1. YOLLY TEODOSIO y BLANCAFLOR, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 124346 June 8, 2004

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated February 28, 1995 of the Court of Appeals2
affirming with modification the decision3 dated January 18, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City, Branch 109, convicting herein appellant Yolly Teodosio of violation of Section 15, Article
III of RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended.

Appellant was charged with selling and delivering regulated drugs in an Information that read:

That on or about the 6th day of August 1992, in Pasay City, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Yolly Teodosio Y
Blancaflor, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver to another Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
regulated drug.

Contrary to law.4

During his arraignment on August 19, 1992, appellant pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: SPO1 Jeffrey Inciong, SPO1 Emerson Norberte,
Julita de Villa and Marita Sioson.

The evidence of the prosecution showed that, after four days of surveillance on the house of
appellant, at around 8:00 p.m. on August 5, 1992, Chief Inspector Federico Laciste ordered a team
from the PNP Regional Office Intelligence Unit to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant who
was suspected of peddling regulated drugs known as shabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride). The
team was headed by SPO1 Emerson Norberte and composed of SPO1 Jeffrey Inciong, SPO3
Roberto Samoy, SPO3 Pablo Rebaldo and SPO1 Rolando Llanes.5

About midnight, the team and their informer proceeded to the appellants house in Solitaria Street,
Pasay City. SPO1 Jeffrey Inciong and the informer entered the open gate of appellants compound
and walked to his apartment while the rest of the team observed and waited outside. At 12:10 a.m.,
the informer introduced Inciong to the appellant as a shabu buyer. Appellant told them that a gram of
shabu cost 600. When Inciong signified his intention to buy, appellant went inside his apartment
while Inciong and the informer waited outside. A few minutes later, appellant came out and said
"Swerte ka, mayroon pang dalawang natira (You are lucky. There are two [grams] left)." When
Inciong told appellant that he only needed one gram, the latter gave him one plastic packet. In turn,
Inciong handed to appellant 600 or six pieces of 100 bills earlier treated with ultraviolet powder.
After verifying the contents of the packet as shabu,6 Inciong gave the signal to the other police
officers who witnessed the transaction. After introducing himself as a police officer, Inciong, together
with his companions, arrested appellant.7

The marked money bills,8 the other packet of shabu9 recovered from appellants right front pants-
pocket and the buy-bust shabu were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination by
forensic chemists Julita de Villa and Marita Sioson. Appellant was also taken to the said laboratory
to determine the presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder. The results were positive in appellants
hands, the marked money bills and the right front pocket of his pants.10 The buy-bust shabu and the
contents of the other packet recovered from appellant were also confirmed to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride.11

For his defense, appellant, a driver by profession, claims that police officers raided his house without
a search or arrest warrant. When they found no drugs, they took a bag containing a large sum of
money. To support his defense, the following witnesses were presented: the appellant himself,
Ulysses Ramos (appellants neighbor), Marilyn Teodosio (appellants wife) and Paul Teodosio
(appellants 10-year-old son).

Appellant, Marilyn Teodosio and Paul Teodosio alleged that, on August 5, 1992, they were sleeping
in their bedroom on the second floor of their apartment when they were suddenly awakened by a
noise downstairs. Appellant went down and, while on the third step of the stairs, he met three
policemen on their way up. Their guns were pointed at him. One of the three inquired from him
where he kept his shabu but he denied having any. The three then searched appellants room on the
second floor but did not find any shabu. Instead, they took an overnight bag from a locked cabinet
which they forcibly opened. The bag contained $7,260 and approximately 40,000 belonging to the
appellants niece who was scheduled for a heart operation. After appellant was arrested by six police
officers, he was dragged, slapped and punched in the stomach. As he was being forcibly taken out
of his apartment, SPO3 Samoy fired a gun near his ear. On their way to his detention cell in Bicutan,
Taguig, his hands were handcuffed behind his back. Appellant felt and saw the police officers
rubbing 100 bills on his hands.12

Defense witness Ulysses Ramos testified that, after the arrest of appellant, his wife called for police
assistance. Two police officers responded while appellants son Paul took pictures13 of the broken
door and their ransacked apartment. Thereafter, his wife and Marilyn Teodosio went to the police
station and formally reported the incident.14

On January 18, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Yolly Teodosio
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) violation of Section 15, Art. III of RA 6425 as
amended and hereby sentences him to life imprisonment.

The methamphetamine hydrochloride is hereby forfeited in favor of the government

and the Clerk of Court of this Branch is hereby ordered to transmit the same to the
Dangerous Drugs Board thru the National Bureau of Investigation for proper
disposition.

SO ORDERED.

Pasay City, January 18, 1993.15

In convicting appellant, the trial court relied on the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses who were officers of the law without any ill-motive to testify falsely against him. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, there was a presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official functions. The trial court gave no credence to the claim that the police officers stole a bag
containing a large sum of money, considering the failure of appellants niece to file a case or even
complain against the officers. Also, for the reason that they were biased witnesses, the trial court
junked the claim of appellants wife and son that the police officers illegally raided their apartment.
Ramos testimony was given little weight because he did not actually see the police officers go in
and out of the apartment. Furthermore, the trial court dismissed appellants claim of a frame-up
because this defense, like alibi, could be fabricated with facility and was therefore an inherently
weak defense unless proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court also wondered how the
appellant could have seen the officers rubbing money on his handcuffed hands behind his back. It
also took note of the fact that the appellant, a driver by profession, attempted to cover up his
ownership of the 190 square-meter lot and the three-door apartment thereon worth about
300,000.16

In view of the imposition of the penalty of life imprisonment, the appeal was originally brought to us.
However, the Second Division of this Court ordered the transfer of this case to the Court of Appeals
in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Simon y Sunga17 wherein we held that RA 7659 which
amended RA 6425, effective December 31, 1993, should be given retroactive application in so far as
the amended and reduced imposable penalties provided therein are favorable to the appellant.
Section 17 of RA 765918 states that the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua, depending on the quantity of the drug. In the present case, the amount of shabu sold by
appellant was only 0.73 gram, thus the penalty of reclusion perpetua could not be imposed. Such
being the case, the appeal should have been filed in the Court of Appeals and not in this Court
because we can only exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.19

The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated February 28, 1995, affirmed the judgment of the trial court
convicting the appellant but modified the penalty imposed, as follows:

Finally, even as We agree on the findings of the lower court on the guilt of the
appellant for a Violation of Section 15, Article III, Republic Act 6425, as amended,
considering the application of Section 17 of RA 7659, the penalty imposed should be
reduced to Ten (10) years of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) Years of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, except for the modification of the penalty, as above indicated (sic),
the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, in all other respects. No
pronouncement as to costs.20

Agreeing with the factual findings of the trial court, the Court of Appeals gave more weight to the
prosecutions claim that the entrapment operation in fact took place outside the appellants
apartment. The appellate court gave no merit to appellants assertion that no warrant was secured
despite four days of surveillance. It described as minor the appellants observations of alleged
inconsistencies in the prosecutions version of events.

Hence, this appeal based on the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN

MATERIAL AND UNDISPUTED FACTS IN ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDING THAT
THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION CONDUCTED WITHOUT A SEARCH
WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE
RESIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.

II
 BOTH THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS A
MATTER OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION IN ADMITTING THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE WHICH WAS EITHER PROCURED FROM AN
ILLEGAL WARRANTLESS RAID OR FABRICATED BY THE RAIDING
POLICEMEN.

III

The lower court and the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that subjection of
petitioner to ultra-violet powder test without assistance of counsel is violative of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.

IV

The Honorable Court of Appeals, sad to say, disregarded and ignored the inherent
and natural bias and prejudice of the trial judge, her honor, Judge Lilia LopEz,
against persons charged of (sic) drug offenses as duly noted by the Supreme Court
in People vs. Sillo, 214 SCRA 74.

The accused is entitled to an acquittal based on reasonable doubt because the

evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to warrant conviction.21

In short, appellant insists that the police officers forcibly entered and searched his house without a
warrant. When they did not find any regulated drug, they instead took a bag containing a large sum
of money. They also showed their brutality by slapping him and punching him in the stomach.
Thereafter, they framed up appellant by wiping ultraviolet powder on his palms.

We affirm appellants conviction.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve the
credibility of witnesses are to be respected when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts
and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gleaned from such findings.22 Such
findings carry even more weight if they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in the case at bar.
The alleged flaws pointed out by appellant are not enough for us to reverse the factual findings of
the courts a quo.

The police officers were clear and categorical in their narration of how the entrapment operation was
conducted. SPO1 Inciong, acting as a poseur-buyer, was introduced by the informer to appellant in
front of the latters apartment. Thereafter, appellant went inside his apartment and came back with
two packets of shabu. Inciong handed to appellant six pieces of 100 bills treated with ultra-violet
powder in exchange for one packet of shabu. Immediately after, Inciong gave the signal to the other
policemen who then entered the compound and effected appellants arrest. Recovered from
appellant was the other packet of shabu and the six pieces of marked money. The tests conducted
on these pieces of evidence, appellants hands and right front pants-pocket showed that appellant
was the same person who sold the drugs to police officer Inciong. There was strong evidence
therefore, certainly beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant was engaged in drug-dealing.
The elements of the crime were duly proven. In the prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.23

On the other hand, appellant insists he was framed up for possession of shabu after the search in
his apartment produced no illegal drugs. Frame-up, a usual defense of those accused in drug-
related cases, is viewed by the Court with disfavor since it is an allegation that can be made with
ease. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that the arresting policemen performed their duties in a regular and
proper manner.24

However, appellant was unable to prove he was the victim of a frame up. First, appellant failed to
show any motive why the police officers would illegally raid his house. Thus, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty by the persons in authority was never overcome.
Second, if indeed they broke into his apartment and took an overnight bag containing a hefty
amount, appellant or any of his family members should have filed a criminal complaint against the
supposed malefactors but they did not. This weakened the defenses story that the police officers
stormed and robbed appellants apartment. Third, appellant testified that, after the search for shabu
proved futile, the police officers dragged and slapped him, and punched him in the stomach.
However, appellant never filed a case for physical injuries against the arresting officers. No medical
certificate was presented to show his alleged injuries. He never even complained about it to
anybody.

To prove his allegation that the arresting officers raided his apartment, appellant quoted officer
Inciongs testimony that "his (Inciongs) informant introduced him to Yolly Teodosio specifically at the
house of Yolly Teodosio." Appellants argument is misplaced. The preposition "at" merely signifies
that Inciong was within the vicinity of appellants apartment. There is nothing in it from which we can
infer that Inciong entered appellants abode. Moreover, the statement must be taken in conjunction
with the rest of his testimony which unequivocally showed that the transaction happened in front of
the door of appellants apartment, not inside.

Appellant also cites in his defense the police blotter of the Investigation Branch of the Pasay City
Police Station:25

x x x.

It was learned that on or about 11:45 p.m. 05 August 1992, a group of RPIU
Operatives headed by SPO3 Emerson Norberte went inside the room of 421-C
Apartment by forcing to open it and the owner / occupant was brought with them,
who was identified as YOLLY TEODOSIO.

x x x.

Unfortunately for appellant, the police blotter does not support his version because
entries in police blotters, although done in the regular course of the performance of
official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth stated in such entries and should
not be given undue significance or probative value. They are usually incomplete and
inaccurate. Sometimes they are based on partial suggestion or inaccurate reporting
and hearsay, untested in the context of a trial on the merits.26

Appellant furthermore points out the discrepancies in the testimonies and the joint affidavit of arrest
executed by officers Inciong and Norberte. First, the affidavit stated that the second packet of shabu
was recovered from appellants pants-pocket but the officers testimony in court was that it was
recovered from appellants hands. Second, the affidavit stated that the informer acted as the poseur-
buyer but the policemen testified in court that Inciong was the poseur-buyer.

The established rule is that discrepancies between the affidavit of a witness and his testimony in
court do not necessarily discredit him because it is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits,
being taken ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate. Besides, the testimonial
discrepancies may be due to the natural fickleness of memory; this in fact tends to strengthen, rather
than weaken, credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.27

In an attempt to weaken the prosecutions case, appellant also cites several inconsistencies in the
narration of events.

According to appellant, SPO1 Norberte testified that it was SPO1 Inciong who knocked at the door,
contrary to Inciongs own testimony that it was the informer who knocked at the door. This is,
however, a minor matter that does not affect the substance of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. Minor variances in the details of a witness account, more frequently than not, are badges
of truth rather than indicia of falsehood and they often bolster the probative value of the testimony.28

Also, according to appellant, the prosecution witnesses testified that the total weight of the
confiscated shabu was 2 grams but its actual weight was only 0.73 grams. It must be remembered
that during the drug deal, it was appellant who led officer Inciong to believe that each packet of
shabu he was selling weighed 1 gram. Inciong, under the circumstances, had no opportunity to verify
the actual weight of the drug. Thus, the discrepancy did not in anyway weaken the credibility of
Inciongs testimony that appellant was selling a prohibited drug.

Appellant likewise attacks SPO1 Norbertes credibility. Norberte claimed that he wrote the serial
numbers of the marked money bills after the operation; however, he later declared that he listed the
numbers in the logbook before the buy-bust operation. There is no contradiction. Norberte never
said that he wrote the serial numbers after the operation. On the contrary, what he said was that he
wrote the numbers prior to the buy-bust.29

Appellant likewise points out several instances of improbable behavior in the prosecutions version of
the facts. Appellant believes it is not a discreet and wary behavior of a pusher to bring two packets of
shabu after closing a deal for only one packet with an unknown, newly-introduced buyer. Likewise, it
is unnatural for a drug pusher to shout while being arrested. His natural tendency is to hush things
up so as not to attract the neighbors attention. Appellant also swears that he could not have held the
money bills because the traces of the powder were only in the thumb and forefinger. This means that
he held some sort of a cylindrical object but not money. Moreover, it was unnatural for SPO1 Inciong
to be the poseur-buyer instead of the informant considering the caution practiced by pushers in
selling only to customers known to them. And, contrary to standard procedure, the police officers did
not issue any receipt for the shabu and money bills confiscated from appellant. Lastly, the police
authorities had four days to secure a search and arrest warrant but they did not get one.

We dismiss all of appellants observations as pure nonsense and inanity that did not in anyway affect
the clear and unequivocal testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. No physical or testimonial
evidence was presented during the trial to support his allegations. If there was anything such
gratuitous statements proved, it was that appellant appeared to be extremely familiar with the
intricacies and practices of drug dealers.
As to his allegation that he never held any money bills treated with ultra-violet powder, we note his
failure to rebut the unimpeached testimony of forensic chemist Julita de Villa that the yellow
ultraviolet powder in the money bills was the same yellow powder found in his fingers.

His argument that the prosecutions case was weakened by the fact that the police officers did not
issue a receipt for the confiscated drugs and money bills, is stretching things too far. Issuing such a
receipt is not essential to establishing a criminal case for selling drugs as it is not an element of the
crime.

On the argument that the officers had four days to secure a warrant but did not get one, the
evidence was that the four-day period was not enough to establish probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant. All that the police authorities knew about appellant was the information gathered from
the informer and their surveillance of the area. Furthermore, no warrant was needed considering that
the mission was not a search but an entrapment. An arrest made after an entrapment does not
require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court.30 Any search resulting from a lawful warrantless arrest is valid
because the accused committed a crime in flagrante delicto, that is, the person arrested (appellant in
this case) committed a crime in the presence of the arresting officers.31

On another constitutional issue, appellant alleges that his right against self-incrimination was
violated when he was subjected to ultra-violet powder test without the presence of a lawyer. We
disagree. In People vs. Gallarde,32 we held that:

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of

physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts
are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt,
hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis,
et al., 154 SCRA 513 [1987]) The essence of the right against self-incrimination is
testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a
testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235
SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383 [1999]) Hence, it has been
held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920])
and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was
suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23
Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil.
735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody
footprints;(U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and
to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or
to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, et
al., 86 Phil. 244 [1950])

Appellant also questions the impartiality of Judge Lilia Lopez who allegedly had an inherent bias
against persons facing drug charges. We seriously doubt the fairness of the accusation.
Nevertheless, it is now too late for the appellant to raise this defense because the good judges
impartiality was never questioned during the trial and the appeal to the Court of Appeals. Moreover,
no evidence was presented on any specific act manifesting partiality against appellant.

We now determine whether the appellate court imposed the proper penalty on appellant. In the 1994
case of People vs. Simon y Sunga,33 the proper penalties for drug-related crimes under RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659, were clarified. The appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua if the quantity of
the drug weighs 750 grams or more. If the drug weighs less than 250 grams, the penalty to be
imposed is prision correccional; from 250 grams to 499 grams, prision mayor; and, from 500 grams
to 749 grams, reclusion temporal.34

Since appellant was caught selling 0.73 grams of shabu only, the proper penalty should be no more
than prision correccional. There being neither generic mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the
penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed in its medium period. And applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
in degree which is arresto mayor. No fine is imposable in this case because appellants penalty is
not reclusion perpetua or death.35 Pursuant to our jurisprudence on the sale of less than 1 gram of
shabu,36 we therefore impose the penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum to 4 years and
2 months of prision correccional as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 28, 1995 of the Court of Appeals convicting herein
appellant Yolly Teodosio for the sale of 0.73 grams of shabu is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty of imprisonment imposable on appellant should be the
indeterminate sentence of 6 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

 2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONIDA
MERIS y PADILLA, accused-appellant.

G.R Nos. 117145-50 & 117447. March 28, 2000

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
1, convicting accused-appellant Leonida Meris y Padilla of illegal recruitment in large-
scale and six counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision1 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused, Leonida Meris y Padilla,

GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of estafa in Criminal
Cases Nos. 91-94192 to 91-94197, and of illegal recruitment in large scale
in Criminal Case No. 91-94198 and, as a consequence thereof, sentences
her as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 91-94192, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
months (sic) of prision correccional as maximum;

2. In Criminal Case No. 91-94193, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional as maximum;

3. In Criminal Case No. 91-94194, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of

one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional as maximum;

4. In Criminal Case No. 91-94195, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of

one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional as maximum;

5. In Criminal Case No. 91-94196, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of

one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
 correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional as maximum;

6. In Criminal Case No. 91-94197, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of

one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional as maximum;

7. In Criminal Case No. 91-94198, to suffer the penalty of life

imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00.

Further, the accused shall indemnify the private complainants, Napoleon

Ramos, Cristina Nava, Margarita Nadal, Purita Conseja and Leo delos
Santos, the sum of P30,000.00 each and complainant Merlita Bombarda
the amount of P20,000.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the
date of institution of these cases, i.e., April 29, 1991, until fully paid.

Costs against the accused in all the above-captioned cases.

SO ORDERED.

The above conviction stemmed from seven informations. The information in Criminal
Case No. 91-94192 reads:

That on or about and during the period comprised between January 12,
1991 and February 17, 1991, both dates inclusive, prior or subsequent
thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating with three others whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown, helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud NAPOLEON RAMOS y
ESPEJO in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representation which they made to
said NAPOLEON E. RAMOS to the effect that they had the power and
capacity to recruit and employ him as Factory Worker in Hongkong and
could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of
other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
NAPOLEON E. RAMOS to give and deliver, as in fact (he) gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of P30,000.00 on the strength of
said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that
the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in
fact did obtain the amount of P30,000.00 which amount once in
possession, with intent to defraud he (sic) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
 NAPOLEON E. RAMOS, in the aforesaid amount of P30,000.00,
Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The information in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94193, 91-94194, 91-94195, 91-94196 and
91-94197 likewise charged accused-appellant with Estafa and contain substantially the
same allegations as the above-quoted information, except as to the name of the
complainants and the amounts involved.3

The seventh information in Criminal Case No. 91-94198 charged accused-appellant

with illegal recruitment in large-scale, to wit:

That on or about and during the period comprised between December 21,
1990 and February 17, 1991, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with others still
unknown and helping one another, and representing herself to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and
promise employment abroad to Leo D. delos Santos, Merlita L. Bombarda,
Margarita R. madae (sic), Purita A. Conceja, Cristina I. Nava and
Napoleon E. Ramos, without first securing the required license or authority
from the Dept. of Labor.

Contrary to law.4

Criminal Case No. 91-94198 was originally filed before Branch 45 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila where, upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.5 The six
other cases were filed before Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, where
accused-appellant, likewise, entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the indictments. The
cases were eventually consolidated and tried jointly before Branch I.6

The evidence for the prosecution, as summarized by the trial court, is reproduced
herein:

Napoleon Ramos, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94192 and 91-

94198, testified that he was at the house of the accused on Estrada
Street, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, in the evening of January 9, 1991, between
the hours of 7:00 and 8:00 oclock. Also in the house were Nadal, Conseja
and Bombarda. The accused told the private complainants that she knew
someone in Manila who could help them secure employment in
Hongkong; that if they are interested she would take them to Manila on
January 12, 1991, and that they should be prepared to make an initial
payment of P15,000.00 each, for their placement fees.

On the early morning of January 12, 1991, Ramos, Nadal, Conseja and
Bombarda together with the accused proceeded to Manila by bus. They
went directly to a house on Lardizabal Street, Sampaloc, Manila, where
they were served breakfast. After a while, a woman arrived and was
introduced by the accused to the private complainants as Julie Micua. The
complainants were assured by Micua that she could get them overseas
employment and upon payment of their placement fees of P35,000.00
each, they would leave for Hongkong within one month. Ramos, Nadal,
Conseja and Bombarda made a downpayment of P5,000.00 each to the
accused and her husband. The corresponding receipts, however, which
were prepared by the accused, were in the name of and signed by Micua,
Exhibits "E-1," "L," "H," "D," and "C."

xxx

On January 14, 1991, Ramos went back to the House in Sampaloc,

Manila, and handed to the accused the sum of P15,000.00. As in the first
payment, the accused prepared a receipt in the name of Micua, who
signed the same, Exhibit "E." On January 17, 1991, Ramos paid the
accused an additional sum of P10,000.00 and the latter prepared a receipt
in the name of Micua, who signed it, Exhibit "E-2." After Ramos failed to
leave for Hongkong or secure overseas employment for more than two
months since January 1991, he became suspicious and later realized that
he and the other complainants had been hoodwinked.

On April 26, 1991, Ramos and the other five complainants went to Manila
and lodged with the Western Police District Command, Manila, criminal
complaints for estafa and illegal recruitment against the accused, which
led to her immediate arrest, Exhibit "A" and "B."

On the other hand, Merlita Bombarda, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos.

91-94196 and 91-94198, declared that in 1987, the accused offered to
recruit her for overseas employment in Japan, but she declined the offer,
due to her singing engagement in Dagupan. Later, she worked in
Singapore. Upon her return to the Philippine in 1990, she again met the
accused in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The accused told Bombarda that she
knew of an agency that was recruiting people for overseas employment as
factory workers in Hongkong, in consideration of a placement fee of
P45,000.00.

In the evening of January 9, 1991, she was at the accuseds house where
she met the other complainants, Nadal, Ramos, Delos Santos and
Conseja. The accused discussed with them the requirements for their
overseas employment such as documentation, payment of placement fees
and their trip to Manila.

On the early morning of January 12, 1991, the complainants and the
accused left by bus for Manila. They were taken by the accused to a
house on Lardizabal Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Bombarda was assured by
Micua that she would be employed in Hongkong as a factory worker with a
monthly salary of H$4,000.00. She and the other complainants were
asked by Micua to sign blank contracts of employment. After signing the
blank contracts, complainants paid P5,000.00 each to the accused, who
prepared the receipts that Micua signed. The receipt issued to Bombarda
was marked as Exhibit "D-2."

On January 17, she paid another P5,000.00 to the accused at the same
house in Sampaloc, Manila, Exhibit "D-1."

On February 17, she again paid P10,000.00 to the accused at the latters
house in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Exhibit "D," in the presence of Micua.
She was told by the accused that she (Bombarda) would leave for
Hongkong within two months, but she waited in vain. Neither was her
money returned by the accused.

Leo delos Santos, complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 91-94197 and 91-
94198, asserted that he met the accused in Urdaneta, Pangasinan in
October 1990. The accused persuaded him to apply for overseas
employment, by telling him that she knew a recruiter who could deploy
workers abroad. He was further advised by the accused to prepare
P15,000.00 as initial payment of his placement fee. On December 21,
1990, January 21 and February 17, 1991, De los Santos gave to the
accused the respective sums of P8,000.00, P10,000.00 and P12,000.00,
Exhibits "F," "F-2," "F-3," and "F-4." The accused assured De los Santos
that he would leave for Hongkong and work thereat as a factory worker
within two months, but his projected trip never materialized. Neither was
his money returned.

When recalled to the witness stand by the prosecution as a witness for

Margarita Nadal, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94194 and 91-
94198, Napoleon Ramos declared that Nadal was his neighbor in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan; that on January 9, 1991, he was with Nadal when
she applied with the accused a the latter's house in Urdaneta, Pampanga,
 for employment abroad; that he was present when Nadal handed to the
accused the sum of P5,000.00 in Sampaloc, Manila, and he saw the
accused prepare a receipt therefor that was signed by Micua, Exhibit "J;"
that he was also present when Nadal gave an additional sum of
P10,000.00 to the accused at her residence on Estrada Street, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, for which a receipt was issued by the accused, Exhibit "J-3
that Nadal had gave (sic) to him other receipts of payments she had made
to the accused on January 21 and 22, 1991 in the respective sums of
P5,000 and P10,000.00, Exhibits "J-1" and "J-2," but he was not present
when these two payments were made, and that Nadal was unable to
testify, because she is now abroad.

The prosecution next presented Cristina Nava, complainant in Criminal

Cases Nos. 91-94193 and 91-94198, who testified that sometime in 1991,
the accused went to her (Navas) house in San Nicholas, Villasis,
Pangasinan, and offered to recruit her for overseas employment in
Hongkong. Nava told the accused that she would consult her husband
about the matter. A few weeks later, the accused again visited Nava and
she (accused) succeeded in convincing the reluctant Nava to accept the
offer. The accused told Nava that her placement fee would be P40,000.00
of which P30,000.00 was to be paid in advance and the balance of
P10,000.00 would be deducted from her salary. On different occasions,
Nava delivered to the accused various amounts totalling P30,000.00 as
placement fee, Exhibit "G," "G-1," and "G-2." The accused assured Nava
that she would leave for and work in Hongkong within two months, but the
promised employment turned out to be a dud. Despite repeated demands
from Nava, the accused has failed and refused to return the latters money.

x x x.7

Testifying in her own defense, accused-appellant denied the charges of engaging in

recruitment activities and of receiving money from complainants. She described herself
as a public school teacher living in Pangasinan with her four children and unemployed
husband. Like the other complainants, she claimed she was a victim of Julie Micua. She
first met Micua on December 17, 1990, at the house of Lina Salcedo in Sampaloc,
Manila. Micua was introduced to her as a recruiter of overseas workers. Interested, she
applied for a job abroad. Micua informed her that she would be a factory worker and
showed her a contract. Accused-appellant was required to submit her medical certificate
and passport and to make an advance payment of P5,000.00 as part of the P40,000.00
placement.8
When complainants learned that she had applied for overseas employment, they sought
her help in going to the agency where she applied. Hence, on January 12, 1991,
accused-appellant accompanied the complainants to see Julie Micua who assured them
that they would be leaving for Hongkong within two or three months. They were also
informed that their placement fee would be P45,000.00. On that day, accused-appellant
and complainants gave Julie Micua the amount of P5,000.00. On February 17, 1991,
accused-appellant gave Micua an additional P5,000.00. According to her, complainants
were all given corresponding receipts for their payments. The receipts were issued and
signed by Micua.

Accused-appellant got to know complainant Ramos when she was invited by his wife
Marita to a birthday party at the couples residence. In that party, they talked about
applying for a job abroad and Marita convinced her husband to apply. It was Ramos
who introduced accused-appellant to complainant Nadal. Ramos convinced Nadal to
apply for overseas employment. On the other hand, accused-appellants co-teacher,
Isabel Valdez, brought complainant Delos Santos to accused-appellants classroom and
sought her assistance in applying for an overseas job through the agency she was
using. With respect to Merlita Bombarda, accused-appellant met her through her cousin
Nadal who also accompanied Merlita to accused-appellants house to apply. Purita
Conceja, who was also introduced to accused-appellant, sought her help in applying for
a job abroad through the agency she was using. As regards complainant Cristina Nava,
accused-appellant met her through Cristinas husband who was a regular customer of
her store. Accused-appellant claims she never represented herself as having the
capacity to deploy workers abroad. She only told them that she could accompany them
to the agency where she also applied.

According to accused-appellant, two months after they were unable to leave for abroad,
she and the complainants had a meeting. They discussed how they could recover their
money. On April 26, 1991, upon Nadals invitation, she voluntarily joined the
complainants in going to Manila. Their main purpose was to look for Julie Micua. In
Manila, they went to Blumentritt where they met Blas Santos, a police officer whom
Ramos knew. Accused-appellant saw Ramos collecting money from his companions.
Afterwards, they proceeded to the United Nations Police Headquarters. Santos
endorsed them to investigator Val Torres, who, in turn, typed the consolidated affidavits
of complainants. The money collected by Ramos was given to the investigator. The
complaint filed by the complainants included accused-appellant as one of the
defendants.9

Lina Salcedo corroborated accused-appellants testimony. Salcedo testified that she

owns the house on 1333 Lardizabal St., Sampaloc, Manila. Also living there was a
house boarder named Paz Alonzo who had a friend named Julie Micua. Sometime in
December 1990, Micua visited Paz at Salcedos boarding house when accused-
appellant arrived. It was on this occasion that Julie Micua and accused-appellant met for
the first time and they discussed how to get employment in HongKong. After Christmas,
accused-appellant returned to Salcedos house with some companions. Salcedo saw the
members of the group giving money to Julie Micua for which the latter issued
corresponding receipts. It was Julia Micua who did all the explaining. Accused-appellant
and her companions returned to Salcedos house on two other occasions. According to
Salcedo, she was present when all the transactions took place and she observed that
Julie Micua never gave money or any consideration to accused-appellant.10 Lina
Salcedos testimony was corroborated on the witness stand by her sister Violy
Constantino.11

On March 1, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch I, rendered the decision
now on appeal before this Court. In justifying accused-appellants conviction, the trial
court gave full credence to the testimonies of the complainants as they were "clear and
straightforward" and "reflect spontaneity and are replete with details, which conform to
what appears from the other evidence on record." It found that the complainants
"positively identified the accused as the one who had persuaded them to apply for
overseas employment, accompanied them all the way from Pangasinan to Manila, [and]
personally received from them various sums as placement fees." Further, the trial court
found no improper motive on the part of the complainants, thus:

xxx it is hard to believe that the private complainants, who all reside in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, would undergo the expense, rigor and
inconvenience of a public trial if their motive is not to bring to justice the
person/s who had defrauded them. xxx12

Accordingly, the trial court held that all the elements of Article 315, Paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code were proven in the cases for estafa. In likwise finding accused-
appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, the trial court stated:

x x x this court is convinced beyond moral certainty that there was unity of
action, purpose and design between the accused and Julie Micua to
recruit the private complainants for overseas employment in Hongkong
without first securing a license or an authority therefor from the Philippine
Overseas and Employment Agency. The accused took a direct and active
participation in the recruitment of the private complainants by referring and
persuading them to apply for deployment abroad, accompanying them all
the way from Urdaneta, Pangasinan, to Manila to refer them to Micua, who
presented herself as a recruiter of worker(s) for overseas employment,
 personally collecting and receiving from them various amounts for their
placement fees, and preparing the receipts therefor.13

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THIS CASE ON

THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION ON ITS PART OVER THE
PERSON OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BY REASON OF THE FACT
THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WAS ILLEGAL.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT RECRUITED THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS FOR
DEPLOYMENT AS LAND WORKERS IN HONGKONG.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FIND (SIC) THAT ALL THE

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF ESTAFA AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE 315,
REVISED PENAL CODE, ARE CONCURRENTLY SATISFIED IN THIS
CASE.

We find no valid grounds to reverse accused-appellants conviction.

Accused-appellants first assignment of error challenges the trial courts judgment on a

jurisdictional ground. She argues that her arrest without warrant was illegal and,
therefore, following the settled rule that the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of one who is illegally arrested, the case should have been dismissed.14 This
contention is untenable.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by arrest or voluntary
appearance in court. The record amply demonstrates that accused-appellant voluntarily
appeared in court at her arraignments, entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the charges
against her, and later actively participated in the trial. Hence, granting arguendo that
accused-appellants arrest was defective, such is deemed cured upon her voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.15 It should be stressed that the question of
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the
arrest was illegal is not sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment.
The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State
of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the
accused.16

The second and third assigned errors regarding accused-appellants culpability for the
crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale are closely interrelated, hence,
shall be discussed jointly. These alleged errors boil down to the issue of credibility.

All the complainants are one in saying that accused-appellant made representations
that she knew someone who could help them secure employment in Hongkong. Relying
on these representations, they applied for placement for employment abroad and paid
various sums of money therefor. Unfortunately, accused-appellant failed to comply with
her promise of employment or restitute the amounts she received from them.

For her part, accused-appellant claims that she merely helped complainants find an
agency that could secure for them employment overseas. She acted as a "good
samaritan" by facilitating their quest for a better economic status. She denies receiving
the fees paid by complainants and asserts that it was Julie Micua who recruited
complainants and collected the placement fees for overseas employment. An
examination of the records, however, reveals that accused-appellant is as culpable as
Julie Micua.

As to which of the contending claims should be believed is fundamentally an issue of

credibility. Well settled is the rule that the issue of credibility is the domain of the trial
court that had observed the deportment and manner of the witnesses as they testified.
The findings of facts of a trial court, arrived at only after a hearing and evaluation of
what can usually be expected to be conflicting testimonies of witnesses certainly
deserve respect by an appellate court.17 We find no cogent reason to depart from this
time-honored doctrine.

Accused-appellant failed to show that complainants, who were mostly her townmates
and some even her relatives, were ill-motivated in filing the cases against her; hence,
their testimonies merit full faith and credit.

The Court finds unacceptable accused-appellants claim that the complainants are
"barking at the wrong tree" and that they only turned their ire on her because the
alleged real culprit, Julie Micua, was nowhere to be found.18 Complainants would not run
after her if she, too, were really a victim. The lame defense consisting of accused-
appellants bare denial cannot overcome the prosecutions positive evidence proving her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, compared to accused-appellants evidence,
which is mainly one of denial, the prosecution presented evidence showing her positive
acts of complicity with Julie Micua in recruiting complainants. The accordance of greater
probative value to evidence that is positive in nature than that which is negative in
character is a time-honored principle. Hence, the negative assertions of accused-
appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the complainants.19

The prosecution undoubtedly proved that accused-appellant, without license or

authority, engaged in recruitment and placement activities. This was done in
collaboration with Julie Micua, when they promised complainants employment in
Hongkong. Art. 13, par. (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as
"any act of canvassing enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided that any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."

In People v. Agustin,20 therein appellant argued that she could not be convicted of illegal
recruitment because in introducing the complainants to the alleged recruiters, she
merely acted "out of the goodness of her heart."

In resolving said case, the Court ruled:

Hence, the inevitable query is whether or not appellant Agustin merely

introduced complainants to the Goce couple or her actions went beyond
that. The testimonial evidence hereon show that she indeed further
committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All four prosecution
witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached
regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they
learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they
had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the
accused spouses who owned the placement agency.

As such, the Court concluded that appellant was an employee of the Goce spouses, as
she was actually making referrals to the agency. She was, therefore, engaged in
recruitment activities.

The same factual circumstance obtains in this case. Although accused-appellant was
not an employee of the alleged illegal recruiter Julie Micua, the evidence show that she
was the one who approached complainants and prodded them to seek employment
abroad. It was through her that they met Julia Micua. This is clearly an act of referral.
Worse, accused-appellant declared that she was capable of placing them in jobs
overseas. Suffice it to say that complainants recruitment would not have been
consummated were it not for the direct participation of accused-appellant in the
recruitment process.

Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code provides that:

Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated

under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-
holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article
39 of this Code.

Illegal recruitment is conducted in a large scale if perpetrated against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group. This crime requires proof that the accused: (1)
engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 or in any
of the prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) does not have a
license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and
(3) committed the infraction against three or more persons, individually or as a group.21

All these three essential elements are present in the case at bar. As earlier discussed,
accused-appellant recruited the six complainants. Further, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration certified that neither accused-appellant nor Julie Micua is
licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.22

Accused-appellants contention that she was a mere applicant and eventually a victim
like complainants holds no water. Note should be made of the fact that throughout the
trial of the case, no mention was made that accused-appellant exerted any effort to
seek a refund for her money nor did she file a case against Julie Micua, her alleged
victimizer. Her only excuse was that at the time of the filing of the complaint in Manila,
she was confused and the investigating officer would not listen to her side of the
controversy.

Moreover, accused-appellant and her husbands acts of receiving almost all the
payments of the complainants and issuing receipts signed by Julie Micua contradict her
claim of being a mere applicant. There were even times that accused-appellant herself
signed the receipts for the placement fees.23 Taken as a whole, the evidence shows that
accused-appellant conspired and actively participated in the deceitful plan adopted by
her co-accused Julie Micua, Rico Cordova and her own husband, Renato Meris, to hire
without license or authority, gullible and nave applicants for non-existent overseas jobs.
Likewise, we find that accused-appellant committed the crime of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. This is committed by any person who
defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damages.24

Complainants parted with their money upon accused-appellants prodding and

enticement, and on the false belief that she had the capacity to deploy them abroad. In
the end, complainants were neither able to leave nor get their money back.

A close scrutiny of the appealed decision warrants correction of the penalty imposed in
each of the estafa cases.

The pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision

mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which maybe imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, a the case
may be;

xxx

In People v. Gabres,25 where the amounts swindled ranged from P40,000 to P50,000,
the Court said:

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty
shall be "that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall
be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the
offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty
 prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion
of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.

The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00
should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate
penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying
circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full
indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with the rule
that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the
penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty
next lower would be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within
six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months while
the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6)
years and one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded
P22,000.00 plus an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00.

Here, the amounts involved are P20,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 91-94196 and
P30,000.00 each in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94192, 91-94193, 91-94194, 91-94195 and
91-94197. The amounts in excess of the P22,000.00 as provided for in the first
paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are less than P10,000.00, hence,
do not warrant the imposition of an additional one-year imprisonment. There being no
proven modifying circumstances, the correct penalty in each of the six (6) estafa cases
should be the indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum. With respect to Criminal Case No. 91-94198, the trial court correctly imposed
the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P100,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the decision in question is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the

modification that in each of the six (6) estafa cases, the indeterminate sentence that
appellant Leonida Meris y Padilla must serve is two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED. 6/21/00 1:40 PM

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE v CA G.R. No. 189122
March 17, 2010

CORONA, J.:

Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his

release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required,26 is the

answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with

the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the dubious interval, often years

long, between arrest and final adjudication?27 Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism

to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in

assuring the accuseds presence at trial.28

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by

death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced

to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is

admitted to bail.29 An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate

court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted
accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never

owed.30 Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds

interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review,

opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of

prison.31 On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by

swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. 32 Other recognized societal interests

in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight

from court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the

avoidance of delay in punishment.33 Under what circumstances an accused may

obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society

and those of the accused.34

Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail

pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not

punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that

discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the

allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with

grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been

in fact convicted by the trial court.35

THE FACTS

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio

Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime

of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one

day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as

maximum.36

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.37 Pending appeal, he filed

an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age

and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on

his part.
 The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.38 It invoked the

bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend

bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for

strong reasons. Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick

pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the

prison facility. It found that petitioner

failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued
confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger.
x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from
seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to
be attended by his personal physician.39

For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be

allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners

conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima

facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the

evidence of petitioners guilt.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.40

 Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his

application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail

under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.

Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than

six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third

paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending

appeal.

THE ISSUE

The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending

appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for

more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal

mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances

mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial

Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may
be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However,
if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with
and resolved by the appellate court.
 Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same
bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six

(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent,

or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded

sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or

conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of

flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review
the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned

in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application

for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more

than six years imprisonment should automatically be granted.

Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and

substantive rules.
BASIC PROCEDURAL CONCERNS
FORBID GRANT OF PETITION

Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application

for admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to

challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory

order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.41

Other than the sweeping averment that [t]he Court of Appeals committed

grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal

despite the fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule

114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the prosecution, 42 however,

petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with

grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals

should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances

enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error
and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on the ground that the

evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.

We disagree.

It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution

without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the

Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or

life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Two,

the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where

the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the

offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the

appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve

petitioners urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.

Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave

abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal.

Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such a

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of

jurisdiction.43 Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion

must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility.44 It must be so patent and gross as to amount

to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or

to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari

to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise

of discretion.45

Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending

appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically.

No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to

the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or imputation be inferred. As

observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its

discretion. The denial of petitioners application for bail pending appeal was not

unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill

health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose

of granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not,

or whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its

discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.

 At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application

and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the

extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings

or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.46 In this connection, Lee v. People47 is

apropos:

Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent
court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are
not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse
of discretion correctible by certiorari.

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions.
An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is
shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as
regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory
orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration
of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.48 (emphasis supplied)

WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5,

RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS
INTERPRETATION

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the

penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six
years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said

paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or

commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous

escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of

his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under

probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of

flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the

pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second

scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.

The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in

the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority

in remedial law:

Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused
may be summarized in the following rules:

xxxxxxxxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of

imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not
one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);

f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of

imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x49 (emphasis supplied)
 Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in

remedial law, is of the same thinking:

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when

the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six

(6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall
be denied.50 (emphasis supplied)

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means

that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule

114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An

application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating51

circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other

words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said

circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more

stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny

or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending

appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending

appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination

of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the

circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will

establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or

stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the

exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first

scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider

all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of

Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;52 on the basis

thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the

appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily

focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances

that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any
of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a

finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically

result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use

the less stringent sound discretion approach.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two

different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114.

Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of

the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail

pending appeal.

In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it

interprets the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where

the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding

six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is

always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of

whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of

this position is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied.

Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.

Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-

finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This

unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances

in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty

imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six

years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the

appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of

the five bail-negating circumstances is present.

However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice.53 Choice occurs

where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),

there is more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to

the decision maker.54 On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule

of action is the end of discretion.55 Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts

discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for

bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on

the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively

renders nugatory the provision that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,

admission to bail is discretionary.

The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in

this case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve

the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed

reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts

and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter. 56 In view of the grave

caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all

circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his

conviction is affirmed.57 It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters

beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record, character and reputation

of the applicant,58 among other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine

allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very

least, an initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial

question of law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court. 59 In other

words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is
not pro forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.60

This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and

time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude

on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong

presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was

sound,61 specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment

shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for substantial error.62

Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations

mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the

bail-negating circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the

expressio unius est exclusio alterius63 rule in statutory construction. However, the

very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that

the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The

provision categorically refers to the following or other similar circumstances.

Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial

or revocation of bail pending appeal.

Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to

unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from

adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court

is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed

bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where

the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient

than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or

revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years

imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is

present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six

years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.

Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending

appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those

convicted of less serious crimes?

PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY

AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL
 Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and

evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal.

The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6,

Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First
Instance. After judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court
of First Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.

Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance.

After conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application,
be bailed at the discretion of the court.

Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this
rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and
at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.

Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the

commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt
is strong.

The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114

of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal

Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall

before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged
with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this
Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission,
 and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
(emphasis supplied)

The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative

Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows:

The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down
in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
which provides:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall

before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged
with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a

capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be
entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his
conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is
strong.

Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well
as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following
policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:

1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law

existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after
trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than
that charged in the complaint or information, he may be allowed to remain free on
his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the proper court directs
otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;

2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense

which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and
after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged
in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding
paragraph shall be applied;

3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense

which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
 for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and
the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.

As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now
pending appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty,
the following rules are laid down:

1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within
ten (10) days from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall
inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond
shall be ordered by this Court;

2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National
Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain
under confinement pending resolution of his appeal;

3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid

period of ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be
issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have
jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)

Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94

dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as

follows:

SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a)

before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this
Rule. (3a)

SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional

Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on

provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to
 the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years
but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his
bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual

delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation,

parole, under conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal,
the accused may commit another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court,
on motion and with notice to the adverse party. (n)

SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is

used in these Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe
punished with death. (4)

SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)

The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114

were thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.

 The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a

more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to

the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with

leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a

non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial

Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending

appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial

courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was

a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the

action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by

reclusion perpetua.64

The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail

pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not

punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus,

Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter of

post-conviction grant of bail.

 A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly

identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal

under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated

the tough on bail pending appeal configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-

94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure

which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction.65 Under

the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial

Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, the

presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail

pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as

conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua

or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.

Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail

pending appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view

of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the

absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule

114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all
relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph

of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?

The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail

pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our

original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated.66 While this is of

course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail

pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.

In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of

bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly

with respect to extending bail should be exercised not with laxity but with caution

and only for strong reasons.67 In fact, it has even been pointed out that grave caution

that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted

accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94

amending Rule 114, Section 5.68

Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle

that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty
 or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it
would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon
in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show
error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that
the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the
accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before
conviction.69 (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon,

the Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals70 (promulgated in 2001 when the

present rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is a matter

of wise discretion.

A FINAL WORD

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates

and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.71 From then on, the grant of
bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion

must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that

the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal

should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds

strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial

courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting

the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our

criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays

often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the

post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be

more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally,

permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting

appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court

processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits,

the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159,

with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 4. ANITA ESTEBAN, Petitioner, - versus - HON. REYNALDO A.
ALHAMBRA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 39, San Jose City, and GERARDO ESTEBAN,
Respondents.
September 7, 2004 | G.R. No. 135012

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

In this present petition for certiorari,72 Anita Esteban seeks to annul the

Orders dated July 9, 1998 and August 20, 1998 issued by Judge Reynaldo A.

Alhambra, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose

City, in Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-88(95), SJC-27(97), SJC-30(97) and SJC-

31(97). The Orders denied petitioners application for cancellation of the cash

bail posted in each case.

Gerardo Esteban is the accused in these criminal cases. His sister-in-

law, Anita Esteban, petitioner herein, posted cash bail of P20,000.00 in each

case for his temporary liberty.

 While out on bail and during the pendency of the four criminal cases,

Gerardo was again charged with another crime for which he was arrested

and detained.

Fed up with Gerardos actuation, petitioner refused to post another

bail.73 Instead, on June 18, 1998, she filed with the trial court an application

for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the four criminal cases.74

She alleged therein that she is terminating the cash bail by surrendering the

accused who is now in jail as certified to by the City Jail Warden.75

In an Order dated July 9, 1998,76 respondent judge denied petitioners

application, thus:

xxx
In these cases, accused was allowed enjoyment of his provisional liberty
after money was deposited with the Clerk of Court as cash bail. Applicant-movant
(now petitioner) did not voluntarily surrender the accused. Instead, the accused
was subsequently charged with another crime for which he was arrested and
detained. His arrest and detention for another criminal case does not affect the
character of the cash bail posted by applicant-movant in Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-
88(95), SLC-27(97), SJC-30(97) and SJC-31(97) as deposited pending the trial of
these cases. Money deposited as bail even though made by a third person is
considered as the accuseds deposit where there is no relationship of principal and
 surety (State vs. Wilson, 65 Ohio L-Abs, 422, 115 NE 2d 193). Hence, the money
so deposited takes the nature of property in custodia legis and is to be applied for
payment of fine and costs. And such application will be made regardless of the fact
that the money was deposited by a third person.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the application for cancellation of

bail bonds is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration77 but was denied in an

Order dated August 20, 1998.78

Hence, the instant petition assailing the twin Orders as having been

issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.

Petitioner states that she is constrained to bring this matter directly to

this Court as the issue is one of first impression.79

Petitioner submits that by surrendering the accused who is now in jail,

her application for cancellation of bail in the four criminal cases is allowed
under Section 19, now Section 22, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 22. Cancellation of bail. Upon application of the bondsmen, with due
notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused
or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the
accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability
on the bail. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners submission is misplaced.

The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a situation where,

among others, the surety or bondsman surrenders the accused to the court

that ordered the latters arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon application by the

surety or bondsman, cancels the bail bond.

We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did not

surrender the accused, charged in the four criminal cases, to the trial court.

The accused was arrested and detained because he was charged in a

subsequent criminal case.

Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in the form of cash

deposit which, as mandated by Section 14 (formerly Section 11) of the same

Rule 114, shall be applied to the payment of fine and costs, and the excess, if

any, shall be returned to the accused or to any person who made the deposit.

Section 14 provides:

Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The accused or any person acting in
his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or
provincial, city or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon
submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing
compliance with the requirements of Section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be
discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and
applied to the payment of fine and costs, while the excess, if any, shall be returned
to the accused or to whoever made the deposit. (Underscoring supplied)

The Rule thus treats a cash bail differently from other bail bonds. A

cash bond may be posted either by the accused or by any person in his

behalf. However, as far as the State is concerned, the money deposited is

regarded as the money of the accused. Consequently, it can be applied in

payment of any fine and costs that may be imposed by the court. This was

the ruling of this Court as early as 1928 in Esler vs. Ledesma.80 Therein we

declared that when a cash bail is allowed, the two parties to the transaction

are the State and the defendant. Unlike other bail bonds, the money may
then be used in the payment of that in which the State is concerned the fine

and costs. The right of the government is in the nature of a lien on the money

deposited. We further held in the same case that:

x x x. Similar cases have frequently gained the attention of the courts in the
United States in jurisdictions where statutes permit a deposit of money to be made
in lieu of bail in criminal cases. The decisions are unanimous in holding that a fine
imposed on the accused may be satisfied from the cash deposit; and this is true
although the money has been furnished by a third person. This is so because the
law contemplates that the deposit shall be made by the defendant. The money, x
x x, must accordingly be treated as the property of the accused. As a result, the
money could be applied in payment of any fine imposed and of the costs (People
vs. Laidlaw [1886], Ct. of App. Of New York, 7 N. E., 910, a case frequently cited
approvingly in other jurisdictions; State of Iowa vs. Owens [1900], 112 Iowa, 403;
Mundell vs. Wells, supra.). But while as between the State and the accused the
money deposited by a third person for the release of the accused is regarded as
the money of the accused, it is not so regarded for any other purpose. As between
the accused and a third person, the residue of the cash bail is not subject to the
claim of a creditor of property obtain (Wright & Taylor vs. Dougherty [1908], 138
Iowa, 195; People vs. Gould [1902], 78 N. Y. Sup., 279; Mundell vs. Wells,
supra.).81

In fine, we fail to discern any taint of grave abuse of discretion on the

part of respondent judge in denying petitioners application for cancellation

of the accuseds cash bail.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 5. ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP, petitioner, vs. The Honorable
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent. G.R. Nos. 138859-60.
February 22, 2001

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The right of a person to preliminary investigation is recognized by the law and is governed by
the Rules of Court. However, the failure to accord this right does not ipso facto result in the
dismissal of the information; the case is merely suspended, and the prosecutor directed to conduct
the proper investigation.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing two Orders
of the Sandiganbayan, both dated February 15, 1999. The first Order rejected the attempt of
petitioner to stop his arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 24524-25, on the ground that he had been
denied the right to a preliminary investigation. In the assailed second Order, the Sandiganbayan
directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for all the accused, including herein petitioner.

The Facts

Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the

Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order dated September 19, 1995, naming the following as
respondents: Benjamin Arao, Frederick Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay
and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The Order also required respondents, within ten days
from receipt thereof to submit their counter-affidavits and other pieces of controverting evidence.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution dated January 15, 1998,
recommending the prosecution of the aforenamed respondents for violation of Article 269 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as
amended. Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one of the
persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in the
Order of September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation.
Accordingly, two Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525 (unlawful arrest under
Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code).
 On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
24524. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on
May 20 of the same year. On the same day, he filed a Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman
- Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation.
In a Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his
alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court.
On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again on the lack of
preliminary investigation. In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the Sandiganbayan resolved not
to take action on the Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction
insofar as Criminal Case No. 24525 was concerned.
On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had
not been accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the Sandiganbayan
rejected his claim and proceeded with the arraignment.
Hence, this recourse.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioners plea for preliminary investigation in this wise:
This morning, the accused herein appeared for arraignment duly represented by their counsel. Before
proceeding, Atty. Omar A. Rivera appearing in behalf of accused Yusop informed this court of his
reservations about proceeding with the arraignment this morning, primarily on the ground that accused
Yusop did not undergo preliminary investigation, with the additional claim that he had not been furnished
any notice nor was he informed of the proceedings before the Ombudsman with respect to these cases. It
would appear that one of the reasons [therefor] is that the accused despite notice of the existence of the
accusation against him in Criminal Case No. 24525, had not given any timely notice nor any statement of
any alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the Information herein; thus, the Court is
not persuaded that the claim of the accused Yusop with regard to the inadequacy of the proceedings as
against him could still be validly entertained at this time. This is more particularly significant under Section
27 of Republic Act 6770 and x x x Criminal Cases 24524 and 24525 refer to the same incident although the
prosecution, for its part, has filed Informations under different statutes covering the same incident. Thus,
the claim of accused Yusop that he was not notified with respect to one of the cases on an identical set of
facts herein is not [of] particular significance since this would be indulging in a superfluity.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, in view of all the following, the Court will now proceed to the arraignment of the accused herein.

The Issue

Although the parties did not specify the issue in this case, it is clear from their submissions
that they are asking this Court to resolve this question: Whether the Sandiganbayan, despite being
informed of the lack of preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner, in Criminal Case No.
24524, committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment.
 The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious in part. While petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation,

the case against him should not be dismissed.

Main Issue:
Preliminary Investigation

Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient

ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The Court explained that the rationale of a
preliminary investigation is to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of
defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been
first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer.
The Rules of Court requires such investigation before an information for an offense
punishable by at least four years, two months and one day may be filed in court. The old Rules, on
the other hand, mandates preliminary investigation of an offense cognizable by the regional trial
court.
Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24524 with violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019.
Such offense is punishable with, among other penalties, imprisonment of six years and one month
to fifteen years. Under the aforecited Rules, whether in the old or the revised version, he is entitled
to a preliminary investigation.
It is undisputed, however, that before the Information against petitioner was filed, no
preliminary investigation had been conducted. In fact, the Office of the Ombudsman admitted that
petitioner was denied of his right to preliminary investigation.
We find no basis for the Sandiganbayans ruling that petitioner had not given timely notice nor
any statement of the alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the Information.
First, there was no showing that petitioner was notified of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri.
As earlier noted, he had not been named as a respondent in the September 19, 1995 Order of the
Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao. His name did not even appear in the caption of its January
15, 1998 Resolution, which recommended the filing of charges against the accused. Indeed, in his
Compliance with the August 26, 1998 Sandiganbayan Resolution, Special Prosecution Officer
Diosdado V. Calonge manifested that petitioner was not notified of the proceedings of the
preliminary investigation and was accordingly not given the opportunity to be heard thereon.
After learning of the filing of the Information against him when he was served a Warrant of
Arrest, petitioner did not dally. He immediately informed the Sandiganbayan that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted in regard to him. Several months later, moments before his
arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the preliminary investigation be conducted. In this light,
the Sandiganbayan erred in saying that he had not given the court timely notice of this deficiency.
Even assuming that prior to the filing of the Information, petitioner had known that the
proceedings and the investigation against his co-accused were pending, he cannot be expected to
know of the investigators subsequent act of charging him. Precisely, he had not been previously
included therein and, consequently, he had not been notified thereof.
In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the right to preliminary investigation is waived
when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
Conversely, if the accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case, the
right is not waived.
Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioners right to preliminary
investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, [a]n
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning
the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them
before entering his plea. x x x.
We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or
technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.
Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him must be conducted.
We disagree with the Sandiganbayans reliance on Section 27 of Republic Act 6770. This
provision cannot justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for
conducting preliminary investigation. The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it deals
merely with the finality of orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman -- not
the deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary investigation. Moreover, petitioner cannot
be bound by the Ombudsmans January 15, 1998 Resolution, which recommended the filing of
charges. He was not a party to the case and was not accorded any right to present evidence on his
behalf.
In any event, even the Ombudsman agrees that petitioner was deprived of this right and
believes that the former has the duty x x x to see to it that the basic rudiments of due process are
complied with. For its part, the Sandiganbayan opted to remain silent when asked by this Court to
comment on the Petition.

Dismissal of the Charges

Not Justified

Petitioner also prays that the cases against him be dismissed for lack of preliminary
investigation. We disagree. In the first place, nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
or even the old Rules, is there any mention that this lack is a ground for a motion to quash.
Furthermore, it has been held that responsibility for the absence of a preliminary investigation does
not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. We reiterate
the following ruling of the Court in People v. Gomez:
If there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the
attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary
investigation may be conducted.
 In sum, Criminal Case No. 24524 must be suspended with respect to petitioner even if the
case is already undergoing trial, because [t]o reach any other conclusion here, that is, to hold that
petitioners rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence
subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to
permit the government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute
important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Orders are REVERSED,
and the Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary
investigation of the charge of violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019 against Petitioner Alvarez Aro
Yusop. The trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 24524 shall be SUSPENDED in regard to
petitioner until the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
 6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, Branch 10, and JUAN MAGALOP y SALVACION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-80845 March 14, 1994

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
(now Provincial Prosecutor) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, in behalf of the People of the
Philippines, assailing the judgment of respondent Judge Ernesto M. Mendoza in Crim.
Case No. 4264 acquitting accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion, private respondent
herein, of the crime of robbery with force upon things notwithstanding his plea of guilt.
Petitioner prays that respondent Judge be ordered to reverse his judgment exonerating
Magalop and, instead, to impose upon him the proper penalty for the offense to which
he pleaded guilty.

The evidence discloses that on 20 January 1987, the storeroom of the Bukidnon
National School of Home Industries (BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was ransacked.
After an on-the-spot investigation, the police found themselves at a loss as to the
identity of the culprit or culprits. The value of the missing articles was estimated at
P15,298.15.

Eventually, responsibility for the robbery with force upon things was laid on accused
Juan Magalop y Salvacion, Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias
Ricky. All three (3) were represented by District Citizens Attorney Isidro L. Caracol. At
the arraignment on 23 June 1987, Magalop pleaded "guilty" while Fernandez pleaded
"not guilty." The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was "not mentally well."

Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop, the court a quo conducted trial. The
prosecution presented Pat. Jakosalem, INP, who investigated the break-in, as well as a
clerk and a storekeeper of the BNSHI. The prosecution likewise offered in evidence
colored pictures of the ransacked storeroom, a pair of ordinary pliers colored blue, a
pair of long-nose pliers colored red, and a coping saw. The last three items were said to
have been recovered by the police.

The defense having opted to waive its right to present evidence, the case was
submitted for decision.
On 8 October 1987, respondent Judge acquitted accused Fernandez as well as
Magalop who earlier pleaded guilty to the charge. The two-paged, single-spaced
judgment is quoted hereunder for careful scrutiny and better appreciation. Thus

This is a case where three accused were allegedly responsible for

forcibly taking things from the storeroom of the Bukidnon National
School of Home Industries.

It was established by the prosecution that the storeroom of the

Bukidnon National School of Home Industries at Maramag,
Bukidnon, on January 20, 1987 was ransacked as shown by the
testimonies of the policemen and by the keepers of the storeroom.
After on the spot investigation, the policemen were at a loss to
identify the person or persons responsible thereof.

Except for the accused Juan Magalop who pleaded guilty, the
identity of the perpetrators remained a problem. Accused Ricarte
Dahilan is mentally deranged; hence the trial was separate for
accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop.

As shown by the evidence of the prosecution, some of the stolen

things were in the possession of a certain Babie Tan, consisting of
two pliers and a saw, and these were all allegedly sold to said
Babie Tan who refused to testify on the matter.

The evidence of the prosecution failed to prove that the three

accused were responsible for stealing these three articles or tools.

Although Juan Magalop pleaded guilty, it was not shown who

(how?) they conspired and helped each other in the commission of
the crime charged. To the Court, the plea of Juan Magalop was not
intelligently done. In the course of the proceedings, it was not
established how Juan Magalop and Petronilo Fernandez
participated in the looting. No evidence was introduced to show that
the accused sold the stolen things to Babie Tan, which the
prosecution could have proved to show that the possessors of the
stolen things could have been identified as the thief or thieves;
hence, the prosecution utterly failed to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond doubt (emphasis supplied).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the accused Petronilo Fernandez and

Juan Magalop are hereby ACQUITTED. With respect to Ricarte
Dahilan, let this case be held in abeyance until he is mentally well.1

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before us
contending that the decision of 8 October 1987 and the order of 4 November 1987
denying reconsideration are "purely capricious and arbitrary, made for no proper reason
at all and rendered without legal authority whatsoever, thereby amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion, and curtailed the power of the state to
punish criminals."2

Petitioner submits that the accused Magalop, who was assisted by counsel, had
voluntarily, spontaneously and intelligently pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery with
force upon things. Thus, the trial court had no alternative but to pronounce judgment
and impose the proper penalty.

Parenthetically, petitioner interposed no objection to the acquittal of accused

Fernandez.

It may be stressed that the petition is defective since it was filed by the Provincial Fiscal
and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and not by the Solicitor
General. We have already ruled in a number of cases that only the Solicitor General
may bring or defend actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines once such
actions are brought before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. 3 As a matter of
fact, in his Manifestation filed with this Court on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General
steered away from the case, explaining that the petition was filed directly by the
Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, "without coursing it through the OSG," as a
consequence of which it should be the fiscal who should submit the required pleadings.

Nonetheless, even if we overlook this procedural lapse and treat the case on the merits,
the petition should, just the same, be dismissed.

Petitioner would have this Court set aside the acquittal of Magalop, insisting that with
his voluntary plea of guilt, the trial court had no other recourse but to pronounce
judgment and impose the proper penalty.

The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and
with full knowledge and understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the
information as well as the consequences of his plea.4 It is an unconditional admission of
guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from
said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by
law under the circumstances.5 Thus, under the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may
receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed. 6

This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the judge to persist in holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and
sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the evidence points to his acquittal.
There is no rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the
charge that his conviction automatically follows. Additional evidence independent of the
plea may be considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently made.
Here it is evident, even from the start, that the case of the prosecution against the three
(3) accused was virtually non-existent as the asported articles were found in the
possession of a certain Babie Tan and yet, quite inexplicably, the prosecution did not
summon him to the witness stand. Babie Tan could have positively identified those who
sold him the stolen articles if called to testify. Or, he could very well have been the
perpetrator of the crime himself. In the absence of an explanation of how one has come
into possession of stolen effects, the possessor is presumed to be the author of the
crime of robbery.7

Indeed, not even the testimonies and the mute exhibits introduced during the trial could
breathe life into the moribund state of the case for the prosecution. While the loss of
articles in the storeroom of the BNSHI was established, there was nothing, independent
of the acknowledgment of guilt, which could link accused Magalop to the robbery. As
the trial court succinctly put it, "the plea of Juan Magalop was not intelligently done."

Admittedly, the procedure followed by respondent judge was not the normal course, as
the better procedure would have been that set forth in People v. Padernal, 8 where the
court sustained the exoneration of the accused notwithstanding his plea of guilt. In that
case, in view of the exculpatory testimony of the accused who had earlier pleaded guilty
to the charge of homicide, the trial court correctly considered the plea as withdrawn and,
in its place, ordered a plea of not guilty entered. This was not done by respondent
judge. For even after finding that the plea of Magalop was not intelligently made, Judge
Mendoza proceeded to pass judgment without requiring Magalop to plead anew to the
charge. Applying the principle laid down in the Padernal case, it can fairly be concluded
that there was no standing plea at the time the court rendered its judgment of acquittal
hence said acquittal was a nullity.

Be that as it may, however, in the interest of substantial justice, we cannot allow such
procedural error to prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. In fairness to Magalop, outside of his improvident
plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him presented or forthcoming.
From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which accused Magalop could
have been implicated. It is for this fundamental reason that, even pro hac vice, his
acquittal must be sustained. Interdum even it ut exceptio quae prima facie justa videtur,
tamen inique noceat. It may sometime happen that a plea which on its face seem just,
nevertheless is injurious and inequitable. It is so in this instance.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the acquittal of the accused-respondent JUAN MAGALOP Y SALVACION is sustained.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz J., Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:

I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop,

presumably upon the advice of his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the
PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than conscientious when he advised his
indigent client to admit a crime the man did not commit. As the ponencia observes,
"outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him
presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by
which Magalop could have been implicated."

It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an
incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any
moral compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.

The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause. The
defense counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he
prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to submit evidence in his behalf.

# Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop,

presumably upon the advice of his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the
PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than conscientious when he advised his
indigent client to admit a crime the man did not commit. As the ponencia observes,
"outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him
presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by
which Magalop could have been implicated."

It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an
incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any
moral compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.

The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause. The
defense counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he
prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to submit evidence in his behalf.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PANFILO PADERNAL,
defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-26734 September 5, 1967

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Benjamin Pongas for defendant-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The present case is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision acquitting the
accused. At issue is the purely legal question of whether the principle of double
jeopardy bars this appeal.

The facts are fully and well recounted in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of
September 13, 1966, certifying the appeal to us, as follows:

On January 4, 1961, Panfilo Padernal was charged by Asst. Provincial

Fiscal Eleodoro G. Alvero in the CFI of Ormoc City with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of Brigido Rodila thru stabbing
which took place in the Municipality of Kananga, Province of Leyte, on
December 3, 1960. The witnesses listed in the Information are: (1)
Felicidad Rodila, sister of the deceased; (2) Nemesio Ouano, Municipal
Policeman of Kananga; (3) Sanitary Inspector Joaquin Demillo; and (4)
Municipal Judge Demetrio D. Sarit of Kananga. On January 12, 1961, the
CFI presided over by Hon. Numeriano G. Estenzo reduced the bail bond
of accused Panfilo Padernal to P8,000.00 and set the arraignment and
trial for January 26, 1961 at 7:30 A.M. with notice to Fiscal Eleodoro G.
Alvero and to defense counsel Atty. Benjamin T. Pongos (See Minutes,
Roll 6).

When the case was called for arraignment and trial on January 26, 1961,
the transcript shows the following incidents:

"Atty. Pongos (defense counsel):

The accused in this case, Your Honor, is willing to enter the plea of
guilty to the crime charged in the Information.1awphl.nt

"Court:

"Arraign the accused.

(The Court interpreter, Mr. Edilberto Maglasang, read the
information to the accused).

"Court Interpreter: (To the accused)

"Q Are you guilty or not guilty?

"Accused:

"I plead guilty, Your Honor.

"Atty. Pongos (defense counsel):

"Your Honor, please, before the imposition of the penalty, I invoke

the presence of the following mitigating circumstances in favor of
the accused for the imposition of the penalty, to wit: (1) Incomplete
self-defense; (2) lack of education and instruction; (3) voluntary
surrender; and (4) spontaneous plea of guilty.

"The accused, Your Honor was wounded in the right arm and in the
head by the bolo belonging to the deceased and this occurred
during the scuffle in order to wrest the bolo that was in the
possession of the deceased who was responsible for the unlawful
aggression. When the accused wrested the bolo from the
deceased, Your Honor, and in order to defend himself, he struck
the deceased who was then advancing notwithstanding the fact that
the bolo was already in the possession of the accused. So, we pray
that the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense be
considered in favor of the accused for the imposition of the penalty.

"Court:

"What do you say fiscal?

"Fiscal:

"As regards the voluntary surrender, Your Honor, there is a warrant

of arrest issued without any showing that the accused surrendered
voluntarily. The record does not indubitably show there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.

"Court:

(To Atty. Pongos)

 "You present your evidence to prove the mitigating circumstances
of incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender. (tsn 1-3)."

xxx xxx xxx

Thereupon in compliance with the trial court's directive, defense counsel put on the
witness stand on January 26, 1961, Municipal Policeman Nemesio Ouano, whose name
is listed in the Information as a prosecution witness and whose brief testimony was to
the effect "that this accused killed Brigido Rodila" and "he surrendered to the Police
Department of Kananga, Leyte, on the very night of the incident" (tsn 3-4). Evidently, the
purpose of defense counsel was to prove voluntary surrender. After the defense was
through with the testimony of Policeman Nemesio Ouano, the prosecution placed on the
witness-box Felicidad Rodila, sister of the deceased Brigido, who testified that her
brother was stabbed three times by accused Panfilo Padernal with a bolo at about 7:30
in the evening (tsn 4-6). Asked whether the deceased was armed, Felicidad replied she
could not tell, her exact testimony being "I do not know whether he had a weapon, but at
the time of his death I was present" (tsn 7). She further testified she did not know the
cause of the fight and who provoked it (tsn 8). After Felicidad Rodila as prosecution
witness had testified, the trial Court (addressing the defense counsel) said: "You
present the accused" (tsn 9). As a result, accused Panfilo Padernal took the stand and
testified as follows to quote:

(1) "I betted with Brigido Rodila in the amount of P.50 in the hantak game.
When I won I asked from him the money, but immediately hacked me" (tsn
10).

(2) "At first I was hit on the head; he stabbed me again and I was hit on my
right forearm" (tsn 10).

(3) "I took hold of his bolo and I was able to wrest it from him" (tsn 10).

(4) "I did not run, because I was close to the fence of the house" (tsn 10).

(5) "I have no more chance of running away because I was already close
to the fence" (tsn 12).

(6) "That is the bolo I wrested and I used in killing the deceased" (tsn 13).

(7) "I was squatting when the victim slashed me" (tsn 13).

(8) "Because I exerted efforts to wrest the bolo from his possession
because I was already hit" (tsn 15).

From the above quotations taken from the transcript, it will be noted that on January 26,
1961, the trial (which was for the purpose of proving incomplete self-defense) started
with the testimony of Policeman Nemesio Ouano, as a defense witness, followed by
Felicidad Rodila as a prosecution witness, and ended with the testimony of accused
Panfilo Padernal. For lack of time, however, the trial was reset for the following day,
January 27, 1961, at 7:30 with notice to Atty. B. Pongos and Fiscal Alvero in open court
(See Minutes, Roll 4). When the case was called for continuation on January 27, 1961,
upon realizing from accused's testimony given on the day before, January 26, 1961, that
he (accused) was invoking complete self-defense, what the trial Judge did was to make
the following order:

"Let a plea of not guilty be entered by the accused and let it be tried on the
merits on January 31, 1961 at 8:30 A.M. with notice to Atty. B. Pongos
and Fiscal Alvero and also Sgt. Nemesio Ouano, in open court (See
Minutes on January 27, 1961, Roll 5)."

As directed by the trial court, the case was called for trial on the merits on January 31,
1961, with the same appearance (tsn 16). The transcript discloses the following:

"Court:

"Do you submit the case?

"Fiscal Alvero:

"We will submit the case, Your Honor, without presenting any further
evidence.

"Atty. Pongos (defense counsel):

"We submit, Your Honor, the case.

"Court:

"The evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense during the
time the case was heard for the purpose of determining presence of
incomplete self-defense shall be considered as evidence for the purpose
of determining the guilt of the accused, by virtue of which this case shall
be deemed submitted for decision." (tsn 16-17).

"Atty. Pongos (defense):

"We submit, Your Honor. We adopt the testimony of the accused.

"Fiscal Alvero:

"We submit, Your Honor. (tsn 17)."

Right after the above statements had been given by the prosecution and the defense,
the trial Judge dictated in open court on January 31, 1961, a decision acquitting
accused Panfilo Padernal of the crime of homicide with which he was charged "on the
ground of reasonable doubt" (tsn 17-19). Thereafter, Fiscal Alvero verbally moved for a
reconsideration alleging that the accused has entered a plea of guilty which is "sufficient
to sustain conviction of the offense charged in the Information without the introduction of
further evidence, the accused himself has supplied the necessary proof of his guilt and
which closes the right of the accused to defend himself and leaves the Court with no
alternative but to impose the penalty prescribed by law" (tsn 19-20). The defense
counsel, on the other hand, argued "there was a trial on the merits in this case, Your
Honor, the evidence presented in the previous hearing to prove the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense was the same evidence that were presented
during the trial on the merits" (tsn 20). In denying the prosecution's oral motion for
reconsideration, the trial Judge draws attention to the fact that "a plea of not guilty has
been ordered entered for the accused and that this cases be tried on the merits.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alvero petitioned this Court for the postponement of the trial
of this case until today (Jan. 31, 1961). Said motion for postponement was granted by
the Court. When this case was called for hearing today (Jan. 31, 1961), both parties
submitted that whatever evidence had been presented by both the prosecution and the
defense during the hearing on January 27, 1961 (sic Jan. 26) would be considered in
the decision of this case, to avoid any repetition" (see Denial Order, tsn 21). The trial
Judge also invoked double jeopardy, "if the decision will be modified or amended" (tsn
22).

Appellants' contention is that defendant, having pleaded guilty, cannot be acquitted and
that there was no trial on the merits but only a hearing to establish mitigating
circumstances. In People v. Balisacan, L-26376, August 31, 1966, this Court ruled that
where the accused pleads guilty and proceeds, in a hearing to prove mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense, to state facts constituting full and complete
self-defense, the trial judge should declare his plea of guilty thereby withdrawn, order
that a plea of not guilty be entered and proceed to trial on the merits. For failure, in the
Balisacan case, to follow this procedure, We ruled therein that there was deprivation of
day in court against the prosecution. An acquittal on the merits thus made without the
requisite trial providing sufficient opportunity to the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused, was held improper. And in said Balisacan case, We held
that the right to appeal existed in favor of the prosecution because there was in effect
no plea, since the testimony of the defendant operated to withdraw his plea of guilty and
the trial court failed to order that a plea of not guilty be entered in its place; and because
there was no due process in proceeding to dispose of the case on the merits without
trial on the merits. And thus, without a standing plea, and without due process, double
jeopardy was not attendant to bar the appeal therein.

Not so are the facts in this case. As stated, the court a quo caused a plea of not guilty to
be entered in place of the plea of guilty considered withdrawn by the exculpatory
testimony of the accused. And the trial judge re-set the case for hearing on the merits
four days thereafter, giving the prosecution and the defense sufficient opportunity to
prepare for such trial on the merits. The fact that on the date of the trial itself, the
prosecution and the defense chose to adopt the testimonies adduced during the
previous hearing as their evidence on the merits, to save the trouble of re-taking them,
does not mean there was no trial on the merits. The prosecution and the defense simply
adopted the testimonies already taken as the testimonies for the trial on the merits. Due
process of law was observed and both parties were given full and adequate opportunity
to prove their respective case. Accordingly, the case was duly submitted for decision
upon evidence on the merits after the requisite trial providing fair opportunity to the
prosecution and the defense to adduce evidence in chief and rebuttal evidence. The
decision of acquittal, therefore, can no longer be reviewed herein, since the appeal is
barred by the principle of double jeopardy, the requisites, among others, of a plea and
due process, not to mention trial on the merits, being attendant herein.

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is hereby dismissed for being barred by the principle
of double jeopardy. No costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles
and Fernando, JJ., concur.