of the proceedings personally taken by them. For this is what respondent judge did. The
records show that he took copious notes of the testimonies of the witnesses on which he
apparently based this decision, as the transcript of the stenographic notes were not yet
complete at the time of the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the review of the case
suffered some delay due to the failure of stenographer Eduardo Bober to submit to this
Court the transcript of stenographic notes of some hearings.

Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of courts and
judges. More than this is the essentiality of justice and fairness which is the primordial
objective of the courts. Respondent judge lamentably disregarded the latter for the former.

The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the decision rendered by another trial court
in the case of People v. Banayo, 129 SCRA 725, regarding which We said:

At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the apparently indifferent attitude
displayed by the trial court towards a murder case it has tried as shown by the rendition of
a decision, the body of which contains only 63 lines spread out over less than three
typewritten pages, double-spaced and wide-margined. While brevity should characterize a
court's decision and length is not necessarily determinative of its quality, the lower court in
deciding this murder case nonetheless should have outlined in greater and more
satisfactory detail the evidence presented by both prosecution and the defense, the facts
as found by the trial judge based on the evidence on record and the jurisprudence and the
authorities supporting the court's decision.
This trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of authority in the decision. The
issues raised by the appellant include allegations of concocted testimony, the nature of a
dying declaration, premeditation, conspiracy, treachery and superior strength. The issues
raised are quite serious and they deserved better treatment. [Emphasis supplied].

With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to the
requirements of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case should have been
remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new judgment. However, since the
records of the case, including all evidence necessary for a determination of the innocence
or guilt of the accused- appellants are now before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment
in this case in order to accord the accused-appellants their right to a speedy disposition of
their cases. 8

The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a principal by indispensable cooperation

in the crime of robbery with homicide. In support thereof, it tried to prove that Escober's
actuations during the incident in question were done with the knowledge of and pursuant
to said nefahous plan. These acts consist of- [1] his alleged act of opening the gate of the
compound to his co-conspirators; [2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind
Alorte/Abuyen, the alleged mastermined, after the gunshot; and [3] his having volunteered
the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. The prosecution further attempted to
show that the gun-firing was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion and that Escober's
version of the incident is too replete with contradictions to merit belief.

After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan Escober has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent gesture. One who
imputes an evil motive or purpose thereto must prove his allegations convincingly. In the
case at bar, even if the version of Macario Punzalan, Jr. that Escober opened the gate at
the knock of the alleged mastermind Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be believed,
the same would not constitute sufficient and convincing proof that Escober had knowledge
of the nefarious plan. The worse that could be attributed to him is lack of better judgment
or laxity in the performance of his duties as a security guard in having failed to exercise
the minimum precaution dictated by his occupation to exclude from the premises being
guarded persons who have not demonstrated any legitimate reason for getting in. For it
must be remembered that having been co-employees, Escober knew Abuyen/Alorte. It
was therefore not surprising that he should open the gate for him. In fact, even Domingo
Rocero, the security guard who replaced Abuyen/Alorte and who was not as familiar with
Abuyen/Alorte admitted on his Sworn Statement having allowed Abuyen/Alorte into the
compound thus:

20.T Mula ng manungkulan ka sa Bee Seng Electrical Supply, ilang beses mo ng nakita si
Roberto Alorte sa malapit sa iyong pinagguaguardiayahan?

S Dalawang beses ko na po siyang nakita sa lugar na iyon, una noong buwan ng

Septyembre at pangalawa noong buwan November 1982.

21.T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar na iyan?

S Una binisita niya ako at pangalawa mayroon siyang kasamang babae at hindi ko na siya
pinapasok sa loob ng Bee Seng Electrical Supply. 9

The facts of the case likewise do not support the prosecution's theory that the gun-firing
incident was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We share the keen observation of
counsel for Escober that "... it is not a common experience that a person allows himself to
be shot by a gun. He would be the stupidest person on earth if he allows that ... to avoid
suspicion that he was in cahoots [sic] with malefactors The least or perhaps the safest
way for that evil purpose is to allow himself to be rendered ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic]
him up, mauling him or wounding him so he would live if he were a conspirator. To allow
him to be shot by a gun is too risky a ritual for he might get killed. 10

Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within a span of 5-10 minutes, not
half an hour as found by the trial court, a time too short to enable Abuyen/Alorte and
Escober to contrive such a ritual or scenario, or if it were a pre-conceived plan, for
Abuyen/Aorte to have remembered it considering the unexpected apprearance of Lina
Chua at the scene and the need for immediate escape.

Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the air and not at Escober, the same
could have been done to scare Lina Chua away from the scene of the crime rather than to
divert suspicion from Escober.

That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober was not a part of the criminal plan are
further bolstered by the statement made by Macario Punzalan during the preliminary
investigation, and extra-judicial statement of the alleged mastermind Abuyen /Alorte dated
April 16, 1986, submitted by the prosecution as Exhibit B during the separate trial of said
Abuyen/Alorte. The pertinent portion of Macario Punzalan's statement reads:

FISCAL: Ito ba si Abuyen at saka si Juan Escober at Abuyen ay matagal ng magkakilala?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam sir, dahil po sa guardiya po dati yung Alorte.

FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia [referring to Escober]

PUNZALAN: Oho, siya po ang naka guardia noon. [duty]

FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng pag-uusap nila ano pa ang ginawa? Kung mayroon pa?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko na po nakikita sir.

FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.

FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober nakita mong umakyat?

PUNZALAN: Hind ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin ni Abuyen ni Alorte.

FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.

FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.

PUNZALAN: Hindi po.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir, kasi po ay gusto
kong mahuli yung Abuyen, sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang utak eh. 11

On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in part:

... Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle at nakarating kami sa bahay ni Mr. Chua ng
bandana alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng Desiyembre. Pagdating namin doon ay kumatok
ako at binuksan naman ako ng guwardia dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko muna siya kong
paano ang buhay-buhay niya. Habang nagkakamustahan kami ay bigla ko siyang
tinutukan ng aking baril sinabi ko sa kanya na pasensiya na siya. Pinakuha ko ngayon kay
DON-DON iyong baril na .22 kalibre sa lalagyan nito. Pagkatapos ay sabay pumasok si
DON-DON at si REY sa opisina ni Mr. Chua. Ako naman ay pumuesto sa labas ng opisina
at sa gate ay si KUMANG. Nang nakapuesto na ako sa pintuan ay pumalag itong
guwardiya na si Escober na hindi an pala ginapos nitong si KUMANG. Nang makita ko ay
binaril ko siya pero hindi siya tinamaan. Noong matapos kong barilin si ESCOBER ay
niyaya ko na sila at tumakbo na kami ... 12

These exculpatory statements, although emanating from alleged co- conspirators and
therefore may ordinarily be considered "polluted," deserve credence. Punzalan's
statement, it must be observed, is not even responsive to the question being asked. The
spontaneous and candid manner by which it was given lends credence to his statement,
that Abuyen/Alorte wanted Escober killed. This statement, together with the statement of
Abuyen/ Alorte that he himself fired at E scober although the latter was not hit, unwittingly
corroborates Escober's version that the gun was aimed at him. That Escober was not
thereby hit should not be taken as conclusive proof that the gun-firing was a mere ritual
because the same could be easily occasioned by a poor aim and/ or the hurried manner of
its execution.

On the other hand, We see no reason why Abuyen/Alorte should absolve Escober of any
complicity in the crime if this were not the truth. The usual practice is for a conspirator to
exculpate himself and pass on the blame to a co-conspirator, particularly in a case such
as this where the crime charged is indeed very grave and serious. However undesirable a
person may seem, there may be left in him a sense of justice and fairness. Without
passing judgment on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe that it was this sense of justice and
fairness that moved him to disclose the truth in his extrajudicial confession.

Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was not hit does not prove either that
he was a co-conspirator. It was but natural that he would want to inform and assure his
superior who is presumed to be concerned with his safety and well-being. The motivation
attached to said act by the prosecution is therefore too conjectural and far-fetched to pass
the test of logic and reason.
The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to a conclusion of Escober's
complicity is the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua that upon hearing a shot, she looked at the
garage where the shot sounded to have come from and saw Abuyen/Alorte walking
towards the gate with Escober about a meter behind.

We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this statement. We observe that
Mrs. Lina Chua was the last among the prosecution witnesses to give her statement to the
police. She gave her statement on December 8, 1983 when none of the accused had
been apprehended. So, soon after the violent incident her appreciation of what she saw
may have been faulty when she attributed the blame on Escober whose lack of better
judgment and laxity in the performance of his job resulted in the tragic event.

Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of Abuyen/Alorte quoted above,

Mrs. Chua's narration of the situation would suffer from inaccuracy, aside from being
susceptible to other interpretations. Abuyen/Alorte declared that immediately after the
shooting, he called his companions and ran away from the scene of the crime. Punzalan's
testimony was of the same tenor, i.e., that Abuyen/Alorte and his companions started
running and he [Punzalan] followed them. This was precisely the moment when the
malefactors were fleeing from the scene of the crime, and at which point Escober could
have felt safe enough to emerge from the pick-up where he was held captive. Thus, Mrs.
Chua claims to have seen Escober about a meter behind Abuyen/ Alorte, who was not
walking, but running away from the scene of the crime.

Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret the situation she described having
seen. She was then in an agitated condition on seeing the pedestrian gate of the
compound open, which was Escober's duty to keep closed. Moreover, from the relative
positions of Mrs. Chua, Abuyen/Alorte and Escober, the line of vision of Mrs. Chua was
such that it would be difficult for her to determine for certain the distance between
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober and whether the latter was merely walking behind the former
or in fact chasing him.

Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the separate trial of Abuyen/Alorte, she
declared that 'they [referring to Abuyen/Alorte and Escober] were walking towards the
gate; they were nagmamadali [in a hurry]." 13This description given by Lina Chua does not
jibe with the impression gathered from her previous statement of seeing Escober walking
behind Abuyen/Alorte. The element of speed injected into the 'walking" by the descriptive term
'nagmamadali" corroborates Abuyen/ Alorte's declaration that after firing the gun, he ran away
from the scene of the crime, and tills can be interpreted to mean that Escober was indeed
chasing Abuyen/Alorte.

The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not,
by itself, sufficient to establish his criminal liability. To hold the accused guilty as
co-principal in the crime charged, the existence of conspiracy between the accused and
the actual killers, must be shown, and the same degree of proof required for establishing
the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must be
shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. 14

The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that [1] Escober had knowledge of the criminal design and [2] that his
acts during the commission of the crime, such as the opening of the gate and having been
behind Abuyen after the gunshot, were performed pursuant to said nefarious plot. This
being the case, the prosecution's reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in Escober's
testimony regarding his actuations during the incident at bar can not improve its case. To
convict on this basis is repugnant to the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved 15 and its corollary rule that the prosecution must rely on
the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 16

Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during the commission of the crime and
his having opened the gate to persons who turned out to be robbers and killers make him
an easy suspect. A less discerning mind could have been blinded by these suspicions and
compassion for the two hapless victims. But convictions can never rest on mere
suspicions, however, grave and serious.

We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends having been denied his rights to
remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation, the preliminary
investigation and the trial on the merits.

Punzalan's extra-judicial statement 17 is prefaced by the for lowing:

PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM NG SALIGANG BATAS NG PILIPINAS.

Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng pulisya hinggil sa isang
usaping kinasasangkutan mo sa salang PAGNANAKAW NA MAY KASAMANG
PAGPATAY. Bago ka tanungin ng anoman, ipinauunawa ko muna sa iyo at
pinagpapaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas,
tulad ng mga sumusunod:

1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag magsalita o magbigay ng

salaysay kung hindi mo nais.

2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod ng isang abogado na iyong

mapipili. Kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng abogado, at nais mong magkaroon ng
paglilingkod nito maglalaan ng isa para sa iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na kailangang
bayaran ang paglilingkod nito.

3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng anomang pahayag na maaaring

gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo.

4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin,o gamitan ng anomang uring karahasan o pamilit para ikaw ay
magbigay ng salaysay.

Tanong Pagkatapos na malaman mo, maipaunawa sa iyo at mapagpaalalahanan ka

ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, nahahanda ka bang
magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob ng salaysay?

Sagot Opo.

Tanong Nahahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na walang abogado na

sumusubaybay sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat?
Sagot Opo.

Tanog Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi maaaring pilitin or gamitan ng

anomang uri ng karahasan upang maging saksi laban sa iyong sarili?

Sagot Opo.

Tanong Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang ipinaunawa sa iyo magbibigay ka pa rin

ba ng salaysay?

Sagot Opo.

Sgd. Macario G. Punzalan, Jr.

Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in Escober's extra-judicial
statement, 18 the latter carried the same quoted prefatory statement. This, to our mind,
indicates the lack of zeal and initiative on the part of the investigating officers to fully and truly
inform Punzalan of his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation.
The Identical manner by which the police sought to inform Escober and Punzalan of their
constitutional rights shows a blatant disregard for individual comprehensive ability arising from
differences in intelligence level, educational background and personal experiences. No effort
was exerted to see to it that Punzalan really understood what was being told, considering his
low educational attainment of Grade 2 Elementary level. The so-called "informing" done by the
police in the case at bar was nothing more than a superficial and mechanical act, performed
not so much to attain the objectives of the fundamental law as to give a semblance of
compliance thereto. Besides, the phraseology used by the police respecting the appointment
of counsel de oficio for Punzalan was misleading. It gives the impression that the services of a
counsel de oficio can be availed of by Punzalan only during the court proceedings, not during
the custodial investigation.

Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to counsel, the waiver appearing in
Punzalan's extrajudicial statement cannot be considered intelligently made. For this
reason, aside from the fact that it was done without the assistance of counsel, said waiver
is not valid. 19 Needless to say, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. 20

With respect to Punzalan not having been represented by counsel during the preliminary
investigation, suffice it to say that such irregularity which amounts to an absence of
preliminary investigation, should have been raised before the trial court, Philippine
jurisprudence is uniform and consistent in ruling that:

The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into
by the Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio
Teehankee, has held that the trial Court is called upon 'not to dismiss the information but
hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a
reinvestigation. As stressed in People vs. Casiano, I SCRA 478 (1 961), this is the proper
procedure since the 'absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance. The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable does not
argue against the validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to
remand the case in order that such investigation could be conducted.
... the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated
is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence
of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the
regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived.
These are matters to be inquired into by the trial courts, not an appellate court. 21

While it may be conceded that it would have been more judicious for the trial court to
appoint a counsel de oficio for Punzalan other than the counsel de parte of his co-accused
Escober, such failure did not constitute prejudicial error to warrant nullification of the
proceedings taken against Punzalan. There is no evidence that Atty. Mariano was biased
in favor of Escober to the prejudice of Punzalan. The records show that Atty. Mariano
defended both accused with equal zeal and vigor and that Punzalan was able to present
his defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version of having knocked that the trial court
believed. In the final analysis, the only prejudice Punzalan might have suffered was the
failure of Atty. Mariano to cross-examine Escober on the latter's testimony regarding
Punzalan's presence at the scene of the crime. 22 Escober's testimony, however, was
merely corroborative of the testimonies of Lina Chua and Domingo Rocero, witnesses for the
prosecution who were cross-examined by Atty. Mariano. 23

Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had established the fact of robbery
and we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Punzalan knew of such plan. It is
incredible that his three companions would fetch him on the pretext of drinking beer and
just bring him along to the scene of crime, thereby risking another eyewitness to the
perpetration thereof. Punzalan's flight from the scene of the crime with his companions
and his failure, if he were truly innocent, to report to the police what he knew about the
crime after reading it in the newspapers further demonstrate his knowledge of the plan.

While it has been established that Punzalan's participation in the crime was to act as a
look-out, and as such, he did not participate in the killing of the two helpless victims, he
cannot evade responsibility therefor. Well-established is the rule in this jurisdiction that
whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery are also
guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they
did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored
to prevent the homicide. 24

WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Juan
Escober y Geralde is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and his
immediate release from confinement is ordered, unless detained for some other crimes.
Accused- appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and is
accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000,00,

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 111962-72 December 8, 1995

MAXIMINO GAMIDO y BUENAVENTURA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed with modification 1petitioner Maximino B. Gamido's conviction by the Regional Trial
Court on eleven counts of having forged the signature of the Chief Executive. Specifically,
petitioner was accused in 11 cases of forging the signature of the President of the Philippines
in the following documents and making it appear that the documents were genuine official
documents of the Republic of the Philippines:

1. Criminal Case No. 85-40361 Special Appointment of Maximino Gamido as

Confidential Presidential Representative dated November 30, 1984; 2

2. Criminal Case No. 85-40362 Memorandum/Order No. 1489 informing all Heads of
Ministries, Bureaus, Instrumentalities of the Government, and Government Controlled
Corporations and others on the existence of Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring
Services (PRAMS) dated July 29, 1985; 3

3. Criminal Case No. 85-40363 Appointment of Maximino Gamido as Presidential

Regional Executive Assistant and Executive Director of the PRAMS dated November 7,
1983; 4

4. Criminal Case No. 85-40364 Memorandum to Land, Air and Navigation

Transportation Operators in the Philippines dated July 11, 1985; 5

5. Criminal Case No. 85-40365 Memorandum Order to all Heads of Ministries, Bureaus,
Government Corporations, Government Agencies and Instrumentalities, and Government
Controlled Corporations dated July 29,
1985; 6

6. Criminal Case No. 85-40366 Memorandum Order No. 1480 To: Hon. Maximino B.
Gamido, Presidential Regional Executive Assistant/Executive Director PRAMS-PREMO
dated November 23, 1984; 7
7. Criminal Case No. 85-40367 Memorandum/Circular to all Operators: (1)
Transportation; (2) Shipping Transportation; (3) Air Line Transportation dated November
30, 1984; 8

8. Criminal Case No. 85-40368 A letter addressed to President Ferdinand E. Marcos,

thru the Minister of the Budget, submitting the required STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES (SOP) specifying the functions and duties of PRAMS personnel and their
salaries allegedly approved by the President on November 23, 1984; 9

9. Criminal Case No. 85-40369 Executive Order No. 820 Creating the Presidential
Regional Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) in all Regions of the Philippines dated
October 11, 1983; 10

10. Criminal Case No. 85-40370 Special Presidential Certification dated September 9,
1985; 11 and

11. Criminal Case No. 85-40371 Presidential Permission for Free of Fare (sic) in any
Transportation in the Philippines dated February 28, 1985. 12

The prosecution was made under Art. 161 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as
follows:

Art. 161. Counterfeiting the great seal of the Government of the Philippine Islands, forging
the signature or stamp of the Chief Executive. The penalty of reclusion temporal shall
be imposed upon any person who shall forge the Great Seal of the Government of the
Philippine Islands or the signature or stamp of the Chief Executive.

It appears that on March 25, 1985, then Executive Assistant Juan C. Tuvera issued
Memorandum Circular No. 1281 13 which read:

INFORMING ALL HEADS OF MINISTRIES, AGENCIES, GOVERNMENT

CORPORATIONS AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING
PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL REGIONAL ASSISTANT MONITORING SERVICES (PRAMS) WITHIN
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

The Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) is a non-existent

agency within the Office of the President. Its alleged Executive Director, Mr. Maximino B.
Gamido is likewise not connected, in any capacity, with this Office.

It is gathered that personnel from the PRAMS have been using Presidential directives,
particularly Executive Order No 819; Memorandum Order No. 811; and Memorandum
Circular No. 1278, to support its fraudulent activities. These issuances, however, refer to
the creation, designation/appointment, and operationalization of the Presidential Regional
Monitoring Officer (PREMO) System, the duly authorized regional monitoring arm of the
Office of the President, which is charged to provide the President with the information on
development in the region.

Furthermore, Mr. Gamido has not been given any authorization to sign for and on behalf
of the President of the Philippines. As such, all memorandum/directives issued by Mr.
Gamido on behalf of the Office of the President are fraudulent. All
memorandum/directives issued by alleged PRAMS personnel are likewise fraudulent.

By Authority of the President:

JUAN C. TUVERA

Presidential Executive Assistant

Following the issuance of this memorandum, the Presidential Security Command and the
Office of the President, through the Malacaang Complaints and Investigation Office
(CIO), investigated petitioner.

On September 27, 1985, upon the invitation of Atty. Quirino Sagario, CIO Hearing Officer,
petitioner appeared and presented the 11 documents, claiming that President Ferdinand
E. Marcos had signed them in his (petitioner's) presence.

The lone witness for the prosecution, Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Presidential Staff Director
of the Malacaang Records Office (MRO), testified that there were no copies of the
documents on file in his office and that the signatures thereon did not appear to be those
of the former President.

For his part, petitioner said that he was the Executive Director of the Presidential Regional
Assistant Monitoring Services, or PRAMS, having been appointed by then President
Marcos and that his appointment and the related documents, subject of the prosecution,
had been signed by the former President in petitioner's presence.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, in finding the petitioner guilty, held:

The defense put up by the accused, that all the subject documents were actually signed
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his office at Malacaang, and in the presence
of said accused, is as preposterous as it is unbelievable, the said defense, besides being
completely negated and belied by the established facts (that subject documents, do not
exist in the Malacaang Records Office, and therefore, are spurious) is an imposition on
human belief and all sense of propriety. Further, the accused does not appear to the Court,
and has not shown himself, to be of such stature as to enjoy the privilege of having the
former Chief Executive sign documents in his presence. Moreover, the testimony of the
accused in support of his defense is totally untrustworthy and unreliable.

On the basis of the foregoing factual and legal considerations, the Court is convinced,
beyond any shadow of doubt, that the felony of the forging the signature of the President,
as defined and penalized under Art. 161 of the Revised Penal Code, was committed by
the accused on eleven (11) counts.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
forging the signature of the Chief Executive, and/or violation of Art. 161 of the Revised
Penal Code, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
in each of these eleven (11) criminal cases, or a total of eighty (80) years up to one
hundred fifty-four (154) years, with costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals 14 affirmed with the
modification already noted on the margin of this opinion.

In this petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
affirming his conviction for the following reasons:

(1) The fact that the documents in question are not on file in the Malacaang Records
Office does not ipso facto prove that they are forged but only that they were lost or
destroyed.

(2) The lone prosecution witness, Melquiades T. dela Cruz, is incompetent to testify that
the documents were forgeries since there is no evidence to show that he had seen then
President Marcos sign documents. Indeed, this witness could not say with certainty that
the signature on each of the 11 documents was not that of President Marcos.

(3) No handwriting expert was presented in court to give an opinion as to the genuineness
of President Marcos' signatures.

(4) The Court of Appeals and the RTC committed the fallacy of "argumentum ad elenchi"
in concluding that the signatures in the documents were forgeries from the documents'
"unusual format and atrocious grammar" when these documents were not offered to prove
their appearance and grammar.

(5) Assuming these defects in format and grammar, there is no forgery since the
documents could not have deceived any person.

(6) A writing or instrument in order to constitute a forgery must possess some apparent
legal efficacy (36 Am. Jur. 2d 690), and if PRAMS is a non-existent entity as
Memorandum Circular No. 1281 declared, then the documents executed under it cannot
acquire such "apparent legal efficacy."

(7) Assuming further that the signature of former President Marcos on the document
creating the PRAMS was a counterfeit (Exh. C), the criminal liability of the author thereof
absorbed all acts of forgery committed under the fictitious office, because there was only
one intent, i.e. to discharge the imagined functions of a non-existent office.

(8) Assuming that the signatures of then President Marcos in the documents were
spurious, petitioner, the possessor of the documents, must be exempted from criminal
responsibility because no person of sound mind would make it appear that the President
created an office and appointed him to that office.

The petition has no merit.

First. Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Director of the Malacaang Records Office, testified that
his office did not have a record of the documents. For his part Executive Secretary Juan C.
Tuvera declared the Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services as nonexistent
and its alleged Executive Director, herein petitioner, as not in any capacity connected with
the Office of the President. From these premises it is rational to conclude that the
documents in question, which purport to have been signed by then President Marcos, are
bogus documents. The trial court and Court of Appeals correctly found petitioner to be the
author of the forgery. The presumption is that the possessor and user of a falsified
document is the forger thereof . 15

Second. Petitioner contends that Melquiades T. dela Cruz was incompetent to testify as to
whether the signatures on the documents, purporting to be those of President Marcos,
were forgeries because there is no showing that he had witnessed President Marcos
signing his name.

What dela Cruz said that is that he was familiar with the signature of President Marcos
and that the signatures on the documents in question were not those of President
Marcos. 16 This is sufficient to establish the signatures as forgeries. Under Rule 132, 22 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is not required that the person identifying the handwriting of
another must have seen the latter write the document or sign it. It is enough, if the witness "has
seen writing purporting to be his [the subject's] upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person." De la Cruz has
been record custodian at Malacaang for so many years; it is inconceivable he had not
acquired familiarity with the signature not only of President Marcos but of other Presidents
under whom he had served.

There was thus no necessity for a handwriting expert testify on the genuineness of the
challenged signatures. As this Court has once observed, the authenticity of signatures "is
not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning,
e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a
highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a
questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion
rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. The signatures on a questioned
document can be sighted by a judge who can and should exercise independent judgment
on the issue of authenticity of such signatures." 17 Here, as the trial court observed, "the
forgeries were not only established by the evidence, but they are also as clearly discernible to
the naked eye or mere ocular inspection, as they are conspicuously evident from their
appearance. . . . " 18

Third. Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that forgery could not be said to exist since
the documents, because of their "unusual format, atrocious grammar, and misspelled
words" could not have defrauded or deceived anyone, and that moreover they lack
apparent legal efficacy." That is not so. If the documents were fanciful or whimsical, as for
example, a commission appointing petitioner mayor of a mythical kingdom, the forgery
could simply be dismissed as a spoof. But as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
Office of the President had to issue a memorandum denouncing the legality of PRAMS
because of the possibility that the less wary would be deceived, especially because that
the documents pertaining to it bear the Great Seal and were typed on stationary which
have the appearance of official stationery of the Office of the President.
Fourth. Petitioner also argues that he should have been charged under only one
information because there was only one intent "to discharge the imagined functions of a
non-existent office." The argument has no merit. The documents in this case were forged
on different dates. One act was not done to commit another. There is therefore no basis
for considering the various acts as constituting only one crime of forgery.

Fifth. As a last-ditch effort of sorts to escape criminal liability, petitioner claims that since
"no person of sound mind would [make] it appear that the Chief Executive created an
office for him and appointed him thereto," he must be exempt from criminal liability under
Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. This, again, is not necessarily so since the
purpose may be to deceive others. Moreover, this defense now invoked should have been
raised below. At all events, the presumption is in favor of sanity. 19 In this case there is no
evidence to show that petitioner was insane at the time he committed the acts for which he is
being prosecuted.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's petition for review and petition for bail pending appeal are
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.